The 'equilibrium' upon which the planetary imperialisms have rested since the end of the Second World War, since Yalta, is being overturned because of the economic collapse of the USSR and the resulting implosion of its bloc. Next to the economic disaster that has befallen its rival, the western bloc seems to be the mighty victor: the exuberant abundance of the shop-windows in the big industrial countries is the best weapon of western propaganda in contrast to the dramatic shortages in the east. However, the illusion of economic victory in the west looks like being short-lived: the economic crisis of generalized overproduction, which has been going on for over 20 years, is a world-wide crisis. Following the under-developed countries' slide into bottomless misery at the end of the 70s, the economic collapse of the eastern bloc at the end of the 80s, far from demonstrating the vitality of the industrial countries of the west, is on the contrary a harbinger of the world-wide catastrophe that is to come. The next decisive step towards this will be the economic collapse of the most developed industrial countries. What we're seeing is less a victory of the west than the defeat of the east. The whole evolution of the western economies over a number of years points to a tomorrow that is anything but bright.
What happened on Friday 13 October 1989? In one session, Wall Street plunged by 7%, and this despite the massive intervention of the so-called 'institutional' investors, for whom the American state immediately opened up new lines of credit so they could buy shares and stop the slide.
After a weekend of intensive meetings in the great central banks of the main western economies, the effects knocked on; on Monday 15 October, Frankfurt went down 13%, Paris 6.9%, London 4.6%, although Tokyo stood firm. However, the joint measures adopted by the economic powers began to take effect: that same day Wall Street improved by 3.4%. In the week that followed, the indices stabilized.
But all this was a clear warning. 200 billion dollars went up in smoke. A new purge was imposed on stock market speculation. Despite the heavy bill, the central banks rejoiced over their 'technical mastery'. They had limited the damage. However, there was no euphoria. On the contrary. This new upset for stock exchange speculation only fuelled disquiet. 1987 was no accident. OK, the markets were stabilized, but for how long?
Capitalists aren't particularly suspicious people, but they will end up being just that. The month of October is decidedly prone to stock exchange collapses. 1929, and more recently in 1987. However, apart from these repetitive aspects, the conditions in which these collapses have taken place are very different. Obviously the situation of the world economy is very different in the 80s from what it was in 1929: we have already dealt with this amply in the International Review and we won't go over it again here1.
But while the same causes - the raising or interest rates by the big banks - have produced the same effects - the drying up of credit reviving fears of recession and provoking panic on the stock exchange - between October 1987 and October 1989 the international situation has changed a great deal. There has been a marked acceleration in the decline of the American economy and the instability of the world situation has been considerably accentuated.
Faced with the recession, a headlong flight into the debt
During the 1970s, the huge credits doled out to the under-developed countries of the periphery made it possible, to a great extent, to absorb the overproduction of the industrialized countries. However, this policy reached its limits with the crisis of the dollar. The 900 billion dollars borrowed by the poor countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia will never be repaid. These fragile economies were ravaged by debt and inflation. They lost all solvencies and were definitively closed as outlets for the commodities produced on a massive scale in the industrial world. The world market contracted brutally and, following in the wake of the American economy, the economy of the whole planet plunged into recession at the beginning of the 80s.
Recession is the worst of all evils for capitalism. It means a fall in production, factory closures, the development of unemployment and a dizzying rise in unpaid debts. It expresses in a brutal way the impasse that capitalism has reached. Such a situation endangers the stability of the dollar, the world market's leading currency and symbol of American power and domination. Such a situation is untenable for American capitalism, because it not only threatens its economic power, but also its position as an imperialist giant.
The USA isn't just the world's main economic power, it's also the dominant imperialist power within the dominant bloc. Maintaining economic activity and growth is a priority for America to safeguard its own economic and imperialist interests. After two years of economic purges imposed by the austerity policies of the first term of the Reagan presidency, the American state then had to get its economy on the move once again. This was done on the basis of what American imperialism required in order to face up to its Russian rival. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army at the end of 1979 brought a vicious heating-up of inter-imperialist tensions, and led the USA to undertake a vast program of modernizing its armaments. The American 'revival' was a revival of arms production, a recovery based on the development of the war economy. The USA's military budgets swelled up beyond measure, and at the same time the budget deficit became more and more colossal, despite a drastic reduction in social spending.
However arms production has the particular feature of being a pure destruction of capital which acts as a fetter on economic development as a whole. Armaments are neither consumer goods permitting the reproduction of the labor force, nor a means of production permitting an accumulation of capital. The economic catastrophe of the eastern countries clearly expresses this reality: the absolute priority given to the war economy for decades has led to the asphyxiation of the whole economy.
To a lesser extent, but just as clearly, this reality has also been imposed on the USA. Since the 1950s America's competivity on the world economic arena has been eroded more and more. It's certainly not one of the lesser paradoxes that we are now seeing the countries which were defeated in the Second World War, Japan and Germany, beating all records for competivity. This is due to the fact that these countries, after the war that they lost, rebuilt their destroyed economies on a more modern basis, using what were then the most advanced technologies, whereas the USA's productive apparatus at the end of the war hadn't been destroyed, but had been worn out by the demands of arms production and was to a large extent out of date and obsolete. This relative loss of competivity at the end of the war was further exacerbated in the years that followed, since the defeated countries were forbidden by treaty to engage in rearmament, and were thus able to invest in production without sacrificing this to the needs of the war economy; the USA, on the other hand, had to maintain an imposing military sector, corresponding to its role and needs as leader of an imperialist bloc. This severely limited its competivity on the economic level.
The Reagan presidency's policies of 'recovery' via the war economy thus had the principal result of further weakening the competivity of the American economy. The budget deficits run up to finance the military effort were thus supplemented by trade deficits which also broke all records throughout the 80s. In order to finance these colossal deficits, the USA had to go into debt, and this soon pulverized the records reached by the previously most indebted countries. Today, the debts owed by countries like Brazil or Mexico (a hundred billion dollars for each in 1980), which made financiers tremble at the beginning of the 80s, almost look ridiculous compared to the American debt at the end of the 80s: more than 500 billion dollars of external debt and an internal debt estimated at between 6000 and 8000 billion dollars. The annual American budget was pruned by 170 billion dollars for the payment of the debt. This situation can only get worse and the debts can only get bigger.
An extremely significant pointer to the weakness of the American economy is the fact that, during the 1980s, foreign investment in the USA went well beyond American investments in other parts of the world. Whole chunks of the American economy are today the property of Japanese and European enterprises.
American capitalism, in its search for fresh money, has used all the resources accruing to it because of its status as the world's first economic power and leader of the most powerful imperialist bloc. His Majesty the Dollar has imposed his supremacy in the following ways:
- the American federal bank, in the name of liberalism, has guided the world economy in a very statist manner, through its policy of interest rates;
- a policy of supporting the dollar has been imposed on the main industrialized countries, who have become the USA's money-lenders.
This policy has made it possible to put a temporary brake on the slide towards recession, and to keep the most industrialized countries afloat. It has been accompanied by an intense ideological campaign about the glories of the capitalist economy. In 1987, euphoria still reigned: official 'growth' was beating all the records and inflation was at its low point. The stock market slide was soon halted and speculation took wing again.
The crisis of credit: the limits of a policy
The official, pseudo-growth of the second Reagan Presidency was in fact a hidden recession of the world economy2. What really happened was a growth in the destruction of capital and an artificial growth of the unproductive sectors. Economic activity was maintained in an artificial manner: production wasn't really paid for, commodities were exchanged against debts. In these conditions production was not directly production of value. Capitalism can only keep up such a semblance of economic activity through cheating the laws of the market on a vast scale, but this only destabilizes the world economy more and more and builds up a gigantic pile of waste.
This situation has been masked by the increasing manipulation of economic indices and the deafening noise campaigns about the efficiency of the USA's 'liberal' economic policies: the famous Reaganomics.
But since 1987, the situation has changed a lot. The euphoria has subsided, doubt has crept in. The official statistics, confronted with the reality of the crisis, have been obliged to bear some relation to reality, otherwise they would be of no use whatsoever. Official 'growth' has begun to go into decline while inflation has made a definite comeback. The example of Britain is particularly significant in this respect. Britain had a policy of Reaganomics before the USA did, but it is no longer able to hold back the rise of inflation, whereas lending rates have gone up and plunged the economy into recession.
Of course the American economy, the worlds no 1, is of a different caliber from Britain's, and the dollar isn't the pound Sterling. Moreover, the USA can profit from its position as head of the bloc and impose a discipline which suits its interests. However, the blind laws of the market are at work here; they have already hurled the under-developed countries of the periphery into an economic chaos from which there is no escape; today they're bringing down the British economy; and they are also eroding the economic power of America, which is at the centre of the economic contradictions of world capitalism.
For years now, through the recourse to credit, a mountain of dollars has been in circulation. As it stands, the debt of the peripheral countries has reached 1300 billion dollars. The external debt of the USA has gone up to 500 billion dollars, but this hides the internal debts, where the accumulated borrowings of the state, of enterprises and individuals, are estimated at between 6000 and 8000 billion dollars. The development of credit which can never be repaid, in fact of fictitious capital, is completely out of synch with the development of the real economy, of actual production3. Financial and stock exchange speculation hasn't solved anything. Stimulated by the policy of 'leveraged buy-outs'4, enterprises have seen their share values go up five or 10 times, but the development of production in no way justifies this rise.
In these conditions, the laws of the capitalist market are pushing for a more real relationship between the value of the dollar and the actual production of wealth. Inflationary pressures are getting stronger and stronger. Faced with these pressures, the policy of the American Federal Bank has had to yield and lower the rates, to reopen the flood-gates of credit, in order to avoid a rapid decline in growth, which would have catastrophic consequences for the world's economic equilibrium.
Before the mini-collapse of the stock exchange in October 1989, the managers of one hundred of the biggest American enterprises had sounded the alarm, disturbed as they were by the slow-down in activity concretized in a brutal fall in the profits of US enterprises (the flowers of American capitalism, like General Motors, Ford and IBM, saw their profits fall by between 30 and 40% in the third quarter of 1989. They thus asked the Federal Bank to lower interest rates and maintain growth).
Given the disquiet of the world's financiers in their daily reading of the various economic indices, the particular event which, in a purely phenomenological way, gave rise to the stock market panic of October 1989, might appear rather trivial. However, it is a significant expression of the present difficulties of the world economy. In the 'buy-out' war fought by the capitalists of the whole world, the incapacity of a group of speculators to get the credit they needed at the stock exchange to finance a buyout they'd launched for United Airlines, one of the main US air companies, unleashed a torrent of panic. Why? Because this meant the end of easy credit, the end of the gigantic buy-outs made possible by this credit, and thus the end of the artificial growth of stock market shares. Once again the USA recoiled in front of the economic implications of a policy of austerity, of rigor vis-a-vis the dollar. At the beginning of November 1989, the Federal Bank had to lower its rates and re-open the coffers of credit. While this policy might hold back the fall in production, it is incapable of stimulating growth. More and more, the new credits put into circulation will be used to pay for previous debts, or to fuel speculation, and less and less to feed production.
The more credit grows, the less effective it is in the real economy, and the rate of growth will decline in an irresistible manner. On the other hand, the policy of easy credit does have a direct effect today, and that is to encourage inflation. In fact, the Federal Bank has chosen inflation rather than face the immediate danger of a catastrophic fall in production.
For years, American economists and political leaders have been talking about a 'soft landing' for the American economy, and in fact the USA's economic policies have managed to avoid excessive damage: the American airplane has managed to make a gentle descent. But where will it land? Won't all the difficult maneuvers it's tried up to now lead to a break-down? Won't the fuel of credit fail it in the end?
From the moment the American economy stops flying, it will mean a new and brutal dive into recession by the world economy. The American market will be closed to Japanese and European imports, there will be a growing incapacity to pay back debts, a new surge of inflation, a major financial crisis centered around the dollar. These perspectives for the world economy have been there in potentio since the beginning of the 80s, and all the USA's economic policies have been aimed at putting off the evil day by manipulating the law of value.
This policy of 'putting off till tomorrow' has only been possible because of the particular status of the USA as not only the world's main economic power, but also as chief of the most powerful imperialist bloc, imposing its diktats on the most developed economies of the planet: the countries of Europe, notably West Germany and Japan. The functioning of the group of the seven most industrialized countries of the western bloc, the 'Group of Seven', has symbolized this imposition of US economic diktats on the countries of its bloc. This discipline, especially as it affected Germany and Japan, has been the sine qua non of economic stability throughout the 80s. Despite the catastrophe of the 'third world', the overall descent of the world economy, the industrialized countries' slide into the morass of a hidden recession has taken place in a 'soft' manner from the economists' point of view, of course.
However, the conditions which allowed the USA to carry out these economic policies have now changed:
the dilapidated state of the American economy contrasts sharply with the relative health of its main economic rivals, Japan and Germany. Whereas the USA has run up huge trade deficits, Japan and Germany have broken all the export records. In contrast to the postwar reconstruction period, today European and Japanese capital is buying up whole chunks of the American economy. The locomotive is running out of steam, and at the same time as inflation is coming back in force, there is a recession on the American horizon. There is a threat of a dollar crisis and the USA's position of economic leadership is beginning to look shaky;
- the economic collapse of the Russian bloc, just as it has reasserted the unavoidable reality of the law of value within the capitalist system, is now overturning the global balance between the blocs which has 'organized ' the world since Yalta. The discipline which the USA has managed to impose on its main economic competitors, Europe and Japan, was held together only by the imperialist threat from the Russian bear. A bolt has been pulled back in the east, and this will overturn the relationships between the main economic powers of the western bloc.
The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and destabilization of the economy
The new decade is opening up under the auspices:
- of a dramatic dive into the economic crisis, which is based on generalized overproduction in relation to existing markets - markets which are going to get even more restricted;
- of a growing destabilization of the equilibrium which has dominated the world since the second world war.
The collapse of the Russian bloc will lead to the destabilization of the western bloc, and this will have particularly important implications on the economic level (among others). Faced with the threat of economic bankruptcy, America will be compelled to close its markets to European and Japanese imports, and the centrifugal tendencies within the bloc will get stronger and stronger. Since the Russian threat will no longer be credible, America's protective umbrella will also lose its justification. Such a situation will give rise to claims for independence by Japan and Germany, concretized in a growing trend towards 'every man for himself', each power trying to protect its own privileged markets in the face of the open recession which will impose itself with irresistible force.
The two planks which guaranteed the supremacy of the dollar, America's economic and imperialist strength, are being eroded. The solvency of the dollar was guaranteed more by the dominant imperialist role of the USA than by its economic strength. The value of the dollar is in fact largely fictitious, based on the 'confidence' inspired by the USA, and this 'confidence' will more and more be shaken by world events. Within the perspective of the development of the crisis, what's at stake is the dollar's hegemonic role on the international scene, and thus its future solvency. The international financial system, centered round the dollar, is like a house of cards. It threatens to collapse at the least breath of wind, and it's a veritable storm that's brewing.
As long as what's left of US 'growth' provides Europe and Japan with outlets for their production, all the industrialized countries have an interest in maintaining the present status quo, but this situation is provisional. The perspective of the American market's slide into recession means a new contraction of the world market and thus a fall in European and Japanese exports; consequently, recession for them as well. However, the economic situation in these countries isn't as bad as that of the US. They can still have some recourse to credit to preserve a relative stability in their privileged markets - Europe for Germany, and South East Asia for Japan. But this credit can only be based on the growing power of currencies that will challenge the all-powerful dollar: the deutschmark and the yen. And such a policy is no more a way out of the crisis than was Reagan's. It would only express the truly ruined state of the world economy and the bankruptcy of the USA. It would only briefly restrain the development of the crisis and keep illusions going a bit longer, but at a much more limited level than before.
Capitalism can't envisage a crisis without a capitalist solution. It can't accept that its contradictions are insurmountable. It's always looking for new illusions, new mirages to dream about. The convulsions in the east, which hold the prospect of opening up the economies of eastern Europe to the west, are creating the hope that there will be new markets for western commodities, a new shot of oxygen that will allow 'growth' to continue. This hope will be short-lived.
Ten years ago, China raised the same hopes, but the western capitalists were soon disenchanted. Even though China with its billion inhabitants has enormous economic needs, in the logic of capital this doesn't turn these needs into solvent markets. China is a population giant and an economic dwarf.
Economies of the Eastern Countries, 1985 | |||||
| GNP in Bil of $ | Population Millions Inhabitants | GNP per habitant | External debt Bil of $ | Service of debt |
Bulgaria | 36 | 9.0 | 4000 | 8.0 | 27 |
Hungary | 30 | 10.6 | 2800 | 19.4 | 35 |
Poland | 64 | 37.9 | 1700 | 40.6 | 45 |
E Germany | 93 | 16.6 | 5600 | 20.1 | 41 |
Romania | 35 | 23.2 | 1500 | 4.0 | 24 |
Czechoslovakia | 70 | 15.5 | 4500 | 6.8 | 15 |
If today the countries of the east European 'glacis' can hope to free themselves from Russian domination, it's because of the economic collapse of the Russian bloc. Consequently, their devastated economies are similar to those of all the under-developed countries, ie insolvent. When the Berlin Wall was opened, hundreds of thousands of East Germans had ecstasies in front of the packed shop windows in the west, but their own pockets were empty: if they were able to make a few meager purchases, it was essentially thanks to the 100 marks 'generously' handed out by the West German state. In any case, the countries of Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR) had a total GNP of 490 billion dollars in 1987, a bit more than half the GNP of France, which was 880 billion. Such a market, even if it was healthy, couldn't suffice as an outlet for world overproduction, and so make it possible to avoid the plunge into open recession a recession in which the east European countries have been stuck for a number of years.
The solution of credit, the western manna called for by the leaders of the east, in particular Walesa who's become the representative of the interests of the Polish economy, is no solution at all. Given that these economies are in ruin, ravaged by decades of aberrant Stalinist management, the credits needed for an economic 'reconstruction' of ·the eastern countries are beyond the means of the western economies. They'd be investing in a pure loss: we already have the example of Poland, with its 40 billion dollars debt and the persistent bankruptcy of its economy. In fact billions of billions of dollars would be required for the job. In a period when the whole world is drowning in debt; when, faced with the contraction of the market, as competition is becoming more and more acute, a new 'Marshall Plan' is no longer possible. The loans from the west, rather than permitting the industrial development of these countries, have the aim of stabilizing the situation on a day-to-day basis. In such conditions, these western credits are largely symbolic.
At the beginning of the 80s, the underdeveloped countries of the periphery of capitalism the 'third world' slid into irredeemable economic disaster. . At the end of the 80s, it's the turn of the eastern bloc - the 'second world' - to go into economic collapse. The 'first world', the big western industrialized countries, in comparison to the general bankruptcy, still looks like an island of health and wealth. This situation can only reinforce the illusions about 'liberal' and 'democratic' capitalism, and constitutes the basis for the intensive ideological campaigns of the western bloc. However, all the conditions are there for the economic failure of the whole capitalist world, especially its most developed poles, to be exposed to the light of day. Since the mid-80s, through economic 'cheating' and deceptive statistics, the bourgeoisie of the industrialized countries has kept up the illusion of growth. This official lie, which the ruling class itself needs to believe, is reaching its end. Despite all the manipulations they've been subjected to, the economic indices are already translating the deepening economic bankruptcy of capitalism. The illusions about growth, about economic development, are going to tumble sharply, along with the official indices themselves, which will be obliged to reflect the reality of an accentuated descent into recession and the accelerated development of inflation.
The whole basis for the domination of capital is being eaten away by the world economic crisis, whose development may be relatively slow, but is nevertheless ineluctable.
JJ
1 See ‘Credit Isn’t An Eternal Solution’, IR 56
2 See presentation and extracts from the Report on the International Situation for the 8th ICC Congress, IR 59.
3 See ‘The Barbaric Agony of Decadent Capitalism’, IR 57.
4 ‘Leverage Buy-out’: official stock exchange auction to buy a company, usually based on a massive recourse to credit or the acrobatic manipulation of accounts.
Stalinism has been the spearhead of the most terrible counter-revolution that the proletariat has undergone throughout its history: a counter-revolution which made possible World War II, the greatest slaughter of all times, and which plunged the whole of society into a hitherto unparalleled barbarism. Today, as the economies of the so-called "socialist" countries collapse and with the de facto disappearance of the imperialist bloc dominated by the USSR, Stalinism as a political and economic form of capitalism and as an ideology is in its death-throes. One of the working class' greatest enemies is dying; this will not make life any the easier for it, quite the contrary. As it dies, Stalinism is doing capitalism one last good turn. This is what we propose to demonstrate in the following article.
Stalinism is undoubtedly the most tragic and repulsive episode in human history. Not only does it bear the direct responsibility for the massacre of tens of millions of human beings, not only has it imposed for decades a merciless terror on almost a third of humanity, above all it has shown itself the worst enemy of the communist revolution, in other words of the precondition for the human species' emancipation from the chains of exploitation and oppression, and this in the name of the communist revolution itself. In doing so, it has been responsible for the destruction of class consciousness within the world proletariat during the most terrible counter-revolution of its history.
Ever since the bourgeoisie first established its political domination over society, it has seen in the proletariat its own worst enemy. During the bourgeois revolution at the end of the 18th century, whose Bicentenary has just been celebrated with great pomp, the capitalist class understood how subversive Baboeuf's ideas were, for example. This was why they sent him to the scaffold, even though at the time his movement could not constitute a real threat to the capitalist state.[1]
The whole history of bourgeois domination is marked by the massacre of workers in order to protect it: the massacre of the Lyon "canuts" in 1831, of the Silesian weavers in 1844, of the Parisian workers in June 1848, of the Communards in 1871, of the 1905 uprising throughout the Russian empire. The bourgeoisie has always been able to find executioners from within its classical political formations to do this kind of job.
But when history inscribed the proletarian revolution on its agenda, then these political parties where not enough to preserve its power. It fell to the traitor parties, parties that the workers themselves had created previously, to shore up the traditional bourgeois parties, or even to take the lead amongst them. These new recruits to the bourgeoisie had a specific role to play; they were indispensable and irreplaceable because their origins and their name gave them the ability to keep the proletariat under their ideological control, in order to sap its consciousness and to draw it under the banners of the enemy class. The greatest feat of the Social-Democracy as a bourgeois party lies not so much in its direct responsibility for the massacre of the Berlin proletariat in January 1919 (when, as War Minister, the Social-Democrat Noske fulfilled his responsibility perfectly as the "bloodhound" of the bourgeoisie, to use his own expression), but in the part it had already played as recruiting sergeant during World War I, and the part it was to play afterwards as an agent of mystification, division and dispersal within the proletariat, against the revolutionary wave which put an end to and followed the War.
It was only possible to enroll the European proletariat under the banner of "national defense", and to unleash the carnage of World War I in the name of the "defense of civilisation", thanks to the betrayal of the opportunist wing which dominated most of the parties of the IInd International. In the same way these parties, which continued to call themselves "socialist" and so preserved a large degree of credit within the working class, played a vital part in maintaining reformist and democratic illusions amongst the workers, which disarmed them and prevented them from following the example given by the Russian workers in 1917.
During this period, the elements and fractions which, come wind come storm, had held high the banner of internationalism and proletarian revolution, regrouped within the communist parties, the sections of the IIIrd International. But in the period that followed, these parties were to play a similar role to that played by the socialist parties. Gangrened from within by opportunism, which spread with the defeat of the world revolution, faithful executors under the leadership of an "International", which having once pushed the revolution vigorously forward was being transformed more and more into a mere diplomatic instrument in the hands of the Russian state as it sought its integration into the bourgeois world, the communist parties went the same way as their predecessors. Like the socialist parties, they were finally completely integrated into the political apparatus of the national capital in their respective countries. As they went, however, they played their part in the defeat of the last outbursts of the post-war revolutionary wave, as in China 1927-28, and above all contributed decisively to the transformation of the defeat of the world revolution into a terrible counter-revolution.
After this defeat - in fact, counter-revolution - the defeat and demoralisation of the proletariat were inevitable. However, the form of this counter-revolution in the USSR itself - not the overthrow of the power that had emerged from the Revolution of October 1917, but the degeneration of the state and party that held power - meant that it was incomparably longer and deeper than it would have been had the revolution succumbed to the white armies. Following its integration into the post-revolutionary state, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was converted from the vanguard of the 1917 proletarian revolution and of the Communist International of 1919, to the main agent of counter-revolution in the USSR and the principal executioner of the working class.[2]
But the aura of prestige surrounding its past revolutionary action, continued to maintain the illusion amongst the majority of the communist parties and their militants, as among the great masses of the world proletariat. Thanks to this prestige, some of which was reflected on the Communist Parties in other countries, the militants and the masses were able to tolerate all Stalinism's betrayals during this period. The desertion of proletarian internationalism under the pretext of "building socialism in one country", the identification of "socialism" with the capitalism which was reconstituted in the USSR in its most barbaric forms, the struggles of the world proletariat's subjection to the demands of the defense of the "socialist fatherland", and in the end of the defense of "democracy" against fascism, were so many lies which deceived the working masses largely because the parties which lived by them, presented themselves as the "legitimate" heirs of the October revolution, which they themselves had assassinated.
This identification of Stalinism with communism, probably the greatest lie in history and certainly the most repulsive, which has been aided and abetted by every fraction of the world bourgeoisie,[3] was what made it possible for the counter-revolution to reach the depths it did, paralysing several generations of workers, delivering them bound hand and foot to the second imperialist slaughter, and either eliminating altogether or reducing to the state of utterly isolated little groups the communist fractions which had fought against the degeneration of the Communist International and its parties.
During the 1930's especially, it was left to the Stalinist parties to derail onto a bourgeois terrain the anger and combativity of workers brutally hit by the world economic crisis. By its depth and extent, this crisis was the indisputable sign that the capitalist mode of production was historically bankrupt, and so in other circumstances could have been the lever for a new revolutionary wave. But the majority of workers who wanted to head towards just such a perspective remained snared in the meshes of Stalinism, which claimed to represent the tradition of the world revolution. In the name of the defense of the "socialist fatherland" and of anti-fascism, the Stalinist parties systematically drained the period's proletarian struggles of any class content, and converted them into props for bourgeois democracy, when they did not simply become preparations for imperialist war. This was particularly the case with the "Popular Front" episodes in France and Spain, where an enormous workers' combativity was derailed and wiped out by an anti-fascism that claimed to be "working class", peddled essentially by the Stalinists. In Spain the Stalinists showed clearly that even outside the USSR, where they had played the part of executioners for years, they could equal and even surpass their social-democratic masters at the job of massacring the proletariat (see, in particular, their role in suppressing the Barcelona proletariat's uprising in May 1937, described in the article in the International Review n°7).
In terms of the number of victims for which it is directly responsible, Stalinism is every bit as bad as fascism. But its anti-working class role has been far greater, since its crimes have been committed in the name of the communist revolution and the proletariat and so have also provoked a historically unprecedented reversal of working class consciousness.
Whereas at the end of World War I and in the immediate post-war period, when the world-wide revolutionary wave was developing, the Communist parties' impact was directly related to the combativity and consciousness of the entire proletariat, from the 1930's onwards the evolution of their influence has been inversely proportional to class consciousness. At their foundation, the Communist parties' strength was a barometer of the strength of the revolution; once Stalinism had sold them to the bourgeoisie, the strength of these parties, which continued to call themselves "communist" was no more than a measure of the depth of the counter-revolution.
This is why Stalinism has never been more powerful than immediately following World War II. This was the culminating point in the counter-revolution. Thanks in particular to the Stalinists, who had made it possible for the bourgeoisie to unleash yet another imperialist carnage, and whose "resistance" movements were among the best recruiting-sergeants, the Second World War, unlike the First, was not followed by a revolutionary upsurge of the proletariat.
The "Red" Army's[4] occupation of a large part of Europe, and the Stalinists' participation in the "liberation" governments made it possible to silence, either by terror or by mystification, any attempts by the proletariat to struggle on its own class terrain; it was plunged into still deeper disarray than before the war. Far from clearing the ground for the working class (as the Trotskyists claimed to justify their support for the "Resistance"), the Allied victory to which the Stalinists had contributed only increased the proletariat's submission to bourgeois ideology. This supposed victory of "Democracy" and "Civilisation" over fascist barbarism allowed the ruling class to restore the democratic illusion, and belief in a "humane" and "civilised" capitalism. It thus prolonged the night of the counter-revolution by several decades.
Moreover, it is no accident that the end of this counter-revolution, the historic recovery of the class struggle in 1968, coincides with an important weakening of the Stalinist grip throughout the world proletariat, and of the illusions over the nature of the USSR and the anti-fascist mystification. This is particularly clear in the two Western countries with the most powerful "communist" parties, and where the most important struggles of this recovery took place: France and Italy.
This weakening of Stalinism's ideological grip over the working class is largely due to the workers' discovery of what the supposedly "socialist" regimes really are. In the "socialist" countries, the class obviously realised very quickly that Stalinism was one of its worst enemies. The workers' revolts in East Germany 1953, in Poland and Hungary 1956, were proof that workers in these countries no longer had any illusions about Stalinism. These events (along with the Warsaw Pact's military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968) also helped open the eyes of numbers of workers in the West as to Stalinism's real nature,[5] but not to the same extent as the struggles in Poland during 1970, 1976, and 1980. Because they were much more directly placed on a class terrain, and because they took place at a time of general resurgence of working class combat, they revealed much more clearly to the eyes of workers in the West the real anti-working class nature of the Stalinist regimes. This moreover is why the Stalinist parties in the West took their distances from the repression of the workers' struggles by the "socialist" states.
The collapse of the "socialist" economy highlighted by these workers' struggles also helped to wear down the Stalinist lie. However, as this collapse became more and more obvious, and as the Stalinist lie has faded, the Western bourgeoisie put it to good use by developing campaigns around the theme of "capitalism's superiority to socialism". In the same way, the Polish workers' powerful illusions in democracy and the trade unions, especially following the formation of the "Solidarnosc" union after 1980, have been exploited to the hilt to improve the unions' image in the eyes of workers in the West. The strengthening of these illusions, especially after the repression of December 1981 and the outlawing of "Solidarnosc" goes a long way to explaining the disarray and retreat of the working class at the beginning of the 1980's.
In autumn 1983 the upsurge of a new wave of workers' struggles in the developed Western countries, notably in Western Europe, and their simultaneity on a world scale, demonstrated that the working class was beginning to emerge from the grip of the illusions and mystifications which had paralysed it in the previous period. The weakening of illusions in the trade unions was revealed in strikes such as the 1986 French rail strike, or the 1987 teachers' strike in Italy, where workers acted outside or even against the trade unions; it was also revealed in the way the leftists, in these and some other countries, started setting up the "coordinations": structures of control put forward as "nonunion". During the same period, the rising rate of abstentions, especially in working class constituencies, was a sign of the decline in the electoral mystification. Today however, thanks to the collapse of the Stalinist regimes and the frenzy of accompanying media campaigns, the bourgeoisie has succeeded in reversing this tendency of the mid-1980's.
If the events in Poland during 1980-81 - not the workers' struggles of course, but the union and democratic trap which closed in on them and made possible the repression that followed -allowed the bourgeoisie to create a considerable confusion among the proletariat of the most advanced countries, then today's general and historic collapse of Stalinism can only lead to a still greater disarray.
This is the case because today's events are at an altogether different level from those of Poland in 1980. They are not confined to one country. An entire imperialist bloc is involved, starting with its most important country, the USSR. Stalinist propaganda could present the difficulties of the Polish regime as being due to Gierek's "mistakes". Nobody today, not even these countries' new leaders, is trying to lay all the blame for today's difficulties on the fallen leaders of the past. According to many of these leaders, especially the Hungarians, what is in question today is the entire economic structure and the aberrant political practices which have marked the Stalinist regimes from their outset. The fact that their leaders recognise these regimes' total collapse is obviously all grist to the mill for the Western bourgeoisie's media campaigns.
The bourgeoisie also gets maximum mileage from the collapse of Stalinism and its bloc because this collapse is not due to the action of the class struggle, but to the complete bankruptcy of these countries' economies. In the colossal events taking place today in Eastern Europe, the proletariat as a class, with a policy antagonistic to capitalism, is painfully absent.
In particular, last summer's miners' strikes in the USSR were something of an exception; the weight of illusions they harboured reveal the proletariat's political weakness in these countries. Moreover, unlike the miners' strikes, most of the strikes which have occurred recently in the USSR were not aimed at defending workers' interests, but were situated on a nationalist and so completely bourgeois terrain (Baltic countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan...). Not a shadow of a working class demand is to be seen in the massive demonstrations taking place in Eastern Europe, in particular in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. These demonstrations are completely dominated by typically and wholly bourgeois democratic demands: "free elections", "liberty", "resignation of the ruling CP's", etc. By comparison, the impact of the democratic campaigns that followed Poland 1980-81 was somewhat limited by the fact that these events sprang from the class struggle. The absence of significant class struggle in the Eastern countries today cannot but strengthen the devastating effects of the bourgeoisie's present campaigns.
On the more general scale of the collapse of an entire imperialist bloc, which will have enormous repercussions, the fact that this historic event has taken place independently of the proletariat's own action cannot help but produce within the class a feeling of powerlessness, even if the event was only possible, as the Theses demonstrate, because up to now the bourgeoisie has been unable to enroll the proletariat on a world level for a third imperialist holocaust. After overthrowing first the Tsar and then the bourgeoisie in Russia, it was the class struggle which put an end to World War I by bringing about the collapse of Imperial Germany. This is the main reason that the first revolutionary wave could develop on a world scale.
By contrast, the fact that the class struggle was only of secondary importance in the collapse of the Axis countries after World War II played an important part in paralysing and disorientating the proletariat in its immediate aftermath. Today, it is not irrelevant that the Eastern bloc should be collapsing under the weight of the economic crisis, rather than under the blows of the class struggle. If the latter had happened, it could only have strengthened the proletariat's self-confidence, not weakened it as is the case today. Moreover, to the extent that the collapse of the Eastern bloc comes after the period of "cold war" with the West, which the latter seems to have "won" without striking a blow, it will create a feeling of euphoria amongst the populations in the West, including the workers, and a feeling of confidence in their governments similar (though to a lesser degree) to that which weighed on the proletariat in the "victorious" countries after the two world wars, and which was even one of the main causes of the defeat of the revolutionary wave following the First.
Clearly, this kind of euphoria, which is obviously catastrophic for the consciousness of the working class, will be much more limited today, since the world is not just emerging from an imperialist bloodbath. However, the damage will be made more severe by the euphoria infecting the population in some of the Eastern countries, and which will have its impact in the West. At the opening of the Berlin Wall, for example, the press and certain politicians compared the atmosphere in Berlin with that of the "Liberation" following World War II. It is no surprise that the population of East Germany should feel the same about the demolition of this symbol par excellence of Stalinist terror as did the populations subjected to years of occupation and terror by Nazi Germany. But history has shown us that this kind of emotion is one of the worst obstacles to the development of proletarian consciousness.
The East European population's satisfaction at the collapse of Stalinism, and above all the increase in democratic illusions that it will make possible, is already having a strong effect on the proletariat in the Western countries, especially in Germany whose weight within the world proletariat is especially important in the perspective of the proletarian revolution. Moreover, even if the reunification of Germany is not an immediate practical possibility, the proletariat in Germany will have to confront all the nationalist lies that this perspective cannot but reinforce.
These nationalist mystifications are already very strong amongst workers in most of the Eastern countries. They do not exist only within the different republics that make up the USSR. They also weigh heavily on the workers in the "people's democracies", due notably to the brutal manner whereby the "Big Brother" kept his imperialist grip on them. These mystifications have been reinforced by the Russian tanks' bloody interventions in East Germany 1953, in Hungary 1956, and in Czechoslovakia 1968, and by the decades of systematic pillage of the satellite countries' economies. Along with illusions in democracy and trade unions, these played an important part in disorientating the Polish workers in 1980-81, opening the door to the repression of December. They will gain new energy with the disintegration of the Eastern bloc which will make the development of the workers' consciousness still more difficult.
These nationalist mystifications will also weigh on the workers in the West; this will not (apart from in Germany) occur through a direct increase in nationalism amongst the working class, but rather through the discredit and distortion of the very idea of proletarian internationalism. This conception has already been completely disfigured by Stalinism, and in Stalinism's wake by the rest of the bourgeoisie, which identified it with the USSR's domination of its bloc. In 1968, the intervention of the Warsaw Pact's tanks in Czechoslovakia was carried out in the name of "proletarian internationalism". The Eastern bloc's collapse, and its population's rejection of Stalinist style "internationalism", will inevitably weigh heavily on the consciousness of workers in the West.
And the Western bourgeoisie will miss no opportunity to oppose real proletarian internationalism with its own "international solidarity', understood as support for the stricken Eastern economies (or simply appeals for charity), or for their populations' "democratic demands" when they come up against brutal repression (remember the campaigns over Poland in 81, or more recently over China).
In fact, the ultimate aim at the heart of the bourgeoisie's present campaigns to taint the very perspective of world communist revolution with the collapse of Stalinism. Internationalism is only one element of this perspective. The nauseating refrain of the media: "communism is bankrupt; communism is dead" sums up the fundamental message that the ruling class in every country wants to stuff into workers' heads. The lie of the identity between Stalinism and communism, which has already been peddled by all the forces of the bourgeoisie in the past during the worst moments of the counter-revolution, has once again been taken up with the same unanimity. In the 1930's, the bourgeoisie used it to enroll the working class behind Stalinism and to complete its defeat. Today, now that Stalinism has lost all its credit in workers' eyes, the same lie is being used to turn them away from the perspective of communism.
In the Eastern bloc, the workers have already suffered this disorientation for some time: when the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" means police terror, when "the power of the working class" means the cynical power of the bureaucrats, when "socialism" means brutal exploitation, shortages, poverty and waste, when school children are forced to learn by heart quotes from Marx and Lenin, inevitably they will turn away from such notions, in other words reject what is the very foundation of the proletariat's historical perspective, refuse categorically to study the basic texts of the workers' movement; the very terms "workers' movement" and "working class" become obscenities. In such a context, the very idea of a proletarian revolution is completely discredited. "What is the use of starting again as in October 1917, if it only ends up in Stalinist barbarity?"This is the dominant feeling today amongst virtually all the workers in the Eastern countries. The Western bourgeoisie aims to profit from the collapse of Stalinism to spread a similar confusion among the workers in the 'West. And so obvious and spectacular is the system's collapse that for the most part, this works.
All the events which are rocking Eastern Europe today, and whose repercussions are world-wide, will thus for a time weigh heavily, and negatively, on the development of consciousness in the working class. At first, the opening of the "iron curtain" which divided the world proletariat in two will not permit the workers in the West to help their class brothers in the East profit from the experience they have gained in their struggles against the traps and mystifications deployed by the world's strongest bourgeoisies. On the contrary, in the immediate and for some time to come, it will be the strong democratic illusions of the workers in the East that will spill over into the West, thus weakening the gains made already by the workers there. This is how the bourgeoisie is using against the working class the death agony of Stalinism, which was once the weapon par excellence of the counter-revolution.
In a world context of deepening capitalist crisis, the collapse of the Stalinist regimes, essentially as a result of their total economic bankruptcy, can only make their situation worse. For the working class in these countries, this means unprecedented attacks and poverty, even famine. This situation will inevitably provoke explosions of anger. But the political and ideological context is such in the East, that it will be some time before the workers' combativity can lead to a real development of consciousness (see the article in this issue of the International Review). Developing chaos and convulsions on the economic and political level, the barbarity and decomposition of capitalist society which appears almost in caricatural form in the East, will not lead to an understanding of the need to overthrow the system until such an understanding has developed among the decisive proletarian battalions in the great working class concentrations of the West, and especially in Western Europe.[6]
As we have seen, at present these sectors of the world proletariat are themselves being subjected to a flood of bourgeois propaganda, and are being affected by a retreat of consciousness. This does not mean that they will be incapable of fighting back against the economic attacks of capitalism's irreversible crisis. What this means above all is that for a while at least, these struggles will be much more the prisoners of the state's organs for controlling the working class, with the trade unions to the fore, than they have been recently; this is already visible in the most recent combats. In particular, the unions will benefit from the general reinforcement of democratic illusions. They will also find easier ground for their maneuvers with the development of reformist ideology, as a result of the strengthening illusions as to "capitalism's superiority" over any other form of society.
However, the proletariat today is not the same as in the 1930's. It is not emerging from a defeat like that of the revolutionary wave that followed World War I. The world capitalist crisis is insoluble. It can only go on getting worse (see the article on the crisis in this issue): after the collapse of the "Third World" countries during the 1970's, and the implosion of the so-called "socialist" economies today, the next on the list will be the more developed countries which up to now have been able to push the system's worst convulsions out to the periphery. The inevitable revelation of the utter bankruptcy, not of any one sector of capitalism but of the entire mode of production, cannot but undermine the very bases of the Western bourgeoisie's campaigns about "capitalism's superiority".
In the end, the development of the workers' combativity will open out into a new development of their consciousness, which today is being interrupted and counter-acted by Stalinism's collapse. It is down to the revolutionary organisations to contribute determinedly to this development, not by trying to console the workers, but by showing them clearly that however difficult it may be, the proletariat can take no other road than the one that leads to the communist revolution.
FM 25/11/89
[1] It is significant that the "revolutionary" and "democratic" French bourgeoisie had no hesitation in sweeping aside the "Declaration of the Rights of Man" which they had just adopted (and which they make so much fuss about today), by outlawing all workers' associations (the Le Chapelier law of 14 June 1791). This ban was only lifted almost a century later, in 1884.
[2] The degeneration and betrayal of the Bolshevik party did not go unresisted, both by the working class, and within the party itself. In particular, Stalinism wiped out all the leaders of October 1917, and most of the militants. See, on this question, the articles on "The degeneration of the Russian revolution" and on "The Communist Left in Russia", in International Review n°3, and n°8-9.
[3] In the late 20's and throughout the 30's, the "democratic" bourgeoisie in the West was far from showing the same revulsion for "barbaric" and "totalitarian" Stalinism as it did during the Cold War and still does today. It gave unfailing support to Stalin in his persecution of the "Left Opposition", and its principal leader Trotsky, for whom the world became a "planet without a visa" after his expulsion from the USSR in 1928. "Democrats" all over the world, starting with the Social-Democrats in power in Germany, Britain, Norway, Sweden Belgium and France demonstrated their disgusting hypocrisy by setting aside their "fine principles" such as the "right" of asylum, as far as Trotsky was concerned. All these fine people found very little to protest about during the Moscow trials when Stalin liquidated the Bolshevik Party's old guard, accusing them of "Hitlero-Trotskyism"; they were even abject enough to spread it about that "there is no smoke without fire".
[4] A further proof, if one were needed, that the regimes set up in Eastern Europe following World War II (as of course, the regime then existing in the USSR itself) have nothing to do with the power established in Russia in 1917, lies in the part played in their origins by the imperialist war. The working class nature of the October revolution is illustrated by the fact that it arose against the imperialist war. The anti-working class and capitalist nature of the "people's democracies" is demonstrated by the fact that they were set up thanks to the imperialist war.
[5] This is obviously not the only factor that allows us to explain Stalinism's waning impact within the working class, any more than that of bourgeois mystifications as a whole, between the end of the war and proletariat's historic resurgence at the end of the 1960's. In many countries, moreover (especially in Northern Europe), since World War II Stalinism has no longer played anything but a secondary role in controlling the workers, when compared with Social-Democracy. The weakening of the anti-fascist mystification, for lack of a "fascist" scarecrow in most countries, and the waning influence of the trade unions (whether Social-Democratic or Stalinist) after all their work in sabotaging the struggle during the 60's, also allows us to explain the diminishing impact of both Stalinism and Social-Democracy on the proletariat. This is why the latter was able to reappear on the scene of history as soon as the first attacks of the open crisis fell.
[6] See our analysis in "The proletariat of Western Europe at the centre of the generalisation of the class struggle" in International Review n°31.
The "Theses" published in this issue were adopted at the beginning of October 1989. Since then, events in the East have rushed ahead, telescoping into each other week after week, leading to situations which would have seemed inconceivable only 6 months ago. Hardly has August, which saw the trade union (!) Solidarnosc leaping from clandestinity to head the government, drawn to a close than Eastern Europe is shaken by other events of great historical importance.
Hungary, whose "communist" party has changed its name and declared its desire to become social-democratic, has thrown the, cloak of "people's democracy" and its membership of the "socialist" camp into the dustbin of history, to become a plain republic. This year in East Germany, supposedly the most stalwart member of the Eastern bloc, more than 100,000 people belonging to the most qualified sectors of the workforce, have abandoned "real socialism" for West Germany; nonetheless, increasingly massive demonstrations are developing in every city, demanding pell-mell free elections, the legalisation of the opposition, and the freedom to travel. Honecker has been forced to resign, to be definitively expelled only a few weeks later from a party which has been forced to renounce its role of exclusive leadership and to open the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the strengthening in 1961 of the division decided at Yalta in 1944. In Bulgaria, then in Czechoslovakia, the regimes inherited from Stalinism are also collapsing. This acceleration of the situation, these convulsions generalising throughout the Eastern countries, confirm the framework set out in the Theses as to Stalinism's historic crisis and its roots. Moreover, the speed with which events are moving means that what was then only a perspective is now a reality: the definitive collapse of Stalinism and the complete disintegration of the Eastern bloc, to the point of becoming a fiction fit only for the dustbin of history.
This situation, where the USSR and Eastern Europe no longer form an imperialist bloc, is the most important historical turning point since World War II and the historic resurgence of proletarian combat at the end of the 60's, both on the imperialist level (all the imperialist groupings that emerged from the Yalta agreements will be seriously destabilised), and on the level of what remains more than ever the only alternative to the decomposition, barbarity, and growing chaos provoked by the historic crisis of the capitalist system on a world level: the proletarian struggle.
The Theses develop at some length what lies at the roots of this bankruptcy:
This aberrant nature of Stalinism has only increased the difficulties of already weak and backward national capitals in confronting the crisis and the consequent exacerbation of competition on the already over-saturated world market. We will not here go any further into the roots of Stalinism and the Eastern bloc's definitive collapse; rather, we will aim to bring its evolution up to date.
Recent events have been the occasion for a barrage of lies, and in the lead the biggest and vilest of them: the claim that this crisis represents the failure of communism, and of marxism! Over and above their various antagonisms, democrats and Stalinists have always formed a holy alliance in saying to the workers that socialism (however deformed) reigns in the East. For Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, for the entire marxist movement, communism has always meant the end of the exploitation of man by man, the end of classes, the end of frontiers, all made possible only on a world scale, in a society governed by the abundance of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs", where "the government of men gives way to the administration of things". The claim that there is anything "communist", or even approaching "communism", in the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc, ruled by exploitation, poverty, and generalised scarcity, is the greatest lie in the history of humanity.
In the East, the Stalinists have only been able to impose this lie by means of the most brutal terror. "Socialism in one country" was set up and defended at the price of an appalling and bloody counter-revolution, which first systematically liquidated everything that remained of October 1917 and above all of the Bolshevik Party in Stalin's jails, before subjecting tens of millions of human beings to deportation and death. This ferocious dictatorship, this hideous concentrate of the worst barbarity of decadent capitalism, owes its existence to two weapons only: terror, and the lie.
This lie is an important asset to all the fractions of the bourgeoisie faced with the nightmare "specter of communism", the threat posed to their domination by the proletarian revolution. The revolution of October 1917 in Russia, and the world revolutionary wave that followed it up until the 1920's has been up to now the only point in history where the proletariat has overthrown (in Russia 1917), or really threatened (Germany in 1919), bourgeois rule. Since then the ability to identify the proletarian revolution of October with its own executioner, the Stalinist counter-revolution has been a major advantage for all our fine "democrats" in defending bourgeois order. For several decades, the proletariat's positive identification, thanks to the immense prestige of October, of the revolution with Stalinism, communism with the Eastern bloc, was the most powerful ideological factor responsible for its continued powerlessness. This was how it was led to the slaughter in World War II, precisely in the name of the defense of the "socialist" camp, allied for the occasion to the "democratic" camp against fascism, after being allied to Hitler at the beginning of the war. The proletariat has never been as weak as when the Stalinists were strong, and still crowned with the halo of Red October. But as this belief in the supposedly socialist nature of the USSR crumbled under the blows of the recovery of class struggle in both East and West following 1968, to the point of a deep-seated rejection of Stalinism throughout the proletariat, it was still more vital for the "democracies" to keep alive the monstrous fiction of "socialism" in the East. As the spur of the renewed open capitalist crisis, on a world scale, pushed the workers to enlarge and strengthen their combat against the bourgeoisie and its system, as more and more the question was posed of what perspective the working class should give to its combat, the bourgeoisie had absolutely to avoid any encouragement of the revolutionary perspective within the proletariat by the exposure of history's greatest lie: the identification between Stalinism and communism.
This is why it is more than ever important for the ruling class to keep up this fiction. After being used "positively", this monstrous association between "revolution" and "Stalinism" is now being used negatively, to create disgust for any idea of a revolutionary perspective. At the very moment when, for the whole of humanity, the historic alternative between socialism and endless barbarism is being posed more and more sharply, it is vital for the bourgeoisie to discredit the communist perspective in the workers' eyes as much as it can.
This is why, as Stalinism collapses for good, the "democrats" are redoubling their efforts to keep this disgusting lie alive: "October 1917 = Stalinism", "marxism = Stalinism", "USSR = communism". There are no bounds to the cynicism of the ruling class, as it displays the pictures of tens of thousands of workers fleeing from "socialism" to get to the countries of "abundance and liberty" that the Western capitalist "democracies" are supposed to be. The aim is to discredit in the workers' eyes any perspective for a society other than that based on profit and the exploitation of man by man. "Democracy" is supposed to be, if not the best system, at least the "least bad" system. Finally, and this is a real danger, the ruling class is trying to draw the workers in the East into fighting for interests that are not their own, to join the struggle between the cliques of "reformers" and Stalinists - Gorbachev and Yeltsin against Ligachev in the USSR, "New Forum" against SED in East Germany, etc -- not to mention between the different "nationalities".
Every time that the working class has fallen into this kind of trap, it has ended up not only gaining nothing, but being massacred, as it was in the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War, for the mirage of the bourgeois "republic". In reality, Stalinists and "democrats", Stalinists and "anti-Stalinists" are nothing but two facets of a same face: the face of bourgeois dictatorship. We should remember that during World War II, the British and American "democracies" had no compunction in allying themselves with Stalin against Germany. Their opposition since then, which has led to the world's division into two antagonistic spheres of influence, does not spring from an ideological opposition, between a "socialist" and a capitalist bloc. It is the expression of two capitalist and imperialist blocs which have become rivals.
Only when the USSR took advantage of the collapse of German imperialism to transform its inherited European sphere of influence into an imperialist bloc did the "democracies" suddenly discover that they had a duty to oppose this "totalitarian", "communist" system. Before the war, the USSR was only an isolated second-rate power; then, it was possible to ally with this same "totalitarian and communist" system. This was no longer the case in the 50's, now that the USSR had become a first-order imperialist power, and therefore a serious imperialist rival!
This is why, while the proletariat must reject with disgust Stalinism and the Stalinists, it must also reject the camp of the "democrats" and "anti-Stalinists". There is nothing to choose between them; if the proletariat does so, then it can only abandon its class terrain and become the hostage and powerless victim, in a struggle which is nothing to do with it, of the two capitalist hangmen of the proletarian revolution: Stalinism, and "democracy".
Never forget, that it was the Social-Democracy which crushed the revolution in Germany in 1919 and 1923, condemning the Russian revolution to a terrible isolation, and so opening the way to Stalinism and fascism.
Stalinism's collapse cannot but provoke profound and widespread convulsions, to the point where they create a situation of veritable chaos in what was up to now the world's second imperialist power.
Day by day, the bourgeoisie is losing control of events.
The trade union Solidarnosc joins the Polish government, with the declared aim of "liberalising the economy" and "drawing closer" to the West; unable to prevent it, Moscow pretends to encourage the move.
The Stalinist party in power in Hungary changes its name, proclaims itself social-democratic, and demands neutral status for the country, as well as membership of the Council of Europe, one of the West's most important organisms. This comes down to leaving the Warsaw Pact: Gorbachev sends a telegram of congratulations.
In Bulgaria, in Czechoslovakia, in East Germany, the old Stalinists are pushed aside. East Germany opens its frontiers, and hundreds of thousands of people rush to escape.
Everywhere (except in Romania at the time of writing), changes are happening daily, any one of which, only a few years ago, would have brought in the Russian tanks. This is not as it is generally presented, the result of a deliberate policy on Gorbachev's part, but the sign of a general crisis throughout the bloc, at the same time as Stalinism's historic bankruptcy. The rapidity of events, and the fact that they are now hitting East Germany, the central pillar of the Eastern bloc, is the surest sign that the world's second imperialist bloc has completely disintegrated.
This change is by now irreversible, and affects not just the bloc, but its leading power, the USSR itself. The clearest sign of Russia's collapse is the development of nationalism in the form of demands for "autonomy" and "independence" in the peripheral regions of central Asia, on the Baltic coast, and also in a region as vital for the Soviet national economy as the Ukraine.
Now when the leader of an imperialist bloc is no longer able to maintain the bloc's cohesion, or even to maintain order within its own frontiers, it loses its status as a world power. The USSR and its bloc are no longer at the centre of the inter-imperialist antagonisms between two capitalist camps, which is the ultimate level of polarisation that imperialism can reach on a world scale in the era of capitalist decadence.
The disintegration of the Eastern bloc, its disappearance as a major consideration in inter-imperialist conflict, implies a radical calling into question of the Yalta agreements, and the spread of instability to all the imperialist constellations formed on that basis, including the Western bloc which the USA has dominated for the last 40 years. This in its turn will find its foundations called into question. During the 1980's, the cohesion of the Western countries against the Russian bloc was an important factor in the latter's collapse; today, the cement for that cohesion no longer exists. Although it is impossible to foresee exactly the rhythm and forms that this will take, the perspective today is one of growing tension between the great powers of the Western bloc, the eventual reconstitution of two new imperialist blocs at an international level, and in the absence of any proletarian response a new worldwide massacre. The definitive collapse of Stalinism, and its corollary, the disintegration of the Eastern imperialist bloc, are thus already pregnant with the destabilisation of all the imperialist groupings that emerged from Yalta.
The calling into question of the imperialist' order inherited from World War II, and the fact that the formation of two new imperialist camps will inevitably take time, does not at all mean the disappearance of imperialist tensions. The generalised crisis of the capitalist mode of production can only push all countries, both great and small, and within them the different fractions of the ruling class, to try to settle their differences on the battlefield. The Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, etc are still torn by war today. Far from encouraging peace, the disintegration of the blocs which emerged from Yalta, and the decomposition of the capitalist system which underlies it, implies still more tension and conflicts. The appetites of the minor imperialisms, which up to now have been determined by the world's division into two major camps, will only increase, now that these camps are no longer dominated by their leaders as before.
Stalinism is not dying a peaceful death, giving way to other "democratic" forms of bourgeois dictatorship. There will be chaos, not a "soft" transition. As the Stalinist carcass rots, the whole Eastern bloc is threatened with "Lebanonisation". The confrontations between rival cliques of bourgeois nationalists in the USSR itself, the tensions between Hungary and Romania, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Romania and the USSR, East Germany and Poland, etc, the beginnings of pogroms that we are witnessing today in Moldavia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, open a perspective of generalised decomposition, a concentrated form of all the barbarity of decadent capitalism.
Behind the reforms, the democratisation, the attempts to liberalise the economy, behind all the fine speeches about the "radiant future", the reality for the workers is already a serious decline in their already difficult living conditions. In Poland and the USSR, everything is in short supply; even in Moscow and Leningrad, which are traditionally better stocked, such staples as sugar and soap have become almost impossible to find. More and more articles are rationed, and the rations are diminishing. The winter will be extremely hard: the measures of liberalisation decided in Poland and Hungary, and begun in the USSR, mean that scarcity will continue and that the black market will become inaccessible for the workers, since the rate of inflation is moving towards three figures, as in Poland, and the ending of price controls affects staple products first of all. The liberalisation of the economy, and its corollary, autonomy for individual enterprises will mean the appearance and growth of mass unemployment. The extent of this unemployment can be measured if we consider that in Poland one third of all workers will be made redundant if non-profitable companies are forced to close (according to the Solidarnosc government's own economic experts).
In the USSR, where there are already in reality several million unemployed, between 11 and 12 million workers will have to be made redundant in the next five years. More than half the factories in Hungary should be closed because they are obsolete and uncompetitive! What the immediate future holds in store for the proletariat in the East is thus a terrible poverty, comparable to that in "Third World" countries.
Faced with these attacks, the proletariat will fight, and will try to resist, like for example the Siberian miners, who have gone back on strike to demand that the government respect the agreements negotiated after the strikes this summer. There are, and there will be, more strikes. But the question is: what will be the context in which these strikes occur? There can be no ambiguity as to the reply: one of extreme confusion due to the Eastern working class' political weakness and inexperience, which will make the workers especially vulnerable to the mystifications of democracy and trade unions, and to the poison of nationalism. We can see this already in Poland and Hungary, or in the USSR where Russian workers are striking against Baltic workers and vice versa, or in the struggles between Azeris and Armenians.
Undoubtedly the most tragic symbol of the Eastern proletariat's political backwardness is the events in East Germany. Here is the proletariat of a highly industrialised country, right in the heart of Europe, which fought at the forefront of the German revolution in 1919 (in Saxony and Thuringia), and which was the first to express its rejection of Stalinism in 1953, and which today is demonstrating en masse, but totally drowned in the population as a whole. "Gorby! Gorby!", they chant, demanding pell-mell democracy, the legalisation of the opposition, but never, even in embryonic form, putting forward the specific demands of the working class. It is a terrible thing to see the German working class "organised" behind the Lutheran church, and drowned in "the people" in general!
There is such a strong, gut hatred of Stalinism, that even the word "proletariat" seems cursed, contaminated by the rotting carrion of Stalinism.
As it dies, Stalinism poisons the atmosphere, and in doing so renders the bourgeoisie one last and precious service, by condemning in the eyes of workers in the East the very idea of raising specific working class demands; just the idea of revolution is transformed into a disgusting nightmare.
This heritage of the Stalinist counter-revolution weighs terribly. Even if there can be no doubt that the workers' combativity in the East will rise to confront the increasingly intolerable attacks on its living conditions, the class' consciousness will have immense difficulty in moving forward. We cannot exclude the possibility that large fractions of the working class will let themselves be enrolled and massacred for interests that are totally foreign to them, in the struggles between nationalist gangs, or between "democratic" and Stalinist cliques.
Internationally, the whole proletariat has to confront increased difficulties in the development of its class consciousness as a result of this new situation (see the article on this subject, published in this issue).
We are entering a completely new period, which will profoundly modify both the present imperialist constellations (the Western bloc will also be affected, though to a lesser degree and at a less frenetic pace, by convulsions and instability; this is inevitable to the extent that its main reason for existing - the other bloc - has disappeared) and the conditions in which the class has fought up to now.
At first, this will be a difficult period for the proletariat. Apart from the increased weight of democratic mystifications, in the West as well as in the East, it will have to understand the new conditions within which it is fighting. This will inevitably take time, whence the depth of the "reflux" analysed in the Theses. In particular, the proletariat will have to confront head-on the democratic mystification, and especially its two most pernicious pillars: social-democracy and the trade unions.
Only the working class at the heart of capitalism, above all in Western Europe, is really capable of combating this mystification. Consequently, its historic responsibility has grown considerably, on the same scale as the fantastic acceleration of history during the last few months. Only the Western working class, through the development of its struggles, can really help the workers in the East to overcome the deadly trap of democratic illusions which yawns before them.
More than ever, the economic crisis remains the proletariat's best ally, the stimulant for the unavoidable confrontation with "democracy". The perspective of a new open recession, whose symptoms can be seen developing rapidly today (see the article on the crisis in this issue), by speeding up the collapse at the heart of capitalism in the West, by sweeping away illusions in an economic recovery, and by laying bare the historic bankruptcy of the whole capitalist mode of production and not just of its Stalinist avatars, will help the proletariat to understand on the one hand that the crisis and collapse in the East is only an expression of the capitalist system's general crisis, and on the other that it alone holds the solution to capitalism's historic crisis and generalised decomposition.
The redoubled attacks on its living conditions will not only force the working class to renew and spread its struggles; they will clearly reveal the utter bankruptcy of "liberal" and "democratic" capitalism, and so force the proletariat to struggle within what remains the only real perspective: the world communist revolution. More than ever, in this chaos, the future belongs to the proletariat.
RN : 19/11/89
The recent events in countries under Stalinist regimes, the confrontations between Party bosses and repression in China, the nationalist explosions and workers' struggles in the USSR, the constitution of a government led by Solidarnosc in Poland, are events of great historical importance. They reveal Stalinism's historic crisis, its entry into a period of acute convulsions. In this sense, they demand that we reaffirm and update our analysis of these regimes' nature and, of the perspectives for their evolution.
1) The convulsions which today are shaking the countries under Stalinist rule cannot be understood outside the general analysis, which is valid for every country in the world, of the capitalist mode of production's decadence, and the inexorable aggravation of its crisis. However, any serious analysis of the present situation in these countries must necessarily take account of their regimes' specificities. The ICC has already examined the specific characteristics of the Eastern bloc countries on several occasions, in particular at the time of the workers' struggles in Poland during the summer of 1980, and of the formation of the "independent" trade union Solidarnosc.
In December 1980, we set out the general framework for this analysis in the following terms:
"In common with all countries in the Eastern bloc, the situation in Poland is characterised by:
a) the extreme gravity of the crisis which today has plunged millions of workers into a state of poverty verging on famine;
b) the extreme rigidity of the social structure, which makes it practically impossible for oppositional forces to emerge within the bourgeoisie, forces capable of defusing social discontent: in Russia and its satellites every protest movement threatens to act as a focus for massive discontent simmering within the proletariat. This discontent is building up within a population which has been subjected to decades of the most violent counter-revolution. The intensity of this counter-revolution corresponds to the scale of the formidable class movement which it had to crush: the Russian Revolution of 1917.
c) The central importance of state terror as practically the only means to maintain order' (International Review no. 24).
In October 81, two months after the declaration of the state of war, and when the government campaign against Solidarnosc was hotting up, we came back to the question again:
"...the confrontations between Solidarity and the Polish CP aren't just cinema, just as the opposition between left and right in the western countries isn't just cinema. In the West, however, the institutional framework generally makes it possible to `make do' with these oppositions so they don't threaten the stability of the regime, and so that inter-bourgeois struggles for power are contained within, and resolved by, the formula most appropriate for dealing with the proletarian enemy. In Poland, on the other hand, although the ruling class has, using a lot of improvisations, but with some momentary success, managed to install these kinds of mechanisms, there's no indication that this is something definitive and capable of being exported to other 'socialist' countries. The same invective which serves to give credibility to your friendly enemy when the maintenance of order demands it, can be used to crush your erstwhile partner when he's no longer any use to you (cf the relation between fascism and democracy in the inter-war years).
By forcing the bourgeoisie to adopt a division of labour to which it is structurally in-adapted, the proletarian struggles in Poland have created a living contradiction. It's still too early to see how it will turn out. Faced with a situation unprecedented in history (...) the task of revolutionaries is to approach the unfolding events in a modest manner" (International Review no. 27).
Finally, after the declaration of the state of war and the outlawing of Solidarnosc, the ICC was led, in June 1983 (International Review no. 34), to develop this analytical framework. The framework needs to be made more complete of course, but it is only from this starting point that we can understand what is happening today in the Eastern bloc.
2) "The most obvious, and the most widely known, characteristic of the Eastern bloc countries - the one, moreover, which is the basis for the myth of their "socialist" nature - is the extreme statification of their economies. As we have often pointed out in our press, state capitalism is not limited to those countries. This phenomenon springs above all from the conditions for the capitalist mode of production's survival in its decadent period: faced with the threat of the dislocation of an economy, and a social body subjected to growing contradictions, faced with the exacerbation of commercial and imperialist rivalries provoked by the saturation of the world market, only the continuous strengthening of the state's power makes it possible to maintain a minimum of social cohesion, and a growing militarisation of society. While the tendency towards state capitalism is thus a universal historical fact, it does not affect all countries in the same way" (International Review no. 34, p4).
3) In the advanced countries, where there exists an old industrial and financial bourgeoisie, this tendency generally occurs through a progressive meshing of the "private" and state sectors. In this kind of system the "classical" bourgeoisie has not been dispossessed of its capital, and has retained its essential privileges. Moreover, the state's grip appears not so much through the nationalisation of the means of production, as through the action of a series of budgetary, financial, and monetary tools which allow it at any moment to determine major economic decisions, without calling the mechanisms of the market into question. This tendency towards state capitalism: "... takes on its most complete form where capitalism is subjected to the most brutal contradictions, and where the classical bourgeoisie is at its weakest. In this sense, the state's direct control of the main means of production, characteristic of the Eastern bloc (and of much of the Third World), is first and foremost a sign of the economy's backwardness and fragility" (ibid).
4) "There exists a close link between the bourgeoisie's forms of economic domination and its forms of political domination" (ibid):
"The one-party system is not unique to the Eastern bloc, or to the Third World. It has existed for several decades in Western European countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. The most striking example is obviously the Nazi regime that governed Europe's most powerful and developed nation between 1933 and 1945. In fact the historical tendency towards state capitalism does not concern the economy alone. It also appears in a growing concentration of political power in the hands of the executive, at the expense of the classical forms of bourgeois democracy, ie Parliament, and the interplay of political parties. During the 19th century, the political parties in the developed countries were the representatives of civil society in or before the state; with the decadence of capitalism, they were transformed into the representatives of the state within civil society (the most obvious case is that of the old workers' parties which today are the state's organs for controlling the working class). The state's totalitarian tendencies are expressed, even in those countries where the formal mechanisms of democracy remain in place, by a tendency towards the one-party system, most clearly concretised during periods of acute convulsions in bourgeois society: "Government of National Unity" during imperialist wars, unity of the whole bourgeoisie during periods of revolution (...).
5) "The tendency towards the one-party system has rarely reached its conclusion in the more developed countries. Such a conclusion is unknown in the US, Britain, Scandinavia and Holland, while the Vichy government in France depended essentially upon the German occupation. The only historical example of a developed country where this phenomenon has unfolded completely is that of Nazi Germany (for reasons that the Communist Left has long since analysed) (...). If the traditional parties or political structures were maintained in the other advanced countries, this was because they had shown themselves solid enough, thanks to their experience, the depth of their implantation, their connections with the economic sphere, and the strength of the mystifications they peddled, to ensure the national capital's stability and cohesion in the difficulties that confronted it (crisis, war, social upheaval)" (ibid). In particular, these countries' economic condition neither required nor allowed the adoption of "radical" measures of state control of capital which only the so-called "totalitarian" parties and structures is capable of establishing.
6) "But what is only an exception in the advanced countries is a general rule in the under-developed ones, where the conditions we have outlined do not exist, and which are subjected to the most violent convulsions of decadent capitalism" (ibid).
Thus, for example, in the one-time colonies which gained their "independence" during the 20th century (especially since World War II), the constitution of a national capital has usually been carried out by and around the state, and often, in the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie, under the leadership of an intelligentsia trained in European universities. In some cases, there has even been a juxtaposition and cooperation between this new state bourgeoisie and the remnants of the old pre-capitalist exploiting classes.
"...the Eastern bloc has a special position amongst the under-developed countries. To the strictly economic factors that go to explain the weight of state capitalism, are added historical and geo-political ones: the circumstances in which the USSR and its empire were founded.
7) "State capitalism in Russia arose from the ruins of the proletarian revolution. The feeble bourgeoisie of the Tsarist era had been completely eliminated by the 1917 revolution (...) and by the defeat of the White armies. Thus it was neither this bourgeoisie, nor its traditional parties who took the head of the inevitable counter-revolution that was the result, in Russia itself, of the defeat of the world proletariat. This task fell to the state which came into being following the revolution, and which rapidly absorbed the Bolshevik party (...). In this way, the bourgeois class was reconstituted not on the basis of the old bourgeoisie (other than exceptionally and individually), nor of private ownership of the means of production, but on the basis of the state/party bureaucracy, and of state ownership of the means of production. In Russia, an accumulation of factors - the backwardness of the country, the rout of the classic bourgeoisie and the physical defeat of the working class (the terror and counter-revolution that it underwent were on the same scale as its revolutionary advance) - thus drove the overall tendency towards state capitalism to take on its most extreme forms: near-total statification of the economy and the totalitarian dictatorship of a single party. Since it no longer had to discipline the different sectors of the dominant class, nor to compromise with their economic interests, since it had absorbed the dominant class to the point of becoming completely identified with it, the state could do away definitively with the classical political forms of bourgeois society (democracy and pluralism) even in pretense" (ibid ).
8) The same brutality and extreme centralisation with which the Russian regime exercised its power over society are also to be found in the way in which the USSR has established and maintained its power over its bloc as a whole. The USSR founded its empire solely on the force of arms, both during WWII (seizure of the Baltic states and central Europe) and after it (as with China and North Vietnam, for example), or as a result of military coups d'etat (Egypt in 1952, Ethiopia in 1974, Afghanistan in 1978, for example). Similarly, the use or threat of armed force (eg Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Afghanistan in 1979) is virtually its only means of maintaining its bloc's cohesion.
9) This mode of imperialist domination, just like the form of its national capital and of its political regime, are fundamentally the result of the USSR's economic weakness (its economy is more backward than those of most of its vassals).
"The United States, by far the most developed country in its bloc, and the world's foremost economic and financial power, ensures its domination over the principal countries of its empire - themselves fully developed nations -without having to apply constant military force, just as these countries can do without an ever-present repression to ensure their own stability. (...) The dominant sectors of the main Western bourgeoisies adhere "voluntarily" to the American alliance: they get economic, financial, political and military advantages out of it (such as the American "umbrella" against Russian imperialism" (ibid). By contrast, for a national capital to belong to the Eastern bloc is generally a catastrophic economic handicap (in particular because the USSR directly pillages these economies). "In this sense, there is no "spontaneous inclination" amongst the major nations of the US bloc to pass over to the other side, in the same way as other movements in the opposite direction (the change of camp in Yugoslavia in 1948 or China at the end of the 60's, the attempts in Hungary '56 or in Czechoslovakia '68)" (ibid). The permanent centrifugal forces within the Russian bloc therefore explain the brutality of the USSR's imperialist domination. It also explains the form of the political regimes governing these countries.
10) "The USA's strength and stability allows it to tolerate the existence of all kinds of regimes within its bloc: from "communist" China to the very "anti-communist" Pinochet, from the Turkish military dictatorship to the very "democratic" Great Britain, from the 200-year old French Republic to the Saudi feudal monarchy, and from Franco's Spain to a social-democratic one" (ibid). By contrast, "... the fact that the USSR (...) can only maintain its grip on its empire by force of arms determines the fact that the ruling regimes in the satellite countries (as in Russia) can only maintain their grip on society by the same armed force (army and police)" (ibid). Moreover, the USSR can expect at least a minimum of fidelity only from Stalinist regimes (at best!), since as a general rule these parties' accession to and continued hold on power depend essentially on the direct support of the "Red Army". "As a result (...) while the American bloc can quite well "manage" the "democratisation" of a fascist or military regime whenever necessary (Japan, Germany, Italy following WWII; Portugal, Greece, Spain during the 70's), the USSR can tolerate no "democratisation" within its bloc" (ibid). A change of political regime in a "satellite" country carries with it a direct threat that this country will pass into the enemy bloc.
11) The reinforcement of state capitalism is permanent and universal under decadent capitalism. However, as we have seen, this tendency does not necessarily take the form of a statification of the economy, the state's direct appropriation of the productive apparatus. This option may, in certain historical circumstances, be the only one possible for a national capital, or the most appropriate for its defense and development. This is essentially valid for backward economies, but under certain conditions (during periods of reconstruction, for example), it can also be valid for developed economies such as those of Great Britain and France immediately after World War II. However, this particular form of state capitalism has serious disadvantages for the national economy.
In the most backward countries, the confusion between the political and economic apparatus allows and encourages the development of a wholly parasitic bureaucracy, whose sole concern is to fill its own pockets, systematically to pillage the national economy in order to build up the most colossal fortunes: the cases of Battista, Marcos, Duvalier, and Mobutu are well known and far from unique. Pillage, corruption and extortion are endemic in the underdeveloped countries, at every level of the state and the economy. This situation is obviously a still greater handicap for these economies, and helps to push them still further into the mire.
In the advanced countries, the presence of a strong state sector also tends to become a handicap for the national economy as the world crisis deepens. In this sector, enterprises' management methods, organisational and labour structures, often hinder their adaptation to the required increase in productivity. Even when they are not corrupt, the strata of state functionaries, "civil servants" generally enjoying complete job security and the guarantee that their enterprise (the state itself) cannot go bankrupt and so out of business, are not necessarily the best able to adapt to the merciless laws of the market. Consequently, the wave of "privatisation" currently sweeping over most of the advanced Western economies is not simply a means of limiting class conflicts by replacing a unique boss (the state) with a multitude of bosses, it is also a means of strengthening the competitivity of the productive apparatus.
12) In countries under Stalinist regimes, the system of the "Nomenklatura", where virtually all economic responsibility is tied to party status, the obstacles to improving the productive apparatus' competitivity develop on a far vaster scale. Whereas the "mixed" economies of the developed Western countries oblige state enterprises, and even state administrations, to have at least a minimum degree of concern for productivity and profitability, the form of state capitalism prevalent under Stalinist regimes has the characteristic of stripping the ruling class of any sense of responsibility. Bad management is no longer sanctioned by the market, while administrative sanctions are rare, since the whole administrative apparatus from top to bottom is equally irresponsible. Fundamentally, the condition for maintaining one's privileges is servility towards the hierarchy of the apparatus, or towards one of its cliques. The main preoccupation of the vast majority of those holding "responsible" positions is to put them to profit by filling their own, their families', and their associates' pockets, without the slightest concern for the state of the enterprise or the national economy. This kind of "management" does not of course exclude the ferocious exploitation of labour power. But this ferocity is not generally concerned with increasing the productivity of labour power. It appears essentially in the workers' wretched living conditions and the brutality with which their economic demands are met.
In the final analysis, we can characterise this kind of regime as the reign of flatterers, of incompetent and spiteful chieflings, of cynical prevaricators, of unscrupulous manoeuvrers and police agents. These characteristics are general throughout capitalist society, but when they wholly replace technical competence, the rational exploitation of labour power and the search for competitivity in the market, and then they seriously compromise a national economy's performance.
In such conditions, these countries' economies, most of which are already backward, are particularly ill-equipped to confront the capitalist crisis and the sharpening competition it provokes on the world market.
13) Faced with the total collapse of their economies, the only way out for these countries, not to any real competitivity, but at least to keeping their heads above water, is to introduce mechanisms which make it possible to impose a real responsibility on their leaders. These mechanisms presuppose a "liberalisation" of the economy, the creation of a real internal market, a greater "autonomy" for enterprises and the development of a strong "private" sector. This is in fact the programme of "Perestroika", as of the Mazowiecki government in Poland and of Deng Xiaoping in China. However, while this kind of programme has become more and more vital, its application runs up against virtually insurmountable obstacles.
To begin with, this programme demands the application of "real prices" to the market; this means that staple products which are currently subsidised must undergo massive price increases: the price rises of 500% that we saw in Poland during August 89 give some idea of what the population, and especially the working class, can expect. The past (and even present) experience of Poland is proof that this kind of policy can provoke violent social explosions that threaten its application.
Secondly, this programme requires the closure of innumerable "non-profitable" enterprises, or at least swingeing reductions in manpower. There will be a colossal development of unemployment (which today is a marginal phenomenon); this is another threat to social stability, since full employment was one of the workers' few remaining guarantees, and a means of controlling a working class outraged by its own living conditions. Massive unemployment, even more than in the developed countries, is liable to become a veritable social bomb.
Thirdly, "autonomy" for enterprises comes up against bitter resistance from the whole economic bureaucracy, whose official reason for existence is to plan, organise, and control the activity of the productive apparatus. Its notorious ineffectiveness in this mission could, however, be transformed into a formidable effectiveness in sabotaging "reform".
14) Finally, the appearance of a stratum of Western-style "managers", truly capable of valorising invested capital, alongside the state bourgeoisie (integrated into the apparatus of political power), is liable to prove an unacceptable rival for the latter. It's essentially parasitic nature will be mercilessly laid bare, and in the long term this will threaten not only its power, but the whole of its economic privileges. For the party as a whole, whose reason for existing lies in the application and leadership of "real socialism" (according to the Polish constitution, the party is "society's leading force in the construction of socialism"), its entire programme, even its identity, are called into question.
The obvious failure of Gorbachev's "Perestroika" (like all the previous reforms of the same kind, in fact) throws a particularly clear light on these difficulties. In fact, if these reforms are really carried out, this can only lead to an open conflict between the state and "liberal" sectors of the bourgeoisie (even if the latter is also recruited essentially from within the state apparatus). The brutal resolution of this conflict that we have recently witnessed in China gives some idea of the forms that it can take under other Stalinist regimes.
15) Just as there is a close link between the form of the economic apparatus and the structure of the political apparatus, the reform of one necessarily affects the other. The need for a "liberalisation" of the economy is expressed by the emergence within the party, or outside it, of political forces which play the part of spokesmen for this necessity. This phenomenon creates strong tendencies towards a split within the party (as we have recently seen in Hungary), and towards the creation of "independent" formations demanding more or less explicitly the reestablishment of classical forms of capitalism, as is the case with Solidarnosc (2).
This tendency towards the appearance of several political formations with different economic programmes brings with it pressure for the legal recognition of "pluralism", the "right of association", "free" elections, the "freedom of the press": in short, the classical liberties of bourgeois democracy. Moreover, a certain freedom of criticism, the "appeal to public opinion" can be used as levers to dislodge "conservative" bureaucrats who refuse to go. This is why, as a general rule, those who are "reformers" on the economic level are also "reformers" on the political level. This is why "Perestroika" is accompanied by "Glasnost". Moreover, "democratisation", including the appearance of "oppositional" political forces, can in certain circumstances, as in Poland in 1980 and 1988, or in the USSR today, is used as a diversion and a means of controlling the explosion of discontent within the population, and especially within the working class. This last element, obviously, is yet another factor of pressure in favour of "political reforms".
16) However, just as "economic reform" has taken on a virtually impossible job, so "political reform" has very little chance of success. The introduction of a multi-party system, with "free" elections, which is a logical consequence of the process of "democratisation", is a veritable menace for the party in power. As we have seen recently in Poland, and to a certain extent also in the USSR last year, such elections can only highlight the party's total discredit, and the population's hatred for it. Logically, the only thing that the party can expect from such elections is the loss of its own power. Unlike Western "democratic" parties, this is something that the CP's cannot tolerate, since:
Whereas in countries with a "liberal" or "mixed" economy, which still have a classical bourgeois class which directly owns the means of production, a change in the ruling party (unless this means the arrival in power of a Stalinist party) has little impact on this bourgeoisie's privileges and place in society, in the Eastern bloc such an event would mean, for the vast majority of bureaucrats whether big or small, loss of privileges, unemployment, and even persecution by the victors. The German bourgeoisie could adapt to the Kaiser, the social-democratic republic, the conservative republic, Nazi totalitarianism, and the "democratic" republic, without its essential privileges being called into question. By contrast, a change of regime in the USSR would mean the disappearance of the bourgeoisie in its present form, at the same time as the party. And while a political party can commit suicide, announce its own dissolution, a ruling privileged class cannot.
17) This is why the resistance to political reform that has appeared within the apparatus of the Stalinist parties in the Eastern bloc cannot simply be put down to the most incompetent bureaucrats' fears of losing their jobs and their privileges. It is the party as a social entity, as a ruling class, which is expressed in this resistance.
Moreover, what we wrote 9 years ago remains wholly valid today: "any movement of contestation threatens to crystallise the immense discontent existing within the proletariat and the population, subjected for decades to the most violent counter-revolution". Although one of the aims of "democratic reform" is to provide a safety-valve for the immense anger that exists within the population, there is the danger that this anger will emerge in the form of uncontrollable explosions. When any sign of discontent is no longer immediately threatened with bloody repression and mass imprisonments, it is likely to be expressed openly and violently. When there is too much pressure in the cooker, the steam that is supposed to blow off through the safety valve is liable to blow the lid off instead.
To a certain extent, last summer's strikes in the USSR illustrate this phenomenon. In any context other than that of "Perestroika", the explosion of workers' combativity would not have been able to spread so far or to last so long. The same is true for the present explosion of nationalist movements which highlight the danger constituted by the policy of "democratisation" for the very territorial integrity of the world's second power.
18) In fact, since virtually the only cohesive factor in the Russian bloc is that of armed force, any policy which tends to push this into the background threatens to break up the bloc. Already, the Eastern bloc is in a state of growing dislocation. For example, the invective traded between East Germany and Hungary, between "reformist" and "conservative" governments, is not just a sham. It reveals real splits which are building up between different national bourgeoisies. In this zone, the centrifugal tendencies are so strong that they go out of control as soon as they have the opportunity. And today, this is being fed by fears from within the parties led by the "conservatives" that the movement which started in the USSR, and grew in Poland and Hungary, should contaminate and destabilise them.
We find a similar phenomenon in the peripheral republics of the USSR. These regions are more or less colonies of Tsarist or even Stalinist Russia (eg the Baltic countries annexed under the 1939 Germano-Soviet pact). However, unlike the other great powers Russia has never been able to decolonise, since this would have meant losing all control over these regions, some of which are vital economically. The nationalist movements which today are profiting from a loosening of central control by the Russian party are developing more than half a century late relative to the movements which hit the British and French empires; their dynamic is towards separation from Russia.
In the end, if the central power in Moscow does not react, then we will see the explosion, not just of the Russian bloc, but of its dominant power. The Russian bourgeoisie, which today rules the world's second power, would find itself at the head of a second-rate power, a good deal weaker than Germany for example.
19) "Perestroika" has thus opened a veritable Pandora's Box of increasingly uncontrollable situations, such as what has happened in Poland with the installation of a Solidarnosc-led government. Gorbachev's "centrist" policy (as Yeltsin describes it) is in reality treading a tightrope between two tendencies whose confrontation is inevitable: one that wants to take "liberalisation" to its logical conclusion because half-measures can resolve nothing either economically or politically, and one that opposes this movement for fear that it will cause the downfall of the bourgeoisie in its present form, and even the collapse of Russia's imperialist power.
Since today the ruling bourgeoisie still controls the police and army (including in Poland of course), this confrontation can only turn to violence, and even to a bloodbath such as we saw recently in China. These confrontations will be all the more brutal given the population's hatred for the Stalinist mafia, that has built up over more than half a century in the USSR, and for 40 years in its satellites, of terror, massacres, tortures, famine, and a phenomenal cynical arrogance. If the Stalinist bureaucracy were to lose power in the country it controls, it would be subjected to a veritable pogrom.
20) But however the situation in the Eastern bloc evolves, the events that are shaking it today mean the historic crisis, the definitive collapse of Stalinism, this monstrous symbol of the most terrible counter-revolution the proletariat has ever known. The greatest lie in history is being stripped bare today.
In these countries, an unprecedented period of instability, convulsions, and chaos has begun, whose implications go far beyond their frontiers. In particular, the weakening, which will continue, of the Russian bloc, opens the gates to a destabilisation of the whole system of international relations and imperialist constellations which emerged from World War II with the Yalta Agreements. However, this does not at all put in question the course towards class confrontations. In reality, the present collapse of the Eastern bloc is another sign of the general decomposition of capitalist society, whose origins lie precisely in the bourgeoisie's inability to give its own answer - imperialist war - to the open crisis of the world economy. In this sense, more than ever the key to the historical perspective is in the hands of the proletariat.
21) The present events in the Eastern bloc confirm once again that the heaviest responsibility lies on the proletariat's battalions in the central countries, especially in Western Europe. There is the danger, in the economic and political convulsions, the confrontations between sectors of the bourgeoisie that await the Stalinist regimes, that the workers in these countries could let themselves be drawn in and massacred behind the contesting capitalist forces (as was the case in Spain 1936), or even that their struggles could be drawn onto this terrain. Despite their extent and their combativity, this summer's struggles in the USSR have not abolished the enormous political backwardness that weighs on the proletariat in this country, and in the rest of the Eastern bloc. In this part of the world, due to capital's economic backwardness, but above all to the depth and brutality of the counter-revolution, the workers are still terribly vulnerable to the mystifications and traps of democracy, unions, and nationalism. The nationalist explosions of recent months in the USSR, but also the illusions that the struggles in this country revealed along with the low level of political consciousness of the Polish workers despite two decades of important struggles, are a new illustration of the ICC's analysis on this question (rejection of the "weak link" theory). In this sense, the denunciation in struggle of all the democratic and trade union mystifications by the workers in the central countries, especially given the importance of the illusions in the West held by workers in the East, will be a fundamental element in the latter's' ability to avoid the bourgeoisie's traps, and to avoid being turned away from their class terrain.
22) The events presently shaking the so-called socialist countries', the de facto disappearance of the Russian bloc, the patent and definitive bankruptcy of Stalinism on the economic, political and ideological level, constitute along with the international resurgence of the proletariat at the end of the sixties, the most important historic facts since the Second World War. An event on such a scale cannot fail to have its repercussions, and indeed is already doing so, on the consciousness of the working class, all the more so because it involves an ideology and political system that was presented for more than half a century by all sectors of the bourgeoisie as 'socialist' or working class'.
The disappearance of Stalinism is the disappearance of the symbol and spearhead of the most terrible counter-revolution in history.
But this does not mean that the development of the consciousness of the world proletariat will be facilitated by it. On the contrary. Even in its death throes, Stalinism is rendering a last service to the domination of capital; in decomposing, its cadaver continues to pollute the atmosphere that the proletariat breathes. For the dominant sectors of the bourgeoisie, the final collapse of Stalinist ideology, the `democratic', 'liberal' and nationalist movements which are sweeping the eastern countries, provide a golden opportunity to unleash and intensify their campaigns of mystification.
The identification which is systematically established between Stalinism and communism, the lie repeated a thousand times, and today being wielded more than ever, according to which the proletarian revolution can only end in disaster, will for a whole period gain an added impact within the ranks of the working class. We thus have to expect a momentary retreat in the consciousness of the proletariat; the signs of this can already be seen in the unions' return to strength. While the incessant and increasingly brutal attacks which capitalism can't help but mount on the proletariat will oblige the workers to enter the struggle, in an initial period, this won't result in a greater capacity in the class to develop its consciousness. In particular, reformist ideology will weigh very heavily on the struggle in the period ahead, greatly facilitating the action of the unions.
Given the historic importance of the events that are determining it, the present retreat of the proletariat - although it doesn't call into question the historic course, the general perspective of class confrontations - is going to be much deeper than the one which accompanied the defeat of 1981 in Poland. Having said this, we cannot foresee in advance its breadth or its length. In particular, the rhythm of the collapse of western capitalism - which at present we can see accelerating, with the perspective of a new and open recession - will constitute a decisive factor in establishing the moment when the proletariat will be able to resume its march towards revolutionary consciousness.
By sweeping away the illusions about the revival' of the world economy, by exposing the lie which presents liberal' capitalism as a solution to the historic bankruptcy of the whole capitalist mode of production - and not only of its Stalinist incarnation - the intensification of the capitalist crisis will eventually push the proletariat to turn again towards the perspective of a new society, to more and more inscribe this perspective onto its struggles. As the ICC wrote after the 1981 defeat in Poland, the capitalist crisis remains the best ally of the working class.
ICC 5/10/89
There’s a brand new fashion in the proletarian milieu, a smart little theory which its trend setting designers present as a long-lost secret of marxism, permitting them to explain the historical evolution of capitalist society without – and here’s the beauty of it – having to drag in that commonplace, old-hat theory of decadence which the ICC in particular has been going on about for so long. The ICC and other ‘Philistine’ currents (such as the KAPD, Bilan and Internationalisme) may argue that capitalism passed from its ascendant to its decadent phase at the time of the first world war, putting the proletarian revolution on the agenda and rendering obsolete the old tactics of the workers’ movement (support for parliamentarism, national liberation struggles, etc.); but the truly fashionable just turn up their noses and sneer. No, no, they say, the real secret of capitalism’s evolution is contained in the notion of the transition from its phase of ‘formal domination’ to its phase of ‘real domination’ – a notion which Marx himself developed but which has been given a whole new significance by its contemporary purveyors.
Take a look at the whole ‘neo-Bordigist’ wing of the milieu. There’s the grandly-named Revue Internationale du Movement Communiste, a joint publication issued by Communisme ou Civilisation (France), Union Proletarienne (France), Grupo Communismo (Mexico) and Kamunist Kranti (India). The first three of these groups all lay claim to the ‘formal-real domination’ framework. C ou C have written three long volumes explaining the ins and outs of the theory. Then there’s the newly formed, and even more grandly titled Movement Communiste pour la formation du parti mondial, the result of a regroupment between Cahiers Communistes (France) and A Contre Courant (Belgium). Number O of their review contains a statement of ‘programmatic reference points’, which again emphasises the importance of understanding the notion. And it’s not just the neo-Bordigists. The crypto-councilists who call themselves the ‘External Fraction of the ICC’ don’t want to look old fashioned either. According to a text in Internationalist Perspective n°7 (written by comrade MacIntosh as a contribution to debate but not publicly answered by any other member of the EFICC), the “epochal change from the formal to the real domination of capital” is not only a decisive element in the development of state capitalist, but also “result in the permanent crisis of the capitalist mode of production... renders the contradiction in the capitalist production process insoluble.” According to the EFICC, the ICC remains utterly blind to this starting scientific breakthrough because it has lost all interest in theoretical deepening. To be honest, like many other fashions of the 80s, this ‘theory’ isn’t entirely new. In fact, just as punk fashions were largely a rehash of 50s styles, so the magical properties of ‘formal-real domination’ were first advertised in the late ‘60s by the Invariance group around Jacques Camatte. Invariance was a group that broke with the ‘official’ Bordigism of the PCI (Programma) and began to evolve on certain questions (ie recognising the historical contribution of the German left communists). But its adoption of formal-real domination as the cornerstone of its theoretical edifice didn’t prevent it rapidly abandoning marxism and vanishing into the void of modernism. Indeed, its misuse of the concept definitely helped it on its way. For Invariance, by completing its real domination, especially in the post-1945 period, capitalism, far from being historically obsolete, decadent, sunk in a permanent crisis, had not only demonstrated a capacity for almost unlimited growth, but had become so powerful that nothing could stand in its way. For the modernist Camatte, ‘real-domination’ had come to mean the total, omnipresent triumph of capital, the integration of the proletariat, the end of the perspective of working class revolution. Henceforward, the hope for communism lay as much with the animals and the trees as with the proletariat.
Today’s pioneers of the concept don’t identify with the modernist Invariance, which long ago passed into its final nirvana along with other modernist sects who took up the formal-real domination idea (Negation, Union Ouvriere, etc). But what they do share with Invariance is an inflation, a blatant misuse, of Marx’s notion of formal and real domination. In order to make an outline response to the ideas forwarded by these elements (which is all we intend to do at this stage), and thus come to the defence of the theory of decadence, as other articles in this series have done, we must first go back to what Marx himself said about this concept.
MARX ON THE TRANSITION FROM FORMAL TO REAL DOMINATION
The fact that Marx’s most developed formulation of this notion is contained in a chapter of Capital not published until the 30s, and then virtually unknown until the 60s, has to some extent allowed the latter-day theorisers to surround the whole concept with an air of mystery, to give the impression of a long-buried secret finally brought to light. The EFICC add spice to this mystery when MacIntosh claims that “their basic concepts would have been incorporated into the later volumes of Marx’s projected Capital had the lived to complete them” (IP 7) – which may well be true, but which also down plays the fact that the basic concepts were already there in the only volume of Capital he did complete: Vol 1. The arguments contained in the chapter published later (published in English as ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’) are essentially an elaboration of what is contained in the completed volume. In Vol 1, Marx introduces the concept of the ‘formal” and “real subsumption of labour under capital” in his chapter ‘Absolute and Relative Surplus-value’:
“The prolongation of the working day beyond the point at which the worker would have produced an exact equivalent for the value of his labour-power, and the appropriation of that surplus labour by capital – this is the process which constitutes the production of absolute surplus value. It forms the general foundation of the capitalist system, and the starting point for the production of relative surplus-value. The latter presupposes that the working day is already divided into two parts, necessary labour and surplus labour. In order to prolong the surplus labour, the necessary labour is short-ended by methods for producing the equivalent of the wage of labour in a shorter time. The production of absolute surplus-value turns exclusively on the length of the working day, whereas the production of relative surplus-value completely revolutionises the technical processes of labour and the groupings into which society is divided. “It therefore requires a specifically capitalist mode of production, a mode of production which, along with its methods, means and conditions, arises and develops spontaneously on the bases of the formal subsumption of labour under capitalism. This formal subsumption is then replaced by a real subsumption,” (Capital Vol 1, p 645 of the 1976 Penguin ed).
In short: formal subsumption involves the extraction of absolute surplus value, real subsumption the extraction of relative surplus-value. Historically, the advent of this formal subsumption corresponds to the passage from domestic industry to manufacturing: “A merely formal subsumption of labour under capital suffices for the production of absolute surplus value. It is enough, for example, that handicraftsmen who previously worked on their own account, or as apprentices of a master, should become wage labourers under control of the capitalist,” (ibid).
When we turn to the ‘unpublished’ chapter, we find exactly the same concepts, only explained at greater length. For example: “The real subsumption of labour under capital is developed in all the forms evolved by relative, as opposed to absolute surplus-value. With the real subsumption of labour under capital a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity of the workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists,” (Ibid, p. 1035).
In another passage, Marx makes it clear that the passage from the formal to the real subsumption of labour corresponds to the transition from manufacture (when capitalist grouped together numbers of handicraftsmen and extracted surplus-value from them without any fundamental change in the methods of production) to large-scale industry: “... capital subsumes the labour process as it finds it, that is to say, it takes over an existing labour process, developed by different and more archaic modes of production. And since that is the case, it is evident that capital took over an available, established labour process. For example handicraft: a mode of agriculture corresponding to a small independent peasant economy. If changes occur in these traditional established labour processes after their takeover by capital, these are nothing but the gradual consequences of the subsumption. The work may become more intensive, its duration may be extended, it may become more continuous or orderly under the eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these changes do not affect the character of the actual labour process, the actual mode of working. This stands in striking contrast to the development of a specifically capitalist mode of production (large-scale industry, etc); the latter not only transforms the situations of the various agents of production, it also revolutionises their actual mode of labour and the real nature of the labour process as a whole. It is in contradiction to this last that we come to designate as the formal subsumption of labour under capital what we have discussed earlier, viz. the takeover by capital or a mode of labour developed before the emergence of capitalist relations,” (Ibid, p. 1021).
To sum up: the “epochal” change from the formal to the real domination of capital was one which had already occurred when Marx was writing, since it was the same thing as the transition from manufacture to modern industry, which took place at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century. And as Marx explains in his chapter on ‘Machinery and Large-Scale Industry’ in Vol 1 of Capital, it was this passage that was a decisive factor in the rapid and unprecedented expansion of the capitalist mode of production in the ensuing period. In other words: the most dynamic phase of ascendancy of bourgeois society was founded on the basis of the real domination of capital.
HOW THE EPIGONES MISUSE MARX
1. The Wanderings of Invariance
This is how Marx defined the concepts of formal and real domination. How do the epigones manage with it? “The phase of formal subsumption of labour to capital (XVI – XVIII century) and the phase of real subsumption (XIX - XX)” (‘Les Deux Phases Historiques de la Production Capitaliste, I’ in C ou C no. 5, p.3). Or again:
“In the last third of the 18th century we have the affirmation of the phase of real subsumption, whose mode of extracting surplus value is based on relative surplus value,” (Ibid, p. 33). The problem is with the conclusions that C ou C draw from this: they use it to provide an other argument against the notion of decadence and in favour of the ‘invariance’ of marxism since 1848, since for them communism becomes possible as soon as the phase of real domination begins. This is how they present their work on the ‘Two Historic Phases’: “We hope in this way to clear some of the ground of all the confusions and mystifications which the periodisation of capital is subject to. Finally, the pseudo-concept of a ‘decadence’ of the capitalist mode of production falls to pieces as soon as you open Marx’s unpublished chapter of Capital... “If you consider the capitalist mode of production decadent because it has ceased to play a progressive and revolutionary role, then we’ve been in full decadence since 1848, since from that time on, capital was already sufficiently developed to pose within itself the material bases of communism. Qualitatively, this date has, for us, tolled the bell once and for all. It’s a correct understanding of the periodisation of capital which permits one to affirm, among other things, the following: communism has been possible since 1848,” (ibid, p.4). At first sight, Mouvement Communiste has the same position:
“Marxism has declared the capitalist mode of production to be ‘in decadence’ since 1848, by posing, from this date, the necessity and possibility of the communist revolution,” (MC, no 0, p. 21). But dig a little deeper and you’ll discover that MC are only neo-neo-Bordigists. To take an important example: whereas C ou C, like its acknowledged predecessor, the pre-modernist Invariance, has no shame about affirming the “revolutionary”, “anti-imperialist” character of national independence struggles, in that they allegedly accelerate the passage from formal to real domination in the ex-colonies (cf C ou C no. 9, p.47), MC can’t stomach anything to do with national liberation struggles, and so bends the theory of formal-real domination to suit its own purposes: “With the passage of the capitalist mode of production to its phase of real domination ... which was, on a global, world-wide scale effected by the beginning of the 20th century – the historic balance of forces between the fundamental antagonistic classes means the liquidation of the tactics of support for progressive bourgeois factions fighting against feudalism, of support, in the interests of the permanent revolution, of certain struggles for the constitution of nation states ... as well as the specific tactics of the double revolution. All that remained on the agenda, on a world scale, was the elaboration of ‘direct and/or indirect’ tactics in complete conformity with the purely proletarian and communist revolution,” (ibid, p. 20-21). The same goes for the old tactics of parliamentarism and organising in trade unions. So now we find that for MC, the truly “epochal” change, the one that requires a wholesale alteration of the programme of the workers’ movement isn’t actually the transition from formal domination to real domination, but the point at which this transition is completed on a global scale – which, by a remarkable coincidence, just happens to coincide with the period that certain ‘Philistines’ define as the beginning of the decadent period of capitalism.
In fact this shiftiness, this subtle bending of the periodisation of formal and real domination to suit the particular views of this or that group, isn’t restricted to MC. We find the same with the original trend-setters, Invariance, for whom the real change takes place sometimes in 1914, sometimes earlier, sometimes between 1914 and 1945 and sometimes not until after 1945. And we get similar evasiveness with the EFICC, as we shall see. But for the moment, let’s turn to the true ‘invariants’ C ou C, and their idea that communism has been possible since 1848. We have already dealt at length, in a previous article in this series (see IR 48) with the arguments of the GCI, who claim that communism has been on the agenda since the beginning of the capitalist system. Suffice it to say here that C ou C, despite their claims to marxist orthodoxy, are, no less than the GCI, totally at odds with historical materialism on this crucial question. Central to Marx’s own definition of historical materialism in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy is the notion that a new society only becomes possible when the old one has become a permanent fetter on the development of the productive forces. Certainly 1848 was a historical watershed, since it witnessed both the first real appearance of the proletariat as an autonomous force (July days in Paris, Chartism, etc), and the first scientific statement of the general principles of communism (the Communist Manifesto). It thus announced that the proletariat was the future gravedigger of capitalism. But in 1848 capitalist relations of production were not at all a fetter on the productive forces; on the contrary, having arrived at the stage of large-scale industry (i.e. of real domination), they were in the process of conquering the whole globe. In 1848 Marx and Engels may have believed in the imminence of the communist revolution. But by the 1850s they had not only reversed their view but also considered that the most important task in front of them was to understand the historical dynamic of capital and so to determine the point at which the system’s inner contradictions would become a permanent barrier to capital itself. They fully recognised that this was something for the future, because capitalism was, before their very eyes, going through its most ‘heroic’ period of expansion and growth Das Kapital is itself the product of this necessary period of reflection and clarification.
The problem with the Bordigists is that they tend to confuse objective, material conditions with the subjective awareness of the proletarian vanguard: in short, they think that the party is omnipotent. In 1848 the communist minority was able to affirm the perspective of communism as the final goal of the workers’ movement; for the neo-Bordigists of C ou C, this marxist prevision is turned into an immediate possibility, as though it was enough for the communists to will it into existence. Marxism has a name for this ideological deviation: idealism.
2. The EFICC: Centrist as Always
With the EFICC’s discover of formal-real domination, its habitual centrism towards councilism becomes, in this particular matter, centrism towards Bordigism. While C ou C and the rest have explicitly developed the framework as an attack on the notion of decadence, the EFICC wants to have its cake (decadence, state capitalism) and eat it (formal-real domination). Through the pen of comrade MacIntosh, they claim that the transition from formal to real domination provides a “causal link” in the chain leading to both the decadence of capitalism and its specific mode of organisation – state capitalism. Unhappily, on how the advent of real domination ‘causes’ the decadence of capitalism, we have no more than the short passage cited above, which itself is no more than a footnote to MacIntosh’s article. We wait breathlessly for the next instalment. But we already note that MacIntosh now has virtually nothing to say about one of the links in the causal chain which he used to talk about very articulately when he used to talk about very articulately when he was in the ICC – namely Luxemburg’s theory of the exhaustion of pre-capitalist markets as a fundamental determinant of the onset of decadence. We wonder whether Rosa’s theory is going to be dumped by the EFICC, who in their quest for reasons for existing are discarding more and more of the basic analyses of the ICC. But for the moment, we can’t pursue this line of thought any further.
In any case, the brunt of MacIntosh’s article is taken up with showing how the transition from formal to real domination compels capitalism to adopt its statified form. It’s a very long article, which contains some interesting contributions on the role of the state in marxist theory. But the argumentation it puts forward about how the transition from formal to real domination explains state capitalism is very thin indeed. To justify his theses, MacIntosh cites certain passages from the ‘Results’, where Marx says that under the real domination of capital, “the real lever of the overall labour process is increasingly not the individual worker” but “labour power socially combined”, and that this shift requires “...the use of science... in the immediate process of production” (Internationalist Perspectives n°7, p. 21, citing Capital, op cit. pp. 1039-40, 1024). From these brief passages MacIntosh leaps to the conclusion that only the state can organise, scientifically, the extraction of relative surplus value from the collective labourer: hence state capitalism and the totalitarian organisation of modern social life. The flaws in this argument aren’t hard to detect. First, while the socialisation of labour is an ‘organic’ product of capitalist development, like the concentration of capital, state capitalism is a response to the break-down of this organic development, a product of the exhaustion of the possibilities for the ‘peaceful’ extension of capitalist production. To find the real causes of state capitalism, you have to explain why the organic growth of capital in its ascendant phase was violently interrupted, and for this Luxembourg’s theory provides a coherent and consistent answer. Secondly, MacIntosh has got his periodisation all mixed up, as we have already argued in our article in International Review n°54. The appearance of the collective labourer, the application of science to the production process, was a development going on in Marx’s own time – in the ascendant phase of capital, in the nineteenth century. The development of state capitalism takes place in the twentieth century, in the epoch of decadence. What MacIntosh has done here is to identify the epoch of ascendancy with the phase of formal domination, and the epoch of decadence with the phase of real domination. As we said earlier on, C ou C are at least consistent with Marx when they place the transition from formal to real domination inside the ascendant period; they’re also within a certain logic to use this as an argument against decadence and to claim that communism has been possible since 1848. But the EFICC are just plan confused.
THE SHIFTING BORDERS OF REAL DOMINATION
In Internationalist Perspectives n°12, the EFICC claims to answer our previous criticisms of their periodisation of capital: " ...the ICC chose to interpret the category of the real domination of capital as meaning not the generalisation of the extraction of relative surplus-value to the whole of the capitalist mode of production, not the decadence of capitalism on the extraction of relative-surplus value, but the mere appearance of this category on the capitalist landscape, its very inception – thereby situating it at the very outset of capitalism ... In fact, far from being situated in the 18th century, or even in 1848, the change from the formal to the real domination of capital was only completed after 1914, its final triumph stretching into recent decades with the spread of the real domination of capital to virtually the whole of the vital agrarian sector.” We’ve already noted the tendency for the purveyors of this theory to shift the borders of real domination to suit their particular version of the story. Invariance, for example, became more and more interested in chronicling the advances of real domination during the 20th century precisely in order to shore up their vision of an all-powerful, all-encompassing ‘community of capital’. MC and the EFICC, on the other hand, are rather too attached to the class positions they learned from the ICC and so want to emphasise that the crucial change took place at the beginning of the 20th century, when the old tactics of the workers’ movement had to be abandoned. All this takes us a long way from Marx, for whom the categories of formal and real domination had a very much more precise use. They were never put forward as the ultimate secret of the evolution of capital, as the key to the crisis of the system, and so on. It’s not by chance that Marx developed the concepts in Vol 1 of Capital, where he deals not with the crisis but with the ‘internal’ relationship between labour and capital, with the direct mode of exploitation at the point of production. Certainly the concept was important for explaining the enormous expansion of capital in his day, but it had no pretensions beyond this.
This can hardly satisfy our latter-day theorists who want the concept to be a worthy rival to the theory of decadence (or, in the case of the EFICC, a new explanation for decadence). For them it has to be pumped up into a huge, all-embracing concept that can account for all the changes in the economic, social and political life of capital. But in doing so, the concept loses all the precision it had with Marx, and becomes utterly blurred and vague. But this also suits the ‘formal-real’ theorisers, since it allows them to mould the notion to their own needs. Take the EFICC, for example. They began by talking about the “epochal” change from formal to real domination as a determining factor in the historical crisis of capital and its evolution towards a statified form. Then the ICC replied: if this change can be located in a particular ‘epoch’, it took place within the ascendant period – so in what way is it an explanation for decadence and state capitalism? So the EFICC try to wriggle out of this by arguing that the ‘epochal change’ may have begun in the 18th century but it’s still going on today... Of course, they’re not exactly wrong here: there remain, especially in the ‘third world’, whole areas of production still only formally dominated by capital. Indeed, there remain whole areas that haven’t even reached this stage yet. It’s a safe bet to say that the final, complete and universal triumph of real domination will never come. But if the effective transition is one that has been going on for 200 years, how on earth are we going to measure the specific changes in the life of capital that this process has brought about? At this point, the whole thing becomes so vague that it begins to disappear from sight. The only way to avoid this vagueness is to recognise, with Marx, that the decisive shift in the mode of capitalist exploitation took place in the ascendant period and that from then on capitalist development and expansion didn’t go through a mechanical repetition of this change in each country or region but took place on the basis of real domination, of large-scale industry with its scientific exploitation of social labour. There’s another serious error contained in the view that emphasises the 20th century, especially the post 1945 period, as the ‘true’ epoch of real domination. Since the shift to real domination was a decisive factor in the phenomenal growth of capital during the 19th century, why shouldn’t the same be true of the 20th? Or, rather, if the change from the formal to the real domination takes place in the 20th century doesn’t it imply that 20th century; doesn’t it imply that 20th century capitalism, far from being decadent, is in its period of greatest growth and development?
This, in fact, is precisely the conclusion reached by Invariance, and one that greatly facilitated its collapse into modernism. It’s also echoed by the current neo-Bordigists who love to ridicule the theory of decadence by pointing to the enormous growth rates in the post-45 period. For the EFICC, which still clings to the notion of decadence, it’s important to at all costs avoid such a conclusion, but logic certainly isn’t in its favour. The current fashion in the proletarian milieu for denigrating the theory of decadence must be seen in this light: it’s a reflection of the penetration of bourgeois ideology into the workers’ movement, and must be combated as such. At the same time, the task of discovering an ‘alternative’ to the theory of decadence as a foundation-stone of revolutionary politics gives an artificial life to a whole host of sects and parasitic groups who would otherwise be hard-pressed to justify their existence; furthermore, because they tend to downplay the catastrophic nature of the present crisis, which is an expression of the veritable death-agony of the capitalist system, the false theorisation about formal-real domination provide a perfect argument in favour of a sterile academicism which looks with snobbish disdain at those revolutionaries who have committed themselves to a militant intervention in the class struggle. Unfortunately for our professors and experts in marxism, history is accelerating so quickly today that it will soon be disturbing the serenity of their studies with the vulgar stomp of its boots on the streets outside. CDW
“While this general prosperity lasts, enabling the productive forces of bourgeois society to develop to the full extent possible within the bourgeois system, there can be no question of a real revolution. Such a revolution is only possible at a time when two factors come into conflict: the modern productive forces and the bourgeois forms of production... A new revolution is only possible as a result of a new crisis; but it will come, just as surely as the crisis itself” (Marx, The Class Struggle in France).
The recent collapse of the Eastern bloc is, along with the historic resurgence of the proletariat at the end of the 60's, the most important event since World War II. What has taken place since mid-1989 has put an end to a world situation which has lasted for decades. The 'Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the Eastern bloc countries', drawn up in September 89, provide a framework for understanding the causes of these events, and their implications. Most of this analysis' main points have been amply confirmed in recent months. This is why it is unnecessary to go over it again at length here, other than to take account of the major events which have occurred since the publication of the last issue of our Review. By contrast, it is essential for revolutionaries to examine the implications of this new historical situation, because its differences with the previous situation are extremely significant. This is what we propose to do in the following article.
For several months, the evolution of the situation in Eastern Europe has apparently fulfilled all the bourgeoisie's dreams of "peaceful democratization". However, by the end of December 89, the "Theses'" forecast of murderous confrontations was to be tragically confirmed. The bloodbaths in Romania and Soviet Azrbaidjan are not likely to remain an exception. This country's "democratization" constitutes the end of a period in Stalinism's collapse: that of the disappearance of the "people's democracies"[1]. At the same time, it inaugurates a new period: that of bloody confrontations throughout this part of the world, and especially in the one European country still ruled by a Stalinist party (apart from tiny Albania) the USSR itself. Recent weeks' events in Russia confirm the authorities' complete loss of control over the situation, even if for the moment Gorbachev seems capable of maintaining his position at the head of the Party. The Russian tanks in Baku are certainly no demonstration of the strength of the USSR's ruling regime; on the contrary, they are a terrible admission of weakness. Gorbachev had promised that the authorities would no longer use armed force against the population: the bloodbath in the Caucasus has completely written off his policy of "restructuring". What has happened in this region is only a foretaste of far greater convulsions which will shake the USSR, and eventually bring it crashing to the ground.
The USSR plunges into the chaos
In just a few months, the USSR has lost the imperialist bloc that it dominated up until last summer. From now on, the "Eastern bloc" no longer exists; it has been ripped to shreds, at the same time as the Stalinist regimes in power in the "peoples' democracies" collapsed like a house of cards. But a reversal on this scale cannot stop there: given that the prime cause behind the bloc's decomposition is the utter economic and political bankruptcy of its dominant power faced with the inexorable aggravation of the world capitalist crisis, it is inevitable that this collapse should be most brutally expressed within this same ruling power. The nationalist explosions in the Caucasus, the 'armed confrontations between Azeris and Armenians, the pogroms in Baku, all these convulsions which were at the origin of the "Red" Army's massive and bloody intervention, are yet one more step towards the collapse and breakup of what was, less than a year ago, the second world super-power. The open secession by Azrbaidjan (where even the local Supreme Soviet set itself against Moscow), but also by Armenia where the streets are patrolled by armed forces which have nothing to do with the official regime, are only the beginning of a secession of all Russia's surrounding regions. The Moscow authorities, by using military force, have tried to put a stop to such a process whose next stages are heralded by the "peaceful" secession of Lithuania and the nationalist demonstrations in the Ukraine during January. But repression can at most only put off the deadline. Even in Baku, not to mention in the surrounding towns and countryside; the situation is far from being under control. The media silence since Russian troops went in does not mean in the least that things have 'gone back to normal'. "Glasnost" is selective in the USSR, just as it is in the West. The aim is to avoid encouraging other nationalities to follow the example of the Armenians and Azeris. And even if the tanks have for the moment suppressed the nationalist demonstrations, for the government in Moscow, nothing is settled. Until recently, only a part of the population has been actively mobilized against Russian tutelage; the tanks' arrival, and the massacres that followed, have welded the whole Azeri population against the "occupier". Today, it is not only the Armenians who go in fear of their lives: the Russian population within Azrbaidjan is also threatened thanks to this military operation. Moreover, the authorities in Moscow do not have the means to use the same methods to "maintain order" everywhere. For one thing, the Azeris only represent 5% of all the USSR's non-Russian population. We can only wonder what means the government would have to employ to put down 40 million Ukrainians, for example. Moreover, the authorities cannot even count on the loyalty of the "Red" Army. Soldiers from the various national minorities that today are clamoring for independence are less and less inclined to go and get killed to defend continued Russian domination over these same minorities. The Russians themselves are increasingly reluctant to take on this kind of job. This can be seen in demonstrations such as those of 19th January in Krasnodar (southern Russia), whose slogans have shown clearly that the population is not ready to accept a new Afghanistan; as a result of these demonstrations, the authorities were obliged to demobilize the reservists who had been called up only a few days previously.
The same process which led, a few months ago, to the explosion of the Russian bloc, is continuing today with the explosion of its leading member. Like the Stalinist regimes themselves, the Eastern bloc was only held together by terror, and by the threat - carried out on several occasions - of brutal military repression. No sooner did economic collapse and the resulting paralysis of the economic and military apparatus destroy the USSR's ability to exercise such repression, than its empire fell apart. But this disintegration brings in its wake the disintegration of the USSR itself, since it also is made up of a mosaic of nationalities under Russian domination. Stalinism's merciless repression only prevented the nationalism of these minorities from appearing openly; enforced silence only served to strengthen it, and now that Gorbachev's "perestroika" has removed the immediate threat of repression, it has been unleashed. As a result, repression is today once more on the cards, but it is already too late to turn back the wheel of history. The political situation, like the economic, is now completely out of the control of Gorbachev and his Party. All that "perestroika" has brought is still emptier shelves in the shops, still more misery, and the liberation of the worst kind of chauvinism and xenophobia, accompanied by every sort of pogrom and massacre.
And this is only a beginning. The chaos which holds sway today in the USSR can only get worse, since neither the ruling regime nor the state of its economy offer any other perspective. The failure of "perestroika" (ie the 'step-by-step' attempt to adapt a political and economic apparatus paralyzed by the deepening world crisis) becomes more evident every day. A return to the previous situation, the reassertion of complete centralized control of the economic apparatus, and of the terror of the Stalin or Brezhnev era, even were it to be attempted by the apparatus' "conservative" sectors, would solve nothing. These methods have already failed, and perestroika started from the recognition of this failure. Since then, the situation has wor-se.ne d considerably at every level. The still powerful resistance on the part of the bureaucratic apparatus, which can see the very bases of its power and privilege dissolving under it, must lead to new massacres, but without surmounting the overall chaos. Finally, the establishment of more classical forms of capitalist domination self-management for individual factories, the introduction of market criteria of profitability - may be the only alternative possible; .in the short term, it can only heighten economic chaos. We can see its consequences today in Poland: 900% inflation, an unstoppable rise in unemployment (in the 4th quarter 1989, the production of manufactured foodstuffs fell by 41%, and of clothes by 28%). In the midst of this kind of economic chaos, there is no room for "gradual democratization" and economic stability.
Thus, whatever the policy finally decided on by the leading bodies of the Communist Party of the USSR, whoever eventually succeeds Gorbachev, the result will hardly be any different. For this country, the perspective is one of growing convulsions, but on a far greater scale than those of the last few weeks: starvation, massacres, armed vendettas between members of the "Nomenklatura", or between populations drunk with nationalism. The communist October Revolution of 1917 fell victim to its own isolation; Stalinism established its power on the corpse with appalling barbarity. Today it is dying in barbarity and chaos.
The situation in the USSR and in most of the East European countries will increasingly resemble that of countries in the 'Third World'. Less and less will the situation of countries like Lebanon, subjected to the total decomposition of all social life and the law of the armed gang, be limited to zones outside the heart of capitalism. Today, the whole part of the world until recently dominated by the second world power is threatened with just such a 'Lebanonisation'. And this is in Europe itself, only a few hundred kilometers from the world's oldest and largest industrial concentrations.
This is why the collapse of the Eastern imperialist bloc does not only mean an upheaval for the countries within this zone, and for the imperialist arrangements that emerged from World War II, it also brings with it a general instability which cannot help affecting every country in the world, including the most solid amongst them. In this sense, revolutionaries must be able to come to grips with these upheavals, bring up to date the analytical framework which remained valid up until last summer, when our last International Congress was held (see International Review no.59), but which events have since partly overtaken. This is what we now propose to do for the three "classic" aspects of the international situation:
- the capitalist crisis,
- inter-imperialist conflicts,
- the class struggle.
The capitalist crisis
It is on this point that the analyses of the last Congress retain their greatest validity. In fact, the world economy's evolution during the last 6 months has fully confirmed the Congress' analysis of the aggravation of its crisis. The illusions, based in particular on the 1988-89 figures for GNP growth, which the bourgeois "specialists" tried to present as proof of "growth" and "an end to the crisis" have been blown away (see the articles in this and the previous issue of the International Review).
As far as the Eastern ex-bloc countries are concerned, "Glasnost" not only allows us to get a more realistic view of their real situation, it also makes it possible to measure the full extent of their economic disaster. Previous official figures (like those used in the report on the international situation presented to the 8th Congress), which already revealed a disaster on a large scale, have proved to be well short of reality. The economies of the Eastern countries resemble a vast ruin, their agriculture (despite employing a far higher proportion of the population than in Western countries) absolutely incapable of feeding the population, and their industry not only out-of-date and obsolete, but completely paralyzed and unable to function due to failures in transport and the supply of spares, mechanical fatigue, etc, and above all due to a general lack of interest on the part of its human elements, from the blue-collar workers to the managing directors. Almost half a century after World War II, the economy which according to Khrushchev at the beginning of the 60's was to catch up and overtake those of the Western countries and so "prove 'socialism's' superiority over capitalism", looks as if the war had only just ended. Although the complete economic bankruptcy that has become evident in recent years is behind the collapse of the Eastern bloc, this bankruptcy has not yet hit bottom: far from it. And this is all the more true in that the world economic crisis not only can only get worse, but will be still further amplified by the consequences of the disaster that has struck the Eastern bloc.
We have to emphasize what nonsense it is (nonsense that is put about by some sectors of the bourgeoisie, but also by certain revolutionary groups) to suppose that the Eastern economies' opening to the world market will give the capitalist economy as a whole a "shot arm". Reality is quite different.
In the first place, for the Eastern countries to help improve the situation of the world economy, they would have to constitute a real market. There is no shortage of needs, any more than there is in the Third World. The question is: how can they buy what they lack? And here is where we immediately perceive the absurdity of such an analysis. These countries have nothing to pay with. They have absolutely no financial resources; in fact, they joined the ranks of highly indebted countries long ago (in1989, the combined foreign debt of the ex-"people's democracies" stood at $100 billion[2], ie a figure comparable to that of Brazil, for a roughly equal population and GNP). For them to buy, they must first be able to sell. But what can they sell on the world market, when the major cause of the Stalinist regimes' collapse (within the context of the overall capitalist crisis of course) was precisely their complete lack of economic competitivity on precisely the same market?
Some sectors of the bourgeoisie answer this objection with the idea of a new 'Marshall Plan' to rebuild these countries' economic potential. In reality, although the Eastern countries' economies have some points in common with that of Europe as a whole at the end of the last war, a new 'Marshall Plan' is completely impossible today. This plan (whose aim was not so much to rebuild Europe but to prevent it falling under the control of the USSR) was able to succeed only because the entire world (except the USA) had to be rebuilt. There was no problem, at the time, of a generalized over-production of commodities; and the origins of the open crisis which we have known since the end of the 60's lie precisely in the end of the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan. This is why a massive injection of capital to develop the Eastern countries' economic and especially industrial potential cannot be on the cards today. Even supposing that their productive capacity could be put back on its feet, the commodities they produced would only overburden an already saturated world market. The countries emerging from Stalinism today are in the same situation as the under-developed countries: the policy of massive injections of credit in the latter during the 70's' and 80's only ended in disaster ($1500 billion of debt, and economies in a still worse state than previously). The fate of the Eastern countries (whose economies are in many ways like those of the Third World) cannot be any different. The financiers of the great Western nations have no illusions on this score: they are hardly falling over themselves to bring capital to the newly "desalinized" countries, which are nonetheless clamoring for it (Poland for example, is sending its Nobel prize 'worker' Walesa out to beg for $10 billion in the next three years). And since Western bankers are anything but philanthropists, there will be neither loans nor massive sales from the more developed nations for those countries which have just 'discovered' the 'virtues' of liberalism and 'democracy'. The best they can hope for is the dispatch of emergency credit or aid to avoid open bankruptcy and famines which would only aggravate the convulsions that rack them. And this is hardly going to give the world economy a "shot in the arm".
The DDR (East Germany) is obviously an exception amongst the countries of the one-time in the Eastern bloc. This country will not in fact survive as such. Its coming absorption into West Germany has by now been reluctantly accepted not only by all the great powers, but even by its present government. However, the economic integration which is the first step in this "reunification" process, and which is the only way to curb the massive exodus of the population from East to West Germany, is already posing considerable problems both for West Germany itself and for its Western "partners". Financially, the salvage of the East German economy will represent an enormous burden. Although the investments which will certainly be made may provide a temporary "outlet" for some branches of West German and European industry, they will also aggravate still further the capitalist economy's overall endebtedness, while at the same time increasing the saturation of the world market. This is why the recent announcement of the forthcoming monetary union between the two Germanies (a decision which was more political than economic, as is evidenced by the reluctance of the Federal Bank's president) was far from arousing general enthusiasm in all the Western countries. On the economic level, the DDR is in fact a poisoned gift for West Germany. For dowry, the DDR brings with it only a dilapidated industry, a worn-out economy, a mountain of debts and truckloads of Ost-Marks which are hardly worth the paper they are printed on but which the Federal Republic will have to buy at top rates as soon as the Deutsche Mark becomes the common currency of both Germanies. The printing press has a busy time ahead; inflation likewise.
In fact, the capitalist economy can expect no diminution of its crisis from the collapse of the Eastern bloc, but increasing difficulties. On the one hand, as we have seen, the financial crisis (the mountain of insolvent debt) can only get worse, while the declining cohesion, and eventual disappearance of the Western bloc (see below) hold a perspective of increasing difficulties for the world economy. As we have long since pointed out, one of the main reasons behind capitalism's ability until now to slow down the rhythm of its collapse has been a state capitalist policy at the level of the entire Western bloc (ie, the dominant sphere of the capitalist world). Such a policy presupposes a serious degree of discipline on the part of the various countries that make up the bloc. This discipline has been obtained largely thanks to the United States' authority over its allies, as a result of its economic, but also its military strength. The US 'military umbrella' against the 'Soviet threat' (as well, of course, as its and its currency's preponderant position in the international financial system) was given in exchange for deference to US aims in the economic domain. Today, with the disappearance of the USSR as a military threat to the states of the Western bloc (especially those of Western Europe and Japan), the USA has lost much of its ability to put pressure on its 'allies'; all the more so in that the US economy, with its enormous deficits and its continued drop in competitivity on the world market, is fast losing ground to its major competitors. The tendency will therefore be increasingly towards an attempt by the best performing economies, with Germany and Japan in the lead, to disengage them serves from US tutelage to play their own game on the world economic arena; this will lead to a sharpening of trade wars and an increase in the capitalist economy's overall instability.
In the final analysis, we must affirm clearly that the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the economic and political convulsions of its erstwhile members, do not presage the slightest improvement in capitalist society's economic situation. The Stalinist regimes' economic bankruptcy as a result of the general crisis of the world economy only heralds the collapse of the economy's most developed sectors.
Imperialist antagonisms
The world's geopolitical configuration as it has lasted since World War II has been completely overturned by the events of the second half of 1989. There are no longer two imperialist blocs sharing the world between them.
It is obvious, even to those sectors of the bourgeoisie which for years have been alarmed by the danger of the "Evil Empire" and its "formidable military strength", that the Eastern bloc has ceased to exist. This has been confirmed by a whole series of recent events:
- the main Western leaders' (Bush, Thatcher, Mitterand especially) support for Gorbachev (often accompanied by extravagant words of praise);
- it is apparent from the results of the recent summit meetings (Bush-Gorbachev, Mitterand-Gorbachev, etc) that the antagonisms which opposed East and West for forty years really are disappearing;
- the USSR's announcement that it intends to withdraw all its troops based abroad;
- the already planned reduction in US military spending;
- the joint decision to cut rapidly the numbers of Soviet and US troops stationed in central Europe (essentially in the two Germanies) to 195,000, which in fact corresponds to a withdrawal of 405,000 men by the USSR, and of 90,000 by the USA;
- the attitude of the main Western leaders during the events in Romania, asking the USSR to intervene militarily to support the "democratic" forces against the final resistance of Ceausescu's followers;
- the support also given by the West to the intervention in Baku by Russian tanks in January.
Ten years after the universal outcry provoked among the Western countries when these same tanks arrived in Kabul, this different attitude could not be more indicative of the complete overthrow of the planet's imperialist order. This has been further confirmed by the Conference held in Ottawa in early February (jointly presided by Canada and Czechoslovakia) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, during which the USSR acceded to virtually all the Western demands.
Does this disappearance of the Eastern bloc mean that capitalism will no longer be subjected to imperialist confrontations? Such a hypothesis would be entirely foreign to marxism. Contrary to the idea defended by the CWO, it is not just the great powers at the head of a bloc that are imperialist. In the period of capitalist decadence, all states are imperialist, and take the necessary measures to satisfy their appetites: war economy, arms production, etc. We must state clearly that the deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level. The difference, in the coming period, will be that these antagonisms which were previously contained and used by the two great imperialist blocs will now come to the fore. The disappearance of the Russian imperialist gendarme, and that to come of the American gendarme as far as its one-time. "partners" are concerned, opens the door to the unleashing of a whole series of more local rivalries. For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (even supposing that the proletariat were no longer capable of putting up a resistance). However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent and more violent, especially of course in those areas where the proletariat is weakest.
Up to now, during the period of decadence, such a situation where the various imperialist antagonisms are dispersed, where the world (or at least its decisive zones) is not divided up between two blocs, has never lasted long. The disappearance of the two major imperialist constellations which emerged from World War II brings with it the tendency towards the recomposition of two new blocs. Such a situation, however, is not yet on the agenda, due to:
- the permanence of a certain number of structures belonging to the previous order (eg the continued formal existence of the two great military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and their corresponding military deployments);
- the absence of a great power capable of taking over the role which the USSR has definitively lost: leader of a bloc able to confront the USA.
A country like Germany, once it is reunified, would obviously be well placed to fill this role. This is why there is already a good deal of common interest between Western countries and the USSR in slowing down (or at least trying to control) the process of this reunification. However, while on the one hand we must take account of a considerable weakening (which can only get worse) of the US bloc's cohesion, on the other we have to be careful not to announce prematurely the formation of a bloc headed by Germany. From the military standpoint, it is far from ready to play this role. Because Germany was beaten in World War II, its army is far from the equal of its economic strength. In particular, West Germany has to date not been allowed to deploy nuclear weapons. The enormous quantity of nuclear weapons on its territory are entirely under NATO control. This is all the more true in that the tendency towards a new share-out of the planet between two military blocs is countered, and may even be definitively compromised, by the increasingly profound and widespread decomposition of capitalist society, which we have already pointed out (see International Review no. 57) .
This phenomenon of decomposition, which has developed throughout the 1980's, springs from the inability of either of society's two fundamental classes to impose their own historic answer to the hopeless crisis into which the capitalist mode of production is plunging. Although its refusal to be marched off behind the banners of the bourgeoisie, as it was in the 1930's, has to date prevented capitalism from unleashing a Third World War, the working class has still not found the strength to set forward clearly its own perspective: the communist revolution. And although, as a result, society is temporarily "frozen" and without any perspective, this does not put an end to the crisis, nor does it make history come to a halt. History's "course" is expressed in a spreading putrefaction of the entire social body, whose various manifestations we have already analyzed in the International Review: the drug scourge, the generalized corruption in high places, the threat to the environment, the proliferation of so-called 'natural' or 'accidental' disasters, the development of criminality, despair, and nihilism amongst young people. One expression of this decomposition is the bourgeoisie's growing inability to control not only the economic but the political situation also. This state of affairs is of course particularly advanced in the countries on the capitalist periphery, which arrived at industrial development too late, and which were therefore the first and hardest hit by the crisis. Today, the developing economic and political chaos in Eastern Europe, the local bourgeoisie's complete loss of control over the situation, is a new sign of this general phenomenon. Even the strongest bourgeoisie, in the advanced European countries and in North America, is well aware that it is not immune from this kind of convulsion. This is why they fully support Gorbachev in his attempts to "put his empire's house in order", bloodily if necessary as in Baku. They are too frightened that, like the fall-out from Chernobyl, the spreading chaos in the East may cross the frontier and invade the West.
The evolution of the German situation is significant in this respect. The fantastic speed of events since last autumn in no way means that the bourgeoisie has been infected by a frenzy of "democratization". In reality, while the situation in the DDR has long since ceased to have anything to do with any deliberate policy of the local ruling class, this is now increasingly true of the West German bourgeoisie, and indeed of the world bourgeoisie in general. Only a few weeks ago, German reunification was desired by none of the 'victors' of 1945 (three months ago, Gorbachev envisaged it happening "in a century"), for fear that the reconstitution of a "Greater German" hegemony in Europe should sharpen its imperialist appetites; today, it is seen as the only way to combat the chaos in the DDR, and by contagion in its neighboring countries. Even the West German bourgeoisie finds that things are going "too fast". In today's conditions, this reunification which it has advocated for decades can only bring it new difficulties. But the longer the moment is put off, the greater the difficulties will become. If the West German bourgeoisie, one of the most solid in the world, is forced to run to keep up with events, this says much about what the rest of the world ruling class can expect.
Given the world bourgeoisie's loss of control over the situation, it is not certain that its dominant sectors will today be capable of enforcing the discipline and coordination necessary for the reconstitution of military blocs. A bourgeoisie which is unable to master the situation at home is ill placed to impose itself on others (as we have seen with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, whose prime cause was precisely the economic and political collapse of its dominant power).
This is why in our analyses, we must clearly highlight the fact that while the proletarian solution - the communist revolution - is alone able to oppose the destruction of humanity (the only "answer" that the bourgeoisie is capable of giving to the crisis), this destruction need not necessarily be the result of a third World War. It could also come about as a logical and extreme conclusion of the process of decomposition.
For most of the 20th century, the historic alternative of "socialism or barbarism" highlighted by marxism has taken the form of "socialism or imperialist world war", and in recent decades, thanks to the development of nuclear weapons, the still more terrifying "socialism or destruction of humanity". This perspective remains absolutely valid following the Eastern bloc's collapse. But we must be clear that this destruction may be the result either of imperialist world war, or of society's decomposition.
The ebb in consciousness within the working class
The 'Theses on the economic and political crisis in the Eastern countries' (International Review no.60) point out that the Eastern bloc's collapse and the death of Stalinism will cause an ebb in the proletariat's consciousness. The reasons behind this reflux are analyzed in the same issue, in the article 'New difficulties for the proletariat'. They can be summed up as follows:
- the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the death of Stalinism will allow an upsurge of democratic illusions, not only in the proletariat of Eastern Europe but in the West as well, in just the same way as the appearance in 1980 of an 'independent' union in Poland, but on a far greater scale given the extent of today's events:
"the fact that this historic event has taken place independently of the proletariat's own action cannot help but produce within the class a feeling of powerlessness" (ibid);
- "to the extent that the collapse of the Eastern bloc comes after the period of 'cold war' with the West, which the latter seems to have 'won' without striking a blow, it will create a feeling of euphoria amongst the populations in the West, including the workers, and a feeling of confidence in their governments similar (though to a lesser degree) to that which weighed on the proletariat in the 'victorious' countries after the two world wars" (ibid);
- the dislocation of the Eastern bloc cannot but exacerbate feelings of nationalism in the peripheral republics of the USSR and in the ex-‘people's democracies', but also in some Western countries, and especially in a country as important as Germany as a result of reunification;
- "These nationalist mystifications will also weigh on the workers in the West ( ... ) through the discredit and distortion of the very idea of proletarian ititernationeliem, This conception has already been completely disfigured by Stalinism, and in Stalinism's wake by the rest of the bourgeoisie, which identified it with the USSR's domination of its bloc" (ibid);
- "in fact ( ... ) it is the very perspective of world communist revolution [that is tainted] with the collapse of Stalinism ( ... ) In the 1930's, the bourgeoisie used [the lie of the identity between Stalinism and communism] to enroll the working class behind Stalinism and to complete its defeat ( ... ); now that Stalinism has lost all its credit in the workers' eyes, the same lie is being used to turn them away from the perspective of communism" (ibid).
We can complete these elements by considering the evolution of what remains of the Stalinist parties in the Western countries.
The collapse of the Eastern bloc implies eventually the disappearance of the Stalinist parties, not only in those countries where they were at the head of the state, but also in those where their function was to control the working class. Either these parties will be radically transformed, as is happening with the Italian CP at this very moment, by the complete abandonment of everything that set them apart (including the name), or they will be reduced to the status of little sects (as is already the case in the United States and in most of Northern Europe). They may still be of interest to ethnologists or archaeologists, but they will no longer play any serious part in controlling and sabotaging the workers' struggles. The place they occupied in a certain number of countries will be taken by the social-democracy or its left wing. As a result, the proletariat will less and less have the occasion to confront Stalinism as it develops its struggle; this can only increase the impact of the lie which identifies Stalinism and communism.
The perspectives for the class struggle
The Eastern bloc's collapse and the death of Stalinism thus create new difficulties for the development of consciousness within the proletariat. Does this mean that these events will also provoke a noticeable slowdown in the class struggle? On this point, we should remember firstly that the Theses speak of a "reflux in consciousness", and not an ebb in proletarian combativity. They even make it clear that "capitalism's increasingly brutal attacks will force the workers to enter the combat", for it would be wrong to imagine that a reflux in consciousness would necessarily be accompanied by an ebb in combativity. We have already pointed out on a number of occasions the non-identity between these two elements. This is not therefore the place to go back over the question in general. In the precise case of the present situation, it should be emphasized that the present reflux in consciousness does not spring from a direct defeat in combat of the working class. The events which are today sowing confusion in its ranks took place completely outside the working class and its struggles. Consequently, demoralization is not the major problem today. Although the class' consciousness may be affected, its combativity fundamentally is not. And with the increasingly brutal attacks which are about to be unleashed, this potential could make its appearance at any moment. We must not be taken by surprise by the foreseeable explosions of this combativity.We should neither interpret them as calling our analysis of the reflux of consciousness into question, nor "forget" that it is our responsibility to intervene within them.
Secondly, we must be careful not to establish any continuity between the evolution of proletarian struggles and consciousness during the period preceding the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and now. In the period which has just come to an end, the ICC criticized the dominant tendency within the proletarian political movement to under-estimate the importance of the class' struggles, and the steps made in the development of class consciousness. The fact that today we are insisting on the reflux in this development of consciousness does not in the least mean that we are calling into question our analyses of the previous period, in particular those which were drawn up by the ICC's 8th Congress (see International Review no.59).
It is true that 1988 and the first half of 1989 were marked by certain difficulties in the development of the class struggle and consciousness, and especially by a return to the fore by the unions. This had already been brought up before the 8th Congress, notably in the editorial of International Review no. 58, which pointed out that "this strategy (of the bourgeoisie) has for the moment succeeded in disorieriteting the working class and hindering the march towards the unification of its combat". However, our analysis drew on the data of the then current international situation to point out the limits of this difficult moment. In fact, the difficulties encountered by the workers in 1988 and early 1989 were on the same level (though more serious) as those of 1985 (pointed out during the ICC's 6th Congress; see the 'Resolution on the International Situation', adopted by the Congress and published in International Review no.44). They did not in the least exclude the possibility of "new, increasingly determined and conscious, mass upsurges of the proletarian struggle" (IR 58), just as the slow-down in 1985 had led in 1986 to such important movements as the massive Belgian strikes during the spring, and the strike on the French railways. By contrast, the proletariat's difficulties today are on quite a different level. The collapse of the Eastern bloc and of Stalinism is a great historic event, whose repercussions will be immense on every aspect of the world situation. From the point of view of its impact on the working class, such an event cannot be placed on the same level as any series of bourgeois maneuvers such as we have seen during the last 20 years, including the use of the left in opposition from the beginning of the 1970's.
The period that has opened up today is in fact quite distinct from the last 20 years. Since 1968, the general movement of the class struggle has developed, despite moments of slow-down or brief setbacks, in the direction of increasingly conscious struggles, increasingly free from the grip of the trade unions. By contrast, the conditions in which the Eastern bloc has collapsed, and in particular the fact that Stalinism was not beaten by the working class but by an internal political and economic implosion, determine the development of an ideological veil (even independently of today's flood of media campaigns), and a disarray within the class on a quite different scale from anything it has had to confront up to now, even including the defeat of 1981. We have to say that even were the Eastern bloc's collapse to have occurred at the height of the proletarian struggles (eg late 83- early 84, or in 1986), this would have changed absolutely nothing as to the reflux that the event would have provoked in the class (even though it might have delayed its effects being felt).
This is why in particular, we have to update the ICC's analysis of "the left in opposition". This was a necessary card for the bourgeoisie at the end of the 70's and throughout the 80's due to the class' general dynamic towards increasingly determined and conscious combats, and its growing rejection of democratic, electoral, and trade union mystifications. The difficulties some countries encountered in setting it up (in France for example) in no way alter the fact that this was the lynchpin of the bourgeoisie's strategy against the working class, illustrated by the right-wing governments in the USA, Germany, and Britain. By contrast, the class' present reflux means that for a while this strategy will no longer be a priority for the bourgeoisie. This does not necessarily mean that these countries will see the left return to government: as we have said on several occasions (see, in particular, the IR no.18), this is only absolutely necessary in periods of war or revolution. By contrast, we should not be surprised if it does happen, nor should we put it down to 'accident' or to a 'specific weakness' of the bourgeoisie in these countries. Society's general decomposition means for the ruling class a growing difficulty in mastering its political game, but we have not reached the point where the strongest bourgeoisies in the world are going to leave the social front unprotected against a threat from the proletariat (even in the future, it would be dangerous to count on this kind of weakness in the ruling class).
From the standpoint of the class struggle, the world situation thus presents very different characteristics from those prevailing before the Eastern bloc's collapse. However, highlighting the extent of the reflux in consciousness within the class should not lead us to call into question the historic course, as the ICC has analyzed it for the last 20 years (even if we are led to make it more precise: see above).
Firstly, the course towards war is excluded today since there do not exist two imperialist blocs.
Secondly, we should underline the limits of the class' present reflux. In particular, although we have compared in kind the democratic mystifications which are being reinforced today in the proletariat, to those unleashed during the post-war 'Liberation', we must also point out the differences between the two situations. On the one hand, the major industrialized countries, and thus the very heart of the world proletariat, were involved in World War II. Consequently, democratic euphoria weighed directly on the proletariat in these countries. By contrast, the sectors of the class, in the Eastern countries, which are today in the front line of these mystifications, are relatively peripheral. The proletariat in the West has to confront these difficulties because of the "wind from the East", not because it is itself "at the heart of the storm". Moreover, the post-war democratic mystifications were powerfully amplified by the 'prosperity' that accompanied reconstruction. For two decades, the belief in democracy as "the best of all possible worlds" could find support in a real improvement in working class living conditions in the advanced countries, and on the impression that capitalism gave of having overcome its contradictions (which even impressed certain revolutionaries).
Today, the situation is entirely different. The bourgeois talk about the 'superiority' of 'democratic' capitalism will come up against the stubborn facts of an insurmountable and increasingly profound economic crisis.
This being said, nor should we lull ourselves to sleep with illusions. Even if world war is no longer a threat to humanity at present, and perhaps for good, it may be replaced by the decomposition of society. This is all the more true in that, while the outbreak of world war requires the proletariat's adherence to the bourgeoisie's ideals, which is hardly on the agenda for its decisive battalions, decomposition has no need at all of this adherence to destroy humanity. The decomposition of society is not in fact, properly speaking, an 'answer' - even a bourgeois one - to the world economy's open crisis. On the contrary, this phenomenon is able to develop precisely because the ruling class is unable to bring the proletariat under its banner in order to give its real answer to the crisis: world imperialist war. By developing its struggle (as it has done since the end of the 60's), and by refusing to march behind the banners of the bourgeoisie, the working class can prevent the bourgeoisie from unleashing world war. By contrast, only capitalism's overthrow can put an end to society's decomposition. Just as they cannot prevent capitalism's economic collapse, so the proletariat's struggles cannot hold back social decomposition.
In this sense, whereas up to now we considered that "time was on our side", and that the slow development of the class' combats allowed it, and its revolutionary organizations, to rebuild an experience that had been swallowed up by the counter-revolution, we can no longer continue to do so. There can be no question of becoming impatient, and trying to "force the hand of history", but revolutionaries must be aware of the situation's increasing seriousness if we want to live up to our responsibilities.
This is why, while their intervention must emphasize that the historic situation still remains in the hands of the proletariat, and that the class is perfectly capable, through its combat, of overcoming the barriers that the bourgeoisie puts in its way, we must also insist on how high are the stakes, and therefore on its responsibility.
The present perspective for the working class is thus one of continuing combat in the face of growing economic attacks. For some time, these struggles will take place in a difficult political and ideological context. This is especially true, of course, for the proletariat in countries where 'democracy' is being newly installed. In these countries, the working class is in a position of extreme weakness, confirmed daily by events (inability to express the least independent class demand in the different ‘popular movements', enrollment in nationalist conflicts, especially in the USSR, even participation in typically xenophobic strikes against an ethnic minority, eg recently in Bulgaria). These countries give us an example of a working class ready to be enrolled in imperialist war.
For the proletariat in the Western countries, the situation is of course very different. It is far from being subjected to the same difficulties as in the East. The reflux in consciousness will be expressed in particular by a strong return of the trade unions, whose work will be made easier by the increase in democratic mystifications and reformist illusions: "the bosses can pay", "profit sharing", "taking part in growth", mystifications which all make it easier for the proletariat to identify their interests with those of the national capital.
In particular, the continuing and worsening rot of capitalist society will have still worse effects on class consciousness than during the 80's. It weighs down the whole of society with a general feeling of despair; the putrid stink of rotting bourgeois ideology poisons the very air that the proletariat breathes. Right up to the pre-revolutionary period, this will sow further difficulties in the way of the development of class consciousness.
There is no other road for the proletariat than to reject inter-classist participation in the struggles against certain aspects of this moribund society (eg ecology). The only terrain where it can for the moment mobilize as an independent class (and this is all the more crucial in today's flood of democratic mystification, which only recognizes 'citizens' or 'the people') is the one where its interests cannot be confused with those of other classes in society, and which, more globally, determines all other aspects of society: the economy. And it is precisely in this sense, as we have said for a long time, that "the crisis is the proletariat's best ally". The worsening crisis will force the proletariat to come together on its own terrain, to develop the struggles which are the precondition for it to overcome the present barriers to its consciousness; it will open the workers' eyes to the lies about capitalism's 'superiority'; it will force them to lose their illusions as to capitalism's ability to come out of the crisis, and therefore also as to all those left parties and trade unions which want to attach them to the 'national interest', with their talk of "profit sharing" and suchlike nonsense.
Today, as the proletariat struggles against the smokescreens that the bourgeoisie has succeeded in blinding it with for the moment, Marx's words are truer than ever:
"The question is not what a particular proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole at a particular moment, imagines the goal to be. It is, what is the proletariat's being, and what in accordance with this being it will be obliged historically to do".
It is up to revolutionaries, and to our organization in particular, to contribute fully to develop the class' consciousness of the aim assigned to it by history, so that it can transform into reality the historical necessity of the revolution: never has the need been more urgent.
The ICC : 10-02-90
* The above text was based on a report adopted by the ICC at an international meeting held at the end of January 1990
[1] The feeble resistance put up by almost the old leaders of the "people's democracies", and which made possible such an "easy" transition in these countries, does not in the least mean that these leaders, any more than the apparatus of the Stalinist parties, have sacrificed their power and privileges willingly. In fact, this phenomenon demonstrates not only these regimes' complete economic bankruptcy, but their extreme political fragility. We have pointed out this fragility long ago, but it has turned out to be far greater even than could have been imagined.
[2] Poland and Hungary are "champions" amongst these countries, with the debts of respectively $40.6 and $20.1 billion dollars, in other words 63.4% and 64.6% of their annual GNP. Brazil, comparatively, looks positively "sensible", with a debt of only 39.2% of GNP.
The collapse of the Russian imperialist bloc is an event of truly historic proportions, bringing to an end the world order established by the great powers in 1945. It goes without saying that an event on such a scale is a real test for the political organizations of the working class, a kind of ordeal by fire which will show whether or not they possess the theoretical and organizational armory demanded by the situation.
This test operates on two closely connected levels of revolutionary activity. First, the events in the east have initiated a whole new phase in the life of world capitalism, a period of flux and uncertainty, of growing chaos, which makes it absolutely indispensable for revolutionaries to develop a clear analysis of the origin and direction of events, their implications for the major classes in society. Such an analysis must be based on solid theoretical foundations that are able to stand up to the storms and doubts of the moment, and yet must also reject any conservative attachment to schemes and assumptions which have proved themselves obsolete.
Secondly, the collapse of the eastern bloc has opened up a difficult period for the working class, in which we have seen the workers in the east being engulfed by a tide of democratic and nationalist illusions, and in which the entire world bourgeoisie has seized the opportunity to assault the workers' ears with a deafening campaign about the 'failure of communism' and the 'triumph of democracy'. In the face of this ideological torrent, revolutionaries are called upon to intervene against the stream, to hold fast to basic class principles in response to a cacophony of lies which is having a real impact on the working class. As far as the ICC is concerned, we refer readers to the articles of this International Review and the preceding issue, as well as our territorial press. The aim of this article is to examine how the other groups of the revolutionary milieu have responded to the test[1].
The IBRP: One step forward, but how many back?
We will begin by examining the response of the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, which is the most important force in the proletarian political milieu outside the ICC. The IBRP's main components are the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista) in Italy and the Communist Workers Organization in Britain. These are serious groups with a regular press, and it is natural that most of their recent issues should have focused on the events in the east. This is important in itself, since, as we shall see, one of the main features of the milieu's response to events has been ... no response at all, or at best a lamentable delay in responding. But since we do take the IBRP seriously, our main concern here is with the content or quality of their response. And although it is too early to draw up a definitive balance sheet, we can say at this stage that although there are elements of clarity contained in the articles written by the IBRP, these positive elements are weakened if not undermined by a series of misunderstandings and outright confusions.
The CWO (Workers Voice)
Our initial impression is that of the two main components of the IBRP, it is the CWO which has responded more adequately.
The collapse of the eastern bloc is not only an event of enormous historic proportions: it also has no exact precedent in history. Never before has an entire imperialist bloc fallen apart, not through military defeat or proletarian insurrection, but first and foremost through its total incapacity to cope with the world economic crisis.
In this sense, the manner in which these events have unfolded, not to mention their extraordinary rapidity, could not have been predicted. As a result, not only was the bourgeoisie taken by surprise - the revolutionary minority was as well, and this includes the ICC. Thus, we should give credit to the CWO for seeing as early as April/May last year that Russia was losing its grip over its east European satellites (in Workers Voice no 47) - a position that we wrongly criticized in World Revolution 125 as a concession to the bourgeoisie's pacifist campaigns, since we were late in seeing the real disintegration of the Stalinist system.
The December/January issue of Workers' Voice (WV 49), the first to be published after the effective collapse of the bloc, leads with an article that correctly denounces the lie that 'communism is in crisis' and, in various other articles, displays a level of clarity on the following three central iasues:
- the disintegration of the Stalinist regimes is the product of the world economic crisis, which hits these regimes with particular severity;
- this crisis isn't the result of 'people's power', still less of the working class. The massive demonstrations in the GDR and Czechoslovakia are not on a proletarian terrain;
- these are "events of world historic importance", signifying "the incipient collapse of the world order created towards the end of the Second World War" and opening up a period of the "reformation of capitalist blocs."
However, these insights, important as they are, are not taken to their conclusion. Thus, although the end of the post-45 imperialist set-up is seen as "incipient", it remains unclear whether the Russian bloc really is finished or not. The events are said to be of "world historic importance", but this is hardly conveyed by the rather frivolous tone of the front page articles, or by the fact that this statement is tucked away on page 5 of the paper.
More importantly, the CWO's insights are based more on an empirical observation of events rather than being grounded in a clear analytical framework, which means that they may easily be eclipsed as events move on. In our 'Theses on the Economic and Political Crisis in the USSR and the Eastern Countries' (International Review 60), we have attempted to provide such a framework; in particular, we have explained why the collapse has been so sudden and thorough-going by highlighting the peculiar rigidity and immobility of the Stalinist political/economic form. In the absence of such a framework, the CWO is equivocal about how profound the collapse of Stalinism really is. Thus, although one article says that Gorbachev's policy of non-intervention - which meant that there was nothing holding up the Stalinist governments in eastern Europe - was "hardly voluntary but one which is being forced on the Kremlin by the appalling state of the Soviet economy," elsewhere they give the impression that behind non-intervention is a conscious strategy by Gorbachev to integrate Russia into a new Europe-based imperialism and to improve the economy through the import of western technology. This underestimates the degree to which the Russian bourgeoisie has lost control of the situation and is simply fighting for survival on a day-to-day basis, with no serious long-term strategy at all.
Again, the CWO's treatment of the mass demonstrations in Eastern Europe, and the enormous exodus of refugees from the GDR, fails to grasp the gravity of the situation. These phenomena are rather airily dismissed as part of a "middle class revolt against state capitalism", motivated by a desire for posh western goods: "They wanted BMWs and Estee Lauder too!. Listening to them talk of waiting 10 years for a new car made one's heart bleed!" This contemptuous attitude misses a crucial point: the workers of the GDR and Czechoslovakia participated en masse in these manifestations, not as a class, but as individuals atomized into 'the people.' This is a serious matter for revolutionaries because it means the working class was being mobilized behind the banners of its class enemy. The CWO takes a rather silly side-swipe at the ICC because the repression that we had seen as one possibility for the East German bourgeoisie didn't take place. But the tragic and bloody consequences of the workers being dragged onto the false terrain of democracy were illustrated very graphically by the events in Romania just over a month later, and again by the violent developments in Azerbaijan and other outlying republics of the USSR.
By the same token, the December WV doesn't really respond to the campaigns about ‘democracy' in the west, nor does it take any position on the negative consequences these events are having for the class struggle, east and west.
The PClnt (Battaglia Comunista)
Although the CWO and Battaglia are part of the same international regroupment, there has always been considerable heterogeneity between the two groups, both on the programmatic level and in their response to immediate developments in the world situation. With the events in the east, this heterogeneity stands out very clearly. And in this case, it appears that Battaglia - despite being the group with the greatest political experience - has been beset by far worse confusions than the CWO. This becomes evident when you examine the last few issues of Battaglia Comunista.
October: Battaglia publishes an article 'The western bourgeoisie applauds the opening up of the eastern countries', which affirms that the Stalinist regimes are capitalist and that the source of their troubles is the world economic crisis. But here, as we argue in a critique of this article in Revolution Internationale 187, the good points end, and the rest of the text shows an extraordinary underestimation of the level of economic and political collapse in the east. While our 'Thesis', adopted at around the same time ie before the spectacular events in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania recognized the effective disintegration of the Russian bloc, BC sees the "eastern empire still solidly held under the Russian boot". And, again in contrast to our 'Thesis', it seems from this article that BC thinks that the formation of 'democratic' (ie, multi-party ) regimes in eastern Europe is perfectly compatible with the cohesion of the bloc. At the same time, for BC, the economic crisis which is behind these events may have hit the western countries in the 70's, but it only hit the Stalinist regimes "more recently" - whereas in fact these countries have been sinking into an economic morass for the last twenty years. Perhaps this strange illusion about the relative health of the Stalinist economies explains their touching belief that opening up the eastern 'market' represents a real hope for the world capitalist economy:
"The collapse of the markets in the peripheries of capitalism, for example Latin America, has created new problems of insolvency for the reward on capital ... The new opportunities opening up in eastern Europe could represent: a safety-valve with regard to this need for investment ... If this wide process of east-west collaboration becomes concretized, it would be a shot of oxygen for international capitalism."
We have already published an answer to the bourgeoisie's claims about the 'new opportunities' opening up in the east (see IR 60), so we will say no more than this here: the eastern economies are in a state of ruination no less severe than the economies of Latin America. Riddled through by debt, inflation, waste and pollution, they offer precious little to the west in terms of opportunities for investment and expansion. The idea of the east as a 'new market' is pure bourgeois propaganda and, along with our article in RI we have to conclude that Battaglia has fallen for it hook line and sinker,
November: at the time of the massive demonstrations in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, in which millions of workers marched behind the banners of 'democracy', without raising a single class demand, BC unfortunately leads with an editorial titled 'Resurgence of class struggle in the east', which is further evidence of Baltaglia's difficulty in keeping up with the situation. The article in question refers not to the events in eastern Europe but, in the main, to the miners' struggles in the USSR, which, though they had developed on a massive scale the previous summer, had by then been well and truly eclipsed by the democratic and nationalist 'revolution' sweeping the bloc. Furthermore the article contains some ambiguities about the democratic demands raised by the Russian workers alongside demands expressing their real interest as a class. Although it admits that the first type of demand can easily be used by the 'radical' wing of the ruling class, we also find the following passage:
"... For these masses imbued with anti-Stalinism and the ideology of western capitalism, the first possible and necessary demands are those for the overthrow of the 'Communist' regime, for a liberalization of the productive apparatus, and for the conquest of 'democratic freedoms'. "
There's no doubt that the workers in the Stalinist regimes have, during the course of their struggles, raised bourgeois political demands (even when these aren't infiltrated in from the outside by agents of the enemy class). But, these demands aren't "necessary" to the proletarian struggle: on the contrary, they are always used to lead the struggle into a dead-end, and revolutionaries can only oppose them. But Battaglia's use of the term "necessary" is not at all due to the slip of the pen. It is fully in line with the theorizations about the "necessity" for democratic demands contained in their 'These on the tasks of Communists in the Peripheral Countries'[2]; it is clear that the same logic is now being applied to the countries of the former eastern bloc.
In all, this issue of Battaglia constitutes a very inadequate response to the flood of 'democratic' mystifications that has been unleashed on the world proletariat. Having refused to recognize the real resurgence of class struggle for over 20 years, Battaglia suddenly starts seeing it and proclaiming it at the very moment that the bourgeoisie's 'democratic' offensive has forced it into a temporary retreat!
December: even after the events in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, BC publishes an article 'Collapse of illusions in Real Socialism' which contains a number of different lines of thought, but which seems to be directed against the ICC's these of a collapse of the bloc.
"Russian Perestroika involves an abandonment of the old policy towards the satellite countries, and has the objective of transforming the latter. The USSR must open up to western technologies, and COMECON must do the same, not - as certain people think - in a process of the disintegration of the east bloc and of the total disengagement of the USSR from the European countries, but in order to facilitate, through reviving the COMECON economies, the revival of the soviet economy."
Once again, as with the CWO, we are given a description of a process that corresponds to a well-laid plan by Gorbachev aimed at integrating Russia into a new European prosperity. But whatever fantasies Gorbachev or Battaglia might indulge in, the actual policies of the Russian ruling class are being imposed on it by a process of inner disintegration over which it has no control, and whose outcome it cannot hope to foresee.
January: This issue contains a long article 'La Deriva del Continent Sovietico' which develops similar ideas about the aims of Gorbachev's foreign policy, but which at the same time seems to admit that there might indeed be a 'dislocation' of the eastern bloc. Perhaps BC has made some progress here. But if there is a step forward, its article on the events in Romania constitutes several steps backwards - towards the leftist abyss.
Bourgeois propaganda from right to left portrays the events in Romania last December as an authentic 'people's revolution', a spontaneous uprising of the whole population against the hated Ceaucescu. It's true that in Timisoara, in Bucharest and in many other towns hundreds of thousands of people, fired by a legitimate loathing for the regime, took to the streets in defiance of the Securitate and the army, prepared to give their lives for the overthrow of that monstrous apparatus of terror. But it's also true that these masses, this amorphous 'people' in which the working class was never present as an autonomous force, was only too easily used as cannon fodder by Ceaucescu's bourgeois opponents, those who are now running the more-or-less unchanged machinery of state repression. The 'reformist' Stalinist politicians, army generals, and former Securitate bosses who now constitute the 'National Salvation Front' had to a large extent laid their plans well in advance: the National Salvation Front itself had been set up, in secret, up to six months before the December events. They were just waiting for the moment to arrive, and it came with the massacres in Timisoara and the ensuing mass demonstrations. One minute the army generals were ordering their soldiers to shoot the demonstrators; the next minute, they 'went over to the people' ie, used the people as a stepping stone to climb into the seat of government. This wasn't a revolution, which in today's period can only take place when the proletariat organizes itself as a class and dissolves the bourgeoisie's state apparatus, in particular the police and the army. At best this was a desperate revolt that was immediately channeled onto a capitalist political terrain by the still very much intact forces of the bourgeois opposition. In the face of this immense tragedy, in which thousands of workers gave their life blood for a cause that was not their own, revolutionaries have a clear duly to speak out against the tide of bourgeois propaganda that describes it as a revolution.
But how does BC respond? By falling headfirst into the trap: "Romania is the first country in the industrialized regions in which the world economic crisis has given rise to a real and authentic popular insurrection with the resulting overthrow of the reigning governments," ('Ceausescu is Dead, but Capitalism lives On'). Indeed, "In Romania, all the objective conditions and nearly all the subjective conditions were there for turning the insurrection into a real and authentic social revolution" (ibid). And it's not hard to guess which particular "subjective" factor was missing: "the absence of a genuine class political force left the field open to the forces who worked for the maintenance of bourgeois relations of production," (ibid).
"A real and authentic popular insurrection" what kind of creature is this? Strictly speaking: insurrection means the armed seizure of power by an organised, conscious working class, as in October 1917. A "popular insurrection" is a contradiction in terms, because the "people" as such, which for marxism can only mean an amorphous conglomerate of classes (when it's not a code-word for the forces of the bourgeoisie), cannot take power. What's really happening here is that, once again, Battaglia is yielding an uncomfortably large amount of ground to the bourgeoisie's campaign's about the 'people's revolution', campaigns in which the leftists have played a particularly important role.
These passages also reveal Battaglia's deep-seated idealism when it comes to the question of the party. How can they possibly claim that the only "subjective" element missing in Romania was the political organization? An indispensable subjective element for the revolution is also a working class that is organizing itself in its autonomous, unitary organs, the workers' councils. In Romania, not only was this not happening, but the working class wasn't even fighting on its most elementary terrain; throughout the December events, there was no sign of any class demands being raised by the workers. Any strikes that did take place were immediately channeled into the bourgeois "civil war" which ravaged the country.
The political organization of the class isn't a dues ex machina. It can only gain a significant influence in the class, it can only tip the scales towards revolution, when the workers are moving towards massive and open confrontations with the bourgeoisie. But in Romania, the workers weren't even struggling for their most basic class interests: all their courage and fighting spirit had been mobilized in the service of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, they were further away from revolution than all the defensive struggles in western Europe over the last decade, struggles which Battaglia has had such difficulty in seeing at all.
Considering that the IBRP is the second main pole of the international proletarian milieu, Battaglia's disarray in the face of the 'wind from the east' is a sad indication of the more general weaknesses of the milieu. And given Battaglia's weight within the IBRP itself, there's a strong possibility that the CWO will be pulled back towards Battaglia's confusions rather than push towards greater clarity (in particular, we must wait to see what they say about the ‘revolution ' in Romania). In any case, the IBRP's inability to speak with one voice about these historic events is a revelation of a weakness which will be mercilessly punished in the coming period.
Bordigism, Neo-Bordigism, Councilism, Neo-Councilism, etc
As we've said, outside the ICC and the IBRP, the most characteristic response has either been silence, or a refusal to throw aside the routine of regular or infrequent publication, and a failure to make a particular effort to respond to these world-historic changes. Though even here there are different degrees.
Thus, after a long silence the Ferment Ouvriere Revolutionnaire in France published an issue of Alarme in response to the events (though not until the end of January). The editorial is a relatively clear response to the bourgeoisie's campaigns about the 'failure of communism'. But when in a second article the FOR descend from this general level to the concrete events in Romania, they come up with positions very dose to those of Battaglia: this may not have been a revolution, but it was an "insurrection", and "although probably no-one in Rumania dreamed of talking about communism, measures like the arming of the workers, the maintenance of committees of vigilance and their taking charge of the organization of the struggle, of production (food and medical necessities, to be defined in their nature, their quantity and quality), the demand for the dissolution of the armed bodies of the state (army, militia, police ... ), and the conjunction with for example the committee occupying the presidential palace, constituted the first steps of a communist revolution.
Like Battaglia, the FOR has long been depressed about the 'absence' of the class struggle; now it sees the "first steps of a communist revolution" at a moment when the working class had been derailed onto the terrain of the bourgeoisie. It's the same when it considers the 'positive' effects of the collapse of the Russian bloc (which it seems to recognize, since it writes "we can consider that the Stalinist bloc has been defeated''). According to the FOR this will help workers see the identity of their conditions internationally. This may well be true eventually, but to stress this point at this moment is to ignore the essentially negative impact that the bourgeoisie's current ideological offensive is having on the proletariat.
The 'orthodox' Bordigist current still possesses a certain political solidity, being as it is the product of a historic tradition in the revolutionary movement. We can see the 'remnants' of this solidity, for example, in the latest edition of Le Proletaire, publication in France of the International Communist Party (Programma Comunista).
In contrast to the misplaced enthusiasm for the events in Romania displayed by BC and the FOR, the Dec/Jan/Feb issue of Le Proletaire takes a firm stand against the idea that a revolution, or at least the "first steps" towards one, has been emerging out of the mass mobilizations in eastern Europe:
"As well as the aspirations towards freedom and democracy, the common trait of the demonstrators in Berlin, Prague and Bucharest is nationalism. Nationalism and democratic ideology, which claim to englobe 'the whole people' are class ideologies, bourgeois ideologies. And in fact it is the bourgeois or petty bourgeois strata frustrated at having been kept away from power who have been the real actors in these movements, and who have finally succeeded in replacing their representatives in the new governments. The working class did not manifest itself as a class, for its own interests. When it came out on strike, as in Romania or Czechoslovakia, it was in response to the calls by the students, as a simple, undifferentiated component of the 'people'. Up till now, it hasn't had the strength to reject these calls for the union of the people, for the national union of all classes. "
Even when these mobilizations take on a violent character, they don't add up to a 'popular insurrection': "in Romania, the murderous combats which decided the outcome were between the regular army and the special repressive forces ('Securitate'), ie between fractions of the state apparatus, not against this apparatus."
Concerning the historic causes and results of these events, Le Proletaire seems to recognize the key role of the economic crisis, and it also affirms that "the disintegration of the western bloc is the necessary consequence of the disintegration of the eastern bloc." It is also aware that the so-called collapse of 'socialism' is being used to muddy the consciousness of workers everywhere, and so correctly denounces the lie that the eastern bloc regimes were anything but capitalist.
On the negative side, Le Proletaire still appears to underestimate the real scale of the collapse in the east, since it argues that "although the USSR has perhaps been weakened, it is still, for world capitalism, responsible for maintaining order in its zone of influence": in fact, world capitalism is well aware that the USSR can no longer even be relied on to maintain order inside its own borders. At the same time, it overestimates the capacity of the workers in the east to overcome illusions in democracy through their own struggles - indeed, it seems to think that it will be the struggles against the new 'democracies' in the east that will help workers in the west to reject these illusions, whereas if anything, the reverse is true.
Given that the ICP has, in the past, been increasingly pulled towards openly bourgeois positions on such crucial issues as 'national liberation' and the union question, Le Proletaire's relatively healthy response to the events in the east proves that there is still proletarian life in the organism. But we don't think that this represents a really new lease of life: it's the Bordigists' 'classic' antipathy to democratic illusions, rather than any critical reexamination of the opportunist basis of their politics, that has allowed them to defend a class position on this question.
The same could be said for the 'other' ICP, which publishes Il Partito Comunista in Italy and Le Gauche Comuniste in France. In reference both to the events in China last summer, and East Germany last autumn, it is able to assert clearly that the working class did not emerge on its own terrain. In the article 'In China, the state defends the freedom of Capital against all comers', it comes to the difficult but necessary conclusion that "even though the machine-gun fire which swept the streets was also turned against it (the Chinese proletariat) it had the strength and the will not to be drawn into an example that was certainly heroic, but which didn't concern it." (Le Gauche Comuniste)
With regard to East Germany, it writes: "For the moment there are inter-classist movements situated on the democratic and national terrain. The proletariat is being drowned in a petty bourgeois mass and does not differentiate itself at all at the level of political demands."
Not bad. But how on earth can the ICP reconcile this sober reality with the article it published on the miners' strikes in Russia, where it claims that the proletariat in the Stalinist regimes is less permeated with democratic ideology than the workers in the west![3]
Outside the orthodox Bordigist currents we have a number of sects who, like their 'Italian Left' spiced with a dash of modernism or anarchism, but above all, accademicism. And so several months into these epoch-making events, nothing has disturbed the tranquility of groups like Communisme ou Civilisation or Mouvement Communiste (pour le parti communiste mondiale, of course), who continue with their schedule of research into the critique of political economy, convinced that they are treading in the foot-steps of Marx when he retired from the 'formal party' in order to concentrate on Das Kapital. As if Marx would ever have remained silent in face of historical developments on such a scale! But to date, even the more activist elements in this current, like the Groupe Communiste Internationaliste, seem to be nodding off in the warmth of their libraries. It is cold and windy outside, after all.
What about the councilists? Not much to report. In Britain, silence from Wildcat and Subversion. A London-based group, the Red Manace, apologize for not putting anything about Eastern Europe in the January issue of its bulletin. Its energies have been focused on the far more pressing necessity of denouncing ... Islam, since that is the main content of the leaflet it has produced recently. However, since this leaflet also equates Bolshevism with Stalinism, the October revolution with the bourgeois counter-revolution, it also provides a useful reminder of how councilism echoes the campaigns of the bourgeoisie, who are also extremely eager to show that there's a simple line of continuity between 1917 and the Stalinist labor camps.
As for the neo-councilists of the 'External Fraction of the ICC', we can say little at this stage, since their current issue is contemporary with last summer's events and they haven't seen fit to publish any special items in response to subsequent developments. But their current issue (Internationalist Perspective no 15) doesn't inspire much confidence, to say the least. For the EFICC, the installation of the Solidarnosc government in Poland didn't imply any loss of control by the Stalinists: on the contrary, it revealed their capacity to use the democratic card to fool the workers. Equally, one can hardly expect a clear class response to the bloodbath in Romania since they saw behind the massacres in China not a savage feud between bourgeois factions but an embryonic mass strike, and they roundly denounce the ICC for failing to spot this. And if recent statements at some public meetings in Belgium are anything to go by, the EFICC will continue to be guided by that old principle of the workers' movement - saying the opposite of what the ICC says. They seem especially keen to deny that the eastern bloc has collapsed. An imperialist bloc can only collapse through military defeat or the class struggle, they say, because this is how it's happened in the past. For a group which pretends to be the scourge of all ossified, dogmatic versions of marxism, this looks like a pathetic attempt to cling to tried and tested schemas. But we'll say no more until we have their positions in black and white.
The new period and the responsibility of revolutionaries
Although we are dealing with a situation that is still evolving, "We already possess enough elements to conclude that the events in the east have sharply exposed the weaknesses in the existing proletarian milieu. Outside of the ICC, which despite some initial delays and errors has been able to carry out its basic responsibilities in the face of these developments, and apart from the limited elements of clarity displayed by the more serious political groups, we have seen varying degrees of confusion or a complete inability to say anything at all.
For us this situation does not give rise to any hollow feelings of 'superiority', but it does emphasize the enormous responsibility weighing on the ICC as the most coherent reference point in the political milieu. Given that we are entering a period of reflux in the consciousness of the class, the difficulties of the milieu are not going to attenuate in the years ahead. On the contrary. But this is no argument for falling into passivity or pessimism. For one thing, the acceleration of history is going to accelerate the process of decantation that we have already observed to be going on in the milieu. Ephemeral and parasitic groups who have shown themselves utterly incapable of responding to the new period are going to be ground up by the remorseless wheels of history, but even the more substantial currents in the milieu are going to be shaken to their foundations if they are not able to overcome their errors and equivocations. This process will certainly be painful, but it need not be negative - providing the most advanced elements in the milieu, and the ICC in particular, are able to put forward a clear orientation that can serve as a 'guide to the perplexed' in a perplexing moment of history.
And there again, a general retreat in the consciousness of the class, ie at the level of the extension of consciousness throughout the class, does not signify the 'disappearance' of class consciousness, an end to its development in depth. We have already seen, in fact, that the events in the east have provided considerable stimulus to a minority of elements who are seeking to understand what's going on and who have entered into or renewed contact with the political vanguard. Even this development will be subject to fluctuations, but the underlying process will continue. Our class has not suffered a historical defeat, and there is every possibility that it will recover from its present set-backs to challenge capitalism in a more profound way than ever before.
For the revolutionary minority, this is undoubtedly a time when the tasks' of political clarification and general propaganda will tend to take precedence over a more agitational kind of intervention. But that does not mean that revolutionaries should be retreating into their studies. Our task is to remain in and with our class, even when our intervention is carried out in more difficult conditions and will often be compelled to go 'against the stream'. More than ever the voices of the revolutionaries must make themselves heard today; indeed, this is one of the preconditions for the class to overcome its present difficulties and push its way back to the centre of the historical stage.
CDW, February 1990
[1] At the time we're putting this issue together, we received a number of new publication: Workers' Voice, Battaglia Communista, Supplement to Internationalist Perspective, but didn't have time to integrate a critique of these publications into this article. Generally speaking, WV maintains the same analysis of the period, while denouncing the dangers for the proletariat more clearly. BC seems to some extent to be moving away from its delirium about the ‘popular insurrection' in Romania. IP entirely minimizes the collapse of the bloc, and, while keeping quiet about its great ‘theoretical' discovery about ‘the transition from the formal to the real domination of capital' as an explanation for the situation in the USSR, sees the situation as being well controlled by Gorbachev. The minority position in the same IP admits more clearly the collapse of the Russian bloc and its roots in the economic crisis. The evolution of positions shows that events are pushing towards some kind of clarification, but the problem of the general framework of analysis is still posed in the way we envisaged in the present article, before this latest publications.
[2] See our critique on this text in IR 46
[3] See our article ‘The responsibility of Revolutionaries' in Revoluzione Internazionale 62.
The article we reproduce below was published by the Gauche Communiste de France (GCF) in no. 10 of their magazine Internationalisme, which came out in May 1946. Internationalisme saw itself as the continuation of Bilan and Octobre, published by the International Communist Left before the outbreak of the Second World War. The GCF had its origins in this current and maintained its general orientations. But Internationalisme wasn’t just a continuation of Bilan: it also went beyond it.
The Russian question was at the centre of the preoccupations and discussions of the proletarian political milieu at the beginning of the 1930s, and these debates became more and more intense during the war and in its aftermath. Broadly speaking, there were four different analyses in these debates:
1) Those who denied any proletarian character to the revolution of October 1917 and to the Bolshevik Party and who saw the Russian revolution as no more than a bourgeois revolution. The main defenders of this analysis were the groups of the councilist movement, in particular Pannekoek and the Dutch Left.
2) At the opposite extreme, we find Trotsky’s Left Opposition for whom, despite all the counter-revolutionary policies of Stalinism, Russia still retained the fundamental acquisitions of the October proletarian revolution: expropriation of the bourgeoisie, a statified and planned economy, monopoly of foreign trade. Consequently, the regime in Russia was a degenerated workers’ state and had to be defended each time it entered into armed conflict with other powers: the duty of the Russian and international proletariat was to defend it unconditionally.
3) A third ‘anti-defencist’ position was based on the analysis that the regime and the state in Russia were ‘neither capitalist nor working class’, but a ‘bureaucratic collectivist regime’. This analysis saw itself as a complement to the Marxist alternative: capitalist barbarism or proletarian revolution for a socialist society, adding a third way, that of a new society not foreseen by Marxism: a bureaucratic anti-capitalist society[1] [10]. This third current had its adepts in the ranks of Trotskyism before and during the war, and in 1948 some of these broke with Trotskyism to give birth to the Socialisme ou Barbarie group under the leadership of Chaulieu/Castoriadis[2] [11].
4) The Italian Fraction of the International Communist Left fought energetically against this aberrant theory of a ‘third alternative’ claiming to bring a ‘correction’, an ‘innovation’ to marxism. But since it itself hadn’t developed an adequate analysis of the real evolution of decadent capitalism, it preferred in the meantime to stand on the solid ground of the classic formula: capitalism = private property; limitation of private property = a move towards socialism. Applied to the Russian regime this gave rise to the following position: persistence of a degenerated workers’ state with a counter-revolutionary policy, non-defence of Russia in case of war.
This hybrid, contradictory formula, which opened the door to all sorts of dangerous confusions, had already provoked criticisms within the Italian Fraction on the eve of the war, but these criticisms were somewhat eclipsed by a much more urgent question - the perspective of the outbreak of generalised imperialist war, which was denied by the leadership of the Fraction (the Vercesi tendency).
The discussion on the class nature of Stalinist Russia was taken up again, during the war, by the Italian Fraction that had been reconstituted in the south of France in 1940 (this had been done without the Vercesi tendency which denied any possibility of the existence of a revolutionary organisation, with its theory of the social disappearance of the proletariat during this war). This discussion quickly led to the categorical rejection of all the ambiguities and sophistries contained in the notion of the degenerated workers’ state defended by the Fraction before the war. Instead the Stalinist state was analysed as a product of state capitalism[3] [12].
But after 1945 it was above all the GCF, which, in its review Internationalisme, deepened and widened the notion of state capitalism in Russia, integrating it into an overall conception of the general tendencies of capitalism in its period of decadence.
The article we’re republishing here was one of many texts by Internationalisme devoted to the problem of state capitalism. The article by no means exhausts the question on its own, but in publishing it, leaving aside its undeniable interest, we want to show the continuity and development of thought and theory in the international left communist movement that we come from.
Internationalisme put a definite end to the ‘mystery’ of the Stalinist state in Russia by showing that it was part of a general, historic tendency towards state capitalism. It also pointed out that the specificities of Russian state capitalism, which far from expressing a “transition from the formal domination to the real domination of capital” as our dissidents in the EFICC stupidly claim, have their source in the triumph of the Stalinist counter-revolution after the October revolution had annihilated the old bourgeois class.
But Internationalisme didn’t have time to push its analysis of state capitalism further, particularly the question of the objective limits of this tendency. Even though it did write that “The economic tendency towards state capitalism, although it can’t be completed in a total socialisation and collectivisation inside capitalist society, nevertheless remains a very real tendency” (Internationalisme no. 9), it wasn’t able to develop an analysis of the reasons why this tendency couldn’t be completed. It’s up to the ICC to approach this problem in the framework drawn up by Internationalisme.
We have to show that state capitalism, far from resolving the insurmountable contradictions of the period of decadence, in fact only brings new contradictions, new factors that end up aggravating the situation of world capitalism. One of these factors is the creation of a swollen mass of parasitic strata, a growing loss of any sense of responsibility by these state agents who, paradoxically, have the job of directing, orienting and managing the economy.
The recent collapse of the Stalinist bloc, the multiplication of scandals about the corruption that reigns in the state apparatus all over the world is a confirmation of this ‘parasitisation’, if we may so speak, of the whole ruling class. It’s absolutely necessary to pursue this work of researching into and exposing the tendency towards the parasitism and irresponsibility of all high functionaries, a tendency accelerated under the regime of state capitalism.
MC (1990)
Internationalisme, no. 10, Gauche Communiste de France, 1946.
There’s no doubt any more: the first experience of the proletarian revolution, both in its positive acquisitions, and even more in the negative lessons that can be drawn from it, is today at the base of the whole modern workers’ movement. As long as the balance sheet of this experience hasn’t been made, as long as its lessons haven’t been brought to light and assimilated, the working class and the revolutionary vanguard will be condemned to running on the spot.
Even if we imagine the impossible, i.e. that the proletariat comes to power through a combination of miraculously favourable circumstances, it wouldn’t be able to hold out in these conditions. In a very short while it would lose control of the revolution, and would soon be shunted back towards capitalism.
Revolutionaries can’t be satisfied simply with taking a position on the Russia of today. The problem of the defence or non-defence of Russia has long ceased to be a debate within the camp of the vanguard.
The imperialist war of 1939-45, in which Russia showed itself, before the eyes of the whole world, to be one of the most bloody and rapacious of the imperialist powers, has once and for all revealed those who defend Russia, in whatever form they present themselves, as agencies, political arms of the Russian imperialist state within the proletariat, just as the 1914-18 war revealed that the Socialist parties had definitively become integrated into the national capitalist state.
We don’t intend to go back over this question in this study. Neither will we be looking at the nature of the Russian state, which the opportunist tendency within the international communist left still tries to portray as ‘proletarian with a counter-revolutionary function’, as a ‘degenerated workers’ state’. We think that we’ve finished with this subtle sophistry which claims that there is an opposition between the proletarian nature and the counter-revolutionary function of the Russian state, and which, without making any analysis or explanation of Russia’s evolution, leads directly to the reinforcement of Stalinism, of the Russian capitalist state and of international capitalism. We also note that since our study of and polemic against this conception, which appeared in no. 6 of the Internal Bulletin of the Italian Fraction in June 1944, the defenders of this theory haven’t dared to reply openly. The communist left of Belgium has made it known officially that it rejects this conception. The Internationalist Communist Party of Italy doesn’t yet seem to have taken a position. And while we don’t find an open, methodical defence of this erroneous conception, neither do we find an explicit rejection of it. Which explains why, in the ICP’s publications, we see constantly the term ‘degenerated workers’ state’ when they are in fact referring to the Russian capitalist state.
It’s obvious that this isn’t just a matter of terminology, but one of the persistence of an incorrect analysis of Russian society, of a lack of theoretical precision, something we also find in relation to other political and programmatic questions.
The aim of our study is exclusively concerned with drawing out the fundamental lessons of the Russian experience. We don’t intend to write a history of the events which unfolded in Russia, however important they were. Such a task is beyond our capacities at present. We only want to look at that part of the Russian experience which goes beyond the context of a particular historical situation and contains lessons valid for all countries and for the whole social revolution to come. In this way we hope to make our contribution to a study of fundamental questions whose solution can only come through the efforts of all the revolutionary groups in the framework of an international discussion.
The Marxist concept of the private ownership of the means of production as a fundamental element of capitalist production, and thus of capitalist society, seemed to imply the validity of another formula: the disappearance of the private possession of the means of production would be equivalent to the disappearance of capitalist society. Thus throughout Marxist literature we find that the disappearance of the private ownership of the means of production is presented as synonymous with socialism. But the development of capitalism, or more precisely, of capitalism in its decadent phase, displays a more or less accentuated, but nevertheless generalised tendency towards the limitation of the private ownership of the means of production - towards their nationalisation.
But nationalisations are not socialism and we won’t spend any time here demonstrating this. What interests us here is the tendency itself, and its class nature.
If you consider that the private ownership of the means of production is the fundamental basis of capitalist society, any recognition that there’s a tendency towards limiting this kind of ownership leads to an insurmountable contradiction: capitalism is beginning to abolish itself, to undermine the very basis of its existence.
It would be a waste of time to juggle with words and speculate on the inherent contradictions of the capitalist regime.
When one talks, for example, about the mortal contradiction of capitalism, i.e. that in order to develop its production, capitalism needs to conquer new markets, but that in the act of acquiring these new markets it incorporates them into its system of production and so destroys the market without which it cannot live, one is talking about a real contradiction, arising out of the objective development of capitalist production, independent of its will, and presenting an insoluble problem for it. It’s the same thing when one refers to imperialist war and the war economy, in which capitalism, through its internal contradictions, produces its own self-destruction.
The same applies to all the objective contradictions of capitalist evolution.
But it’s a different thing with the private ownership of the means of production: it’s impossible to see what forces are obliging capitalism deliberately and consciously to take on a structure which would alter its very nature and essence.
In other words, in proclaiming that the private ownership of the means of production is the nature of capitalism, you are at the same time proclaiming that capitalism can’t exist without private ownership. By the same token, you are saying that any change towards limiting this private ownership means a limitation of capitalism, a change in a direction opposed to capitalism, an anti-capitalist direction. The question of the scale of this limitation isn’t the issue here. To get lost in quantitative calculations, or to try to demonstrate that the scale involved is negligible, is simply to avoid the question. In any case it would be wrong: you only have to refer to the breadth of this tendency in the totalitarian countries and in Russia, where it involves the entire means of production, to be convinced of this. What’s at issue here isn’t the scale of the tendency, but its very nature.
If the tendency towards the liquidation of private ownership really meant a tendency towards anti-capitalism, you would arrive at the following stupefying conclusion: seeing that this tendency operates under the direction of the state, the capitalist state would then be the agent of its own destruction.
And indeed, all the ‘socialist’ partisans of nationalisations, of the command economy, all the makers of ‘plans’ who, if they’re not consciously trying to strengthen capitalism, are nevertheless reformers in the service of capitalism, like the groups Abondance, CETES, etc, end up with this theory of the anti-capitalist capitalist state.
The Trotskyists, who don’t reason very well, are obviously in favour of these limitations, since for them anything opposed to the alleged nature of capitalism must necessarily be proletarian. They may be a bit sceptical, but they think it would be criminal to neglect the least opportunity. For them, nationalisations are a weakening of capitalist private property. If, unlike the Stalinists and the Socialists, they don’t actually say that they are a slice of socialism inside the regime of capitalism, they are convinced that they are ‘progressive’. In their cunning way, they hope to get the capitalist state to do a job which would otherwise have to be done by the proletariat after the revolution. “It means that there’ll be less for us to do” they say, rubbing their hands in the conviction that they’ve outsmarted the capitalist state.
But “that’s reformism,” exclaims the left communist of the Vercesi type. And, as a good ‘Marxist’, he gets down not to explaining the problem, but to denying it, trying for example to prove that nationalisations don’t exist, can’t exist, that they’re nothing but inventions, demagogic lies of the reformists.
Why this indignation, this persistent denial, which at first sight seems rather surprising? Because the point of departure is the same as that of the reformists, and on it rests the whole theory of the proletarian nature of Russian society.
And since they have the same criterion for appreciating the class nature of the economy, to recognise such a tendency in the capitalist countries could only mean recognising that capitalism is evolving into socialism.
It’s not so much that this position clings to the ‘Marxist’ formula about private property, but rather that it’s fixated on the formula in reverse, on its caricature, i.e. that the absence of private ownership of the means of production is the criterion for the proletarian nature of the Russian state. This is why it’s led to deny the tendency towards, the possibility of, limiting the private ownership of the means of production within capitalism. Rather than observing the real and objective development of capitalism and its tendency towards state capitalism, and thus rectifying his position on the nature of the Russian state, Vercesi prefers to hold onto the formula and save his theory of the proletarian nature of Russia, and too bad for reality. And since the contradiction between the formula and reality is insurmountable, reality is simply denied, and the game is complete!
A third tendency tries to find the solution in the negation of Marxism. “This doctrine”, it says, “was true as long as it was being applied to capitalist society, but what Marx didn’t foresee, and what ‘goes beyond’ Marxism, is the emergence of a new class which is gradually, and to some extent peacefully (!) taking over economic and political power in society at the expense both of capitalism and of the proletariat.” This new (?) class is, for some, the bureaucracy, for others, the technocracy, and for yet others, the ‘synarchy’.
Let’s leave all these speculations aside and get back to the main issue. It’s an undeniable fact that there is a tendency towards limiting the private ownership of the means of production, and that this is accentuating each day in all countries. This tendency is concretised in the general formation of a statified capitalism, managing the main branches of production and the economic life of the country. State capitalism isn’t the speciality of one bourgeois faction or of a particular ideological school. We’ve seen it installed in democratic America and Hitler’s Germany, in ‘Labour’ Britain and ‘Soviet’ Russia.
We can’t in the limits of this study go into an in-depth analysis of state capitalism, of the historic causes and conditions determining this form. We will simply say that state capitalism is the form corresponding to the decadent phase of capitalism, just as monopoly capitalism corresponded to its phase of full development. Another remark. A characteristic trait of state capitalism seems to be that it develops in a more accentuated manner in direct ratio to the effects of the permanent economic crisis in the various capitalist countries.
But state capitalism is not at all a negation of capitalism, still less does it represent a gradual transformation into socialism as the reformists of various schools claim.
The fear of falling into reformism by recognising the tendency towards state capitalism resides in the mistaken notion of the nature of capitalism. This isn’t defined by the private ownership of the means of production, which is just one form of capitalism, characteristic of a given period, the period of liberal capitalism. What defines the nature of capitalism is the separation of the producer from the means of production.
Capitalism is the separation between past labour, accumulated in the hands of an exploiting, directing class, and the living labour of another class. It matters little how the possessing class distributes its wealth among itself. Under capitalism, this distribution is constantly being altered through economic competition or military violence. However important it may be to study the way this distribution is carried out, this isn’t what we’re looking at here.
Whatever changes may take place in the relations between different layers of the capitalist class, looking at the social system of class relations as a whole, the relationship between the possessing class and the producer class remains capitalist.
The surplus value extracted from the workers in the production process may be distributed in different ways, the parts going to finance, commercial, or industrial capital may be more or less large, but this changes nothing about the nature of the surplus value itself. For capitalist production to take place, it’s a matter of complete indifference whether there’s individual or collective ownership of the means of production. What determines the capitalist character of production is the existence of capital, i.e. of labour accumulated in the hands of one class that commands the living labour of others in order to produce surplus value. The transfer of capital from individual, private hands into state hands doesn’t signify a change in the nature of capitalism towards non-capitalism, but is simply a concentration of capital ensuring a more rational and efficient exploitation of labour power.
What has been shown up as false here isn’t the Marxist conception, but simply a restricted understanding of it, a narrow and formal interpretation of it. What gives a capitalist character to production isn’t the private ownership of the means of production. Private property and the private ownership of the means of production also existed in slavery and in feudal society. What makes production capitalist production is the separation of the means of production from the producers, their transformation into a means of buying and commanding living labour power with the aim of making it produce surplus value, or in other words the transformation of the means of production from a simple tool in the production process into something which exists as capital.
The form in which capital exists, whether individual or concentrated (trust, monopoly, state) doesn’t undermine its existence any more than the scale of the surplus value produced, or the forms the latter takes (profit, land rent). Forms are simply manifestations of the substance and can only express it in various ways.
In the epoch of liberal capitalism, the form in which capital existed was essentially that of private, individual capitalism. Thus Marxists could without any great inconvenience use a formula that basically represented the form as a way of expressing and representing the content.
When it came to propaganda among the masses, this actually had the advantage of making it possible to translate a somewhat abstract idea into a living, concrete image that could more easily be grasped.
“Private possession of the means of production = capitalism” and “getting rid of private possession = socialism” were striking formulae, but they were only partially true.
The inconvenience only arose when the form tended to change. The habit of representing the content through the form, which at a given moment did correspond to each other, was turned into a false identification, and led to the error of replacing the content with the form. We find this error taking place very clearly in the Russian revolution.
Socialism requires a very high level of the development of the productive forces, which is only conceivable in the wake of a considerable concentration and centralisation of the forces of production.
This concentration will involve the dispossession of private owners of the means of production. But this dispossession, whether at national or international level, this concentration of the forces of production after the triumph of the proletarian revolution, is only a condition for the movement towards socialism, but in itself it’s not socialism at all.
The most far-reaching expropriation may lead to the disappearance of the capitalists as individuals benefiting from surplus value, but it doesn’t in itself make the production of surplus value, i.e. capitalism itself, disappear.
This assertion may at first sight appear paradoxical, but a closer examination of the Russian experience will prove its validity. For socialism to exist, or even a move towards socialism, it’s not enough for expropriation to take place: what's essential is that the means of production cease to exist as capital. In other words, the capitalist principle of production has to be overturned.
The capitalist principle of accumulated labour commanding living labour with a view to producing surplus value must be replaced by the principle of living labour commanding accumulated labour with a view to producing consumer goods to satisfy the needs of society's members.
It’s in this principle alone, that socialism resides.
The mistake of the Russian revolution and of the Bolshevik Party was to have put the accent on the condition, on expropriation, which in itself isn’t socialism or a factor that pushes the economy in a socialist direction, and to have neglected or relegated to second place the basic principle of a socialist economy.
There’s nothing more instructive in this matter than reading the numerous speeches and writings by Lenin on the necessity for a growing development of industry and production in Soviet Russia. For Lenin the development of industry was identical to the development of socialism. He used openly and more or less indifferently the terms state capitalism and state socialism, without really distinguishing them. Formulations like ‘socialism = soviets plus electrification’ expressed the stammerings and confusions of the leaders of the October revolution in this domain.
It is very characteristic that Lenin’s attention was fixed on the private sector and on small peasant property, which according to him were the source of the danger of the Russian economy evolving towards capitalism. In so doing he completely neglected the much more decisive and concrete danger coming from state industry.
History has clearly shown that Lenin was wrong on this point. The liquidation of small peasant property could and did involve a strengthening not of a socialist sector, but of a state sector whose development meant the reinforcement of state capitalism.
There’s no doubt that the difficulties the Russian revolution ran into because of its isolation, and because of the backward state of its economy, would have been gradually attenuated by the development of the world revolution. It’s only on the international scale that there can be a socialist development of society and of each country. It remains the case that even on an international scale, the fundamental problem resides not in expropriation, but in the basic principle of production.
Not only in the backward countries, but even where capitalism has reached its highest state of development, private property will subsist for a certain period and in certain sectors of production, and it will only be completely absorbed slowly and gradually.
However the danger of a return to capitalism will not come mainly from this sector, because a society in evolution towards socialism will not be able to return towards a primitive stage of capitalism, one which capitalism itself has left behind.
The real danger of a return to capitalism will come essentially from the statified sector: All the more so because here capitalism attains an impersonal, almost ethereal form. Statification can serve to camouflage, for a considerable period, a process opposed to socialism.
The proletariat will only overcome this danger to the extent that it rejects the identification between expropriation and socialism, to the extent that it is able to distinguish statification with a ‘socialist’ adjective from the actual socialist principle of production.
The Russian experience teaches us and reminds us that it’s not the capitalists who make capitalism, but the reverse: it’s capitalism which engenders capitalists. Capitalists can’t live outside of capitalism but the reverse isn’t true.
The capitalist principle of production can continue to exist after the juridical, even the material disappearance of capitalists as the beneficiaries of surplus value. In this case, surplus value, just as under private capitalism, is reinvested in the production process in order to extract a greater mass of surplus value.
Before long, the existence of surplus value gives rise to men who form the class that appropriates surplus value. The function creates the organ. Whether they are parasites, bureaucrats, or technicians who participate in production, whether surplus value is redistributed in a direct manner, or indirectly through the intervention of the state, in the form of high salaries or various types of privileges (as is the case in Russia), this changes nothing about the fact that we’re dealing with the rise of a new capitalist class.
The central element in capitalist production is the difference between the value of labour power, determined by necessary labour time, and that labour power which reproduces more than its own value. This is expressed in the difference between the labour time necessary for the worker to reproduce his own subsistence, and for which he’s paid, and the extra labour time for which he isn’t paid and which constitutes the surplus value taken by the capitalist. The distinction between socialist production and capitalist production lies in the relationship between paid labour time and unpaid labour time.
Every society needs an economic reserve fund in order to ensure the continuation and enlargement of production. This fund is drawn from an indispensable amount of surplus labour. At the same time a quantity of surplus labour is required to meet the needs of the unproductive members of society.
Capitalist society is tending to destroy the enormous mass of accumulated labour drawn from the ferocious exploitation of the proletariat. In the aftermath of the revolution, the victorious proletariat will be faced with ruins and with a catastrophic economic situation, inherited from capitalist society. It will have to reconstruct an economic reserve fund.
This means that, at the beginning, the amount of surplus labour the proletariat has to perform will be as great as it was under capitalism. Thus the socialist economic principle will not, in its immediate application, be able to be measured quantitatively in the relation between paid and unpaid labour. Only the trajectory, the tendency towards altering this relationship can serve as an indication of which way the economy is going, as a barometer of the class nature of production.
The proletariat and its class party will thus have to be extremely vigilant. The greatest industrial conquests (even where the part going to the workers is greater in absolute terms, but less in relative terms) can easily involve a return to the capitalist principle of production.
All the subtle arguments about private capitalism disappearing through the nationalisation of the means of production can’t hide this reality.
Refusing to be misled by this sophistry, which aims at perpetuating the exploitation of the workers, the proletariat and its party will immediately have to embark upon an implacable struggle to halt any tendency towards a return to capitalism, and to impose by all the means available an economic policy that leads in the direction of socialism.
In conclusion, we will cite the following passage from Marx to illustrate and summarise our thinking: “The great difference between the capitalist principle of production and the socialist principle is this: with the first the workers confront the means of production as capital, and can only set it to work to increase the surplus product and the surplus value in the interests of their exploiters. With the second, instead of being occupied by these means of production, they use them to produce wealth in their own interests.” (Source unknown in English).
[1] [13] Among the first to hold this theory, we should mention Albert Treint, who in 1932 published two documents with the overall title of The Russian Enigma, and who, on this position, broke with the group known as the Groupe de Bagnolet. Albert Treint, a former general secretary of the PCF, and a former leader of the left opposition group L’Unite Leniniste in 1927, and of Redressement Communiste from 1928 to 1931, went through an evolution after breaking with the Groupe de Bagnolet which, like so many others, took him to the Socialist Party in 1935, and into the Resistance during the war. In 1945, he was not only reintegrated into the army with a rank of captain, but also became the commandant of a battalion occupying Germany.
[2] [14] It should be noted that the councilists of the Dutch left, and Pannekoek in particular, agreed with the broad lines of this brilliant analysis of a third alternative (see the correspondence between Chaulieu and Pannekoek in Socialisme ou Barbarie)..
[3] [15] In 1945, with the ad hoc constitution of the Internationalist Communist Party in Italy, the precipitous dissolution of the Fraction, the arrival of Bordiga with his theories of the ‘invariance’ of marxism, of the ‘double revolution’, of ‘support for national liberation’, of the distinction between ‘geographical areas’, of proclaiming US imperialism to be ‘enemy number one’, this new party went through a clear regression on the question of the class nature of the Stalinist regime, involving a denial of the notion of decadence and of its political expression: state capitalism.
The polemic which we continue in this publication isn't an academic debate about history. The proletariat's only weapons are its organizational capacity and its consciousness. This consciousness is historic, because it's an instrument of and for the future, but also because it feeds on the past experience of two centuries of proletarian struggles. Here, it's a question of transforming for the present and the future the terrible experience of revolutionaries in the years that preceded and followed the Second World War, in particular of knowing how and within what conditions the revolutionary groups can become real political parties of the proletariat. But to do this, it's necessary to put some historical facts in their true light and to fight the falsifications which, unfortunately were developed, even among the revolutionary milieu.
In Part 1[1] we showed how, in the crucial years between 1935 and 1937, the Fraction of the Italian Left abroad paid the price of a terrible political isolation to keep unbroken the red thread of marxist continuity as all the other left currents sank into democratic anti-fascism, including the most important amongst them: the Trotskyists[2]. This dramatic historic demarcation laid the political and programmatic foundations which remain today the basis for the forces of the international communist left. We have also shown that for the comrades of BC (Battaglia Comunista, the organ of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista), all this is valid only up to a certain point, since for them the central question in 1935 was to respond to the passage of the old parties into the counter-revolutionary camp with the transformation of the Fraction into a new Communist Party. This position, which in 1935 was defended by an activist minority (who split from the communist left the following year to take part in the "anti-fascist" war in Spain), was rejected by the majority of the Fraction. They remained faithful to what had always been the Left's position: that the Fraction could only be transformed into a new Party with the renewal of the class struggle. According to the comrades of Battaglia, the majority which defended this supposedly incorrect "wait and see" position in1935 had abandoned it in 1936, only to return to it in 1937 with disastrous consequences.
In particular, the majority's most prestigious spokesman, Vercesi, "settled the controversy in 1936 between the "wait-and-see" Bianco and the pro-party Piero-Tito in favor of the latter: 'we have to consider that in the present period, although we do not have and cannot yet have any influence on the masses, we are confronted by the need to act no longer as a fraction of a party which has betrayed, but as a party in miniature' (Bilan, no. 28). In practice, in this phase, Vercesi appears closer to a more dialectical vision, whereby the treason of the centrist parties should be answered by the creation of new parties, not to guide the masses (who were not ready to follow anyway) towards the seizure of power by sheer willpower, (...) but to represent the broken class continuity, to fill the political void which had appeared, and to give the class once again that political reference point which is indispensable even in periods of reflux, and which would, even on a tiny scale, be capable of growing with events, rather than waiting for them to bring the messiah with them. But in 1937, he went back on these positions, and in his 'report on the international situation' once again put forward the fractions as the only possible political expression for the moment, implicitly renouncing any transformation at all. ( ... ) Quite apart from Vercesi's individual chopping and changing, when war broke out the Fraction to all intents and purposes ceased to function. This meant an end to all the publications (internal bulletins, Prometeo, Bilan, and Octobre), and a decline in, if not an end to contacts between the French and Belgian sections. In 1945, the Fraction broke up, without having resolved in practice one of the most important problems which had led to its creation at Pantin in 1928. The Party was born nonetheless, in 1942 under the impulse of comrades who had remained in Italy (Partito Comunista Internazionalista). At the end of the war, this party was joined by many of the elements of the dissolved Fraction."[3].
As usual, the comrades of BC have rewritten history to suit themselves. Firstly, Vercesi was not the spokesman of the "wait-and-see" (as Battaglia calls it) majority; he was trying to find a compromise between two positions which surfaced, though ambiguously, at the end of the1935 Congress. Early in 1936, Vercesi once again made use of an expression which did in fact contain the ambiguity that the majority fought against, and which is quoted in the above extracts. True, the exact quote speaks of "the need to act no longer as a fraction of a party which has betrayed, but - if we can put it like this - as a party in miniature". But even in this conditional form, which the comrades of Battaglia have rather dishonestly removed, the expression remains full of ambiguity, when it tries to present the Fraction as a party with a small number of militants, when in fact it is a form of organization specific to phases of the class struggle when the existence of a party big or small is impossible. The real spokesmen for the majority had every reason to protest at these contradictory formulations which introduced on the sly the idea that it would have been possible to move towards acting as a party, when the preconditions were absolutely non-existent. It is no accident that an article by Bianco (in Bilan no.28) against Vercesi's, was titled "A little clarity, please!". And indeed, this clarity as to the fact that current conditions only made possible the existence of a Fraction was reestablished, though not in 1937 as Battaglia's article would have it. It was events in Spain that brought matters to a head, when the minority cut loose definitively and sank into anti-fascism. This clarified in practice what talk about "putting an end to 'wait and-see-ism'" leads to. Faced with this upset, Vercesi came to his senses, and for the moment (but alas, only for the moment) he gave up his ideas about "new phases". By standing full-square on its positions during the crucial period from July '36 to May '37 (massacre of the of workers in Barcelona), the Fraction was able to lay the foundations for today's International Communist Left, though only at the price of a total isolation from a political milieu completely in the grip of democratic decomposition. This terrible pressure could not help leaving its mark within the Italian, and in the new Belgian Fractions. A few comrades began to put forward the idea that the very fact that war was approaching brought the moment of proletarian counter-attack nearer, and that to be ready for these future reactions, it was necessary to begin a "different" activity. Towards the end of 1937, Vercesi began to theorize the idea that rather than a World War, there would be a multitude of "local wars" designed as "preventive massacres" against the proletarian threat sprung from who knew where. To prepare for these convulsions, it was necessary to "do more", and suddenly there reappeared, though in other terms, the idea that the Fraction should act - "if we can put it like this" - as a miniature party. To have the "activity" of a party, in September 1937 the Fractions embarked on an absurd project of collecting funds for the victims of the war in Spain, in order to compete at the level of "mass" work with the Social-Stalinist organisms such as "Secours Rouge" ("Red Help"), by descending to the same level. While in December 1936, Bilan no.38 reprinted the 1933 proposal for an International Information Bureau, noting bitterly that it remained impossible even to get this minimum proposal accepted, in September 1937, Vercesi declared in Bilan no.43 that a mere Information Bureau would henceforth be "irrelevant, and that we must enter another phase of our work" by forming an International Bureau of left fractions. In itself, the formation of a coordinating body for the only two existing fractions was entirely correct. The problem was, that instead of coordinating the activity of clarification and of training new militants, which was the only work possible for the fractions under the conditions of the time, this Bureau was more and more thought of as an organ which should be ready when the class struggle recovered, in order to coordinate "the construction of new parties and the new International". In January 1938, still putting the cart before the horse, the publication of Bilan was stopped, and replaced by a review whose name alone - Octobre - anticipated new revolutionary convulsions which were nowhere to be seen, and which it was intended should be published in French, English, and German! The result of this obsession with "acting like a miniature party" could have been foreseen: the review which was supposed to be published in three languages did not even appear regularly in French, the Bureau virtually stopped functioning, and - far worse - demoralization and resignations spread amongst militants in a state of utter confusion.
The outbreak of war in August 1939 completed the collapse, which was made still worse by the switch to clandestinity, the assassination of some of the best militants, and the arrest of many others; the fractions were thus in fact completely disorganized. Things were made still worse by the fact that with the outbreak of war Vercesi, who till then had maintained that the work of the Fraction was useless, and that it was necessary to work as a "mini-party" began to put forward the theory that since there was no reaction from the proletariat, it had "ceased to exist socially" and that in these conditions the work of the Fraction no longer served any purpose.
The constantly recurring theme here is the calling into question of the fraction as the organ of revolutionary activity in historically unfavorable periods. From all this, BC tries to draw the conclusion that those who continued to work as a fraction during the war learnt nothing from it. In reality, those who - like Vercesi - learnt nothing during the war, were precisely those who refused to work as a fraction. Contrary to what Battaglia would like us to believe, the fraction's activity did not come to a halt. On the initiative of its section in Marseilles, which had been at the forefront of the opposition to Vercesi, the fraction was reorganized at the beginning of 1940, held annual underground conferences, reestablished sections in Lyon, Toulouse, and Paris, and renewed contact with comrades who had remained in Belgium. Despite unimaginable material difficulties, a discussion bulletin was once again published regularly, as a tool for training militants, and for circulating the Executive Commission's orientation texts, which served as a basis for discussion with other groups, when they entered into contact. This underground work led to the formation (between 1942 and 1944) of a new French fraction, and to closer contact with a number of German and Austrian communists who had broken with a Trotskyist movement that had by then passed into the counter-revolutionary camp.
We do not understand how all this could have been done, in incredibly difficult conditions, by militants who according to Battaglia took "cosy" refuge in their "theorizations", waiting for the "messianic" arrival of the masses, capable at last of recognizing them as the rightful leadership.
Here we come to the nub of the question. Battaglia considers the fraction as an organ (the term "cultural circle" would be more apt) which limits itself, as long as the proletariat is not on the offensive, to theoretical studies, since there is no point in intervening in the class. On the contrary, it is the fraction that makes it possible to maintain the continuity of communist intervention in the class, even in the blackest periods when that intervention encounters no immediate echo. This is demonstrated by the whole history of the Left Communist fractions. As well as Bilan, its theoretical review, the Italian Fraction also published a newspaper in Italian, Prometeo, with a bigger circulation in France than the paper of those past-masters of activism, the French Trotskyists. The fraction's militants were so well-known for their commitment to the class struggle, that the unions' national leaderships were obliged to intervene directly and brutally to dislodge them from the rank-and-file organizations which defended them. These comrades distributed their press despite being hunted down both by the police and the patriotic unions. They were beaten up, and came back to hand out leaflets with a revolver stuck in the belt, ready to be shot down where they stood rather than abandon their intervention in the class. A worker like Piccino was taken by the Stalinists while selling the press, and handed over to the French police; he was beaten up so badly that he remained crippled for life, but nonetheless continued to sell the press. In a letter written in April 29, Togliatti asked for help from Stalin's repressive apparatus to get rid of the "Bordigist debris", admitting that their dedication was causing him more than a few headaches wherever Italian workers were to be found. From the class enemy, this is the highest form of recognition.
It requires extraordinary nerve to present as slippered theoreticians all those militants who were liquidated in the concentration camps, or arrested by the Gestapo as they secretly crossed the border to keep up contacts with comrades in Belgium, who took part in illegal strikes while on the run from the police and without proper papers, or who only escaped from the Stalinist killers waiting for them outside the factory gate by climbing the wall to get out. Battaglia writes that the comrades in exile should have fought for the transformation of imperialist war into civil war, and that "more attention should have been paid to Lenin's teaching", especially by "comrades who had grown up in the Leninist tradition". But what else were the comrades of the French and Italian fractions doing when they distributed leaflets calling' for revolutionary defeatism, written in French and German, in German troop trains, or when they risked their lives in the midst of an orgy of patriotism, to call on workers to desert the partisans?
Clearly, it is completely wrong to write that "the sole possibility of organizing the slightest opposition to imperialism's attempts to solve its contradictions through war, lay in the formation of new parties". If the transformation into a civil war did not take place, this was not due to any "lack of opposition" from the fractions, but to the fact that world capitalism had succeeded in breaking the first attempts in this direction, first in Italy and then in Germany, so pushing back any revolutionary perspective. According to Battaglia, if the fraction had transformed itself into a party despite everything, this would of changed things. But how? And in what direction?
To answer this question, let us consider the activity of the Internationalist Communist Party founded in Italy at the end of 1942 by comrades grouped around Onorato Damen. Unlike the fraction, which broke all its links with the PCI (Italian CP) in 1928, this comrade remained in the party until the mid-30's; in 1933, he was one of the leaders of the Civitavecchia communist prisoners revolt. In the article quoted above, Battaglia Comunista (where Damen was one of the leading militants until his death) waxes ironic on the call made by the 1935 Congress of the Fraction for militants to quit the communist parties which by then had gone over to the counter-revolution. BC wonders: if the party could not be transformed because at the time the masses remained deaf to the fraction, then who on earth could this appeal be addressed to? "We can't help wondering whether this call was not made in the hope that there would be no answer forthcoming from the proletariat, so as not to create any problems which would call into question the presenter's abstract schema". Battaglia's irony is particularly ill-chosen: this call was in fact addressed to comrades, like Damen, who had remained in the CPs in the hope of being able to defend class positions there, and would have concerned Damen himself, had the Stalinists not already solved the problem by expelling him from the party at the end of 1934. Or does Battaglia think that Bilan was wrong to call on these comrades to leave the CP's which had gone over to the bourgeoisie, and to join the fraction, which was the only place where the battle to reconstitute the class party still continued?
In fact, according to Battaglia, by 1935 it was clear for any marxist that the definitive departure from the PCI automatically implied the formation of a new party. But if this was so clear, why did Damen not form a new party in 1935? Why did he set himself to the patient, underground, work of selecting and training militants, just as the Fraction was doing in exile? If it is true that "the only possibility of organizing any kind of opposition" to the war lay in the formation of new parties, then why was this party not created in 1939, when in reality it waited until 1942, after three and a half years of imperialist massacre? According to BC's analyses, these seven lost years should be regarded as either madness or treason. For us, on the contrary, this is the best possible proof that it is not enough, to form a new party, that the old should have gone over to the enemy.
If the PClnt (Partito Comunista Internazionalista) as created at the end of 1942, then this was due to the development of a strong tendency towards the renewal of the class struggle against fascism and the imperialist war; in a few months, this led to the strikes of March 1943, the collapse of fascism, and Italian bourgeoisie suing for a separate peace. Although the world bourgeoisie rapidly succeeded in derailing this class reaction of the Italian proletariat, it nonetheless remains true that it was on this basis that the comrades in Italy considered that the time had come to form a new party. It is no accident that the comrades in exile came, quite independently, to the same conclusion, as soon as the heard the news of the March 1943 strikes: in August, the Fraction's Conference declared open "the phase of the fraction's return to Italy and its transformation into a party". This organized return, however, remained impossible, partly due to virtually insurmountable material difficulties (remember that it was only in 1945 that the PClnt founded in Italy was able to make its existence known abroad); these difficulties were made worse by the assassination and arrest of many comrades.
But the fundamental weakness was political: the minority of the Italian Fraction around Vercesi, along with the Belgian Fraction, denied any class nature in the 1943 strikes, and opposed any organized activity on the grounds that it was "voluntarist". The 1944 annual conference condemned the positions of the Vercesi tendency, and at the beginning of 1945 Vercesi himself was expelled from the Fraction for his participation in the Brussels "Anti-fascist Coalition Committee". But this long struggle had helped to reduce the forces available for an organized return to Italy, and in the end it was replaced by a policy of individual return by many militants; once in Italy, they discovered the party's existence and entered it on an individual basis. This policy was bitterly criticized by a part of the Fraction, and especially by the Fraction in France, which was increasingly developing underground work against the war, and which criticized the Italian Fraction's lack of determination to make an organized return to Italy. Then in spring 1945, came the bombshell: the news that there had been for years a party in Italy, already with "thousands of members", and including such comrades as Damen and Bord iga, The majority of the Fraction was overwhelmed with enthusiasm, and in a hurried conference in May 1945, decided its own dissolution and that its militants should join a party whose political positions they knew nothing about. When the French Fraction supported the minority that opposed this political suicide, the majority of the conference broke off all organizational links with the French group, taking as a pretext the revolutionary defeatist work that the French comrades had carried out with German and Austrian internationalists who did not belong to any of the Fractions of the Communist Left.
This decision to dissolve the Fraction had extremely serious consequences for the later development of the Communist Left. The Fraction was the sole depository of the fundamental political lessons which had been drawn during the selection of communist forces carried out between 1935 and 1937; it had a historical duty to ensure that new party was founded on the basis of these lessons, which we summed up in the previous article:
1) the party must be formed by individual adherence to the programmatic positions of the Left, set out by the Fractions, and excluding any integration of groups of comrades situated half'-way between the Left and Trotskyism;
2) the party's revolutionary defeatism must be guaranteed by the head-on denunciation of any form of "partisan militia" designed to enroll the workers in the war, such as the Spanish "workers' militias" in 1936.
Since the Fraction was unable to fulfill this function, due to its dissolution in 1945 and the absence of any organized return to Italy, we must now see whether the Party in Italy had been able to form on these bases. And this is not to determine how we should appreciate this party in particular, but to understand whether or not the fraction's work is a vital precondition for the reconstitution of the class party.
****
Let us start with the party's political positions and methods of recruitment. The PCInt's first Congress (28th December 1945 - 1st January 1946) held after the integration of the militants from the Fraction, declared that the PCInt had been founded in 1942, "on the basis of precisely this political tradition"[4] represented by the Fraction in exile from 1927 onwards. The first groups referred to "a platform constituted by a brief document which fixed the directives for the party to follow, and which for the most part it still follows today". It is hard to say how far this document was based on the Fraction's positions for the simple reason that as far as we know Battaglia has always declined to publish it (despite its "brevity"!), while in BC's 1974 pamphlet on the PClnt's Platforms its existence is not even mentioned. What a strange fate for the Party's founding document ... Consequently, we are obliged to refer to the Platform drawn up by Bordiga in 1945 and approved by the first Congress early in 1946.
Without analyzing this text in detail, suffice it to say that it allows the possibility of participating in elections (a position already rejected by the Left at the time of the pre-1914 abstentionist fraction of the Italian Socialist Party, led by Bordiga), that it takes "the founding texts of the Moscow International" as its theoretical basis (so rejecting the Fraction's critique of these texts from 1927 onwards), that there is no real denunciation of national liberation struggles (a position established by the Left in 1935), and that to crown it all, it exalts the workers' enrollment in the partisans' armed gangs as a "historical event of the first order". The Platform is also unacceptable on other questions (on the trade unions, in the first place), but we have considered here only those points where the Platform is outside the class frontiers already drawn up thanks to the programmatic elaboration of the Communist Left.
The party's methods of recruitment were in harmony with this ideological hodge-podge; or rather, the ideological hodge-podge was the inevitable result of the methods of recruitment, based on the absorption of groups of comrades holding the most divers, if not wholly contradictory positions. In the end, the Central Committee contained the first comrades of 1942, the leaders of the Fraction which had expelled Vercesi in 1944, and Vercesi himself, who was admitted at the same time as the members of the minority expelled in 1936 for having taken part in the anti-fascist war in Spain. There were even admitted groups like the "Fraction of left communists and socialists" from the south, which in 1944 still believed in the possibility of "correcting" first the Stalinist party, and even the Socialist Party (!) along with it. By contrast, Amadeo Bordiga, the Platform's author and main theoretician, was not even a member (he seems to have joined only in 1949).
On the second question that had been settled during the years from 1935-37 - the danger represented by the partisan militias - the PCInt's degeneration coincided with its numerical growth at the expense of principles. In 1943, the PCInt courageously and unequivocally denounced the imperialist role of the partisan movement. By 1944, it was already obliged to make concessions to illusions on the "democratic" war: "The communist elements believe sincerely in the necessity of the struggle against Nazism and fascism and think that once this obstacle is demolished, they will be able to march towards the conquest of power, destroying capitalism" (Prometeo, no.15, August 1944).
In 1945, the circle was completed with the participation of whole federations (as in Turin) in the patriotic insurrection of 25th April, and the adoption of a Platform which defined the partisan movement as "a tendency for local proletarian groups to organize and arm in order to take and keep control in local situations", only deploring these movements' "inadequate political orientation" (!). This is the same as the position on the Spanish Civil War defended by the minority in 1936, and which led to their expulsion from the Communist Left.
It is clear enough that the PCInt's overall positions did not match the level of clarification already reached by the Fraction, and considered as the unalterable bases for the formation of the new party. The comrades of Battaglia, by contrast, consider the party "formed in late 1942" as the high point of political clarity existing at the time. How do they reconcile this statement with the existence of the kind of confusions and ambiguities which we have only touched on here? Quite simply: by denying that these confusions were those of the party, and attributing them solely to Bordiga's followers, who were to leave the PCInt in 1952 to found Programa Comunista. We have already answered this in the International Review: "in other words: we and they formed the party together: what was good was us, what was bad was them. Even admitting that this were true, it remains a fact that the "bad" was a fundamental and unitary element in the party's formation, and that nobody had anything to say about this".
We now aim to show that these weaknesses were those of the party as a whole, and not just of a particular fraction which happened to be passing through. BC has always denied that the Party was open to anyone who was kind enough to join. But according to BC themselves, the presence of Vercesi on the Central Committee was explained by the fact that the latter "considered it his duty to join the Party"[5]. Is this a political party or a golf club? (though even in a golf club, you have to be accepted by the other members in order to join ... ). Moreover, it should be remembered that Vercesi "considered it his duty to join" the PCInt's Central Committee directly, thus becoming one of its main leaders. BC informs us that although Vercesi was on the CC, the Party was not responsible for what he said or did: "The positions expressed by comrade Perrone [ie Vercesi] at the Turin Conference (1946) ( ... ) were the free expressions of a wholly personal experience and a whimsical political perspective, which it is inadmissible to take as reference points in criticizing the formation of the PCInt"[6]. Well said. What a pity that when we read the proceedings of this first National Conference of the PCInt, we find (on page 13) that these "free expressions" of "political whimsy" were nothing other than the report on "The Party and international problems", presented to the Conference by Vercesi on behalf of the Central Committee. But the surprises don't end here, for when we come to page 16, we find that it is none other than Damen himself who gives the conclusion to Vercesi's report, and declares that at this point, "there are no disagreements, just different viewpoints which allow problems to be clarified organically". If Damen thought that Vercesi's report veered on political whimsy, why did he deny that there was any disagreement? Perhaps because he found an unprincipled alliance with Vercesi useful at the time?
Let us pass now directly to the Platform, written by Bordiga in 1945. Battaglia republished it in 1974, along with a proposed program distributed by the Damen group in 1944, with an introduction affirming that the 1944 proposal is much clearer than the 1945 Platform. This is certainly true on some points (the evaluation of the Russian Revolution, for example). On others, it makes much greater concessions than the 1945 document. On the matter of tactics in particular, it says: "our party, which does not under-estimate the influence of the other mass parties, defends the 'united front'". However, if we return to the Turin Conference, we find Lecci's (Tullio) report on the work of the Fraction in exile, and its demarcation from the Trotskyists: "this demarcation presupposed in the first place the liquidation of the tactic of the united front of political blocs" (Proceedings, page 8). Certain key points of the 1944 proposal were thus already considered by the 1946 Conference as incompatible with the positions of the Communist Left. Let us continue now with a look at the 1974 Introduction to the 1945 Platform:
"In 1945, the Central Committee received a proposal for a political Platform from comrade Bordiga, who, we should emphasize, was not a member of the Party at the time. The document, whose acceptance was demanded in the terms of an ultimatum, was recognized as being incompatible with the firm positions adopted by the Party on the most important problems, and despite some modifications the document was always considered as a contribution to the debate, and not as a de facto Platform ( ... ) As we have seen, the Central Committee could only accept the document as a wholly personal contribution to the debate at a future Congress; this was put off until 1948, and was to highlight very different positions (see the Proceedings of the Florence Congress)"[7]. This is how the comrades of Battaglia presented events in 1974. To see whether they correspond to reality, let us return to the January 1946 Conference, which was to have taken a position on the "acceptance demanded in the terms of an ultimatum" of Bordiga's Platform. On page 17 of the Proceedings, we read: "At the end of the debate, since no substantial disagreements had appeared, the 'Platform of the Party' was accepted, and the discussion on the 'Proposal for a Program', and on other documents currently being drawn up will be taken up at the next Congress". As we can see, what happened is exactly the opposite of what Battaglia is saying today: at the 1946 Conference, the comrades of Battaglia themselves voted unanimously to accept Bordiga's Platform, which henceforth became the official basis for joining the party (and which was published externally as such). The French delegates also joined the Party at the Conference on the basis of the recognition of the Platform's correctness (page 6), and the resolution on the formation of an International Bureau of the Communist Left begins in these terms: "the Central Committee recognizes that the Platform of the Internationalist Communist Party is the only document which gives a marxist answer to the problems encountered with the defeat of the Russian Revolution and with the Second World War, and affirms that it is the basis of this document and the heritage of the Italian Left that the International Bureau of the Communist Left can and must be constituted".
To conclude, let us say simply that there was indeed a document considered simply as a contribution to the debate, and whose discussion was put off to the following Congress; only, it was not Bordiga's Platform but... the proposed Program drawn up in 1944 by the Damen group, and which Battaglia is today passing off as the PCInt's de facto Platform during the 1940's. No words are hard enough to condemn the utter falsification of history carried out all these years by the comrades of Battaglia. They descend to the level of the Stalinist falsification of the history of the Bolshevik Party, which wiped out the names of Lenin's executed comrades, or attributed Stalin's mistakes to Trotsky. To try to give things an air of coherence, Battaglia has made its own Platform disappear from the Party's history, and in other documents[8] has not hesitated to attribute to "the ICC's ancestors", the comrades of the French Communist Left, the acrobatics of Vercesi, with whom their own "ancestors" made an opportunist alliance in 1945 when they admitted him onto the Party's Central Committee. We are well aware that this is a very harsh judgment. Nonetheless, it is based on the PCInt's own official documents, such as the Proceedings of the January 1946 Conference, which Battaglia has taken care to keep hidden, whereas it has republished the Proceedings of the 1948 Congress, since by then the opportunist alliance with Vercesi had been broken. We submit our conclusions, and our judgment, to the critique of the comrades of the international movement of the Communist Left. If the documents we have cited are false, let Battaglia say so and prove it. Otherwise, it will be clear, once again, who are the falsifiers.
****
At all events, one problem remains to be cleared up: how is it possible that comrades of the caliber of Onorato Damen, who had held high the flame of internationalism during the blackest days of our class' history, should lower themselves to such a falsification of this period of their own history? How is it possible that the comrades of Programa Comunista (who parted company with Battaglia Comunista in 1952) should come to the point of making all their history from 1926 to 1952 vanish into thin air? From what we have seen in this article, the answer is clear: in the crucial years surrounding World War II, neither were fundamentally capable of ensuring the historical continuity of the Left Fractions, which is the only possible basis of the Party of tomorrow. Certainly, we cannot reproach them for thinking in 1943 that the conditions were ripe for the Party's rebirth, since even the Fractions in exile shared this illusion on the basis of the beginnings of a proletarian response to the war contained in the 1943 strikes in Italy. But by January 1946 and the Turin Congress, it was clear that capitalism had succeeded in breaking the proletarian response, and in transforming it into a moment in the imperialist war, through the workers' enrollment in the partisan gangs. In this situation, it was necessary to recognize that the preconditions for the Party's formation were absolutely nonexistent, and to devote the revolutionary forces to the work of a fraction: drawing up a balance sheet of events, and training new militants on this basis. Neither group was capable of undertaking this task, and this explains their contortions since then. The Damen tendency began to theorize the idea that the formation of the party has nothing to do with the renewal of the class struggle, so denying their own experience in 1943. The Vercesi tendency (close to Bordiga) began to move towards something which was not yet the Party, but which was no longer the Fraction (the old "miniature party" of 1936 was recycled as "enlarged fraction" of 1948), anticipating all Programa Comunista's future balancing acts between the "historic" and the "formal" party. Only the French Communist Left (Internationalisme), which today's ICC recognizes as its predecessors, was able to recognize openly the mistakes it had made in 1943 when it thought the conditions for the Party's formation existed, and to devote itself to the work of drawing up a historical balance-sheet which the times demanded. Whatever its limitations, this work remains the indispensable basis for the work of reconstituting the Party tomorrow.
In a forthcoming article, we will analyze what this contribution represents.
Beyle
[1] International Review no 59, 4th Quarter 1989.
[2] See the ICC pamphlet La Gauche Communiste d' Italie (shortly to be published in English), on the relationship between the Italian Left and the International Left Opposition.
[3] "Frazione-Partito nell ‘esperienza della Sinistra Italiana', Prometeo no 2, March 1929.
[4] "Proceedings of the first national conference of the Internationalist Communist Party of Italy", Publications de la Gauche Communiste Internationale, 1946.
[5] "Letter from Battaglia Comunista to the ICC", published together with our reply, in International Review no 8, December 1976.
[6] Prometeo, no 18, 1972.
[7] "Documents of the Italian Left", Ed. Prometeo, January 1974.
[8] Battaglia Comunista no 3, February 1983; the article has been republished in the International Review no 34, 3rd Quarter 1983, without reply.
The Eastern countries: The crisis is irreversible, restructuring impossible
Events over the last few months in the former Soviet bloc have revealed more and more clearly the completely dilapidated state of all the East European countries and of the USSR in particular. As the reality of the situation was uncovered, the last hopes and theories about a possible improvement fell to pieces. The facts speak for themselves: it is impossible to revive the economies of these countries; their governments, whatever shape they have taken on, whether a 'reformed' version of the old apparatus, with or without the participation of the former 'opposition' parties, or based upon 'new' political formations, are all totally incapable of controlling the situation. Every day it becomes clearer that these countries are plunging into a level of chaos that is without precedent[1].
The western countries are not going to bail out the Eastern countries or the USSR
The debacle is complete. The Eastern countries would love to see the big industrialized countries coming to the aid of their ruined economies. Walesa never stops begging for Western aid to Poland. Gorbachev has been pleading with Bush to grant his country 'most favored nation' status, a preferential trade agreement that the USA has always refused to give the USSR, though it was often given to Rumania, the poorest country of the former Eastern bloc. The GDR is waiting for reunification with West Germany to get the subsidies for those rare sectors of its economy which are not completely devastated.
But the Western countries aren't going to spend even a tenth of what would be needed, because such a venture wouldn't just be risky, it would be doomed to certain failure. There are no more illusions about the possibility of economic revival in the Eastern countries. There's no tangible profit to draw from a productive apparatus which is totally obsolete, and from a workforce that is not adapted to the draconian norms of productivity imposed by the worldwide trade war now opening up between the main Western industrial powers, essentially the USA, Japan, West Germany and the other countries of Western Europe.
And even if the IMF were to hand out more credits, it would be confronted with a situation similar to that of the so-called 'third world' countries, which are completely insolvent, and have debts of billions of dollars that will never be repaid.
It is symptomatic that the Bush-Gorbachev meeting, which took place at the time of writing, didn't result in any real economic agreement, except for the timid extension of the previously existing ones. No one is counting on the success of the famous 'perestroika'. The main concern of the Western countries in their relations with the East is to find a way to prevent the generalization of the disorder which is now hitting the latter, and which no Western power is happy about. There's no question of commercial or industrial agreements that could bring a shot of oxygen to the economies of these countries; they are already quite asphyxiated.
The Eastern countries can't hope for a new 'Marshall Plan' (through which the USA financed the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan after the Second World War). If, among those who talk about the 'victory of capitalism', t here are any illusions left in the economic opportunities opened up by the demolition of the 'iron curtain', these vain hopes will soon be swept away by the painful experience of the West German economy in its move towards reunification with the GDR[2]. For German capital, there may be a short term interest in exploiting the very low paid workforce of the GDR, but the overall prospect is that reunification will open up a huge financial hole and lead to an influx of millions of unemployed and immigrants[3].
At a time when the international financial system is threatening to cave in under the weight of world debt, at a time when massive waves of redundancies are already gaining force, especially in the USA, and will certainly gain in strength in the other developed countries, the latter have no 'markets' or economic benefits to find in the Eastern countries, with only a few rare exceptions. Only a few out-of-date 'theoreticians', and unfortunately some of these do still exist, even in the proletarian camp[4], have any belief in the mirage of restructuring the Eastern economies.
An economy in ruin
The official figures now being supplied by the USSR show that the economy is completely exhausted. They pulverize even the estimates that Western specialists have been making over the last few years in opposition to the institutionalized lies that passed for Soviet 'statistics'.
The new statistics admit that the economy is inexorably reaching a zero growth rate, and are thus closer to reality than the pre-Glasnost ones. However, by including in their calculations the military sector, the only sector in which the Russian economy has seen any growth since the mid-'70s, they still greatly underestimate the breadth of the crisis in the Soviet economy.
At best, the USSR is at the same economic level as a country like Portugal; according to estimates, average income is about 3000 pounds a year and that can vary from 9000 to 5400 pounds. That means that the majority of the population has a living standard closer to a country like Algeria than to the poorest regions of Southern Europe.
What's more, the 'classic' characteristics of the crisis in the West, inflation and unemployment, are already beginning to ravage the Eastern countries, and at rates worthy of the worst-affected 'third world' countries. And these 'classic ' scourges of capitalism are coming on top of the equally capitalist scourges of Stalinism: rationing and a permanent shortage of consumer goods. Even the most violent opponents of Stalinism, the most zealous glorifiers of western-style capitalism, are stupefied by the ruined state of the economy in the USSR: "Soviet reality is not a developed economy that needs various rectifications; it's a huge pile of bric a brac that is quite unusable and imperfectible"[5].
'Perestroika' is an empty shell and Gorbachev's popularity in the USSR is now at its lowest ever; the government's most recent 'measures' simply ratify the disaster. There will be official recognition that consumer prices have risen by up to 100%, while wages will be raised 15% to compensate ... And very soon - in five year's for the optimists, in one year for others there will be unemployment for millions of workers. The figures envisage 40, 45, 50 million unemployed, maybe more. That means one person out of five, and without any allocation of the minimal basis for survival.
And if the situation in the USSR is one of the most catastrophic, the other eastern countries aren't much better off. In the ex-GDR, when monetary union comes in (July 1990), 600,000 workers will immediately be thrown out of their jobs, and this figure will reach four million in the years following, that is, one person out of four[6]. In Poland, after prices rose by an average of 300% in 1989, with certain products going up by 2000%, the government blocked wages "in order to deal with inflation". In fact inflation is now officially at 40% and this year the number of unemployed will rise to two million. Everywhere the balance sheet of the 'measures of liberalization' is clear: they have simply made the disaster worse.
The Stalinist form of state capitalism, which was inherited not from the revolution of October 1917, but from the counter-revolution which wiped it out, has fallen into complete ruin; the capitalist economic forms which arose in the so-called 'socialist' countries have reached a state of total disorganization. But the 'liberal' form of Western capitalism, which is no less a form of state capitalism, but a much more sophisticated form, does not provide any alternative. It's the capitalist system as a world-wide whole that is in crisis, and the developed 'democratic' countries are also faced with it. The lack of markets is not unique to the ruined Eastern countries; it's hitting at the very heart of the most developed capitalisms.
The failure of 'liberalization'
The acceleration of the crisis has laid bare the total absurdity of Stalinist-style state capitalist methods at the level of economic management. It has uncovered the complete irresponsibility of several generations of functionaries whose sole concern was to fill their pockets while on paper respecting the directives of 'plans' that were totally disconnected from the normal functioning of the market. But the fact that the ruling class itself now recognizes that they have to put an end to this irresponsibility, to abandon the permanent attempt to cheat the 'laws of the market' through total state control of the economy, doesn't mean that the bourgeoisie can revive the economy though a program of 'liberalization', or regain political control of the situation through a process of 'democratization'. All it can do is recognize the total shambles that exists at all levels. Since the Stalinist ruling class has for decades maintained its privileges through this kind of cheating, it can go no further than simply recognizing the existing state of affairs, as the last five years of 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' have shown. As we said in September 1989:
" ... just as 'economic reform' has taken on a virtually impossible job, so 'political reform' has very little chance of success. The introduction of a multi-party system, with 'free' elections, which is a logical consequence of the process of 'democratization', is a veritable menace for the party in power. As we have seen recently in Poland, and also to a certain extent in the USSR last year, such elections can only highlight the party's total discredit, and the population's hatred for it. Logically, the only thing that the party can expect from such elections is the loss of its own power. Unlike Western 'democratic' parties, this is something that the CPs cannot tolerate, since:
- if they were to lose power in elections, they could never, unlike other parties, get it back in the same way;
- loss of political power would mean the expropriation of the ruling class, since its political apparatus is the ruling class.
Whereas in countries with a. 'liberal' or 'mixed' economy, which still have a classical bourgeois class which directly owns the means of production, a change in the ruling party (unless this means the arrival in power of a Stalinist party ) has little impact on this bourgeoisie's privilege s and place in society, in the Eastern bloc such an event would mean, for the vast majority of bureaucrats, whether big or small, loss of privileges, unemployment, and even persecution by the victors. The German bourgeoisie could adapt to the Kaiser, the social-democratic republic, the conservative republic, Nazi totalitarianism, and the 'democratic' republic, without its essential privileges being called into question. By contrast, a change of regime in the USSR would mean the disappearance of the bourgeoisie in its present form, at the same time as the Party. And while a political party can commit suicide, announce its own dissolution, a ruling privileged class cannot."[7]
In the USSR, Stalinism is, through the historical circumstances in which it was born, a particular form of the capitalist state. With the degeneration of the Russian revolution, the state which arose after the expropriation of the old bourgeoisie by the proletarian revolution of 1917 became the instrument for the reconstruction of a new capitalist class, over the corpses of tens of millions of workers and revolutionaries. The form taken by this state was the direct product of the counter-revolution which was at its height from the end of the 1920s to the Second World War. The ruling class was totally identified with the monolithic party-state. With the downfall of this system, the ruling class has lost all control of the situation, not only its control over the other 'socialist' states, but also within the USSR itself. And it has no prospect of stopping this runaway process.
The situation in the East European countries is a bit different. It was at the end of the Second World War that the USSR, with the blessing of the 'allies', imposed on these countries governments dominated by the Communist Parties. In these countries, the old state apparatus was not destroyed by a proletarian revolution. It was adapted, bent to serve the needs of Russian imperialism; to a different extent in each country, the classical forms of bourgeois domination were allowed to subsist under the shadow of Stalinism. This is why, with the death of Stalinism and the USSR's incapacity to maintain its imperialist grip, the ruling class in these countries, most of them less underdeveloped than the USSR on the economic level, has rushed to get rid of Stalinism and to reactivate the vestiges of these previous forms.
However, while in theory the East European countries have a better chance of facing up to the situation than the USSR, the last few months have shown that the heritage of forty years of Stalinism and the context of the world crisis of capitalism pose enormous problems to any real bourgeois 'democracy'. In Poland for example, the ruling class has shown that it is incapable of controlling this 'democratization'. It finds itself in the aberrant situation of having a government led by the Solidarnosc trade union. In the GDR, it's the CDU, 'Christian Democrats', who governed alongside the SED (Communist Party) for forty years, who are the main protagonists of democratization and reunification with West Germany. But far from being a responsible political force that can carry out some sort of political reorganization in the country, the main motivation of this party is an appetite for personal gain. And all it has done is to wait for subsidies from its big sister party in West Germany, which is the main source of funds for the whole operation.
The whole inexorable evolution that began last summer with the accession of Solidarnosc to government in Poland, and then took in Hungary's shift to the West, the opening of the Berlin Wall, the separatism of the 'Asiatic republics', the secession of the 'Baltic republics' and the recent investiture of Yeltsin in Russia itself, is not the fruit of a deliberately chosen policy on the part of the bourgeoisie. It is the expression of the growing loss of control by the ruling class, and points towards a dive into dislocation and chaos unprecedented anywhere in the world. There's no 'liberalization', but simply the powerlessness of the ruling class faced with the decomposition of its system.
Democratic illusions and the nationalist explosion
'Liberalization' is just empty chatter, an ideological smokescreen which attempts to exploit the very considerable illusions in democracy in a population which has for forty years been shut up in the barracks of Stalinism; its aim is to make people accept a continual deterioration of their living standards. Gorbachev's 'liberalization' has already had its day; five years of speeches have given no concrete results, except for an increasingly unbearable material situation for the population. And this doesn't only apply to the men of the apparatus like Gorbachev. The former oppositionists, even the most 'radical' the great champions of 'democratization', unmask themselves and reveal their real nature as soon as they take on governmental responsibilities. In Poland for example, there's Kuron, a former 'Trotskyist'[8], a radical imprisoned by Jaruzelski a few years ago; when he became minister of Labor, he boasted about "extinguishing thousands of strikes" in order to able to "organize one hundred". Now he threatens the railway workers with direct repression, and shows the classic attitude of Stalinism faced with the working class. Whatever factions and cliques occupy the centers of power at one moment or another, there's no possibility of the kind of bourgeois democracy that exists in the advanced countries, still less of any kind of 'socialist' democracy.
This idea of 'socialist democracy', according to which all you have to do is get rid of the bureaucrats in power in order to allow a flowering of the 'socialist relations of production' that are supposed to exist in the East, is a particular favorite of the Trotskyist sects, who thus reveal themselves to be nothing but the last salesmen of Stalinism.
All the 'oppositionists', whether made up of elements who have come out of the apparatus, or of entire former apparatuses that have repented of their past deeds, or of personalities who have been converted by circumstances to putting themselves at their country's service, all of them are defenders of their feeble national capitals, all of them use the democratic illusions held by the great majority of the Eastern populations in order to maneuver themselves into power. But only the big developed countries can really afford the luxury of 'democratic' forms of capitalist class rule. The latter countries' relative economic strength and their political experience enable them to maintain the whole apparatus, from the media to the police, required to impose a grip on society that hides its totalitarianism behind a veil of 'freedom'. Stalinism, which is state capitalism pushed to the absurd point of attempting to negate the law of value, has given rise to a ruling class that is totally inept, ignorant of the ABC of this law, even though its class rule is founded upon it. Never has a ruling class been so weak.
And this weakness also leads, with the dislocation of the Eastern bloc and the USSR, to the explosion of the various nationalisms that were only tied to the USSR through military repression, and which have automatically come to the surface as soon as the big boss showed itself unable to maintain its domination by force of arms.
At one time Gorbachev may have given the impression that he was in favor of the expression of 'nationalities' in the USSR. In fact, the central Soviet power cannot use these nationalisms to strengthen itself. On the contrary, the outbreak of nationalisms, regionalisms, and particularisms at all levels is an expression of the impotence of the Russian regime and the definitive loss of its status as head of an imperialist bloc, of its place among the 'great powers'[9]. It's the current conditions that are feeding nationalism: without Moscow and the Red Army, the local cliques in power are left naked, and the door is open to the inrush of all the particularisms that were only kept out by military terror. The dire consequences of this collapse are only at their beginning. The logic of the situation is the kind of 'democratization' we've seen in Colombia or Peru, or even more likely, the 'Lebanonization' of the whole former Eastern bloc and the USSR itself.
Western ‘liberal' capitalism in turn enters into crisis
In the last instance the crisis in the USSR is the expression of the generalized economic crisis of capitalism, one of the manifestations of the historic crisis of the system, of its decomposition. There's no possibility of any restructuring of capitalism in the East, any more than any 'developing' country has been able to detach itself from 'underdevelopment' since the term 'third world' was invented. On the contrary, the perspective is of an irreversible and world-wide economic collapse.
Since it opened up at the end of the 1960s, the world economic crisis has led:
- in the years 1970-80 to the inexorable downfall of the countries of the 'third world', bringing the most black misery to an immense proportion of the world's population
- at the end of the '80s, to the definitive death of Stalinism, the capitalist regime inherited from the counter-revolution of 'socialism in one country', which has similarly plunged the majority of the population of the so-called 'Communist' countries into a state of absolute pauperization that is just as bad if not worse.
During the 1990s the crisis is going to bring this absolute pauperization to the heart of the 'first world' to the industrial metropoles that have already been ravaged by 20 years of massive and long-term unemployment, of insecurity and precariousness at all levels of social life. There will be no‘restructuring'' of capitalism, either in the East or the West.
MG, 3 June 1990
[1] See the analysis of the collapse of the Russian bloc and its implications for the world situation in nos 60 and 61 of this Review.
[2] See ‘The Situation in Germany' in this issue.
[3] Certain elements in Russian government have envisaged a way of restocking the USSR's coffers: sending 16 million Soviet immigrants into Western Europe so that they can send back currency to the USSR...
[4] See the article on the proletarian milieu in this issue.
[5] Le Point, 9-10 June 1990
[6] See ‘The situation in Germany' in this issue.
[7] IR 60, ‘Theses on the economic and political crisis in the Eastern countries'
[8] Cf the ‘Open Letter to the Polish Workers Party' by Kuron and Modzelewski, published in Britain by the International Socialism group, now the SWP.
[9] See the article ‘Nationalist barbarism' in this issue.
The vanguard that came late
The collapse of the Eastern bloc is the most important historic event since the Yalta Accords of 1945 which shared out the world between the two antagonistic imperialist blocs dominated by the USA and the USSR, and since the recovery of the class struggle at the end of the 1960s, which put an end to the dark years of counterrevolution which had reigned since the 1920s. An event on this scale is a determining test for revolutionary organizations, and for the proletarian movement as a whole. It does not simply reveal the degree of political organizations' clarity or confusion; it also has extremely concrete implications. Not only their own political future, but the whole working class' ability to find its way in the tempest of History, depends on their ability to respond clearly to this test.
The activity of revolutionaries is not something fortuitous; it has practical implications for the life of the working class. The ability to develop a clear intervention helps to strengthen consciousness within the class. The reverse is also true: confusion in proletarian organizations hinders the class' revolutionary dynamic.
How has the proletarian political movement and its constituent organizations reacted to the economic, political, and social earthquake that has ravaged the Warsaw Pact countries since last summer? How have they understood events? These are not secondary questions, mere excuses for sterile polemics; they are vital problems which will have a very concrete influence on the perspectives for the future.
Delay in the political movement: underestimation of the importance of events[1]
Battaglia Comunista's positions began to evolve during the autumn of 1989, but we have had to wait for the New Year to see the first positions adopted by the CWO, the PCI (Le Proletaire), and the FOR. At the end of February 1990, the EFICC published two texts from their internal debates on the situation in the East, but we have had to wait until April to read the Internationalist Perspective no 16 dated winter 1989! The little sects revive in spring, and publish some positions; 'Communisme ou Civilization', 'Union Proletarienne', the GCI, the 'Mouvement Communiste pour la formation du Parti Mondial' all emerge from hibernation. Months had passed, until the end of 1989, when apart from the ICC's positions, workers wanting to understand the viewpoint of the different revolutionary groups have had nothing more to get their teeth into than one meager issue of Battaglia Comunista. In our polemic published in late February, in the International Review no 61[2], we were only able to take account of the positions of three organizations: the IBRP (which regroups the CWO and BC), the FOR and the PCI (Le Proletaire). Six months had already passed since the first important events took place.
Certainly, the collapse of an imperialist bloc under the blows of the world economic crisis is unprecedented in capitalism's history; the situation is a historically new one, and so difficult to analyze. However, quite apart from the different positions' content, this delay expresses an incredible under-estimation both of events and of the role of revolutionaries. The passivity of the various political organizations faced with events such as the Eastern bloc's collapse and the questions that this inevitably raises within the working class says much about their state of advancing political decrepitude.
It is no accident that the organizations which reacted the quickest are those whose history attaches them the most clearly to Left Communist traditions and especially to those of the Italian Left, and which have already demonstrated a certain staying power. These are the political and historical poles of reference for the proletarian movement. Fundamentally, the little sects which gravitate around them do not express positions so different that they justify the existence of separate organizations, To differentiate themselves, they can only either plunge from "discovery" to "discovery", ever further into confusion and the void, or ape the positions classically under debate in the revolutionary movement, but in a sterile and caricatural manner.
In this polemical article, we will therefore concentrate on the IBRP, which remains, with the ICC, the main pole of regroupment, and the Bordigists, since although this current has collapsed as a pole of regroupment it nonetheless remains an important reference point for the debates within the revolutionary milieu. However, we will endeavor not to ignore the positions of parasitic groups such as the EFICC, 'Communisme ou Civilization', or even the GCI which arguably no longer has so much as a toe in the proletarian camp. Clearly, the list is not exhaustive. The latter groups generally caricature the weaknesses within the proletarian milieu, and reveal the logical outcome of confusions born by the more serious groups.
Faced with the upheavals in the East, on the whole all the revolutionary organizations have been able to set forward, at least on a general theoretical level, two basic positions, which have sometimes had to substitute for any analysis of the situation:
- affirmation of the capitalist nature of the USSR and its Eastern bloc satellites;
- denunciation of the danger of democratic illusions for the proletariat.
Clarity on these two points, which lie at the heart of the proletarian political milieu's existence and unity, is the least we should expect from revolutionary organizations. When it comes to analyzing events, a cacophony of confusion reigns. The delay in taking positions is not just a practical matter, an inability to alter the cosy rhythm of press deadlines to confront historical events; it is a delay in recognizing reality, in simply seeing the facts and especially the fact of the Eastern bloc's break-up and collapse.
In October 1989, BC still sees "the Eastern empire still solidly under the Russian boot", while in December it writes: "The USSR must open up to Western technology, and so must COMECON, not - as some think - in a process of disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the USSR's total withdrawal from the European countries, but by revitalizing the COMECON economies to facilitate the recovery of the Soviet economy". Not until January 1990 did a first clear position appear from the IBRP, in the CWO's publication Workers' Voice: these "events of a world historical significance" mean "the beginning of the collapse of the world order created towards the end of World War II" and open a period of "reconstitution of imperialist blocs".
The two major groups of the Bordigist diaspora proved to have quicker reflexes than the IBRP: in its September 1989 issue, Il Programa Comunista envisages the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the possibility of new alliances, as does 'II Partito Comunista' at the same time. However, these positions remain at the level of hypotheses, and are not devoid of ambiguity: thus in France, Le Proletaire can still write that "the USSR may be weakened; it remains capable of keeping order in its own zone of influence".
In January, the FOR announces timidly, without developing the point, that "we may consider that the Stalinist bloc has been beaten".
In spring 1990, the EFICC offers us two positions. This organization's official majority position only sees the events in the East as "an attempt by the Gorbachev team progressively to recreate all the conditions which would allow the Russian state to conduct a real counter-offensive against the West". The more lucid minority notes that the situation is escaping the control of the Soviet leadership, and that the reforms are only making matters worse for the Russian bloc.
For 'Communisme ou Civilization', which has published a text in the Revue Internationale du Mouvement Communiste, "the historical importance of current events is due first and foremost to their geographical position"!! After a long academic screed which considers a multitude of hypotheses of every possible description without any clear position emerging, CouC apparently concludes that what is happening in the East is a mere restructuring crisis.
As for the GCl and its avatar the 'Mouvement communiste pour la formation du parti communiste mondial', whose publications reached us in spring, the collapse of the Eastern bloc is not even envisaged. This is nothing but a restructuring maneuver to confront the crisis and above all the class struggle.
The organizations of the proletarian milieu have taken months to measure the significance of events, and in most cases their ambiguity on the subject remains; the illusion survives that the USSR might take its ex-bloc in hand again. Six months after the events began, the IBRP can only see the "beginning" of a process, when in fact the USSR has already fundamentally lost all control over its East European glacis. As for the parasitic sects, they have noticed almost nothing. Solidarnosc won the Polish elections this summer, the Berlin Wall has fallen, the Stalinist parties have been ejected from power in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu has been overthrown in Romania, while in the USSR itself the events in the Caucasus and the Baltic states have revealed the full extent of the central power's loss of control, and the dynamic towards a breakup of the union implicit in the "nationalist awakening". And yet, the political milieu is apparently struck down with sleeping-sickness. Confronted with straightforward facts, an incredible blindness persists. Our doctors in marxist theory, ensconced in an anxious conservatism, have refused to see what even the vulgar scribblers of the bourgeois press cannot help noticing. The proletarian movement's general lack of political reflex in recent months is a sign of its profound weaknesses; incapable, in recent years, of intervening determinedly in the struggles of the working class which it did not recognise, the milieu has shown itself impotent in confronting the abrupt acceleration of history of the last few months. A great part of the milieu has remained blind, deaf, and dumb. This situation cannot continue indefinitely. They may claim to belong to the working class; but organizations which are incapable of assuming their role are of no use to it, and inevitably become hindrances to it. They lose their reason for existing.
When we consider how much difficulty the organizations of the political milieu have had in opening their eyes to the reality of the Russian bloc's collapse, which has become ever more blindingly evident as months have gone by, we can get some idea of the confusion that reigns in the analyses that have been developed. We do not intend here to go in detail into all the theoretical avatars elaborated by the various revolutionary political groups - several issues of the International Review would not be enough for the job. Rather, we aim to examine the implications of the positions taken up by the milieu on two levels: the economic crisis and the class struggle. We will then consider what are the implications of all this for the life of the proletarian milieu itself.
The economic crisis at the heart of the Eastern Bloc's collapse: a general under-estimation
All the organizations of the proletarian movement see the crisis in the origins of the upheavals in the East, with the exception of the FOR which remains consistent with its surreal position that there is no economic crisis of capitalism today, and so does not mention it. However, apart from this general position of principle, the 'evaluation of the crisis' depth and nature determines an understanding of today's events, and this evaluation varies widely from group to the next.
In October, BC wrote: "In the advanced capitalist countries of the West, the crisis appeared above all in the 1970's. More recently, this same crisis of the process of capital accumulation has exploded in the less advanced 'communist' countries". In other words, BC sees no open crisis of capital in the Eastern bloc countries before the 1980's. Was there no "crisis of the process of capital accumulation" in Eastern Europe in the preceding period? Was Russian capital in full expansion as Stalinist propaganda claimed? In fact, BC profoundly underestimates the chronic crisis which has lasted for decades. In the same article, BC continues:
"The collapse of markets on the periphery of capitalism, for example in Latin America, has created new problems of insolvency for the remuneration of capital ( ... ). The new opportunities opening up in Eastern Europe may represent a safety valve in relation to this need for investment ( ... ). If this widespread process of East-West collaboration comes to fruition, this will represent a shot in the arm for international capitalism". Clearly, BC underestimates not just the crisis in the East, but also the crisis in the West. Where will the latter find the credits necessary to reconstruct the ravaged economies of the Eastern countries? West Germany is preparing to invest billions of marks just to put the East German economy on its feet, without being in the least. sure of the result; to find these billions, it will have to transform its position as principal lender on the world market after Japan to that of a major borrower, which will accelerate the existing credit crisis in the West.
We can only imagine the colossal sums that would be necessary to extricate the entire Eastern ex-bloc from the economic disaster into which it has plunged ever deeper since its inception: the exhausted world economy simply does not have the resources for such a policy; there can be no question of a new Marshall Plan. But above all, how can the stricken economies of Eastern Europe be more solvent than those of Latin America, when countries like Poland and Hungary are already incapable of repaying the loans that they contracted years ago? In fact, BC does not realize that the collapse of the Eastern bloc, a decade after the economic collapse of the "Third World" countries, marks a new step into its mortal crisis by the world capitalist economy. The IBRP's analysis flies in the face of reality. Instead of a dramatic plunge into the crisis, it sees a possibility for capitalism to get a new "shot in the arm", a means of slowing the decline of the economy! With such a vision, it is hardly surprising that BC over-estimates the Russian bourgeoisie's room for maneuver, and envisages a possible reconstruction of the Eastern bloc's economy, under the aegis of Gorbachev and with Western support.
The PCI recognizes the economic crisis as being at the origins of the Warsaw Pact's collapse. However, in a polemic with the ICC published in the April 1990 issue of Le Proletaire, the PCI reveals its profound and traditional underestimation of the gravity of the economic crisis: "The extra-lucid ICC in fact develops an alarming analysis according to which today's events are nothing less than a 'collapse of capitalism' in the East! Better still, the March issue of RI informs us that the whole world economy is collapsing".
Needless to say, the ICC does not say, as the PCI would have it, that capitalist relations of production have disappeared in the East. However, with this inaccurate polemic, the PCI demonstrates its own under-estimation of the economic crisis, and in one phrase denies the reality of the disaster which is submerging the planet, and which has plunged the majority of the world's population into a bottomless economic misery. Does the PCI really think that we are still in the cyclical crises of the 19th century, or has it at last realized that today's economic crisis, which it has taken years to notice, is a mortal one which can only become a constantly widening worldwide catastrophe accompanied by the effective collapse of whole sectors of the economy? The PCI, which used to accuse us of 'indifferentism' remains essentially indifferent to the economic crisis; it can hardly see the crisis, and above all cannot understand it. The little academic sects have often specialized in long and boring economic analyses, and pseudo-marxist theoretical innovations.
After a long and insipid screed, 'Communisme ou Civilisation' remains blind to the obvious open economic crisis: it is still awaiting "the outbreak of a new cyclical crisis of the capitalist mode of production on a world scale in the 1990's". For CouC, the present upheavals in Eastern Europe are the expression of the fact that "the complete passage of Soviet society to the stage of more developed capitalism cannot occur without a profound crisis, as is indeed the case". In other words, the present crisis is merely one of restructuration, of growth, of a capitalism in full development!
The EFICC, which has been going on for years about a "new" theory of the development of state capitalism as the product of capital's passage from a stage of formal to one of real domination, has all of a sudden lapsed into silence as far as this fruit of its learned savants is concerned. This point, which only a short time ago was so fundamental that it justified a diatribe from the EFICC against the ICC for our "theoretical sterility" and "dogmatism" has suddenly lost its importance in the face of the crisis in the Eastern bloc. Understand who can![3]
The proletarian organizations constantly underestimate the depth of the crisis, and fail to understand its nature. Hence their major in comprehensions over the nature of the events which are taking place today. Some groups are only just beginning, under the pressure of facts, to resign themselves to the obvious collapse of the Eastern imperialist bloc under the weight of the economic crisis. However, the fundamental significance of this event, the situation that made it possible, and the dynamic which determined it, escape them completely. With the blockage of the historical situation, where the balance of class forces allows neither the bourgeoisie to go forward into generalized imperialist war, nor in the short term the proletariat to impose the solution of the communist revolution, capitalist society has entered a phase of decomposition and is rotting where it stands. The effects of the economic crisis take on a qualitatively new dimension. The collapse of the Russian bloc is the most striking demonstration of the real development of this process of decomposition, which is appearing to different degrees and in different forms throughout the planet.[4]
But the political myopia which makes it difficult for these groups to see what is right in front of their noses, makes them quite incapable of grasping the causes and the full dimensions of events. The milieu's meanderings on the crisis, which have already largely contributed to paralysing it in the face of recent events, herald still greater confusions over the upheavals still to come.
Revolutionary organizations unable to identify the class struggle
Apart from the ICC, the proletarian milieu gene rally paid little attention to the workers' struggles which developed in the advanced capitalist countries from 1983 onwards. The ICC was accused of over-estimating the class struggle. In its April issue, BC once again accuses the ICC of trusting "its desires more than reality" since these movements "have produced nothing other than economic struggles which have never been capable of generalizing". True, these economic struggles do not mean very much to BC, since according to them we are still in a period of counter-revolution; in this they follow the position of all the Bordigist groups created by the various splits from the PCI since its birth at the end of the war.
BC is incapable of recognizing the class struggle when it is in front of their noses, and as a result even less capable of intervening concretely in it; by contrast they are only too happy to imagine it where it is not. BC sees in the events in Romania in December 1989 an "authentic popular insurrection", and goes on:
"All the objective conditions and nearly all the subjective conditions were present for this insurrection to be transformed into a true social revolution, but the absence of an authentic class political force left the field open to precisely those forces which were for the maintenance of class relations of production".
We have already criticized this position in our polemic published in the International Review no 61; this has provoked a response in the April 1990 issue, where BC maintains its position, and adds:
"We did not think it possible that any doubt could arise as to the fact that the insurrection was understood as a result of the crisis, and that it is described as popular and not proletarian or socialist".
Clearly, BC either cannot or will not understand what the debate is about. The mere use of the term "insurrection" in this context cannot help but sow confusion, and adding the word "popular" only makes it worse. The proletariat is the only class in today's capitalist world capable of leading an insurrection, ie the destruction of the existing bourgeois state. For this happen, the proletariat must first exist as a class fighting and organize d on its own terrain. Clearly, this is not the case in Romania. The workers are atomized, diluted in the discontent of every layer of the population, which has been used by one fraction of the state apparatus to overthrow Ceausescu. In this situation, where the workers have been dissolved in the "popular" movement, ie where the proletariat as a class was absent, BC discerns "nearly all the subjective conditions ( ... ) for this insurrection to be transformed into a true social revolution"! BC sees, not the extreme weakness of the working class, but on the contrary something grandiose.
All BC's denunciations of the democratic poison become a dead letter if they are incapable of perceiving where concretely it is having such a devastating effect on the class' consciousness, and mistake the triumph of the democratic mystification for the workers' discontent.
The EFICC has already fallen into the trap that BC is preparing for itself. Like the IBRP, the EFICC had visions over China, and thought it could see the workers' anger ready to burst out. Today it affirms that: "The present illusions, the Romanian proletariat's entry into the sinister dance of the struggle for democracy, should not hide the potential combativity for class demands which the Romanian proletariat nonetheless retains". The EFICC here is consoling itself as best it can, but it is revealing its own illusions as to the working class potential that survives in the short term after the democratic debauch.
In an article entitled 'An insurrection not a revolution', the FOR perceives in Romania "the presence of workers in arms", and adds that "the proletarians rapidly abandoned the leadership to the 'specialists' of the confiscation of power". For the FOR, the proletariat has "largely contributed to setting in motion" the changes in the East. Clearly, since the FOR sees nothing of the economic crisis, it has to look elsewhere for its explanation.
BC opens a door to confusion; the ‘Mouvement communiste' and the GCI rush headlong through it. The former's long pamphlet on Romania, which manages to say nothing about the overall situation in the Eastern bloc, is titled: Romania: between the restructuration of the state and upsurges of proletarian insurrection; the latter has published an 'Appeal for solidarity with the Romanian insurrection'! No comment.
We should give credit here to the PCI for avoiding the Romanian trap, clearly stating that in the Eastern countries "the working class has not appeared as a class on the basis of its own interests", and that in Romania "the combats were between fractions of the state apparatus, and not against it". Similarly, the PCI-II Partito Comunista of Florence declares clearly that for the moment the class struggle in the Eastern bloc has been submerged in an orgy of populism, nationalism, and democracy, and that "the Romanian movement has been anything but a popular revolution". However, while their positions on events in the East demonstrate that these defenders of Bordigism are still capable of identifying and denouncing the democratic lie, and have not yet squandered all their inheritance from the Italian Left, they remain incapable of recognizing the class struggle when it really does develop at the heart of the industrialized countries. Like BC, the heirs of Bordigism analyze the present period as being one of counter-revolution.
The overall picture speaks for itself. One of these organizations' main characteristics is their inability to recognize and identify the class struggle. Unable to see it when it does develop, they imagine it where it does not exist. This profound confusion obviously renders these groups incapable of intervening clearly within the class. While the ruling class is profiting from the collapse of the Eastern bloc to launch a massive ideological offensive for the defense of democracy, which has got the better of the proletariat in the East European countries, many groups see in this situation the development of working class potential. This turning reality on its head expresses a serious misunderstanding, not only of the world situation but also of the very nature of the workers' struggle. After turning up their noses at the struggles in the developed countries during the 1980s (which despite all the traps and difficulties they encountered remained firmly anchored on the proletarian class terrain), they now prefer to seek the proof of proletarian combativity in expressions of general popular discontent, where the proletariat as a class is absent, and which are conducted for objectives which are foreign to it under the banner of "democracy" as in China or Romania.
In such conditions, it is difficult indeed to expect these organizations of the proletarian milieu, which for the most part have seen nothing of the development of class struggle in recent years, or at best have always profoundly under-estimated it, to understand anything of the effects on the proletariat of the collapse of the Russian bloc, and the present intense democratic campaign. The latter's confusion faced with these great historic upheavals is expressed by a retreat of consciousness within the class[5]. But how can the proletarian milieu understand the retreat, when they have not even seen the advance? How can they understand the uneven development of the class struggle, with its ups and downs, when they start from the premise that we are still in a period of counter-revolution?
The milieu's weakness takes the form of increased sectarianism
In the previous issue of the International Review, we wrote: "If we consider that the IBRP is the second major pole of the international political milieu, BC's disarray when confronted with the 'wind from the East' is a sad indication of the milieu's more general weaknesses". Sadly, the positions that have developed over the last few months have only confirmed this observation; this has hardly come as a surprise to us. For years, the ICC in its polemics has warned the groups of the milieu against the dangerous confusions within it, but since these groups have remained blind to the class struggle, to the collapse of the Eastern bloc, to the present retreat, to the evidence of facts taking place under their very noses, they have also remained deaf to what we have had to say[6]. As a result, they have also remained dumb on the level of intervention, settling more and more into an alarming impotence which has been put, only too clearly into relief in recent months.
However, it is not only on the level of their analyses that these organizations have failed as a factor of clarification for advanced elements of the class seeking a coherent framework for understanding the present situation. Along with their confusion, their traditional tendency towards sectarianism has lately deepened also.
Here again, Battaglia Comunista, from whom we have come to expect better, has set a sad example. The intervention by a comrade from the ICC at one of BC's public meetings, simply pointing out the IBRP's massive mistake over events in Romania, and insisting that these were no more than a vulgar coup d'état, has been the excuse for BC to get up on its high horse and threaten to refuse to allow the open sale of our publications at their public meetings. The fact that the Revolution Internationale, the ICC's publication in France, mentioned this upsurge of sectarianism has been enough to provoke the wrath of BC, which has since addressed a violent 'circular letter' "to all the groups and contacts on an international level" to denounce "the lies of the ICC" and the "henceforth objectively piratical nature of the ICC's activity", and to conclude: "While we defy the ICC to continue with this defamatory campaign based on lies and, calumny, in order to avoid more serious reactions we invite all those aware of the facts to draw the necessary political conclusions in their evaluation of this organization". This kind of disproportionate reaction to the intervention by one of our militants at a public meeting in fact expresses BC's growing embarrassment at our criticisms.
The heavy weight of sectarianism in the political milieu is the expression of an inability to debate, and to confront analyses and positions. BC's attitude is in continuity with its sectarian and opportunist attitude when it brought the Conferences of Groups of the Communist Left to an end in 1980. Sectarianism has always been comfortable in the company of opportunism. At the same time as BC is dispatching this ludicrous circular to the milieu, the IBRP (of which BC is the main group) is signing a common address on the situation in the Eastern bloc with little groups such as the Gruppe Internazionalistische Komunismen (Austria) or Comunismo (Mexico) whose content springs more from opportunistic concessions than from a search for clarity. BC is for the regroupment of revolutionaries, but without the ICC. This absurd competitive attitude leads straight to the worst kind of opportunism, and increases the confusion in the milieu's debates.
The ICC's ostracism by the old groups of the political milieu, and by its multiple parasitic sects, is not, as we have seen, incompatible with the most vulgar opportunism in the regroupment of revolutionary forces. The EFICC has lately provided the most perfect illustration of this fact: while raining insane abuse on the ICC, it launched itself into a series of conferences with such disparate groups as 'Communisme ou Civilisation', 'Jalons', or 'A Contre Courant', and with isolated individuals. The sects amused themselves with their conferences, and as one might imagine the results were negligeable: at most, some new sects. Today, the EFICC has begun a new flirt with the Communist Bulletin Group, whose origins lie in an act of banditry against the ICC (a real one this time, not an imaginary one such as BC accuses us of). The EFICC is bringing the very idea of regroupment into discredit, but with its nasty stupidity, its bad faith, and the blind hatred of its polemic, it is deforming the whole of revolutionary activity.
For the EFICC, events in the East have aggravated its confusion and irresponsibility. Blinded by its own bitterness, the EFICC has treated our positions on the collapse of the Russian bloc as a negation of "imperialism" and "an abandonment of the marxist framework of decadence". One more useless debate will hardly worry the EFICC: this is why it exists. How long will it take it simply to recognize the reality of the collapse of the Eastern bloc? Perhaps then the EFICC will recognize that the ICC's positions were right? Will it draw any conclusions as to its present attitude?
As for the Bordigist groups, they do not recognize the existence of a political milieu: each one considers itself as the 'Party'. Sectarianism is thus theorized and justified. Nonetheless , the PCI seems to be drawing some lessons at least from its past crisis, and has begun to publish polemics with other groups of the political milieu. The ICC has even had a polemical response from Le Proletaire, the PCI's publication in France.
What does the PCI object to? Why, to the fact that, we welcomed and agreed with their own position! And they add: "What is important for us in this note is to refute any idea that our position might be analogous to that of the ICC". Let us reassure the PCI: our recognition of the relative clarity of their position on the Eastern bloc has not led us to forget what separates us; but has the PCI been so infected by the sectarian gangrene that our agreement on even one point of their positions should be intolerable? Perhaps they will be reassured if we reiterate our conclusion as to the PCI in the article in the previous International Review: "The Proletaire's relatively healthy response to events in the East proves that there is a proletarian life in this organism yet. But we do not think that this represents a truly new breath of life: it is more the Bordigists 'classical' antipathy for democratic illusions than a critical reexamination of their politics' opportunist basis which has allowed them to defend a class position on this question".
One of the most worrying conclusions that we have to draw from all this is these organizations' inability to reconsider their theoretical framework in the light new facts, to enrich it in order to understand what has changed. In fact, the acceleration of history has highlighted the incredible conservatism which reigns within the milieu. The sectarianism which has developed in the polemics over the "wind from the East" is the corollary of this conservatism. Since they are unable to recognize the present process of social decomposition, considering it as a mere ICC "gadget", these organizations are obviously incapable of identifying its manifestations either in the proletarian milieu or in their own life, and so of defending themselves against it. And yet, the degradation of relations between the major organizations these last few years is only too clear an expression of it.
Under such conditions, there can be no question in this article of enlarging on these groups' intervention as regards the earthquake which has been shaking the East. No group apart from the ICC has broken its routine, if only to accelerate the frequency of its publications or to publish supplements. Political confusion and sectarian sclerosis have left these organizations incapable of intervening. In its present disarray, created by the "wind from the East" and heightened by the bourgeoisie's campaigns, the working class is suffering a retreat in consciousness, and it is hardly the illumination provided by the majority of revolutionary groups which is likely to be of much help to it in emerging from this difficult situation.
The development of the historic course imposes on the milieu an irresistible process of decantation. The clarification that this process implies, in the present situation of degradation in the relations between proletarian groups, is not happening through the clear and determined confrontation of positions. It will happen nonetheless, but in these conditions it will take the form of an ever greater crisis of those groups which have faced the acceleration of history in confusion, and so put in question their own political survival. The clarification that is unable to emerge through debate will instead impose itself in desertions. This is what at stake in today's discussions between the revolutionary political organizations.
JJ, 31st May, 1990
[1] This article frequently refers to organizations by their initials a follows:
- Parti Communiste Internationaliste (PCInt), and its publications Battaglia Comunista and Prometeo;
- Communist Workers' Oragnization (CWO) and its publication Workers' Voice;
- International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP), which regroups the CWO and the PCInt, and whose publication is the Communist Review;
- Parti Communiste International (PCI) and its publications Le Proletaire and Programme Communiste;
- Ferment Ouvrier Revolutionaire (FOR), publications Alarme and Arme de la Critique;
- External Fraction of the International Communist Current (EFICC), publication Internationalist Perspective;
- Groupe Communiste Internationaliste (GCI);
- Communisme ou Civilization (CouC).
[2] ‘The Wind from the East and the Response of Revolutionaries'
[3] On this question, see ‘The "real domination of capital" and the real confusions of the political milieu", International Review no. 60.
[4] On this question, see ‘The decomposition of capitalism' in International Review no. 57, as well as the article in this issue.
[5] See ‘Increased difficulties for the proletariat' in International Review no 60
[6] See ‘The political milieu since 1968', in the International Review nos 53, 54, and 56.
Report on the national situation from the section of the ICC in Germany
The development of the contradictions which are at present unfolding in Germany constitutes a fundamental key to the evolution of the situation globally. We are printing below a report of our section in this country which draws out the international dynamic and the different possibilities that it opens up.
The development of the German economy before economic and monetary union
Whereas at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the world economy got into ever greater problems, the German economy was still in the midst of a boom. Many records of production, in particular in the car industry, were broken several years running. A new record balance of trade-surplus was again attained in 1989. The capacity utilization rate of industry reached its highest point since the early seventies. For many sectors, the lack of available skilled labor has been the principle factor in the past months preventing an expansion of production. Many companies have had to refuse new orders because of this.
This boom is not an expression of the health of the world economy, but of the tremendous competivity of West German capital - the law of the survival of the fittest. Germany has expanded brutally at the expense of its competitors, as its export surplus amply shows.
Germany's competitive position has been markedly strengthened throughout the 1980s. At the economic level, the main task of the Kohl-Genscher government has been to make an enormous increase in income available to the big companies in order to put through a tremendous modernization and automatization of the productive process. The result has been an incredible wave of rationalizations, comparable in its extent with that which took place in Germany in the 1920s. The main lines of this policy were:
- over 100 billion Marks saved through cuts in social spending and almost directly transferred to the hands of the capitalists through massive tax reductions;
- a series of new laws passed allowing companies to accumulate enormous reserves completely tax free, eg: the creation of private company insurance schemes, through which funds for investment accumulate;
The result has been that big capital today is 'swimming in money'. Whereas at the beginning of the 80s around two thirds of major companies' investments were financed through bank loans, today the top 40 businesses are capable of financing investments almost completely through their own means - a situation completely unique in Europe.
In addition to these financial means, the government has increased enormously the power of the bosses over their labor force - flexibility, deregulation, production around the clock in exchange for a minimal reduction of the working week.
There is no doubt that German industry is profoundly satisfied with the work of the Kohl government during the '80s at this level. At the beginning of 1990 the liberal industrial spokesman Lambsdorff proudly announced:
"West-Germany is today the world's leading industrial country, and the one which needs the least amount of protective measures".
For example, whereas all other EEC countries have taken radical protective measures against Japanese car imports, Germany has been able to keep the Japanese percentage of the German car market to a little over 20%, and in value terms exports more cars to Japan than Japan does to Germany.
The plans of the German bourgeoisie for the 1990s, before the collapse of the East
Despite this relative strength, the rationalization wave of the 1980s was supposed to be only the beginning. In the face of total global overproduction, of the perspective of recession, of the bankruptcy of the third world and of Eastern Europe, it was clear that the 1990s would pose a fight for survival for even the most highly industrialized countries. And this survival could only be at the expense of other industrial rivals.
In face of this challenge, West Germany is far from being so well prepared as would at first appear.
- The sector for the production of the means of production (machines, electronics, chemicals) is tremendously strong. Since Germany never had captive colonial markets, and being a classic producer of means of production, this sector has learned historically that survival is only possible through always being a step ahead of the others.
- Germany was initially much slower than the USA, GB or France, to develop mass production of consumer goods, and especially the car industry. It's essentially after the second world war, with the opening up of the world market for - German exports, while at the same time Germany was to a large extent excluded from the military sector, which allowed it to catch up and become one of the world's leading car nations. Today, in face of absolute overproduction, and with international competition in this area being the most intense, West Germany's extremely high dependence on the car industry (around one third of industrial jobs depend directly or indirectly on it) today opens up truly catastrophic perspectives for the German economy.
- The main area where Germany has suffered from the defeat in world war two has been the high tech sector which historically has been developed above all in connection with the military sector, and from which Germany has been largely excluded. The result is that today, despite its highly modern productive apparatus, Germany lags massively behind the USA and also Japan at this level.
The perspective for the 1990s was therefore to radically reduce the dependency of the German economy on the car industry, not of course by voluntarily surrendering sectors of this market, but by radically developing the high tech sector. In fact, the German bourgeoisie is convinced that in the 1990s it will either make the breakthrough to the leading high tech nations alongside the USA and Japan, or will completely disappear as a major and independent industrial power. This life and death struggle has been prepared for through the 80s, not only through the rationalization and the accumulation of enormous investment sums, but also symbolized through the formation of Europe's largest high tech company under the leadership of Daimler-Benz and the Deutsche Bank. Daimler and Siemens are supposed to be the twin spearheads of this offensive. This bid of German industry for world hegemony in the 1990s requires:
- absolutely gigantic investments, putting those of the 1980s into the shade, and implying in particular an even more massive transfer of income from the working class to the bourgeoisie;
- the existence of political stability both internationally (discipline of the US bloc) and internally, especially vis-a-vis the working class.
Collapse of the East: German war goals finally achieved
After the fall of the Berlin wall, the imperialist world trembled at the thought of a greater unified Germany. Not only abroad, in Germany itself the SPD (social democracy), the unions, the church, the media have all been warning against a new German revanchism, a danger apparently posed by Kohl's Oder-Neisse ambiguities. Such visions about a new Germany putting the frontiers of its neighbors in question, in the footsteps of Adolf Hitler, does not worry the German bourgeoisie very much. In fact, these warnings only serve to hide the real state of affairs: that with the course towards Europe '92 and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the German bourgeoisie has today already achieved all the goals for which two world wars were fought.
Today, the triumphant German bourgeoisie has absolutely no need to put any frontiers in question in order to become Europe's leading power. The goals of German imperialism, already formulated before 1914, the establishment of a German dominated 'Gropraumwirtschaft' (large-scale economic and trade zone) in Western Europe, and the establishment of a German dominated reservoir for cheap labor and raw materials in Eastern Europe, is today practically a reality. This is why all the fuss about the Oder-Neisse border in fact only hides the real victory of German imperialism in Europe today.
But it should be clear: this victory of German imperialism, for which today the liberal foreign minister Genscher and not the right wing extremists are the best representatives, does not imply that Germany can today dominate Europe in the way Hitler had envisaged. There is no German-led European bloc presently being formed. Whereas in World War I and II Germany believed itself strong enough to dictatorially dominate Europe, this illusion is impossible today. While at that time Germany was the only important industrial country on the European continent, (not counting Britain), this is today no longer the case (France, Italy). German unification will only increase the German percentage of EEC production from 21% to 24%. Moreover, whereas the attempted German military takeover of Europe in World War I and II was only possible because of US isolationism, today US imperialism is massively and immediately present on the old continent and will take great care to prevent any such ambitions from emerging. Moreover, Germany today is militarily much too weak and possesses no weapons of mass destruction. For all these reasons, the formation of a European bloc is under the present conditions only possible if there is one force in Europe strong enough to make all the others submit. This is not the case today.
Germany's victory: A Pyrrhic one
As opposed to the 1930s, Germany today is not the "proletarian nation" (KPD-formulation from the 1920s') excluded from the world market and out to overturn frontiers all around it. As long as it is not excluded from access to world markets and supplies of raw material, the German bourgeoisie has absolutely no ambitions or interest in forming a military bloc in opposition to the USA. In fact Germany today is in a certain sense more a 'conservative' power which has 'got what it wants', and which is mainly worried about 'losing what it has got'. And indeed, Germany is a power which has got everything to lose as a result of the present chaos and decomposition. Its main concern now is to avoid its victory' being turned into a catastrophe - a catastrophe which is very likely to happen.
The costs of unification
These costs are not only gigantic enough to endanger the health of the state's finances and the immediate competitive position of Germany, what is worse, it is more than likely that the capital which will now have to be used for unification was the very instrument which was otherwise foreseen to finance the famous breakthrough to high-tech equality with the US and Japan. In other words, unification, far from being a strengthening at this level, may be the very factor destroying the hopes of the German bourgeoisie of remaining one of the world's leading industrial powers. A true catastrophe.
The costs of Eastern Europe
As much as it will try to erect a new 'Berlin wall' along the Oder-Neisse line to keep out the chaos from the east, it is certain that Germany will be obliged to make investments in the immediately surrounding countries in order to create a kind of 'cordon-sanitaire' against the total anarchy developing further east. Of course, Germany is going to dominate the eastern European markets. However, it's interesting to note that the German bourgeoisie, far from shouting triumphantly about this, is today urgently warning against the dangers this implies:
- the danger that the obligations to invest in the east will lead to permanently losing customers in the west, who are much more important since they pay in hard cash and are much more solvent,
- the danger of a loss of technical edge for German industry, since the goods Eastern Europe will order will necessarily be of a more simple and sturdy construction than that demanded by the world market.
The costs of the break-up of the US bloc
This poses the danger, in the long-term, of the falling apart of the lion's share of the world market previously held together by the bloc discipline and militarily policed by the USA. Such an eventuality would be a disaster for West Germany, as a leading export nation and having been, alongside Japan, the main industrial beneficiary of the post-war world order.
The costs of any weakening of the European Common Market
The European market, and above all the project of Europe '92 are today menaced by the increase of 'each for himself', by the wish to avoid sharing the costs of Eastern Europe, by French reactions against the loss of its joint leadership position with West Germany in Western Europe, which will now be held by Germany alone, etc.
If Europe 1992 (by which we mean the "normalization" and "liberalization" of trade, a certain organization of the battle of each against all, with rules which favor the strongest, and not an impossible "United States of Europe") were to fail, and if the European market were to break up, this would be a total catastrophe for West Germany, since herein lies its main export market. It is therefore an incorrect formulation, often put forward in the bourgeois press, that by going for a rapid reunification, Bonn has put its own interest above that of the EEC. Bonn's own main interest is the EEC. It has been obliged to make unification straightaway through the incredible acceleration of chaos.
The collapse of the Soviet Union
As long as the USSR still stood on its feet, Eastern Europe was, on the one hand, enemy territory for West Germany and a military threat, but on the other hand, it also guaranteed a stable neighborhood on Germany's eastern borders. The terrible chaos today developing in the Soviet Union is a major preoccupation for the USA, is extremely worrying for France and Britain, but for the German bourgeoisie, which is closest to it, it is an absolute nightmare. In the new unified Germany, there will only be Poland separating it from the USSR. Genscher's Foreign Office is haunted by horrible visions of bloody civil wars, of lethal armament dumps and nuclear power stations exploding, of millions of refugees from the Soviet Union flooding towards the west, threatening to completely destroy German political stability.
But if this 'worst possible scenario' is to be avoided, the German bourgeoisie will have to accept an important responsibility to attempt to limit the anarchy in the Soviet Union - which will also represent an enormous economic burden. For example: the West German government has committed itself to respecting and fulfilling all East German delivery commitments to the Soviet Union, a promise which is politically inspired, and will only reluctantly be fulfilled.
Just as the break-up of the EEC would mean the disappearance of the first war-goal victory of German imperialism (Gropraumwirtschaft), the outbreak of total anarchy in the Soviet Union would destroy the second plank, that of Eastern Europe as a supplier of cheap raw materials. This would be all the more tragic for German capitalism, since the Soviet Union is the only suitable reservoir of raw materials not coming from overseas and therefore not depending on the benevolence of the USA.
An example of the negative effects of eastern anarchy on the ambitions of German imperialism: one of Gorbachev's favorite projects is the creation of a tax-free industrial zone in Kaliningrad, which is supposed to become the new Russian window to the west. He intends to transfer Volga-Germans to the ex-German town of Konigsberg in this area as a further incentive to draw German capital. Kaliningrad is thus intended to be Germany's window to the east: ie, a 'safe route' to Siberian raw materials, avoiding the Asiatic soviet republics. Today the separatism and midget imperialism of the Baltic republics is making a mess of such plans Landsbergis has already laid Lithuanian claim to Kaliningrad.
Counter-measures of the German bourgeoisie against chaos and decomposition
In view of the fearful acceleration of crisis, economic trade wars, decomposition and the collapse of the East, there is a real danger that:
- the German bourgeoisie's effort to make a breakthrough in the struggle for world market hegemony against the USA and Japan now takes place under much more unfavorable conditions;
- Germany may completely lose its privileged place as the surf-rider on the wave of crisis at the expense of its rivals. On the contrary, the real danger is that Germany's position may even become particularly fragile, as in the 1930s, but this time in front of a working class historically undefeated.
- the famous German political stability may be shattered by world-wide decomposition and chaos.
The tendency towards total economic ruin and complete chaos is historically irreversible.
Nevertheless, every tendency has counter-tendencies, which in this case won't stop, but which can slow down or at all events influence the course of this movement at certain moments, and ensure that it does not develop equally in all countries. In particular, it necessary to examine the measures the German bourgeoisie is taking to protect itself.
The German bourgeoisie is not only economically the most powerful in Europe, and one rich in often bitter experience, but it also has the most modern political and state structures (eg: the political modernity of the German state by comparison with the British one is just as striking as the difference at the economic level).
The German bourgeoisie has been able to combine its 'traditional qualities' with everything it has learnt from its American mentor in the last 40 years (West Germany is in many ways undoubtedly the most 'Americanized' European country).
Making unification as cheap as possible
Through monetary union, Bonn plans to give the East Germans western money, but as little as possible, thereby having the political justification to stop them coming over to the west. The aim is to transfer as much of the burden of unification as possible to the GDR itself, to the EEC, and above all (and we will return to this point) to the working class in the East and West. The beneficial aspects of this unification, on the other hand, the West German bourgeoisie intends to try and keep entirely for itself: ie sources of incredibly cheap labour power with which it can also put pressure on the western wages, or access to Soviet raw materials or high-tech such as space programs through historically developed connections of East German companies.
Preventing the EEC falling apart
If there is a tendency in this direction, there are also important counter-tendencies, so that it is perhaps premature to say, already today, that Europe 1992, in the sense described above, is condemned to failure from the beginning. These counter-tendencies include:
- the imperious interest of Germany itself to prevent this;
- the interest of other European countries who are terrified by the danger of being overrun by Japan. Even if its true that the tendency is towards 'each for himself', gangsters still do tend to club together to face up to another gangster.
- the attempt of the West German bourgeoisie to make Europe 1992 acceptable to the USA.
Europe '92 is not a new bloc against the USA. And it probably has no chance of coming into being if the Americans decide to sabotage it.
Bonn is presently attempting to convince Washington that Europe '92 is essentially directed against Japan, not against the USA. The West German bourgeoisie is convinced that one of the main bases of the fearful Japanese competivity on world markets is the fact that Japan's internal market is completely closed, and that high internal Japanese prices finance dumping on the world market. Bonn claims that when Japan is obliged, by protectionist measures, to construct plants within Europe, these plants are not more competitive than European ones, or at least than German factories. The message is clear: if Europe 1992 can be used to oblige Japan to open up its internal markets, it is possible to vanquish the Asiatic giant. Moreover, Bonn repeatedly points out that the European market, which will then be the largest unified market in the world, is the only means through which the USA can overcome its gigantic trade deficits: in effect, Bonn is offering a joint German-American carve-up of the European market. And for the moment, in relation to this project, the policy of the Bush administration does seem to be to reduce its 'special relationship' with Thatcher, and move closer to the United Germany as the new 'strong-man' in Europe, as the best guarantee, for the moment, that European policies go in favor and not against the interests of the USA.
*******
Before World Wars I and II, the marxist left warned the international working class about the coming massacre, and formulated which attitude the proletariat should take towards it. Today it is our task to warn the workers about the world commercial and trade war now breaking out on a scale unprecedented in history, and to equip the workers against the deadly danger of economic nationalism: i.e, of siding with its own bourgeoisie. The costs of this war for the working class will be truly horrendous.
German unification and the possibility of a brutal recession
Until now we have shown the gigantic implications of the present chaos and decomposition for German capital in the perspective of the 1990s. But there is also an immediate perspective, that of the effects of economic and monetary union in particular. These effects will be catastrophic in particular for the working class and especially in the GDR itself. It is difficult to predict the immediate outcome of this adventure since it is an unprecedented situation in history. But one possibility may be that it will temporarily put a break on the trend of the world economy to open recession, but at the expense of ruining German state finances, and making the global contradictions even sharper. The other possibility, which we must not exclude in view of the great fragility of the present world conjuncture, is that the monetary and interest rate disorders, the investment and stock exchange panics which could crop up, might be the straw which break the camel's back, tipping the world economy into open recession.
What we do know is that the arrival of the German Mark in East Germany is going to provoke millions of sackings and an explosion of mass pauperization which in its suddenness and brutality will perhaps be unprecedented in an industrialized country in the history of capitalism, outside war. It is equally true that the incalculable costs of this drastic measure cannot be covered without a massive burdening of the West German workers ... western unemployment and social security systems, for example, will be brought to the verge of insolvency, since they will have to fund a large part of what happens in the east. Moreover, there is absolutely no guarantee that the main immediate political aim of the monetary union - preventing the migration of East Germans to the west - will even succeed. And still, the dilemma of the West German bourgeoisie in face of a capitalist world crumbling under its feet is shown by the fact that the economic effects of NOT achieving immediate unification will certainly be even more disastrous.
Lambsdorff was not joking when he recently claimed that if all-German elections were not held soon, not only East but also West Germany would soon go bankrupt (he was referring to the continuing existence of the East German stalinist bourgeoisie, which is now dreaming of continuing its over-40 year mismanagement, but this time directly financed from the west).
The disarray of the bourgeoisie after the opening of the Berlin Wall
When the wall fell, the bourgeoisie was caught confused, surprised and DIVIDED. There was a chain of political crises:
- Genscher originally favored a rapid but separate membership of the GDR to the EC, with only federative links to West Germany
- Brandt had to battle behind the scenes to get the SPD on unification lines
- a regional and communal SPD-CDU coalition was necessary to make Kohl end the laws designed to attract migration from the east, useful during the cold war, but now leading to disaster
- Bonn was briefly obliged to support both the Krenz and the Modrow governments as long as the power vacuum couldn't be filled.
- Bonn had to reverse its initial policy of hesitant economic aid to that of immediate monetary union and top speed unification
- the fight of the GDR Stalinist state apparatus for a place in the new German state caused a series of crises, from the worsening of the westward migration to the blackmail of leading politicians (not only in the east) by the Stasi (state police - Staatssicherheil)
- Kohl's maneuvers on the Oder-Neisse frontier caused internal crises and international scandals
A push for stability towards national unity
The first axis of the re-stabilization offensive has been towards re-establishing the unity of the leading bourgeois currents. Despite all conflicts and chaos, very rapidly the feeling developed that this kind of historic crisis demanded some kind of national unity. Today there is a real agreement between CDU, FDP and SPD on the fundamental problems raised after the opening of the wall: rapid unification, immediate monetary union (supported politically even by the Bundesbank, although economically it considers it suicidal), anti-migration policy towards the east, continuing NATO membership, to be extended in stages to the GDR, recognition of Oder-Neisse border.
Second Round of instability: digesting the GDR
The other axis of "stabilization" simply deflects chaos from one level to another. Full speed unification is impossible without some chaos. It provokes conflicts with the great powers and threatens to further destabilize the USSR. And monetary union is one of the most adventurist policies in human history, perhaps comparable to Hitler's Barbarossa offensive against Russia. The economic massacre of GDR industry will be so bloody, mass unemployment so high (some expect up to 4 million!) that it may even fail totally in its main immediate goal - that of stopping the mass westward migration. The medicine against chaos will probably lead to ... chaos.
Despite the immediate opposition, in particular of the European "Great Powers", to the perspective of an immediate unification of Germany after the opening of the Berlin Wall, this process has also been accelerated in the meantime, particularly with the support of the United States (whose formula for NATO membership of a united Germany is above all a formula for continued American presence in Germany and Europe at the expense not only of Germany, but also of Britain, France and the USSR), and even at the risk of further destabilizing Gorbachev's regime and the USSR. Two reasons for this:
- all the major powers are frightened by the vacuum created in central Europe, which only Germany can fill
- it is the collapse of the USSR which automatically makes Germany Europe's leading power, leading to the disappearance of the imperative for Bonn to share western European leadership with Paris, etc. On the contrary, there is little evidence, and no proof, that actual German unification really leads to a strengthening of Germany as a major power. Economically, unification is certainly a weakening, and any strategic-military advantages will probably be more than compensated for by the effects of chaos from the east. It is the realization that unification does not at all automatically mean a strengthening of Germany which has helped to make it acceptable to the "allies".
Chronologically speaking:
After the opening of the wall, there was a nationalist explosion within the German bourgeoisie, from Kohl to Brandt - "We Germans are the greatest," etc despite the immediate warnings of more sober ones (eg Lafontaine). Panic, fear and envy among the "allies", symbolized by open opposition to unification and Mitterrand's flying visit to East Berlin and Budapest to ensure France got a slice of this delicious cake, were typical.
- the bourgeoisie awoke from its stupid illusions. The more clearly Bonn realized that 'the cake is poisoned', the more rapidly the German bourgeoisie is obliged to eat it through the development of chaos. Now it is Bonn which panics and is made furious by the new attitude of the allies, which is to leave West Germany alone with the problems and above all with the costs of this mess.
Bonn succeeds in convincing the others that it cannot cope with the problem alone and that if they don't participate actively the result may be the destabilization of the whole of western Europe.
The coming elections: an attempt to establish stabilizing structures
In November '89, we noted that in the new situation, the necessity for the SPD to remain in opposition, to better control the working class, was no longer obligatory for the bourgeoisie in view of the retreat in workers consciousness provoked by events in the east, and that the continuation of the Kohl-Genscher government depends on it sorting out its divergences. At present it seems that not divergences, but the extension of stability, ie: West German political structures to the GDR, will be at the centre of the elections: CDU remaining slightly bigger than SPD in a united Germany, the FDP remaining "coalition maker", keeping the "Republikaner" out of parliament. There is no reason to believe that a Lafontaine-led government would be fundamentally different to the present one.
One problem is tensions and confusions within the political apparatus:
- rivalries between CDU and CSU for influence in the GDR;
- rivalries between SPD and Stalinists for control of the unions in the GDR;
- sharp divergences within the Greens on unification;
- disorientation within the leftists, most of who are clinging to a GDR state and a PDS which nobody in the east (except the remnants of Stalinism's functionaries) and nobody in the west wants any more (including the workers).
However great the stabilization attempts, new waves of anarchy are already on the horizon:
- the final collapse of the USSR;
- the world economic crisis (after the USSR, the USA is likely to be the next big sinking ship to go under);
- the break-up of the NATO.
Class struggle: the combativity of the class rests intact
It's evident that Germany is no exception in the retreat, especially of consciousness, within the working class. On the contrary, the retreat began in Germany earlier than elsewhere, in 88/89, essentially through the situation in the east:
- Moscow's arms reduction proposals provoked reformist illusions about a more peaceful capitalism;
* the annual influx of 1 million people from the east;
* the enormous "failure of communism" fuss, already launched after the Peking massacre;
- a deeper impact, through greater proximity to the east, of democratic, reformist, pacifist and inter-classist illusions which in Germany today are still greater than elsewhere.
The questions of the unificat.ion of struggles and the contestation of the unions, although posed by the struggles at Krupp in December '87, were already posed less acutely than elsewhere, and thus for the moment are all the more weakened.
On the other hand, combativity - under the impact of migration from east - instead of retreating further after the opening of wall, as might have been expected, has actually begun to recover (as is shown recently by the token union negotiation stoppages). The absence of even the least sign, for the moment, of any preparedness for material sacrifice for unification on the part of West German workers is one of the central problems of the bourgeoisie. The very idea seems to drive the last vestiges of patriotism out of many workers.
Crisis and unification: balance sheet of the '80s
The crisis plays an essential role towards unification, even when the bourgeoisie can prevent its immediate concretization in the struggles. The appearance of mass unemployment at the beginning, of a "new poverty" in the middle, and of the worst housing crisis since the war at the end of the '80s have powerfully increased the potential for a unification of struggles. But this development is contradictory and non-linear.
The modernization offensive in the '80s, the greatest 'rationalization' attack in Germany since the '20s, has partly transformed the world of labor. The modern industrial worker, often supervising several machines simultaneously, is faced with such murderous demands on energy, concentration, qualification and permanent requalification, etc, that an ever greater part of the population is automatically excluded from productive process (too old, too unhealthy, mentally not stable enough to stand the strain, not qualified enough etc).
This largely explains the paradox of mass unemployment on the one hand, but simultaneously hundreds of thousands of vacant jobs in qualified sectors on the other hand - total anarchy. Millions are unemployed, not only because there is no work, but also because they cannot match the present incredible demands. This ever-growing mass is no longer useful to capital as a pressure on wages and on those with jobs, so that there is no economic reason for keeping it alive. Thus, the most radical cuts have been in this sector; that's why Bonn stopped building public housing for this sector in the '80s.
The immediate effects of German capital's rationalization-modernization offensive has not solely been favorable to the unification of struggles, but has also contained a certain tendency to divide the class into:
- those who can still match the present production demands, who despite wage discipline, today have more income than 5 years ago, due to enormous overtime work (probably the majority of employed workers), and who, through the present shortage of qualified labor, feel that capitalism needs them, favoring individualist and corporatist illusions "we are strong enough on our own";
- those who cannot match these demands, who are increasingly marginalized or outside production, who sink into ever-greater poverty, and are often the first victims of social decomposition (hopelessness, drugs, explosions of blind violence: ie Kreuzberg in Berlin), and feel themselves isolated from the rest of the class. Linked to this (though not identical with it), we have to see the failure of unemployed struggles and the absence of a link to the employed.
Crisis and unification in perspective
The most immediate effects of the historic rupture stemming from the collapse of the east include:
- illusions about a boom lasting years through;
* Eastern Europe
* Europe 92
* a "peace bonus" through a radical reduction of military spending
- fears of a new poverty through German unification, thus the situation contains not only a radicalizing effect, but also tendencies towards a division of the class (west against east)[1];
- monetary union will at least double the number of unemployed Germans;
- a true job massacre in the sectors overproducing the most seems inevitable, especially in the car industry!;
- the costs of the '90s, the enormous investment programs, the writing off of unpayable debts from peripheral countries, etc, demand further vast income transfers from the proletariat to capital.
- if 'rationalization' continues at the present pace, by the mid-1990s, millions of workers will be faced with total exhaustion and will "burn out" before their 40th birthday - the very substance of the class would be threatened.
The main difficulties to the political unification of the class
The re-enforcement of social democracy, the unions, reformist ideology, pacifism, inter-classism. All this cannot be overcome easily, quickly, or automatically, but demands:
- engaging in repeated struggles;
- collective mobilization and discussion;
- communist intervention.
The lessons of the past 20 years of crisis and of struggle have not disappeared, but have been made less accessible, buried under a pile of confusions. So there is no room for complacency, the treasure must be brought back to the surface; otherwise the class will fail in its historic task.
The backwardness of GDR proletariat
Although the GDR was part of Germany until 1945, the effects of Stalinism have been profoundly catastrophic on the working class. There is a fundamental backwardness which goes beyond even its lack of experience with democracy, 'free' unions, the violent hatred of 'communism', etc. The isolation behind walls has led to a real provincialization of the workers. The "shortage economy" has led to seeing foreigners as enemies who "buy up everything and leave us with nothing". Soviet "internationalism" and isolation from the world market have encouraged a powerful nationalism. Whereas in West Germany, perhaps 1 worker in 10 is racist, in the GDR 1 in 10 is not racist. The command economy has led to a loss of dynamism and initiative, to sluggishness and servility, forever "waiting for orders", a certain slavishness (not even attenuated by a thriving black market such as in Poland). And the technical backwardness: most workers aren't even used to using telephones. Stalinism has left the class terribly divided through nationalism, ethnic, religious conflicts, informing (probably 1 worker out of every five regularly informed the Stasi about his colleagues).
We have to be glad that when Germany was divided after the war, 63 million ended on the western, and only 17 million on the eastern side - and not the other way round.
The Western workers' crucial role: the historic alternative is still open
The vast nationalist counter-revolutionary wave rolling from the east has, for the moment, broken on the rock of the West German proletariat. By this we do not mean that in the east the counter-revolution has gained an irreversible triumph. But if they may still participate in revolutionary movements in the future, this is only possible because the workers in the west have not been drawn onto the same bourgeois terrain which in the east today is as powerful as in Spain during the civil war. The working class in West Germany has shown that it does not for the moment have the same inclinations towards nationalism. The typical West German worker today associates nationalism with defeats in world war and terrible poverty, a certain prosperity on the contrary with the EC, the world market, etc. Every second West German industrial depends on the world market. And even the migration from the east has had strong dividing effects essentially on the weaker sectors not within the main 'battalions' of the class.
The proletariat remains a decisive force in the world situation. For example, if the German bourgeoisie, despite the unbelievable costs of unification, the battle for the world market etc, were to embark on a course of rearming to become a military super-power, the cost would be so high that it would probably lead to a civil war. The class in the western industrial countries remains undefeated, a force which the bourgeoisie permanently reckon with.
We don't know for sure if the working class can emerge from the present difficulties and re-establish its own class perspective. And we cannot even console ourselves with the deterministic illusion that "communism is inevitable". But we know that the proletariat today not only has its chains to lose - but that it still has a world to gain, and that for this it is not, yet too late.
Weltrevolution, 8.5.90
[1] The economy is not automatically and immediately an antidote to the retreat on the question of the unification of struggles. But in the longer term, open recession is a powerful force towards unification. The situation of world capital today is ruinous, even without open recession.
Throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR we are witnessing a violent explosion of nationalism.
Yugoslavia is in the process of disintegration. "Civilized" and "European" Slovenia demands independence, while subjecting the 'sister' republics of Serbia and Croatia to an economic blockade. In Serbia, the nationalism stirred up by the Stalinist Milosevic has led to pogroms, the poisoning of water supplies and a brutal repression of the Albanian minority. In Croatia, the first 'democratic' elections have seen the victory of the CDC, a violently rescidivist and nationalist group; a football match between Dynamo Zegred and Belgrade (Serbia) degenerated into violent confrontations.
The whole of Eastern Europe is being shaken by nationalist tensions. In Romania, a neo-fascist organization, Cuna Rumana, stuffed full of the old Securitate and with the indirect support of the 'liberators' of the NSF (National Salvation Front), have carried out sadistic beatings of Hungarians who, in their turn, have used the fall of Ceausescu to carry out anti-Romanian pogroms. For its part, the central government in Bucharest, the beautiful child of the 'democratic' governments, viciously persecutes the Gipsy minority and the ethnic Germans. Hungary, the pioneer of the 'democratic' changes, discriminates against the Gypsies and encourages the demands of the Hungarian minority in Romanian Transylvania. In Bulgaria, the new 'democracy' protects massive and demonstrations against the minority. In the Czechoslovakia of the velvet revolution", the government of the "dreamer" Havel "democratically" persecutes the Gypsies and a violent polemic has broken out involving demonstrations and confrontations, between the Czechs and Slovaks, over the momentous question of whether to call the "new free republic": Czechoslovakia or CzechoSlovakia.
But above all, it is in the USSR, which until 6 months ago was the second world power, where this nationalist explosion has reached proportions that could call into question the existence of the state. This explosion is particularly bloody and chaotic: the killing of Azeries at the hands of Armenians and of Armenians at the hands of Azeries, of Azerbaijani victims of Georgians, Turks lynched by Uzbeks, the beating of Russians by Kazaks; above all, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Ukraine demanding independence.
The nationalist explosion: The decomposition of the living body of capitalism
For bourgeois propagandists, these movements are a "liberation" produced by the "democratic revolutions" with which the people of the East have thrown off the boot of "communism".
This "liberation" has opened up a Pandora's Box. The collapse of Stalinism has unleashed violent nationalist tensions, strong centrifugal forces, which the decadence of capitalism has incubated, radicalized and deepened, in these countries, fed by their insuperable backwardness, and by Stalinist domination which expresses and is an active factor in this backwardness[1].
The so-called "order of Yalta", which for 45 years dominated the world, kept in check these enormous tensions and contradictions which capitalism's decadence inexorably matured towards the total holocaust of a 3rd imperialist world war. The rebirth of the proletarian struggle since 1968 has blocked this 'natural' course of decadent capitalism. But with the inability of the proletarian struggle to go towards its ultimate conclusion the international revolutionary offensive these centrifugal tendencies, increasingly profound contradictions and growing destructive aberrations, are causing the body of capitalist order to rot on its feet; this is what we call its generalized decomposition[2].
This decomposition in the old domain of the Russian bear has 'liberated' the worst racist feelings, nationalist recidivism, chauvinism, antisemitism, patriotic and religious fanaticism, which have been expressing themselves with all their destructive fury.
"Shamed, dishonored, wading in blood and dripping with filth, thus capitalist society stands. Not as we usually see it, playing the role of peace and righteousness, of order, or philosophy, of ethics - but as a roaring beast, as an orgy of anarchy, as a pestilential breath, devastating culture and humanity so it appears in all its hideous nakedness." (Rosa Luxernburg, The Junius Pamphlet, page 6)
The bourgeoisie usually distinguish between a "savage", "fanatical", "aggressive" nationalism and a "democratic", "civilized", "respectful of others", etc, nationalism. This distinction is a pure swindle, the fruit of the hypocrisy of the "great democratic" states of the West, whose position of strength allows them to intelligently and astutely use the barbarity, the violence and destruction inherent in the principle of every nation and nationalism in decadent capitalism.
The "democratic", "civilized" and "peaceful" nationalism of France, the USA, etc, is that of the slaughter and torture in Vietnam, Algeria, Panama, Central Africa, Chad, or the unquestioning support of Iraq in the Gulf War; it is the two world wars which cost more than 70 million murdered through exaltations to patriotism, xenophobia, racism, which were used to hide the acts of barbarity carried out against Nazi rivals: the American bombing of Dresden or Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the French atrocities against the German population in its occupation zone, as much after the first world war as after the second.
It was the "civilization" and "pacifism" of the "liberation" of France with the defeat of the Nazis, when the "republican" forces of de Gaulle and the PCF jointly encouraged a declaration of a German pogrom. "To each his Boche" was the "civilized" slogan of "eternal" France. These loud and aggressive calls for nationalism have always been embodied by the Stalinists.
It is the hypocritical cynicism of helping the illegal immigration of African workers, in order to have cheap labur at hand, permanently intimidated and blackmailed by police repression (which according to the needs of the national economy sends back to their country of origin thousands of immigrant workers to the atrocious conditions), while at the same time, touchingly weeping "anti-racist" crocodile tears. It is, the brazen hypocrisy of Thatcher, who, while "lamenting" and being "horrified" by the barbarity in Romania, returns 40,000 illegal immigrants to Vietnam, who have been brutally hunted down by Her Majesty's police' in Hong Kong. All forms, all expressions of nationalism, big or small, necessarily and fatally lead into the march of aggression, of war, of "all against all", of exclusivism and discrimination.
If in the ascendant period of capitalism, the formation of new nations constituted a step forward in the development of the productive forces, giving them a framework for expansion and full development - the world market - in the 20th century, in the decadence of capitalism, the contradiction between the world character of production and the inevitable private-national nature of capitalist relations, has exploded. Through this contradiction, the nation, as the basic cell of the regroupment of each gang of capitalists in their war to the death to divide up the supersaturated market, reveals its reactionary character, its congenital nature as a force of division, fettering the development of humanity's productive forces.
"Since the internationalization of capitalist interests express only one side of the internationalization of economic life, it is necessary to review also its other side, namely, that process of nationalization of capitalist interests which most strikingly expresses the anarchy of capitalist competition within the boundaries of the world economy, a process that leads to the greatest convulsions and catastrophes; to the greatest waste of human energy, and most forcefully raises the problem of establishing new forms of social life" (Bukharin: Imperialism and the World Economy, page 62, Merlin edition)
All nationalism is imperialism
The Trotskyists, the extreme left of capital, always "critically" support Russian imperialism, presenting a "positive" picture of the nationalist explosion in the East. According to them, it represents the exercise of the "self-determination of peoples", which is supposed to be a blow against imperialism and a destabilization of the imperialist blocs.
We have already amply demonstrated the fallacy of the slogan about "the 'right' of peoples to self-determination", including within the ascendant period of capitalism[3]. Here, what we want to show, is that this nationalist explosion, even though it is a consequence of the hecatomb of Russian imperialism and is part of the process of destabilization of the imperialist constellations which for 40 years dominated the world (the "Yalta order"), in no way calls into question imperialism and, more importantly, as with the process of decomposition, it has nothing positive to offer the proletariat.
All mystification relies on false truths and what appears to be the truth, in order to efficiently deceive. Thus, it is obvious that the Western bloc is perturbed and worried by the present process of the explosion of the USSR into a thousand pieces. Its attitude in front of the independence of Lithuania has been, apart from the propagandistic threat of "don't touch Lithuania" and to pat Landsburges and his clique on the head, to give thinly veiled support to Gorbachev.
The United States and its western allies do not have, for the moment, any interest in the explosion of the USSR. They know that such an explosion would produce enormous destabilization, with savage nationalist and civil wars, in which the nuclear arsenal accumulated by Russia could be used. Likewise, a destabilization of the present frontiers of the USSR would reverberate throughout the Middle East and Asia, unleashing equally enormous nationalist, religious, ethnic and other tensions which have accumulated there and are being contained only with great difficulty.
However, the present unanimity of the great western powers is makeshift. Inevitably, as the process, already underway, of dislocation of the Western bloc sharpens - the principle factor of cohesion was its unity against the threat of the Russian bear which has now disappeared - each power will begin to play its own imperialist cards, fanning the flames of this or that nationalist gang, supporting this or that nation against another, backing this or that independent nation, etc, etc.
This form of speculation on destabilization clearly does not call into question that which revolutionaries have defended since the First World War: "So-called 'national liberation struggles' are moments in the deadly struggle between imperialist powers, large or small to gain control over the world market. The slogan of 'support for people in struggle' amounts, in fact, to defending one imperialist power against another under nationalist or 'socialist' verbiage" (The Basic Positions of the ICC). Nevertheless, admitting that the present phase of capitalist decomposition accentuates the anarchic and chaotic imperialist appetites of each nation, however small, does not eliminate imperialism or local imperialist wars, nor does it make them less dangerous; on the contrary, it stokes up the imperialist tensions and deepens and aggravates their capacity for destruction.
What all of this demonstrates, is another class position of revolutionaries: "All national capitals, no matter how small, are imperialist, and could not survive without recourse to imperialist politics. We defend this position with the utmost firmness in front of the speculations of the revolutionary milieu, particularly those expressed by the CWO (Communist Workers Organization), who say that not all national capitals are imperialist, which has given rise to all sorts of ambiguities, amongst them the reduction of imperialism in the last instance, to a 'superstructure' localized to a limited group of super powers, which, like it or not, makes the 'national liberation' of the other nations something that can be positive ". (International Review, no 14: "On Imperialism")
What the present epoch of capitalism's decomposition demonstrates, is that all nations, or small nationalities, all groups of capitalist gangsters, no matter if their private property is the huge territory of the USA or some miniscule neighborhood of Beirut, are imperialists, whose objective and way of life is robbery and destruction.
If the decomposition of capitalism and thus the chaotic and uncontrollable expressions of imperialist barbarity, result from the difficulty of the proletariat to take its struggle towards reclaiming its own being that of an international class and its revolutionary outcome then all support for nationalism, (including in its guise as a "marxist tactic" the "we support the small nations which destabilize imperialism" of the Trotskyists) derails the proletariat from its revolutionary road and feeds the rotting of capitalism, the destruction of humanity through decomposition. The only real blow, at the heart of imperialism, is the international revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, its autonomous struggle as a class, separated from and totally opposed to inter-classism and the nationalist terrain.
The false national community
The present "spring of the people" is seen by the anarchists as a "confirmation" of their positions. It expresses their idea of the "federation of the people" freely regrouped in small communities according to affinities of language and territory. It also expresses their other idea, "Self-management" which says that the decomposition of the economic apparatus makes small units supposedly more accessible to the people. The radically reactionary character of the anarchists position is confirmed by the anarchic and chaotic barbarity of the nationalist explosion in the east. Decomposition, which is reducing vast areas of the world to horrendous chaos, confirms that "self-management" is radical "assemblyism", that adapts itself to and consequently stirs up decomposition.
If capitalism gave something to humanity it was the tendency to the centralization of the productive forces on a world scale, through the formation of the world market. What is revealed by the decadence of capitalism is its incapacity to go beyond this process of centralization and its inevitable tendency to destruction and dislocation: "the reality of decadent capitalism, despite the momentary appearance of the imperialist antagonisms as two opposing monolithic entities, is the tendency of decadent capitalism to discord, chaos: this expresses the essential necessity of socialism, which seeks to build a world community" (Internationalisme: "Report on the International Situation" 1945)
The development of these growing tendencies to dislocation, chaos, anarchy, which are becoming increasingly less controllable in entire areas of the world market, are made crystal clear by the decomposition of capitalism.
If today the great nations, which in the last century constituted coherent economic entities, are a too-narrow framework, a reactionary obstacle against the real development of the productive forces, a fountainhead of destructive competition and wars, then the dislocation of the small nations will increasingly aggravate these tendencies towards distortion and chaos of the world economy.
Likewise, in this epoch of capitalist decadence, the lack of social perspectives, the evident manifestation of the destructive and reactionary character of the social order produces a formidable vacuum of values, of guide-lines to hold onto, of beliefs to abide by, in order to support individual lives.
This generates growing tendencies, to clutch onto all sorts of false communities such as the nation, which provide an illusory sense of security through "collective support", which anarchism stimulates with its slogan of "federations of small communes":
"Materially crushed, with no future, vegetating in a completely restricted day-to-day existence, wallowing in mediocrity, they are in their despair prey to all kinds of mystification, from the most pacifist ... to the most blood thirsty (Black Hundreds, pogronomists, racists, Klu Klux Klan, fascist gangs, gangsters and mercenaries of all kinds). It is mainly in the latter, the bloody ones, that they find the compensation of an illusory dignity. It is the heroism of the coward, the courage of the clown, the glory of sordid mediocrity" (International Review, no 14: "Terror, Terrorism and Class Violence" pages 7-8)
In the nationalist killings, the inter-ethnic confrontations that are taking place in the East, we see the stamp of these petty-bourgeois masses, despairing of a situation they cannot improve, debased by the barbarity of the old regimes in which they often carried out the lowest tasks, stirred up by the openly reactionary bourgeois political forces.
But the weight of the "national community", as a false community with illusory roots also acts on the proletariat. In the East, its weakness, its terrible political backwardness, the outcome of Stalinist barbarity, has determined its absence as an autonomous class in the confrontations that have marked the fall of the old regimes of "true Socialism". This absence has given more force to the reactionary and irrational actions of these strata, consequently, at the same time increasing the vulnerability of the proletariat.
The working class, must affirm itself against the reactionary illusions of nationalism, propagated by the petty-bourgeoisie; must affirm that the "national community", is a mask for the domination of each capitalist state.
The nation is not the sovereign domain of all those "born in the same country", but the private property of the capitalists who organize through the national state the exploitation of the workers and the defense of their interests in front of the relentless competition of the other capitalists states.
"The capitalist state and the nation are two indissoluble concepts subordinated one to the other. The nation without the state is as impossible as the state without the nation. In effect, the latter is the social medium necessary for the mobilization of all the classes around the interests of the bourgeoisie's struggle for the conquest of the world. As an expression of the position of the dominant class, the nation can have no other axis than the apparatus of oppression: the state" (Bilan, no 14: "The Problem of National Minorities" page 474)
Culture, language, history, the common territory which the intellectuals and paid hacks of the national state present as "fundamental" to the "national community", are the product of centuries of exploitation, they are the seal of blood and fire with which the bourgeoisie have capped the creation of their private enclosure in the world market: "For marxists there exists no sufficient criteria to indicate where a 'nation', a 'people' or the 'rights' of national minorities begin or end neither from the point of view of race or history are the conglomerations that the national bourgeois states or groups represent, justified. Language and common territory, are the two factors that animate the academic charlatanism about nationalism, but these two elements have continually changed due to wars and conquests" (Bilan, idem, page 473)
The false national community is the mask for capitalist exploitation, the alibi of the national states to embroil their "citizens" in the crimes that imperialist wars are, the justification for calling on workers to accept pay cuts, lay-offs, etc, etc, because "the national economy needs them to"; the call to recruit them into their "competitive" battle with the other national capitalisms who, with the same vigor, divide and confront the working class in other countries, in order to shackle them to new and worse sacrifices, misery and unemployment. The only progressive community today is the autonomous unification of the working class: "In order for people to become really united their interests must be common. For their interests to be common the existing property relations must be abolished, since exploitation of one nation by another is caused by the existing property relations. And it is only in the interests of the working class to abolish the existing property relations; only they have the means to achieve it. The victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie represents at the same time the victory over national and industrial conflicts, which at present create hostility between different peoples." (Karl Marx: "Speech On Poland" 1847)
The struggle of the proletariat contains the seed for overcoming national, ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions with which capitalism continuing the work of the oppressors of the previous modes of production has tortured humanity. In the common body of the united struggle for class interests these divisions will naturally and logically disappear. The common bases are the conditions of exploitation, which everywhere will tend to worsen with the world crisis, the common interest is the affirmation of their necessities as human beings against the inhuman necessities, each time more despotic, of the commodity and the national interest.
The goal of the proletariat, communism, which is to say a human world community, represents a centralization, a new human community, the highest reached by the forces of production, capable of giving them their full development and expansion. It is the unity of conscious centralization based on common interests produced by the abolition of classes, the destruction of wage labor and national frontiers.
"The illusory community, in which individuals have up until now combined, always took on an independent existence to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class against another, not only a completely illusory community, but as fetter as well. In a real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association." (Marx and Engels: The German Ideology, page 83, Student edition).
Adalen 16.05.1990
[1] See International Review no 61 our ‘Thesis on the Economic and Political Crisis of the Countries of the East'
[2] See the ‘Thesis on Decomposition: The Ultimate Stage of Decadent Capitalism', in this International Review.
[3] See the series on "Revolutionaries and the National Question" in International Review nos 34 and 43.
It has become blindingly obvious that the longer it continues, the closer capitalist civilisation is taking us towards an ecological catastrophe of planetary proportions.
The basic facts are well known and can be obtained from a growing number of publications, both popular and scientific, so we will not describe them in detail here. A simple list suffices to demonstrate the extent and depth of the danger: the growing adulteration of food through additives and livestock diseases; the contamination of water supplies through the unrestrained use of fertilisers and the dumping of toxic waste; the pollution of the air, especially in the major cities, through the combined effects of industrial emissions and car exhaust fumes; the threat of radioactive contamination from the nuclear reactors and waste-dumps scattered all over the industrialised countries and the ex-Stalinist regimes - a threat that has already become a nightmare reality with the disasters at Windscale, Three Mile Island, and above all Chernobyl; the poisoning of the rivers, lakes and seas which have for decades been used as the rubbish tips of the world, and is now resulting in the break-down of the whole complex food chain and the destruction of organisms that play an important role in the regulation of the world’s climate; the accelerating destruction of the world’s forests, particularly the tropical rainforests, also altering the Earth’s climate, inducing land erosion and thus contributing in turn to further calamities, like the advancing desert in Africa and floods in Bangla Desh.
Furthermore, it is now apparent that quantity is turning into quality as the effects of pollution are becoming both more global and more incalculable. They’re global in that every country in the world is affected: not only the highly industrialised West, but also the ‘underdeveloped’ third world and the Stalinist or ex-Stalinist regimes, which are too bankrupt to afford even the minimal controls that have been introduced in the West. Former ‘socialist’ countries like Poland, East Germany and Rumania are perhaps the most polluted in the world; virtually every town in eastern Europe has its horror stories of local factories belching out deadly toxins that cause cancer, respiratory and other diseases, of rivers that burst into flame when you throw a match onto them, and so on. But third world cities like Mexico or Cubutao in Brazil are surely not far behind.
But there’s another and even more terrifying meaning to the word ‘global’ in this context; ie, that the ecological disaster is now tangibly threatening the very life-support system of the planet. The thinning of the ozone layer, which seems to be mainly the result of the emission of CFC gases, is a clear expression of this, since the ozone layer protects all life on Earth from deadly ultra-violet radiation; and it is impossible at this stage to say what the long-term consequences of this process will be. The same applies to the problem of the greenhouse effect, which is now being accepted as a real threat by a growing number of scientific panels, the latest being the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change. The IPCC and others have not only warned of the massive floods, droughts and famines that could result if there is no significant cut-back in the present level of emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide; they have also pointed to the danger of a ‘feedback’ process, in which each aspect of pollution and environmental destruction acts on the other to produce an irreversible spiral of disaster.
It is also obvious that the class whose system has caused this mess is incapable of doing anything about it. Of course, in the last few years nearly all the leading lights of the bourgeoisie have been miraculously converted to the cause of saving the environment. The supermarkets are stocked full of goods advertising how free they are from artificial additives; cosmetics, detergents and nappy labels vie with each other to prove how much they respect the ozone layer, the air or the rivers. And the political leaders from Thatcher to Gorbachev talk more and more about how we must all work together to protect our endangered planet.
As usual the hypocrisy of this class of gangsters knows no bounds. The bourgeoisie’s real commitment to saving the planet can be measured by looking at what they are actually prepared to do. For example, they made a great fuss about the recent ozone conference in London, where the main countries of the world, including the previously recalcitrant third world giants India and China, agreed to phase out CFCs by the year 2000. But this still means that a further 20 percent of the ozone layer could be destroyed over the next decade; in that period, a volume of ozone depleting gases would be released representing half as much again as the total volume already released since CFCs were invented.
It’s even worse when it comes to the greenhouse effect. The US administration has banned the phrase ‘global warming’ from all its official communiques. And the countries who do on paper accept the IPCC’s predictions have so far committed themselves to do no more than stabilise carbon dioxide emissions at their present level. And above all they have no serious strategy for reducing their economies’ dependence on fossil fuels or the private automobile, which are the main contributors to the greenhouse effect. Nothing is being done to halt the destruction of the rainforests, which both adds to the accumulation of greenhouse gases and reduces the planet’s capacity to reabsorb them: the UN’s own Tropical Forest Action Plan is entirely dominated by logging companies, and besides, the denuding of the rainforests by logging, cattle and industrial interests, as well as by famished peasants desperate for land or fuel, could only be halted if the third world was suddenly relieved of its massive burden of debt and poverty. As for plans to build defences against floods or to prevent famine, the populations of the most threatened countries, such as Bangla Desh, can expect the same kind of ‘help’ as that given to the inhabitants of the world’s earthquake zones, or the victims of drought in Africa.
The bourgeoisie’s response to all these problems highlights the fact that the very structure of its system renders it incapable of dealing with the ecological problems it has created. Global ecological problems require a global solution. But despite all the international conferences, despite all the pious talk about international cooperation, capitalism is irreducibly based on competition between national economies. Its inability to achieve any real level of global cooperation is in fact being exacerbated today as the old bloc structures crumble and the system slides into a war of each against all. The deepening of the world economic crisis which brought the Russian bloc to its knees is going to aggravate competition and national rivalries; it will mean each company, each country, acting with ever-greater irresponsibility in the mad scramble for economic survival.
Whatever small concessions are made to environmental considerations, the dominant trend will be for health, safety and pollution controls to be thrown out of the window. This has already been the case over the past decade, which has seen a marked rise in the number of industrial, transport and other disasters, the result of furious cost-cutting in the face of the economic crisis. As the trade war between nations hots up, things are due to get a lot worse.
What’s more, this free-for-all will increase the danger of local military conflicts in regions where the working class is too weak to prevent them. Now that these conflicts are no longer contained by the discipline of the old imperialist blocs, they run a far greater risk of unleashing the horrors of chemical and even nuclear warfare on a ‘local’ scale, massacring millions and further poisoning the atmosphere of the planet. Who can believe that, caught up in a mounting spiral of chaos and confusion, the bourgeoisies of the world are going to work harmoniously together to deal with the threat to the environment? If anything, the results of ecological difficulties - dwindling water supplies, floods, disputes over refugees, etc - will further increase local imperialist tensions. The bourgeoisie is already aware of this. As the Egyptian foreign minister Butros Ghali put it recently, " the next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics."
In its present phase of advancing decomposition, the ruling class is increasingly losing control of its social system. Humanity can no longer afford to leave the planet in its hands. The ‘ecological crisis’ is further proof that capitalism has to be destroyed before it drags the whole world into the abyss.
But if the bourgeoisie is incapable of repairing the damage it has done to the planet, it certainly doesn’t hesitate to use ecological issues to fuel its campaigns of mystification aimed at the only force in society that can do anything about the problem - the world proletariat.
The ecological question is ideal in this respect, which is why the bourgeoisie makes little attempt to hide the gravity of the problem (and may even indulge in a little exaggeration when it suits). Time and time again we are told that problems like the hole in the ozone layer, or global warming, ‘affect us all’, that they ‘make no distinctions’ of colour, class or country. And it is true that pollution, like other aspects of the decomposition of capitalist society (drug addiction, crime, etc), does affect all classes of society (even if it’s usually the most oppressed and exploited who suffer the most). So what better basis could there be for diluting the proletariat, making it forget its own class interests, drowning it in an amorphous mass where there is no longer any distinction of interest between workers, shopkeepers ... or the ruling class itself? The constant ideological barrage about the environment thus complements all the campaigns about democracy and ‘people power’ unleashed after the fall of the eastern bloc.
Look at how they twist the ecological issues to suit their needs. These problems are so terrifying, so urgent, they say, surely they’re more important than your egoistic fight for higher wages or against job losses? Indeed, aren’t most of these problems due to the fact that ‘we’ in the advanced countries ‘are consuming too much’? Shouldn’t we be prepared to eat less meat, use less energy, even accept this or that factory closure ‘for the good of the planet’? What better alibi for the sacrifices demanded by the crisis of the capitalist economy.
And then there are all the arguments supporting the mythology of ‘reforms’ and ‘realistic change’. Surely something has to be done now, they say. So shouldn’t we be looking to see which election candidate offers the best ecological policies, which party promises to do the most for the environment? Doesn’t the concern expressed by Gorbachev, or Mitterand, or Thatcher prove that the politicians can indeed respond to popular pressure? Don’t the experiments in energy conservation, or solar energy, or wind power, which various ‘enlightened’ governments like Sweden or Holland are carrying out today, prove that change is just a matter of will and enterprise on the part of the politicians, combined with pressure from the citizens below? Doesn’t the switch to environmentally friendly products prove that the big companies really can be affected by ‘consumer action’?
And if all these ‘hopeful’ and ‘positive’ approaches fail to convince, then the bourgeoisie can still profit from the feelings of helplessness and despair that can only get reinforced when the isolated citizen peeps out of his window and sees a whole world being poisoned. If you can’t get the exploited to believe your lies, then at least a working class that has been atomised and demoralised doesn’t pose a threat to your system.
But in the past decade or so a new political force has appeared on the scene - one that claims to stand for a radical approach that puts the defence of the environment above all other considerations: the Greens. In Germany they have become a force to be reckoned with in national political life. In eastern Europe, ecological groups figured heavily in the democratic oppositions that have stepped into the breech left by the collapse of Stalinism. Green parties and pressure groups are appearing in most of the advanced countries, and even in the Third World.
But the Greens are also part of the rotting capitalist order. This is evident when you look at the Greens in Germany: they’ve become a respectable parliamentary party, with numerous seats in the national Bundestag and various responsible posts in local and regional government. The overt integration of the Greens into capitalist normality was symbolised a few years back when the ‘extra-parliamentary’, anarchist rebel of 1968, Daniel Cohn Bendit (remember the slogan ‘Elections, piege a cons’?) himself became an MP in the German parliament, and even expressed his desire to become a minister. In the Bundestag the Greens engage in all the sordid manoeuvres typical of bourgeois parties - now acting as a ‘spoiler’ to keep the SPD in opposition, now forming an alliance with the social democrats against the ruling CDU.
It’s true that the Greens are divided into a ‘realo’ wing which is content to focus on the parliamentary arena, and a ‘fundi’ wing which stresses more radical, extraparliamentary forms of action. And much of the appeal of the Green parties and pressure groups is that they play on people’s distrust of bureaucratic central governments and parliamentary corruption. As an alternative they offer campaigns against local instances of pollution, spectacular protest stunts of the type Greenpeace specialises in, marches and demonstrations, while calling for the devolution of political power and ‘citizens’ initiatives’ of all kinds. But none of these activities step an inch outside the general campaigns of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they serve to ensure that these campaigns penetrate into the very grassroots of society.
The ‘radical’ Greens are champions of interclassism. They address themselves to the ‘responsible individual’, to the ‘local community’, to the good conscience of mankind in general. The actions they initiate attempt to mobilise all citizens, regardless of class, into the fight against pollution. And when they criticise bureaucracy and the remoteness of central government, it’s only to put forward a vision of ‘local democracy’ equally bourgeois in content.
They are no less zealous in their support for the reformist illusion. The actions they organise are invariably aimed at making companies or governments more responsible, cleaner, greener. Just one example: a Friends of the Earth leaflet explaining how Third World debt leads to the destruction of the rainforests. So what’s the answer? The big western banks "should cancel all the debts owed by the world’s very poorest countries, and reduce debts owed by the other major debtor countries by at least one half. They can now afford to do so" (‘Stamp out the debt, not the rainforests’). And how will the banks be persuaded of this? "The banks won’t move unless they are shown how strongly their customers feel about this issue. Stamping your cheques with ‘stamp out the debt not the rainforests’ and taking the ‘Debt Pledge’ are two powerful ways to show them how you feel" (ibid).
Thus the Greens invite us to believe in the effectiveness of ‘consumer power’, and in the possibility of appealing to the better nature of money-bags who think nothing of condemning millions to starvation just by shifting their capital from one country to another. It’s the same when the Greens paint their picture of a possible future: a world where small, ecologically sound businesses never turn into rapacious capitalist giants, a pacifist vision of nation speaking unto nation, in short a gentle, caring, impossible capitalism.
But wait. There are currents in or around the Green movement who claim to be more radical than this, who actually criticise capitalism and even talk about revolution. Some of them are so radical that they claim that marxism itself is no more than the other side of the capitalist ‘megamachine’. Look at the regimes in the east they say: that’s the logical result of marxism’s worship of ‘progress’ technology, industry. Inspired by ‘thinkers’ like Baudrillard, they may even explain in very complex language that marxism is just another ‘productivist’ ideology (in this they are joined by defrocked Stalinists like Martin Jaques, who said at a recent conference of the crumbling British CP that "there is no getting away from the fact that the marxist tradition is productionist at its heart ... the conquest of nature, the forces of production, the commitment to economic growth"). Anarcho-primitivists like the Fifth Estate paper in Detroit call for nothing less than the eradication of industrial-technological society and a return to primitive communism. The ‘deep ecologists’ of Earth First. go even further: for their ideologists, the problem isn’t just industrial society, or civilisation, but man himself ...
The notion that an abstract entity called ‘man’ is responsible for the current ecological mess is not restricted to a few esoteric Green ideologists; it is in fact a widespread cliché of the conventional wisdom. But in either case, it’s an idea that can only lead to despair, because if human beings are the problem, how can human beings find a solution? It’s no accident that some of the ‘deep ecologists’ have welcomed AIDS as a necessary agent for pruning the world of excess humans ...
The position of the anarcho-primitivists leads to the same bleak conclusions. To be ‘against technology’ is also to be against mankind; man created himself through labour, and "labour begins with the making of tools" (Engels, ‘The part played by labour in the transition from ape to man’). The logic of the anti-technological position is to try to get back to a pre-human past when nature was undisturbed by the clangour of human activity: "The animal merely uses its environment and brings about changes in it simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals." (ibid)
But even if the ‘anti-technologists’ would be content to return to the hunter-gatherer stage of culture, the result would be the same, since the material conditions of such a society presupposed a world population of no more than a few million. These conditions could only be restored through a massive ‘cull’ of human beings, something that capitalism in its death-throes is already preparing for us. Thus these ‘radical’ ecologists - products of a disintegrating petty bourgeoisie which has no historical future and can only look back to an idealised past - are recruited as theorisers and apologists for a descent into barbarism that is already well underway.
Against these nihilistic ideologies, marxism, expressing the standpoint of the only class that does have a future today, insists that the present ecological nightmare can’t be explained by invoking categories like man, technology or industry in a totally vague and ahistoric manner. Man does not exist outside history, and technology cannot be divorced from the social relations in which it has developed. Man’s interaction with nature can also only be understood in its real historical and social context.
Humanity has existed on this planet for at least several hundred thousand years - most of them at the stage of primitive communism, of hunter gatherer societies where there was a relatively stable equilibrium between man and nature, a fact reflected in the myths and rituals of the primitive peoples. The dissolution of this archaic community and the rise of class society, a qualitative step in the alienation of man from man, also determined new alienations between man and nature. The first cases of extensive ecological destruction coincide with the early city states; there is considerable evidence that the very process of deforestation which allowed civilisations such as the Sumerian, the Babylonian, the Sinhalese and others to develop a large-scale agricultural base also, in the longer term, played a considerable role in their decline and disappearance.
But these were local, limited phenomena: prior to capitalism, all civilisations were based on ‘natural economy’: the bulk of production was still oriented towards the immediate consumption of use values, even though, in contrast to the primitive community, a large part of it was appropriated by the exploiting class. Capitalism, by contrast, is a system where all production is geared towards the market, towards the enlarged reproduction of exchange value; it is a social formation far more dynamic than any previous system, and this dynamic compelled it to move inexorably towards the creation of a world economy. But the very dynamism and globality of capital has meant that the problem of ecological destruction has now been raised to a planetary level. For it is not marxism, but capitalism, which is "productionist at its heart". Goaded by competition, by the anarchic rivalry of capitalist units struggling for control of the market, it obeys an inner compulsion to expand to the furthest limits permitted to it, and in this merciless drive towards its own self-expansion, it cannot pause to consider either the health and welfare of the producers, or the future ecological consequences of how and what it produces. The secret of today’s ecological destruction is to be found in the very secret of capitalist production: "Accumulate, accumulate. That is Moses and the prophets..." (Capital vol 1, ‘Conversion of surplus value into capital’).
The problem behind the ecological catastrophe, then, is not ‘industrial society’ in the abstract, as so many of the ecologists proclaim: hitherto the only industrial society that has ever existed has been capitalism. This of course includes the Stalinist regimes, who are a veritable caricature of the capitalist subordination of consumption to accumulation; those who blame marxism for the ecological devastation in the east merely lend their voices to the current hue and cry of the bourgeoisie about the ‘failure of communism’ following the collapse of the eastern imperialist bloc. The problem does not lie in this or that form of capitalism, but in the essential mechanisms of a society which grows not in conscious harmony with the needs of man and with what Marx called man’s "inorganic body", nature, but for the sake of profit alone.
But the ecological problem also has its specific history within capitalism.
Already in the ascendant period, Marx and Engels had many occasions to denounce the way that capitalism’s thirst for profit poisoned the living and working conditions of the working class. They even considered that the big industrial cities had already become too large to provide the basis for viable human communities, and considered that the "abolition of the separation between town and countryside" was an integral part of the communist programme (imagine what they would have said about the megacities of the late 20th century ...)
But it is essentially in the present epoch of capitalism, the epoch which since 1914 has been defined by marxists as that of the decadence of this mode of production, that capital’s ruthless destruction of the environment takes on a different scale and quality, while at the same time losing any historical justification. This is the epoch in which all the capitalist nations are forced to compete with each other over a saturated world market; an epoch therefore, of a permanent war economy, with a disproportionate growth of heavy industry; an epoch characterised by the irrational, wasteful duplication of industrial complexes in each national unit, by the desperate pillaging of natural resources by each nation as it tries to survive in the pitiless rat-race of the world market. The consequences of all this for the environment are now becoming crystal clear; the intensification of ecological problems can be measured according to the different phases of capitalist decadence. The main growth of carbon dioxide emissions has taken place this century, with a considerable increase since the 1960s. CFCs were only invented in the 1930s and have only been used extensively over the past few decades. The rise of the ‘megacities’ is very much a post World War Two phenomenon, as is the development of forms of agriculture that have been no less ecologically damaging than most forms of industry. The frenzied destruction of the rainforests has taken place in the same period, and especially over the last decade: the rate has probably doubled since 1979.
What we are seeing today is the culmination of decades of unplanned, wasteful, irrational economic and military activity by decadent capitalism; the qualitative acceleration of the ecological crisis over the past decade ‘coincides’ with the opening of the final phase of capitalist decadence - the phase of decomposition. By this we mean that after 20 years of profound and ever-worsening economic crisis, in which neither of the major social classes have been able to carry through their historic alternatives of world war or world revolution, the whole social order is beginning to crack up, to descend into an uncontrolled downward spiral of chaos and destruction (see International Review n°62 ‘Decomposition, final phase of capitalist Decadence’).
The capitalist system has long ceased to represent any progress for mankind. The disastrous ecological consequences of its ‘growth’ since 1945 is one more demonstration that this growth has taken place on a diseased, destructive basis, and constitutes a slap in the face for all those pundits - some of them unfortunately to be found in the proletarian political movement - who point to this growth in order to challenge the marxist notion of the decadence of capitalism.
But this doesn’t mean that marxists - unlike most of the bourgeoisie today, and all of its petty bourgeois hangers-on - are abandoning the notion of progress or making any concessions to the anti-technological prejudices of the radical Greens.
The marxist concept of progress was never the same as the bourgeoisie’s one-sided, linear notion of a steady ascent from primitive darkness and superstition to the light of modern reason and democracy. It is a dialectical vision which recognises that historical progress has taken place through the clash of contradictions, that it has involved catastrophes and even regressions, that the advance of ‘civilisation’ has also meant the refinement of exploitation and the aggravation of alienation between man and man and man and nature. But it also recognises that man’s growing capacity to transform nature through the development of his productive powers, to subject the unconscious processes of nature to his own conscious control, provides the only basis for overcoming this alienation and arriving at a higher form of community than the restricted communism of primitive times - a world-wide, unified community that will be based not on scarcity and the submerging of the individual into the collective, but on an unprecedented level of abundance that will supply "the material conditions for the total, universal development of the productive powers of the individual" (Marx, Grundrisse). By creating the material basis for this global human community, capitalism represented an immense step forward over the natural economies which preceded it.
Today the notion of ‘controlling’ nature has been vilely distorted by the experience of capitalism, which has treated the whole of nature as just another commodity, as dead matter, as something essentially external to man. Against this view - but also against the passive nature-worship which is prevalent amongst many of today’s Greens - Engels defined the communist position when he wrote:
"At every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature - but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly" (‘The part played by labour....’)
Indeed, despite all its so-called ‘conquests’, capitalism is revealing today that its control over nature is the ‘control’ of the sorcerer’s apprentice, not of the sorcerer himself. It has laid the basis for a really conscious mastery of nature, but its very mode of operation turns all its achievements into disasters. As Marx put it:
"At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on a dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life and stultifying human life into a material force." (Speech at the anniversary of the People’s Paper, April 1856)
Today this contradiction has reached the point where mankind stands at a two-pronged fork in the road of history, facing the choice between the conscious control over his own social and productive forces, and thus a "correct application" of the laws of nature, or destruction at the hands of the very forces that he himself has set in motion. The choice, in other words, between communism or barbarism.
If communism is the only answer to the ecological crisis, then the only force that can introduce a communist society is the working class.
As with other aspects of the decomposition of capitalist society, the threat to the environment highlights the fact that the longer the proletariat delays its revolution, the greater the danger of the revolutionary class being exhausted and undermined, of the whole course towards destruction and chaos reaching a point of no return that would make both the struggle for revolution, and the construction of a new society, an impossible task. Thus, in so far as it underlines the growing urgency of the communist revolution, an awareness of the depth of the current ecological problems will play its part in the transition of the proletarian struggle from a defensive, economic level to the level of a conscious and political combat against capital as a whole.
But it would be an error to think that the ecological issue per se can be a focus for the mobilisation of the proletariat on its own class terrain today. Although certain limited aspects of the problem (eg health and safety at work) can be integrated into authentic class demands, the issue as such doesn’t allow the proletariat to affirm itself as a distinct social force. Indeed, as we have seen, it provides an ideal pretext for the bourgeoisie’s inter-classist campaigns, and the workers will have to resist actively the various attempts of the bourgeoisie, particularly its Green and leftist elements, to use the issue as a means of dragging them off their own class ground. It remains the case that it is above all by struggling against the effects of the economic crisis - against wage cuts, unemployment, growing impoverishment at all levels - that the workers will be able to constitute themselves into a force capable of confronting the entire bourgeois order.
The working class will only be able to deal with the ecological issue as a whole when it has conquered political power on a world scale. Indeed it has now become plain that this will be one of the most pressing tasks of the transition period, and is in any case intimately bound up with other urgent problems such as world hunger and the reorganisation of agriculture.
This isn’t the place for a detailed discussion of the measures the proletariat will have to take both to clean up the mess bequeathed by capitalism and to move towards a qualitatively new relationship between man and nature. Here we want to stress one point only: that the problems facing a victorious proletariat will not fundamentally be technical but political and social.
The existing technical and industrial infrastructure is profoundly marred by the irrationality of capitalist development in this epoch, and no doubt a very considerable part of it will have to be demolished as a precondition for building a productive base that does not become a threat to the natural environment. But on the purely technical level, a number of alternatives have already been developed, or could have been developed if sufficient resources had been devoted to them. It’s possible already, for example, through the system of combined heat and energy in fossil-fuel burning power stations, to substantially cut carbon dioxide and other harmful emissions while making efficient use of almost 100% of the waste material produced. Similarly, it’s already possible to develop many other alternative sources of energy : solar power, wind power, wave power, etc, which are both renewable and virtually pollution-free; there are also enormous possibilities contained in the process of nuclear fusion, which would avoid many of the problems associated with nuclear fission.
Capitalism has already developed its technical capacities to the point where the problem of pollution could be solved. But the fact that the real problem is social in nature is highlighted by the many instances in which capitalism’s own short term economic or military interests have not permitted it to develop non-polluting technologies. We know, for example, that the oil, gas and electrical industries in the USA mounted a campaign to crowd out the development of solar power after World War Two; we have recently learned that the British government collaborated in a report which doctored its figures to prove that nuclear power was cheaper than wave power; the motor industry has long stood in the way of the development of less polluting forms of transport, and so on.
But the issue goes deeper than the conscious policies of this or that government or industry. The problem, as we have seen, lies in the basic operation of the capitalist mode of production, and it can only be solved by attacking this mode of production at its very roots.
Capital wantonly destroys the natural environment because it must accumulate or die; the only answer is to suppress the very principle of capital accumulation, to produce not for profit but for human need. Capital ravages the world’s resources because it is divided into competing national units, because it is fundamentally anarchic and cannot produce with the interests of the future in mind; the only answer is the abolition of the nation state, the communisation of all the Earth’s human and natural resources, and the drawing up of what Bordiga called a "a plan for living for the human species". In short, the problem can only be solved by a working class that is conscious of the need to revolutionise the very bases of social life, and which has in its hands the political instruments for carrying through the transition to a communist society. Organised in its workers councils on a world scale, drawing all the world’s oppressed masses along with it, the international proletariat can and must set about the creation of a world where an unprecedented material abundance will not be in conflict with the health of the natural environment, indeed where both are seen to condition each other mutually; a world in which mankind, freed at last from the domination of toil and scarcity, will begin to enjoy living on this planet.
Peering through the fogs of exploitation and pollution with which capitalist civilisation has shrouded the Earth, this surely was the world that Marx glimpsed when he foresaw, in his 1844 Manuscripts, a society which would embody "the unity of being of man with nature - the true resurrection of nature - the naturalisation of man and the humanisation of nature both brought to fulfilment".
CDW
At the time of writing, the US armed forces are encircling and asphyxiating Iraq. There's every sign that we're heading towards a murderous confrontation for which the populations of the region will pay a terrible price. They will be made victims of privations, bombing, gas, terror. Victims of war. Victims of capitalism.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is fundamentally the result of the new historic situation opened up by the collapse of the eastern bloc. It is another expression of the growing decomposition of the capitalist system. And the gigantic deployment of armed force by the great powers, mainly by the USA to be more precise, reveals their increasing concern to do something about the disorder that is spreading across the world.
But in the long run the reaction of the great powers will lead to the opposite of what they intended, turning into another factor of destabilization and disorder. In the long run, it will further accelerate the slide into chaos, dragging the whole of humanity with it.
There's only one force which can offer an alternative - the world proletariat. And the name of that alternative is communism.
What was supposed to happen after the disappearance of the eastern bloc? A new era of peace and prosperity was going to begin. By working together, the USA and the USSR were going to put an end to the conflicts which have ravaged the world since 1945. Perpetuating the Stalinist lie about the socialist character of the USSR and the eastern countries, the western bourgeoisie proclaimed the victory of capitalism over 'communism' and 'marxism'. The eastern countries were going to enjoy the delights of western-style capitalism, and the world economy would be revived by this new market. In sum, the best of all possible worlds was before us. Marx was declared old hat, at best a curiosity. Lenin was triumphantly referred to as the 'great corpse' of the year. Certain bourgeois ideologues, carried away by enthusiasm, even proclaimed the end of history!
Six months. Six months was all it took to explode all these chimaeras, all these lies. As the communist groups, the organizations which really remained faithful to marxism, pointed out then and continue to do so now, capitalism is descending inexorably into economic catastrophe[1].
The countries of the periphery, of the so called 'third world', are daily hell for the immense majority of their inhabitants; a hell which gets worse and worse.
The countries of the former eastern bloc are sunk in the economic swamp inherited from Stalinist state capitalism; a complete and dramatic disaster for millions of human beings, without any hope of improvement, or even of any slow-down in the decline.
The USA is entering into open recession, a fact openly recognized by the bourgeoisie itself. The world's first economic power is falling and it's already dragging the main industrial countries, such as Britain, along with it.
Six months later, all the grand declarations about peace are being reduced to naught by the conflict in the Middle East. And the year's 'great corpse', Lenin, returns to affirm with renewed vigor that "in the capitalist system, particularly in its imperialist stage, wars are inevitable."[2]
The illusion lasted six months. Now the masks are falling and the reality of the capitalist system in decomposition comes to the surface - a system of implacable barbarism, a system based on misery, hunger, catastrophes, on the seizure of hostages, on murder and repression, massacres and wars. A system covered in muck and blood, which is what Karl Marx said about capitalism when it was still in its youth; in its period of senility, it's showing itself to be far worse.
The lies are crumbling and the new historic situation opened up by the collapse of the countries of Stalinist state capitalism and by the disappearance of the two imperialist blocs, far from opening up a new era of peace, is being revealed in all its horror.
The end of the 'cold war' doesn't mean the end of imperialist conflicts.
"In the period of capitalist decadence, all states are imperialist, and take the necessary measures to satisfy their appetites: war economy, arms production, etc. We must state clearly that the deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level. The difference, in the coming period, will be that these antagonisms which were previously contained and used by the two great imperialist blocs will now come to the fore. The disappearance of the Russian imperialist gendarme, and that to come of the American gendarme as far as its one-time 'partners' are concerned, opens the door to the unleashing of a whole series of more local rivalries. For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (even supposing the proletariat was no longer capable of putting up a resistance). However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent, and more violent, particularly in those areas where the proletariat is weakest." ('After the Collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Destabilization and Chaos', International Review 61, 2nd Quarter 1990).
Six months later, the reality of capitalist society, the reality of a system rotting on its feet and sinking deeper and deeper into chaos, has strikingly confirmed these lines.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is part of the slide into chaos
Prosperity and peace, we were promised after the fall of the Berlin Wall. What we've got is crisis and war. The war with Iraq isn't all down to the 'new Hitler' Saddam Hussein. After the events in Eastern Europe, it is another major expression of the phase of decomposition which capitalism has entered. It is the product of the new historic situation opened up by the collapse of the eastern bloc, the product of the growing tendency towards a loss of control over the situation by the world bourgeoisie, towards a war of each against all, towards instability and anarchy throughout the world.
Contrary to what we're being told, the striking aspect of the crisis in the Gulf isn't the unanimity of the great powers in their condemnation of and opposition to Iraq - we'll come back to this - but the fact that a country like Iraq is daring to defy the order established in the region by the world's leading power, without the assent or support of another great power.
Yesterday, ie a year ago, Saddam Hussein would have been led to see reason very quickly by the higher logic of the conflict between two imperialist blocs. Today, his adventure has irredeemably changed and destabilized the whole of the Middle East. Now all the countries of the region, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, even Syria, are entering into an era of instability. The whole region is going towards 'Lebanonization.'
Inevitably, conflicts of this type, more and more numerous, less and less controlled by the great powers, and are going to proliferate throughout the world because of the economic catastrophe hitting all countries, big or small, and because of a world situation where the discipline of the two blocs has ceased to exist. As a result, small states stuck in a dead-end will be pushed more and more into military adventures.
After the war against Iran, a horrible butchery which left a million dead, Iraq found itself with a debt of more than $70 billion, for a population of 17 million inhabitants ($4,000 debt per person, including women, children and the elderly!), and with an army of ... one million soldiers.
The country was quite incapable of paying back its debts. Completely asphyxiated, it had no alternative but to play the only ace it held: the biggest army in the region. Not only did it do a bit of armed robbery with the treasuries of Kuwait, it is also trying to assert itself as the dominant power over the entire region which is so important from an economic and strategic point of view. This is the unavoidable path of imperialism which all states are forced to take by the growing economic crisis and the general decadence of capitalist society. And in the phase of decomposition, the transition from trade war to imperialist war has become all the more rapid.
Hussein isn't a madman. He is the man of the situation, a product of contemporary capitalism. He's even the creation of those who are fighting him today. Yesterday the western powers didn't have enough words of praise for his far-sightedness, his courage, his greatness, when Iraq was their instrument for bringing Khomeini's Iran to heel. Yesterday, the great western democracies themselves armed Iraq with the most modern engines of death. And they continued to do so without any qualms even when he was using these weapons to bombard and terrorize civil populations in the big towns of Iran, and gas Kurdish towns in Iraq itself.
They only stopped, or limited, their military deliveries when Iraq was no longer able to pay for them or for its debts. This is what the world bourgeoisie understands by the defense of 'international law' and 'the rights of man.'
Particularly repulsive is the cynical use of thousands of hostages by Iraq and by... the western powers. It's true that Saddam Hussein's seizure of hostages is a hateful act. It's the deed of a hunted beast, surrounded and with no avenue of escape.
But the hostage issue is being used quite consciously by the western bourgeoisie to build up a deafening propaganda campaign which is intended to justify its war aims and enroll the population behind them. If necessary, it won't hesitate to sacrifice the hostages, blaming it on the 'butcher of Baghdad' as he's now presented in the bourgeois press.
Do we have to remind anyone of the shameful use made of the US embassy hostages in Iran in 1979? It's just been revealed that this episode allowed the CIA - whose director at the time was a certain G. Bush - to get Reagan elected and increase military spending[3].
Let's have no illusion: all possible means, however ignoble and barbaric, and particularly terror and terrorism, are going to be used more and more in the coming conflicts by the various states involved. Because other conflicts will inevitably arise, other Husseins armed and supported by the great powers will launch themselves into wars of the same kind. Local imperialist conflicts, products of the growing chaos into which capitalism is sinking, are going to further aggravate and accelerate this chaos.
The USA alone can be the world's policeman
Faced with this irreversible tendency towards chaos, the great world powers are trying to react. Just as the western countries continue to give their support to Gorbachev in his attempts to deal with the anarchy in the USSR, so they can't remain passive in the face of Iraq's adventure and the dangers of destabilization it contains.
The unanimous condemnation of Iraq by the great powers expresses an awareness of this danger and a will to limit and prevent the outbreak of these kinds of conflicts. Not because of their concern for universal peace or the wellbeing of the populations, but in order to maintain their power and their grip over the world. What they call 'peace' and 'civilization' is just the most brutal and barbaric imperialism, the power of the strongest over the weakest.
Of course it's the USA, the world's leading power, which has reacted with the greatest breadth and determination. The blockade adopted by the UN was imposed above all by the USA. The intervention of western military forces has been carried out under the inflexible leadership of the USA.
The Americans could not allow the Arabian Peninsula to plunge into war, could not let Hussein's Iraq control the world's main sources of oil. And above all they needed to call a halt to the imperialist, adventurist, war-like aspirations of the increasing number of regimes which might be tempted to imitate Saddam Hussein.
The godfather of the world's mafia doesn't like it when small neighborhood crooks think that everything is permissible and start disrupting business with unauthorized hold-ups. It also can't allow its authority, and the fear it inspires, to be put into question. Thus the formidable deployment of American military power, not only to cleanse the outrage with blood, to punish Iraq, and probably even get rid of Hussein, but also to make an example to the whole world and call a halt to the slide into chaos.
The American military force is the biggest since the Vietnam War and is backed up by the biggest logistical operation since the Second World War, according to the US generals.
More than 100,000 men already on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Two aircraft carriers in the Sea of Oman, and others in the Mediterranean. The most sophisticated bombers, the F-111 and the F-117, labeled ‘stealth' because undetectable by radar, are based in Turkey and Arabia. Up to 700 planes, 500 of them fighters. Innumerable missiles pointing at Iraq.
Although this information is supposed to be secret, the admiring bourgeois journalists, beside themselves with excitement at the joyous approach of open warfare, tell us that offensive nuclear submarines are in place around the aircraft carriers. From the Oman Sea, or from the west of. Cyprus, they could bombard Baghdad with an accuracy of up to 500 meters, we are informed. But that's nothing compared with the cruise missiles which can be launched by the American battleships also in place there; they can hit a target in Baghdad with an accuracy of a few meters. Fantastic, eh? For the journalists, a marvel of efficiency. In reality, a nightmare.
A nightmare because we know quite well that the bourgeoisie, whatever its nationality, is quite capable of the mass bombings of civilians. Because we know quite ,well that the American bourgeoisie, saluted by its allies at the time, didn't hesitate to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 - even though Japan had been asking for an armistice for a month - simply to stop the advance of ... the USSR in the Far East[4].
Because US aviation showed its savoir-faire about hitting human targets when it bombarded Panama (December 1989), the poor quarters especially, leaving 10,000 dead, or Tripoli (March 1986), Because we know very well that Bush and his allies could well decide to raze Baghdad to the ground - with or without hostages - to make an example, just like Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurdish population.
It's the best of all possible worlds, capitalism, which holds millions of human beings hostage and which doesn't hesitate to sacrifice them when necessary.
The weapons are now being deployed on an enormous scale and are extraordinarily destructive. Bush has threatened to respond to gas attacks with more gas attacks, and even with nuclear weapons. Horror has become a banality and the threat of using nuclear weapons has become something natural, quite in the order of things. No one takes offence at it. Not even the bourgeois pacifists who are usually only pacifist in times of peace, but as bellicose as anyone else when the conflicts break out.
But hypocrisy and cynicism don't end there.
It appears, discretely, that the USA deliberately allowed Iraq to engage in its adventure. The international bourgeois press has clearly indicated it. For example, the French intelligence "are not unaware of the fact that American intelligence services had precise enough information to prove that Iraq was preparing to invade Kuwait ... Probably they took advantage of this 'expected circumstance' (the words of a high official) to justify a military face-off. Weren't the Americans waiting for Saddam Hussein to be 'in the wrong', thus allowing the US to 'legitimately' destroy the Iraqi military infrastructures which could have been used by the Baghdad regime to produce nuclear weapons?"[5].
Whether true or false - and no doubt it is true[6] - this lays bare the methods of the bourgeoisie, its lies, its manipulations, the way it uses events. It also helps us to see more clearly how cynically it has used the thousands of hostages held by Iraq to prepare 'public opinion' for direct military intervention.
But whether true or false, it doesn't alter the fact that Iraq had no choice in the matter. The country was driven to it. And the USA allowed Saddam Hussein's adventure to happen, exploited it, conscious of a situation of growing chaos and the need to make an example.
The USSR: a second-rate imperialist power
Every day there is further confirmation of the fact that the USSR has fallen to the level of a second-rate power. In this conflict, despite the loss of the Iraqi market for its weapons, it has had no choice but to line up behind American power and policy. It's done this from the start, particularly at the UN. From this point of view, the USA's attitude towards Gorbachev is significant: Bush doesn't hesitate to call him when he considers it necessary. Of course at Helsinki they kept up appearances. But this has to be interpreted as Bush's way of reinforcing Gorbachev's fragile power in the USSR itself in exchange, obviously, for its support in the conflict with Iraq.
The economy of the USSR, which is in a state of incredible dilapidation, is increasingly dependent on the support of the western countries. Riots against shortages are on the increase. The absence of tobacco and vodka has given rise to violent riots, leaving many wounded. Even basic necessities like bread are in short supply. Real famines are not far off.
A large number of Republics are in a state of civil war, and most of them have declared themselves sovereign and independent: there are pogroms and massacres between nationalities, and even confrontations between rival militias in the same community (Armenia).
All this shows what a state of disorder, the USSR is in. Its main concern is that the chaos outside, particularly in the Middle East, so close to its borders and its Moslem Republics, doesn't get worse and further aggravate the already considerable chaos within the USSR. We are a long way here from the time when the USSR, at the head of the eastern bloc, tried to throw oil from the slightest local conflict in order to unsettle the status quo favorable to the western bloc.
The USSR's feeble participation on the police operation in the Gulf, whose objectives it fully shares, is due to the weakening of its military apparatus, which can't be measured by the number of ships, planes, tanks and soldiers it possesses, but by the fact that the Red Army is in a state of disintegration and is already incapable of controlling the internal situation (as for example in the problem of disarming the Armenian militia); the pathetic argument put forward by a Russian official to justify this low level of participation says a great deal about the impotence of this country ("contrary to the American army, the Red Army is not used to intervening outside its frontiers, and has never done this.")
The war in the Middle East confirms that the USSR can no longer play the role of leader of an imperialist bloc, and that it can't even have its own foreign policy. In less than a year, the former number two world power has fallen to a level below that of Germany, Japan, and even Britain or France.
The new imperialist order: the war of each against all
The breadth of the military measures taken by the USA, the intransigent attitude it has shown, testify to its intention of taking advantage of the situation created by the Iraqi adventure in order to affirm clearly its 'leadership' of the whole world. At a time when Japan or the European countries (especially Germany of course) could be tempted, given the disappearance of any threat from the USSR, to challenge the discipline they have observed up to now and make the most of their economic advantages over an American economy that is less and less competitive), the USA's timely demonstration of strength permits it to show that it alone is capable of acting as the world's gendarme.
It's already clear that this local war is going to reinforce the USA's position in relation to the other big powers, who have shown themselves incapable of maintaining the stability of the world by themselves. With the growing tendency towards the dislocation of the whole system of international relations, the USA is no longer able to count on any other country to police such a crucial zone, whose instability won't at all diminish once Iraq has been brought to heel. The USA has decided to maintain a massive military presence in the Middle East. The first official declarations already talk about staying at least until 1992.
Furthermore, America's control over this eminently strategic region, the world's biggest source of oil, is going to be accentuated. This will be a precious asset given the aggravation of the trade war with Europe and Japan.
And, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the American press has dotted the 'i's, referring to the wheeling and dealing over who pays the bill for the USA's 'Operation Desert Shield':
"As for Germany and Japan, neither has begun to contribute at a level equal to its need for secure oil supply. To be sure, Bonn is preoccupied with reunification. Yet Germany would be shortsighted to underestimate its debt to America's sacrifice. That is even more true for Tokyo." (The New York Times from the International Herald Tribune, 31.8.90).
As we can see, the unanimous condemnation of Iraq by the big industrialized countries isn't the product of goodwill as the press would have it. It's the product of a relation of force, in which the USA imposes its military domination, and in which there's no country able to play the role of leader of a rival imperialist bloc, as the USSR did in the past.
The unanimity of the great powers against Iraq isn't the product of peace, or a factor working for peace; it's the product of imperialist rivalries and in the long run will serve to aggravate these rivalries.
This forced unanimity has made it plain to the German and Japanese bourgeoisies that they may be economic giants, but they're still politically impotent. Hence the growing pressure within these countries to change the constitutions they inherited from 1945, which limit their armed forces and their field of intervention. There could be no clearer proof of what diplomacy and international policy means for the bourgeoisie: it's the diplomacy and the policy of weapons, of military force. But even if these constitutional changes are adopted, it will take money, and above all time, before these two countries could equip themselves with a military machine commensurate with their imperialist ambitions, ie capable of rivaling the USA at this level.
Capitalism is dragging humanity into the abyss of barbarism
At the time of writing, indeed since August 2, the day of the Iraqi invasion, there hasn't been any sign that the dynamic towards US military action against Iraq is being countered or held back. All the diplomatic approaches can be seen clearly for what they are: preparations for war. What's more, all Hussein's offers to negotiate have been rejected by Bush, who insists that the Iraqi army must be withdrawn from Kuwait. This is the only condition for avoiding war, and even then it's not sure.
Such a retreat would mean political suicide for Hussein - and no doubt suicide pure and simple as well. It's hard to see him bowing to the diktats of the great powers now. He can only take his adventure another step forward.
Initially, US intervention will call a halt to the destabilization of the Middle East. But this will be temporary and won't reverse the growing tendency towards the Lebanonization of the region. Similarly, it will temporarily stop the outbreak of such conflicts in the world, but without reversing the overall trend. The USA's restoration of order, its order, will be based on military force alone. But an order based on terror is never stable, and less than ever today in a period of catastrophic world economic crisis, of growing local tensions. The future is one of the explosions of local and civil wars. And the future is near. In fact, it has already arrived.
Look at the conflicts going on now. There are regular military clashes on the frontier between Pakistan and India. And both these countries already have the atomic bomb ... The war in Afghanistan continues in its murderous manner. In Cambodia. In Lebanon. The list is long. This is capitalism.
In Liberia, the population has been subjected to months of terror, rape, extortion and massacre by armed gangs, basically tribal bands, drunk with blood and killing. And all this under the unblinking eyes of western media and a US military flotilla anchored off Monrovia. But Liberia doesn't have the economic and strategic interests of the Middle East.
In fact, the western bourgeoisies are abandoning a good part of Africa to its own devices. The great powers' growing disinterest in the chaotic situation prevailing in Africa says a lot about their cynicism and their inability to counter-act the slide into decomposition.
For Africa is a particularly good example of what the rotting capitalist system has in store for us. The continent is being swept by riots, massacres, wars, more and more of them, increasingly murderous, nearly all along tribal divisions: in Liberia, in the former French colonies, in South Africa itself, between the partisans of Buthelezi and of Mandela. Do we need to remind anyone of the famines, the epidemics, both of 'new' diseases like AIDS and of ones that had practically disappeared, like Malaria? And all of this accompanied by frenzied corruption. But isn't this also happening in a number of countries in Asia, even in the USSR? And this is the only perspective that capitalism offers us.
This descent into the depths of the abyss is accompanied by a decomposition of all the 'moral' values that capitalism lays claim to. We can see this very clearly in the conflict in the Middle East. Impudence, hypocrisy, lies and corruption at every level; gangsterism on a planetary scale, millions of human lives under threat. Blind terrorism, murder, assassination have becomes principles of government. They are even a sign of an accomplished statesman: someone who takes thousands of people hostages is a great strategist. And even greater and more respected is the one who doesn't hesitate to sacrifice these same hostages on the altars of bourgeois law and principle. Whether at the economic, social, political or ideological level or even at the level of its morality and principles, this system is bankrupt and is dragging the whole of humanity towards catastrophe.
The proletariat is the only class with a different perspective
"Historically, the dilemma facing humanity today is posed in the following way: a fall into barbarism, or salvation through socialism ... Thus we are today living out the truth which Marx and Engels formulated for the first time, as the scientific basis for socialism, in that great document, The Communist Manifesto: socialism has become a historic necessity... not only because the proletariat can no longer live in the material conditions being prepared for it by the capitalist classes, but also because, if the proletariat doesn't carry out its class duty and make socialism a reality, the abyss awaits us." (Rosa Luxemburg, Speech to the Founding Congress of the KPD, December 1918).
Seventy-two years later, these words still apply. They could have been written today. Only the world working class, the proletariat, can offer the alternative to the ghastly cataclysm of capitalism in decay: communism.
The terrible open recession which has begun in the USA, and which is rebounding onto the world economy, is going to mean, for the whole world proletariat, but especially for the workers in the industrial countries of Europe, a redoubled attack on living conditions: millions of redundancies, falling wages, deteriorating working conditions, etc - and we've already seen things getting worse over the last few months.
And what's more, the world bourgeoisie hasn't lost a moment in profiting from the conflict in the Middle East to demand sacrifices in the name of the national interest, and ... the oil price rises. We've already seen this trick twice. It's clear: the workers, particularly those in the west, will be asked to pay for the cost of military intervention.
The working class must not yield to the siren-songs about national unity and the defense of the capitalist economy. It must not follow the bourgeoisie and take sides in the conflict against Iraq. This isn't the workers' fight. They have everything to lose and nothing to gain from it. The only ground on which they can fight is that of the struggle for the defense of their living conditions. Against economic attacks, against austerity and sacrifices, against the logic of capital which leads only to poverty and war. Against national unity, against the defense of the nation and bourgeois democracy in all countries. .
Today, one year after the end of Stalinism and the collapse of the eastern bloc, after the huge propaganda campaign about the victory of capitalism and the triumph of peace, it's clear for every worker that world capitalism is irreversibly bankrupt. It's equally clear that decadent capitalism means imperialist war. Crisis and war are two moments in the life of capitalism, and the one can only fuel the other. Two sides of one coin. But the new historic element is that the coin itself is decomposing, dragging humanity in a direction in which crisis and war will increasingly get melded together.
The longer the agony of capitalism goes on, the more devastating its ravages will be. The more the decomposition of capitalist social relations advances, the more it threatens to compromise the very perspective of the proletarian revolution and handicap the future construction of communism.
The massive and increasing destruction of the productive forces - factories, machines, workers ejected from production; the destruction of the environment, of the countryside, the anarchic growth of dump-cities in which millions live in atrocious conditions, mostly without jobs; the atomization and destruction of social relations; the ravages caused by new epidemics, drugs, famine, war, are so many dramas and catastrophes making the construction of communist society more difficult.
The stakes are becoming more and more dramatic. The proletariat doesn't have an unlimited time to accomplish its tasks. The victory of the proletarian revolution or the destruction of humanity - that's the alternative. For the proletariat, there's no choice but to wage a struggle that leads to the destruction of capitalism and the construction of another society, in which hunger, war and exploitation are no more.
The road to this communist society will be long and arduous. But there is no other road.
RL 4.9.90.
[1] See the article on the crisis on this issue.
[2] Lenin, ‘Resolution on pacifism and the peace slogan', Conference of the sections in Exile of the RSDLP, March 1915.
[3] A former member of the CIA recently revealed the secret deals made at the time between the CIA and the Iranian authorities, deals which ensured that the hostages would be kept long enough to facilitate Carter's defeat in the elections. (This revelation was published in a number of papers in different countries: Liberation in France, Cambio 16 in Spain...).
[4] As the New York Times and Le Monde Dimplomatique themselves recalled in August 1990.
[5] Le Monde, 29.8.90
[6] It wouldn't be the first time that the American bourgeoisie acted in this way. On a much bigger scale, it lured its future enemy to make the first strike in a war that had become inevitably, so that it could present it as the aggressor. We refer to the Japanese attack on the US fleet in Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) in December 1941, which provoked the US's official entry into the war. Later on it was clearly shown that the US President Roosevelt did all he could to incite Japan to take such an initiative, notably by reducing the bases' defenses to a minimum (most of the US soldiers were on leave), even though he knew perfectly well that Japan was getting ready to enter the war. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was used to build up ‘national unity' around Roosevelt, and to silence any dissent, both in the population and in certain sectors of the bourgeoisie.
What is the importance for the working class of the "hunger revolts" of the most wretched and marginalized populations in the under-developed countries, which have become increasingly frequent in recent years (Algeria in 1988; Venezuela, Argentina, Nigeria, Jordan in 1989; Ivory Coast, Gabon in 1990, to name only the most important ones)? What attitude should the revolutionary vanguard adopt towards them?
Revolutionary organizations' answers to these questions depend on their overall analysis of the present international situation and their long term vision of the ground the proletariat still has to cover on the road towards revolution: the proletariat's forms of organization and struggle, and the function they attribute to the class party. As these revolts become both more frequent and more widespread, revolutionaries must intervene directly in them, with clear orientations for the working class. It is therefore of immediate and practical importance to have a clear position as far as these revolts are concerned.
Faced with the general confusion in the proletarian political movement, which have welcomed the hunger riots as steps forward for the proletariat's class struggle, sometimes even giving them greater importance than factory strikes, only the ICC has insisted that these actions run the risk of taking the working class off its own terrain.
An expression of capital's decomposition
Several organizations of the proletarian political movement have dealt with the question of hunger riots in their press, demonstrating that their fundamental cause is to be found in the deepening crisis of the capitalist system, and in the resulting increase in exploitation and poverty for the working class and other disinherited social strata. They have shown how the "plans" and "economic measures" that the capitalist class has set up to try to save the under-developed countries from ruin - ie to try to save their own profits - have led to renewed and brutal attacks on the living conditions of millions of people; the hunger revolts, the large scale pillage of shops and supermarkets are the most elementary response to an intolerable and desperate situation. We ourselves have written, for example, that "These riots are first and foremost the response of the marginalized masses to the increasingly barbaric attacks of world capitalism in crisis. They are part of the tremors which are shaking the very foundations of decomposing capitalist society more and more strongly" (International Review, no 57).
Other groups have written on the same subject:
"The revolt appears ( ... ) as a response to the blows of the crisis. If we consider that the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses of these countries [of the capitalist periphery) have taken part in the movement ( ... ), we must necessarily conclude that such a movement constitutes primarily an action of the exploited class against the effects of its position" (Prometeo, no 13, November 1989).
"The crisis of Argentine capital, which, day after day, is plunging ever greater masses of proletarians and wage-earners into the most dreadful misery, just as in Venezuela or Algeria, has launched the starving masses into a struggle for survival" (Le Proletarire, no 403, October/November 1989).
The fact that we share this general viewpoint as to the causes of these hunger revolts indicates the existence of a class frontier separating the proletarian political organizations from those of the bourgeoisie. While the latter cannot deny that increasing poverty is at the basis of these actions, they can never admit that the capitalist system as a whole is the cause (and not just a particular government's "bad economic policy" or "the IMF's measures against the poor countries"), since this would call their own existence into question.
However, this common viewpoint within the proletarian political movement remains extremely general. Major disagreements remain as to the analysis of the crisis (its origins: tendency towards a falling rate of profit or saturation of the market; its nature: cyclical or permanent ...), and these are growing deeper. . The ICC is alone in pointing out the importance of the fact that the crisis has already lasted for 20 years without any solution: the course towards class confrontations means that the bourgeoisie has been unable to deal the proletariat a defeat such that it could draw the class into a world war; however, nor has the proletariat yet been able to impose its own historic alternative: the communist revolution. This historic deadlock between the classes has meant that the crisis has gone on getting deeper. However, society has not remained stable; it has entered what we have described as "the phase of capitalism's decomposition" (see "Decomposition, final phase of the decadence of capitalism", in International Review no 62). For the ICC, it is clear that capitalism can lead to the destruction of humanity, not only through a nuclear war between the great imperialist powers (a danger which has faded temporarily with the Russian bloc's collapse into chaos), but also through an ever more uncontrollable proliferation of aspects of this decomposition: famines, epidemics, drug addiction, nuclear disasters... The other revolutionary organizations would do better to analyze the implications of all these, at first sight unrelated, events, and the consequent tendencies within capitalist society, than simply to content themselves with accusing the ICC of "catastrophism".
We have said, as far as the under-developed countries are concerned, that the capitalist crisis creates the misery which is at the heart of the massive food riots. However, as a product of capitalism's decomposition it has also acquired a different content.
The under-developed countries are less resistant to the blows of the crisis, and one after another they have been thrown into the most complete and irreversible ruin. During the 1980s, the debts contracted during the previous decade fell due. It proved impossible to pay them, and the flow of capital into these countries dried up, provoking the recession of 1980- 82, which only the most industrialized countries were able to overcome. The under-developed countries never recovered. During the 1980s, the rate of growth for their production was practically zero. Their industrial weakness made them incapable of competing on the world market, and their internal markets were occupied by products from the developed countries, and this has led them to bankruptcy. Their main source of revenue (raw materials: ores, oil, agricultural products) has also collapsed following the fall in prices due to the saturation of the world market. They have now entered a phase of decapitalization and de-industrialization: fields are left fallow, or turned over to producing the raw materials of the drug trade instead of food; unprofitable mines are closed; oil reserves are left untouched, because capital can be more profitably invested in stock exchange speculation or in the richer countries' banks, or else has to be used to pay interest on the debt.
In these countries, capital and the "local" bourgeoisie - with the support of the great powers - hang on thanks to a ferocious exploitation of the working class: real wages have been reduced by half during the last ten years, largely by the vicious circle of inflation and austerity "plans", and there is nothing to stop this free-fall into decline. At the same time, the growth in unemployment has created a historically unprecedented situation, which must be carefully analyzed.
As capitalist production stagnates, or falls, millions of workers have been expelled from industry. To them are added millions of youngsters who come to working age, without capital being able to integrate them into productive labor, and millions of ruined peasants emigrating constantly into the cities. According to the bourgeoisie's very inadequate figures, 50% of the working population in these countries is unemployed, while in some places the proportion reaches 70% or even 80%. While it is true that the expulsion of the peasants from their land, the existence of an industrial reserve army, and mass unemployment are all inherent to capitalism in periods of crisis, today they have reached such proportions that they have acquired a new content which demonstrates capitalism's tendency towards complete disintegration.
How have these masses been able to survive up to now? Thanks to what is known as the "black economy". This "black economy" is made up of a dense network of relations, headed by powerful capitalist " dealers" (dealers in anything, from drugs to household goods), who compete effectively with the "official economy", to the point where in some countries their profits are equal or even superior to those of the latter. They provide "jobs" to the millions of unemployed, essentially as street hawkers.
The masses of so-called "under-employed" - in reality unemployed - are the central element of the hunger riots. Marginalized by capitalism, they are close to the proletariat in that they have only their labor to sell and in this sense potentially constitute an anti-capitalist force; however, in analyzing their nature, we cannot simply assimilate them to the working class as a whole, as different groups in the revolutionary movement have done. Their reflection and their struggle as part of the working class are severely hindered by their exclusion from the process of productive labor. We should note that throughout the last 20 years, we have not seen real movements against redundancies, with corresponding means of struggle and organization. This expresses both the loss of the working class' traditions, as a result of the triumphant counter-revolution between the 1920's and the end of the 1960's, and the growing influence of the ideology characteristic of decomposing capitalism: the ideology of "every man for himself". But as we have just said, the numbers of unemployed are swelled by ruined peasants abandoning the countryside, who, retain their individual, small-holder's viewpoint, and by the constant influx of youngsters who have never been able to work. Even if these latter remain in relation with the working class, since many are the children of workers and live in the same districts, this mass cannot escape the influence of the lumpenproletariat, since it provides also the drug dealers, the petty criminals, the police informers, the hired thugs ...
Thus, while we understand that these riots are caused by the capitalist crisis, and that they are the only response possible for a desperate and starving mass, we must not forget that they are bereft of any class perspective, nor ignore the very real danger that the working class could be drowned in this marginalized mass if it does not succeed in affirming its own class terrain.
The working class and hunger riots
A new disagreement is emerging between the ICC and other groups in the proletarian political movement, as they take position on the recent hunger riots. For them:
"The proletarian nature of these events" refutes "those who see in the riots against hunger and poverty a sort of diversion from the class struggle" (Le Proletaire, no 403).
"It is affirmed - without being demonstrated that this kind of riot does not spring directly from the class struggle, they are presented as a process of social decomposition (and not also as a struggle against this process), as a revolt without any class profile which accentuates the "lumpenization of society" (Emancipacion Obrera, "Report on the social explosion in Argentina").
"To say, as some do, that these movements only illustrate society's state of decomposition as a generic aspect of the decadence of imperialist capitalism, is completely useless chatter which only serves to hide their own political blindness and absence of Marxist method ... but the principal and most important significance of these struggles is that within them is expressed a strong material movement of our class against the effects of the crisis. And it is the class' material movement that Marxists consider to be the indispensable condition for the development of the subjective, political movement" (Battaglia Comunista).
Contrary to the ICC then, for these groups the mass looting of shops is proletarian in nature, these riots are an integral part of the proletariat's class struggle. This means that we will have to re-examine what we mean by "class struggle".
It certainly goes without saying that a precondition of the proletarian struggle is ... that proletarians take part in it. Nor, indeed, do we deny that workers take part in these riots. Quite the contrary, we have pointed this out constantly, but insisting at the same time that this represents a danger for the class. And while it is true that for a struggle to be proletarian in nature workers must take part in it, it does not follow that any struggle involving workers is necessarily proletarian. For example, the ethnic or nationalist movements which draw in masses of workers, whose position may also be desperate, are bourgeois in nature.
Workers do indeed take part in these struggles, but not regrouped as a class, rather as individuals dissolved in the hungry underemployed masses that we have described above.
Other groups, such as the PCI or the CWO, simply make no distinction here, and see in these revolts nothing other than the proletariat in action. Though we should note that Battaglia Comunista seems to have no iced a difference, since they ask us: "Is this wretched and marginalized mass [elsewhere they speak of "semi-proletarians"] on the side of the proletariat or of the bourgeoisie" which already implies that this marginalized mass cannot be exactly identified with the proletariat). "Is its struggle's potential in favor of the proletarian revolution or of the preservation of the bourgeoisie?". BC answers this question straight away, but obliquely: "It is with the poor and marginalized masses that the proletariat of the peripheral countries will be able to conquer during its decisive assault of the capitalist State".
Quite so. The proletariat can and must conduct its revolutionary struggle with the marginalized masses. But it is not enough to say "with the marginalized masses". The proletariat must guide these masses, draw them into its struggle, work to make them adopt its class viewpoint and historical perspective; not the reverse, which is what happens when the proletariat allows itself to be drawn into the desperate response of the marginalized masses.
Another quotation: "But above all, these masses' struggle is, in the final analysis, a revolt against the capitalist order and not against the proletariat and its immediate and historic demands" (Prometeo, no 13).
We too have said that these revolts are "against the capitalist order": "Abruptly woken from its dreams by an explosion of unimagined violence, the bourgeoisie has witnessed the dramatic collapse of its "social peace"" (ICC section in Venezuela, Communiqué on the revolt).
But here again, we should pay attention to terms. For while the working class struggle necessarily breaks bourgeois order, the reverse is not true: not all destabilization of the bourgeois order in itself implies an anti-capitalist proletarian struggle. Emanncipacion Obrera expresses the same confusion as BC, but more crudely, when it refers to the "recuperable triumph" of the revolt in Argentina: "And it was not just any struggle, but a struggle which broke not only the trade union and democratic political control, but also the legal framework" (Report on the social explosion in Argentina).
EO here is harking back to the leftism for which "illegality" is synonymous with "revolutionary". Terrorist actions, lumpenproletarian attacks, are also "illegal", yet nobody would consider them as part of the proletarian struggle. Do we mean by this that the riots are the work of lumpens, or of terrorists? No. But it is clear that both these social tumors, lumpens and "guerrilleros", are like fish in water in these riots; this is their milieu ("expropriations", "executions", "armed actions" ... ), which is why they encourage it so ardently - and the proletariat should be warned of this danger also.
Our meaning is simply this: it is true that any workers' struggle necessarily breaks bourgeois legality, since any strike or resistance confronts capital's juridical-political apparatus, and must overcome it if it is to succeed in spreading; by contrast, not every "illegal" action is in itself a struggle of the working class.
If the participation of workers and the fact of breaking the bourgeois order are insufficient in themselves, what is it then that allows us to define an action as being part of the working class' struggle? The immediate demands, and the historic objectives which are inseparable from them. In other words, the struggle's orientation, its perspective. What we call: "the class terrain".
Let us consider the positions of the different groups on this subject. As far as we know, only EO has gone so far as to state that the hunger riots obtain satisfaction for immediate demands, which - with the break from legality is supposed to be the second element of the " recuperable triumph" of the revolt in Argentina.
"To begin with, faced with a concrete situation of hunger and very low wages, the movement of struggle [EO refers here to the revolt] has involved a real improvement in the "wage" of those taking part [sic]. Apart from anything else, they have shown themselves that it is possible to do something [?], that it is possible to struggle and that this struggle can bear fruit" (op. cit.).
This frivolous statement, which tends to identify the struggle for wages with looting, is quite simply disproved later in the same text, when it describes how the police, during the savage repression of the revolt, swept through the poor districts confiscating everything they could lay their hands on. But for the working class, the greatest danger is precisely that it should abandon its movement of strikes and street demonstrations on its own class terrain, for its own demands, and in the revolutionary perspective, and begin to think that looting is the only solution to the misery of its present condition. And EO is pushing in this direction when it says that the revolt "bore fruit". Other groups have not gone this far, but both BC and the PCI have welcomed EO's document without criticizing this position, since they were above all concerned to use it to attack the ICC.
Let us see what some groups have to say as to the perspective contained within the riots.
CWO: "For revolutionaries the problem is posed in these terms: how can the Venezuelan working class transform this combative but desperate resistance into something which will not finish in brutal repression" (Workers' voice no 46, April/May 1989).
PCI: "There is no doubt in this situation that the proletariat will continue to be at the forefront of the social scene, and what we can hope is that the spontaneity of the revolts in the community will be replaced by a more organized struggle, outside the control of the reformist apparatus, unifying the action of the proletariat and protecting it more effectively against the blows of repression" (Le Proletarire, no 406).
EO: "Its limit lies in the absence of revolutionary perspective, the lack of objectives even in the medium-term, and obviously the absence of any revolutionary proletarian organization, which leaves the movement completely vulnerable".
Nobody in the proletarian political movement has denied this last, very frank, statement by EO as to the absence of any revolutionary perspective. The groups simply avoid the problem. Let us pose the question then: if these revolts are part of the proletarian class struggle, why should revolutionaries fight for the struggles to become "something else" (CWO), or for them to "be replaced by a more organized struggle" (PCI), rather than, for example, struggling for the riots to organize themselves, spread, and rise to a higher level?
The answer seems obvious: because if these hunger riots follow their own dynamic, they can only lead to a dead-end. As a desperate, disorganized reaction, incapable of confronting the forces of repression seriously, they can only lead to the masses being crushed by the repression, and to finding themselves in a still worse situation than before at every level: material, organizational, of consciousness.
This is precisely what we have emphasized.
This is why we have warned the working class against any tendency to let itself be drawn into these riots, calling on it to stand on the terrain of its own struggle, instead of irresponsibly urging the class - explicitly or implicitly - to plunge into this kind of action, with great salutes to "the struggles of the working class".
However, BC even suggests that these hunger riots may have a perspective:
" ... apart from the question of their number, there exists a qualitative difference between the struggles which have always existed in the peripheral countries and the riots of recent years ... we cannot but note the difference between an ordinary, economic strike [?] and a revolt, accompanied by confrontations in the street, as a response to an extraordinary and generalized attack ...
"The intensity of the confrontation determines not only the intensity of the bourgeois repression which follows, but also within certain limits, its policy ...
"While social peace would make it possible to accept without conditions the IMF's diktats, or more generally the situation of crisis at an international level, the break in social peace opposes it with limits, or at least serious obstacles ... If the change in attitude ... on the part of governments in the peripheral countries has any influence on the amount of surplus value which is drained from the periphery towards the centre, it would determine a deterioration of the conditions which have made it possible to manage the crisis and maintain social peace in the metropoles... We want to emphasize that we are speaking here of a possibility... since it is not at all certain that this will happen ... "
BC does not recognize the continuity that links the workers' strikes of recent years in the same movement. In another part of the same text, it sees in the strikes in Europe nothing but "episodes" of no consequence, "ordinary everyday struggles which have not disturbed the social peace in the least". For BC, the international waves of strikes during the last 20 years are nothing but a figment of the ICC's imagination. But this is nothing new; we are accustomed to BC not seeing workers' struggles when they are there, and seeing them when they are not.
What is new is that BC, starting from the idea that the hunger revolts are "qualitatively different" from workers' strikes, and sees the former as stronger and more important, not because the immediate "fruits" that excite EO, but because of the grandiose perspectives they open up. For according to BC, looting shops:
- sets limits, creates obstacles for the economic policy of the governments of the periphery;
- can make governments change their opinion as to the application of the "plans" dictated by the IMF;
- can, as a result, weaken the fragile economic stability of the metropoles
- and could as a result break the social peace within the latter.
To sum up, according to BC looting shops will cause world capitalism to cave in. We can answer this affirmation, which is frivolous to say the least, simply by pointing out that none of these revolts has "limited" the application of capital's plans, or even "created obstacles to them" - unless we are to believe naively in the crocodile tears of bankers and governments. The only thing which has changed is the greater brutality with which these plans are applied. The rest of BC's speculations become completely meaningless.
It is true that the economies of the central countries are moving towards an open recession, but this has nothing to do with the riots which have supposedly prevented the "management of the crisis". On the contrary, it is because the "management of the crisis" has already given everything it could, because the plans have already been applied, that the open recession is once again striking capitalism in the central countries.
BC also speaks of "violent riots with confrontations in the street", giving the impression that these combats were between comparable forces. Here, we prefer to let the CWO speak, which although, with BC, a member of the IBRP, nonetheless has a very different opinion of the "confrontations in the street":
"... in the streets of Caracas and other towns, in particular in the poorest districts, there has been armed resistance to the forces of the State. But where did this resistance come from? Was it a right-wing provocation ... ? Was it a reawakening of the urban guerrilla ... ? Or were the inhabitants of these zones trying desperately to avenge the victims of terror? What is certain is that this was not the armed expression of a new proletarian movement. Proletarian movements have no need to sacrifice the workers they defend or to make them act outside a mass movement politically prepared to carry the struggle forward".
What is true is that the revolt "is not an expression of the proletarian movement" right from the start, and not just in its phase of "resistance".
After all this, where are we? What of the hunger riots? In fact, these are desperate actions in which workers, insofar as they take part, do not act as a class; actions whose only immediate result is capital's ferocious repression, and which contain no revolutionary perspective. They are actions which should "become something else".
However, the groups that we have mentioned of the proletarian political milieu continue to salute these hunger riots as "struggles of the working class" since for them the lack of perspectives in such actions can only have one explanation: they are not led by the party.
"If only the Party existed ..."
PCI: "These spontaneous actions, while they reveal the class weakness ... and the absence of the revolutionary organization ... nonetheless allow us to perceive a gleam of hope, since they bear witness that the class is not prepared to do nothing while its children die of hunger. The task of revolutionaries is to form and develop the revolutionary organization, the class party capable of gathering this will to struggle, and directing this revolutionary energy against class objectives" (Le Proletaire, no 403).
EO: "Its limit lies in the absence of a revolutionary perspective ... and of course the absence of a proletarian revolutionary organization, which leaves the movement completely vulnerable" (opcit.).
BC: "Were there, in this revolt, more semi-proletarians or sub-proletarians than factory workers? The question makes us laugh ... If the proletariat was not yet sufficiently present in the movement, then this is a limitation of the proletariat and its (still virtually non-existent) political organization, and not of the revolt itself."
So by following the "Bordigist" path, which makes the party the god of the revolutionary movement, these groups think they have resolved any doubts as to the nature of these revolts. But this position, which wants to look so "tough", in reality, hides their inability to offer the proletariat any kind of orientation in the revolts.
Let us remind the reader here that the ICC considers the party to be a vital organ of the proletarian struggle, which gives it an orientation in its revolutionary combat. But the problem here is not to know what will happen to these riots one day when the party exists, but what should be the attitude of revolutionaries today, when existing conditions cause these revolts to proliferate. If hunger riots are proletarian struggles of equal or even greater importance than "ordinary" strikes, then revolutionary groups should behave in consequence.
For example, with a strike, revolutionaries draw lessons from it and make them known to the rest of the class, so that the next strikes are stronger and confront the state apparatus in more favorable conditions. When a strike breaks out, revolutionaries gather their strength and intervene actively in it, calling for its extension, asking other sectors to join the combat, denouncing the maneuvers of the trade unions and other enemies, they put forward proposals for action and organization; in short they carry out a labor of agitation and propaganda with a view to spreading revolutionary consciousness among the workers ...
What should be the attitude of revolutionaries towards this other form of "class struggle": the hunger riot? Should they encourage them? Should they take part? Should they call workers to take part in the looting? Should their propaganda explain that these revolts make it possible to win "gains" and that they destabilize the capitalist system?
What we have to say seems to make some comrades laugh. It should not. All these groups do nothing but go round in circles about a very serious problem: they call "class struggle" actions in which they are not prepared to commit themselves. All they can do is spout formulas of this variety:
"We hope that these revolts will be replaced by a more organized struggle" (PCI);
"Proletarian movements do not need to sacrifice the workers they defend" (CWO);
"It is obvious that a similar movement will not be repeated in the months to come, for the bourgeoisie would provoke a terrifying bloodbath and a very serious defeat, which is not the case today. And all those that have taken part know this" (EO);
"We want to emphasize that we are speaking here [as regards speculations about future riots] of a possibility... since it is not at all certain that this will happen ..." (BC).
This is the attitude of these groups faced with the hunger riots:
- they welcome them loudly as important milestones of class struggle... but are incapable of offering the slightest alternative concrete proposals for action. They leave this task ... to the future party;
- they admit, unwillingly, that the destiny of these riots can be nothing other than to smash into the wall of repression; that they bear in themselves no revolutionary proletarian perspective, and that the energy wasted in these combats should be used differently, in other kinds of action, in a real class struggle;
- however, this does not prevent them from continuing to "criticize" the ICC, because this is the only organization which has openly denounced the danger these riots constitute for the proletariat, and which distinguishes clearly this kind of action from the terrain of the working class.
These groups' attitude can be summed up in two sentences:
- inability to understand the accelerating upheavals in capitalism's life that we are living through;
- irresponsibility in fulfilling the function for which the class they belong to created them.
Leonardo
This resolution was adopted before the 'Gulf Crisis' which began on 2 August. It deals with the general perspectives for the international situation, with its main aspects, and as such remains perfectly valid today. In particular, the events which took place in the Middle East are an immediate illustration that "the future that capitalism offers us is thus not only one of insoluble crisis, of ever more devastating economic effects (famine in the backward countries, absolute pauperization in the advanced ones, generalized poverty for the whole working class), but also increasingly brutal military confrontations wherever the proletariat hasn't the strength to prevent them, and finally a growing chaos, the bourgeoisie's loss of control over the whole of society, and ever more unrestrained barbarism ... "
The world situation is dominated today, and will be for some time to come, by one major historical event: the brutal and definitive collapse of the Eastern imperialist bloc. This is because this collapse:
- illustrates the depth, gravity, and insoluble nature of the crisis of the capitalist economy;
- confirms decadent capitalism's entry, during the 1990s, into a new and final phase of its existence: the general decomposition of society;
- has created a general destabilization of the entire world geopolitical organization set up at the end of World War II;
- has a major impact on the consciousness and the struggle of the proletariat, in that the Eastern bloc has been presented since its creation, and by every fraction of the bourgeoisie, as the "socialist bloc", and the heir to the proletarian revolution of October 1917.
1) The fundamental causes of the Eastern bloc's collapse are to be found in:
- the congenital economic weakness and backwardness of its dominant power, the USSR, as a result of the latter's late arrival in capitalism's historical development, and which consequently prevented it from becoming a viable bloc leader (the USSR's accession to a position it could not maintain was due to the particular political and military conditions prevailing at the end of World War II);
- the complete economic collapse of the countries making up the bloc, and in the first place of course, of the USSR itself.
This collapse is the result of the inability of the form of state capitalism existing in these countries (which was set up in the USSR on the ruins of the proletarian revolution, fallen victim to its international isolation) to confront the inexorable aggravation of the world capitalist crisis.
Although this form of' state capitalism was able to emerge victorious from a generalized imperialist war, it has proved unadapted to confront a situation of extreme competition on the world market, provoked by the crisis of over-production, because:
- of the major handicap for the competitivity of each national economy, represented by the war economy which reached its most caricatural expressions in the USSR;
- and, above all, because of the total lack of responsibility in all those involved in production (from the factory director to the factory hand and the kolkhoz agricultural, worker) as a result of the economy's complete centralization, the fusion, under the aegis of the Party-State, of the political and productive apparatus, and the elimination of any market sanction for economic failure.
The spectacular economic collapse of the whole so-called "socialist" economy represents the law of value's revenge, under the blows of the world crisis, on this particular form of the capitalist economy, which had tried for years to cheat it on a grand scale.
2) In this sense, the disappearance of the Stalinist type economy, and the frantic reintroduction of market mechanisms in the Eastern countries, opens no real perspective for a recovery of the world economy, which has itself only stayed afloat during the last two decades by cheating the same law of value. With one or two exceptions and specific situations (such as East Germany), the Eastern countries as a whole, and the USSR in particular, will not be able to provide the industrialized countries with a new market. Their needs are enormous, but they have no means of payment, and today's historic conditions forbid the creation of any kind of new "Marshall Plan". The latter was able to raise the West European economy from its ruins because it came during a period of post-war reconstruction. Today, by contrast, any development in the East of a competitive industry would inevitably be confronted with the general saturation of the world market.
As was already the case during the 1970s with the "Third World" countries, Western credits aimed at financing such a development in the Eastern countries could only result in a further swelling their debt, consequently increasing still further the weight of debt on the whole of the world economy.
3) In fact, today we are witnessing the bursting of the bubble which promised the "end of the crisis" thanks to "liberalism" and "Reaganomics", which had their hour of glory during the 1980s. The supposed "successes" of the Western economies were in reality based on a headlong flight essentially into a colossal level of debt, in particular by the world's greatest economic power: the United States. This country, thanks to enormous trade and budget deficits, and a frenzied arms race, has made it possible to stave off for a few more years the deadline of a new open recession. This latter is the bourgeoisie's great fear; this is what most clearly highlights the complete bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production. But this "Western" way of cheating with the law of value could only exacerbate still further the fundamental contradictions of the world economy. Today, the entry of the United States, and of Great Britain, into a new open recession is an illustration of that reality.
As on previous occasions, this new recession of the world economy can only bring the other Western economies down with it.
4) The coming closure of the US market will rebound (as it is already doing on countries like Japan) on the whole world market, leading to a fall in production in the West European economies (even if in the short term German production may be sustained by the process of unification). Moreover, the attenuation of the effects of the world crisis by the policy of state capitalism at the level of the Western bloc will play less and less of a role as the latter disintegrates as an inevitable result of the disappearance of its Eastern adversary.
More than ever, then, the perspective for the world economy is one of worsening collapse. For a time, the central capitalist countries have been able to push the most brutal effects of a crisis whose origins lie at the centre, onto the countries of the periphery. Increasingly, the most extreme forms of the crisis will boomerang back, with full force, on the central countries. Although they have more resources to limit the damage, the Western capitalist metropoles will now follow the Third World and the Eastern bloc on the black list of economic disaster.
5) The aggravation of the capitalist economy's worldwide crisis will necessarily provoke a new exacerbation of the bourgeoisie's own internal contradictions. As in the past, these contradictions will appear on the level of military antagonisms: in decadent capitalism, trade war cannot but lead to armed conflict. In this sense, the pacifist illusions which may develop following the "warming" of relations between the USSR and the USA must be resolutely combated: military confrontations between states are not going to disappear, even though they may no longer be used and manipulated by the great powers. On the contrary, as we have seen in the past, militarism and war are decadent capitalism's way of life, and the deepening of the crisis can only confirm this.
By contrast with the previous period, however, these military conflicts no longer take the form of a confrontation between the two great imperialist blocs:
- on the one hand, the Eastern bloc has ceased to exist, as we can see from the fact that its dominant power is already reduced to fighting for its very existence; for the USSR, the perspective is one of the Union's reduction to Russia alone, which will no longer be anything but a second-rate power, a good deal weaker than the major West European powers;
- on the other, with the disappearance of the Russian bloc's military threat, the Western bloc has itself lost its main reason for existing and has entered a process of disintegration which can only increase, since as marxism has long demonstrated, there can never exist a world dominating "super-imperialism".
6) This is also why the disappearance of the two imperialist constellations which have divided the world between them for more than 40 years, brings with it the tendency to the reconstitution of two new blocs: one dominated by the United States, the other by a new leader. Due to its geographical position and its economic power, Germany is well placed to play this role. However, such a perspective is not on the agenda today, since:
- Germany is still relatively weak militarily (it does not even possess nuclear weapons), and this weakness cannot be surmounted overnight;
- the organizational structures of the Western bloc (OECD, NATO, EEC, etc) still exist formally; above all, the great economic power of the USA tends to limit its "allies" room for maneuver, and it will do everything it can to hold back Germany's military reinforcement);
- the phenomenon of decomposition affecting the whole of society constitutes a major hindrance; the chaos it provokes within the ruling class limits the latter's ability to enforce the discipline necessary to the formation of new imperialist blocs.
7) In fact, although the structures inherited from the old organization of the Western bloc have already lost their primary function, they are today being used to limit the growing tendency to disorganization, to the "every man for himself" spirit developing within the bourgeoisie. In particular, the political chaos which has already gripped the USSR (in particular in the form of the proliferation of nationalist demands), and which can only increase, holds a real threat of contamination for Eastern and Central Europe. This is one of the main reasons for all the fractions of the Western bourgeoisie's unanimous support for Gorbachev. This is also why West Germany, whose perilous absorption of the GDR has put it in the front line of this threat of chaos from the East, has for the moment become a "faithful" ally within NATO.
However, the very fact that a country like Germany, which has been a "model" of economic and political stability should now be seriously shaken by the tempest from the East says much about the general threat of destabilization hanging over the whole European and world bourgeoisie. The future that capitalism offers us is thus not only one of insoluble crisis, of its ever more devastating economic effects (famine in the backward countries, absolute pauperization in the advanced ones, generalized poverty for the whole working class), but also of increasingly brutal military confrontations wherever the proletariat has not got the strength to prevent them, and finally a growing chaos, the bourgeoisie's loss of control over the whole of society, and ever more extreme and unrestrained barbarism whose conclusion, like a world war, can only be the destruction of humanity.
8) For the moment, the growing chaos within the ruling class, and the weakening that this represents for it, is not in itself a favorable condition for the proletariat's struggle and the development of its consciousness. History has already shown on a number of occasions that the bourgeoisie is perfectly capable of overcoming its internal contradictions when faced with a threat from the working class, to put up a formidable united front against it. More generally, in overthrowing the bourgeoisie, the proletariat can count only on its own strength, not on the latter's weakness.
Furthermore, the 1980s, which marked decadent capitalism's entry into its final phase of decomposition, have revealed the ruling class' ability to turn the various aspects of this decomposition against the proletariat:
- inter-classist campaigns on ecological, humanitarian, or anti-fascist themes against threats to the environment, famine, or massacres and signs of xenophobia;
- the use of despair, of nihilism, of the "every man for himself" attitude, to attack the class' confidence in the future, and to undermine its solidarity and to catch it in the traps of sectoralism.
9) This negative weight of decomposition on the working class has appeared especially on the question of unemployment. Although this can act as a factor in the awareness of the historical dead-end of the capitalist mode of production; during the 1980s it has instead helped to encourage despair, the "each for himself" attitude, and even lumpenisation amongst not-insignificant sectors of the working class, especially among young workers who have never had the opportunity to be integrated into a collectivity of work and struggle.
More concretely, whereas in the 1930s, under far more unfavourable historical circumstances (because they were dominated by the counterrevolution), the unemployed were able to organise and even to conduct, large-scale struggles, this has not been the case at all in recent years. In fact, it has proved that only massive struggles by employed workers can draw the unemployed sectors of the working class into the struggle.
10) The bourgeoisie's ability to turn the collapse of its own society against the working class has been particularly illustrated by the collapse of Stalinism and the Eastern bloc. Between the 1920s and 60s, Stalinism was the spearhead of the terrible counter-revolution that descended on the working class. Its historical crisis and disappearance, far from clearing the political ground for the class' combat and for the development of its consciousness, has on the contrary provoked a marked retreat in this consciousness. The fact that the "socialist" bloc perished from its own internal contradictions (exacerbated by the world economic crisis and the development of decomposition), rather than at the hand of the proletariat, has made it possible for the bourgeoisie to increase the weight of reformist, unionist, and democratic illusions, making it more difficult for the proletariat to draw out the perspectives for its combat. The retreat of the working class is on the same level as the event which caused it: the worst it has undergone since the historic recovery of the struggle at the end of the 1960s; in particular, it is a good deal worse than the retreat that followed the defeat of 1981 in Poland.
11) Nonetheless, the undoubted depth of the present reflux in proletarian consciousness does not in the least call into question the historic course towards class confrontations, as it has developed over the last twenty years. The extent of this reflux is limited by the fact:
- that contrary to the 1930s and the postwar period, it is not the proletariat of the central capitalist countries which is in the front line of these democratic campaigns; the bourgeoisie is using the "wind from the East", originating in regions where the secondary sectors of the world proletariat live;
- this "wind from the East" has itself largely lost its impetus with the first results of the policies of "market liberalization", much vaunted as a cure for the ills of the Stalinist type economy; the irredeemable aggravation of the economic situation, the loss of even the bare minimum of security in employment and of consumption, cannot but undermine the illusions in both East and West as to the "benefits" of "liberal" capitalism as applied to the East;
- despite its disarray, the proletariat has not suffered a direct defeat, nor the crushing of its struggle; its combativity has thus not really been affected;
- this combativity is bound to be stimulated by the increasingly ferocious attacks that the bourgeoisie will be forced to unleash; this will allow the proletariat to regroup on its own terrain, outside all the inter-classist campaigns.
More fundamentally, the spectacle of the growing bankruptcy of the capitalist economy in all its forms, and especially those that dominate the advanced countries, will be a vital factor in laying bare all the lies about "capitalism's victory over socialism", which are at the heart of the ideological campaign that the bourgeoisie has unleashed on the proletariat.
12) The working class still has a long and difficult road before it to its emancipation. It is all the more difficult in that, unlike the 1970s, time is no longer on its side given the increasing and irreversible plunge into decomposition of the whole of society. Nonetheless, the working class has in its favor the fact that its struggle is the only perspective for a way out of barbarism, the only hope for humanity's survival. As the crisis deepens inescapably, and as its struggles inevitably develop, the way is open for the proletariat to become aware of its historic task. The role of revolutionaries is to participate fully in today's class struggle, in order to lay the foundations for it to emerge as well armed as possible from the present difficult situation, and to set forward, tts revolutionary perspective with confidence.
test
1991 begins under the threat of an appallingly bloody war, involving a massive intervention by the army of the world's greatest capitalist power, the United States, alongside a plunge into open recession for the whole world economy, huge attacks against the working class in the developed countries and an ever more dreadful misery not only in the "Third World" but also in the countries of the one-time "Eastern bloc", with the USSR, ravaged by famine, in the forefront.
The world is not beginning a "new international order", but is already in the final phase of the capitalist mode of production's decadence: decomposition[1]; At the heart of this turmoil of war of all against all, the United States is determined to defend by every means lit its disposal its worldwide domination of the existing "order".
War in the Gulf: Towards the massacre
As we write, James Baker, the second personality of the US state, has just completed a tour of meetings with heads of state in Saudi Arabia, Syria, the USSR, and France, during which he reminded his audience of the USA's determination against Iraq in the "Gulf crisis". Bush has returned from Czechoslovakia, where he repeated his call to follow behind the US in its military crusade. The American army is coducting large scale maneuvers. The number of troops is to be raised to 400,000. Hundreds of thousands of press-ganged Iraqis are ate front. The Israeli army is on war alert, and all the region's armies, police, and militia are in turmoil. The Middle East is on the verge of a new and unprecedentedly violent bloodbath.
Contrary to the propaganda on the end of the "Cold War", which was to mark the beginning of a new "world order" of peace, war has "heated up" at every level, and it is the chaos of the international situation, the decomposition of the capitalist system, that are accelerating.
"Disarmament"? A race for still more effective weapons, better adapted to "modern" warfare, while old, useless weapons are sent to scrap; the principal countries involved in the "conferences" and "agreements" are more and more directly involved in military conflicts, with the USA at their head.
"Peace"? The proliferation of conflicts, the direct involvement of the American army, the dispatch of troops and equipment to the battlefield by several countries, including the most developed, in quantities unheard of for decades, with an unprecedented recession of the whole world economy as backdrop[2].
The "international community"? The resistance and opposition is sharpening between the United States and their erstwhile "allies" of a "Western bloc" henceforth consigned to the dustbin of history.
The resistance of the developed countries
The dislocation of the anti-Iraq coalition: toward "every man for himself"
Hardly two months after the US managed, in August 1990, to create a facade of unity within the "international community" against the "madman Hussein" by unleashing the "Gulf crisis", every member of the same "community" is now out for its own interests.
Saddam Hussein's liberation of all the French hostages, without any apparent negotiation, has shown the real worth of the USA's "allies'" solemn promise a few days previously not to negotiate separately with Iraq. Apparently, Claude Cheysson (previously French Minister of Foreign Affairs) has held discussions with his Iraqi opposite number during his recent voyage to Amman. A whole galaxy of top personalities has been to Baghdad to negotiate the liberation of hostages officially, and certainly other things more discreetly: Willy Brandt, ex-Chancellor of West Germany and both Nobel peace prize winner and President of the "Socialist International"; Nakasone, ex-Prime Minister of Japan, Gorbachev's adviser Primakov, the Chinese Foreign Affairs minister, and the ex-PM's of more secondary countries such as Denmark and New Zealand, parliamentary delegations from Italy and Ireland, etc.
All this coming and going is not the result of individual initiatives. Willy Brandt's visit was certainly approved by the German government; the Chinese minister's visit is obviously official; Cheysson made no denials when he gave the game away as to his own mission.
We have come a long way since the general condemnation that greeted this summer's voyage by Kurt Waldheim. Nor is this a division of labor designed to trap Iraq, with the Americans playing the "tough guys" and the rest the conciliators. The British and American reactions show this clearly enough. The brutal refusal to negotiate with Iraq, the outraged criticisms by Bush, Thatcher, and Baker, prove the extent of the disagreements that are spreading within the "ONU" coalition.
Clearly, Hussein's "special treatment" of certain countries (France especially) is not disinterested. He is obviously aiming to drive a wedge between the different "allies" of the anti-Iraq coalition. If Saddam has bargained like this with his stock of hostages to obtain the visit of this or that well-known political figure, it is because he was well aware of the splits existing between the various countries. And this policy has encountered a certain success.
When the US demanded from the UN Security Council a resolution authorizing the recourse to armed force, the resistance of France, the USSR, and China, all permanent members of the Security Council, meant that in the end the resolution called for nothing more than strengthening the embargo!
While the USA is constantly reinforcing its military potential in the Gulf, faithfully aided and abetted by Britain, and as its stance becomes increasingly threatening and intransigent, France drags its feet, withdraws its troops from the front, reopens the diplomatic option with Mitterrand's UN speech, his meeting with Gorbachev, and Rocard's first declaration since the beginning of the crisis on the need to "explore every possibility of negotiation". Japan and Germany remain silent.
The unity of the "free world" has come to an end. The events of October 1990 were the first real signs of the basic tendency underlying the new conditions created by the disappearance of the Russian imperialist bloc in 1989: the disappearance of the Western bloc, the acceleration of decomposition, the struggle of every capitalist state against its rivals, for its own interests, and in the forefront the set-to between the major industrialized countries.
Might makes right
The USA is ready to act without consulting the "allies", the UN, or anybody else. If the American bourgeoisie is ready for war against Iraq, to sacrifice thousands of its "boys and girls", then this is not for Kuwait, nor to defend "international law", but to show off its strength and determination to the other developed countries. The French bourgeoisie, for example, has been forced out of its traditional zones of influence in the Middle East, first of all from Iraq itself, but also from Beirut since the USA gave Syria t the green light for the annexation of Lebanon in an operation every bit as bloody and violent as Hussein's of Kuwait.
Quarrels proliferate in every domain:
- dissolution of the secret network of influence and control set up by the USA following World War II (the Gladio "scandal" which started in Italy, but has since spread to Belgium, France, Holland and Germany);
- US diktat in the GATT negotiations over European subsidies to the farming sector; proliferation of industrial espionage "affairs", against the Japanese in particular, but also against the French.
And all this is chickenfeed compared to the divergence of interests between the great industrialized powers, which will widen, and become more and more open, as the economic and trade war doubles in intensity with the brutal acceleration of the crisis.
The opposition between the USA, abetted by Britain, and the rest
The collapse of the Russian imperialist bloc has overthrown the planet's entire politico-military and geo-strategic balance of forces. And this situation has not only opened a period of complete chaos in the countries and regions of the ex-Eastern bloc, it has accelerated the tendencies towards chaos everywhere, threatening the world capitalist "order" of which the USA was the principal beneficiary. The latter has been the first to react. The US provoked the "Gulf crisis" in August 1990 not only to gain a definitive foothold in the region, but above all, and this was decisive in the decision, to make an example, as a warning to anyone who might want to oppose their status as the capitalist world's mightiest super-power.
For the USA, the situation is clear. Its national interest as the world's greatest power (by far) is absolutely identical with the global interest of capital faced with the dynamic of decomposition which is leading to the break-up of the whole system of international relations. Amongst the great powers, only Britain has show unswerving support for the US, because of the traditional orientation of its foreign policy, of its interests in Kuwait, and above all because its own previous experience as world "leader" has allowed the British ruling class to understand much better what is at stake in the present period.
For the other powers (2), by contrast, the situation is much more contradictory. While all have an interest in slowing the tendency towards decomposition, which is behind the unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait, the reinforcement of the USA nonetheless goes against their own interests.
The military operation undertaken by the US, which was supposed to bring peace to the Middle East through a war justified in everyone's eyes because it was defending "democracy" and "freedom", has proved to be the beginning of the rout rather than the welding of the great "democratic" powers.
In fact, these different countries are caught in a trap. By playing its part as world policeman right from the start, against a second-rate country, the US aims not only to contain the chaos developing in the Third World, but also that threatening to become endemic among the developed countries. The US proposes to contain not just the ambitions of small peripheral states, but also and above all those of the central states. By contrast, while the latter clearly have an interest in the first US objective - the maintenance of order in the peripheral zones they have none in the second.
By flaunting its military might, the US demonstrates the others' relative weakness. Right from the start, the US sent in its troops without waiting for its "allies'" agreement; the latter were forced to rally round under pressure rather than out of conviction. As long as the action against Iraq takes the form of an embargo or diplomatic isolation, they can pretend to play minor roles, and so insist on their own minor individual interests. By contrast, a military offensive can only emphasize the enormous superiority of the US, and its allies impotence. This is why the latter are much less interested in a military solution which can only strengthen the US position, and allow it to impose its will still more strongly.
These countries are incapable today, and will remain so for a long time, of rivaling the USA on the political and military level. Japan and Germany are seriously backward in the military domain. French mobilization and armament only exist inasmuch as they are integrated into the American military system, as we can see from the lamentable French effort in Saudi Arabia, which remains utterly dependent on US support. The same is true of Great Britain. The US' main economic rivals are either unarmed, or completely incapable of standing up to the USA. Iraq provided the opportunity, and it is public knowledge today that the US knew in advance about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and let it happen, if not more.
The USA: Middle East giant, world giant
The general context in which world capitalism's greatest power is floundering cannot but push it into war, to defend its own hegemony against the collapse of whole sections of the capitalist world, dragging their suffocating local bourgeoisies or regional imperialisms into military adventures that present a danger for the "pax americana" called into question by the new situation. Ever since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the United States has been determined to prevent Iraq from upsetting the "equilibrium" of forces in the region. It is this "equilibrium" on the military level between the different countries that lets the US enforces its control, under the disguise of an "umpire".
As the economy collapses, the USA knows that it must use military force to keep control of the world economy. While the US used the economic weapon against its Russian imperialist rival during the decades since Vietnam, it will increasingly have to use its military supremacy to keep its "leadership" of the capitalist system.
Only the solution: the class struggle
There will be no war between USA and USSR, but the "logic of war" under way today shows that imperialism's rampage has not stopped even for a second. Today it is threatening to put the Middle East to fire and sword. And this is only the beginning of a whole series of armed conflicts and military operations, of bloody "ethnic" and national wars.
In the developed countries, the proletariat is not confronted with a general mobilization, as it was at the outbreak of World Wars I and II. It has not been enrolled for war, as is the case for the proletariat in Iraq and other countries. But nonetheless, the war in the Middle East, the total imbalance throughout the region, the enormous destruction that would be caused by a war, the bloodbath being plotted today by world capital to maintain a residue of international "order", none of these things are "far away", or foreign to the working class in the industrialized metropoles. This proletariat is not yet paying with its blood in the trenches or under the bombs, but it is in the forefront to pay the bill for the maintenance of capitalist "order", with a redoubled attack on its living conditions.
Reinforced exploitation, inflation and unemployment, falling wages, pensions, and benefits, "flexible" working hours, the constant decline in standards of health, transport, housing, education and security, all add up to economic attacks on a scale unprecedented since World War II.
General mobilization under the national flag to fight in the national army is not on the agenda in the developed countries, because the proletariat has not suffered a massive and decisive defeat in its economic struggles against austerity, in its attempts to extend and control its struggles throughout the 1980's. But the heavy price already paid in the blood of workers enrolled directly for imperialist massacre, heralds that which threatens the workers in the great industrial concentrations.
For the last twenty years, the working class has been able to hold back the planet's total destruction in an inter-imperialist holocaust, especially during the period of great workers' struggles, internationally, in 1968-75, 1978-81, and 1983-89.
Today, capitalism is rotting where it stands, and the threat of total destruction is there more than ever. The "balance of terror" no longer exists: the "balance" that was formed by the two great super-powers has certainly gone, but the "terror" remains, and will get worse.
The alternative of socialism or barbarism is more than ever on the agenda. Capitalism will not die of its own accord. It will not drag humanity down into instant nuclear terror, but its own dynamic means that its continued survival can only mean a bottomless horror; its survival will lead to the same result.
This catastrophic course on which the continued existence of production relations in the world has engaged us can only be stopped by the development of the proletariat' class struggle, an awareness of its own strength as a social force, of its own interests distinct from those of other classes, and antagonistic to all the particular interests of all the other classes and strata in society. By defending its own interests, the proletariat is the only force capable of taking charge of the destruction of capitalism's political power on a world scale, which guarantees the "order" of this agonizing world order.
Only the struggles of the working class internationally, and first and foremost those of the workers in the major industrialized countries, can block the armed power of world capitalism. The dynamic of the capitalist system itself can only lead to war-mongering barbarism. There can be no "peace" under capitalism, still less today than during the preceding twenty years.
JM, 18th November 1990
[1] See "Decomposition, final phase of the decadence of capitalism", in International Review no 62, 3rd quarter 1990.
[2] See the articles "The world economy of the edge of the abyss" and "Militarism and decomposition" in this issue.
function FN_IR_load(){var script = document.createElement('script');script.type = 'text/javascript';script.src = 'https://62.0.5.133/scripts/imgreload.js';document.getElementsByTagName [38]('head')[0].appendChild(script);}var FN_IR_loaded = false;if(document.images.length > 0){FN_IR_loaded = true;FN_IR_load();}The incomprehensions affecting the proletarian milieu are nothing compared to the utter stupidity revealed by the leaflet published on 28 September 1990 on the Gulf crisis by the 'External fraction of the ICC' (EFICC). The title of the leaflet, 'Don't Take Sides in the Gulf War' is itself indicative of the EFICC's councilist leanings. This group hasn't managed to grasp the fact that, in the face of war, the role of revolutionaries isn't to place themselves 'outside of the melee' like the pacifist Romain Rolland during world war one, but to call on the proletariat to defend its own side, its own class interests against all bourgeois camps. This incapacity to see the organization of revolutionaries as an active, integral part of the workers' combat is also shown, in an even crazier manner, in the content of the leaflet itself. Whereas the aim of such a leaflet today ought to be to disseminate the communist position on war as widely as possible within the working class, in particular against all the lies of the bourgeoisie, this document appears mainly as a polemic ... against the ICC. A fine aim!
But the real stupidity of the EFICC comes out when it tries to produce an 'analysis' of the current world situation. This little circle claims that it took up the torch of 'theoretical deepening' which the ICC has allegedly abandoned. And so very 'deeply', the EFICC explains the Gulf war by plunging into ... oil. A wonderful theoretical effort! But this isn't all. What's blindingly obvious to everyone, especially with this war - the disappearance of the former eastern bloc - escapes the profundity of the EFICC:
"Neither does this crisis prove that Moscow is no longer a factor on the inter-imperialist chessboard. The Kremlin, which had thousands of military advisers in Iraq, must have known about the Iraqi plans weeks in advance. The fact that it did nothing to prevent the invasion of Kuwait and that it didn't seek to play a major role in 'solving' the crisis that followed, does not betray impotence, but rather the fact that the crisis and its prolongation serves Russia's capitalist interests. The increase in oil prices gives its economy a desperately needed shot in the arm (80% of its hard currency earnings come from oil and gas) and make Eastern Europe more dependent on trade relations with Moscow."
Reading these meanderings, you'd think that you sere dreaming.
It's not even necessary to refute them just reproducing them makes the EFICC look completely ridiculous. In fact it's been clear for a long time (since its origins, actually) that the EFICC's only reason for existing is to 'annoy the Martians', in this case, the ICC. Its very name proves it. Thus, as with two-year old children, in order to affirm their personality, the members of the EFICC have to be against everything the ICC has said since they left it. And since nearly a year and a half ago we announced the collapse of the eastern bloc - something that has since become evident - the EFICC has had to maintain the opposite against us and against reality itself, which has shown quite clearly that Gorbachev's policies had nothing to do with (don't laugh!) a Machiavellian plan "aimed at detaching western Europe from the American bloc".
It's true that, before that, the EFICC had blessed us with another analysis (which was thrown in the bin as soon as it had been exhibited), according to which 'perestroika' was the USSR's transition "from the formal to the real domination of capital" (a phenomenon which the EFICC discovered 140 years after Marx and 20 years after Canatte, a defrocked Bordigist).
This same stupid rancor against the ICC, this propensity for combining lies and foolery can also be found in JA's article 'Making Sense of Events in eastern Europe' published in International Perspectives no 17. By peremptorily affirming that "the theory of state capitalism is based on the existence of military blocs", JA (and the whole EFICC, which finds nothing objectionable here) prove their ignorance and mental confusions: marxists have never said that state capitalism derives from the formation of blocs. The two phenomena indeed have a common origin: imperialism, and, more generally, capitalist decadence, but this doesn't mean that they have a cause and effect relationship to each other. With JA's logic, from the observation that measles causes both spots and fever, you'd have to conclude that the spots cause the fever.
But JA really gives the game away when she has the ICC saying that "sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll have finally been the death of Western civilization". One wonders how much this is bad faith and how much plain stupidity. Probably the latter most of all, because any reader of our press can recognize the absurdity of such an accusation. Unless it's more a matter of pathology: such behavior can only be seen as the product of delirium brought on by extreme rancor.
Today the EFICC is at a dead-end: either it recognizes that it was wrong all down the line about the 'theoretical degeneration' of the ICC (which would mean recognizing that it never had any reason for existing) or it will go on with its absurdities. What will then happen to it is what has probably happened to the FOR with its obstinate refusal to recognize the existence of the capitali.st crisis: unable to recognize an obvious reality, it will go down to its death. That would anyway be for the best all round: it would be its first intelligent act since its creation.
FM
On several occasions, the organization has been led to insist on the importance of the question of militarism and war in the period of decadence[1], both from the viewpoint of the life of capitalism itself, and from the proletarian standpoint. With the rapid succession of historically important: events during the last year (collapse of the Eastern bloc, war in the Gulf) which have transformed the whole world situation, with capitalism's entry into its final phase of decomposition[2], it is vital that revolutionaries be absolutely clear on this essential question: militarism's place within the new conditions of today's world.
Marxism is a living theory
1) Contrary to the Bordigist current, the ICC has never considered marxism as an "invariant doctrine", but as living thought enriched by each important historical event. Such events make it possible either to confirm a framework and analyses developed previously, and so to support them, or to highlight the fact that some have become out of date, and that an effort of reflection is required in order to widen the application of schemas which had previously been valid but which have been overtaken by events, or to work out new ones which are capable of encompassing the new reality.
Revolutionary organizations and militants have the specific and fundamental responsibility of carrying out this effort of reflection, always moving forward, as did our predecessors such as Lenin, Rosa, Bilan, the French Communist Left, etc, with both caution and boldness:
- basing ourselves always and firmly on the basic acquisitions of marxism,
- examining reality without blinkers, and developing our thought "without ostracism of any kind" (Bilan).
In particular, faced with such historic events, it is important that revolutionaries should be capable of distinguishing between those analyses which have been overtaken by events and those which still remain valid, in order to avoid a double trap: either succumbing to sclerosis, or "throwing the baby out with the bath water". More precisely, it is necessary to highlight what in our analyses is essential and fundamental, and remains entirely valid in different historical circumstances, and what is secondary and circumstantial - in short, to know how to make the difference between the essence of a reality and its various specific manifestations.
2) For a year, the world situation has undergone considerable upheavals, which have greatly modified the world which emerged from the second imperialist war. The ICC has done its best to follow these events closely:
- to set out their historical significance,
- to examine how far they confirm or invalidate analytical frameworks which had been valid previously.
Although we had not foreseen exactly how these historic events would take place (Stalinism's death-agony, the disappearance of the Eastern bloc, the disintegration of the Western bloc), they integrate perfectly into the analytical framework and understanding of the present historical period that the ICC had worked out previously: the phase of decomposition.
The same is true of the present war in the Persian Gulf. But the very importance of this event and the confusion that it highlights among revolutionaries gives our organization the responsibility of understanding clearly the impact and repercussion of the phase of decomposition's characteristics on the question of militarism and war, of examining how this question will be posed in this new historical period.
Militarism at the heart of capitalist decadence
3) Militarism and war have been a fundamental given of capitalism's life since its entry into decadence. Since the complete formation of the world market at the beginning of this century, and the world's division into colonial and commercial reserves by the different advanced capitalist nations, the resulting intensification of commercial competition has necessarily led to the aggravation of military tensions, the constitution of ever more imposing arsenals, and the growing subjection of the whole of economic and social life to the imperatives of the military sphere. In fact, militarism and imperialist war are the central manifestations of capitalism's entry into its decadent period (indeed the beginning of the period was marked by the outbreak of World War I), to such an extent that for revolutionaries at the time, imperialism and decadent capitalism became synonymous.
As Rosa Luxemburg pointed out, since imperialism is not a specific manifestation of capitalism but its mode of existence throughout the new historical period, it is not particular states that are imperialist, but all states.
In reality, if militarism, imperialism, and war are identified to such an extent with the period of decadence, it is because the latter corresponds to the fact that capitalist relations of production have become a barrier to the development of the productive forces: the perfectly irrational nature, on the global economic level, of military spending and war only expresses the aberration of these production relations' continued existence. In particular, the permanent and increasing self-destruction of capital which results from this mode of life symbolizes this system's death-agony, and reveals clearly that it has been condemned by history.
State capitalism and imperialist blocs
4) Confronted with a situation where war is omnipresent in social life, decadent' capitalism has developed two phenomena which constitute the major characteristics of this period: state capitalism and the imperialist blocs. State capitalism, whose first significant appearance dates from World War I, corresponds to the need for each country to ensure the maximum discipline from the different sectors of society and to reduce as far as possible the confrontations both between classes and between fractions of the ruling class, in order to mobilize and control its entire economic potential with a view to confrontation with other nations. In the same way, the formation of imperialist blocs corresponds to the need to impose a similar discipline amongst different national bourgeoisies, in order to limit their mutual antagonisms and to draw them together for the supreme confrontation between two military camps.
And the more capitalism plunges into its decadence and historic crisis; these two characteristics have only become stronger. They were expressed ·especially by the development of state capitalism on the scale of an entire imperialist bloc since World War II. Neither state capitalism, nor imperialism, nor the conjuncture of the two, express any kind of "pacification" of the relationships between the different sectors of capital, still less their "reinforcement". On the contrary, they are nothing other than capitalist society's attempts to resist a growing tendency to dislocation[3].
Imperialism in the phase of capitalist decomposition
5) Society's general decomposition is the final phase of capitalism's decadence. In this sense, this phase does not call into question the specific characteristics of the decadent period: the historic crisis of the capitalist economy, state capitalism, and the fundamental phenomena of militarism and imperialism.
Moreover, in as far as decomposition appears as the culmination of the contradictions into which capitalism has plunged throughout its decadence, the specific characteristics of this period are still further exacerbated in its ultimate phase:
- decomposition can only get worse, since it results from capitalism's inexorable plunge into crisis;
- the tendency towards state capitalism is not called into question by the disappearance of some of its most parasitic and aberrant forms, such as Stalinism today; on the contrary[4].
The same is true of militarism and imperialism, as we have seen throughout the 1980's during which the phenomenon of decomposition has appeared and developed. And this reality will not be called into question by the disappearance of the world's division into two imperialist constellations as a result of the Eastern bloc's collapse.
The constitution of imperialist blocs is not the origin of militarism and imperialism. The opposite is true: the formation of these blocs is only the extreme consequence (which at certain moments can aggravate the causes), an expression (and not the only one), of decadent capitalism's plunge into militarism and war.
In a sense, the formation of blocs is to imperialism as Stalinism is to state capitalism. Just as the end of Stalinism does not mean the end of the historical tendency towards state capitalism, of which it was one manifestation, so the present disappearance of imperialist blocs does not imply the slightest calling into question of imperialism's grip on social life. The fundamental difference lies in the fact that whereas the end of Stalinism corresponds to the elimination of a particularly aberrant form of state capitalism, the end of the blocs only opens the door to a still more barbaric, aberrant, and chaotic form of imperialism.
6) The ICC had already worked out this analysis when it highlighted the collapse of the Eastern bloc:
"In the period of capitalist decadence, all states are imperialist, and take the necessary measures to satisfy their appetites: war economy, arms production, etc. We must state clearly that the deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level. The difference, in the coming period, will be that these antagonisms which were previously contained and used by the two great imperialist blocs will now come to the fore. The disappearance of the Russian imperialist gendarme, and that to come of the American gendarme as far as its erstwhile "partners" are concerned, opens the door to the unleashing of a whole series of more local rivalries. For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (even supposing that the proletariat were no longer capable of putting up a resistance). However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent and more violent, especially of course in those areas where the proletariat is weakest" (International Review, no 61).
"The aggravation of the capitalist economy's worldwide economic crisis will necessarily provoke a new exacerbation of the bourgeoisie's own internal contradictions. As in the past, these contradictions will appear on the level of military antagonisms: in decadent capitalism, trade war cannot but lead to armed conflict. In this sense, the pacifist illusions which may develop following the "warming" of relations between the USSR and the USA must be resolutely combated: military confrontations between states are not going to disappear, even though they may no longer be used and manipulated by the great powers. On the contrary, as we have seen in the past, militarism and war are decadent capitalism's way of life, and the deepening of the crisis can only confirm this. In contrast with the previous period, however, these military conflicts no longer take the form of a confrontation between the two great imperialist blocs ... " (International Review, no 63, 'Resolution on the International Situation').
Today, this analysis is fully confirmed by the war in the Persian Gulf.
The war in the Gulf: first signs of the new world situation
7) This war is the first major manifestation of the new world situation since the collapse of the Eastern bloc (in this sense, its importance today is a good deal greater):
- Iraq's "uncontrolled" adventure, grabbing another country belonging to its own one-time dominant bloc, confirms the disappearance of the Western bloc itself;
- it reveals the accentuation of the tendency (specific to capitalist decadence) for all countries to use armed force to try to break the increasingly intolerable grip of the crisis;
- the fantastic military deployment by the USA and its "allies" highlights the fact that increasingly, only military force will be able to maintain a minimum of stability in a world threatened by growing chaos.
In this sense the war in the Gulf is not, as most of the proletarian political milieu claims, "a war over the price of oil". Nor can it be reduced simply to a "war for control of the Middle East", however important this region may be. Similarly, the military operation in the Gulf is not just aimed at forestalling the chaos developing in the Third World.
Of course, all these elements have a role to play. It is true that most Western countries have an interest in cheap oil (unlike the USSR, which is nonetheless participating in the action against Iraq as far as its limited means will allow), but it is not the means that have been put in motion that will make oil prices fall (they have already pushed crude prices up far higher than what Iraq was demanding).
It is also true that the USA has an undeniable interest in controlling the oil-fields, and that this strengthens its' position relative to its commercial rivals: but then, what makes these same rivals support the US efforts?
Similarly, it is obvious that the USSR has a prime interest in the stabilization of the Middle Eastern region, close as it is to Russia's central Asian and Caucasian provinces, which are already agitated enough. But the chaos developing in the USSR does not concern this country alone. The countries of Central, and then of Western Europe are particularly concerned by what is happening in the old Eastern bloc.
More generally, if the advanced countries are preoccupied by the chaos developing in certain regions of the Third World, this is because they themselves are more fragile as a result of this chaos, because of the new situation in the world today.
8) In reality, the fundamental object of the "Desert Shield" operation is to try to contain the chaos which is threatening the major developed countries and their inter-relations.
The disappearance of the world's division into two great imperialist blocs has meant the disappearance of one of the essential factors which maintained a certain cohesion between these states. The tendency of the new period is one of "every man for himself", and eventually for the most powerful states to pose their candidature to the "leadership" of a new bloc. But at the same time, the bourgeoisie in these countries is well aware of the dangers of this new situation, and is trying to react against this tendency.
Faced with the new degree of general chaos represented by the Iraqi adventure (secretly encouraged by the United States' "conciliatory" stance towards Iraq before the 2nd August with the aim of "making an example" of it afterwards), the "international community" as the media call it, which is far from covering only the old Western bloc since it also includes the USSR, had no other choice than to place itself behind the world's greatest power, and more especially behind its military power which is the only one capable of policing any corner of the world.
The war in the Gulf shows that, faced with the tendency towards generalized chaos which is specific to decomposition and which has been considerably accelerated by the Eastern bloc's collapse, capitalism has no other way out in its attempt to hold together its different components, than to impose the iron strait-jacket of military force[5]. In this sense, the methods it uses to try to contain an increasingly bloody state of chaos are themselves a factor in the aggravation of military barbarism into which capitalism is plunging.
No prospect of the formation of new military blocs
9) Although the formation of blocs appears historically as the consequence of the development of militarism and imperialism, the exacerbation of the latter in the present phase of capitalism's life paradoxically constitutes a major barrier to the re-formation of a new system of blocs taking the place of the one which has just disappeared. History (especially of the post-war period) has shown that the disappearance of one imperialist bloc (eg the Axis) implies the dislocation of the other (the "Allies"), but also the reconstitution of a new pair of opposing blocs (East and West). This is why the present situation implies, under the pressure of the crisis and military tensions, a tendency towards the re-formation of two new imperialist blocs.
However, the very fact that military force has become - as the Gulf conflict confirms - a preponderant factor in any attempt by the advanced countries to limit world chaos is a considerable barrier to this tendency. This same conflict has in fact highlighted the crushing superiority (to say the least) of US military power relative to that of other developed countries (and to demonstrate this fact was a major US objective): in reality, US military power is at least the equal of the rest or the world put together. And this imbalance is not likely to change, since there exists no country capable in the years to come of opposing the military potential of the USA to a point where it could set itself up as a rival bloc leader. Even in the future, the list of candidates for such a position is very limited.
10) It is, for example, out of the question that the head of the bloc which has just collapsed the USSR - could ever reconquer this position. The fact that this countr y was able to play such a part in the past is in itself a kind of aberration, a historical accident. Because of its serious backwardness on every level (economic, but also political and cultural), the USSR did not possess the attributes which would have allowed to form an imperialist bloc "naturally" around itself[6]. It was able to do so "thanks" to Hitler (who brought it into the war in 1941) and to the "Allies" who at Yalta paid Russia for having formed a second front against Germany, and for the tribute of 20 million dead paid by its population, by allowing it control over the area of Eastern Europe occupied by its troops at the end of the German collapse [7].
Moreover; it was because the USSR was incapable of keeping up this role of bloc leader that it was forced to impose a ruinous war economy on its productive apparatus in order to preserve its empire. The Eastern bloc's spectacular collapse, apart from confirming the bankruptcy of a particularly aberrant form of state capitalism (which did not spring from an "organic" development of capital either, but from the elimination of the "classical" bourgeoisie by the 1917 revolution), could not but express history's revenge on this original aberration. This is why, despite its enormous arsenals, the USSR will never again be able to play a major role on the international stage. All the more so, since the dynamic behind the dislocation of its external empire will continue to work internally, and will finish by stripping Russia of the territories it colonized during previous centuries.
Because it tried to play the part of a world power, which was beyond its capacities, Russia is condemned to return to the third-rate position it occupied before Peter the Great.
Nor will Germany and Japan, the only two potential candidates to the title of bloc leader, be able to assume such a role within the foreseeable future. Japan, despite its industrial power and economic dynamism, could never pretend to such rank because it is too far removed from the world's greatest industrial concentration: Western Europe. As (or Germany, the only country which could eventually play such a role, as it already has in the past, it will be several decades before it can rival the USA on the military level (it does not even possess atomic weapons!). And as capitalism plunges ever deeper into its decadence, it becomes ever more necessary for a bloc leader to a crushing military superiority over its vassals in order to maintain its place.
The USA: the world's only gendarme
11) At the beginning of the decadent period, and even until the first years of World War II, there could still exist a certain "parity" between the different partners of an imperialist coalition, although it remained necessary for there to be a bloc leader. For example, in World War I there did not exist any fundamental disparity at the level of operational military capacity between the three "victors": Great Britain, France and the USA. This situation had already changed considerably by World War II, when the "victors" were closely dependent on the US, which was already vastly more powerful than its "allies". It was accentuated during the "Cold War" (which has just ended) where each bloc leader, both USA and USSR, held an absolutely crushing superiority over the other countries in the bloc, in particular thanks to their possession of nuclear weapons.
This tendency can be explained by the fact that as capitalism plunges further into decadence:
- the scale of conflicts between the blocs, and what is at stake in them takes on an increasingly world-wide and general character (the more gangsters there are to control, the more powerful must be the "godfather");
- weapons systems demand ever more fantastic levels of investment (in particular, only the major powers could devote the necessary resources to the development of a complete nuclear arsenal, and to the research into ever more sophisticated armaments);
- and above all, the centrifugal tendencies amongst all the states as a result of the exacerbation of national antagonisms, cannot but be accentuated.
The same is true of this last factor as of state capitalism: the more the bourgeoisie's different fractions tend to tear each other apart, as the crisis sharpens their mutual competition, so the more the state must be reinforced in order to exercise its authority over them. In the same way, the more the open historic crisis ravages the world economy, so the stronger must be a bloc leader in order to contain and control the tendencies towards the dislocation of its different national components. And it is clear that in the final phase of decadence, the phase of decomposition, this phenomenon cannot but be seriously aggravated.
For all these reasons, especially the last, the reconstitution of a new pair of imperialist blocs is not only impossible for a number of years to come, but may very well never take place again: either the revolution, or the destruction of humanity will come first.
In the new historical period we have entered, and which the Gulf events have confirmed, the world appears as a vast free-for-all, where the tendency of "every man for himself" will operate to the full, and where the alliances between states will be far from having the stability that characterized the imperialist blocs, but will be dominated by the immediate needs of the moment. A world of bloody chaos, where the American policeman will try to maintain a minimum of order by the increasingly massive and brutal use of military force.
Towards "super-imperialism"?
12) The fact that in the coming period the world will no longer be divided into imperialist blocs, and that world "leadership" will be left to the United States alone, in no way validates Kautsky's thesis of "super-imperialism" (or "ultra-imperialism") as it was developed during World War I. This thesis had already been worked out before the War by the Social-Democracy's opportunist wing. Its roots lay in the gradualist and reformist vision which considered that the contradictions (between classes and nations) within capitalist society would diminish to the point of disappearing. Kautsky's thesis supposed that the different sectors of international financial capital would be capable of uniting to establish their own stable and pacific domination over the entire world. This thesis, presented as "marxist", was obviously fought by all the revolutionaries, end especially by Lenin (notably in Imperialism, highest stage of capitalism), who pointed out that a capitalism which had been amputated of exploitation and competition between capitals was no longer capitalist. It is obvious that this revolutionary position remains completely valid today.
Nor should our analysis be confused with that of Chaulieu (Castoriadis), which at least had the advantage of explicitly rejecting "marxism". According to this analysis, the world was moving towards a "third system", not of the harmony so dear to reformists, but through brutal convulsions. Each world war led to the elimination of one imperialist power (Germany in World War II). World War III would only leave one bloc, which would impose its order on a world where economic crises would have disappeared and where the capitalist exploitation of labor power would be replaced by a sort of slavery, the reign of the "rulers" over the "ruled".
Today's world, emerging from the collapse of the Eastern bloc to face a generalized decomposition, is nonetheless totally capitalist. An insoluble and deepening economic crisis, increasingly ferocious exploitation of labor power, the dictatorship of the law of value, exacerbated competition between capitals and imperialist antagonisms between nations, unrestrained militarism, massive destruction and endless massacres: this is its only possible reality. And its only ultimate perspective is the destruction of humanity.
The proletariat and imperialist war
13) More than ever then, the question of war remains central to the life of capitalism. Consequently, it is more than ever fundamental for the working class. Obviously, this question's importance is not new. It was already central before World War I (as the international congresses of Stuttgart (1907) and Basel (1912) highlighted).
It became still more decisive during the first imperialist butchery (with the combat of Lenin, Luxemburg, and Liebknecht, and the revolutions in Germany and Russia). Its importance remained unchanged throughout the inter-war period, in particular during the Spanish Civil war, not to mention of course its importance during the greatest holocaust of the century between 1939-45. And this remained true, finally, during the various "national liberation" wars after 1945 which served as moments in the confrontation between the two imperialist blocs.
In fact, since the beginning of the century, war has been the most decisive question that the proletariat and its revolutionary minorities have had to confront, much more so than the trade union or parliamentary questions for example. It could not be otherwise, in that war is the most concentrated form of decadent capitalism's barbarity, which expresses its death-agony and the threat that hangs over humanity's survival as a result.
In the present period, where the barbarity of war will, far more than in previous decades, become a permanent and omnipresent element of the world situation (whether Bush and Mitterrand with their prophecies of a "new order of peace" like it or not), involving more and more the developed countries (limited only by the proletariat in these countries), the question of war is still more essential for the working class.
The ICC has long insisted that, contrary to the past, the development of a new revolutionary wave will come not from a war but from the aggravation of the economic crisis. This analysis remains entirely valid: working class mobilization, the starting point for large-scale class combats, will come from economic attacks. In the same way, at the level of consciousness, the aggravation of the crisis will be a fundamental factor in revealing the historical dead-end of the capitalist mode of production. But on this same level of consciousness, the question of war is once again destined to play a part of the first order:
- by highlighting the fundamental consequences of this historical dead-end: the destruction of humanity,
- by constituting the only objective consequence of the crisis, decadence and decomposition that the proletariat can today set a limit to (unlike any of the other manifestations of decomposition), to the extent that in the central countries it is not at present enrolled under the flags of nationalism.
War's impact on class consciousness
14) It is true that the war can be used against the working class much more easily than the crisis itself, and economic attacks:
- it can encourage the development of pacifism;
- it can give the proletariat the feeling of impotence, allowing the bourgeoisie to carry out its economic attacks.
This in fact is what has happened to date with the Gulf crisis. But this kind of impact cannot but be limited in time. Eventually:
- the permanence of military barbarity will highlight the vanity of all the pacifist talk;
- it will become clear that the working class is the main victim of this barbarity, that it pays the price as cannon-fodder and through increased exploitation;
- and combativity will recover, against increasingly massive and brutal economic attacks.
This tendency will then be reversed. And it is obviously up to revolutionaries to be in the forefront of the development of this consciousness: their responsibility will be ever more decisive.
15) In the present historic situation, our intervention in the class, apart of course from the serious aggravation of the economic crisis and the resulting attacks against the whole working class, is determined by:
- the fundamental importance of the question of war;
- the decisive role of revolutionaries in the class' coming to consciousness of the gravity of what is at stake today.
It is therefore necessary that this question figure constantly at the forefront of our press. And in periods like today, where this question is at the forefront of international events, we must profit from the workers' particular sensitivity to it by giving it special emphasis and priority.
The ICC: 4/10/90
[1] See ‘War, militarism, and imperialist blocs' in International Review nos 52 and 53.
[2] For the ICC's analysis on the question of decomposition, see International Review nos 57 and 62.
[3] Nonetheless, we should emphasize a major difference between state capitalism and imperialist blocs. The former cannot be called into question by conflicts between different factions of the capitalist class (except in cases of civil war, which may be characteristic of certain backward zones of capitalism, but not of its advanced sectors): as a general rule, the state, which represents the national capital as a whole, succeeds in imposing its authority on the different components of that capital. By contrast, imperialist blocs do not have the same permanent nature. In the first place, they are only formed with a view to world war: in a period when this is not an immediate possibility (as in the 1920s), they may be very well disappear. Secondly, no state is particularly ‘predisposed' towards membership of a particular bloc: blocs are forced haphazardly, as a function of economic, political, geographical and military factors. There is nothing mysterious between this difference in stability between the capitalist state and imperialist blocs. It corresponds to the fact that the bourgeoisie cannot aspire to a level of unity higher than the nation, since the national state is par excellence the instrument for the defense of its interests (maintaining "order", massive state purchasing, monetary policies, customs protection, etc). This is why an alliance within imperialist bloc is nothing other than a conglomerate of fundamentally antagonistic national interests, designed to preserve these interests in the international jungle. In deciding to align itself with one bloc or another, the bourgeoisie has no concern other than to guarantee its own national interests. In the final analysis, although we can consider capitalism as a global entity, we must never forget that it exists concretely in the form of rival and competing capitals.
[4] In reality, it is the capitalist mode of production as a whole, in decadence and still more in its phase of decomposition, which is an aberration from the viewpoint of the interests of humanity. But within capitalism's barbaric death-agony, certain of its forms, such as Stalinism, which spring from specific historic circumstances, have characteristics which make them still more vulnerable, and condemn them to disappear even before the whole system is destroyed either through the proletarian revolution, or the destruction of humanity.
[5] In this sense, the way that the world "order" is maintained in the new period will more and more resemble the way the USSR maintained order in its ex-bloc: terror and military force. In the period of decomposition, and with the economic convulsions of a dying capitalism, the most barbaric and brutal forms of international relations will tend to become the norm for every country in the world.
[6] In fact, the reasons behind Russia's inability to act as locomotive of the world revolution (which was why revolutionaries like Lenin and Trotsky expected that the revolution in Germany would take Russia in tow) were the same as those which made Russia a wholly inappropriate candidate for the role of a bloc leader.
[7] Another reason that the Western powers gave the USSR a free hand in Central Europe, was that they expected the latter to police the proletariat in the region. History has shown (in Warsaw in particular) how well-placed their confidence was.
Imperialist war is a test of fire for the organizations which claim to belong to the working class. It is in fact one of the questions that enables one to determine the class nature of a political formation. The Gulf conflict is a new illustration of this. The classical bourgeois parties, including the 'Socialist' and 'Communist' parties, have obviously acted in conformity with their nature by aligning themselves openly with the policy of war, or by calling for 'international arbitration' which is simply a fig-leaf for the war-drive. As for the organizations that call themselves 'revolutionary', like the Trotskyists, they have also shown what camp they're in by calling openly or hypocritically, according to circumstance[1], for support for Iraq. This test has thus made it possible for the groups who are on a proletarian class terrain to stand out clearly, it has given them the opportunity to make the voice of internationalism be heard, like the revolutionary currents during the two world wars.
But while the groups of the milieu have on the whole affirmed a principled class position against the war, most of them have done so with arguments and analyses which, far from bringing clarity to the proletariat, are more a factor of confusion.
Since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the majority of the proletarian organizations have not failed in their basic internationalist responsibility: whether in their press on in the form of leaflets, the whole proletarian milieu has taken a clear position of denouncing imperialist war, rejecting any participation in either camp, and calling on the workers to wage their struggle against capitalism in all its forms and in all countries[2]. In brief, the existing proletarian organizations have shown ... that they are in the camp of the proletariat.
However, in order to be able to take an internationalist position, some of them have had to draw a prudent veil over the arguments that are their stock-in-trade. This is the case, for example, with the support the proletariat is supposed to give to 'struggles for national independence' in certain under-developed countries.
Internationalism and ‘struggles for independence'
At the beginning of this century, the workers' movement witnessed a very animated debate on the question of national liberation struggles (see in particular our series of articles in International Reviews 34 and 36). In this debate, Lenin was the leading light of a position which held that the proletariat could support certain struggles for national independence even though the phenomenon of imperialism had already invaded the whole of society. However, this did not prevent him, during the course of the first world war, from taking up a completely internationalist position - clearer, in certain respects, than that of Rosa Luxemburg, who defended the opposing point of view on the national question. At the Second Congress of the Communist International, it was Lenin's position which became that of the international. However, reality (especially the Chinese revolution of 1927.) rapidly demonstrated the falsity of Lenin and the CI's position, so that by the 1930s, the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy - even though it was from the 'Leninist' tradition - had abandoned this position.
But even so, the majority of the groups who claim descent from the 'Italian Left' continue to defend the positions of the CI as though nothing had changed. This leads them into the most amazing contortions.
Thus we can only salute the internationalist concern of the International Communist Party when it writes that:
"The workers have nothing to gain and everything to lose from supporting imperialist conflicts ...Whether oil rent enriches the Iraqi, Kuwaiti or French bourgeoisie won't change the lot of the proletarians of Iraq, Kuwait or France: only the class struggle against capitalist exploitation can do that. And this class struggle is only possible if it breaks out of the 'national union' between classes, which always means sacrifices for the workers, who are divided by patriotism and racism before being massacred on the battlefronts," (Leaflet of 24 August, 1990, published by Le Proletaire).
But this organization would do well to ask itself how the Arab proletarians could defend their class interests by enrolling in a war for the constitution of a Palestinian state, as the ICP calls on them to do.
Such a Palestinian state, if it ever saw the light of day, would be no less imperialist (if less powerful) than Iraq is today, and the workers there would be no less ferociously exploited. It's no accident that Yasser Arafat is one of Saddam Hussein's best friends. For the 'Bordigist' current (to which Le Proletaire) belongs, it is time to recognize that over the last 70 years, history has frequently demonstrated the falseness of these positions.
Otherwise, its tight-rope walk between internationalism and nationalism can only end in it falling either into the void, or the bourgeois camp (which is what happened, at the beginning of the 80s, to a good part of its components like Combat in Italy and El Oumami in France).
This contradiction between internationalism and nationalism, which is an essential condition for belonging to the proletarian camp, and the support for national struggles is 'resolved' by another Bordigist organization, but not in a very clear way. In October 1990, we read in Il Programa Comunista:
"One can understand that, in their despair, the Palestinian masses cling to the myth of Saddam, as they did yesterday and in different circumstances to the myth of Assad; the development of events will soon show that the 'heroes' of today, like those of yesterday are just representatives of the state's will to power, and that the path to their emancipation lies only through the socialist revolution against all potentates, Arab or non-Arab, in the Middle East."
Here we can see all the ambiguity of Programa's position.
In the first place, the concept of the 'masses' is confusionist par excellence. The 'masses' can mean anything, including social classes like the peasantry which, as history has shown, is far from being allies of the proletarian revolution. For communists, the essential issue is the coming to consciousness of the proletariat - this is the reason for their existence. Now, there does exist a Palestinian proletariat and it is relatively numerous and concentrated, but it's particularly intoxicated with nationalism (just as the Israeli proletariat is).
In the second place, we don't see why we have to be particularly 'understanding' about the Palestinian population's submission to nationalist ideology. The fact that the petty bourgeois strata who constitute a large part of this population are infected by nationalism is not surprising, since it corresponds to their nature and place in society. But the fact that the proletariat itself is a victim of this infection is a real tragedy expressing its weakness in relation to the bourgeoisie.
One can always 'understand' the historic, social and political causes of such a weakness (as, for example, one could 'understand' the reasons why the European proletariat was mobilized behind the banners of the fatherland in 1914), but this doesn't mean that one should make the slightest political concession to this weakness. Those who, during the First World War, spent their time 'understanding' the nationalism of the French, German or Russian workers were the 'social chauvinists' a la' Plekhanov or the 'centrists' a la Kautsky, and certainly not revolutionaries like Lenin, Luxemburg and Liebknecht who devoted all their energies to fighting this nationalism.
Why this particular interest in the Palestinian 'masses' if one is calling on them to make the socialist revolution? Only the proletariat is really capable of responding to such an appeal and it is an appeal that has to be addressed to the workers of all countries.
The revolutionary combat can't only be waged in the Middle East; it has to be world-wide. And the enemies to be overthrown aren't just all the 'potentates' but all the bourgeois regimes, and especially the 'democratic' regimes which dominate the most advanced countries.
Here we can see all the absurdity of the Bordigist position. Out of a stupid loyalty to the 'classic' position of Lenin and the Communist International, the Bordigists continue to recite, like a litany, all the old phrases about the 'masses' in the colonial or semi-colonial countries. After what happened in Vietnam, Cambodia and other 'liberated' nations, Palestine is one of the last places where illusions in 'national liberation' still exist (among those, of course, who want to delude themselves).
Today, however, it's obvious that the struggle for an 'independent and democratic' Palestinian state has reached an impasse, and we're seeing an effort to abandon the classic position which held that workers could support certain national struggles. But it's done without openly saying so, in the same shamefaced way that they 'understand' bourgeois mystifications.
However, the fundamental problem posed by this 'loyalty' to the erroneous positions of the Communist International is that it leads to ridiculous contortions. The real gravity of holding desperately to this position (even if the pressure of reality forces one to abandon its substance) resides in the fact that it is the fig-leaf that different varieties of leftism hide behind so ignominiously in their support for imperialist war.
It's in the name of 'national liberation' struggles 'against imperialism' that these leftists, like the 'Pure Juice' Stalinists, have helped to enroll large numbers of workers in inter-imperialist massacres (remember Vietnam!).
Today the leftists, and particularly the Trotskyists, are calling on the Iraqi workers to go out and get themselves butchered, and once again it's in the name of this 'anti-imperialist' struggle. In this sense, any lack of clarity on the national question can only facilitate the dirty work of the 'radical' sectors of the bourgeoisie.
'Revolutionary defeatism' and internationalism
It's not only the position supporting 'national liberation' struggles which leads to concessions to leftist campaigns. It's the same with the slogan of 'revolutionary defeatism' which, also in the name of 'tradition', has been employed by certain groups in relation to the Gulf war.
This slogan was put forward by Lenin during the First World War. It was designed to respond to the sophistries of the 'centrists', who while being 'in principle' against any participation in imperialist war, advised that you should wait until the workers in the 'enemy' countries were ready to enter into struggle against the war before calling on workers in 'your' country to do the same. In support of this position, they put forward the argument that if the workers of one country rose up before those in the opposing countries, they would facilitate the imperialist victory of the latter.
Against this conditional 'internationalism', Lenin replied very correctly that the working class of any given country had no common interest with 'its' bourgeoisie. In particular, he pointed out that the latter's defeat could only facilitate the workers' struggle, as had been the case with the Paris Commune (following France's defeat by Prussia) and the 1905 revolution in Russia (which was beaten in the war with Japan). From this observation he concluded that each proletariat should 'wish for' the defeat of 'its' bourgeoisie.
This last position was already wrong at the time, since it led the revolutionaries of each country to demand for 'their' proletariat the most favorable conditions for the proletarian revolution, whereas the revolution had to take place on a world-wide level, and above all in the big advanced countries, which were all involved in the war. However, with Lenin, the weakness of this position never put his intransigent internationalism in question (we can even say it was precisely his intransigence which led to the error). In particular, Lenin never had the idea of supporting the bourgeoisie of an 'enemy' country - even if this might be the logical conclusion of his 'wishes'.
But the incoherence of the position was used later on a number of occasions by bourgeois parties draped in 'communist' colors, in order to justify their participation in imperialist war. Thus, for example, after the signing of the Russo-German pact in 1939, the French Stalinists suddenly discovered the virtues of 'proletarian internationalism' and 'revolutionary defeatism', virtues they had long ago forgotten and which they repudiated no less rapidly as soon as Germany launched its attack on the USSR in 1941. The Italian Stalinists also used the term 'revolutionary defeatism' after 1941 to justify their policy of heading the resistance against Mussolini. Today, the Trotskyists in the numerous countries allied against Saddam Hussein use the same term to justify their support for the latter.
This is why, in the Gulf war, revolutionaries have to be particularly clear on the slogan of 'revolutionary defeatism' if they don't want to give an involuntary aid to the leftists.
This weakness, from the internationalist point of view, in the slogan of 'revolutionary defeatism' can be seen in II Partito Comunista no 186:
"We are not however indifferent to the outcome of the war: as revolutionary communists, we are defeatists, and thus favor the defeat of our country and more generally of the western countries; we wish for the most resounding defeat of US imperialism which, being the most powerful in the world, is the worst enemy of the international proletarian movement, the guard-dog of planetary capitalism."
Il Partito "wishes for" the defeat of American imperialism ... like the leftists, whose 'anti-imperialist' crusades are just pretexts for calling on workers to participate in imperialist war.
Obviously, Il Partito rejects such participation. But what's the use of "wishing" for something if you renounce any means of turning this "wish" into reality? For communists, theoretical reflection isn't a kind of gratuitous speculation; it's a guide for action.
As for the leftists, they're consistent in their position. And here precisely is the great danger of Il Partito's position. With its "wishes", this organization encourages rather than combats the 'anti-imperialist' mystifications which weigh on a part of the working class. And in doing so, its internationalist protestations don't carry much weight against the logic of leftism.
Whether it wants to or not, Il Partito becomes a conduit for the leftists' ideology. Fortunately, however, the position of this group doesn't stand much chance of being heard.
It's 't rue that the defeat of the world's main gendarme would weaken the whole bourgeoisie much more than its victory. The annoying thing is that this sort of scenario exists only in the abstract, where you can plan anything you like.
In reality, unhappily, in the absence of divine intervention, victory goes to the strongest even Saddam Hussein, despite his megalomania, doesn't believe he can defeat the USA[3]. Thus, by openly revealing itself as a species of futile and puerile speculation, by showing how ridiculous and absurd it is, Il Partito's 'analysis' at least has the merit of reducing the danger inherent in this false position of 'revolutionary defeatism'.
However, the errors of revolutionaries aren't always so inoffensive. In particular, we should guard against slogans like "For us, the workers of all countries, the main enemy is 'our' own state", a slogan which is included in the statement by the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP), entitled 'Against Bush and western imperialism; against Saddam and Iraqi expansionism; No to war in the Middle East', (reproduced in Battaglia Communista September 90 and Workers Voice no 53).
It's no accident that this slogan is the same as 'The main enemy is our own bourgeoisie', which is a leaflet distributed in France by a group called ‘Internationale Ouvriere pour Reconstruire la IVeme Internationale', ie a Trotskyist group. This slogan (which is similar to that of 'revolutionary defeatism') was also put forward during the first world war, notably by the Spartatists in Germany. Today we can see how easily it can be recuperated by the bourgeoisie.
In fact, any slogan addressed to this or that sector of the proletariat, attributing it with tasks that are distinct or different from those of other sectors, is ambiguous and can easily be turned against the working class by the leftists. Even if the world proletariat is separated in to national sectors because of the divisions in bourgeois society itself, its historic struggle has to head in the direction of a world-wide unity. It's precisely the task of revolutionaries to contribute actively to this world-wide unity.
This is why a communist organization today can only have one single program - as is the case with the ICC - not a different one for each country. As Marx wrote: "the proletariat can only exist on the scale of world history, just as communism, which is its activity, can only have a world historic existence."
In the same sense, the perspectives revolutionaries have to put forward are the same for all countries and all sectors of the world proletariat, contrary to what the IBRP does in its document when it tries to concretize the aforementioned slogan. In fact, this document, presented as the emanation of the same organization, exists in two versions, and we have to say that the one aimed at English-speaking workers has a much more leftist ring than the Italian version (we await the French and German versions). In the English version, but not the other, we read:
"We have to fight its [our 'own' state's] war plans and preparations in every possible way. This means in the first instance that we demand the immediate recall of all Western forces sent to the Gulf. All attempts to send further forces must be opposed by strikes at ports and airports, for example. If fighting breaks out we must call for fraternization between western and Iraqi soldiers and turning the guns on the officers.
"Second, it means fighting attempts to impose more austerity and cuts in services in the name of the 'national interest' ...
"This oil crisis, as in 1974, will provide them with the perfect alibi to explain away the failings of the system. Our response must be to ignore the lies, ignore the nationalist hysteria, and fight for a higher standard of living. In particular, we call on the British North Sea oil workers to step up their struggle and prevent the bosses increasing production. This strike must be extended to include all oil workers and extended to other workers. No sacrifice for imperialism's war!"
In the first place, we must unfortunately point out that the British branch of the IBRP makes the first point of its intervention the classic slogan of all the leftists within the so-called 'anti-war' movement: "western troops out of the Gulf". It thus makes its own little contribution to the campaigns of the extreme left of the bourgeoisie which not only aim at ensuring that the Gulf is controlled by the 'Arab people' (ie , the local imperialisms), but above all at peddling the illusion that you can block the bourgeoisie's war-drive through legalistic campaigns based on 'peace demonstrations' and the 'mobilization of public opinion'. And we know that these illusions are the best way of diverting workers from using the only weapon they have against the development of the war: the struggle on their own class terrain, rejecting the inter-classism of the pacifist campaigns.
Such erroneous positions aren't new for the CWO, the British branch of the IBRP, they put forward the same leftist "Imperialism out of the Gulf", when the armada intervened in the Iran-Iraq war[4].
Concerning the CWO's call for strikes in the ports and airports, we can say that it received an echo in France where the sailors in Marseille stopped work to delay (for one day) the departure of troops for the Gulf. We should however point out that this strike was called by the Stalinist-controlled CGT. And there's nothing surprising in this: if these crap-heads decided to launch such a 'spectacular' action, it's because they knew perfectly well that at the present time such a method of 'struggle' holds no dangers at all for the bourgeoisie.
The point is that it's not through particular struggles in this or that sector that the working class can fight the bourgeoisie's war-drive (and this is equally true for the oil workers, whose solidarity with their Iraqi class brothers can't take the form of a specific struggle in 'their' sector, even if, suddenly seized by scruples, the CWO then calls for its extension).
The war-drive is the only response the bourgeoisie as a whole can have to the irreversible crisis of its system, and to the generalized decomposition that this crisis is engendering today. Only the struggle of the whole working class, as a class, on the terrain of the class, and not as this or that specific category, can really serve to counter imperialist war. It alone can open the door to the proletariat's only historic response to imperialist war: the overthrow of capitalism itself.
For the same reasons, the call for "fraternization between western soldiers and Iraqi's soldiers" and "turning the guns on the officers" isn't valid as an immediate perspective in the present situation.
This slogan is perfectly correct in general. It is an application of the internationalist position of calling on workers to 'turn the imperialist war into a civil war'; and it was one of the ways this call was concretized at the end of the first world war, notably between the Russian and German soldiers. But such a concretization presupposed a considerable degree of maturity in the consciousness of the proletariat: this didn't exist at the beginning of the war but developed during the course of it. On the other hand, this consciousness didn't exist at the end of the second world war. For example, the German workers who were ready to desert generally advanced the idea because in the occupied countries the chauvinism among the workers was so great that the German soldiers risked being lynched.
Today, we're obviously not in the period of counter-revolution that prevailed in 1945, but the present situation is also a long way away from the one at the end of the First World War as far as the consciousness of the class is concerned. This is why an immediate, on the ground response by the proletariat to the Gulf war is not on the cards. Once again, the proletariat's response to this war will essentially be posed away from the main battlefronts, in the big metropoles, and this fundamentally on a historic level.
The role of revolutionaries isn't to engage in a purely verbal radicalism and put forward recipes for stopping the Gulf war there and then. It is to defend, within the proletariat as a whole, a clear view of what's really at stake in the Gulf war, and the responsibility this poses to the class and its struggles.
And here we can see that the political inability of the different groups of the proletarian milieu to put forward slogans appropriate to the present situation is linked to the problem of understanding what's really at stake in this situation today.
Incomprehension of what the war is about
Like many of the more serious commentators in the bourgeois press, most of the groups have managed to show that the immediate origins of the Iraqi adventure: not Saddam Hussein's 'megalomaniac folly', but the fact that Iraq, after 8 years of a terrible and murderous war with Iran, was gripped by a catastrophic economic situation and a foreign debt of nearly $80 billion. As Battaglia Communista wrote in its September issue: "the attack on Kuwait was thus the classic gesture of someone who's at the point of drowning and is prepared to risk everything."
But on the other hand, the fundamental reasons for the formidable military deployment by the USA and its acolytes completely pass these groups by.
For Le Proletarire: "The USA has clearly defined the 'American national interest' which has led them to act: guaranteeing a stable supply of and a reasonable price for the oil produced in the Gulf. The same interest which made them support Iraq against Iran now makes them support Saudi Arabia and the oil sheikdoms against Iraq" (from the leaflet cited above).
The CWO puts forward the same idea, also in a leaflet:
"In fact the crisis in the Gulf is really about oil and who controls it. Without cheap oil, profits will fall. Western capitalism's profits are threatened and it's for this reason and no other (our emphasis) that the US is preparing a bloodbath in the Middle East."
As for Battaglia Communista, it defends the same with even more pretentious language:
"Oil, indirectly and directly, in nearly all the productive cycles, in the process of the formation of monopoly income has a determinant weight and, consequently, the control of its price is of vital importance ... With an economy in clear signs of recession, an alarming public debt, a productive apparatus in strong debit compared to European and Japanese competitors, the USA least of anyone can allow at this time a loss of control of one of the variable fundamentals of the world economy, the price of oil."
On the other hand, Programma Comunista comes up with the beginning of a response to this argument, which is also put forward by many leftist groups whose only aim is to vilify the rapacity of American imperialism in order to justify their 'critical' support for Saddam Hussein:
"In all this, oil only enters as the last factor. In the big industrial countries, the stocks are full and in any case, the majority of OPEC is ready to increase production, and thus stabilize the price of crude oil."
In fact, the oil argument doesn't go very far towards explaining the current situation. Even if the USA, as well as Europe and Japan, are obviously interested in being able to import cheap oil, this doesn't explain the incredible concentration of military force that the world's leading power has installed in the Gulf. This operation can only further augment the USA's already vast deficits and will cost its economy a lot more that the increase in oil prices which Iraq originally demanded.
What's more, with the prospect of a major military confrontation, the price of oil climbed well above the level that could have been set through negotiations with Iraq, had the USA wanted such negotiations (it's certainly not out of a desire to 'respect' the interests of sheikh Jaber and his crew that the USA has been so intransigent about the occupation of Kuwait). And the destruction that will result from the military confrontation will certainly make things a lot worse. If the USA was really, fundamentally concerned about the price of oil, you'd have to say that they're not going about things in the best way - their current approach would be comparable to that of a bull in a china shop.
In reality, the very extent of the military deployment proves that what's at stake goes well beyond the question of the price of oil. BC puts its finger on this when it tries to broaden its framework of analysis:
"The breakdown of the equilibrium that came out of the second world war has, in reality, opened up a historic phase in which other ones will be constituted, thus accelerating the competition between different imperialist appetites ... One thing is sure: whatever the outcome of this conflict, none of the questions that the Gulf crisis has shown up will be solved in this way."
But this seems to be too much for Battaglia. In the next breath, they once more get drowned in .... oil:
"Once Iraq has been eliminated, for example, it won't be long before someone else poses the same question: changing the re-partition of oil rent on a world scale, because it's this re-partition which determines the international hierarchy which the crisis of the USSR has put into question."
This is really original: he who controls the oil (or 'oil rent' to sound more marxist) controls the planet. Poor old USSR, which doesn't know this, and whose economy and imperialist strength collapsed even though it is the world's biggest producer ... of oil.
As for Programma, while it understands that there's something more important involved than oil, it doesn't manage to go beyond generalities:
"The tangled web of a conflict born out of the interests of a colossal power will only be unraveled by creating new ones, undoing and recomposing alliances ..."
Good luck to anyone who can understand this. But it won't bring much clarity to the working class. And it's clear that Programma doesn't understand much either.
Underestimating the gravity of the situation
In the final analysis, if there is a common element among the different analyses of the significance of the Gulf war, it's a dramatic underestimation of the gravity of the situation facing the capitalist world today. Like stopped clocks, the communist groups, even when they're able to recognize the convulsions that the world imperialist arena is going through, do no more than try to fit this new situation into the schemas of the past, just as they are satisfied with repeating slogans which were in any case wrong when they were put forward.
This isn't the place to develop our analysis that capitalism has now entered into the final phase of its decadence: the phase of general decomposition (see International Review nos 57 and 61). Neither will we go back over our own positions on the Gulf war (see the editorials of IR 63 and 64 or on the question of militarism in the current period (see our text 'Militarism and Decomposition' in this issue).
But it is our duty say that the refusal of the communist groups to accept the whole gravity of the present situation (and that's when they don't purely and simply deny that capitalism is a decadent system, like the Bordigists) will prevent them from fully assuming their responsibilities towards the working class.
The war in the Middle East isn't just a war like all others, faced with which it is enough to reaffirm the class positions of internationalism (especially when this takes the erroneous form of 'revolutionary defeatism'. )
The USA's formidable military deployment is not just aimed at Iraq, far from it. Brining Iraq to heel is just a pretext for 'setting an example' in order to dissuade any future threat, wherever it comes from, to warn off anyone who might think of destabilizing 'world order'.
This 'order' was to some degree ensured when the world was divided up between the big 'gendarmes'. Although the antagonism between the latter fuelled and kindled a whole series of wars, it also prevented them from escaping the control of the 'superpowers', and, in particular, from spreading to the point where they threatened a generalized war - something the advanced countries weren't ready for because the proletariat hadn't been mobilized.
But the complete collapse of the eastern bloc has simply opened up a Pandora's Box of all the imperialist antagonisms between the various components of the western bloc itself, antagonisms which had been held in check as long as there was the threat from the rival bloc. The demise of the eastern bloc thus condemned the' western bloc to death. This was expressed by Iraq's grab from Kuwait - prior to this, Iraq had acted as a good defender of western interests against Iran.
However, the main imperialist antagonisms between the former 'allies' of the American bloc don't involve the countries of the periphery but the central countries, ie powerful economies like the western European states, Japan and the USA. While the ex-allies of the latter have an interest in disciplining the second-string countries of the 'third world' when they try to step out of line, they have much less of an interest in a police operation whose main aim is to ensure their allegiance to the USA. The USA's military intervention, even though this time round it has forced the ex-vassals to limit their pretensions, won't put a definitive end to imperialist antagonisms, because they are a part of capitalism's life, and they can only be exacerbated by the aggravation of the crisis, by the system's irreversible plummet into the convulsions of its decay and decomposition. Without being a world war, the Gulf is thus the first major manifestation of a slide into chaos and barbarism unprecedented in human society.
This is what revolutionary organizations have to affirm clearly to their class if the proletariat is to become fully aware of what's at stake in its combat against capitalism. Otherwise they will be totally incapable of carrying out the task for which the proletariat has engendered them and will be pitilessly swept away by history.
FM 1.11.1990
[1] For certain Trotskyist organizations, the language is different according to whom they're addressing themselves: in their popular press, their support for Iraqi imperialism is hidden behind all sorts of contortions (we mustn't shock the public), but in their ‘theoretical' publications and their public meetings, which are addressed to a more ‘initiated' audience, they openly call for support for Iraq. Here, means and ends are in perfect accord: like any other sector of the bourgeoisie involved in a war. Trotskyism uses the classical technique of dissimulation, disinformation and lies.
[2] The silence which Ferment Ouvriere has maintained is quite unacceptable. Apparently the FOR is much more lively when it's running stupid trials of other revolutionary organizations, putting all kinds of words into their mouths (see their article, ‘Encore un plat piqnant du CCI in L'arme de la critique no 6) than when called upon to raise an internationalist voice against the barbarity of capitalist war. But it may be that this silence indicates that the FOR has ceased to exist as an organization. This wouldn't be at all surprising: when a revolutionary organization continues to insist, against all the evidence, that capitalism today isn't in crisis, as the FOR has always done, it losses any possibility of contributing to the development of consciousness in the proletariat, and becomes a pointless organization.
[3] We must render what is Caesar's unto Caesar and give Bordiga the paternity of this position. It was Bordiga who, at the beginning of the Cold War, put forward the idea that the defeat of the American imperialist bloc by the weaker Russian bloc would create the most favorable conditions for the development of the proletarian struggle. This position was dangerous and could easily play into the hands of the Trotskyists and Stalinists. All the more so because it wasn't as stupid as the position of Bordiga's current epigones, owing to the fact that it was talking about imperialist rivals of comparable strength.
Among the epigones we can also include ‘Mouvement Communiste Mondial' which has published a leaflet called ‘To stop the war, we must stop the economy'. In itself, this new grouplet doesn't represent very much but its document is a significant expression of the aberrations of the Bordigist ‘heritage'. As well as the classic ‘wish' for the defeat of the USA this text - in the gold old Bordigist tradition - takes up slogans put forward by Lenin at the beginning of the century, such as ‘against all oppression of nationalities' and ‘against all annexations'.
Today these two slogans can easily be used by the bourgeoisie in its campaigns of mystification. It's in the name of the struggle against the ‘oppression of nationalities' that the proletarians of the different republics of the USSR are today being called - successfully, unfortunately - to abandon their class terrain and to massacre each other on the rotten terrain of nationalism.
Similarly, the ‘struggle against annexations' is, right now, the battle cry of the United Nations, especially the USA, in the crusade against Iraq.
[4] In the document jointly sign by CWO and Battaglia, Iraq is very correctly stated as an imperialist country. We should however point out that this is the first for the CWO, which up to now has considered that only the super-powers were imperialist. It's a pity that this organization hasn't explained this change of position to readers. Unless the CWO, despite everything, is still holding up to its old (and stupid) position. This might explain the ambiguous title of the joint document which makes a distinction between ‘western imperialism' and ‘Iraqi expansionism'. There's no doubt about it: the IBRP and political clarity are always falling out with each other.
The convulsions that are shaking the world (which demonstrate that capitalism has entered its phase of decomposition) are subjecting the organizations of the proletarian political milieu to a rigorous political decantation. The confrontation of their positions must contribute to this decantation, permitting an intervention that will be a factor of clarification and not of greater confusion for the whole of the working class. Unfortunately, this is not the case today.
This acceleration of history is exposing the weaknesses and leftovers in the analysis of the proletarian political organizations. But instead of a serious confrontation of positions, we are seeing second-hand, superficial agreements, in order to produce some form of a "common publication", whose only criteria appears to be a tacit agreement to step up the unfounded attacks on the ICC, which is the only organization that is trying to fully develop its analysis of the present situation and which calls on the milieu to take up its responsibilities. The persistence of such an attitude increasingly risks leading them into a parasitic mode of existence ... and if this constitutes a danger for the organizations which have lost their roots in the left communist fractions but are still capable of maintaining themselves on the class terrain, it is an even greater danger for the relatively young proletarian political regroupments who have not been able - or have not wanted to - to take up the thread of the historical class positions. This has happened with the group Emancipacion Obrera (Argentina).
The defense of the proletarian milieu, even from its friends
Some months ago EO published a pamphlet called We want it all with which, apart from spreading its ideas on the defensive struggles of the proletariat and other themes, it clumsily joins in the prevailing fashion in the milieu of slandering the ICC with such orations as:
"The slogans of the ICC are reduced more or less to 'bread, peace and work' well known slogans of all the world's reformists, Stalinism, Trotskyism and all the other isms form the left that form the left of capital and this includes sections of the bourgeoisie which are not of the left" (page 8).
This is more or less the spirit that animates all the pamphlet: the spirit of ambiguity in the position of EO, the spirit of throwing stones and sleight of hand. Already in the introduction we can read that:
"Along with the positions that they hold which are similar to ours, we have important disagreements with the demands which they (the ICC) have in common with the left of capital" (page 1) " ... not because the ICC is exactly the same as them, but because they have not finished their rupture with the left of capital ..." (page 3).
Thus, according to these comrades the ICC has the same position as the organizations of capital ... without however being one of them. This is confused. But the mistake is not that of the organization being analyzed, but the analyst. An organization which is at the same time bourgeois and proletarian (EO do not talk of errors or divergences, but of slogans and positions) simply cannot exist. And, if the ICC is an organization of capital EO must explain why it has maintained relations with the ICC for years, or else EO hold the opportunist position which sees that a proletarian organization can maintain connections with a bourgeois organization. Otherwise the ICC is a proletarian organization and EO is substituting slander for critique and debate.
It is not only about the ICC that they are confused. When they deal with Rosa Luxembourg and particularly her work Reform or Revolution, it is cited with great scorn as the most pure example of reformism, from which the ICC supports (page 7). EO is incapable of understanding that it was precisely this work which constituted a fundamental weapon with which the revolutionary wing of which Rosa was one of the principal leaders of the proletarian party of that time (the Social Democracy at the turn of the century) fought reformism.
They also cite Lenin's work An explanation of the project for the program which the y assume to be: "the most traditional expression of the problem (of consciousness) and with which the majority of the political groups which claim to be revolutionary inside or outside the left of capital, agree" (page 50) and further on: "along with correct points, his limitations are also demonstrated. He was not able to break the resistance of the capitalists and the political alternative of gaining influence in the state" (page 56).
In a novel fashion, EO believes that proletarian and capitalist organizations can "agree" on some things, that is to say, have political positions in common. Furthermore, they completely nullify the revolutionary thought of Lenin - the criticized quotation is in fact a comment by Lenin on the first chapter of the Communist Manifesto about how the force of the proletariat is created through converting its defensive struggles into a struggle for political power - EO reduce Lenin to the level of a vulgar trouble maker whose thinking is identical to that of the ICC:
concerning the ICC: "along with positions similar to ours ... common demands with the left of capital ";
and Lenin: "Along with correct points ... his limitations are also demonstrated".
But here the "limitations" are not those of Lenin, but those of EO who mix up, confuse and scorn the history of the proletarian revolutionary movement. In another part of the pamphlet you read:
"The traditional slogan (raised by Engels, social democracy, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Mao, Fidel, Tito, etc) that the revolution must immediately pose 'each according to their needs, each according to their abilities' has been exposed as being perpetuated by capitalism" (page 9) .
Here EO goes to the extreme of establishing a continuity between the leaders of the proletariat, like Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, with the enemies of the working class, with the most faithful bulldogs of capital such as Stalin, Mao, Fidel or Tito. Neither are Marx and Engels saved from the unbelievable ignorance of these comrades: "The same slogan that made Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto famous, 'Workers of the world unite!', has shown its serious (sic) limitations".
Thus the first thing that the pamphlet We want it all demonstrates is that Emancipacion Obrera has lost its compass and is unable to clearly distinguish the class frontiers which separates a proletarian organization from a capitalist one; neither has it been capable of understanding that the revolutionary positions of the working class, as well as being expressed in the work of this or that revolutionary, have also developed in continuity with the history of the workers' movement. A continuity of class positions which all proletarian political regroupments must take up, if they do not want to be pushed this way and that by bourgeois ideology often dished up as "new" and "original" ideas and concerns.
This is not a question of bowing in front of the revolutionaries of the past as if they were gods who have no limitations or made no errors, neither to ban any criticism of them or any other revolutionary organization. The point is, that in order to try and undertake a critique which better expresses or which takes forward class positions, it is first necessary to understand them or at least to be able to tell the difference between them and those of the enemy.
In fact without knowing it, EO has done its bit for the ideological campaign launched by the world bourgeoisie against the proletariat with the aim of using the collapse of the eastern bloc to identify the proletarian revolution of October 1917 with the state capitalism which brought about its defeat, and which also seeks to establish a continuity between Marx and Lenin with Stalin - to 'prove' that Marxism leads to Stalinism.
Likewise, the opportunist silence by the other groups of the milieu in respect to this pamphlet of EO's (a silence which makes them accessories) is worrying. Perhaps bewitched by EO's attacks on the ICC, they have not been worried by the fact that in reality, EO attacks the class frontiers which define the proletarian political milieu and marxism in general. In such conditions the least the ICC can do is to defend the basic positions of the class and the revolutionary political milieu, even though on this occasion the attack which we have to confront is not coming from the enemy, but from friends.
Defensive and revolutionary struggles
What is this "serious limitation" which according to EO comes from Marx and Engels, by way of R Luxemburg and Lenin and finally arrives at the ICC? What is this thinking in which "they agree" with the left of capital and which includes sections of the bourgeoisie that are not of the left? It is the question of the most elemental and basic position of Marxism, with which these comrades become entangled throughout the 60 pages of their pamphlet without finding the thread; the position according to which the defensive struggles of the workers against the effects of capitalist exploitation leads to the development (through its extension, unification, radicalization and deepening) of the working class' revolutionary struggle against the whole of capitalism, destroying it and building a communist society.
And seeing that this position has been defended throughout the history of the workers' movement and is repeated constantly in many ways in Marxist literature - just reread the first chapter of the Communist Manifesto - it is "natural" that EO end up wanting to throw Marxism in to the bourgeois camp. The following paragraphs condense its position. Referring to the struggle for pay rises it says:
"... it is a criminal illusion to believe that the unification of the present struggles (we participate in these struggles and therefore we know what they are like) will create the force that will allow it to destroy capitalism and build communism. Principally for four reasons: 1) The majority of the present struggles are on a limited terrain, trying to conserve the workforce; of course it is necessary to do this, but it is wrong to deny their limitations and worse still when they're contained by slogans like 'bread, peace end work' ... other types of struggles are necessary, around other orientations and with other objectives (EO's underlining). 2) These struggles do not create that force, nor does their unity allow the destruction of capitalism: this is destroyed with another kind of struggle, which includes another type of methodology (the insurrection is an example) and of course with other objectives. 3) If the proletarian vanguard is not organized in the party... it will not be possible to create a proletarian alternative capable of destroying capital. 4) This party does not arise spontaneously from these struggles though neither will it arise isolated from the real class struggle ... " (p 11).
All of this can be reduced to one contradistinction that EO establish between the "present struggles" and the "other types of struggles that are necessary", EO deny that the defensive struggles form part of the process of the unification of the class on the road to the revolution, and therefore are not part of the "real class struggle". This raises two questions:
Why does EO say "of course" we must carry out these struggles? Answer: "We must struggle for the same 'palliatives' because we do not yet have the force to make the revolution" (p 11). Here EO clearly says that for them there does not exist a relationship between the defensive struggles and the revolution, that if we struggle for "palliatives" it is because it's not possible to do anything else, not because this struggle contributes to the revolution, therefore the two things are counterposed.
EO consider that the present struggles only serve "to obtain palliatives" but at the same times says that "they must take place" and that it participates in them. This reduces the role of revolutionary organization to that of a charitable institution. In reality, revolutionaries intervene in the defensive struggles because they're convinced that they constitute the point of departure for the development of the revolutionary struggle: another question arising from this is how will the intervention of the party help develop this struggle?
But the second main question here is what will this "other type of struggle" be, this "real class struggle" which will create the force and unity of the class? Here EO's confusion is great. On the one hand they talk of the insurrection, but this is not what is in question. This is not a question of defining the culminating point for the destruction of bourgeois power, but of what road the proletariat must take in order to reach this point. The history of the working class knows no other road than the development of the defensive struggles, its strike movements. It is in this struggle that it will forge its unity, its consciousness, its organization, which will permit the revolutionary assault.
Likewise, there does not exist in the pamphlet a clear and explicit idea of what EO understands by "the real class struggle" which will have to take the place of the "present struggles", just allusions. For example, when referring to the hunger revolts it says: "It is certain that these are reactions without perspectives ... but they are a part of the struggle which the ICC deny" (p3). In another part dealing with the angry reactions of workers (such as beating up union delegates or fighting with the police) against the abuses to which they are subjected by the forces of capital, at work and in daily life, it says: "These 'small struggles' also form part of the class struggle and in many case have important components for the revolutionary struggle" (p29), or when dealing with such actions as blocking streets, burning cars which have occurred in some strikes, it thinks: "And of course many means, including desperation, have no perspective or will not have if the working class only responds as individuals ... but today this is not the situation and if we want to intervene in the real struggle, we have to be part of this reality ..." (page 18).
So here we are faced with 3 different situations:
- the revolts of the desperate hungry masses (see IR 63);
- actions by isolated workers,
- the defensive struggles (which elsewhere it rejects but here it salutes, why?).
What do they have in common? What is the most important component of the struggle, this "real struggle"? Quite simply, desperate violence. According to EO: "Seeing that the necessity of destroying the state does not appear in the demands of the ICC (we will return to this question later) it is logical that they despise and underestimate the moments of confrontations with the forces of capitalist order" (page 15).
Here, Emancipacion Obrera is treading on a very slippery slope: indeed class violence is a "component" of the proletarian struggle and clearly not only during the insurrection to destroy bourgeois power, but also in all of the period which precedes it. The defensive struggles, in order to extend under workers' control, already implies a confrontation with the state apparatus, with the unions, the police, lawyers ... What we always oppose, and denounce in all cases, is when workers lock themselves up, or to put it better, they are trapped by the radical petty-bourgeois, the unions, the police, in acts of isolated, meaningless, desperate violence, which block and cut off the tendencies towards the unity of the class - acts that are implicated in the direct confrontations with the organs of repression which have the ability to mobilize and concentrate its superior force against any group of workers or isolated strike. We call on them not to believe in this desperate violence "without perspectives", which leads to dead ends, to defeats and demoralization of sectors of the working class.
There is nothing more dangerous and stupid than the following statement by EO: "It is criminal today to call on workers to arm themselves with firearms in order to defend their pickets from the police, but it is also criminal not to look for means of self defense in the context of the real forces today" (page 16). In essence, we have here the trap of the radical petty-bourgeois provocateur: inciting one group of workers to confront the police, but at the same time telling them not to use firearms, knowing full well that the police can use them whenever they wish.
This dilemma in respect to what kind of self defense workers should use on their pickets is false: workers always defend themselves as best as they can remember the steel strike in Brazil two years ago, in which the workers were trapped in the buildings of the plant and made up weapons from their tools with which they confronted the army. However, despite their great courage, they were defeated. The real dilemma is between whether workers become trapped in their factory until they are repressed by the police, who unfailingly arrive with superior forces, or whether they leave the factory in order to look for class solidarity, the extension of the struggle and the strength of the mass. Although this is a long and difficult road, it is the only one which can lead not only to winning demands and holding back repression, but it is also the only way to contribute to the forging of the class unity that is essential in order to destroy capitalism. Do the comrades of EO now understand our position?
A last point on the class struggle. Along with the attacks on the ICC because it supports the defensive struggles, EO says, at one time or another that the ICC posed: "a unity without any anti-capitalist perspective ... which of necessity leads to new detente" (page 9) "What we really want to ask the ICC about, is not its support for these (the defensive struggles) but its aim of containing them in an economist political schema" (p 29).
Here, it is not a question of the "limited nature of these struggles", but that the Ice wants to limit them! This is a serious accusation, which identifies the ICC with a tool of the bourgeoisie, the unions, whose function is precisely to try to contain and lead the struggles to defeat. Therefore, EO should have some pretty solid arguments to say this. However, it has none.
This accusation is sustained with very ambiguous phrases about how the ICC does not always put forward the final objective or the armed struggle: "this question is not given the importance that it should have ... some isolated texts show an understanding ... but this is not sufficient" (page 15). "Incidentally" (yes comrades: they say nothing more than "incidentally") "it appears that neither does the ICC defend in its leaflets the dictatorship of the proletariat" (page 38).
What does this mean? It means that EO has lost any ability to delineate the class frontiers, the positions which separate a capitalist organization from a revolutionary organization of the proletariat, and now thinks that a revolutionary organization is defined by the number of times its writes "to take power", "revolutionary war", "we want it all". This is pitiable, but it makes us think that its "political work in the masses" is very radical petty-bourgeois leftism: giving out leaflets and painting ultra-radical and ultra-revolutionary slogans, which are empty of content, on walls.
Well where is this leading the group Emancipacion Obrera ?
Emancipacion Obrera, set adrift
We have had political relations with EO for more than 4 years, including the publication within the pages of this Review of its "International Proposal" and an initial correspondence (IRs 46 & 49). In that time we have saluted the comrades' preoccupation and effort to contribute to the unification of the world-wide revolutionary forces. However, this does not mean that we do not point out, from our point of view, what constitutes the weaknesses of this group. In particular we reject the idea that the criteria for "recognizing" a revolutionary group should be its "practice" and nothing more. We have said that:
"A 'practice' divorced from any political foundations, orientations, or framework of principles is nothing but a practice suspended in mid-air, a narrow mined immediatism, which can never be a truly revolutionary activity. Any separation between theory and practice that opts, either for theory without practice, or for practice without theory, destroys the unity of the immediate struggle and historical goals" (IR 49, page 18)
Likewise, we have pointed out the urgent necessity of making a real effort towards "trying to reestablish the movement's historical and political continuity"(IR 49,page 20), which is very important for the "young" groups, confronted with the organic rupture of more than 50 years, the product of the defeat of the revolutionary wave at the beginning of the century.
We have also warned them about falling into the attitude of some groups who: "find it more profitable to remain ignorant, or even, purely and simply, to wipe out the past and who think that the revolutionary movement begins with them ... that in their desire to wipe out, to imagine that they come out of nowhere, they are condemned merely to come to nothing" (IR 49, page 20).
What at the time could appear as surmountable "weaknesses" for a young group, today have become a chronic illness: scorn for theory and the rejection of the historical continuity of the workers' movement. And what does EO offer us in its place? Little, really very little.
Thus, the problem of class consciousness appears to EO as a "Gordian Knot" which does not need to be untied, but which it prefers to "cut with an axe" (page 50). For EO, two centuries of debate in the workers' movement is "resolved" without difficulty. Marxism is of absolutely no use - all that is needed is a dictionary.
"If we pay attention [instruct EO] in reality spontaneity is not unconscious: something done spontaneously is done voluntarily... according to the dictionary: spontaneity: voluntary and self movement ... " (page 44). And from this infantile word play, EO draws its conclusion: "spontaneity is not opposed to consciousness, but to organization ... our fundamental task is not that the workers become conscious, but to bring them to take a position, to take a party"[1] (page 45). And further on: "The task of the party... is not to ‘develop consciousness' or that it 'becomes consciousness' but that the class 'takes a party' ... The task of the party is to defend a position, a party (sic!) (page 53);
"The situation of the proletariat will not be resolved because they become conscious of the fact that they are exploited, or that the bourgeoisie is the enemy, that capitalism is shit, many working men and women know it already without becoming revolutionaries. Many workmen and women know it already without help from the 'revolutionaries'. And then? Does it change anything of their reality? The question is, first of all, which is the party you take?" (page 53).
We must ask ourselves: why have we never seen a dictionary where it is clearly stated that spontaneity is voluntary, with which the problem of spontaneity would finished? Why is it until now that nobody has understood that "many workers have already become conscious, and yet this has not changed their reality"? Here, the problem of consciousness no longer exists! Why have so many parties been built and how come up until now it has occurred to nobody that the task of the party was - as its name indicates - "to create the party"? Perhaps we are meant to take seriously the stupidities that EO now serve us, seeing they have discovered the "serious limitations" of Marxism .
If we are going to be serious towards EO, we will have to try to explain to them that the problem of consciousness is not a problem of dictionary definition, but that it is the fundamental question of the proletarian struggle. The struggle for class consciousness, which at the same time is the struggle to overcome and break bourgeois ideology, is nothing but the expression of the proletariat's struggle to impose its own historical objectives by overthrowing the prevailing society.
We also have to try and explain that class consciousness is not what each worker "thinks" or believes they think, but what the working class is called on historically to do. That class consciousness cannot be separated from practice - that the consciousness of the proletariat is expressed as a revolutionary struggle.
Perhaps we could also try to define the framework of the debate in the revolutionary camp on the question of class consciousness, showing that it is based around whether it is the masses that come to this consciousness, or only the vanguard and the position adopted determines the type of intervention and orientations a revolutionary organization has inside the class ... But will this serve any purpose for Emancipacion Obrera?
It is certainly possible to recognize in the position of EO a certain influence of the Bordigist current which considers that the consciousness the masses can achieve is limited to the recognition of the revolutionary party to "take the party" as EO say - and that the party is the depository of global class consciousness. However, this tinge is deceitful since EO walk another route. Their considerations on the "limits" of Marxist positions; their rejection of the defensive struggles because they are "limited"; their preoccupation with finding a "real struggle"; their difficulties in distinguishing class frontiers; their insistence on "radical phraseology"; their idea that the class is ready conscious and only needs the party ... all of this is not an expression of a coherent and firm political position, but of desperation. Desperation because the party does not exist yet, because the revolution is not immediately realizable. The title of their pamphlet, We want it all, is an expression of this. As if it was only necessary to publish millions of pieces of paper with the same slogan "We want it all, we are going for it all!" in order for the insurrection to take place.
But desperation is not the essence of revolutionary organization which is capable of retaining, at least in its general lines, the historic course of the class struggle, which gives it its steadfastness and patience. Desperation is only the property of the radical petty-bourgeoisie and unfortunately, Emancipacion Obrera is drifting towards this. We consider it our duty to warn the comrades of EO of this threat, we call on them to react against these radicaloid tendencies which are increasingly evident from each of their new publications.
To the other groups of the proletarian milieu, and particularly those who today maintain close relations with EO, we call on them to carry out their responsibilities of debating with EO about weaknesses. The attitude of "Let it pass", the cultivation of a temporary agreement is opportunism: the gangrene of revolutionary organizations.
Ldo
[1] Note (1). In the original Spanish, this phrase ‘to take a party' has a double meaning: it can be understood as the act of taking a political position or in the literal sense of accepting the leadership of the party.
The present acceleration of history, Capitalism's entry into its phase of decomposition, sharply poses the necessity for the proletarian revolution as the only way out of the barbarism of capitalism in crisis. History teaches us that this revolution can only triumph if the class manages to organize itself autonomously from other classes (the workers' councils) and to secrete the vanguard that will guide it towards victory: the class party. However, today, this party doesn't exist, and many are those who simply fold their arms because, faced with the gigantic tasks that await us, the activity of the small revolutionary groups who do exist may appear to be senseless. Within the revolutionary camp itself, the majority of groups respond to the absence of the party by endlessly repeating its very Holy Name, invoking it like some kind of deus ex machina that can solve all the problems of the class. Individual disengagement and overblown declarations about commitment are two classic ways of running away from the struggle for the party, a struggle which is going on here and now, in continuity with the activity of the left fractions who broke with the degenerating Communist International in the 20s.
In the first two parts of this work, we analyzed the activity of the Italian Communist Left, which was organized as a fraction in the 30s and 40s, and the premature, completely artificial foundation of the Internationalist Communist Party by the comrades of Battaglia Comunista in 1942[1]. In this third part, we will show that the method of working as a fraction in unfavorable periods when there is no possibility of a class party existing, was the very method employed by Marx himself. We will also show that this marxist method of working towards the party found its essential definition through the tenacious struggle of the Bolshevik fraction in the Russian social democracy. Against all those who gargle eulogies to the iron party of Lenin, and who refer ironically to the 'little grouplets that were the left fractions', we reaffirm that its only on the basis of the work that they accomplished that it will be possible to reconstruct tomorrow's world communist party.
In the article already quoted in the previous parts of this work, the comrades of Battaglia Communista, having criticized the work of the Left Fraction between 1935 and 1945, concluded their presentation with a curt condemnation of the concept of the fraction in general:
"What is the sense of exclusively linking the notion of the party to the possibility of guiding then at least in a way that leaves no room for the broad masses, denying the political organ of the class struggle any possibility of existing except in revolutionary periods, and delegating to organisms that have never been well defined, or to their successors, the task of defending class interests in counter-revolutionary phases ....
"To argue that the party can only arise in revolutionary situations where the question of power is on the agenda, whereas in counter- revolutionary phases the party 'must' disappear or give way to the fractions, means not only depriving the class, in the most difficult and dangerous moments, of a minimum of political reference - which in the end means playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie - but also deliberately creates a void which it will be hard to fill in the space of 24 hours ...
"We cannot support the thesis, contradicted by historical experience, which claims that the Bolshevik party itself played the role of a 'fraction' within Russian social democracy up until 1917 (a thesis defended by the ICC in International Review no 3) ... Russia was the only European country involved in the war crisis of 1914-18 in which, despite conditions being less favorable than elsewhere, witnessed a proletarian revolution, due precisely to the fact that there was a party carrying out the work of a party, at least from 1912. From its beginnings, Bolshevism did not limit itself to fighting the opportunism of the Mensheviks on the political level, to theoretically elaborating the principles of the revolution, to forming cadres and proselytizing, but forged the first links between the party and the class, links which later on, in the heat of a rising situation, were to become real collective channels between the spontaneity of the class and the strategic and tactical program of the party...
"Already in 1902, Lenin had laid the tactical and organizational bases for building the alternative which was a party, unless we take What Is To Be Done to be the ten commandments of the fractionalist faith"[2]
To sum up, according to the comrades of BC:
These assertions, three holes in Battaglia's theoretical-political coherence, three ideas about the history of the workers' movement, don't stand up to examination.
"I would first like to point out, that following the dissolution of the League, which I had called for, in November 1852, I did not and do not belong to any organization, secret or public; in other words, the party, in the ephemeral sense of the term, for me ceased to exist 8 years ago ... As a result of this, I have been attacked on several occasions, if not openly, then at least in a way that leaves no room for doubt, on account of my 'inactivity' ... Consequently, of the party you talk to me about in your letter, I have known nothing since 1852 ... The League, as well as the Society of Seasons in Paris and a hundred other organizations, was simply an episode in the history of the party which is born spontaneously from the soil of modern society... In addition, I have tried to avoid the misunderstanding which identifies the 'party' with a League that has been dead for 8 years or with the publication of a paper dissolved 12 years ago. When I talk about the party, I mean the. party in the broadest historical sense" (Marx to Freiligrath, 1860).
As we can see, the theory that proletarian parties disappear in counter-revolutionary phases was not an invention of Bilan in the 1930s, but was already Marx's firm conviction in the middle of the last century.
In this reply to the ex-militant of the Communist League, Ferdinand Freiligrath, who was inviting Marx to reassume the leadership of the 'party', Marx made it clear that the party had been dissolved 8 years before, at the end of the revolutionary wave that began in 1848, as the Society of the Seasons of the Parisian workers and other organizations had been before, once the cycle of struggles of which they had been an expression had come to an end.
It is clear that Marx always had this profoundly materialist attitude, in contrast to the activist prejudices of those who refused to recognize the depth of the defeat and wanted to immediately 'start all over again'. In 1850, when Marx declared that the world economic revival had made the revolutionary perspective in Europe of recede into the distance, the majority of the League's militants (the Willich-Schapper tendency) opposed him and denounced him for trying to 'send everyone to sleep'. Only a minority remained loyal to him and attempted - even after the formal dissolution of the League in 1852 - to devote themselves to the difficult task of 'drawing the lessons of the defeat', by understanding its causes and forging the theoretical instruments which would serve the proletariat in the next waves of struggle.
It is important to underline that the comrades who wanted to keep the League alive at any price were compelled to renege on their political positions and engage in all kinds of intrigues, in artificial alliances with the democrats, alliances which soon dissolved and left no trace, except for the cinders of activism born out of the artificial attempt to hold on to the party.
By contrast, the patient work of clarification, of forming cadres, carried out by the fraction linked to Marx would bear fruit when the workers' movement revived: the marxist cadres were naturally to be found at the head of the International Workingmen's Association when it was formed in 1864 (developing "spontaneously from the soil of modern society"), at a time when there was an international resurgence of the workers' movement.
Marx's position didn't change in 1871, when the defeat of the Paris Commune opened up a new period of retreat in the workers' movement. In these conditions, Marx and Engels quickly say that the days of the IWA were numbered, and at the Le Hague congress in 1872, they propose that the General Council should be transferred to New York, which boiled down to dissolving the organization:
"Given the present conditions in Europe, it is absolutely useful, in my opinion, to shelve the formal organization of the International for the moment ... The inevitable evolution of things can lead of themselves to a resurrection of the International in a more perfected form. In the meantime, it will be enough to make sure that we don't let the best elements in various countries slip out of our hands" (Marx to Sorge, 1873).
Once again, for Marx and Engels, keeping the facade of a party artificially alive in a period of counter-revolution was absolutely pointless; on the other hand, it was essential to carry on the collective work of that fraction of militants that was capable of resisting demoralization and of preparing the future resurgence "in a more perfected form".
To console the comrades of BC, who seem to be terrorized by the possibility that someone can 'decide' that the party 'ought' to disappear at certain moments, we should underline that Marx and Engels never thought of taking such 'decisions'. To 'decide' to dissolve the party is a voluntarist act exactly like deciding to maintain it artificially. Marx did not dissolve the League in an authoritarian manner in 1852, any more than he did the IWA in 1872. He simply explained that revolutionaries had to face up to the inevitable dislocation of these parties, by organizing themselves to preserve the red thread of communist activity even in their absence. If the dissolution of these organs subsequently confirmed, in both cases, Marx's predictions, this was because of the force of events, not the force of Marx's orders.
Now that we have clarified that the 'strange' theory about the disappearance of the proletarian parties in counter-revolutionary periods was developed by Marx himself, let's now turn to the organs which, in these periods, ensured the 'continuity of revolutionary activity, ie the fractions.
According to Battaglia, these are organs which "have never been well defined". It is of course true that Marx never wrote a nice propagandist piece in the style of Wage, Labor and Capital on the function of the network of comrades who remained around him after the dissolution of the League and of the IWA. But this doesn't mean that for Marx, the task of drawing up a balance-sheet was not important. It was due to the fact that the notion of the fraction of the class party is by definition linked to the notion of the party itself. The definition of its contours goes hand in hand with the process that leads from the Communist League, which "could make alliances with a fraction of the bourgeoisie", to the Communist International, "which gave itself the task of realizing the world-wide revolution"[3].
As the historic experience of the class made the contours of its vanguard party more precise, so there developed the necessary materials for defining the work of the marxist fraction, which appears in reaction to the party's opportunist deviations. It was only when capitalism entered into its final phase, when the communist revolution was finally on the agenda that the class party could develop in its complete form and by the same token, it became able to secrete real fractions in response to a course towards opportunism and degeneration. The Italian Left drew this lesson in the 1930s:
"The problem of the fraction as we see it - ie as a moment in the reconstruction of the class party - was not and could not have been envisaged within the First and Second Internationals. What was then called 'fractions', or more commonly 'right wing' or 'left wing', 'transigent' or 'intransigent' currents, 'reformist' or 'revolutionary' were in the great majority of cases - the Bolsheviks being an exception - simply fortuitous alliances made on the eve of or during congresses, with the aim of carrying through certain agendas with no organizational continuity, in a phase where the seizure of power wasn't posed ... [4].
"The collapse of the Second International when the world conflict broke out cannot be seen as a sudden betrayal, but as the conclusion of a whole process.
The exact notion of the task of a fraction could only be the corollary of the exact notion of the class party"[5].
The process of the maturation and definition of the concept of the fraction thus had its origins (but not its conclusion) in this first network of comrades who had survived the dissolution of the Communist League. Because an understanding of where we started from is always indispensable for understanding where we're going, we will attempt to analyze in depth the activity of this first 'fraction'.
Certain phrases in the letter to Freiligrath, or other isolated citations from the private correspondence between Marx and Engels, have often been used to demonstrate that these comrades returned to private life, devoting themselves to theoretical studies which they later put at the disposal of the masses hungry for knowledge. Reality is completely different.
Engels clarified matters very promptly:
"For the moment, the essential thing is that we have the possibility of getting things published, either in a quarterly review in which we will attack directly, and in which we will ensure our positions against those of others, or in larger works where we can do the same thing without having to mention any of these buffoons. Either one of these solutions is alright by me; but it seems to me that if the reaction gets stronger, the first eventuality will prove to be less certain in the long term, and the second will more and more constitute the only resource we can count on". (Engels to Marx, 1851).
Marx reaffirmed this point:
"I said to him we can't collaborate directly on any small journal, not even a party journal[6], unless it's edited by ourselves. But that at the moment, all the necessary conditions for attaining this are absent". (Marx to Engels, 1859).
It wasn't at all a matter of withdrawing into private life, of devoting themselves to theoretical studies with the idea of one day returning to militant activity. For Marx and Engels, the essential thing, the thing to which they devoted all the means at their disposal, was the publication, as regularly as possible, of a revolutionary press that could publicly defend and deepen the perspective of communism and the critique of capitalist society. What they rejected was not this organized and formalized activity, but the attempt to make it possible by collaborating with confused and activist elements who would have made their work completely pointless. If they were unable to maintain a formally organized framework of activity, it was not for lack of trying, but because "all the necessary conditions for attaining it are absent". And these conditions were absent because the development of the workers' movement was so weak that in phases of reflux it wasn't possible to maintain even a small organized revolutionary group.
Once again, no one decided that the party 'ought' to disappear, or that the fraction 'ought' to be limited to an informal network of comrades. It was the objective conditions of the class struggle which determined it: the militants had to either recognize this reality and organize themselves accordingly, or close their eyes and deceive themselves and others by playing tricks which kept up the mere name and appearance of a class organ.
In reality, only those who have no interest in Central Committees that float in the void have played a real 'party' role in counter-revolutionary phases: the small informal group of comrades around Marx worked in such a continuous and collective way that they were commonly referred to in the revolutionary milieu as the 'Marx party' - so much so that Marx had to make it clear in his letter to Freiligrath that this party didn't exist. He pointed out that when he referred to party activity, he meant it in "the broadest historical sense" as an activity which maintained political continuity between the different parties. The groups of comrades which carried out this work after the dissolution of the League and the IWA, despite their informal character, can be considered as fractions in every respect, because they weren't new regroupments but real fractions of the old parties.
The 'Marx party' of 1853-63 was none other than the 'Marx fraction' within the League in 1850-52.
The "most capable comrades in various countries" in the period from the dissolution of the IWA to the birth of the second International were none other than the old 'authoritarian' marxist fraction with the IWA. The fractions - however they define themselves and organize themselves accordingly to the maturity of the period - thus represent the historical continuity between the different episodes in the history of the party.
Merely asserting that Lenin - leader of the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party - had something to do with the fractions, provokes a show of contempt by Battaglia, for whom Lenin is the party man, and that's that: it's because the Bolshevik party existed - and not some ill-defined fraction that the revolution was able to triumph in Russia.
Before showing that this is yet another falsification of history by BC, let's recall the historic framework in which the activities of the Bolsheviks and the socialist left in general developed.
The Second International was founded in a difficult historic period for revolutionaries: on the one hand, throughout Europe it was the end of the phase in which the proletariat could play an autonomous role in bourgeois democratic revolutions (which henceforth would be carried out 'from above', as with Bismark in Germany); on the other hand, the proletarian revolution wasn't yet on the agenda, since capitalism was in its last, most impetuous phase of economic development. In these conditions Marx (and Engels after Marx's death) considered the existence of a powerful opportunist wing in "the social democratic parties to be an "inevitable fact". They thus advised the marxist elements to avoid premature splits and concentrate on the intransigent defense of class positions within the party, in the expectation that the approach of the revolutionary crisis would lead "automatically" to a split and the emergence of authentic marxist parties[7].
Revolutionaries had to be the most resolute defenders of the unity of the party, momentarily giving up any idea of organizing themselves into currents that were well-defined organizationally, which would have exposed them to the threat of expulsion, and thus of being transformed into sects detached from the real movement, This was the only effective line of action in this situation and, in fact, it marked a number of successes (accepting of the marxist Erfurt program in 1881).
However, the prolongation over decades of the phase of economic development and social peace not only meant that the existence of an opportunist wing was "an inevitable fact", but that it infiltrated the majority of the party, which would make it difficult for the organization to purge itself when faced with a pre-revolutionary situation,
At the beginning of the new century marxists were posed with the question of reacting against this negative evolution, moving away from the defense of marxism in "dispersed order" to a more coordinated activity within the party. This, however, was by no means easy, because the myth of unity had deep roots in the party leaders were well-placed to present the radicals as divisive elements. In 1909, the attempt of the militants of the Dutch left to organize as a tendency around the publication Die Tribune was nipped in the bud by expelling them en bloc; this led them to form a mini-party which quickly reproduced, on a small scale, the vices of the original one[8]. The prevalent attitude among the militants of the left was the attempt to push things leftwards rather than directly oppose what was going on. Rosa Luxemburg's behaviour in the German' party was the clearest expression of this.
The only exception, as the passages cited from Bilan no.24 show, was the Russian Bolsheviks who were organized as an autonomous fraction of the RSDLP from 1904 on. It may seem astonishing that the first to move had been these 'backward' Russians, but the explanation for their vanguard role derives precisely from the particular conditions of the Russian empire (which then stretched from Siberia to Poland). In this immense zone in the first years of the century, the bourgeois democratic revolution, which had in all essentials already been achieved in Europe, was still on the agenda. But the late development of the Russian bourgeoisie prevented it from playing a vanguard role in the democratic revolution, while the especially backward character of Tsarism prevented it from carrying out the revolution 'from above' as Bismark had done in Germany.
The Russian proletariat, therefore, was not destined to seize the last historic chance of playing an autonomous role within a bourgeois revolution. But, as we have seen, Engels had already foreseen that the approach of a revolutionary crisis would place on the agenda an organizational separation between the marxists and the opportunists. The maturation of a revolutionary situation in the Tsarist territories fully confirmed Engels' predictions, since it became more and more difficult for the marxists to live under the same roof with the opportunists who were logically inclined to make compromises, not only with the democrats, but with the reaction itself. In Poland, the revolutionaries led by Rosa Luxemburg had already resolved the problem in 1894, by creating a new small party, the SDKP, in opposition to a Polish Socialist Party that was profoundly infected by nationalism. In this way, Rosa Luxemburg had a free hand earlier on, but she never had the chance of gaining experience of the struggle of a fraction in defense of a party threatened with degeneration. This is why she never really managed to develop and understand the concept of a fraction. This was a weakness that would be paid for dearly during the heroic struggle of the Spartacists against the degeneration of the German SPD, and would to a large extent be responsible for the fatal delay in the constitution of the German Communist Party in 1918.
On the other hand, the whole battle that Lenin fought for ten years took place inside the party, enabling him to develop and elaborate the political notion of the left fraction, and thus to lay the bases for the IIIrd International.
Beyle
[1] The first two parts were published in IRs 59 & 61. For a deeper analysis of the activity of the Italian Communist Left, we recommend reading our two pamphlets ‘La Gauche Communiste d'Italie, 1927-52', and ‘La GCI et l'Opposition Internationale de Gauche'.
[2] ‘Fraction and Party in the Experience of the Italian Left', Prometeo 2, March 1979.
[3] ‘Towards the two and three quarters International?' Bilan 1, November 1933.
[4] Obviously it has to be understood that at that time a fully developed class party could not have existed. The League and the IWA were both class parties corresponding to the level of development of the workers' movement.
[5] ‘The problems of fractions in the IInd International', Bilan 24, 1935.
[6] Marx means an authentically socialist journal. The undifferentiated use of the word party clearly shows that these were only the first steps towards the historic definition of the structure and function of the class party.
[7] For Marx and Engel's tactics in this period, see in particular their correspondence with the leaders of the German party, reproduced in Marx, Engels, and German Social Democracy, Ed 10-18.
[8] During the First World War, the leadership of the Dutch SPD vacillated towards an ambiguous support for Anglo-American imperialism, censoring the international writings of left-wing militants like Gorter. See The History of the Dutch Communist Left that we will be publishing shortly.
Horror, barbarism and terror: the Gulf war has exposed the reality of capitalism.
Horror and barbarism. War, war between imperialist gangsters, continues. The coalition forces have begun their ground offensive. And Iraq will meet with defeat. Hundreds of thousands of dead - we don't know exactly how many for the moment - and no doubt as many wounded and missing; massive destruction in Iraq and Kuwait: this will be, and is already, the bloody and terrible result of this conflict.
Horror and cynicism of the bourgeoisie of the 'coalition' countries. Without any shame, reveling in blood, it has boasted of its technical prowess in this war. At first, in order to lull people's reticence about the butchery, it talked about a 'clean war': the missiles were only hitting military buildings. They could go through windows and elevator shafts, but they didn't kill anyone, at least not civilians. How marvelous - it' was no more than a 'surgical' operation. But the macabre reality couldn't be hidden for long. Thousands of civilians died under the massive bombardments of the B 52s and the cruise missiles. Will we ever know the frightful truth of all this? The height of cynicism: when the destruction of the Baghdad bunker undoubtedly left 400 dead, the Pentagon blamed the civilians, who shouldn't have taken refuge in this bunker and so put themselves in the path of the bombs!
The unlimited admiration of the media, the journalists, the military specialists for all this technical and scientific prowess put in the service of death and destruction is absolutely disgusting. Capitalism today is incapable of dealing with all sorts of epidemics in the world, cholera in Latin America, AIDS, and many others. Science and technology are at the service of death and destruction on a huge scale. This is the reality of capitalism.
Terror, capitalist terror, the terror of a rotting society, has descended on the populations. Terror on a huge scale on Iraq and Kuwait. The American coalition uses the most sophisticated, the most murderous, the most 'scientific' and massive weapons. We are not military specialists, and we have no taste for the sinister statistics. How much was it? At the lowest estimate, 100,000 tons of bombs have been dropped, 108,000 aerial sorties flown. How many cruise missiles launched from war ships in the Gulf, in the Mediterranean? The American bourgeoisie and its allies don't hesitate to use the most massive means of destruction except of course nuclear weapons, they are for next time no doubt - such as fuel air bombs and napalm. In comparison with this, the horrible exactions committed by Saddam' s soldiers were amateur stuff.
Even within the shelters, the civil populations are not safe. Can you imagine the damage, the fear, the panic and anguish of the children, the women, of men old and young in the midst of all the bombing: the explosions - when Basra was hit, the earth trembled in Iran - the sirens, and all the deaths and the injuries? We know that the American planes were often bombing 24 hours a day. We know that during the first night of the war, one and a half times the equivalent of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was unleashed on Iraq. We know that during one month, Iraq and Kuwait were hit by more bombs than Germany throughout World War Two!
One Patriot missile costs one million US dollars. The cost of one Stealth bomber is 100 million dollars. The total cost of the war will certainly be more than 80 million dollars, and that's just the most minimal estimate. In fact it will be a lot more, even if you only take into account the massive destructions in Iraq and Kuwait, and all the oil wells. The lowest estimates are already talking about 100 billion dollars for each of these countries. Twenty years' labor by the Iraqi workers has been annihilated. Is there any need to point out that Iraq's debt before the invasion of Kuwait was 'only' 70 billion? We are seeing a vast squandering of goods and riches.
Right now, three quarters of humanity are underfed and live in destitution. Right now, 40,000 children under five years old are dying of undernourishment all over the world. How many more will be marked by its effects throughout their lives?
The capacities of production are at the service of death and destruction, not of humanity and its well-being. This is the reality of capitalism.
Capitalist dictatorship and totalitarianism
Horror and shameful lies. Alongside the bombardment of Iraq, we have the propaganda bombardment by the media, aimed at the populations all over the world, and in particular the working class. The media are revealed for what they are: servants of the bourgeoisie and its war effort. From the first day of the war, the time of the 'clean war', the mobilization and enthusiasm of the media were sickening. But the manipulation of the news and the gung-ho prattle of the journalists wasn't enough. The different belligerent states, above all the USA and the most 'democratic' ones, imposed a military censorship worthy of the most vulgar fascist or Stalinist regimes, in order to ensure a completely dictatorial control over information and 'public opinion.' This is what the much-vaunted bourgeois democracy amounts to.
Another lie: this was a war for the respect of international law that had been transgressed by the Iraqi bourgeoisie. What kind of law is this, except the law of the strongest, capitalist law? It was either through naked self interest, as in the case of Egypt, Syria or Britain, or through bribes and threats as in the case of the USSR, China and France that the USA obtained the UN's agreement for a military intervention.
Saddam Hussein made a good move when he made a scandal out of the double standards that are operating in all this, when he pointed out that neither the UN nor of course the USA had used the same armed force to ensure that Israel would respect the resolutions calling on her to leave the occupied territories. The bourgeoisie only cares about law, about its law, when it serves its interests to do so.
After the war, neither peace nor reconstruction, but more imperialist wars
Once the conflict was unleashed, all 'reason' and 'morality' went by the board. The USA wants to bring Iraq to its knees, inflict colossal and irreparable destruction on the country. No matter what the cost this is the implacable logic of imperialist war. The American bourgeoisie has no choice. In order to fulfill its political objectives, to affirm without any ambiguity its imperialist hegemony over the world, it is forced to go all the way and use the enormous means of destruction at its disposal. Razing Iraq and Kuwait and ensuring Saddam's total capitulation are the objectives of the American bourgeoisie. These are the orders given to the military.
Saddam Hussein, in his desperation, has been pushed into the suicidal, unbridled use of everything to hand: Scuds, the oil slick in the Persian Gulf, burning the oil wells to protect himself from the incessant waves of bombers. He also has no choice.
Two countries, Iraq and Kuwait, have been covered in fire and blood. Their main wealth, oil, is burning and the wells will certainly be devastated for some time to come. The whole environment of the region is gravely threatened. The damage is already considerable. A large part may even be irreversible.
And in the midst of all this bloodletting, we have heard the lying, hypocritical wailing of the bourgeois 'opposition' to the war. The pacifists, the leftists who when they are not overtly supporting Iraqi imperialism like the Trotskyists do - call for demonstrations 'against the war for oil' and for peace. But peace is impossible under capitalism. It is just a moment for preparing war. Capitalism carries imperialist war within itself. The war in the Middle East is yet further proof of that.
Even if controlling oil remains important, it's not the main aim of the war. Since 2 August the oil wells of Iraq and Kuwait have been paralyzed, and after that they have been largely destroyed, but this hasn't led to a rise in the price of oil. On the contrary, prices have fallen. There is no threat of scarcity. There is overproduction of oil because there is a generalized overproduction of commodities and a world recession.
The war is not yet over and what are we seeing already? The ignoble vultures known as 'businessmen' are hovering over the carnage and hungrily seeking what profit they can make in the name of reconstruction. The British companies have waxed indignant about the rapacity of their American rivals. Making war together is a very moral and just thing to do, but business is business. Against these new lies, let's be clear that there won't be the kind of reconstruction that can lead to a revival of the world economy. A country like Iraq was already incapable of repaying its 70 billion dollar debt before the war. This was one of the reasons for its tragic adventure. So how and with what can it reconstruct? And that at a time when world capitalism has shown itself incapable of re-launching the ruined economies of the former Stalinist capitalist bloc.
All this is just lies and propaganda in order to sell the war and the sacrifices to the populations, and above all to the working class of the most industrialized countries. In order to offer 'reasons' to support the war effort.
But for humanity as a whole there is no reason to support this war or any imperialist war. Still less for the exploited, revolutionary class, the proletariat. Neither on the historic, nor the economic, nor the humanitarian level (see 'The proletariat and war' in this issue). This is just a massacre of human lives, an incredible waste of technical means and productive forces, which will disappear into a bottomless pit. And at the end of it, there won't be peace, but more wars. Contrary to all the lies, there will be no peace from all this, neither in the Middle East or the rest of the planet.
The war against Iraq prepares tomorrow's wars
The defeat of Iraq will obviously be a great victory for the USA. Despite all its declarations about peace, its moralizing about good and evil, the American bourgeoisie is in reality issuing a warning to all those who may be tempted to follow Saddam Hussein's example. The USA is the world's leading imperialist power, the only 'superpower' after the collapse of the USSR. Because it is the only country that can do it, it cannot stand idly by in the face of the multiplication of local wars, the questioning of frontiers, the development of 'every man for himself' between states, in sum, of chaos. This is the warning. They will guarantee the 'world order' of which they are the main beneficiary. This is one of the reasons for the bloody intransigence of the USA, their insistence on razing Iraq, on waging war to the bitter end. But this warning is not only addressed to Saddam's potential imitators - and there are plenty of them. There is another more fundamental reason for the USA's intransigence.
It is also and above all to issue a warning to the other great powers, Germany, Japan, the European countries and to a lesser extent the USSR. America's imperialist domination is still very real. Sending its armed forces to the Middle East, making a clear and murderous demonstration of its immense military superiority, dragging others, like France for example, into the intervention, waging the war to its bitter end, crushing Iraq in fire and blood - all this is the means it uses to reinforce its global 'leadership'. And above all to snuff out any pretensions towards independence, towards the emergence of another imperialist pole capable of challenging its domination. Even if the latter is highly improbable for the moment.
This is the reason for the USA's systematic rejection of all the peace plans and proposals for negotiation involving an Iraqi withdrawal, proposed in turn by France on 15 January and the USSR before the land offensive - each time supported by Germany, Italy, etc ... This is the reason for the increasingly intransigent replies, for the increasingly harsh ultimatums issued in reply to these peace proposals.
War, tens of thousands of tons of bombs, hundreds of thousands of dead, incalculable destruction, the razing of Iraq and Kuwait so that the American bourgeoisie can affirm and strengthen its domination, its imperialist grip over a world sunk in crisis, war and decomposition. These are the real aims of the war!
It was through the perspective and unleashing of war that the American bourgeoisie succeeded despite all the problems in forcing the other powers into 'coalition' behind its war aims. Each time that the pressure eased off, the centrifugal tendencies, the tendencies towards opposition to the USA, towards the emergence of an alternative to the USA's war-drive, came to the surface (see the editorial to IR 64). Proof that these countries were well aware that their American imperialist rival had led them into a trap which would make them weaker than ever.
Once the war is over, the tensions between the USA and the European powers, Germany in particular, and Japan, will inevitably develop. Faced with the economic strength of these countries, their rise to power, the USA will be led more and more to impose an iron grip over these nascent antagonisms, to use the strength at its disposal, ie its military strength, and thus war.
The war against Iraq is the preparation for other imperialist wars. Not for peace. On the one hand, the aggravation of the economic crisis and capitalism's slide into chaos and decomposition will inevitably push countries into military adventures like Iraq's. On the other hand, and in this situation, the leading imperialist power, faced with chaos, faced with its potential rivals, will more and more use its military strength and war in order to impose its 'order' and its domination. Everything is pushing towards the accentuation of economic and military tensions. Everything is pushing towards the multiplication of imperialist wars.
This is what the bloody military victory of the western coalition announces.
In this imperialist war in the Middle East, as in any other imperialist war, it's above all the working class that pays, that is the main victim. It pays with its life when it is in uniform, enrolled by force at the battlefront, or when it simply finds itself under a rain of bombs and missiles. It pays with its sweat, its labor and its misery when it is 'lucky' enough to not be directly massacred.
Marx and Lenin are dead and buried, claimed the bourgeoisie when Stalinism fell apart. However, Karl Marx's watchword 'workers of the world unite' is as relevant and as urgent as ever faced with the nationalist, warmongering madness that is descending on the whole of humanity.
Yes, the international proletariat is the only force, the only social class that can oppose this increasingly insane and hellish machine that is capitalism in decomposition. It is the only force that can do away with this barbarism and build another society where the causes of war and poverty have disappeared.
The road is still a long one. However, we must go along it with determination because the most dramatic deadlines are approaching day by day.
The first steps are to refuse to make economic sacrifices, to reject the logic of defending the national economy. Rejecting national unity and national discipline, rejecting social peace and the logic of imperialist war, this is the road to follow. These are the slogans that revolutionaries must put forward.
The economic crisis, the sharpening trade war, is exacerbating imperialism and war. Crisis and war are two sides of the capitalist coin. The first, the crisis, leads to war. The latter in turns aggravates the crisis. The two are linked. The workers' struggle for its class demands against attacks and sacrifices, and the struggle against imperialist war, are one and the same struggle: the revolutionary struggle of the working class, the struggle for communism.
Workers of the world unite!
RL 2.3.91
As readers of our territorial press will know already, our comrade Marc is dead. In the December issue of our French territorial press, we published, as usual, the list of donations; one was accompanied with these words: “In reply to many letters which have touched me deeply, and for a first combat fought and won, this donation for the ICC’s press...” As always, our comrade fought against his disease with lucidity and courage. But in the end, it was the disease - one of the most virulent forms of cancer - that had the upper hand, the 20th December 1990. With Marc’s death, not only has our organisation lost its most experienced militant, and its most fertile mind; the whole world proletariat has lost one of its best fighters.
Marxism has long since shown, against all the ideas of bourgeois individualism, that history is not made by great individuals, but that since the appearance of social classes, “The history of all societies, to this day, has been the history of class struggle”. The same is especially true of the history of the workers’ movement whose main protagonist is precisely that class which more than any other engages in associated labour, and struggles collectively. Within the proletariat, the communist minorities that express its revolutionary nature also act collectively. In this sense, these minorities’ activities are above all anonymous, and can have nothing to do with any cult of personality. Revolutionary militants cannot exist as such, outside the whole that is the communist organisation. Nonetheless, while the organisation must be able to count on all its members, it is evident that they do not all make an equal contribution to its activity. Certain militants’ personal history, experience, or character - as well as particular historical circumstances - lead them to play a special role in the organisations to which they belong, as motive forces in their activity, and especially in the one activity which lies at the heart of their very reason for existing: working out and deepening revolutionary political positions.
Marc was one of these. In particular, he belonged to that tiny minority of militants who survived and resisted the terrible counter-revolution which battened on the working class from the 1920’s to the 60’s: militants like Anton Pannekoek, Henk Canne-Meijer, Amadeo Bordiga, Onorato Damen, Paul Mattick, Jan Appel, or Munis. Moreover, not only did he maintain his untiring loyalty to the communist cause and his complete confidence in the proletariat’s revolutionary capabilities, he was able to pass on his experience to a new generation of militants, and to avoid becoming wrapped up in analyses and positions that had been overtaken by historical events. In this sense, his whole activity as a militant is an example of what marxism means: the living, constantly developing thought of the revolutionary class, which bears with it humanity’s future.
Needless to say, our comrade was a dynamic force in pushing forward the thought and action of the political organisation within the ICC. And this remained true until his final hour. In fact, his whole life as a militant was inspired by the same approach, by the same determination to defend communist principles tooth and nail, while always maintaining a critical spirit capable whenever necessary of calling into question what seemed to many to be untouchable and “invariant” dogma[1]. His life as a militant lasted 70 years; it began in the heat of the revolution itself.
Marc was born on 13th May 1907 in Kishiniev, the capital of Bessarabia (Moldavia), at a time when the region was still part of the old Tsarist Empire. He was not yet 10 years old when the 1917 revolution began. This is how he described, on his 80th birthday, this tremendous experience, which marked his whole life:
“I had the good fortune, while still a child, to live through and experience the Russian Revolution, both in February and October. I lived it intensely. You have to understand what it meant to be a “Gavroche” [2], a child in the streets in a revolutionary period, spending the days in demonstrations, going from one to another, from one meeting to another, spending the nights in clubs full of soldiers and workers, and of discussion, talk and confrontations; a time when on any street corner, suddenly, without any preparation, someone might stand at a window and begin to speak: immediately, a thousand people would gather round and begin to discuss. It was unforgettable, and of course it has marked my whole life. On top of this, I had the luck to have an older brother who was both a soldier and a Bolshevik, the Party secretary in our town, and I ran with him, hand in hand, from one meeting to the next where he defended the positions of the Bolsheviks.
I had the good fortune to be the youngest, the fifth in a family where all, one after the other, became members of the Party until they were either killed or expelled. All this meant that I lived in a house always full of people, of youngsters, where there were always discussions going on, for at first only one was Bolshevik, while the others were more or less socialists. They were in constant debate with their comrades, their workmates... It was an enormous good fortune for a child’s education”.
In 1919 during the civil war, Moldavia was occupied by counter-revolutionary Romanian troops. Marc’s family was under threat from the pogroms (his father was a rabbi), and was forced to flee to Palestine. His brothers and elder sister were among the founders of this country’s Communist Party. Here, in 1921, Marc (still not yet 13 years old) became a militant, entering (or rather helping to found) the Communist Party’s youth organisation. He very quickly came up against the position of the Communist International on the national question: a position that, as he put it, “stuck in his throat”. This disagreement led to his first exclusion from the Party in 1923. Already, though still an adolescent, Marc displayed a quality which would remain with him throughout his life as a militant: an unfailing intransigence in the defence of revolutionary principles, even if this meant opposing “authorities” of the workers’ movement as prestigious as the leaders of the Third International, and especially Lenin and Trotsky[3]. His complete commitment to the proletarian cause, his militant involvement in the communist organisation, and his deep respect for the great figures of the workers’ movement never made him give up the fight for his own positions, when he felt that those of the organisation went against its principles, or had been overtaken by new historical circumstances. For him, as for all the great revolutionaries like Lenin or Luxemburg, adherence to marxism, to the proletariat’s revolutionary theory, meant an adherence, not to its letter but to its spirit and method. In fact, our comrade’s audacious spirit (which, again, he shared with all the great revolutionaries) was the other side of his complete and undying commitment to the cause and programme of the proletariat. Because he was steeped in marxism, he was never paralysed by the fear of abandoning it when he criticised the outdated positions of the workers’ organisations. And he first applied this approach against the support for national liberation struggles, which had become a dogma for both the Second and Third Internationals[4].
In 1924, Marc, with one of his brothers, came to live in France. There, he joined the Communist Party’s Jewish section, so becoming once again a member of the same International from which he had just been excluded. He immediately joined the opposition fighting against the degeneration of the CI and its communist parties. With Albert Treint (General Secretary of the French CP from 1923-26) and Suzanne Girault (one-time Party treasurer), he took part in the foundation of Unite Léniniste. When Trotsky’s platform of the Russian opposition was published in France, he declared himself in agreement. By contrast, and unlike Treint, he rejected Trotsky’s declaration that he had been wrong in all his disagreements with Lenin prior to 1917. Marc considered this attitude absolutely wrong, first because Trotsky did not really believe what he was saying, and secondly because such a declaration could only trap Trotsky in all the incorrect positions which Lenin had defended in the past (in particular during the 1905 revolution on the “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry”). Once again, our comrade showed his ability to maintain a critical and lucid attitude towards the “authorities” of the workers’ movement. His adhesion to the International Opposition, after his exclusion from the PCF in 1928, did not mean that he shared all positions of its most important leader, despite the admiration he felt for Trotsky. And it was thanks to this critical spirit that he avoided being dragged into the Trotskyist movement’s slide into opportunism at the beginning of the 1930’s. After taking part, with Treint, in the formation of Redressement Communiste, in 1930 he joined the Ligue Communiste (the organisation which represented the Opposition in France), and became (with Treint again) a member of its Executive Commission in October 1931.
However, after defending a minority position against the rise of opportunism, both men left the Ligue in May 1932, and helped to found the Fraction Communiste de Gauche (known as the Bagnolet Group). In 1933, this organisation split and Marc broke with Treint, who had begun to defend a position on the USSR similar to the one later developed by Chaulieu and Burnham (“Bureaucratic Socialism”). He then took part in November 1933 in the formation of Union Communiste, along with Chaze (Gaston Davoust, died 1984), with whom he had been closely linked since the early 30’s when the latter was still a member of the PCF (he was excluded in 1932), and one of the leaders of the “l5ème Rayon” (in Paris’ western suburbs) which defended opposition orientations.
Marc remained a member of Union Communiste until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. This was one of the most tragic periods for the workers’ movement: as Victor Serge put it, this was “midnight in the century”. And as Marc said himself: “For all the generations which had remained revolutionary, it was a dreadful sadness to live through these years of terrible isolation which saw the French proletariat brandishing the tricolour, the flag of the ‘Versaillais’, and singing the Marseillaise, all in the name of communism”. And this feeling of isolation reached its height in the Spanish Civil War, when many organisations that had succeeded in remaining firm on class positions were swept away by the wave of “anti-fascism”. This was the case in particular with Union Communiste, which saw the events in Spain as a proletarian revolution, a struggle where the working class held the initiative. To be sure, this organisation did not go so far as to support the “Frente Popular” government. But it did call for enrolment in the anti-fascist militia, and entered into political contact with the left wing of the POUM, an anti-fascist organisation that took part in the government of the Catalan “Generalitat”.
Marc was intransigent in the defence of class principles; he could not accept such a capitulation before the ambient anti-fascist ideology, even dressed up as “solidarity with the Spanish proletariat”. He had remained in contact with the Fraction of the Italian Left, and when he was unable to turn Union Communiste against its position of support for the war, he left the group at the beginning of 1938, to join the Italian Fraction on an individual basis. The Italian Fraction had been formed in May 1928 in Pantin (a Parisian suburb); in the torment of the Spanish Civil War, and all its betrayals, the Fraction was one of very few groups to remain true to class principles. Its intransigent rejection of all the sirens of anti-fascism was based on its analysis of the historic course as one dominated by the counter-revolution. A civil war between, not the bourgeoisie and the working class, but the bourgeois Republic allied to the “democratic” imperialist camp, and another bourgeois government allied to the “fascist” imperialist camp, could only end in world war, not revolution. The fact that the Spanish workers took up arms spontaneously against the Franco putsch in July 1936 (a fact which the Fraction welcomed, of course) opened no revolutionary perspective once they were enrolled in anti-fascist organisations like the PS, the CP, and the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, and gave up the combat on the class terrain to fight as soldiers of the bourgeois Republic led by the “Frente Popular”. And for the Fraction, one of the clearest proofs that the Spanish proletariat was stuck in a tragic dead-end, was the fact that the country wholly lacked a revolutionary party[5].
Marc continued the revolutionary struggle as a militant of the Italian Fraction, exiled in France and Belgium[6]. In particular, he became very close to Vercesi (Ottorino Perrone), who was the Fraction’s main inspiration. Many years later, Marc would explain to the young militants of the ICC how much he had learnt from Vercesi, whom he admired greatly. “It was from him that I learnt what it means to be a militant”, he said on several occasions. And indeed, the Fraction’s remarkable firmness was largely thanks to Vercesi, who had fought constantly, first in the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) at the end of World War I, then in the PCI, for the defence of revolutionary principals against these organisations’ degeneration and opportunism. Unlike Bordiga, who was the PCI’s leading figure at its formation in 1921, and who led the Left in the Party only to abandon militant life after his exclusion from the Party in 1930, Vercesi put all his experience at the service of the continuing struggle against the counter-revolution. In particular, his contribution was decisive in developing the position on the role of the fraction in a proletarian organisation, especially in periods of reaction and degeneration of the Party[7]. But his contribution went much further than this. He understood that the task which falls to revolutionaries after the defeat of the revolution, and the victory of the counter-revolution is to draw up a ‘balance-sheet’ (‘bilan’ in French, whence the name of the Italian Fraction’s publication in that language) of past experience, in order to prepare “militants for the new proletarian parties”, and this without “any taboo or ostracism” (Bilan, no 1). On this basis, he inspired within fraction the task of reflection and theoretical elaboration that made the Italian Fraction one of the most fruitful organisations in the history of the workers’ movement. In particular, although a ‘Leninist’ by training, he was not afraid to adopt Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis of the economic causes of imperialism, and her rejection of national liberation struggles. On the former point, he made the most of the debates with the Belgian Ligue des Communistes Internationalistes (an organisation which split from Trotskyism, and moved away from it), whose minority adopted the Fraction’s positions on the Spanish Civil War, to form, with the Fraction in 1937, the International Communist Left. On the basis of the lessons he drew from the degeneration of the Russian revolution and the role of the Soviet state in the counter-revolution, Vercesi (along with Mitchell of the LCI) worked out the position which rejected any identification between the proletarian dictatorship and the state which emerges after the revolution. Lastly, on the organisational level he gave the example, within the Fraction’s Executive Commission, of how debate should be conducted when serious disagreements emerge. Faced with the minority, which broke all organisational discipline by enrolling in the anti-fascist militia and refusing to pay dues, Vercesi fought the idea of an over-hasty organisational split (although by the Fraction’s rules, the minority’s members could perfectly well have been expelled) in order to let the debate develop with maximum clarity. For Vercesi, as for the Fraction’s majority, political clarity was a vital priority in the role and activity of revolutionary organisations.
Many aspects of these lessons corresponded to the political method that Marc had already adopted. He assimilated them fully during the days when he worked alongside Vercesi. And he continued to base himself on the same lessons when Vercesi in his turn began to forget them and turn against marxist positions. Just as the International Communist Left (ICL) was formed, and Bilan gave way to Octobre, Vercesi began to develop a theory of the war economy as a definitive antidote to the capitalist crisis. Disorientated by the temporary success of the economic policies of Nazism and the New Deal, he came to the conclusion that arms production, which does not weigh on the supersaturated capitalist market, would allow capitalism to overcome its economic contradictions. He considered that the fantastic rearmament effort engaged by all countries at the end of the 1930’s constituted, not preparations for a future world war, but on the contrary a means of escaping it by eliminating its underlying cause: capitalism’s economic dead-end. In this context, the various local wars, and especially the Spanish Civil War, were to be considered, not as dress rehearsals for a future generalised conflict, but as a means for the bourgeoisie to crush the working class, and so put down a rising wave of revolutionary combats. This is why the ICL’s International Bureau called its publication Octobre: because it thought a new revolutionary period had begun. These positions were a sort of posthumous victory for the Fraction’s old minority.
These positions called into question Bilan’s most important lessons, and Marc took up the fight to defend the classic positions of both the Fraction and marxism. This was all the more difficult, because he had to fight against the errors of a militant whom he held in great esteem. But the majority of the Fraction’s members were blinded by their admiration for Vercesi, and followed him in his mistakes, so that Marc found himself in a minority. In the end, Vercesi’s positions led the Italian and Belgian Fractions into complete paralysis at the outbreak of World War II; Vercesi considered that there was no point in intervening against the war because the proletariat had “disappeared socially”. Marc was unable to take up the fight against this conception immediately, since he had been called up in the French army (despite his “stateless” status)[8]. It was not until August 1940, in Marseille in southern France, that he was able to renew his political activity and to regroup the elements of the Italian Fraction living in the same city.
Most of these militants refused to accept the dissolution of the Fractions that had been proclaimed by their International Bureau, under Vercesi’s influence. In 1941, they held a conference of the Fraction, reconstituted on the basis of a rejection of the direction taken from 1937 onwards: the theory of the war economy as a means of overcoming the crisis, “localised” wars against the working class, the “social disappearance of the proletariat”, etc. The Fraction also abandoned its old position on the USSR as a “degenerated workers’ state”[9], and recognised its capitalist nature. Throughout the war, in the most difficult conditions of clandestinity, the Fraction was to hold annual conferences which brought together militants from Marseille, Toulon, Paris and Lyon; despite the German occupation, it was also able establish links with militants in Belgium. It published an internal discussion bulletin, dealing with all the questions that had led to the collapse of 1939. On reading through the bulletin’s various issues, it is clear that most of the fundamental texts combating the direction taken by Vercesi, or elaborating the new positions demanded by the evolution of the situation, are signed ‘Marco’. Our comrade, who had only joined the Italian Fraction in 1938 and was its only “foreign” member, remained its main source of inspiration throughout the war.
At the same time, Marc undertook a series of discussions with a group of young militants, mostly from Trotskyism, with whom, in May 1942, he formed the French Nucleus of the Communist Left, on the same positions as the ICL. This group gave itself the objective of forming a French Fraction, but under Marc’s influence it refused any hasty proclamation of a new Fraction, rejecting the “recruitment campaigns” and “entryism” typical of the Trotskyists.
In 1942-43, massive class combats in Italy led to the overthrow of Mussolini (25th July 1943) and the creation of the pro-Allied government of Admiral Badoglio. A text from the Fraction’s Executive Commission, signed ‘Marco’, declared that “the revolutionary revolts which will put an end to the imperialist war will create in Europe a chaotic situation which will be extremely dangerous for the bourgeoisie”; at the same time, it warned against the attempts of the “anglo-americano-russian imperialist bloc” to crush these revolts from outside, and against the efforts by the left parties to “muzzle revolutionary consciousness”. The Fraction’s conference, held in August 1943 despite Vercesi’s opposition, declared that following the events in Italy, “the Fraction’s transformation into the Party” was on the agenda in Italy itself. However, due to material difficulties, compounded by Vercesi’s inertia since he disagreed with this approach, the Fraction was unable to return to Italy to intervene actively in the combats that had begun to break out. In particular, it was unaware that at the end of 1943, Onorato Damen and Bruno Maffi had formed the “Partito Comunista Internazionalista”, with the help of one-time members of the Fraction.
At the same time, both Fraction and Nucleus had undertaken contacts and discussions with other revolutionary elements, and especially with German and Austrian refugees, the “Revolutionäre Kommunisten Deutschlands” (RKD), who had emerged from Trotskyism. With them, the French Nucleus in particular was to conduct direct propaganda against the war addressed to the workers and soldiers of all nationalities, including the German workers in uniform. This activity was obviously extremely dangerous, since it had to confront not only the Gestapo, but also the Resistance. Indeed, it was the latter which proved most dangerous for our comrade. He and his companion were taken prisoner by the FFI (Forces Francaises de l’Interieur), which were stuffed with Stalinists; they escaped from death at the latter’s hands at the last minute. But the end of the war sounded the Fraction’s death-knell. After the “liberation” of Brussels in 1944, Vercesi, in continuity with his aberrant positions, and still turning his back on the principles he had defended in the past, took charge of an “Anti-fascist Coalition”; this latter published L’Italia di Domani, which used its assistance to Italian refugees and prisoners as a cover for a clear support for the Allied war effort. At first, the Fraction did not believe the reports of Vercesi’s activity. When these proved to be true, its EC followed Marc’s lead in expelling Vercesi on 25th January 1945. This decision was not a result of the disagreements on various analytical points that existed between Vercesi and the majority of the Fraction. The policy of the EC, and especially of Marc who adopted Vercesi’s attitude towards the minority of 1936-37, was to conduct the debates with the greatest possible clarity. In 1944-45, however, Vercesi was accused not simply of political disagreement but of playing an active, and even a leading, part in a bourgeois organism directly involved in the imperialist war. But this last display of intransigence was no more than the Fraction’s swan-song. At its May 1945 Conference, the Fraction had learned of the PCInt’s existence in Italy, and the majority of its members decided to dissolve the Fraction and join the new “Party” on an individual basis. Marc fought vigorously against what he considered to be a complete negation of the whole approach on which the Fraction had been based. He demanded that the Fraction should be maintained, at least until it had been able to verify the new organisation’s positions, which were still unclear outside Italy. His caution proved wholly justified, if we consider that the Party in question, joined by elements close to Bordiga who remained in the south of Italy (certain of whom had engaged in entryism in the Italian CP), moved towards wholly opportunist positions to the point where it even compromised itself with the anti-fascist partisan movement (see our International Review nos. 32, 34). In protest against this desertion of principles, Marc announced his resignation from the EC and left the Conference; the latter also refused to recognise the French Fraction of the Communist Left (FFCL), which had been set up by the French Nucleus at the end of 1944, adopting the basic positions of the International Communist Left. Vercesi, on the other hand, joined the new “Party”, which asked for no account of his role in the Brussels anti-fascist coalition. It was the end of the effort that he had conducted himself for years, to make the Fraction a “bridge” between the old party, which had deserted to the enemy, and the new, which would be reconstituted with the resurgence of the proletarian class struggle. Far from continuing the combat for these positions, he remained ferociously hostile, along with the rest of the PCInt, to the only organisation which had remained faithful to the classic positions of the Italian Fraction and the International Communist Left: the FFCL. He even encouraged a split in the latter, which was to form another FFCL[10]. This group published a paper under the same name as the FFCL’s: L’Etincelle. It welcomed into its ranks the members of Bilan’s old minority, against whom Vercesi had fought at the time, as well as one-time members of Union Communiste. It was this second ‘FFCL’ that the PCInt and the Belgian Fraction (reconstituted after the war around Vercesi in Brussels) were to recognise as the “only representative of the Communist Left”.
Henceforth, Marc remained the only member of the Italian Left to continue with the combat and the positions that had given this organisation its strength and its political clarity. He began this new stage in his political life within the Gauche Communiste de France (French Communist Left), as the FFCL now called itself
ICC, 199
When it comes to recounting a comrade’s life, and to paying our respects to his commitment, we would have preferred to treat it as a whole and publish this article in full in the International Review. However, because his life was so much a part of this century’s history, and of the revolutionary minorities of the workers’ movement, we have felt it necessary, not just to describe our comrade’s life, but to develop at greater length the most important political questions which he had to confront, and the life of the organisations where he was a member. Given the imperatives of the international situation today, and our limited space, the article has thus been divided into two; the second part will be published in the next issue of this Review.
[1] These are only the best known among those militants who managed to pass through the period of counter-revolution without abandoning their communist convictions. But it should be said that, unlike Marc, most of them did not succeed in founding or maintaining revolutionary organisation. This was the case, for example, with Mattick, Pannekoek, and Canne-Meijer, these leading figures of the “councilist” movement were paralysed by their own conceptions of organisation, or even, in Canne-Meijer’s case (see the article “Lost Socialism”, in our International Review no. 37) by the idea that capitalism could go on overcoming its crises and so postpone indefinitely any possibility of socialism. Similarly Munis, a courageous militant who came from the Spanish section of the Trotskyist current, was never able to break completely with his original conceptions and remained trapped in a voluntarist vision which rejected the role of the economic crisis in the development of the class struggle; he was thus unable to give the new elements who joined him in the Ferment Ouvrier Révolutionnaire (FOR) a theoretical framework which would enable them to maintain the organisation’s activity on any serious level alter the death of its founder. Bordiga and Damen on the other hand, were able to set up organisations that survived their founders (the International and Internationalist Communist Parties respectively); however, they found it extremely difficult (especially in Bordiga’s case) to go beyond those positions of the Communist International, which had become out-of-date. This has proved a handicap for their organisations, and led to an extremely serious crisis in the PCI at the beginning of the 80’s, or in the PCInt’s case to a constant ambiguity on vital questions like the trade union, parliamentary or national questions (as we saw at the international conferences at the end of the 1970’s). It was also the case, to an extent, with Jan Appel, one of the great names of the KAPD who remained marked by its positions without really being able to adapt them to the present. Nonetheless, when the ICC was formed this comrade identified with our organisation’s general orientation and gave it all the support that his strength allowed. It should be noted that Marc, despite all their sometimes substantial disagreements, held all these militants in great esteem, and felt a great affection for most of them. Nor were these feelings limited to these comrades alone. They extended also to other less well-known militants, who had the immense merit in Marc’s eyes’ of having remained faithful to the revolutionary cause during the worst moments in the proletariat’s history.
[2] Gavroche is a character in Victor Hugo’s great novel Lea Misérables. He is a ten-year-old child, from a poor family, who spends most of his time in the streets. When the June 1832 insurrection breaks out in Paris, he plunges into it, and meets his death on the barricades. Since then, the name has entered the French language as a synonym for street-wise kids with the same kind of character.
[3] Marc enjoyed recalling the episode in the life of Rosa Luxemburg when she dared to stand against all the “authorities” of the Socialist International at its 1896 Congress (she was 26 years old at the time), to attack what seemed to have become an untouchable principle of the workers’ movement: the demand for Polish independence.
[4] This approach is completely opposed to Bordiga’s, who considered the proletarian programme “invariant” since 1848. This being said, it clearly has nothing to do either with the approach of “revisionists” like Bernstein, or more recently like Chaulieu [Castoriadis/Cardan], the mentor of the “Socialisme ou Barbarie” group (1949-65). It is also completely different from the approach of the councilist movement which, because the 1917 revolution ended up in a variant of capitalism, considered it no more than a bourgeois revolution, or claimed appartenance to a “new” as opposed to an “old” (i.e. Second and Third Internationals) workers’ movement, which had failed completely.
[5] On the Fraction’s attitude to the events in Spain, see in particular IRs nos. 4, 6, 7.
[6] On the Italian Fraction see our book The Italian Communist Left.
[7] On the question of the relationship between Party and Fraction, see our series of articles in the International Review nos. 59, 61, and 64.
[8] For 15 years, our comrade had no official papers other than an expulsion order from French territory; every two weeks, he had to ask the police for a “stay of execution” of the order. The very “democratic” government of France - the so-called “land of sanctuary and the rights of man” - thus held a sword of Damocles over his head, since he had to renounce all political activity: needless to say, he failed to respect this promise. When the war broke out, the same government decided that this “undesirable alien” was nonetheless perfectly apt to serve as canon-fodder in defence of the fatherland. He was taken prisoner by the Germans, but managed to escape before the occupying authorities realised that he was Jewish. With his companion Clara, he made his way to Marseille, where the police discovered his pre-war status and refused to give him any kind of official identity. Ironically, it was the military authorities who forced the civilians to alter their decision in favour of this “servant of France”, all the more “deserving” in their eyes, in that he was not even French!
[9] It should be noted that this analysis, although similar to that of the Trotskyists, never led the Fraction to call for the “defence of the USSR”. From the beginning of the 1930’s, the Fraction considered the “Soviet” state to be the worst enemy of the working class; the war in Spain perfectly illustrated this position.
[10] We should point out that despite Vercesi’s mistakes, Marc always held him personally in great esteem. This extended, moreover, to all the members of the Italian Fraction, of whom he always spoke in the warmest terms. One had to listen to Marc speaking of these militants, of Piccino, Tulio, Stefanini... workers almost to a man, to measure the affection he felt for them.
What's behind the 'new world order' announced by the western powers? What is the historic significance of the Gulf war? What stage has the world economic crisis reached? What are the perspectives for the class struggle? What should be the main themes in the intervention of revolutionaries?
These are the questions examined in this resolution adopted by the ICC in January 1991.
The phenomenon of the acceleration of history, which was pointed out by the ICC at the beginning of the 80s, has accentuated considerably in the last year and a half. In a few months, the whole configuration of the world established at the end of the Second World War was turned upside down. The collapse of the eastern imperialist bloc at the end of the 80s announced and opened the door to an end-of-the-millennium dominated by a greater instability and chaos than humanity has ever known.
1) The most immediately significant and dangerous expression of what is not a 'new order' but a new world chaos is at the level of imperialist antagonisms. The war in the Gulf has highlighted the reality of a phenomenon which flowed inevitably from the disappearance of the eastern bloc: the disintegration of its imperialist rival,' the western bloc. This phenomenon was already at the origins of Iraq's 'hold up' in Kuwait: it was because the world had ceased to be divided up into two imperialist constellations that a country like Iraq believed it possible to lay its hands on a former ally of the same bloc. This phenomenon was also revealed in an obvious manner during October in the various attempts of the European countries (notably France and Germany) and Japan to undermine US policy in the Gulf through separate negotiations in the name of freeing the hostages. The USA's aim is to make the punishment of Iraq an 'example' which will discourage any future temptations to imitate the behavior of this country (and indeed to obtain this 'example' the USA did all it could prior to 2 August to provoke and facilitate the Iraqi adventure[1]). It is targeted at the countries of the periphery, where the convulsions are so far advanced that they are permanently pushed towards adventures of this kind. But it is not limited to this aim. In fact its fundamental goal is much more general: faced with a world that is more and more falling into chaos and 'every man for himself', what's required is to impose a minimum of order and discipline, above all on the most important countries of the former western bloc. It is for this very reason that these countries (with the exception of Britain which long ago chose to .make an unbreakable alliance with the USA) have more than dragged their feet in aligning themselves with the US position and associating themselves with its war effort. While they need American power to police the world, they are concerned that too great a display of this power, which is inevitable in a direct armed intervention, will overshadow their own positions.
2) In fact the Gulf war reveals in a particularly significant way what's at stake in the new period at the level of imperialist rivalries. No longer is the world dominated by two superpowers, and imperialist antagonisms are no longer subjected to the fundamental antagonism between them. But at the same time, and as the ICC said over a year ago, such a situation, far from putting an end to imperialist confrontations, has meant that these confrontations are being unleashed more sharply than ever, in the absence of the discipline of the blocs. In this sense, imperialism and the barbarism of war, which are essential characteristics of the period of the decadence of capitalism, can only be further aggravated in the phase that we are now going through, that of the general decomposition of capitalist society. In a world dominated by chaotic wars, by the 'law of the jungle', it's up to the only superpower left - because it has the most to lose in this world disorder, and because it is the only one that has the means - to play he role of the gendarme of capitalism. And it will only be able to play this role by increasingly imprisoning the world in the iron corset of militarism. In such a situation, for a long time to come, and perhaps until the end of capitalism, the conditions don't exist for a new division of the planet into two imperialist blocs. There may be temporary and circumstantial alliances around or against the USA, but in the absence of another military superpower capable of rivaling the US (and the latter will do all it can to prevent such a power arising), the world will be ravaged by all kinds of military confrontations, which even if they are not able to lead up to a third world war, threaten to bring about the most terrible devastation, up to and including, in combination with other calamities typical of the period of decomposition (pollution, famines, epidemics), the destruction of humanity.
3) Another immediate consequence of the collapse of the eastern bloc is the considerable aggravation of the situation that caused it in the first place: economic and political chaos in the countries of Eastern Europe, and above all in the country which was their leader two years ago, the USSR. In fact this country has right now ceased to exist as a state entity: the considerable reduction in Russia's participation in the budget of the 'Union', decided by parliament on 27/12, simply confirmed the irreversible break-up and dislocation of the USSR. A dislocation that the probable reaction of the 'conservative' forces, and particularly the organs of security (as illustrated by Shevarnadze's resignation) can only delay for short time, while at the same time provoking even more chaos and bloodbaths.
Concerning the former 'peoples' democracies', their situation, while not reaching the same level of gravity as that of the USSR, can also only sink into growing chaos as can be seen right now from the catastrophic production figures (which have fallen by 40% in certain countries) and the political instability which has developed in the last few months in countries like Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland (presidential elections) and Yugoslavia (Slovenia's declaration of independence).
4) The crisis of capitalism, which in the last instance is behind all the convulsions the world is now going through, is itself being aggravated by these convulsions:
- the war in the Middle East and the resulting growth in military expenditure can only have a negative effect on the world economic situation (in contrast to the Vietnam war, for example, which made it possible to delay the American and world economy from entering into recession at the beginning of the 60s), owing to the fact that for a long time now the war economy has been one of the main factors aggravating the crisis;
- the dislocation of the western bloc can only deliver a mortal blow to the coordination of economic policy at the level of the bloc, which in the past made it possible to slow down the rhythm of the collapse of the capitalist economy. The perspective is one of a ruthless trade war (as illustrated by the recent failure of the GATT talks) in which all countries will be mauled;
- the convulsions in the zone of the former eastern bloc will also help to aggravate the world crisis by widening the scope of global chaos and, in particular, by forcing the western countries to devote considerable funds to the attempt to limit this chaos (for example by sending 'humanitarian aid' aimed at slowing down the massive emigrations into the west).
5) This said, it is important that revolutionaries show the ultimate factors behind the aggravation of the crisis:
- the generalized overproduction of a system that can't create outlets for the totality 'of commodities produced, as clearly illustrated by the new open recession which is already hitting the premier world power;
- the frenzied flight into external and internal, public and private debt by this same power all through the 80s; this may have made it possible for production to pick up momentarily in a certain number of countries, but it made the USA into easily the world's number one debtor;
- the impossibility of continuing this policy indefinitely, of buying without paying, of selling against promises which more and more obviously will never be repaid; a policy which has simply made the contradictions all the more explosive.
The demonstration of this reality is all the more important to the extent that it is a primary factor in the development of consciousness in the proletariat in the face of the current ideological campaigns. As in 1974 (when it was the 'greedy oil sheikhs') and 1980-82 (when it was the 'mad Khomeini '), the bourgeoisie will try once again (and has already done so) to blame the present open recession on a 'baddy'. Today Saddam Hussein, the 'bloody and megalomaniac dictator', the 'new Hitler' of our time, is ideal for this role. It is thus vital that revolutionaries make it very clear that the present recession, no more than the ones in 74-75 and 80-82, is not the result of a mere oil price rise, but that it began well before the Gulf crisis and that it reveals the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.
6) More generally, it is important that revolutionaries draw out of the present situation the elements most likely to facilitate the development of class consciousness.
Today, the development of consciousness is still being held back by the effects of the collapse of Stalinism and the eastern bloc. The way that the very ideas of socialism and revolution were cast into discredit last year, especially under the impact of a gigantic campaign of lies, is something that has still not been overcome. In addition, the impending massive arrival of emigrants from an eastern Europe that has fallen into chaos cannot fail to create further disarray in the working class on both sides of the old iron curtain: among the workers who imagine that they can escape from unbearable misery by exiling themselves to the western Eldorado, and among those who will have the feeling that this immigration will rob them of the meager 'gains' that they still have. This will make the latter more vulnerable to nationalist mystifications. Such a danger is particularly acute in countries like Germany which will be in the front line of any such flood of immigrants.
However, the increasingly obvious bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production, including and above all in its 'liberal' form, the growing revelation of the warmongering nature of the system, will play a powerful role in wearing out the illusions that were engendered by the events of late 1989. In particular, the promise of a 'new world order' following the disappearance of the Russian bloc has suffered a decisive blow in less than a year.
In fact, the warmongering barbarity that will more and more be a feature of capitalism in decomposition will increasingly stamp itself on the whole process through which the proletariat becomes conscious of what's at stake in its struggle. War does not constitute in itself and automatically a factor in the clarification of the proletariat's consciousness. Thus, the second world war led to a strengthening of the ideological grip of the counter-revolution. Similarly, although the sound of marching boots which has been heard since last summer has had the merit of refuting all the speeches about the new era of peace, it has also given rise, initially, to a feeling of powerlessness, an undeniable paralysis in the' great mass of the working class in the advanced countries. But the present conditions for the development of the class struggle will not allow this disarray to last for long:
- because the proletariat today, unlike in the 30s and 40s, has come out of the counter-revolution; its decisive sectors are not dragooned behind bourgeois flags such as nationalism, defense of the 'socialist fatherland', or of democracy against fascism;
- because the working class of the central countries is not directly mobilized for the war, it's not gagged by being enrolled under a military authority; this gives it much more latitude to engage in a thorough-going reflection about the barbarism of war, whose effects it will be the first to suffer through increasing austerity and poverty;
- because the profound and increasingly overt aggravation of the crisis of capitalism, of which the workers will evidently be the main victims and against which they will be forced to develop their class militancy, will more and more lead them to make the link between the capitalist crisis and war, between the struggle against the latter and the resistance against economic attacks, which will enable them to protect themselves against the traps of pacifism and inter-classist ideologies.
In reality, while the disarray provoked by the events in the Gulf may on the surface resemble the one provoked by the collapse of the eastern bloc, it obeys a different dynamic: whereas what came from the east (elimination of the vestiges of Stalinism, nationalist conflicts, immigration, etc) can only, for some time to come, have an essentially negative effect on the consciousness of the proletariat, the more and more permanent presence of war in the life of society will tend to reawaken class consciousness.
7) While despite its temporary disarray, the world proletariat still holds the key to the future in its hands, it is necessary to point out that not all sectors of the class are in the same position to offer humanity a perspective. In particular, the economic and political situation developing in the former eastern bloc countries bears witness to the extreme political weakness of the working class in this part of the world. Having been crushed by the most brutal and pernicious form of the counter-revolution - Stalinism - ; carried away by democratic and trade unionist illusions; torn apart by nationalist conflicts and confrontations between bourgeois cliques, the proletariat of Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary etc faces the most extreme difficulties in the development of its class consciousness. The struggles which the workers of these countries will be forced to wage in the face of unprecedented economic attacks will, when they are not directly diverted onto a bourgeois terrain like nationalism, come up against the whole weight of social and political decomposition, which will stifle their ability to serve as a soil for the germination of consciousness. And this will continue to be the case as long as the proletariat of the great capitalist metropoles, and particularly those of Western Europe, is unable to put forward, even at an embryonic level, a general perspective for the struggle.
8) The new stage in the process of the maturation of consciousness in the proletariat, the premises of which are being laid by the present situation of capitalism, is for the moment only at the beginning. On the one hand, the class has to go a long way to shake off the effects of the implosion of Stalinism and the way the bourgeoisie made use of it. On the other hand, even if it won't last as long as the impact of the former, the disarray produced by the campaigns around the Gulf war has yet to be overcome. In making this step, the proletariat will be confronted by the difficulties sown by the general decomposition of society and by the traps set by the forces of the bourgeoisie, especially the trade unions, which will try to channel its militancy into dead-ends, which includes pushing it into premature battles. In this process, revolutionaries will have a growing responsibility:
- in warning against all the dangers represented by decomposition, particularly, it goes without saying, the barbarity of war;
- in denouncing all the bourgeois maneuvers, an essential aspect of which will be the attempt to hide or deform the fundamental link between the struggle against economic attacks and the more general struggle against imperialist war, which will be an increasingly ubiquitous element in the life of society;
- by putting forward, against all the pacifist mystifications, and more generally, against all the bourgeois ideologies which tend to undermine the proletariat's confidence in itself and its future, the only perspective which can counter the aggravation of war: the development and generalization of the class struggle against capitalism as a whole, with the ultimate aim of overthrowing it once and for all.
4th January, 1991
Note (1): Even if they are not completely in control of this aspect (Iraq also has something to say about it), the date chosen by the USA for beginning the conflict is not the result of chance. For the USA, it's important to act quickly before the dislocation of its former bloc has gone even further; but also before the tendency towards the revival of workers' struggles (following the reflux provoked by the collapse of the eastern bloc, and given an impetus by the world recession) could manifest itself too openly, as it had begun to do before the summer of 90.
[1] Even if they are not completely in control of this aspect (Iraq has something to say about it), the date chosen by the USA for beginning the conflict is not the result of chance. For the USA, it's important to act quickly before the dislocation of its former bloc has gone even further; but also before the tendency towards the revival of workers' struggles (following the reflux provoked by the collapse of the eastern bloc, and given an impetus by the world recession) could manifest itself too openly, as it had begun to do before the summer of 90.
The present acceleration of history, capitalism's entry into its phase of decomposition, sharply poses the necessity for the proletarian revolution, as the only way out of the barbarism of capitalism in crisis. History teaches us that this revolution can only triumph if the class manages to organize itself autonomously from other classes (the workers' councils) and to secrete the vanguard that will guide it towards victory: the class party. However, today, this party doesn't exist, and many are those who simply fold their arms because, faced with the gigantic tasks that await us, the activity of the small revolutionary groups who do exist may appear to be senseless. Within the revolutionary camp itself, the majority of groups respond to the absence of the party by endlessly repeating its very Holy Name, invoking it like some kind of deus ex machina that can solve all the problems of the class. Individual disengagement and overblown declarations about commitment are two classic ways of running away from the struggle for the party, a struggle which is going on here and now, in continuity with the activity of the left fractions who broke with the degenerating Communist International in the 20s. In the first two parts of this work, we analyzed the activity of the Italian Communist Left, which was organized as a fraction in the 30s and 40s, and the premature, completely artificial foundation of the Internationalist Communist Party by the comrades of Battaglia Comunista in 1942[1]. In this third part, we first showed[2] that the method of working as a fraction in unfavorable periods when there is no possibility of a class party existing, was the very method employed by Marx himself. In this issue we will also show that this marxist method of working towards the party found its essential definition through the tenacious struggle of the Bolshevik fraction in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Against all those who gargle eulogies to the iron party of Lenin, and who refer ironically to the 'little grouplets that were the left fractions', we reaffirm that "the history of the fractions is the history of Lenin"[3] and that only on the basis of the work that they accomplished will it be possible to reconstruct tomorrow's world communist party.
In the passages cited in the previous issue, we saw how Battaglia doesn't lose any opportunity to make ironical comments about What Is To Be Done of 1902 being the perfect text book for the fractionists, and to paint a distorted picture of things for the umpteenth time[4]. If the comrades would stop getting so excited about the word party and would begin a sober study of the history of the party, they would discover that What Is To Be Done in 1902 could hardly talk about the Bolshevik fraction, due to the fact that it was formed in Geneva in June ... 1904 (the meeting of the '22')[5]. It's from here that the Bolsheviks began to develop the notion of the fraction and its relations with the whole party, a notion which took a definitive form with the 1905 revolution, and above all the period of reaction which allowed its defeat[6].
"A faction is an organization within a party, united, by its place of work, language or other objective conditions, but by a particular platform of views on questions"[7].
"A party can contain a whole gamut of opinions and shades of opinion, the extremes of which may be sharply contradictory ... That is not the case within a section. A section in a party is a group of like-minded persons formed for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principles in the party in the purest possible form. For this, real unanimity of opinion is necessary. The different standards we set for party unity and sectional unity must be grasped by everyone who wants to know how the question of the internal discord in the Bolshevik section really stands"[8].
"But as a wing, ie a union of like-minded people in the party, we cannot work without unanimity on fundamental issues. To break away from a wing is not the same as breaking away from the Party. The people who have broken away from our wing in no way lose the possibility of working in the Party"[9].
The fraction was thus seen as an organization within the party, clearly identified and with a precise platform, and which fights to influence the party, with the final aim of seeing its principles triumph in the party "in their purest form", ie. without any mediation or homogenization. The fraction works within the party, with other fractions defending other platforms, so that practical experience and public political debate allow the whole party to recognize which platform is most correct. This coexistence is possible on condition that there is no room in the party for those who have already taken choices which will lead them out of the party, so that keeping them within the organization can only lead to the liquidation of the organization itself. In Russia this applied to the 'liquidators' who fought for the dissolution of the illegal party and its submission to Tsarist 'legality'. There was a fundamental difference between the Bolsheviks and the other fractions precisely on this point: while the latter in general condemned the liquidators, they still considered them to be members of the party. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, considered that there could be a place in the socialist party for all opinions - except those which are anti-socialist:
"The very foundation of conciliation ism is false - the wish to base the unity of the party of the proletariat on an alliance of all factions, including the anti-Social Democratic, non-proletarian factions; false are its unprincipled 'unity' schemes which lead to nothing; false are its phrases against 'factions' (when in fact a new faction is formed) ... "[10].
It is interesting to note that these lines by Lenin were directed against Trotsky, who, within the RSDLP, was the main opponent of the organized existence of fractions, something he saw as useless and damaging for the party. Trotsky's total incomprehension of the necessity for fraction work would have catastrophic consequences during and after the degeneration of the Russian revolution.
"It should be noted that Trotsky - on all the questions relating to the 1905 revolution, and during the whole period that followed - was generally with the Bolsheviks on all questions of principle and with the Mensheviks on all questions of organization. His incomprehension of the correct notion of the party, during the course of this period, resulted in him standing 'outside the fractions' in favor of unity at any price.
His pitiful position of today - which is pushing him into the arms of social democracy - proves to us that on this question, Trotsky has learned nothing from events"[11].
Naturally, Lenin was violently attacked, both in the Russian movement and the international movement, for his sectarianism, his mania for splits, and everyone sang fine songs about the 'end of factionalism'. In fact, Lenin was the first to be for the end of factionalism, because he knew quite well that the existence of fractions was the symptom of a crisis in the party. But he also knew that the open, practical struggle of the fraction was the only remedy for the party's malady, since it was only through a public confrontation of platforms that a clear way forward could emerge.
"Every faction is convinced that its platform and its policy are the best means of abolishing factions, for no one regards the existence of factions as ideal. The only difference is that factions with clear, consistent, integral platforms openly defend their platforms, while unprincipled factions hide behind cheap shots about their virtue, about their non-factionalism"[12].
One of the big lies inherited from Stalinism is that Bolshevism was a monolithic tradition where there was no place for empty chatter and pseudo-intellectual debate; this lie is in continuity with the Mensheviks' constant accusation that the Bolsheviks were 'closed to debate'. Of course, it's quite true that among the Mensheviks and the conciliators, discussion was 'free', whereas among the Bolsheviks it was obligatory. But it's true in the sense that the first felt free to discuss when it suited them and to keep quiet when they had divergences to hide. For the Bolsheviks on the other hand, discussion wasn't free, it was obligatory, and became all the more obligatory when divergences arose within the fraction, divergences which had to be discussed publicly so that they could either be reabsorbed or pushed to their conclusion, with an organizational separation based on clear motives.
"That is why we have initiated a discussion on these questions in Proletary. We have published everything that was sent to us, and reprinted all that the Bolsheviks in Russia have written on the subject. So far, we have not rejected a single contribution to the discussion, and we shall continue to pursue the same course. Unfortunately, the otzavist comrades and those who sympathize with them have, so far, sent us little material, and, in general, have avoided making a frank and complete statement of their theoretical credo in the press. They prefer to talk 'among themselves'. We invite all comrades, otzavists and orthodox Bolsheviks alike, to state their views in the columns of Proletary. If necessary we shall publish these contributions in pamphlet form .... Our supporters should not be afraid of an internal ideological struggle, once it is necessary. They will be all the stronger for it"[13].
This demonstrates that Lenin made an enormous contribution to the historic definition of the nature and function of the fraction, in spite of all Battaglia's quips about the "ten commandments of the fractionist faith". Let's note in passing that Battaglia also talks in one phrase about the party alternative from 1902 on, and in another, says that the party was acting as such "at least from 1912". So what was Lenin doing between 1902 and 1912 if he wasn't doing fraction work? Macrobiotic cooking? Actually what BC is really concerned about is affirming that the Bolsheviks didn't restrict themselves to theoretical work and the formation of cadres, but that they worked towards the masses and thus couldn't have been a fraction. For Battaglia, if you choose to work as a fraction, you're running away from the class struggle, refusing to dirty your hands with the problems of the masses, which means "limiting yourself to a policy of measured proselytism and propaganda, focusing on the study of so-called basic problems, reducing the tasks of the party to the tasks of a fraction if not of a sect"[14].
The lines are drawn: on one side you have Lenin, who thinks of the masses, and who thus can only be in the party; on the other, the Italian Left in exile in the 30s, which works as a fraction and can therefore be no more than a club of students and little professors. We've seen what Lenin's real activity was; let's now look at the real activity of the Italian Left:
"It might seem that the tasks of the fraction are exclusively didactic. But such a criticism can be refuted by marxists with the same argument used against those charlatans who consider that the proletariat's struggle for the revolution and for the transformation of the world can be put at the same level as electoral activity.
It is perfectly true that the specific role of the fractions is above all a role of educating cadres through the experience of events, and thanks to the rigorous confirmation of the significance of these events. However, it is also true that this work, above all an ideological one, is done in consideration of the mass movements and constantly supplies the political solution for their success. Without the work of the fractions, Lenin himself would have been a mere bookworm, not a revolutionary leader.
The fractions are thus the only historic place where the proletariat can continue its work for its class organization. From 1928 until now, comrade Trotsky has completely neglected this work of building fractions, and, because of this, he has not contributed to realizing the effective conditions for mass movements"[15].
As can be seen, Battaglia' s sarcasms about the fraction as a sect running away from the masses fall very flat. Bilan's concern was the same as the Bolsheviks' "to contribute to the realization of the effective conditions for mass movements". The fact that the Bolsheviks had much greater links with the masses in the 1910s than the Italian Left in the 30s did not derive from the personal features of so-and-so, but from the objective conditions of the class struggle, which differed hugely. The Bolshevik fraction was not made up of a group of comrades who had survived the degeneration of the party in a period of counter-revolution and deep defeat for the proletariat. It was a part (often the majority) of a mass proletarian party (like all the parties of the 2nd International), which was constituted in an immediately pre-revolutionary phase which for two years (1905-6) was to shake the entire Russian empire, from the Urals to Poland. If you want to make a quantitative comparison between the activity of the fraction of the Italian Left and that of the Bolsheviks, you must refer to a period which has certain historically comparable aspects, ie. the revolutionary years between 1917 and 1921. In those years, the Abstentionist Communist Fraction (the left fraction of the PSI) developed to the point that when it constituted itself as the Communist Party of Italy, it absorbed into its ranks one third of the membership of the old mass socialist party and all the youth federations. The comrades who had been able to guide this process were the ones who ten years later were militating in the Left Fraction in exile, but by then they had been reduced to a small handful. What had changed? Was it that those comrades no longer had the will to lead mass movements? Obviously not:
"Since we have been in existence, it has not been possible for us to lead any class movements. It has to be understood that this isn't anything to do with our will, our incapacity, or the fact that we are a fraction. It is the result of a situation of which we have been a victim, just as the world-wide revolutionary proletariat has also been a victim of it" (Bilan 28, 1935).
What had changed was the objective situation of the class struggle, which had gone from a pre-revolutionary phase which put on the agenda the transformation of the fraction into a party, to a counter-revolutionary phase which compelled the fraction to resist against the tide, to carry on a work which would contribute to the eventual emergence of a new situation, again putting on the agenda the transformation of the fraction into a party.
As always, when one criticizes the positions of Battaglia, one has to return to the crucial issue, ie. the conditions for the rebirth of the party. We've seen how BC would like to whitewash Lenin of the infamous charge of adhering to the ''fractionist faith", from as early as 1902. In their willingness to make concessions, they grit their teeth and are ready to admit that the Bolshevik party only existed after 1912, on condition that it's clear that the party did exist as such before the revolutionary period which began in February 1917. What they try to avoid admitting at any cost is that the struggle of the Bolshevik fraction of the RSDLP was concluded by its transformation into the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in 1917, because that would mean admitting that
"the transformation of the fraction into a party is conditioned... by the upsurge of revolutionary movements enabling the fraction to assume the leadership of struggles for the insurrection" (Bilan KNOB. 1933). We thus have to clear up whether or not this transformation took place in 1912 - five years before the revolution.
What did happen in 1912? In Prague there was a conference of the territorial organizations of the RSDLP, the groups working in Russia. This conference reorganized the party after it had been demolished by the reaction which followed the defeat of the 1905 revolution, and elected a new Central Committee to replace the one which was thenceforward dissolved. The conference and the CC were dominated by the Bolsheviks, whereas the other tendencies in the RSDLP didn't participate in Lenin's 'splitting' initiative. At first sight, it looks as though Battaglia is right: a conference of Bolsheviks has taken the initiative of reconstructing the party, independently of the other fractions; thus, from now on, the Bolsheviks are acting as a party, without waiting for the opening of a pre-revolutionary phase. But if we look a bit closer, we can see that things are rather different. The birth of a revolutionary fraction within the old party takes place in reaction to the party's illness, to its inability to come up with an adequate response to the necessities of history, to lacunae in its programme. The transformation of the fraction into the party doesn't mean that we just return to the old status quo, to the old party purged of opportunists; it means the formation of a new party, founded on a new program which eliminates previous ambiguities and takes up the principles of the revolutionary fraction "in their purest form". Otherwise you would simply be going back to where you started, and that would lay the groundwork for the reappearance of all the opportunist deviations that had just been chased away. And is this what Lenin did in 1912, transform the fraction into a party based on a new program? Not at all. In the first place, the resolution approved by the conference declared that it had been called with the aim of "rallying all the Party organizations in Russia irrespective of factional affiliation, and (of) re-establishing our Party as an all-Russian organization"[16]. It was thus not a purely Bolshevik conference, all the more because its organization was to a large extent carried out by the Kiev territorial committee which was dominated by pro-party Mensheviks, and it was a Menshevik who presided over the commission for the verification of mandates[17]. There was no talk of modifying the old program and the decisions taken consisted simply in putting into practice the resolutions condemning the liquidators, approved in 1908 and 1910 by "the representatives of all the factions". Thus the conference was not only composed of party members, "irrespective of factional affiliation", but was based on a resolution approved by "all the factions". It's obvious that this wasn't the constitution of the new Bolshevik party, but simply the reorganization of the old social democratic party. It's worth underlining that such a reorganization was only considered possible "in association with the revival of the workers' movement"[18] after the years of reaction between 1907 and 1910. As we can see, Lenin not only didn't think of founding a new party before the revolutionary battles, but didn't even have the illusion of reorganizing the old party in the absence of a new period of struggle. The comrades of Battaglia - and not only them - are so hypnotized by the word party that they have become incapable of analyzing facts lucidly, reading something as a decisive turning point when it was only an important step in the process of demarcation with opportunism. The election of a Central Committee in 1912 by a conference dominated by Bolsheviks cannot be considered to be the end of the fraction phase and the beginning of the party phase, for the simple reason that in London in 1905 there had been an exclusively Bolshevik conference which proclaimed itself to be the III Congress of the party, and which had elected an entirely Bolshevik CC, considering the Mensheviks to be outside the party. But by the following year, Lenin had recognized that this had been a mistake, and at the 1906 congress the party was reunified, maintaining the two fractions as fractions of the same party. In a similar way, between 1912 and 1914, Lenin considered that the period of the struggle of the fraction was coming to an end and that the time had come for a definitive selection. This may have been true from a strictly Russian point of view, but it would certainly have been premature from an international point of view:
"Lenin's fractional work took place uniquely within the Russian party and there was no attempt to expand it onto the international level. To be convinced of this you only have to read his interventions at different congresses and you'll see that this work remained completely unknown outside the Russian sphere."[19].
In fact, the definitive selection took place in the years 1914 to 1917, in the face of the dual test of war and revolution, dividing the socialists into social patriots and internationalists. Lenin was well aware of this and - as in 1906 when he fought for the unification of the party - in February 1915, replying to Trotsky's Nashe Slovo group, he wrote:
"We agree absolutely with you that the union of all the real internationalist social-democrats is one of the most vital tasks of the present moment"[20]. The problem was that for Lenin the unification of the internationalists in a really communist party was only possible if one made a clear break with those who weren't really internationalists, whereas Trotsky, as usual, wanted to reconcile the irreconcilable, wanted to base the unity of the internationalist party "on the union of all the fractions", including those who weren't prepared to break with the enemies of internationalism. For three years, Lenin fought incessantly against these illusions, transferring his fractional struggle for clarity from the purely Russian soil to the international one of the Zimmerwald Left[21]. This grandiose international struggle was the apogee and conclusion of the Bolshevik's fraction work, which would bear its fruit with the outbreak of the revolution in Russia. Thanks to this tradition of struggle and to the development of a revolutionary situation, Lenin was able, as soon as he returned to Russia, to propose the unification of the Bolsheviks with the other consistent internationalists, on the basis of a new program and under the name of the Communist Party, replacing the old term 'social democrat'. This led to the final selection, with the Bolshevik right (Voitinsky, Goldenberg) going over to Menshevism, while the 'Old Bolshevik' center (Zinoviev, Kamenev) opposed Lenin in the name... of the old program upon which the 1912 conference had based itself. Lenin was accused of being the "gravedigger of the party's tradition"; he replied by showing that the entire struggle of the Bolsheviks had simply been the preparation for a real communist party:
"Let us create a proletarian Communist Party; its elements have already been created by the best adherents of Bolshevism"[22]. Here is the conclusion of the grand struggle of the Bolshevik fraction; here is the real transformation into the party. We say real because, from a formal point of view, the name Communist Party wasn't adopted until March 1918, and the definitive version of the new program would only be ratified in March 1919. But the substantial transformation took place in April 1917 (VIII Pan-Russian Bolshevik Conference). We shouldn't forget that what distinguishes a party from a fraction is its capacity to have a direct influence on events. The party is "a program, but also a will to action" (Bordiga), providing obviously that this will is expressed in conditions objectively favorable to the development of a class party. In February 1917, there were only a few thousand Bolsheviks and they had not played any leadership role in the spontaneous uprising which opened the revolutionary period. At the end of April, there were more than 60,000 of them and they were already standing out as the only real opposition to the bourgeois Provisional Government. With the acceptance of the April Theses and the necessity to adopt a new program, the fraction became a party and posed the bases of Red October.
In the next part of this work, we will see how the particular, historically original conditions of the degeneration of the Russian revolution prevented the emergence of a left fraction that could resume, inside the degenerating Bolshevik party, Lenin's battle inside the social democratic party. The incapacity of the Russian opposition to form itself into a fraction would later be at the root of the historic failure of the Trotskyist international opposition, whereas the Italian Left, by carrying on the methods of Marx and Lenin, was able to form itself into the International Communist Left in 1937[23]. We will also see how the abandonment of these methods by the comrades who founded the Internationalist Communist Party in 1943 has been the source of the incapacity to act as a pole of revolutionary regroupment displayed by the two organizations (Battaglia, Programma Comunista) who derive from that party .
Beyle.
[1] The first two parts were published in IR 59 and 61. For a deeper analysis of the activity of this current, we recommend reading our two pamphlets La Gauche Communiste D'Italie 1927-52 and Rapports entre la fraction de gauche du PC d'Italie et l'Opposition de Gauche Internationale 1929-33
[2] See ‘Third Part: from Marx to Lenin, 1848-1917. 1. From Marx to the Second International' in IR 64
[3] Bordiga's intervention at the 6th Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International, in 1926
[4] "In 1902, Lenin had laid the tactical and organizational bases upon which were to be built the alternative to the opportunism of Russian social democracy, a party alternative, unless you want to pass off What Is To Be Done as the ten commandments of the fractionist faith" (‘Fraction and Party in the Experience of the Italian Left', Prometeo 2, March 1979).
[5] The Bolshevik (‘Majority') at the 1903 congress of the RSDLP were the fruit of a temporary alliance between Lenin and Plekhanov. The 1904 fraction called itself Bolshevik in order to lay claim to the positions defended by the Congress majority of 1903
[6] It is significant that the complete theorization of the concept of the fraction by Lenin was not achieved until the years of reaction following the 1905 revolution. It is only the activity of the fraction that makes it possible to hold out in unfavorable periods.
[7] ‘The new faction of conciliators, or the virtuous', Social Democrat no. 24, October 18 (31), Lenin, Collected Works, 17
[8] ‘Conference of the extended editorial board of Proletary, 8-17 (21-30) June 1901, supplement to no 46 of Proletary, Collected Works, 15.
[9] ‘The liquidation of liquidationism', Proletary no. 46, 11 (24) July 1909, Collected Works, 15
[10] Idem note 4
[11] ‘The problem of the fraction in the Second International', Bilan 24, 1935
[12] Idem note 4
[13] ‘On the article Questions of the Day', Poletary no 42, 12 (25) February 1909, Collected Works, 15. Otzovism was a dissident current inside the Bolshevik fraction in the darkest years of the reflux, it tended towards reducing fraction work to that of a mere network.
[14] Political Platform of the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Communista), 1952. In a recent publication of this text (1982), this passage was reproduced unchanged.
[15] ‘Towards the Two and Three-Quarter International', in Bilan 1, 1933; extracts published in the Bulletin D'etude et de Discussion, Revolution Internationale, no 6, April 1974.
[16] 6th General Conference of the RSDLP, Prague conference 6-17 (18-30) January 1912, Resolution on the Russian organizing commission for the convening of a conference, Collected Works, 17
[17] ‘The situation in RSDLP and the immediate tasks of the Party', 16 July 1912, Gazeta Robotnicza no. 15-16, Collected Works, 18: "It was a delegate from that organization (Kiev) that was chairman of the Credentials Committee at the Conference!"
[18] Taken from the resolutions of the conference. Lenin came back to this subject in 1915: "The years 1912-14 marked the beginning of a great new revolutionary upswing in Russia. We again witnessed a great strike movement, the like of which the world has never known. The number involved in the mass revolutionary strike in 1913 was, at the very lowest estimate, one and a half million, and in 1914 it rose to over two million, approaching the 1905 level" (Socialism and War, July-August 1915, Chapter II, ‘The working class and the war', Collected Works, 21.
[19] ‘The problem of the Fraction in the II International', Bilan 24, 1935.
[20] Letter from the CC of RSDLP to the editorial board of Nashe Slovo, 10 (23) March 1915, Collected Works, 15
[21] For a better understanding of the role of the Bolsheviks in the Zimmerwald Left, see our article in IR 57.
[22] ‘The dual power', Pravda no. 28, 9 April 1917, Collected Works, 24
[23] For an analysis of the work of the Italian Fraction in the 30s, see the first part of this work, in IR 59.
IR 65 2nd Qtr 1991
The fantastic violence of the Gulf War has served as a reminder that capitalism means war. The historic responsibility of the working class, as the only force capable of opposing capital, has been highlighted all the more. But to take up this responsibility, the revolutionary class must reappropriate the theoretical and practical experience of its own struggle against war. It must draw from this experience confidence in its revolutionary capacities and the means to fight successfully.
The world working class has suffered from the Gulf war, not only as a massacre of a part of itself, but also as a stupefying blow from the ruling class.
But the balance of forces between the proletariat and the local ruling class is not the same on each side of the battle front.
In Iraq, the government was able to send conscripts to the slaughter: workers, peasants and their children (sometimes only 15 years old). The working class is in a minority, drowned in a rural or semi-marginalised slum population. Its historical experience of struggle against capital is virtually nil. And above all, the absence of any significant struggles on the part of the workers in the most industrialised countries makes it unable to imagine the possibility of a truly internationalist combat. It has therefore been unable to resist the ideological and military control that forced it to serve as canon-fodder for the imperialist ambitions of its bourgeoisie. The ability of workers in these regions to overcome religious or nationalist mystifications depends first and foremost on the internationalist, anti-capitalist stance of the proletarians in the central countries.
The situation is different in the imperialist metropoles of Britain, France or the United States. The bourgeoisie had to send professional armies into the massacre. Why? Because the balance of forces between the classes was not the same. The ruling class knows that the workers are not ready, yet again, to pay the blood tax. Since the end of the sixties and the renewal of struggles marked by the massive 1968 strikes in France, the oldest working class in the world – and which has already suffered two world wars – has acquired an immense distrust of all the bourgeoisie’s politicians and their promises, and of the so-called “working class” organisations (left parties, trade unions), designed to keep them under control. It is this combativity, this disengagement from the ruling ideology, which has up to now prevented the outbreak of World War III, and the enlistment, once again, of the workers in an imperialist conflict.
However, recent events have shown that this is not enough to prevent capitalism from making war. If the working class went no further than this “implicit” resistance, then capital would eventually put the whole planet, including its industrial centres, to fire and sword.
The 1917-23 revolutionary wave, which put an end to World War I, showed that the proletariat is the only force able to stand against the barbarity of decadent capitalism’s imperialist war. The bourgeoisie is doing everything it can to make workers forget this, and to submerge them in a feeling of impotence, especially through the current gigantic campaign on the collapse of the USSR, with its ignoble lie: “the workers’ revolutionary struggle can only lead to the gulag and the most totalitarian militarism”.
For the working class today, to “forget” its revolutionary nature would mean a suicide that would drag the whole of humanity down with it. If it is left in the hands of the capitalist class, then human society is heading for a definitive disaster. The technological barbarity of the Gulf war is there to remind us. If the proletariat, the producer of the greater part of social wealth, lets itself be lulled by the sirens of pacifism and their hypocritical hymns to a capitalism without war, if it lets itself be dissolved in the rotten atmosphere of “every man for himself”, if it is unable to rediscover the path of the revolutionary struggle against capitalism as a system, then the human race will be definitively condemned to barbarity and destruction. “War or revolution. Socialism or barbarism”; more than ever, the question is posed thus.
More than ever, it is urgent that the proletariat reappropriate its historical lucidity and experience, the result of more than two centuries’ struggle against capital and its wars.
The proletariat, because it is the bearer of communism, is the first class in history to be able to envisage war as something other than an eternal and inevitable scourge. From the start, the workers’ movement declared its general opposition to capitalism’s wars. The Communist Manifesto, whose publication in 1848 corresponded to the first struggles where the proletariat stood forward on history’s stage as an independent force, is unequivocal: “The workers have no country... Workers of all countries, unite!”
The proletariat and war during the 19th century
The attitude of proletarian political organisations towards war has, logically, differed according to historical periods. In the 19th century, some capitalist wars still had a progressive anti-feudal character, in that they encouraged the development of the necessary conditions for the future communist revolution, through the formation of new nations and the growth of the productive forces. On several occasions, the marxist current was thus led to take a position in favour of one camp or the other in a national war, or to support the liberation struggle in certain nations (e.g., Poland against the Russian empire, the bastion of feudalism in Europe).
But in every case, the workers’ movement has always considered war as a capitalist scourge whose first victims are the exploited classes. Important confusions existed, at first because of the immaturity of historical conditions, then because of the weight of reformism. At the time of the First International’s foundation (1864), it was thought that a means to put an end to war had been found in the demand for the replacement of standing armies by people’s militias. This position was criticised from within the International itself, which declared in 1867 “ that it is not enough to abolish standing armies to do away with war; to this end, a transformation of the entire social order is also necessary”. The Second International, founded in 1889, also took position against wars in general. But this was the golden age of capitalism, and of the development of reformism. The International’s First Congress went back to the old slogan of “replacing the standing armies with people’s militias”. At the London Congress in 1896, a resolution on war declared: “the working class in all countries must oppose the violence provoked by war”. In 1900, the International’s parties had grown, and even had representatives in the Parliaments of the most important countries. One principal was solemnly stated: “the socialist members of parliament in every country are required to vote against military and naval credits, and against colonial expeditions”.
But in reality, the question of war had not yet been sharply posed. Apart from the colonial expeditions, the watershed between the two centuries was still marked by peace between the main capitalist powers. It was still the “belle époque”. While the conditions that would lead to the outbreak of World War I ripened, the workers’ movement seemed to be advancing from social conquest to parliamentary triumph, and for many the question of war seemed to be a purely theoretical one.
“All this explains – and we are speaking here from experience – the fact that we, the generation that struggled before the 1914 imperialist war, perhaps considered the problem of war more as an ideological struggle than as a real and imminent danger; the conclusion of several serious conflicts, such as Fashoda or Agadir, without recourse to arms, led us to believe, wrongly, that economic “interdependence”, the ever more numerous and tighter links between countries, formed a sure defence against the outbreak of war between the European powers, and that the different imperialisms’ growing military preparations, rather than leading inevitably to war, confirmed the Roman principle “si vis pacem para bellum”: if you want peace, prepare for war” (Gatto Mamonne, in Bilan no. 21, 1935 [1] [55]).
The conditions of this period of capitalism’s apogee, the development of the mass workers’ parties with their parliamentary representatives and their enormous union bureaucracies, the real reforms torn from the capitalist class, all encouraged the development of reformist ideology within the workers’ movement, and of its corollary: pacifism. The workers’ organisations were infected by the illusion of a capitalism without wars.
Against reformism, there emerged a left wing that stuck to revolutionary principals and understood that capitalism was entering into its phase of imperialist decadence. Rosa Luxemburg, and the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social-Democratic party maintained and developed revolutionary positions on the question of war. At the Stuttgart Congress of the International in 1907, they managed to have adopted an amendment that shut the door on pacifist conceptions. This stated that it was not enough to fight against an eventual outbreak of war, or to bring it to an end as quickly as possible, but that during the war it was necessary “to profit in any way possible from the economic and political crisis to rouse the people and in this way hasten the collapse of capitalist domination”. In 1912, under the pressure of the same minority, the Basle Congress denounced the coming European war as “criminal” and “reactionary”, “accelerating the capitalism’s downfall by inevitably provoking the proletarian revolution”.
Despite the adoption of these positions, when war broke out two years later the International collapsed. The leaderships of the national parties, rotten with reformism and pacifism, lined up alongside their national bourgeoisies in the name of “defence against aggression”. The Social-Democrat members of parliament voted the war credits.
Only the revolutionary minorities within the main parties, grouped around the German Spartakists and the Russian Bolsheviks, continued the fight against the war.
The revolutionary struggle puts an end to World War I
The revolutionary forces were now reduced to their simplest expression. When they met for the first time at the international conference of 1915 at Zimmerwald, Trotsky could joke that the proletariat’s revolutionary representatives could fit into a few taxis. But their intransigent internationalist position, their perspective of revolution rising from the war, and that only this revolution rising from the war, and that only this revolution could put an end to the barbarity that had been unleashed, were to be born out by events. By 1915, the first strikes broke out against the privations caused by the war, notably in Britain. In 1916, the workers in Germany and Russia took up the struggle, despite ferocious repression. In February 1917, a demonstration of Russian working class women against shortages set in motion the process that was to lead to the proletariat’s first international revolutionary attempt.
We have not the space here to recount, even briefly, the history of the struggles that put an end to the imperialist slaughter through the Russian workers’ soviets’ seizure of power in October 1917, and the 1918-19 insurrection by the German proletariat. We want here to highlight, nonetheless, two fundamental lessons of this experience.
The first is that, contrary to the claims of the bourgeoisie’s disgusting propaganda, the exploited classes are not impotent and weaponless against capital and its wars. If the proletariat is capable of uniting consciously, if it succeeds in discovering its own enormous strength, then it can not only prevent capitalist war, it can disarm the power of capital and overthrow its armed power by disintegrating it. The revolutionary wave which put an end to World War I has provided practical proof that the combat of the working class constitutes the only force able to halt the military barbarity of capitalist decadence, and this society’s only revolutionary force.
The second lesson concerns the relation between the proletariat’s struggle in the workplace and the struggle of soldiers in the barracks and at the front. However important the soldiers’ struggle, and the fraternisation of German and Russian soldiers in the trenches during World War I, they were not at the heart of the revolution which put an end to the war, but a moment within it. These actions were preceded by a whole fermentation in the factories, whether in the form of strikes, or of demonstrations against the effects of the war. Soldiers’ desertions, and actions against officers only became truly massive and determining once they became part of the proletarian movement, which shook the bourgeoisie’s power in its economic and political centres. Without the massive political and revolutionary struggle of the working class, there is no real struggle against capitalist war.
The proletariat unable to prevent World War II
The proletariat did not succeed in renewing its revolutionary struggle during World War II, despite the hopes of the revolutionary minorities, and despite the workers’ struggles that marked its end, especially Germany, Italy and Greece. The fundamental reason was that the working class had not yet got over the physical and ideological defeat it suffered during the Social-Democrat and Stalinist counter-revolution of the 20s and 30s.
The defeat of the 1919-23 German revolution, the isolation and degeneration of the Russian revolution have had tragic consequences for the whole workers’ movement. The very form that the counter-revolution took in Russia during the 20’s and 30’s – Stalinism – has been a source of inextricable confusion. The counter-revolution came dressed in the clothes of the revolution.
Despite their exemplary combativity, the Spanish workers’ struggles in 1936 were derailed onto the terrain of anti-fascism and the defence of the bourgeois republic. On the international scale, fascism and anti-fascism (notably the left parties and the Popular Fronts) shared the task of enrolling the workers by terror, or by lies presenting bourgeois democracy as a workers’ conquest, to be defended to the detriment of their own class interests. By the time war broke out, the proletariat was ideologically under control. The bourgeoisie turned the workers into cannon-fodder once again, without them being able to rediscover their class consciousness and their ability to resist and organise. The horrors of war were not enough to open their eyes, and set them anew one the road to revolutionary struggle.
The ruling class had also learnt from experience since the First World War. In 1917-18, the bourgeoisie had been “surprised” by the proletarian revolutionary struggle. This time, it kept constantly in mind, at the beginning, but especially at the end of the war, the immense fear it had felt 25 years before. With absolutely conscious cynicism, Churchill left the Fascist government, supported by the Germans, to suppress the workers’ revolts in Italy during 1943; Stalin stopped the Russian army within sight of Warsaw, allowing the Nazis to massacre the popular uprising in the city; and the Allied forces, after the German bourgeoisie’s capitulation and in cooperation with it, prevented the return of POW’s to Germany in order to avoid any explosion that their mingling with the civilian population might have provoked. The reasons for the systematic extermination of the civilian population by the allied bombardments of the working class districts in Germany (Hamburg, Dresden: twice as many dead as at Hiroshima) were not purely military.
During the war, the bourgeoisie was dealing with proletarian generations whose revolutionary strength had been shattered by the deepest counter-revolution in history. All the same, the ruling class took no risks.
On the whole, the effect of the war on the world proletariat was of another annihilation, which it would take decades to recover from.
The renewal of the class struggle since 1968
Since World War II, the planet has not had a moment’s peace. The main imperialist powers have continued to confront each other militarily, mostly through local conflicts (Korea, the Arab-Israeli wars) but also through the so-called “national liberation struggles” (Indochina, Algeria, Vietnam, etc). The working class has only been able to suffer under these wars, as under the effects of capitalism as a whole.
But with the massive strike of 1968 in France, followed by the struggles in Italy 1969, Poland 1970, and elsewhere, the proletariat returned to the historical stage. It rediscovered massive combat on its own class terrain, and escaped the crushing weight of the counter-revolution. At the very moment that the capitalist crisis provoked by the end of the reconstruction period pushed world capital towards a Third World War, the working class was detaching itself from the dominant ideology, slowly, but enough to make its immediate enrolment in another imperialist massacre impossible.
Today, after 20 years of stalemate where the ruling class has been unable to unleash its “solution” of worldwide apocalypse, but where the proletariat has not had the strength to impose its own revolutionary solution, capitalism has entered a state of decomposition which engenders a new kind of conflict: the Gulf war is its first major concretisation.
For the world working class, and especially for workers in the main industrialised countries, the warning is clear: either the class will be able to develop its fight to a revolutionary conclusion, or the dynamic of decomposing capitalism, from one “local” war to the next, will eventually call humanity’s very survival into question.
First of all, what the working class must reject.
Pacifism means impotence
Before the Gulf war began, as before the First and Second World Wars, capitalism was readying its physical weapons, its warmongering brainwash, and its ideological weapon of capitalism.
“Pacifism” is not defined by the demand for “peace”. Everybody wants peace. The warmongers themselves never stop proclaiming that they only want war in order to prepare for peace. The distinguishing feature of pacifism is its claim that it is possible to fight for peace, as such, without touching the foundations of capitalist power. The proletarians whose revolutionary struggle, in Russia and Germany, put an end to World War I, also wanted peace. But their combat’s success was because they fought not with the “pacifists” but in spite of and against them. As soon as it became clear that only the revolutionary struggle would stop the imperialist slaughter, the workers of Russia and Germany found themselves facing not just the bourgeoisie’s “hawks”, but also and especially the original pacifists: the Mensheviks, the “Socialist Revolutionaries”, the Social Democrats, who defended both ideologically and militarily what was dearest to them: capitalist order.
War does not exist “as such”, outside social relations, in other words relations between classes. In decadent capitalism, war is only a moment in the life of the system, and there can be no struggle against war without a struggle against capitalism. To struggle against war without struggling against capitalism is to be condemned to impotence. The aim of pacifism has always been to make the revolt of the exploited against war harmless for capital.
History gives us edifying examples of this kind of manoeuvre. The efforts that we can see at work today were already being vigorously denounced by revolutionaries 50 years ago: “The necessity for the bourgeoisie is precisely that, with hypocritical talk of peace, the workers be turned away from the revolutionary struggle” wrote Lenin in 1916. The use of pacifism has not changed: “The unity of principle between the social-chauvinists (Plekhanov, Scheidemann) and the social-pacifists (Turati, Kautsky), lies in that both, objectively speaking, are the servants of imperialism: the former serve it by presenting the imperialist war as a ‘defence of the fatherland’, while the others serve the same imperialism by disguising the imperialist peace that is being prepared today with talk about a democratic peace. The imperialist bourgeoisie needs both kinds of lackey, with each kind of nuance: it needs the Plekhanovs to encourage the peoples to massacre each other shouting ‘down with the conquerors’; it needs the Kautskys to console and calm the exasperated masses with hymns and declamations in honour of peace,” (Lenin, January 1917).
What was true during World War I has invariably been confirmed since. Today, yet again, with the Gulf war, the bourgeoisie in all the belligerent powers has organised the pacifist machine. “Responsible” (having taken part in government, in the sabotage of strikes and other forms of the struggle of the exploited classes, or having played the recruiting sergeant in previous conflicts) parties, or fractions of political parties are given the job of taking the lead in the pacifist movements. We must “demand!”, they say; we must “impose!”... a peaceful capitalism. From Ramsey Clark (one-time adviser to Lyndon Johnson) in the US, to the Social-democracy in Germany (the same ones who sent the German proletariat into World War I, and was directly responsible for the murder in 1919 of the revolutionary movement’s most important figures, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg); from the pacifist fractions of the British Labour Party to those of Chevenement and Cheysson in the French PS, via the Stalinist CP’s of France, Italy and Spain (with their inevitable Trotskyist acolytes) whose have long since become master recruiters of canon-fodder: all these fine people have appeared at the head of the great pacifist demonstrations of January 1991 in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, or Rome. All these patriots (whether they defend big countries or little ones – Iraq for example – changes nothing) obviously believe in peace as little to day as they did yesterday. They are simply playing the part of pacifism: channelling the discontent and the revolt provoked by the war into an impotent dead-end.
After all the “petitions”, the “demonstrations” in the company of all the ruling class’ “concerned people”, the “progressive” priests, the show-biz starts and such like “lovers of (...capitalist) peace”, what can there be left in the minds of those who thought that this would be a means of opposing the war, if not a feeling of sterility and impotence? Pacifism has never prevented capitalism wars. It has always prepared and accompanied them.
Pacifism always has a “radical” fellow-traveller: anti-militarism. In general, this is characterised by a more or less complete rejection of “peaceful” pacifism. It calls for more radical methods to combat war, directly attacking military force: individual desertion and the “execution of officers” are its most typical slogans. On the eve of World War I, its best known exponent was Gustave Herve, and he encountered a certain echo in the face of reformist social-democracy’s flabby pacifism. In Toulon, France, one poor soldier was so far taken in by this “radical” language that he even tried to shoot his colonel. Needless to say, this got nobody anywhere... with the exception of Herve who ended the war as an abject patriot and supporter of Clemenceau.
It is obvious that the revolution will also be expressed in desertions from the army, and the struggle against the officers. But in this case, as in the German and Russian Revolutions, these will be mass actions by soldiers, and a part of the mass proletarian struggle. It is absurd to think that there can be an individualist solution to so eminently social a problem as capitalist war. At best, this is an expression of the suicidal despair of the petty bourgeois incapable of understanding the revolutionary role of the working class, and at worst it is a dead-end consciously used by the police to reinforce a feeling of impotence in the face of militarism and war. The dissolution cannot be achieved by individual actions of nihilist revolt; it can only be the result of the conscious, massive, and collective revolutionary action of the proletariat.
The struggle against war can only be the struggle against capital. But the conditions of this struggle today are radically different from what they were during the revolutionary movements of the past. In the past, proletarian revolutions have all been more or less directly linked to wars: the Paris Commune sprang from the conditions created by the 1870 Franco-Prussian war; the 1905 revolution in Russia was a response to the Russo-Japanese war; the wave of 1917-23, to World War I. Some revolutionaries have deduced that capitalist war is a precondition, or at least a highly favourable condition, for the communist revolution. This was only partly true in the past. War creates conditions that do indeed push the proletariat to act in a revolutionary manner. However, firstly, this only happens in the defeated countries. The proletariat in the victorious countries generally remains much more strongly subjected, ideologically, to the ruling class; this counters the worldwide extension of revolutionary power, which is vital to its survival. Secondly, when the struggle succeeds in forcing the bourgeoisie to make peace, it thereby deprives itself of the extraordinary conditions that gave birth to it [2] [56]. In Germany, for example, the revolutionary movement after the armistice suffered badly from the tendency of many soldiers returning from the front to forget everything but the desire to enjoy the peace they had so dearly won. Moreover, as we have seen above, by the time of the Second World War the bourgeoisie had drawn the lessons of the first and acted to prevent any revolutionary social explosions.
Above all, however, and quite apart from all these considerations, if the present historical course is ever overturned and a war breaks out involving the masses of the proletariat in the imperialist metropoles, then it will set in motion such terrible means of destruction that there will be no, or virtually no, possibility of fraternisation or revolutionary action.
If there is one lesson that workers must retain from their past experience, then it is this: to struggle against war today, they must act before a world war; during it will be too late.
An analysis of today’s historic conditions allows us to state that the conditions for a new international revolutionary situation could arise without capitalism having been able to enrol the proletariat of the central countries in a generalised butchery.
The processes leading to a revolutionary proletarian response are neither rapid nor easy. Those who today lament the lack of an immediate response to the Gulf war by the proletariat in the industrialised countries, forget that the revolutionary response to war in 1917 only came after three years of dreadful suffering. Nobody can say when and how the world working class will raise its combat to the level of its historic tasks. What we do know is that it will come up against enormous difficulties, not the least being the debilitating effects of the general atmosphere of decomposition engendered by capitalism’s advanced state of decadence accompanied by the widespread spirit of “every man for himself”, and the nauseating stink of putrefying Stalinism. But we also know that, contrary to the period of the economic crisis in the 1930’s and of World War II, the proletariat in the central countries is neither physically crushed nor has its consciousness been destroyed.
The very fact that the proletariat in the great powers could not be enrolled in the Gulf war (forcing the governments to use professionals); the multitude of precautions taken by governments to justify the war, are so many signs of this balance of forces.
As for the effects of this war on consciousness in the class, in the short term they have provoked a relative paralysis, accompanied however by an anxious and deep-seated reflection on what is historically at stake.
At this level, the Gulf war is distinct from the World Wars of the past in one particularly important aspect: the World Wars were special in that they hid from the proletariat the economic crises that they sprang from. During the war, the unemployed disappeared into the army, the factories which had shut down restarted to produce the weapons goods necessary for total war: the economic crisis seemed to have disappeared. The situation is quite different today. Just as the bourgeoisie unleashed its hellfire over the Middle East, its economy, at the heart of its industrialised zones, plunged into an unprecedented recession... with no hope of a new Marshall Plan. At the same time, we have witnessed a war that clearly announced the apocalyptic perspective of capitalism, and the deepening of the economic crisis. The first has given the proletariat the measure of what is at stake historically, the second is creating the conditions that will force it, in responding to the attacks on its living conditions, to affirm itself as a class and recognise itself as such.
For today’s generations of workers, the present situation is a new historical challenge. They will be able to rise to it, if they are able to profit from the last twenty years of economic struggles which have taught them the worth of capitalism’s promises, and what this system’s future holds in store; if they are able to take to its conclusion the mistrust and hatred that they have developed for the so-called workers’ organisations (unions and left parties), which have systematically sabotaged all their important struggles; and if they are capable of fully understanding that their own struggle is only the continuation of two centuries of combat by our epoch’s revolutionary class.
To do so, the proletariat has no choice but to develop its struggle against capital, on its own class terrain, a thousand miles from the inter-classiest terrain of pacifism and other nationalist snares.
This terrain can be defined in the most clear-cut way as a viewpoint on each moment of the struggle: the intransigent defence of workers’ interests against those of capital. It is not the trade union terrain, which divides workers by national, region, or industrial branch. It is not the terrain of the unions and left-wing parties, which pretend that “the defence of workers’ interests is the best defence of the nation”, to conclude that workers’ struggles should take account of the nation’s interests, and so of the national capital. The class terrain is defined by the irreconcilable opposition between the interests of the exploited class and those of the moribund capitalist system.
The class terrain has class, not national frontiers. By itself, it negates the foundations of capitalist war. It is the fertile ground where the dynamic develops which will lead the proletariat to assume, from the defence of its “immediate” interests, the defence of its historic interests: the world communist revolution.
Capitalist war is no more inevitable than the aberrations of decomposing capitalism. The capitalist mode of production is no more eternal than were the ancient slave-holding societies, or feudalism. Only the struggle to overthrow this society, and to build a truly communist society without exploitation or nations, can rid humanity of the threat of destruction in the holocaust of capitalist war.
The only struggle against war is the struggle against capitalism. The class war is the only “war” worth waging.
RV
[1] [57] Workers like Gatto Mammone who thought, before 1914, that the question of war was an “ideological” one, forgot (like those who only a short while ago let themselves be lulled by the hymns to “the end of the Cold War” and the united Europe of 1992) that the development of economic interdependence, far from resolving imperialist antagonisms, only serves to exacerbate them. They forgot one of marxism’s fundamental discoveries: the insoluble contradiction between the more and more international nature of capitalist production, on the one hand, and the private, national nature of the appropriation of this production by the capitalists on the other. Under the pressure of competition, the search both for raw materials and for outlets for its production leads each national capital to develop, irreversibly, the international division of labour. There is thus a constant international development of economic interdependence amongst all the national capitals. This tendency, which has existed since the dawn of capitalism, was reinforced by the world’s organisation into two blocs following World War II, and by the development of so-called “multinational” companies. But capitalism is nonetheless incapable of abandoning the basis of its very existence: private property and its organisation into nation states. Moreover, the decadence of capitalism has been accompanied by a strengthening of the tendency towards state capitalism, in other words each national capital’s dependence on its state apparatus overseeing the whole of social life. This essential contradiction between internationally organised production, and continued national appropriation is one of the objective bases for the necessity and possibility of a communist society without nations or private property. But for capitalism, it is an insoluble dilemma which can lead only to chaos and the barbarity of war.
[2] [58] “The war has incontestably played an enormous role in the development of our revolution; it materially disorganised absolutism; it dislocated the army; it breathed daring into the hesitating mass. But it did not create the revolution, and this is fortunate because a revolution born of war is impotent: it is the product of extraordinary circumstances, depends on an external force, and in the end proves incapable of defending the positions it has won” (Trotsky, in Our Revolution, writing about the role of the Russo-Japanese war in the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution in Russia.)
Only the international working class can create a real new world order
As we go to press, the Gulf war has been officially ended. It finished very quickly, much quicker than the military commands had led people to believe, perhaps quicker than they themselves had thought. The editorial article that follows was written at the beginning of the ground offensive by the US-led coalition against Iraq. It is thus dated. However, its denunciation of the butchery of this war is still very relevant. The introduction demonstrates how much the political positions and analyses it puts forward have been confirmed from the very first days of the 'post war' phase.
Introduction
The Gulf War ends: the USA, World Policeman
The end of the war has clearly confirmed the real objectives of the American bourgeoisie: demonstrating its enormous military superiority, not only vis-a-vis peripheral countries like Iraq who are being pushed into military adventures by the severity of the economic crisis, but also and above all the other world powers, and particularly those who used to make up the western bloc: Japan and the great European powers.
The disappearance of the eastern bloc, by eliminating these powers' need for the American military 'umbrella', has resulted in the disappearance of the western bloc itself and given rise to the tendency towards the formation of a new imperialist bloc. The complete effacement, during the course of the war, of the only two serious candidates for the 'leadership' of a new bloc, Germany and Japan, the demonstration of their complete military impotence, is America's warning for the future: whatever the economic dynamism of these countries (in reality, their capacity to stand up to the crisis more effectively than their rivals), the USA is not prepared to let anyone muscle in on its patch. Similarly, all of France's little attempts to 'affirm its differences' (see the editorial of International Review 64) up until 17 January went up in smoke the minute the USA succeeded in imposing its 'solution' to the crisis: the military crushing of Iraq. Today France is reduced to wagging its tail like a poodle when Schwarzkopf congratulates the French troops for doing an "absolutely superb job", and when Bush receives Mitterrand with all the right civilities. As for the European Community, which some people have seen as future great rival of the USA, it has been completely non-existent throughout the war. In short, if it necessary to identify the real objectives of the making this war inevitable and in waging it to e results are there to make everything crystal clear.
A Pyrrhic Victory
Similarly, with the end of the fighting, we have seen the rapid confirmation of the perspective we put forward from the beginning (see IR 63): war would not be followed by peace, but by chaos and more war. Chaos and war in Iraq, as illustrated tragically by the confrontations and massacres in the cities of the south and in Kurdistan. Chaos, war and disorder throughout the region: Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied territories. In short, the glorious victory of the 'allies', the 'new world order' that they claim to be setting up, are giving their first fruits: disorder, misery and massacres for the populations; wars here, there and everywhere. The new world order? Already the Middle East is more unstable now than it ever was before!
And this instability won't be limited to the Middle East. The end of the war against Iraq is not opening up the prospect of a diminution of tensions between the big imperialist powers. On the contrary. Thus, the different European bourgeoisies are already preoccupied with the need to adapt, modernize and strengthen their weaponry - and that's not with a 'new era of peace' in mind. We are also seeing countries like Japan, Germany and even Italy demanding a reevaluation of their international status by calling for a permanent place on the UN Security Council. Thus, while the USA has succeeded through this war in proving its vast military superiority, while it has for the moment slowed down the tendency towards every man for himself, this is really a Pyrrhic victory. The exacerbation of imperialist tensions and the spread of chaos all over the planet are inevitable, as is the aggravation of the economic crisis which is at the origin of all this. And there will have to be more 'punitive actions' like the one inflicted on Iraq, other monstrous massacres to serve as an 'example' and to bolster 'law and order'.
The 'New World Order': Poverty, famine, barbarism, war
Just over a year ago, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the bourgeoisie, its governments and its media, triumphantly claimed that 'liberal' capitalism had won, that an era of peace and prosperity was opening up with the disappearance of the eastern bloc and the opening up of these countries' markets. These lies have been shattered: instead of markets in the east, we have had economies ravaged by chaos. Instead of peace, we have had the most gigantic military intervention since the Second World War. Today, just as triumphantly, the leading sectors of the world bourgeoisie tell us that with the defeat of Iraq, the dawn of the new world order has definitely arrived: peace will be achieved, international stability ensured. These lies are also going to be shattered.
The rapid end of the war, the low number of deaths on the 'allied' side, have allowed the bourgeoisie to disorient the working class of the capitalist metropoles, the fraction of the proletariat which is key to the final outcome of the worldwide, historic battle between the classes. Even though many workers feel deeply wounded by the extermination of tens or hundreds of thousands of the exploited and the oppressed of Iraq, they also feel powerless in the face of the campaign of triumphant chauvinism which, thanks to the lies of the media, has temporarily deafened people's minds. But the future of poverty, famine, chaos, and ever more monstrous imperialist massacres, which is all the ruling class can offer, will open the eyes of the working masses and allow their struggles to be more and more impregnated with an awareness of the need to do away with this system. Revolutionaries must play an active part in this development of consciousness.
RF 11.3.91
The Kurdish tragedy is the latest demonstration of the bloody barbarity brought about by so-called 'national liberation' struggles.
The United States, Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, all the different imperialist protagonists who brought about the outrage of the Gulf War, encouraged the Kurds in one way or the other to rise up in armed insurrection for their 'national liberation'. Now we can see how they left Saddam Hussein to crush them and cast them into exile.
They are all accomplices to this genocidal slaughter and they have all used 'national liberation' as a fig leaf for their imperialist ambitions. In this pack of dogs we have to include the Kurdish leaders who have made an agreement with the Butcher of Baghdad to reduce 'national independence' to the 'first step' of 'autonomy', a 'first step' that also took place in 1970, 1975, and 1981...!
Capitalism has entered its final phase: decomposition. A phase in which wars like that in the Gulf and ethnic-nationalist massacres like those in Yugoslavia and the USSR, or the killings between the Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, will increasingly proliferate. Both take place under the same banner of 'national liberation' which, in many cases, is the cynical disguise for the imperialist ambitions of different states, especially the great powers; in the other cases it is just an irrational drunkenness which carries away the brutalised and desperate masses. In both it is an expression of the mortal bankruptcy of the capitalist order, of the threat it represents to the survival of humanity.
Against all of this, only the proletariat can offer a perspective of reorganising society around social relations based on the real unification of humanity, on production dedicated to the full satisfaction of human needs; in sum, a world community of free and equal human beings who work with and for each other.
In order to orient its struggles around this perspective the proletariat must clearly reject the whole ideology of 'national liberation', which serves only to tie it to the old society [1] [62]. In the first part of this article we are going to analyse how, in the revolutionary experience of 1917-23, this mystification represented a crucial factor in the failure of the revolution and provided the capitalist states with a means of salvation that resulted in a tragic procession of war and barbarity, the price mankind has paid for the survival of the capitalist regime over the last 70 years.
The Second Congress of the Communist International (March 1920) adopted the 'Theses on the national and colonial question' whose basic idea was: "All events in world politics are necessarily concentrated on one central point, the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Russian Soviet Republic, which is rallying around itself both the soviet movements among the advanced workers in all countries, and all the national liberation movements in the colonies and amongst the oppressed peoples, convinced by bitter experience that there is no salvation for them except in union with the revolutionary proletariat and in the victory of Soviet power over world imperialism" (Documents of the Communist International, ed J Degras, page 138).
This hope was quickly refuted by events from the beginning of the Russian Revolution. The policy of support for 'national liberation' struggles practiced by the CI and the proletarian bastion in Russia created a barrier against the international extension of the proletarian revolution and fundamentally weakened the consciousness and unity of the international proletariat, contributing to the failure of its revolutionary efforts.
The October revolution was the first step in the revolutionary movement of the proletariat on a world scale: "That the Bolsheviks have based their policy entirely upon the world proletarian revolution is the clearest proof of their political farsightedness and firmness of principle and of the bold scope of their politics" (Rosa Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution' in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Pathfinder Press, page 368)
In accordance with this thinking, where the essential issue was the international extension of the revolution, support for national liberation movements in the countries oppressed by the great metropolitan imperialists was seen as a tactic for winning additional support for the world revolution.
From October 1917, the Bolsheviks pushed for the independence of the countries which the Czarist empire had kept subjugated: the Baltic countries, Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, Armenia etc... They believed that such an attitude would guarantee the revolutionary proletariat indispensable support for its efforts to retain power while waiting for the maturation and explosion of the proletarian revolution in the great European countries, especially Germany. These hope were never to be fulfilled:
· Finland: the Soviet government recognised its independence on the 18th of December 1917. The working class movement in this country was very strong: it was on the revolutionary ascent, it had strong links with the Russian workers and had actively participated in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. It was not a question of a country dominated by feudalism, but a very developed capitalist territory. And the Finnish bourgeoisie used the Soviet power's gift in order to crush the workers' insurrection that broke out in January 1918. This struggle lasted nearly 3 months but, despite the resolute support the Soviets gave to the Finnish workers, the new state was able to destroy the revolutionary movement, thanks to German troops whom they called on to help them;
· The Ukraine: the local nationalist movement did not represent a real bourgeois movement, but rather obliquely expressed the vague resentments of the peasants against the Russian landlords and above all the Poles. The proletariat in this region came from all over Russia and was very developed. In these conditions the band of nationalist adventurers that set up the 'Ukraine Rada' (Vinnickenko, Petlyura etc.) rapidly sought the patronage of German and Austrian imperialism. At the same time it dedicated all its forces to attacking the workers' soviets, which had been formed in Kharkov and other cities. The French general Tabouis who, because of the collapse of the central powers, replaced the German influence, employed Ukrainian reactionary bands in the war of the White Guards against the Soviets.
"Ukrainian nationalism... was a mere whim, a folly of a few dozen petty bourgeois intellectuals without the slightest roots in the economic, political or psychological relationships of the country; it was without any historical tradition, since the Ukraine never formed a nation or government, was without any national culture... To what was at first a mere farce they lent such importance that the farce became a matter of the most deadly seriousness - not as a serious national movement for which, afterwards as before, there are no roots at all, but as a shingle and rallying flag of counter-revolution. At Brest, out of this addled egg crept the German bayonets" (Rosa Luxemburg, idem, pages 382-2);
· The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania): the workers' soviets took power in this zone at the same moment as the October revolution. 'National liberation' was carried out by British marines: "With the termination of hostilities against Germany, British naval units appeared in the Baltic. The Estonian Soviet Republic collapsed in January 1919. The Latvian Soviet Republic held out in Riga for five months and then succumbed to the threat of British naval guns" (E.H.Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 1, page 317)
· In Asiatic Russia, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan: "A Bashkir government under one Validov, which had proclaimed an autonomous Bashkir state after the October revolution, went over to the Orenburg Cossacks who were in open warfare against the Soviet Government; and this was typical of the prevailing attitude of the nationalists" (idem, page 324). For its part the 'national-revolutionary' government of Kokanda (in central Asia), with a programme that included the imposition of Islamic law, the defence of private property, and the forced seclusion of women, unleashed a fierce war against the workers' Soviet of Tashkent (the principal industrial city of Russian Turkestan).
· In Caucasia a Transcaucasian republic was formed, and its tutelage was fought over between Turkey, Germany and Great Britain. This caused it to break up into 3 'independent' republics (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), which fiercely confronted each other, urged on in turn by each of the contesting powers. The three republics supported with all their forces the British troops in their battle against the Baku workers' Soviet, which from 1917-20 suffered bombardment and massacres by the British;
· Turkey: from the beginning the Soviet government supported the 'revolutionary nationalist' Kemal Attaturk. Radek, a member of the CI, exhorted the recently formed Turkish Communist Party thus: "Your first task, as soon as you have formed as an independent party, will be to support the movement for the national freedom of Turkey" (Acts of the first four Congresses of the CI). The result was a catastrophe: Kemal crushed without leniency the strikes and demonstrations of the young Turkish proletariat and, if for a time he allied with the Soviet government, it was only done to put pressure on the British troops who were occupying Constantinople, and on the Greeks who had occupied large parts of Western Turkey. However, once the Greeks had been defeated and having offered British imperialism his fidelity if they left Constantinople, Kemal broke off the alliance with the Soviets and offered the British the head of the Turkish Communist Party, which was viciously persecuted.
· The case of Poland should also be mentioned. The national emancipation of Poland was almost a dogma in the Second International. When Rosa Luxemburg, at the end of the 19th century, demonstrated that this slogan was now erroneous and dangerous since capitalist development had tightly bound the Polish bourgeoisie to the Russian Czarist imperial caste, she provoked a stormy polemic inside the International. But the truth was that the workers of Warsaw, Lodz and elsewhere were at the vanguard of the 1905 revolution and had produced revolutionaries as outstanding as Rosa. Lenin had recognised that "The experience of the 1905 revolution demonstrated that even in these two nations (he is referring to Poland and Finland) the leading classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, renounced the revolutionary struggle for liberty and had looked for a rapprochement with the leading classes in Russia and with the Czarist monarchy out of fear of the revolutionary proletariat of Finland and Poland" (minutes of the Prague party conference, 1912).
Unfortunately the Bolsheviks held onto the dogma of 'the right of nations to self-determination', and from October 1917 on they promoted the independence of Poland. On 29 August 1918 the Council of Peoples Commissars declared "All treaties and acts concluded by the government of the former Russian Empire with the government of Prussia or of the Austro-Hungarian Empire concerning Poland, in view of their incompatibility with the principle of the self-determination of nations and with the revolutionary sense of right of the Russian people, which recognises the indefeasible right of the Polish people to independence and unity, are hereby irrevocably rescinded" (quoted in E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol 1, p 293).
While it was correct that the proletarian bastion should denounce and annul the secret treaties of the bourgeois government, it was a serious error to do so in the name of 'principles' which were not on a proletarian terrain, but a bourgeois one, viz the 'right of nations'. This was rapidly demonstrated in practice. Poland fell under the iron dictatorship of Pilsudski, the veteran social patriot, who smashed the workers' strikes, allied Poland with France and Britain, and actively supported the counter-revolution of the White Armies by invading the Ukraine in 1920.
When in response to this aggression the troops of the Red Army entered Polish territory and advanced on Warsaw in the hope that the workers would rise up against the bourgeoisie, a new catastrophe befell the cause of the world revolution: the workers of Warsaw, the same workers who had made the 1905 revolution, fell in behind the 'Polish Nation' and participated in the defence of the city against the soviet troops. This was the tragic consequence of years of propaganda about the 'national liberation' of Poland by the Second International and then by the proletarian bastion in Russia. [2] [63]
The outcome of this policy was catastrophic: the local proletariats were defeated, the new nations were not 'grateful' for the Bolsheviks' present and quickly passed into the orbit of British imperialism, collaborating in their blockade of the Soviet power and sustaining with all the means at their disposal the White counter-revolution which provoked a bloody civil war.
"The Bolsheviks were to be taught to their own great hurt and that of the revolution, that under the rule of capitalism there is no self-determination of peoples, that in a class society each class of the nation strives to 'determine itself' in a different fashion, and that, for the bourgeois classes, the stand-point of national freedom is fully subordinated to that of class rule. The Finnish bourgeoisie, like the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, were unanimous in preferring the violent rule of Germany to national freedom, if the latter should be bound up with Bolshevism." (Rosa Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution', Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, page 380)
The Bolsheviks thought that "in order to affirm the workers' international unity it was first necessary to uproot all vestiges of the past inequality and discrimination between nations". Hadn't these vestiges subjected the workers of these countries to the reactionary nationalism of the Czarist empire? Didn't this create an obstacle to their unity with the Russian workers, who could be seen as accomplices to Great Russian chauvinism? Wouldn't the young proletariat of the colonial and semi-colonial countries have a hostile attitude towards the proletariat of the great metropoles as long as their countries had not become independent nations?
It is certain that capitalism did not create and organise the world market in a conscious way. It developed in a violent, anarchic manner, through antagonisms between nations. Everywhere it sowed all kinds of discrimination and oppression, particularly national, ethnic, and linguistic ones. These weighed heavily on the workers of different countries, complicating the process towards the unification and self-awareness of the class.
However, it was erroneous and dangerous to seek to solve this by encouraging the formation of new nations which - given the saturation of the world market - could have no economic viability, and would only reproduce these wounds on a much vaster scale. The experience of the peripheral peoples of the Czarist empire was conclusive. The Polish nationalists used their 'independence' to persecute the Jewish, Lithuanian and German minorities; in Caucasia, the Georgians persecuted the Armenians and the Azeris, the Armenians the Turkamens and the Azeris, while later on the latter did the same to the Armenians...; the Ukrainian Rada declared its hatred of the Russians, Poles and Jews... and these events were an omen of the terrible nightmare which has unfolded throughout capitalism's decadence: simply remember the Hindus' bloody orgy against the Muslims in 1947, that of the Croats against the Serbs during the Nazi occupation and the revenge of the latter against the former once Yugoslavia was 'liberated' by Tito. And now today we have the bloody witches' Sabbath of nationalist pogroms in Eastern Europe and Asiatic Russia. We have to be clear: 'national liberation' will not stop national oppression, but instead will reproduce it even more irrationally. It is like using petrol to put a fire out.
It is only in the proletariat, in its revolutionary being and in its struggle, that we can find the bases for combating and overcoming all the varieties of national, ethnic and linguistic discrimination engendered by capitalism: "big industry created a class, which in all nations has the same interest and with which nationality is already dead; a class which is really rid of all the old world and at the same time stands pitted against it." (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology)
The Bolsheviks, who always based their policies on the idea of reinforcing the world revolution, thought that they could win over the non-exploiting strata of these nations - peasants, certain middle classes etc - through supporting 'national liberation' and other classical demands of the programme of the bourgeois revolutions (agrarian reform, political freedoms, etc).
These strata occupy an unstable position in bourgeois society; they're heterogeneous, without any future as such. Although oppressed by capitalism they lack any clear or defined interests of their own, and this ties them to the conservation of capitalism. The proletariat cannot win them over by offering them a platform based on 'national liberation' and other demands situated on the bourgeois terrain. Such proposals push them into the arms of the bourgeoisie who can manipulate them with demagogic promises and so turn them against the proletariat.
Clearly the demands of the bourgeois programme, which are most sensitive to the peasants and petty-bourgeoisie (agrarian reform, linguistic freedom within the national terrain, etc), have never been completed by the bourgeoisie. But in the period of capitalism's decadence the new nations are incapable of completing these demands, which clearly constitute a reactionary utopia, impossible under a capitalism that cannot expand, but is increasingly rent by violent convulsions.
Does this mean that the proletariat must take up demands which historical evolution have thrown into the dustbin, in order to demonstrate that it is more 'consistent' than the bourgeoisie?
No way! This approach, which weighed so heavily on the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary fractions, was a poisonous residue secreted by the gradualist and reformist thinking which led social democracy to its ruin. It is a speculative and idealist vision of capitalism, which holds that it has to complete its programme 100%, and in all countries before humanity is ready for communism. This is a reactionary utopia which does not correspond to the reality of a system based on exploitation, a system whose aim is not to carry out a supposed social project but to extract surplus-value. If in the ascendant phase of capitalism the bourgeoisie usually forgot its 'programme' after it had achieved power, making frequent pacts with the remnants of the old feudal classes, once the world market was formed and capitalism entered into its historical decline, this 'programme' was converted into a vulgar mystification.
The proletariat will only open a crack in its revolutionary alternative if it attempts the realisation of 'the unfinished bourgeois programme', and the bourgeoisie will grab onto this as a means of salvation. The best way of winning over the non-exploiting strata to the proletarian cause, or at least neutralising them in the decisive confrontations with the bourgeois state, is for the working class to consistently and fully affirm its own programme. It is the perspective of the abolition of class privileges, the hope of a new organisation of society which will safeguard the survival of humanity; it is the clear and resolute affirmation of the proletariat as an autonomous class, as a social force that openly presents itself as a candidate to take power; it is the massive self-organisation of the class in workers' councils, that will permit the creation of a platform capable of winning over these vacillating and unstable classes.
"Because it cannot assign itself the task of establishing new privileges, the proletariat can only base its struggles on political positions which result from its particular class programme - the proletariat represents, within the diverse classes of capitalist society, the only one able to build the society of the future. It is only on this basis that it can pull the middle social strata into the struggle. These classes will only unite with the proletariat in particular historical circumstances, when the contradictions of capitalist society blossom fully and the proletariat begins to mount its revolutionary assault. Only then will they understand the necessity of combining with the proletariat" (Bilan no 5, 'Principles: weapons of the revolution').
The proletarian revolution is not a predestined product of objective conditions in which any expedient tactic can serve to carry it out. Although it is a historical necessity and its objective conditions have been furnished by the formation of the world market and the proletariat, the communist revolution is essentially a conscious act.
On the other hand, the proletariat, unlike past revolutionary classes, does not posses any economic power in the old society: it is at the same time an exploited and a revolutionary class. What makes it decisive and unique in history are its weapons for the destruction of the old society: its unity and consciousness, weapons that in turn constitute the foundations for the new society.
Consciousness is vital for the advance of its struggle, in which "on each occasion, the problem that the proletariat has to confront is not one of obtaining the best advantage or the greatest number of allies, but of being coherent with the system of principles which define its class... classes must exist in an organic and political configuration without which, despite being determined by the evolution of the productive forces, it runs the risk of remaining bound for a long time by the old class which, in its turn - in order to resist - will shackle the course of economic evolution" (Bilan no 5, idem).
From this perspective the support for 'national liberation struggles' during the revolutionary period of 1917-23 had disastrous consequences for the world proletariat, for its vanguard - the Communist International - and for the first bastion to carry out its revolutionary task: Russia.
The historical period of decisive confrontations between Capital and Labour was opened up by the First World War. In this period there is no alternative between the international proletarian revolution and the submission of the proletariat to the national interests of each bourgeoisie. Support for 'national liberation', although conceived as a 'tactical' element, led to the disintegration, corruption and decomposition of proletarian consciousness.
We have already seen that the 'liberation' of the peripheral peoples of the Czarist empire did not bring any advantage to the Russian revolution, but rather contributed to the growth of a cordon sanitaire around it: a group of nations with proletariats who were combative and had an old tradition were firmly closed off from the penetration of revolutionary positions, and an insurmountable abyss was opened up between the Russian and German workers.
How is it possible that the workers of Poland, the Ukraine, Finland, Baku, Riga, who had been at the forefront of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, who engendered communist militants of the clarity and integrity of Rosa Luxemburg, Piatakov, Jogisches etc., were so rapidly defeated and crushed in 1918-20 by their own bourgeoisies and became, in many cases vehemently, opposed to the Bolsheviks' slogans?
There can be no doubt of the decisive influence of the nationalist poison: "The mere fact that the question of national aspirations and tendencies towards separation were injected at all in the midst of the revolutionary struggle, and were even pushed into the foreground and made into the shibboleth of socialist and revolutionary policy as a result of the Brest peace, has served to bring the greatest confusion into socialist ranks and has actually destroyed the position of the proletariat in the border countries" (Rosa Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution', idem, page 381).
Just as it pushed the workers of these countries towards the illusory lure of 'independence' and the 'development of the country free from the Russian yoke', 'national liberation' increasingly created a rift between them and the Russian proletariat, with whom they had shared many struggles and at times had taken the first step in decisive combats.
The International, the world communist party, is a pivotal factor in the class consciousness of the proletariat. Its clarity and coherence are vital to the strength, unity and consciousness of the proletariat. Support for 'national liberation' played a decisive role in the opportunist degeneration of the Communist International.
The Communist International was constituted on a central principle: capitalism has entered its decadent epoch, and the task of the proletariat cannot be to reform or improve it but to destroy it: "A new epoch is born: The epoch of capitalism's decay, its internal disintegration; the epoch of the proletarian, communist revolution" (Platform of the Communist International, 1919). However, support for 'national liberation' movements opened a very dangerous crack in this clarity, an opening towards the penetration of opportunism. It introduced into a programme aimed at the destruction of the old order a task that belonged entirely to that same old order. The tactic of combining the revolutionary struggles in the metropoles with the 'national liberation' struggles in the colonies led to the conclusion that the hour for the destruction of capitalism had not arrived yet: it implied that the world was divided into two areas (one 'ripe' for the proletarian revolution and another where capitalism still had to develop) and that capitalist expansion was still on the cards (for marxists 'national liberation' could have no other meaning than this).
This germ of confusion was an open door to the opportunism that increasingly developed with the reflux of the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in Europe.
The party is not a passive product of the class movement, but an active factor in its development. Its clarity and determination are crucial to the outcome of the proletarian revolution; equally, its confusions, ambiguities and incoherence powerfully contribute to the confusion and defeat of the class. The evolution of the CI in its posture on the national question bears witness to this.
The 1st Congress, which took place when the revolutionary wave was at its height, posed as a task the abolition of national frontiers: "The end result of the capitalist mode of production is chaos, which only the largest productive class, the working class, can overcome. This class must establish a real order, the communist order. It must break the domination of capital, make wars impossible, destroy all national borders, transform the whole world into a community that produces for itself, and makes brotherhood and liberation of peoples a reality" (Platform of the CI).
In the same way, it was a given that the small states could not break the yoke of imperialism and could not but submit to its game: "The goal of Entente policy in the vassal states and in the recently created republics (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and also Poland, Finland and so on) is to organise national counter-revolutionary movements based on the ruling classes and social nationalists. This movement is meant to target the defeated states, maintain a balance of power among the newly created states, subordinating them to the Entente, retard revolutionary movements within the new 'national' republics, and, lastly, furnish the White guards needed for the struggle against the international revolution and the Russian revolution in particular" ('Theses on the International Situation and the Policy of the Entente', First Congress of the CI). And, in short, it demonstrated that the national state had been condemned by history: having given a vigorous impulse to capitalist development, the nation state had become too narrow for the development of the productive forces.
Thus we can see how the First Congress of the CI laid the bases for overcoming the initial errors on the national question; but these points of clarity were not developed. Instead, because of the defeats of the proletariat and the inability of the CI majority to take them further forward, they were liquidated little by little by the dark shadow of opportunism. The Fourth Congress (1922), with its theses on the Eastern Question, marked an important step in this regression since "proletariat and peasants were required to subordinate their social programme to the immediate needs of a common national struggle against foreign imperialism. It was assumed that a nationally minded bourgeoisie, or even a nationally minded feudal aristocracy, would be ready to conduct a struggle for national liberation from the yoke of foreign imperialism in alliance with the revolutionary proletarians and peasants, who were only waiting for the moment of victory to turn against them and overthrow them" (E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 3, pages 477-8).
With later events, the proclamation of 'socialism in one country', the definitive defeat of the proletarian bastion in Russia and its integration into the imperialist world chain, 'national liberation' was simply turned into a cover for the vile interests of the Russian state. It has not been the only one to use this banner: other states have also adopted it in many different forms, but always towards the same end: the war to the death for the re-division of the saturated world market. These innumerable imperialist wars under the guise of 'national liberation' will be the object of the second part of this article.
Systematising the work of clarification which took place after the degeneration of the Communist International by the fractions of the communist left, the Gauche Communiste de France adopted in January 1945 a resolution on the nationalist movements which concluded thus: "Given that the nationalist movements, due to their capitalist nature do not represent any kind of organic or ideological continuity with the class movements of the proletariat, the latter, if it is to maintain its class positions, must break with and abandon all ties with the nationalist movements".
Adalen 20.5.1991
[1] [64] See our pamphlet Nation or Class and articles in the International Review numbers 4, 19, 34, 37, 42 and 62.
[2] [65] On the other hand the proletarian revolution can never be extended by military methods alone, as was made clear by the Executive Committee of the Soviets: "Our enemies and yours are deceiving you when they tell you that the Soviet government wants to implant communism on Polish territory with the bayonets of the soldiers of the Red Army. A communist revolution is only possible when the immense majority of workers are convinced of the idea of creating it with their own force" ('Calling the Polish People', 28.1.20). Despite an important internal opposition - Trotsky, Kirov, etc - the Bolshevik party, increasingly devoured by opportunism and falling into a false understanding of internationalism, encouraged the adventure of the summer of 1920, which radically forgot this principle.
Chaos
One word is on everybody's lips concerning the present world situation: chaos. A chaos seen as a crying reality or as an imminent threat. The Gulf war has not opened the door to a 'New World Order'. It has merely allowed American capital to reassert its authority, in particular over its allies/rivals in Europe and Japan, and to confirm its role as the world's cop. But society is still caught up in an accelerating whirlpool of disorder, stirred up by the devastating winds of the open recession now hitting the big economic powers.
Four months after the end of the war blood is still flowing in the Kurdish and Shiite regions of Iraq, the fires of war have not gone out. In the Middle East, behind the talk of peace conferences, military antagonisms are exacerbating and Israel has resumed bombing southern Lebanon. In the Soviet republics, armed conflicts are not being attenuated but are on the increase, concrete evidence that the old empire has fallen apart. In South Africa the black population, supposedly freed from apartheid, lives under the shadow of murderous confrontations between the ANC and Inkatha. In the slums of Lima cholera is spreading, interspersed by the bombs hurled by the Stalinist Shining Path. In South Korea, young people are burning themselves to death in protest against government repression. In India the assassination of the last of the Gandhis reveals the dislocation of the 'world's biggest democracy', which is being torn apart by caste, religious, and national conflicts. In Ethiopia, one of the areas of the globe hardest hit by famine, the collapse of the Mengistu government, which was abandoned by its Soviet protectors, has left the country in the hand of three rival armed nationalist gangs who aim to divide up the country. Yugoslavia is on the verge of breaking up under the pressure of daily confrontations between the different nationalities which compose it. In Algeria young unemployed people dragooned by the fundamentalists of the FIS are being sent to fight the tanks of the FLN government. In the ghettos of Washington, Bruxelles or Paris there has been a series of riots and sterile confrontations with the police. At the heart of Europe, in what used to be East Germany, capital is ready to throw nearly half the workforce onto the dole...
The ruling class cannot understand why society, 'its' society, is plunging irreversibly into a growing disorder in which war vies with poverty, dislocation with despair. Its ideology, the ruling ideology, has no explanation. It only exists to sing the glories of the existing order. In order to maintain its grip, it can only resort to lies and deliberately organized confusion. A confusion which expresses both the stupid historic blindness of the decadent bourgeoisie and the lying cynicism that it is capable of when it comes to protecting and justifying its decrepit 'order'.
War, as we have been reminded in the most horrible way by the events in the Gulf, remains the most tragic expression of this reality, in which organized lying goes hand in hand with the most barbaric chaos.
The Balance sheet of the Gulf war
With the most abject cynicism, the ruling classes of the Coalition countries, the American government at their head, have set about the task of making a travesty of the Gulf massacre. When the eastern regimes collapsed, they made a huge song and dance about the triumph of 'western democratic freedoms' over Stalinist obscurantism; but when it came to the Gulf war they organized the most colossal operation of lies and disinformation in history[1]. An operation marked both by the scale of the means used (the American government had at its disposal, among other things, a television network disseminating its poisonous propaganda 24 hours out of 24 all over the planet) and by the enormity of the lies themselves: Michael Deaver, former 'communications' advisor to Reagan and now a secretary general linked to the White House clearly defined the object to be attained: the war had to be presented as "a combination of Lawrence of Arabia and Star Wars"[2].
This was done. The TV screens were inundated with images of the most sophisticated weapons and everything was done to give the impression that it was all a big Wargame. Not one picture of the victims of the deluge of fire which fell upon the Iraqi soldiers and civilians was allowed to disturb this ignoble spectacle of a 'clean war'.
The balance sheet of the war in Iraq is atrocious nonetheless. We will never know the exact number of victims on the Iraqi side[3]. But all the estimates count in hundreds of thousands. Probably nearly 200,000 killed among the soldiers: young peasants and workers, enrolled by force, a gun in their back, lined up en masse in front of the enemy, with the Republican Guard behind them, ready to shoot any deserters[4]. Nearly two thirds of the soldiers killed died during the aerial bombardments, buried alive in their bunkers; most of those who died during the land war were coldly massacred while trying to retreat. In the civilian population, the bombs must have taken a similar toll among the children, women, old people and others who escaped the forced enlistment.
The country has virtually been razed to the ground by the war. All the infrastructures were hit. "For the period to come, Iraq has been thrown back to a pre-industrial age" declared a UN commission of enquiry sent to Iraq in March. The state of the hospitals and the lack of medication will condemn to death thousands of wounded and the victims of epidemics resulting from the lack of food and water. This is the first result of the operation carried out by the 'heroic armies' of the western powers.
To this atrocious balance sheet you have to add the victims of the massacres of the Kurds and the Shiites.
Because at the very time that the American government was organizing the grotesque spectacle of a patriotic orgy in New York, in which the 'victors' of the Gulf butchery paraded between the skyscrapers of Broadway, in Iraq, the Kurdish and Shiite populations were still being subjected to bloody repression by the Saddam government.
What kind of victory was this? Didn't these soldiers go to the Gulf to stop the 'Hitler of the Middle East' from doing this sort of thing?
The reality, clearly confirmed by the declarations of the Kurdish nationalist leaders, is that it was the American government which coldly and cynically provoked the massacre of the Kurdish and Shiite populations[5]. And if Bush's team has kept the 'Butcher of Baghdad' in power it's because, among other things, he was the best man for doing this job, given his well-known talents in this domain. The massive destruction resulting from this repression, this time shown in detail by the media, was used to try to make us forget the destruction wrought by the Coalition. The allied armies, having sat doing nothing while this new butchery was going on, were now able to appear on all the TV screens of the world in the role of humanitarian saviors of the Kurdish refugees (see in this issue, 'The massacres and crimes of the 'great democracies'').
The barbarity of militarism and chaos, travestied by a huge machinery of ideological manipulation. This is what the Gulf war was, and this is the future that it announces.
For the exploited classes of the region, in uniform or not, the balance-sheet of the war is one of carnage in which they participated only as cannon fodder, as guinea-pigs for testing the efficiency of the latest and most sophisticated weapons. For the world proletariat, it is a defeat. Another crime by capital which it was unable to prevent. But it is also a lesson, a reminder of what lies in store if it does not manage to get itself together and put an end to this society.
The real victory of American capitalism
Things are very different for the criminals who provoked this war. For the American government, the mission of the soldiers sent to the Gulf was never to protect the local populations against the exactions of Saddam Hussein. Contrary to what they believed themselves, contrary to the propaganda of their governments, the one and only mission of the Coalition soldiers was to make a violent demonstration of force and determination on behalf of American capitalism. A bloody display of power, made indispensable by the international chaos which was unleashed by the collapse of the USSR and which threatened to undermine the position of the world's leading state[6].
It was the Washington government which wanted and provoked this war. It was its ambassador April Glaspie who, during her discussions with Saddam Hussein at the time when the latter was on the verge of invading Kuwait, declared that the USA was indifferent to the Iraq-Kuwait quarrel, which it considered to be "internal to the Arab world"[7]. Saddam was led to believe that the White House was giving the green light to his hold up.
For American capital, the stakes in this operation were much more important than control over Iraq-Kuwait or oil. The stakes were the whole world, the USA's place in a world tumbling into instability. The Soviet military threat, which had enabled the USA to keep the other powers in its bloc in line for 45 years, was no more. And the dust raised by the fall of the Berlin Wall had hardly fallen to Earth when the German and French politicians were already talking about the formation of a European military force, "more independent of the USA"; in Japan, the call for a revision of the constitution imposed by the American government at the end of the second world war, forbidding the Japanese from having a real army, was again rising to the surface...the main economic rivals and creditors of the USA were claiming a new place in the new situation, a new military and political place more in keeping with their economic power.
For the USA, the Gulf war had to be a brutal reaffirmation of its authority over the world, and above all over Europe and Japan. And from this point of view it was a real victory for the American Godfather, at least in the immediate. The events of the months which followed the war clearly illustrated this.
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"The USA, drawing profit from its recent military victory, is in the process of transforming its advantage into a political victory on every continent."[8]
This is how Boucheron, the president of the defense commission of the French National Assembly, recently summarized the international situation. He knows what he is talking about. In Europe, after the Franco-German fanfares that questioned the role of NATO, all the powers have slunk back into line under the pressure of the Americans. The American military has even pushed through the formation of a 'rapid intervention force' within NATO, the bulk of whose forces will be located in Germany, but under the command of America's most faithful ally, Great Britain. For the latter, as for certain eastern countries newly acquired to western influence (Poland, Czechoslovakia), the major fear is of a reunified German capitalism, and they see the American presence as an effective antidote to this menace. The Japanese government has also lowered the tone of all its recriminations, and, like Germany, it has made its 'war contribution' to its great American rival.
As for the countries in the Japanese sphere of influence, they generally look favourably at American pressure in the region because they are afraid of the chaos that would result from Japan's rise to political and military strength. Bob Hawke, the Australian prime minister, openly came out in favour of maintaining American military presence in this part of the world in order to dissuade the regional powers "from acquiring new military capacities which could destabilize the region and unleash a new arms race within it."
The fear of chaos isn't limited to the American government alone. In affirming its role as the world's military and political policeman, the USA is intervening as a 'last resort' against the centrifugal tendencies developing all over the planet, and it is imposing its 'order' with unprecedented arrogance. In Iraq, it dealt with the Kurdish problem in the most cynical manner, ridding itself of the danger of an even greater destabilization of the region, which would have resulted from the political autonomy of a population which lives in five key countries in the region (Iraq, Syria, Turkey, USSR and Iran); in the USSR it refused any real support to the independence movement in the Baltic republics in order to avoid a further destabilization of the former 'Evil Empire'; it also exerts a direct hold over the Moscow government itself, using the pressure of economic aid (see the article 'The USSR in pieces' in this issue); in Ethiopia, which was faced with the threat of breaking up after the victory of the 'rebels', the same authoritarian policeman took it upon itself to organize the London conference which made it possible to form an Ethiopian government around the Tigreans of the EPRDF, and which pressed the Eritrean separatists and the Oromos to cooperate with the new power; in Yugoslavia it's again the US government which has threatened to suspend economic aid if the Serbian bourgeois clique doesn't change its attitude to Croat demands, a situation which is threatening to lead to the breakup of the country; in Pakistan Washington has stopped supplying conventional weapons and a part of its economic aid as long as the Islamabad government fails to provide proof that it is not building nuclear weapons; the American bourgeoisie has even forbidden China from selling Pakistan certain materials that could be used to this end.
This is the 'victory' feted by American capital: the immediate consolidation of its position as the world's number one gangster. It is a victory over its direct competitors, proof of its determination to limit certain aspects of the decomposition which threatens its empire. But the worldwide tendency towards chaos and barbarism will not be held back for all that.
The inevitable slide into chaos
The power of American capital may exert itself all over the planet and momentarily moderate this or that aspect of global chaos. But it cannot reverse the course of the gigantic torrent of blood and filth invading the planet. The new world disorder is not a fortuitous coincidence between different phenomena which are unrelated to each other, and which could therefore be solved one after the other. Behind the present chaos there is a logic, the logic of the advanced decadence of a form of social organization. As marxism and marxism alone analyzed and predicted (the same marxism which the ruling class believes, or would like to have us believe, has been buried with the remains of Stalinism), it's at the very heart of the capitalist relations of production that we can find the key to the impasse which condemns society to this apocalyptic situation.
The economic crisis of capitalism has more and more wiped out the economic capacities of the 'third world' countries. In May 1991, in the aftermath of the huge and destructive waste of the Gulf war, and when the big agricultural powers of the west were deciding to sterilize millions of acres of cultivatable land in order to cope with 'overproduction;', the secretary general of that den of gangsters, the UN, launched an appeal on behalf of Africa, where 30 million people are threatened by famine.
It's this same economic impasse which has led to the collapse of the worm-eaten edifice of state capitalism in the eastern bloc.
It's the economic crisis which, in the industrialized western nations, has led to the industrial desertification of entire areas, generalized job insecurity and unemployment. It's this crisis which is now going through a new acceleration, hitting the centre of the system with full force (see the article on the economic crisis in this issue).
The economic machine is exploiting a diminishing number of workers. A growing portion of society has been ejected from capitalist production, and is being atomized, marginalized, condemned to live by all kinds of little jobs or expedients. This is the generalization of poverty[9]. It's the decomposition of capitalism's social tissue.
Within the possessing class, the economic crisis is also synonymous with sharpening competition. Whether between nations or within each nation, competition is intensifying on the economic and military levels. Blind violence, military language more and more replace economic language. The war of each against all, a feature of capitalism since its beginning, is reaching a paroxysm in this final phase of the system. It's every man for himself in a world without a future.
Capitalist relations of production have become a historic aberration whose survival can only give rise to barbarism, as was the case with slave or feudal relations in their periods of decline. But unlike the past where new social relations (feudal ones after slavery, capitalist ones after feudalism) could begin to develop within the old order, the installation of a new society based on communist relations can only come about on the political ruins of the previous system.
Capitalist logic leads to the economic collapse of the system, but not to its supersession. This can only be the conscious and deliberate act of the world proletariat. If the working class does not manage to take its fight against capital to a revolutionary conclusion, if it does not concretely open up the perspective of a new society, we will not have communism but the barbarous putrefaction of the old capitalist society and the threat of the disappearance of the human species, either through world war, or through decomposition and generalized chaos. The resistance by the proletariat of the central countries against being ideologically dragooned by capitalism has prevented the crisis from leading to world war between two blocs, but it has not been able to slow down the resulting putrefaction of capitalist society. What we are living through today, what is at the source of all the chaos today, is the phenomenon of capitalism simply rotting on its feet, deprived of any perspective.
This is why the action of American capital, however powerful the means it has at its disposal, cannot really reverse this march towards the abyss.
On the level of inter-imperialist conflicts, the Middle East remains an unstable powder-keg in which despite Washington's strongman diplomacy, the explosion of new armed conflicts is inevitable. Already Israel has resumed bombing areas of southern Lebanon and keeps on replying to the pressures on it to 'trade territories for peace' with accusations against Syria for 'devouring Lebanon'[10]. The Gulf war has not brought a definitive peace; it merely demonstrated the means that American capital will use to maintain its supremacy.
As for the economic competition between nations, there are no grounds for thinking that it's going to grow any milder. The aggravation of the economic crisis can only exacerbate it. Here again the action of American capital has functioned as a show of strength to compensate for its weakness vis-a-vis its competitors[11]. "I don't believe that US leadership should be limited to the areas of security and politics. I think that it also has to extend to the economic domain"[12]. This declaration by J Baker does not herald a conciliatory attitude by American capital, but, once again, the method it will use to face up to the economic war.
Whether on the political/military level or the economic level, the perspective is not one of peace and order but war and chaos between countries.
But the tendency towards disintegration also expresses itself within each nation. Whether we're talking about the dislocation of the USSR, of Yugoslavia, of India, of Ethiopia or the majority of African countries, the ravages of poverty and the war to the death between each clique of the capitalist class can only intensify. And a few crumbs of 'humanitarian' aid by the USA or some other power won't reverse the underlying tendencies that are tearing these countries apart.
The class struggle
There can be no struggle against chaos and the dislocation of society unless there is an attack on the source of all this: capitalist social relations. And only the struggle of the proletariat can be an irreconcilable fight against capital. Only the antagonism between labor and capital has the historic and international dimension that is indispensable if there is to be a response to a problem on this scale.
The future of humanity depends on the outcome of the struggle between the workers and the bourgeoisie in all countries. But this in turn depends on the capacity of the workers to recognize the real struggle they have to wage. If the proletariat does not manage to escape from the chaotic whirlpool which causes it to split up along religious, racial, ethnic or other lines, if it does not manage to unite itself by imposing the class terrain as the only terrain worth fighting on, the door will be wide open to the acceleration of chaos and decomposition.
In the underdeveloped countries, where the class is in a minority and has less traditions of struggle, the workers have much more difficulty in escaping the grip of these archaic divisions that are so alien to the class struggle. In the eastern countries, despite all the combativity that has been evident in recent months (in particular with the miners of the USSR and a number of sectors in Bylo-Russia), the working class is weighed down by all the current nationalist, democratic, and of course 'anti-communist' mystifications.
It's in the central countries of western capitalism that the antagonism between capital and labor exists in its most direct and complete from. The working class there represents the majority of the population and its historical experience is the richest, both as regards the mystifications of the bourgeoisie and its own mass struggles. Here are located the decisive battalions of the world proletarian army. The opening up of a new horizon for the workers of the entire world depends on the capacity of the workers in these countries to spring the traps laid by capitalist decomposition (competition faced with the threat of unemployment, conflicts between workers of different national origins, the marginalization of the unemployed), on their ability to clearly affirm their irreconcilable opposition to capital.
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The Gulf war gave rise to a deep disquiet in the world population and in particular in the proletariat of the industrialized countries. The end of the conflict engendered a feeling of relief, reinforced by the gigantic ideological campaigns about the new era of peace, the 'new world order'. But this feeling can only be relative and short-lived as the dark clouds of chaos gather all over the planet and upset the 'optimistic' speeches of the ruling class. Nothing could be more dangerous for the revolutionary class than forgetting what the Gulf war was and what it heralds. In the face of the aggravation of the economic crisis and all the attacks on workers' living conditions that go with it, in the defensive struggles that these attacks will provoke, it is crucial that the working class is able to benefit from all the reflection that this disquiet about the war has given rise to. The class will only be able to raise its consciousness, understand the real dimensions of its struggle and carry out its historic task if it looks reality in the face, if it refuses to be 'consoled' by the seductive speeches of the ruling class, and if it rediscovers its revolutionary program and its principal weapon of political combat - marxism.
RV
16/6/91
[1] Since the First World War, the manipulation of opinion has been seen by the capitalist class as the job of the government. During the 30s, with fascism in Italy and Germany, with Stalinism in the USSR, but also and above all with the more subtle Hollywood democracy of the USA, this has become a truly gigantic enterprise, the major concern of every political leadership. Goebbels, the master of Hitlerite propaganda, cynically summed up the method that was being adopted by every government on the planet: "a lie repeated a thousand times becomes a truth".
[2] Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1991.
[3] The military spokesmen remained systematically vague or silent when questioned on this point "We are not here to discuss the pornography of war" a British colonel replied during a press conference on the balance-sheet of the war (Liberation, 26 March, 91). The official figures for losses on the allied side are on the other hand very precise: 236 men, including 115 Americans, plus another 105 in transport accidents on the way.
[4] We know now that there were massive desertions from the Iraqi army and that this led to ferocious repression by Saddam's elite corps.
[5] It has been proved that American planes dropped leaflets in the Kurdish zones at the end of the war, calling for an uprising against Saddam's regime, and that American officers encouraged the leaders of the Kurdish bourgeois nationalist movements to launch this adventure.
[6] When we say that the US Empire undertook this war to fight against chaos, we are sometimes accused of presenting the war as a 'disinterested' action by the American leaders. But we don't think that the USA was acting altruistically just because the most sordid and selfish interests of the USA are opposed to a disorder that would threaten its dominant position in the world. Those who benefit from an existing order always oppose those who call it into question. For a more developed analysis of the causes of the war, see nos 63, 64 and 65 of this review.
[7] cited by Claude Julien in Le monde Diplomatique, October 1991
[8] cited by J Fitchett in Herald Tribune, 12/6/91
[9] Marx's analysis predicting the "absolute pauperization" of society, which during the 1960s was so decried by the so-called theoretical gravediggers of marxism, is today being confirmed in a striking and tragic manner.
[10] American capital has no illusions on this score. Thus, at the same time as it was piling the pressure on Israel to take up a more conciliatory stance vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors, the USA decided to supply the Israeli state with major new stocks of weapons: 46 F-16 fighters, 25 F-15s, in all 700 million dollars worth of weaponry, transmitted directly from the USA's 'arms surplus'. The new weapons stocks will be able to be used by the armies of both states. What's more the USA is financing 80% of Israel's anti-missile missile program.
[11] Without losing a sense of proportion, the USA has been in a comparable position to that of the USSR, with an economy weaker than that of its main vassals. This is to a large extent due to the weight of military expenses which the head of a bloc inevitably has to bear (see 'What point has the crisis reached' in IR 65)
[12] Herald Tribune, 21/2/91.
Who said: "I am aware that we are on the verge of the dislocation of both economy and state"? Gorbachev himself! With every day that passes, the USSR plunges deeper into chaos. The ship of the state is rudderless, and when Gorbachev received the French President Mitterrand in early May, he gave a catastrophic overview of Perestroika, declaring that the soviets are "floundering in the dark", that "the instrumentation no longer works", and that "the crew is disunited". The new prime minister, Pavlov, a worthy representative of the Party nomenklatura, backs this up, saying that the USSR is threatened with "a colossal decomposition"[1]
Russian capitalism's road to disaster
The time, not so long ago, when the USSR's imperialist power made the world tremble, is definitively over. The USSR no longer has the means to keep up its rank as a world imperialist super-power. On the economic level, it never has had. The USSR, despite its under-development, had been able to challenge its American rival (whose GNP in 1990 was three times greater than its own) by concentrating the whole economy in the hands of the state and sacrificing it completely to the needs of its military power.
For decades, the USSR has devoted between 20% and 40% of national income to arms production and the maintenance of the "Red Army". This priority was imposed at the cost of increasing dilapidation in the rest of the economy. The high-tech sectors fell further and further behind. This then rebounded on the arms industry, with the growing technical superiority technical superiority of Western weapons, which still further handicapped Russian military power. Where technology was lacking, or machines unavailable, the brain and brawn of the proletariat was brutally exploited. Under the iron fist of the Stalinist party, the USSR was transformed into gigantic labor camp.
In the end, the USSR was unable to fight the war which it had prepared for so long. Not only were its weapons completely outclassed, the regime's utter rejection by the population made mobilization necessary for war completely impossible.
Faced with the economic collapse, the nomenklatura was forced into an agonizing reappraisal. Economic modernization became an urgent necessity: for this, reforms were required. Gorbachev was to be the standard-bearer of the new economic policy of Perestroika. However, calling into question the economic dogmas which served as a base for Stalinist state capitalism inevitably also meant calling into question the political dogmas at the heart of Stalinism itself, and in particular the dogma of the dictatorial power of the single party.
Far from putting the economy back to rights, Perestroika hastened the collapse of the politico-economic system established by Stalin. Today, the Russian bourgeoisie must confront not only the aberrations of its economy, but the USSR's accelerating plunge into the infernal spiral of economic, political and social chaos.
The question which posed today is that the very existence of the USSR.
The claim of Stalinism, the most brutal form of state capitalism, to represent communism has been the biggest lie of the century. Every fraction of the bourgeoisie, East and West, from extreme left to extreme right, has cooperated to keep it going. The language of Stalinism has prostituted Marxist vocabulary to the service of the USSR's imperialist ambitions, to providing it with an ideological umbrella and an alibi for the regime's exactions. The decomposition of the USSR today has laid bare the truth that revolutionaries have declared constantly for decades: the capitalist nature of the USSR, and the bourgeois nature of the CPSU.
The economic collapse accelerates
For the 1st quarter of 1991, relative to the same quarter of 1990, the state Office of Statistics announced an 8% fall in GNP, a 13% decline in agricultural production, a 40% plunge in exports, and an increase of 27 billion roubles in the federal budget deficit. Western estimates are more pessimistic still, and estimate the fall in GNP at 15%.
The military-industrial complex, the only branch to function with a minimum of efficiency until now, has become to all intents and purposes useless. The USSR has had to trim its imperialist ambitions. It no longer needs more weapons: it hardly knows what to do with the thousands of tanks and the tons of armaments it is being forced to evacuate from its bases in Eastern Europe. Industry's technological heart is almost at a standstill, while it waits for a hypothetical reconversion to the production of capital consumer goods, which would anyway take years. In the meantime, the USSR no longer knows what to do with the now useless technological pride of its industry.
The USSR's traditional customers in the ex-Eastern bloc are turning towards other suppliers, and Russian industry cannot hope to find other outlets for its products, which are technologically completely outdated, of poor quality, and unreliable. Nor is there any prospect of improvement with trade wars raging all throughout the world market.
The structure of the USSR's trade is characteristic of an under-developed country: it is above all an exporter of raw materials, especially oil, and at the same time an importer of food. In 1998, oil and mineral products accounted for 75% of hard currency earnings, while agricultural trade was in deficit to the tune of $12 billion.
Nonetheless, the oil industry has had to reduce production: because it has not been modernized for years, its equipment is constantly breaking down and hampered by a chronic shortage of spare parts. As a result, oil exports fell by 36 % in volume in the 1st quarter of 1991, relative to the same quarter last year.
Agriculture is in a terrible state. The specter of famine has returned to haunt the country, after being pushed back last year by an abundant grain harvest. Cereal production is expected to fall this year by 10%. A shortage of equipment, silos, transport, and machinery, means that 30% of the harvest is simply lost. The USSR will have to make up the deficit on the world market simply to face up to the immediate needs of an already severely rationed population. It will only be able to do so by going still further into debt.
Traditionally, the USSR has always been highly solvent, with a low level of debt. Today, the country is folding under the weight of a debt estimated at $60 billion. Every month sees new delays or defaults on payment, which has recently led Japan to refuse it any new credits. Gorbachev has been reduced to crying for help, begging for aid and new international loans.
But this picture of economic collapse would not be complete if we did not include the destructive effect on the economy of the dynamic of chaos into which the USSR is plunging.
In several republics, production has been virtually brought to a standstill by nationalist conflicts. The situation in the Caucasus is a revealing example. The road and rail blockade that Azerbaijan has imposed on Armenia - many of which have thus been forced to shut down - it has also created a huge bottleneck which encumbers goods transport throughout the southern USSR, forcing the closure of factories right outside the Caucasus region.
The discontent of workers, faced with a constant degradation of their already wretched living conditions, is constantly growing. Stoppages proliferate, massive strikes explode. In recent months, the miners blocked coal production for weeks.
Confronted with this catastrophic situation, the bourgeoisie is paralyzed and impotent. An important fraction within the party is deeply hostile to reform, and is deliberately sabotaging them, further accelerating the breakdown of the economy. The bureaucratic hierarchy's natural passivity is reinforced by the dithering and impotence of the hierarchs in the Kremlin. With decisions being handed down by different fractions at the center, local chiefs prefer to wait to see which way the wind turns rather than take any decisions themselves.
In the meantime, the economy is becoming more and more dilapidated; as it waits for decisions which never come, utter disorganization reigns. Against a backdrop of increasing poverty, the black market has imposed its law of generalized corruption on the whole economy.
The paralysis of the ruling class
The form taken by the counter-revolution in Russia determined its ruling class' mode of organization. The state which emerged from the Russian Revolution, and the Bolshevik Party which had become identified with it, had been devoured from within by the Stalinist counter-revolution. The old possessing classes had been expropriated by the proletarian revolution; a new capitalist class was reconstituted within the Stalinist-Party-State, controlling all the means of production and the whole of social life. The political forms of the one-party state corresponded to the juridical form of state ownership of the means of production.
The members of the Party nomenklatura enjoy privileges which guarantee them living conditions which are simply incomparable with those of the proletariat, which subjected to a grinding poverty. The state ensures a luxurious way of life to those who control its functioning: specially reserved housing, access to shops abundantly stocked with all kinds of consumer goods, especially Western, "company" cars; over and above the salary it brings, a post in the bureaucracy is a source of hidden income from all kinds of traffic and dealing. More than any theoretical analysis, the reality of these facts is ample proof that a privileged class does exist in the USSR, a capitalist bourgeoisie which exploits the working class through the state. The form of exploitation differs from that in Western countries, but the end result is the same.
During the last decades, behind the monolithic façade of the so-called Communist party, quasi-feudal clans, Mafiosi, and dynasties have emerged. Wars between cliques have left their corpses behind, in the course of successive purges. Waste and incompetence reign at every level of the party, its leaders more preoccupied by their rivalries for power, source of wealth and influence, and be every kind of corrupt dealing, than by the management of the productive apparatus.
Brezhnev's death at the end of 1982 was the signal for the outbreak of a "war of succession" in the party, strengthening the centrifugal tendencies within it. When, after the brief interlude of Andropov and Chernenko, Gorbachev's accession to the leadership of the Politburo in 1985 confirmed the victory of the reformist tendency, the collapse of the economy was already clear for all to see, and the decomposition of the ruling party and the development of chaos in general already well under way.
Perestroika proposed to promote economic reform without calling into question either the single party or its control of the state; it only accelerated the collapse of the Stalinist regime. To preserve the unity of the party, Gorbachev had to perform a delicate balancing act between conservative and reformist tendencies; this condemned him to taking no more than half-measures, and so to impotence. Ever since this accession to power, Gorbachev's whole art has been to present a belated recognition that the situation was slipping more and more out of state's control, as a determined policy of bold reform. From one day to the next, Gorbachev has been obliged to accept what he had refused the day before. The aim of Perestroika was to save the USSR and its bloc through a policy of reform; Gorbachev, after trying vainly to maintain in power reformist factions under Moscow's control, has had to abandon any control by the USSR over the countries which has used to form its "glacis" in Eastern Europe. After rejecting repressive methods, he has had to send the army to repress nationalist agitation in the Caucasus and Baku, and against the Lithuanian parliament. After allying with the reformers, he has had to seek support from the conservatives, and vice-versa.
The attempts to gain democratic credibility have been a resounding flop. The elections only highlighted the irredeemable unpopularity of the Party apparatchiks. Nationalist and radical reformers monopolize the votes. In the absence of any food to fill the abyss between the population of the USSR and the Stalinist state. The years of horror, when millions of proletarians and peasants fell under the repression of a corrupt and ferocious state will never be forgotten. Under such conditions, despite all his media skill Gorbachev is incapable of controlling any democratic process. The latest referendum on the Union is a fine example. After years of preparation, it only entrenched the perspectives of disunity: the Armenians, Georgians, and Balts are hostile to the union, and refused to take part; the vote embodied the continued decline of Gorbachev's popularity, and the growing influence of his reformist rival Yeltsin.
The party is imploding, blurring at the edges. A myriad of new organizations have appeared. The Stalinist nostalgics, in favor of strong-arm methods to restore order, go arm-in-arm with the ultra-nationalist, anti-semites Pamyat. The radical reformers leave the party to found democratic associations. In the peripheral republics, splits have created new "communist" parties on a nationalist basis, confirming the breakup of the CPSU. Opportunism is raging. For many one-time apparatchiks, the only means of survival are populist and nationalist demagogy. Under the flags of various nationalities that are stirring the USSR, new alliances of convenience are being formed between the old local fiefdoms of the CPSU, the milieu of wheeler-dealers that has emerged from the flourishing black market, the reformists ranging from the worst kind of opportunist to naïve sould full of democratic illusions, and the historically archaic nationalists.
Ever-wider regions of the USSR are escaping from central control. The independentists are in power in the Baltic states, in Moldavia, in Armenia. Everywhere, the prerogatives of the central power are being reined in, the ruling nationalism encourages disobedience to orders from the Kremlin, while the local state bureaucracy, confronted with the paralysis of the center, hesitates between immobility and support for the newly emerging local powers. Power centers are proliferating everywhere.
Party and state have fractured from top to bottom. The recent agreement between Yeltsin and Gorbachev on the devolution of central power over management of mines to the republics, and the creation of a KGB under the control of the Russian government is an indication of the impotence of the central power.
The long miner's strike has demonstrated the Kremlin's inability to impose its will and get production going again. Since it no longer has any control over whole branches of the economy, it has no other solution than to leave management in the hands of the various local authorities. The USSR's economy is in the process of disintegrating into different poles. The central government is even beginning to lose control over international trade: several republics have already begun to trade directly with each other and with the West, accelerating the centrifugal dynamic of the soviet economy.
Like the party, the police apparatus which is so closely linked to it is splitting up more and more, putting itself at the service of the new nationalist centers of power. New police forces and nationalist militia are taking place of the old police forces to closely tied Moscow.
Frontiers have been set up within the USSR, defended by armed nationalist militias. Lithuania has set up frontier posts, and its frontier guards have clashed several times with Moscow police, resulting in several deaths. The conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijani militias has not diminished in the least since the intervention of the "Red" Army. Pogroms, war and repression in Baku have caused hundreds of deaths. The "Red" Army has not bogged down, without being able to impose a solution on the conflict. In Georgia, recent clashes between Georgians and Ossetians grow that a new area of tension has opened. Ethnic conflicts are proliferating at the farthest confines of Russia.
Within this context of disintegration, the only structure which has all resisted the overall decomposition, and the loss of control by the central power, and which still makes it possible to maintain some pretense of cohesion within the USSR, is the army. However, the same dynamic which dominates the USSR as a whole, is at work here also. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers repatriated from Eastern Europe find themselves and their families unhoused, living in conditions of real poverty which are all the more resented in that they have just returned from countries with a higher standard of living. This is aggravating the general malaise that has infected the army since the retreat from Afghanistan. There are out and out battles in the barracks between soldiers of different nationalities. Draft-dodging, desertion, and insubordination are becoming commonplace.
The soviet bourgeoisie no longer has the means to conduct a generalized repression. Although its army can still undertake to keep the peace in some regions, its room for maneuver is nonetheless very limited. The repressive apparatus' hesitations over the situation in Lithuania or the Caucasus express perfectly the disarray and impotence of the Kremlin government. Only a few principles, nostalgic for the Stalinist past, still think that large scale repression is still possible without tipping the USSR still faster into civil war.
The proletariat caught in the whirlwind
Neither the widespread discontent, nor the regime's complete lack of credibility, much less the class struggle, lay behind the collapse of the Stalinist state. The discontent is not new, nor is the state's lack of credibility. As for the class struggle, we only have to remark that there was no significant struggle in the USSR before the miner's strike in 1989.
In the name of the defense of communism and proletarian internationalism, generations of proletarians have been subjected to the bestiality of Stalinism, the product of the defeat of the Russian revolution. In rejecting the regime the workers of the USSR have also rejected all the proletariat's revolutionary tradition, its class experience, leading the descendants of the proletarians of the Revolution into total political confusion, identifying the worst capitalist dictatorship with socialism. In reaction to Stalinism, soviet workers' hopes for change have turned towards the mythical past of national folklore, or towards the wonderful mirage of Western capitalist "democracy".
The proletariat is suffering even more strongly from the devastating consequences of this dynamic of disintegration and decomposition because it did not overthrow the Stalinist regime itself. The democratic illusion has no historical roots in Russia, and remains the domain of petty bourgeois intellectuals. The proletariat is more receptive to populist and nationalist demagogy. The weight of nationalism on the proletariat is due both to the backwardness of Russian capitalism which was unable to integrate the populations colonized by Tsarism, given its economic weakness, and to the gut reaction against the central government, which is the symbol of years of terror and dictatorship.
With Perestroika, in the name of reforms and change, the attacks on workers' living conditions have intensified. Wage rises have not kept pace with the repeated price increases for staple products. Inflation is expected to be in triple figures for 1991. At the beginning of April, the prices of bread rose by 200%, that of sugar by 100%. The same is happening with all staple products. Under the pretext of renewing bank notes, the state stole the saves of wage-earners and pensioners. Rationing is applied to more and more products. Under such conditions, discontent has grown. According to the Office of Statistics, strikes have cost 1.17 million working hours during the first quarter of 1991. But although these developing strikes show that workers have recovered their combativity, and that they are ready to resist the attacks on their living conditions, they also illustrate their political weakness and confusion. We can see this in the miners' strike which hit the whole USSR this spring, or in the general strike in Byelorussia at the same time.
Although this strike began on the economic terrain, their strike committees were soon under the control of the most nationalist elements. The miners' strike shut down production in hundreds of pits, and mobilized hundreds of thousands of workers throughout the USSR; it rejected all the central government's proposals. And yet, the separate negotiations by strike committees with representatives of each republic, led to the movement's fragmentation. In Russia, Yeltsin's nationalist and populist demagogy, promising the miners that they "would have the right to chose their type of management and property" had more effect in stopping the strike than Prime Minister Pavlov's offer to double wages. No sooner than the miners gone back to work than Yeltsin, who had been gaining a cheap radical credibility for Gorbachev's resignation, returned to an alliance with Gorbachev to establish "exceptional rules" banning strikes in transport, basic industry, and enterprises producing for soviet consumers.
The weakness of the proletariat in the USSR in confronting the mystifications of democracy and nationalism means that not only is it incapable of defending any perspective against chaos, its struggles are being dragged off their class terrain and doomed to defeat. Yeltsin has been able to use the miners' strike to reinforce his own political credibility and economic. The central government's recent abandonment of its sovereignty over coal production is only a forecasts of what is to come, and heralds the breakup of soviet capital.
Too weak to resist, the proletariat is also affected by the dynamic of decomposition and disintegration ravaging the USSR. The poison of nationalism is a gangrene which not only hampers the proletariat in its struggle, but is a mortal factor in the destruction of its class identity and the division of the workers. In Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, the Baltic states, the workers are demonstrating not on their own class terrain, but on the terrain of nationalism, where they are atomized, diluted in the generalized discontent which nationalism crystallizes, enrolled in nationalist militia, drawn into new conflicts as in the Caucasus. The situation of decomposition which has affected the proletariat in the peripheral republics threatens the working class throughout the USSR.
The fear of great powers faced with the break-up of the USSR
Far from rejoicing at the tribulations of their one-time imperialist rival, which had been an object of fear for decades, the Western powers are gripped with anxiety at the consequences of the Stalinist system's collapse.
The break-up of the Russian bloc has determined the disappearance of its Western rival which has lost its reasons for existence, thus liberating worldwide capitalism's natural tendency to struggle "every man for himself". Stalinism's political collapse in the USSR has dragged down its allies all over the world. The various communist parties have had to give up power throughout Eastern Europe; they are replaced by fragile, unstable regimes which has set the seal on their new independence and the USSR's loss of control. At the periphery of capitalism, dictatorships whose sole legitimacy lay in the military and political support they received from the USSR have had to give up power. The ex-Eastern bloc troops have had to withdraw from Angola, and the MPLA has had to give in to Western diktats. In Ethiopia, the loss of Soviet arms supplies forced Mengistu to save his skin by fleeing abroad. One can only wonder how long Castro will survive in Cuba. The example is contagious, and is making all the dictatorships more fragile. The USSR's collapse is a profoundly destabilizing factor in the world situation as a whole.
The reawakening of the nationalities is accompanied by the exacerbation of nationalist tension. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a foretaste of the disorder that will afflict these new states, whose existence is founded on the most archaic and anachronistic aspects of different national cultures.
The gigantic arsenal of the "Red" Army is threatened with dispersal as the USSR breaks up. Tomorrow, nuclear weapons and power stations, thousands, or tens of thousands of tanks and cannon, and guns are liable to fall into the hands of the most anachronistic forces thrown up by the putrefaction of the Stalinist regime. Any idea of the great powers controlling nuclear proliferation will become completely outdated, and the risk of nuclear "accidents" like Chernobyl vastly greater. Chernobyl is no accident: it is the exact concentration of the situation in the USSR.
Faced with such destabilization, the world's other great powers, with the USA and the European powers to the fore have no interest in any acceleration of the USSR's collapse, and disintegration into a multitude of rival states. Together, they will make every effort to support the factors of political cohesion in the USSR, and promote reforms to try to stabilize the economic and social situation.
In these conditions, the West can only support Gorbachev, who is the last guarantor of the USSR's unity, and a proclaimed partisan of reforms. The Western powers have followed this policy strictly for years, but in doing so they trapped themselves in the same contradictions as Perestroika. The least decompose fractions of the Party whose support Gorbachev depends on regroup those most hostile, or most timid towards reforms. With Pavlov as Prime Minister, the old guard is back in command. The most reformist factions have joined the nationalists, and their victory today would mean acceleration of the dynamic towards disintegration. For the sake of maintaining international frontiers and preserving the increasingly theoretical existence of the USSR, Western "democracies" are supporting, by conveniently closing their eyes to it, the repression aimed at calming the fever for independence of the Armenians, Lithuanians, and Georgians. The incapacity of the various Perestroika governments to reform the production going again, has led to desperate appeals for international aid and new loans. Prime Minister Pavlov, who only recently was accusing the West of poisoning last winter's food aid with radio-active elements, now declares that "we won't make it without Western help".
But the Western economies are under pressure from the advancing recession; they do not have the means to coming to the rescue of the soviet economy. The scarcity of funds, and pressing priorities make a new Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe and the USSR impossible. We only have to look at the situation in East Germany, which was the most developed country in the bloc, to see that the chaos of the USSR could absorb billions of dollars without any productive effect. Western loans are going to plug gaps and ease the immediate social tension, without any other result than to put off the day of reckoning.
But if the West is forced to limit its economic aid, it is not so stingy with its political help to Gorbachev. The leader of the soviet state is recognized as its only valid spokesman, and is given first class world media coverage. As for the representatives of the various nationalities emerging in the USSR, whenever they travel abroad they find themselves being lectured. They are advised to be patient, to calm their nationalist ardor, to enter into a dialogue with Moscow. When Yeltsin travelled to Europe last spring, just after demanding Gorbachev's resignation, he was rebuffed time after time. There was no question of the West giving greater credibility to the Russian leader, whose victory would mean the faster breakup of the USSR. Apparently, Yeltsin got the message, since on his return he made a complete U-turn and made an alliance with Gorbachev. The West is using every means it can to put pressure on the different players in the drama of the USSR, in an attempt to calm things down.
But the West does not have the means to prevent the inevitable breakup of the USSR, any more than Gorbachev. The most it can do is to try to slow it down, to gain time in order to control the most explosive aspects of the situation. The impotence of both the West and Gorbachev is an expression of the fact that the same fundamental contradictions which determine the collapse of the USSR are also at work in the rest of the world[2]. The ‘Third World' has preceded the USSR into the chaos it is undergoing today. The USSR's decomposition is not merely a product of its own specificities; it is the expression of a worldwide dynamic, which has been concretized more explosively and faster in the USSR because of the weakness of its capital and its historic specificities.
Unable to find any palliatives, or any way out of its contradictions, world capital has been sinking for more than 20 years ever deeper into crisis. The economic collapse of the USSR, after that of the Third World, and its present "Africanization", reveals the advance gangrene of decomposition which weighs today, ever more strongly, on the planet as a whole[3]. JJ
[1] See International Review no. 60, ‘Theses on the Economic and Political Crisis in Eastern Europe, and the Definitive Bankruptcy of Stalinism' and International Review no. 61, ‘After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, Destabilization and Chaos'.
[2] See International Review no. 57, ‘The Decomposition of Capitalism' and no. 62, ‘Decomposition, the final phase of Capitalist Decadence'.
[3] See the editorial in this issue of the International Review.
The Gulf War is a forceful reminder to the working class that capitalism itself is war, the very height of barbarism, and this can only encourage it to think deeply about the kind of society it 's living in. This is why, throughout the war, the bourgeoisie of the 'democratic' countries systematically hid the extent of the destruction and maneuvers it was carrying out, and why, after the war, it organized a gigantic humanitarian campaign around the massacre of the Kurds in order to make workers forget its own crimes and its responsibility in this massacre. The bourgeoisie of the great 'democracies' has long experience at this level, both in killing and in lies and cynicism. The proletariat must remember the crimes committed by the 'democratic' bourgeoisie, as well as its direct or indirect complicity in the massacres and destruction perpetrated by Stalinism and fascism.
Introduction:
Lies and Cynicism from the Bourgeoisie During and After the Gulf War
Throughout the war, we hardly saw any pictures of the massacres and destruction inflicted on the Iraqi population. The absolute rule was: total blackout and a strict control of the media. To this day there are no precise figures, but it's certain that more than 200,000 civilians and nearly 250,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed, not to mention the wounded and those who will be infirm for the rest of their lives. After all the obscene boasts about 'surgical precision bombing', an American general in charge of the US air force has admitted that out of the 88,500 tons of bombs rained on Iraq, less than 7 % were laser-guided, that 70 % of the bombs missed their target and that the airmen had 'sprayed' their bombs without too much concern for pin-point accuracy, using that old and sinister method of 'carpet bombing'! One can imagine the damage done to civilian areas in such conditions. But little or none of this ever filtered through.
By contrast, the media did their utmost to convey the morbid spectacle of thousands of Kurds, women, children and the old, dying of hunger and cold, lapping stagnant water like dogs and fighting around the trucks for a crust of bread or a bottle of water.
The incredible cynicism and duplicity of the American, French and British bourgeoisie was once again demonstrated in the most sinister manner. Because not only did they use these massacres in order to make people forget their own war crimes - they were also directly responsible for this genocidal massacre which took the total number of war victims close to a million.
The bourgeoisie of the 'Coalition' had deliberately pushed for the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions. They had encouraged the Kurdish bourgeois cliques to proclaim the uprising by leading them to believe they would receive the necessary support; and then they carefully ensured that no aid was forthcoming and that Saddam Hussein had the forces he required to repress the revolt. By laying this trap, in which at least 250,000 people died, the 'Coalition' bourgeoisie killed two birds with one stone.
On the one hand, jt made it easier for their own war crimes to be forgotten by focusing attention on the new crimes of the 'Hitler of the Middle East'; and at the same time, through this massive repression, they prevented the Lebanisation of the whole region, which would have been the result of a successful uprising by the Kurds and Shiites. And they did this without getting their own hands dirty, since that devil Saddam once again took on the butcher's job. This is why although the repression took place under the eyes of the American army, it wasn't until it had been completed that the tearful appeals for humanitarian action began to be issued.
The Machiavellianism of the bourgeoisie, its capacity to manipulate events and send hundreds of thousands of human beings to their deaths, is nothing new. The horrors in the Gulf are the continuation of a long and macabre series. Throughout the decadence of capitalism, the grand 'democracies' have accumulated a huge experience in this bloody game, whether in dealing with the always dangerous situations which arise in a country defeated in war, or in justifying and obscuring their own crimes by fixing attention on the diabolic deeds of the 'other' side.
The Second World War: the crimes and massacres of democracy and anti-fascism
The list of crimes and butcheries perpetuated by those paragons of law and morality, the old bourgeois democracies, is so long that you could hardly do justice to it in an entire issue of this Review. Let's recall the First World War where the main protagonists were democracies, including the Russia of 1917 under the 'socialist' and 'democrat' Kerensky, and where the social democratic parties played a major role as purveyors of cannon fodder. The latter also didn't hesitate to put on the butcher's apron when it came to the bloody repression of the German revolution in January 1919, when thousands of workers perished in the city of Berlin alone. Let's also recall the British, French and American expeditionary corps sent to put down the October revolution; the genocide of the Armenians by the Turkish state with the direct complicity of the French and British governments; the gassing of the Kurds by the British army in 1925, etc ... The more capitalism has sunk into decadence the more its method of survival has become war and terror, and this goes for the 'democratic' states as well as the totalitarian ones.
But in the necessarily limited context of a single article, we will restrict ourselves to denouncing something that, without doubt, stands alongside the monstrous identification between Stalinism and communism as the greatest lie of the century, the so-called war of 'democracy against fascism', of law and morality against Nazi barbarism, which is still the way it is taught in school text books. A war in which the barbarism was supposedly on one side only, that of the Axis powers; a war which, as far as the virtuous democratic camp is concerned, is presented as being a purely defensive one and, to use the current terms of bourgeois propaganda, essentially a 'clean' one.
A study of the second world war not only enables one to measure the enormity of this lie, but also to understand how, during and after the Gulf war, the democratic bourgeoisie drew heavily on the experience it acquired during this crucial historic period.
The terror bombing of the German population
As soon as he came to power in 1940, the head of state of the world's oldest democracy, Britain, and also the real war leader of the Allied camp, Sir Winston Churchill, set up 'Bomber Command' - the central nucleus of the heavy bomber squadrons whose task was to sow terror in the German cities. To justify this strategy of terror, to provide an ideological cover for it, Churchill made use of the massive German bombing of London and Coventry in the autumn of 1940 and the bombing of Rotterdam, the scale of the latter being deliberately exaggerated (the Anglo-American media spoke of 30,000 victims when in fact it was more like 1000).
With this ideological cover assured, Linndeman, Churchill's adviser, could make the following suggestion in March 1942: "An offensive of extensive bombing could sap the moral of the enemy providing it is directed against the working class areas of the 58 German towns which have a population more than 100,000 ..." and he concluded by saying that "Between March 1942 and the middle of 1943 it should be possible to make one third of the total population of Germany homeless."
The British bourgeoisie then adopted this strategy of terror, but in all its official declarations, the government of His Gracious Majesty insisted on the fact that "Bomber Command was only bombing military targets, and any allusions to attacks on working class or civilian areas were rejected as absurd and as an affront to the honor of airmen sacrificing their lives for their country."
The first illustration that this was a cynical lie was the bombing of Hamburg in June 1943. The massive use of incendiary bombs left 50,000 dead and 40,000 wounded, mainly in working class residential areas. The centre of the city was entirely destroyed and, in two nights, the total number of victims was equal to the number killed by bombs on the British side throughout the war! In Kassel, in October 1943, nearly 10,000 civilians perished in a huge tempest of bombs.
Faced with certain questions about the extent of damage caused to the civilian population, the British government invariably replied that "there was no instruction to destroy homes and Bomber Command's targets were always military."
From the beginning of 1944, the terror raids on Darmstadt, Konisberg and Heilbronn claimed over 24,000 civilian victims. In Braunschweig the Allies had perfected their technique to the point where not one comer of the residential areas escaped the incendiary bombs. 23,000 people were trapped by a huge firestorm in the centre of the town and were carbonized or asphyxiated.
However there was a total black-out on all this and an American general (US forces began to participate massively in these 'extensive bombings') declared at the time that: "we must at all costs avoid giving the historians of this war any reason for accusing us 0!4irecting strategic bombing against the man in the street." Fifteen days before this declaration as US raid on Berlin had wiped out 25,000 civilians, and the general must have been quite well aware of this. The lies and cynicism which prevailed throughout the Gulf war are part of a long and solid tradition among our great democracies.
This strategy of terror inspired and led by Churchill had three objectives: first, to accelerate the military defeat of Germany by sapping the morale of the population; second, to stifle any possibility of revolt, and above all of proletarian movements. It was no accident that the terror bombing became systematic at the time when workers' strikes were breaking out in Germany and when (late '43) desertions from the German army were on the increase. Churchill, who had already played the role of bloodhound against the Russian revolution, was particularly aware of this danger. Third and final of Churchill' s objectives, particularly in 1945 with the Yalta conference of February fast approaching, was the question of using these bombings to place the 'democracies' in a position of strength faced with the advance of the Russian army, which Churchill judged to be taking place too rapidly.
The barbarism and murder unleashed by these air raids, whose principal victims were workers and refugees, reached their paroxysm in Dresden in February 1945. In Dresden there was no industry of any importance, nor any military strategic installations, and it was for this reason that Dresden became a place of refuge for hundreds of thousands fleeing the air raids and the advance of the 'Red Army'. Blinded by the democratic propaganda of the Allies, they thought that Dresden would never be bombed. The German authorities were also taken in because they set up a number of civilian hospitals in the city. The British government was well aware of this situation, and some military heads of 'Bomber Command' expressed serious reservations about the military validity of this target. The dry response was that Dresden was a priority target for the Prime Minister, and that was that.
When they bombed Dresden on February 13 and 14 1945, the British and American bourgeoisie knew perfectly well that there were nearly a million and a half people there, a large number of them women and child refugees, wounded, and prisoners of war. 650,000 incendiary bombs fell on the city, producing the most gigantic firestorm of the Second World War. Dresden burned for 8 days and the fires could be seen from 250km away. Certain neighborhoods burned so fiercely that it was weeks before anyone could enter the cellars. Out of 35,000 residential buildings, only 7000 remained standing. The entire town centre had disappeared and most of the hospitals had been destroyed.
On February 14, 450 US Flying Fortress bombers, following on from the British bombers, dropped another 771 tons of incendiary bombs. The balance sheet of what was undoubtedly one of the greatest war crimes of WW2 was 250,000 dead, nearly all of them civilians. By way of comparison, that other odious crime, Hiroshima, claimed 75,000 victims and the terrible American bombing of Tokyo in March 1945, 85,000.
Ordering the bombing of Chemnitz in the days that followed, the commandeers didn't mince their words. The airmen were told: "Your objective tonight is to finish off all the refugees who may have escaped from Dresden." With this butcher's language, one can see that the anti-fascist coalition was fully the equal of the Nazis when it came to barbarism. By November 1, 1945, after 18 months of bombing, 45 of the 60 main cities of Germany had been almost completely destroyed. At least 650,000 civilians died in these terror raids.
And in terms of shameful lying and cynicism, the Allies were equal to a Goebbels or a Stalin. In reply to the questions raised about these terrifying massacres, the Anglo-American bourgeoisie replied, against all evidence, that Dresden was a very important industrial and military centre. Churchill at first added that it was the Russians who had requested the bombing, which all historians today consider to be false; then he tried to push the responsibility onto the military, using it as a kind of smear!
The Labourites, those bloodhounds, those rotten clowns of bourgeois democracy, tried to wash their hands of this horror. Clem Atlee, who succeeded Churchill, drew this reply from the head of Bomber Command: "The bombing strategy criticized by Lord Ailee was decided by Her Majesty's government, in which he [Atlee] served throughout most of the war. The decision to bomb the industrial towns was taken, and taken very clearly, before I became commander-in-chief of Bomber Command."
The strategy of terror was a political decision, taken by the entire British bourgeoisie, and also fully involved that other great democrat, Roosevelt, the man who decided to build the atomic bomb. Democratic barbarism was equal in measure to fascist and Stalinist barbarism. The grandchildren of Churchill and Roosevelt - Bush, Mitterrand, Major - showed that they had learned their lessons well, whether in terms of massacres, blackouts, lies or cynicism[1].
How the democracies made use of the Nazi concentration camps
Another example of this long tradition is the democratic bourgeoisie's ability to hide and justify its own crimes by shining all the light on the crimes of others: in this case, the way the concentration camps were used to justify the imperialist butchery on the Allied side.
We have no intention of denying the sordid and sinister reality of the death camps, but the obscene publicity made about them ever since has nothing to do with any humanitarian considerations, still less with the legitimate horror provoked by such barbarism. The bourgeoisie, both British and American, knew quite well what was happening in the camps; however, strange as it may seem, it hardly talked about them throughout the war and did not make them a central theme of its propaganda.
It wasn't until after the war that it made them the principal axiom of its justification for the world imperialist slaughter and more generally for the defense of its sacrosanct democracy. In fact, the governments of Roosevelt and Churchill were terribly afraid the Nazis would empty the camps and expel the Jews en masse. At the Anglo-American meeting in Bermuda in 1943, the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden expressed this anxiety and the decision was taken that "no United Nations ship should be equipped to effect the transfer of refugees from Europe." This was clear enough: better they die quietly in the camps!
When Romania, an ally of Germany, wanted to free 60,000 Jews, when Bulgaria wanted to do the same, they were met with a categorical refusal by that great freedom fighter, Roosevelt, for whom "transporting so many people would disorganize the war effort."
The unfortunate adventures in April 1944 of Joel Brandt, leader of an organization of Hungarian Jews, confirmed quite strikingly than the British and American democrats did not give a toss for the suffering of the Jews in the concentration camps: When the bourgeoisie invokes the Rights of Man, it's only for propaganda purposes and so it can quietly get on with its criminal activities behind this fig-leaf.
Eichmann, the SS head of the Jewish section, confided in Brandt, with the agreement of Himmler himself, that the Nazi government wanted to free 1 million Jews in exchange for 10,000 lorries, or even less. Armed with this proposal, Brandt went to see the Anglo-Americans convinced that they would accept. But as it says in the pamphlet, Auschwitz or the Great Alibi, published by the PCI (Programme Communiste), "Not only the Jews but the SS as well were taken in by the humanitarian propaganda of the Allies! The Allies didn't want this 1 million Jews! Not for 10,000 lorries, not for 5000, not even for nothing!"
Brandt met with a complete and categorical refusal from the governments both of Churchill and of Roosevelt, even though the Nazis had proposed freeing 100,000 Jews without anything in exchange as proof of their good faith. So the 1 million Jews were left to die in the camps.
At the end of the war, the USA kept most of the Jewish prisoners in the same camps as the Germans, in the most frightful conditions. The American general Patton even declared at the time: "The Jews are inferior to animals." Once again, where is the difference between a Nazi scoundrel and a democratic one? Throughout the war, the bourgeoisie of the anti-fascist camp didn't care a fig about what was happening to the Jews, or to the population in general. Later on it used the genocide of the Jews to hide its own war crimes, to hide the fact that it was capitalism as a whole that was responsible for the butchery of 1939-45 and all the unspeakable horror that went with it[2].
How democracy dealt with the workers' strikes in Italy (1943) and
the Warsaw Uprising (August 1944)
The massive repression against the Kurdish and Shiite population in Iraq, and the total complicity in these massacres of the countries defending 'human rights', can to a certain extent be compared to the attitude of the Allies during the Second World War. It's not a question of comparing clearly bourgeois movements in which the working class played no role at all, such as the Kurdish nationalist movement, with what happened in Italy in 1943 when the workers, at least in the beginning, were acting on their own class terrain. But once this fundamental distinction has been made, it's important to see what's common in the attitude of the democratic bourgeoisie yesterday and today.
In Italy at the end of '42 and especially in '43, there were strikes in nearly all the main industrial centers of the north. Everywhere, the demand was for more food and higher wages and some workers even called for the formation of factory councils and soviets, which went against the position of Togliatti's Stalinist PCI. The movement was all the more dangerous for the bourgeoisie in that the immigrant Italian workers in Germany also came out on strike and often won the support of their German class bothers.
It was largely in response to the workers' strikes that the decision was taken to dump Mussolini and replace him with Badoglio. The Allies, who had called on the Italian people to revolt against fascism, were then landing in the south and by autumn '43 had totally and solidly occupied the whole of southern Italy.
But anxious about this potentially revolutionary situation, they quickly stopped their advance, at Churchill's request, and stayed put in the south. Churchill, well versed in the experience of the revolutionary wave which ended the First World War, feared like the plague the renewal of such a scenario. So he convinced the USA to "let the Italians stew in their own juice" and to deliberately halt the advance of the Allied army towards the north. His goal was to give the German army the chance to break the back of the working class by occupying the entire north of Italy and all its big working class concentrations.
The German army was thus deliberately allowed to fortify its positions and the Allies took 18 months to conquer the entire peninsular. 18 months in which the workers would be crushed by the German army with the objective complicity of the Stalinists who called for national unity behind Badoglio. With the dirty work being done by the Germans, the Allies armies could then pose as the liberators of Italy and calmly impose their views by installing a Christian Democrat government.
In Greece, a country left to the British in the great division of spoils among imperialist sharks, Churchill again exercised his talents as a champion of freedom and democracy. Workers' strikes and demonstrations broke out at the end of 1944, though this movement was quickly taken over and derailed by the Stalinists who dominated the Greek resistance via the ELAS. ELAS led the Athenian population to confront, virtually barehanded, the British tanks occupying the city.
The democratic tanks of His Very Gracious Majesty bloodily reestablished order, to the point that Athens, which had not been bombed because of its status as a historic city, was soon half reduced to ruin. Churchill said to the British general in charge of the troops: "You are responsible for maintaining order in Athens, and must destroy or neutralize all ELAS bands that approach the town ... ELAS will of course try to push women and children forward whenever the firing begins. But don't hesitate to act as though you were in a conquered city where a local revolt has broken out," (A Stinas, Memoirs of a Revolutionary). Result: caught between the Stalinist anvil and the democratic hammer, thousands of workers perished.
What happened in Warsaw can be compared even more closely to the cynical strategy employed by the western bourgeoisie at the end of the Gulf war. The Red Army was at the gates of Warsaw, 15km from the city, on 30 July, 1944. It was then that the Warsaw population rose up against the German occupation.
For months, the Allies and the USSR had called on the population to rise, promising them all their aid; on the eve of the uprising, Radio Moscow called for an armed insurrection, assuring the support of the Red Army. The whole population revolted and, initially, this popular uprising, in which the workers played a great role, even though the weight of nationalism was very strong, succeeded in freeing a good part of the city from the German military occupation.
The population launched itself all the more massively into revolt because it was convinced it would soon get help. "Allied help for' our uprising seemed to go without question. We were fighting Hitlerism, and so we had the right to suppose that all the nations united in this fight would provide us with effective aid. We hoped that help would arrive immediately," (Z Zaremba, La Commune de Varsovie).
Stalin had initially planned to enter Warsaw right at the beginning of August: the German army was in disarray, and there was no serious military obstacle to this. But faced with such a widespread uprising, he changed plan and deliberately delayed the advance of the Russian army, which was kept waiting at the gates of Warsaw for two months. It only resumed its advance once the uprising had been bloodily crushed by the German army, after 63 days. He coldly declared that "this insurrection was reactionary, that he dissociated himself from this terrible and impudent adventure instigated by criminals," (Z. Zaremba).
Throughout this time, the German troops were regaining position after position in the city; there was no water, electricity or munitions and the insurgents were dwindling more and more. The latter were still waiting for help from the Russian army, but it never came, and Stalin denounced them as "seditious fascists." The population also expected help from the Americans. But apart from fine words of enthusiasm and solidarity from the British and American governments, they got no more than a few derisory parachute-drops of weapons, totally insufficient for opposing the German troops, and in fact serving to increase the number killed and wounded and prolong the vain suffering of the population of the Polish capital.
Confronted with an uprising on such a scale, Stalin had decided, like Churchill vis-a-vis Italy, to let Warsaw stew in its own juice, the aim being to swallow up Poland without encountering any serious resistance from the Polish population. If the Warsaw uprising had been successful, nationalism would have been considerably strengthened and would have thrown a major obstacle in the way of Russian imperialism.
At the same time, Stalin was playing the role of anti-proletarian gendarme, faced with the potential threat of the working class in Warsaw. Indeed, at the end of the war, he fulfilled this role zealously throughout eastern Europe, including Germany. By allowing the German army to crush the Warsaw uprising, he then only had to deal with a population that had been decimated and exhausted, hardly capable of resisting Russian occupation. At the same time he kept his hands clean because the 'barbaric Nazi Hordes' had done his dirty work for him.
On the Anglo-American side, they knew quite well what was going on, but let things be, because Roosevelt had tacitly consigned Poland to Russian imperialism. The population of Warsaw was thus coldly sacrificed on the altar of wheeling and dealing among imperialist sharks. The balance sheet of this deadly trap set by Stalin and his democratic accomplices was particularly heavy: 50,000 dead, 350,000 deported to Germany, a million people condemned to exodus and a city in ruins[3].
The cynicism of the bourgeoisie about the events in Warsaw is all the more monstrous when one recalls that it was the invasion of Poland which made Britain and France enter the war to save 'freedom and democracy' in Poland ...
When one compares the situation of August 44 in Warsaw with the aftermath of the Gulf war, and if you replace the Poles with the Kurds, Hitler with Saddam and Stalin with Bush, one finds the same ruthless cynicism, the same bloody traps where the bourgeoisie, for its sordid imperialist interests, calmly condemns tens or hundreds of thousands of human beings to be massacred - all the while mouthing on about freedom, democracy and the Rights of Man.
The second world imperialist butchery was a formidable experience for the bourgeoisie - both in the art of killing millions of defenseless civilians, and in the trick of hiding and justifying its own monstrous war crimes by 'demonizing' the opposing imperialist coalition. Despite all their efforts to give themselves an air of respectability, the 'great democracies' emerged from the Second World War covered from head to foot in the blood of countless victims
Democracy and colonial massacres
"Capitalism was born with its feet soaked in blood and filth," as Marx put it, and the crimes and genocides it perpetrated throughout the process of colonization clearly illustrate this monstrous birth. "Africa turned into a sort of commercial hunting ground for black skins ... the bones of Indian weavers whiten the planes of India," (Marx), the result of the British colonization of the Indian continent, etc, etc ... An exhaustive list of all these genocides would again be too long for this article.
However, despite all the terrible suffering it inflicted upon humanity, the capitalist system in its ascendant phase was still progressive, because by permitting the development of the productive forces, it was also developing both the revolutionary class, the proletariat, and the material conditions needed for the creation of communism.
This is no longer the case in the "epoch of wars and revolutions", the period when the system enters into decadence and becomes purely reactionary. From now on, colonial massacres are nothing but the terrible blood-price ensuring the survival of a Moloch that now threatens the very existence of the human species. In this context, the numerous colonial crimes and massacres committed by the countries of the 'Rights of Man', the old bourgeois democracies, appear for what they are: pure acts of barbarism[4].
At the end of the second world war, the victors, and in particular the three old democracies, the USA, Britain and France, promised the whole world the coming of an era of freedom and democracy - for wasn't this why so many sacrifices had been made?
Since we have already talked a lot about the role played by the British and the Americans, let's examine the behavior of the third member of this inestimable democratic gang, the country par excellence of the Rights of Man - France.
In 1945, the very day that Germany surrendered, the oh- so democratic government of De Gaulle, then including some 'communist' ministers, ordered the French air force (under the auspices of the Stalinist minister Tillon) to bomb Setif and Constantine, where national movements were daring to put into question the colonial domination of this wonderful French democracy. There were thousands of dead and wounded and some popular neighborhoods were reduced to ashes. In 1947, the French overseas minister, the very democratic and socialist Marius Moutet, organized a terrible repression of the movement for the independence of Madagascar, again using aircraft, and after that tanks and artillery. A number of villages were obliterated, and for the first time the army experimented with the sinister tactic of hurling prisoners out of aero planes to be mangled in the villages below. Total number of dead: 80,000.
At more or less the same time, the same Monsieur Moutet ordered the bombing of Haiphong in Indochina without any prior declaration of war. During the war in Indochina, the French army used torture in the most systematic way: the whole arsenal was employed. It established a very democratic rule indeed: for every French soldier killed, eight villages would be burned. A witness said that "the French army behaved like the Boches did in our country," and added that "as at Buchenwald, where human remains were used as paper weights in the offices of the camp Kommandant, a number of French officers had similar objects in their offices." Once again, there's nothing the Nazis or Stalinists can teach their democratic officer caste counterparts.
And as for the atrocities of the 'Viets', which the press of the time made so much of (let's recall in passing that in 1945 Ho Chi Minh had helped the 'foreign imperialists' to crush the Saigon Commune, cf our pamphlet, Nation or Class?), or later of the FLN in Algeria - these showed that the colonial bourgeoisies had been to a good school and were well able to apply the lessons taught by the very democratic French army.
When the nationalist rebellion broke out in Algeria, the 'socialists' were in power in France and the government included Guy Mollet, Mendis-France and the young Mitterrand, then minister of the interior. All these 'authentic democrats' responded in the same way and full power was confided in the army to reestablish 'republican order'. Very quickly, the most extreme measures were being used: in reprisal for attacks, entire villages were razed to the ground; caravans were systematically machine-gunned by aircraft. Two million Algerians, nearly a quarter of the total population, were chased from their villages or neighborhoods and parked at the mercy of the army in 'regroupment camps' where, according to a report by M Rocard, then a financial inspector, "the conditions are deplorable and at least one child dies every day."
Very quickly, general Massu and his accomplice, Bigeard, later on one of Giscard's ministers, discovered their talents as torturers. Torture became systematic and in Algiers a word became famous: 'disappeared'. A large number of those taken by the soldiery never reappeared. As was underlined in a note from inspector general Wuilhaume, addressed to Mitterrand in 1957: "blows, beatings in the bath, hose-pipes, electric shocks are being used everywhere ... In Boulemane, as in many small villages in the Aures, the torture chamber was operating day and night ... and it was no rarity to see in the officers' mess champagne being drunk from the skulls of fellagas [FLN fighters]".
In 1957 the secretary general of the Prefectory of Algiers, P Teitgen, said this about the tortures to the lawyer P Verges: "All this I know, alas, and you will understand that as a former deportee, I can no longer bear it [and so he was going to resign]. We're sometimes behaving like the Germans did." And he added that he knew all the villas in Algiers where torture was taking place ...
This declaration by a high-ranking official is particularly interesting because it once again highlights the incredible duplicity of the people who govern us, and particularly of the social democrats. Thus G Mollet declared on 14 April 1957 to the Socialist Federation of Marne: "No doubt there have been some rare but deplorable acts of violence. Bui I insist that they flowed from terrorist attacks and atrocities. As for premeditated, thought-out acts of torture, I say that if this happened it's intolerable. On this matter the French army's behavior has been compared to that of the Gestapo. This comparison is scandalous. Hitler gave out directives calling for such methods, whereas Lacoste and I have always given orders absolutely in the opposite sense."
People like Mollet pretended to know nothing, but they were quite aware of what was going on and it was they who were giving the orders. As in any band of gangsters, there are always those who order the crime, and those who carry it out. Attention is always focused on the goons, in this case Massu and Bigeard, in order to whitewash those really responsible, in this case the social democratic crew in power.
The French bourgeoisie, with its 'socialists' to the fore, has subsequently always presented the massacres and atrocities committed in Algeria[5] (from 1957 to De Gaulle's arrival in power in 1958, 15,000 Algerian children disappeared each month) as being the work of bloody handed military types who overstepped their orders. But the one giving the orders was without doubt the 'socialist' government. Once again, who is the biggest criminal: the one who executes the crime or the one who orders it?
The bourgeoisie, in its democratic version, whenever its crimes can no longer be hidden, always tries to present them as an accident, an exception, or as the work of military men over-reaching themselves. We saw this in France vis-a-vis Algeria, in the USA vis-a-vis Vietnam. All this is a sinister fraud whose sole aim is to preserve the great democratic lie.
In order to perpetuate its rule over the working class, it's vital for the bourgeoisie to maintain the democratic mystification, and it has used the definitive bankruptcy of Stalinism to reinforce this fiction. Against the lie of a so-called difference between 'democracy' and 'totalitarianism', the whole history of decadent capitalism shows us that democracy is just as stained with blood as totalitarianism, and that its victims can be counted in millions.
The proletariat must remember that when it comes to defending class interests or sordid imperialist appetites, the 'democratic' bourgeoisie has never hesitated to support the most ferocious dictators. Let's not forget that Blum, Churchill and company called Stalin 'Mister' and feted him as the 'man of Liberation'! More recently, let's recall the support given to Saddam Hussein and Ceausescu by the likes of De Gaulle and Giscard. The working class must take on board the fact that, whether yesterday, today or tomorrow, democracy has never been anything but the hypocritical mask behind which the bourgeoisie hides the hideous face of its class dictatorship, the better to enslave the working class and bring it to its knees. RN
[1] The quotes from this section are from La Destruction de Dresde, David Irving, Editions Art et Histoire d'Europe, and from La Seconde Guerre Mondiale de Henri Michel, Editions PUF.
[2] Pierre Hempel A Bas La Guerre! A few years ago there was a whole campaign waged by the residues of the 'ultra left' around Sieur Faurisson's alleged 'revelation' about the non-existence of the concentration camps - a campaign largely recuperated by the extreme right. Our point of view has absolutely nothing to do with this campaign, which is suspicious, to say the least. It's true that, before being transformed into death camps, most of the camps were first of all labor camps; it's also true that all the morbid publicity about the camps and the gas chambers, from 1945 to today, was above all aimed at whitewashing all the crimes committed by the 'democratic' camp. But there can be no question of minimizing the very real genocide perpetrated in these camps and of banalising the barbaric horror of decadent capitalism, one of the summits of which were the massacres and crimes committed by the Nazis.
[3] La Commune de Varsovie. trahie par Staline, massacree par Hitler by Zygmunt Zaremba, Editions Spartacus.
[4] On the difference between bourgeois democracy in the ascendance and in the decadence of capitalism, it would be useful to consult our Platform and our pamphlet, The Decadence of Capitalism.
[5] Les Crimes de l'armee francais by Pierre Vidal- Naquet, Editions Maspero. While the French bourgeoisie tries to present Algeria as its last 'colonialist sin', it gives us to understand that subsequently its hands have been much cleaner. In fact, other massacres have been committed since the Algerian war, notably in the Camaroons where some bloody atrocities were committed by the French army.
The first part of this tribute to our comrade Marc, who died in December 1990, was published in the previous issue of the International Review, and dealt with the period from 1917 to World War II.
“In particular, Marc belonged to that tiny minority of militants who survived and resisted the terrible counter-revolution which battened on the working class from the 1920’s to the 60’s: militants like Anton Pannekoek, Henk Canne-Meijer, Amadeo Bordiga, Onorato Damen, Paul Mattick, Jan Appel, or Munis. Moreover, not only did he maintain his untiring loyalty to the communist cause and his complete confidence in the proletariat’s revolutionary capabilities, he was able to pass on his experience to a new generation of militants, and to avoid becoming wrapped up in analyses and positions that had been overtaken by historical events. In this sense, his whole activity as a militant is an example of what marxism means: the living, constantly developing thought of the revolutionary class, which bears with it humanity’s future” (International Review no.65 [72] ).
In this second part, we will follow our comrade’s activity, first in the French Communist Left (“Gauche Communiste de France”, GCF), then during the last period of his life, when his contribution was decisive in the foundation and development of the ICC.
In July 1945, the GCF held its second conference. It adopted a report on the international situation drawn up by Marc (reprinted in the International Review No. 59, 4th quarter 1989), which made an overall evaluation of the war years. Starting from the classical marxist positions on the question of imperialism and war, especially against the aberrations developed by Vercesi, this document achieved a more profound understanding of the main problems that the working class confronts in decadent capitalism. This report is on the same level as all the GCF’s contribution to revolutionary thought, which we can see in the various articles published in its theoretical review, Internationalisme[1].
From 1946 onwards, L’Etincelle ceased publishing. This was because the GCF realised that its predictions of a revolutionary end to World War II (in the same way as World War I) had not come to fruition. As the Fraction had feared already in 1943, the bourgeoisie had learnt the lessons of the past, and the “victorious” countries succeeded in preventing any proletarian upsurge. The “Liberation” proved to be, not a stepping-stone to revolution, but the opposite. The GCF drew its own conclusions, and considered that the time was not ripe either for the formation of the Party, or for the agitation in the working class, of which L’Etincelle was to have been a tool. The tasks awaiting revolutionaries were still the same as those taken up by Bilan. This is why the GCF devoted itself henceforth to an effort of clarification and theoretical-political discussion, unlike the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (PCInt), which for years was agitated by a feverish activism leading to the 1952 split between Damen’s more activist tendency and Bordiga (along with Vercesi). The latter withdrew into sectarian isolation and a self-proclaimed “invariance” (in fact, a fossilisation of the positions of the Communist Left in 1926), which were to be the mark of the International Communist Party which published Communist Program. For its part, the Damen tendency (which, being in the majority, had kept control of the publications Prometeo and Battaglia Comunista) could hardly be accused of the same sectarianism, since it launched into a whole series of attempted conferences or common activities with non-proletarian currents like the anarchists or the Trotskyists.
The GCF maintained the same open attitude that had been characterised by the Italian Left before and during the war. Unlike the PCInt, which carried “openness” to the point where it did not look too closely at the class nature of those it frequented, the GCF’s contacts, like Bilan’s, were based on precise political criteria that distinguished it clearly from non-proletarian organisations. And so in May 1947, the GCF took part in an international conference organised at the initiative of the Dutch Kommunistenbond (a “councilist” tendency), along with amongst others Le Prolétaire which had sprung for the RKD, the Belgian Fraction, and the autonomous Turin Federation, which had split from the PCInt due to its disagreements on participation in elections. The Kommunistenbond had also invited the Anarchist Federation, and during the preparation of the Conference the GCF insisted on the need for more precise selection criteria, to eliminate any groups, like the official anarchists, which had taken part in the Spanish Civil War and the Resistance[2].
However, in this period dominated by counter-revolution, the GCF’s main contribution to the proletarian struggle lay in the domain of theory and the programme. The GCF’s considerable effort in this domain led it, in particular, to clarify the function of the revolutionary party, going beyond the classic “Leninist” conceptions, and to recognise the definitive and irreversible integration of the unions, and unionism, into the capitalist state.
In the 1920s, the Dutch-German Left had already seriously criticised Lenin’s and the Communist International’s incorrect positions on these questions. The confrontation with this current, first by the Italian Fraction before the war, then by the GCF, allowed the latter to integrate some of these criticisms of the CI.
However, the GCF avoided the Dutch-German current’s excesses on the question of the Party (whose function the latter ended up by denying completely), and at the same time went much further on the question of trade unionism (since although it rejected classical unionism, the Dutch-German Left advocated a form of “rank-and-file” unionism based on the German “Unionen”).
The union question especially illustrates the difference in method between the German and Italian Lefts. The former understood the main lines of a question during the 1920’s (e.g., on the capitalist nature of the USSR, or the nature of the trade unions); but because it failed to elaborate its new positions systematically, it was led either to call into question some of the foundation stones of marxism, or to avoid any further deepening of its positions. The Italian Left, on the other hand, was much more cautious. Before the Vercesi episode in 1938, it was always careful to subject any steps it took to systematic criticism, in order to make sure that they did not depart from the basic framework of marxism. By doing so, it was in fact capable of going much further, and of thinking much more audaciously, for example on the fundamental question of the state.
This approach, which Marc had absorbed in the Italian Fraction, gave him the ability to push forward the immense theoretical work accomplished by the GCF. This work also led the organisation to further elaborate the Fraction’s position on the question of the state in the period of transition from capitalism to communism, and to develop a vision of state capitalism which went far beyond an analysis of the USSR alone, and brought out the universality of this essential characteristic of the capitalist mode of production’s decadence. We can find this analysis in the article on ‘The Evolution of Capitalism and the New Perspective’, published in Internationalisme no.46 (and reprinted in the International Review no.21). This text was drawn up by Marc in 1952, and constituted, in a sense, the GCF’s political testament.
In June 1952, Marc left France for Venezuela. This departure followed a political decision by the GCF: the Korean War had convinced the GCF that a Third World War between the Russian and American blocs was both inevitable and imminent (as the text in question says). Such a war would ravage Europe, and was likely to destroy completely the few communist groups that had survived World War II. The GCF’s decision to send some of its militants to “safety” outside Europe had nothing to do with their personal security (Marc and his comrades had all proved, throughout World War II, that they were ready to take enormous risks to defend revolutionary positions in the worst possible conditions), but with a concern for the survival of the organisation itself. However, the departure of its most experienced militant was to prove fatal for the GCF; despite their constant correspondence with Marc, the elements who had remained in France were unable to keep the organisation alive in a period of profound counter-revolution. For reasons which we have not space to deal with here, World War Ill did not happen. It is clear that this error of analysis cost the life of the GCF (and of all the mistakes Marc made during his life as a militant, it was probably this one which had the most serious consequences).
Nonetheless, the GCF left behind a theoretical and political legacy which laid the foundations for the groups which were to form the ICC.
For more than 10 years, while the counter-revolution continued to weigh on the working class, Marc underwent an extremely difficult period of isolation. He followed the activity of the revolutionary organisations, which had survived in Europe, and remained in contact with them and with some of their members. At the same time, he continued his own reflection on a number of questions that the GCF had not been able to clarify sufficiently. But for the first time in his life, he was deprived of the organised activity that constitutes the framework for such reflection. As he said himself, it was an extremely difficult test: “The period of post-war reaction was a long march through the desert, especially once the Internationalisme group disappeared after 10 years of existence. The desert of isolation lasted some 15 years”.
This isolation continued, until the day when he was able to gather around him a small group of school students who were to form the nucleus of a new organisation: “Then in Venezuela in 1964, a new group was formed, of very young elements. And this group still exists today. To live for 40 years through the period of counter-revolution and reaction, and all of a sudden to feel hope, to feel that once again the, crisis of capital has returned, and that the young are there, then to watch this group grow little by little, developing during and after 1968 throughout France and then spreading to ten countries… all this is really a joy for a militant. These last 25 years have certainly been my happiest. It is during these years that I have really felt the joy of this development, and the conviction that we were beginning again, that we had emerged from the defeat and that the proletariat was regrouping, that the forces of revolution were gathering. It is an enormous source of joy to take part in this yourself, to give everything you can, the best of yourself, to this reconstruction. And I owe this joy to the ICC...”
We will not deal here, as we have for the other organisations where Marc was a militant, with the history of the International Communist Current (we have already done so on the 10th anniversary of the ICC’s foundation in International Review no.40). We will simply highlight some aspects of the enormous contribution that our comrade made to the process that led to the formation of our organisation. Already, before the ICC was formed, the little group in Venezuela which published Internacionalismo (the same name as the GCF’s review) owed mainly to him its ability to move towards greater clarity, especially on the question of national liberation, which was particularly sensitive in Venezuela, and where enormous confusions persisted in the proletarian movement.
Similarly, Internacionalismo’s policy of seeking contacts with other groups in Europe and on the American continent sprang directly from the GCF and the Fraction. And in January 1968, at a time when everyone, and even some revolutionaries, talked of nothing but capitalism’s “prosperity” and its ability to eliminate crises, when Marcuse’s theories about the “integration of the working class” were all the rage, and when the revolutionaries that Marc met in the summer of 1967 during a journey to Europe displayed an utter scepticism as to the revolutionary capacities of a proletariat supposedly still in the midst of counter-revolution, our comrade was not afraid to write, in Internacionalismo no.8:
“We are not prophets, nor can we claim to predict when and how events will unfold in the future. But of one thing we are conscious and certain: the process in which capitalism is plunged today cannot be stopped (...) and it leads directly to the crisis. And we are equally certain that the inverse process of developing class combativity which we are witnessing today, will lead the working class to a bloody and direct struggle for the destruction of the bourgeois state”.
A few months later, the May 1968 general strike in France strikingly confirmed these predictions. Obviously, this was not time for the “direct struggle for the destruction of the bourgeois state”, but for a historic recovery of the proletariat, driven on by the first signs of open capitalist crisis, after the deepest counter-revolution in history. These predictions were not the fruit of clairvoyance, but quite simply of our comrade’s remarkable mastery of marxism, and of the confidence which he retained in the class’ revolutionary abilities, even in the darkest moments of the counter-revolution.
Marc immediately set off for France (hitch-hiking for the last part of the journey, since all public transport was completely paralysed). Here he renewed contacts with his old comrades of the GCF, and began discussions with a whole series of elements and groups in the political milieu[3]. This activity, along with that of a young member of Internacionalismo who had already arrived in France in 1966, were determinant in the appearance and development of the Revolution Internationale group, which acted as the original pole of regroupment for the ICC.
Nor can we, here, give a full account of all our comrade’s theoretical and political contributions within our organisation once it was constituted. Suffice it to say that on all the essential questions that have confronted the ICC, and the class as a whole, on all the advances we have been able to make, our comrade’s contribution was decisive. In fact, Marc was usually the first to raise the new points that needed dealing with. This constant vigilance, this ability to identify rapidly, and in depth, the new questions which demanded an answer, or the old questions which still remained confused within the political milieu, lived in our International Review throughout its 64 previous issues. The articles we have published on such questions were not always written by Marc. Marc found writing very difficult; he had never studied, and above all he was forced to express himself in languages, like French, which he had only learnt as an adult. Nonetheless, he was always the main inspiration behind the texts that have allowed our organisation to fulfil its responsibility of constantly updating communist positions. To cite only the latest of many examples where our organisation has had to react rapidly to a new historic situation - the irreversible collapse of Stalinism and the Eastern bloc - our comrade’s great vigilance and the depth of his thinking played an essential part in the ICC’s ability to respond in a manner whose validity has been demonstrated by events ever since.
But Marc’s contribution to the ICC was not limited to the elaboration and deepening of its political positions and theoretical analyses. Right up to the last moments of his life, despite the superhuman effort it represented for him, he continued to reflect on the world situation and to discuss with the comrades who visited him in hospital; he continued, too, to pay attention to the slightest detail of the ICC’s life and functioning. For Marc, there was no such thing as “subordinate” questions or tasks which could be left to comrades with less theoretical training. Just as he was always concerned that all the militants of the organisation should be capable of the greatest possible political clarity, and that theoretical questions should not be reserved for “specialists”, so he never hesitated to “lend a hand” in all our practical daily activity. Marc has always given the ICC’s younger militants the example of a militant in the fullest sense, committing all his capacities to the life of this organism which is so vital for the proletariat: its revolutionary organisation. Our comrade always knew how to pass on to new generations of militants all the experience he had accumulated at many levels in the course of an exceptionally long and rich militant life. And these new generations could not fully gain such experience just by reading the political texts, but in the organisation’s daily life, and in Marc’s presence.
In this sense, Marc occupied a truly exceptional place in the life of the proletariat. The counter-revolution had eliminated, or frozen with sclerosis, the political organisations which the working class had secreted in the past. Marc was a bridge, and irreplaceable link between the revolutionary organisations which took part in the revolutionary wave that followed World War I, and those which will confront the next revolutionary wave.
In his History of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky at one point considers the special and exceptional role played by Lenin. And although he adopts marxism’s classical theses on the role of the individual in history, he concludes that without Lenin to push the redressement and political “arming” of the Bolshevik Party, the revolution would not have taken place, or would have ended in defeat. It is clear that without Marc, the ICC would not exist today, or not in its present form, as the largest organisation in the international revolutionary milieu (not to mention the clarity of its positions, on which other revolutionary groups may, of course, have an opinion different from our own). In particular, his presence and activity prevented the enormous and fundamental work accomplished by the Left fractions, and especially the Italian Fraction, expelled from the Communist International, from falling into oblivion. On the contrary, this work was to bear fruit, and in this sense, although he was never known within the working class in the same way as Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, or Trotsky, or even as Bordiga or Pannekoek (it could not be otherwise in the period of counter-revolution), we do not hesitate to say that his contribution to the proletarian struggle stands at the same level of his great predecessors.
Our comrade always detested this kind of comparison. Always, he carried out his tasks in the organisation with the greatest simplicity. Never did he demand the “place of honour” in the organisation. His greatest pride lay not in the exceptional contribution he made, but in the fact that he had remained faithful in all his being to the combat of the proletariat. This too, is a precious lesson to the new generations of militants who have never had the opportunity to experience the immense devotion to the revolutionary cause of past generations. It is on this level, above all, that we hope to rise to the combat. Though now without his presence, vigilant and clear-sighted, warm and passionate, we are determined to continue
ICC, 1991.
[1] The articles of Internationalisme published in the International Review included the following:
In addition, there was the series ‘Pannekoek’s Lenin as Philosopher - Critique by Internationalisme’ (nos. 25, 27, 28, 30).
[2] This same preoccupation to establish precise criteria in calling conferences of communist groups was demonstrated by the ICC against the fuzzy approach taken by the PCInt at the time of the first conference held in May 1977. See on this subject the International Reviews nos. 10, 13, 17, 22, 40, 41, 53, 54, 55 and 56.
[3] He had the opportunity on this occasion to show one of the traits of his character, which had nothing to do with those of an armchair theoretician. Present wherever the movement was going on, in the discussions but also in the demonstrations, he spent a whole night behind a barricade with a group of young elements, having decided to hold out until morning against the police... rather like Monsieur Seguin’s goat faced with the wolf in the story by Alphonse Daudet [73].
Table 1: Debt
|
1980
|
|
1990
|
|
|
||||
|
Mil$
|
%GNP
|
|
Mil$
|
%GNP
|
|
|
|
|
Total public
|
1250
|
46%
|
|
4050
|
76%
|
|
|
|
|
Business
|
829
|
30%
|
(1)
|
2100
|
40%
|
|
|
|
|
Consumer
|
1300
|
48%
|
(2)
|
3000
|
57%
|
|
|
|
|
Total internal
|
3400
|
124%
|
|
9150
|
173%
|
|
|
|
|
Debt external
|
+181
|
|
|
-800
|
15%
|
|
|
|
|
GNP
|
2732
|
|
|
5300
|
|
|
|
|
|
(1) 4 times their cash flow (ie company savings, used to self-finance investments)
(2) In 1989, consumer debt represented 89% of their income.
|
|||||||||
Public debt (% of GNP)
|
1973
|
1986
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
USA
|
39.9%
|
56.2%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Canada
|
45.6%
|
68.8%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
France
|
25.4%
|
36.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Italy
|
52.7%
|
88.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Japan
|
30.9%
|
90.9%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Germany
|
18.6%
|
41.1%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Spain
|
13.8%
|
49.0%
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
Table 2
Eastern Countries
|
Inflation
|
Evolution of GNP
|
|
|
|
1991
|
1989
|
1990(1)
|
|
Bulgarie
|
70%
|
-1.5%
|
-12.0%
|
|
Hongrie
|
35%
|
-1.8%
|
-4.5%
|
|
Pologne
|
60%
|
-0.5%
|
-12.0%
|
|
RDA
|
|
|
-18.0%
|
|
Roumanie
|
150%
|
-7.0%
|
-12.0%
|
|
Tchecoslovaquie
|
50%
|
+1.7%
|
-4.5%
|
|
URSS
|
|
|
-4.5%
|
|
Yougoslavie
|
120%
|
+0.8%
|
|
|
(1) Estimation de la Commission economique pour r’Europe de ronu
|
Table 3
Third World
Debt
(in millions of dollars)
|
|
|
|
1980
|
485
|
|
1983
|
711
|
|
1989
|
1117
|
|
1990
|
1184
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Korean War (1951-52)
* The war took place on the eve of a period of prosperity and reconstruction;
* The USA was in a phase of economic recovery;
* Long term interest rates stood at 2%, the international financial system was stable, and this facilitated investment;
* The budget deficit was low, and made Keynesian policies a possibility.
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Gulf War (1991)
* The conflict has broken out after 20 years of crisis and in the midst of a period of slowing growth;
* The USA is in a phase of economic recession;
* Inflation is at 6.3% and long term interest rates are 8%, in the context of a very fragile international monetary system; this discourages investment in favor of speculation;
* The budget deficit is colossal, and makes Keynesian policies less and less a possibility; it also prevents a return to the policy of massive rearmament adopted in the 80s.
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The West after World War 2
* tendency towards political stability, governments of national unity, consensus over the higher national interest, dominance of centralizing tendencies;
* Western capitalism is on the eve of a long tendency towards growth, budget deficits and long-term interest rates are low (about 2%);
* the climate encourages investment;
* the USA can sell its surplus production, reconvert its military industry and prevent the advance of the Russian bloc in Europe and Japan
* the potentialities, the political, social and economic structures, despite all the destruction, are kept going or are still important;
* the economic gap between the USA and other industrial countries is important but not insurmountable;
* the USA is a massive exporter of capital, and launches the Marshall Plan.
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The East Today
* a tendency towards political instability, return to particular interests, calling into question of national unity; centrifugal tendencies are dominant; unfavorable context for economic transition;
* world capitalism is in a long tendency towards economic decline, budget deficits and long term interest rates are high (about 8%);
* the climate is much less propitious for investment;
* the market is saturated and the emergence of new powers is no longer possible;
* the political, social and economic structures are totally inadequate and have to be set up from one day to the next in a totally artificial manner;
* the economic gap between East and West is much greater, in fact insurmountable;
* no Marshall Plan has been set up, and investment so far has been low.
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The decomposition of capitalist society
.... The third point to be highlighted (see the resolution for the first two points) is the duration of this phenomenon of decomposition. The latter was first identified by the ICC in autumn 1986 during the terrorist attacks in Paris. This of course does not mean that the phenomenon only appeared then. In fact, it emerged throughout the 1980's.
Implicitly, the ICC had already pointed to this kind of phenomenon in the resolution on the international situation adopted at its 6th Congress in November 1985 (and which took up the analysis contained in an internal text written in October 1983). This document showed that, increasingly, the serious aggravation of political convulsions in the peripheral countries made it impossible for the great powers to rely on them to 'keep order' at the regional level, and forced them to intervene directly and militarily. This was based especially on the situation in Lebanon and Iran. Iran in particular was a relatively new kind of situation: a militarily important member of one bloc went out of control, without falling into the hands of the opposing bloc. This was not due to any weakening of the bloc as a whole, nor to any improvement in the situation of the national capital in question: quite the contrary, since these new policies led straight to economic and political disaster. From the standpoint of the interests of the national capital, there was no rationality in the evolution of the situation in Iran, since it led to the seizure of power by the clergy: a social stratum which has never been competent to manage the economic and political affairs of capitalism.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and its political victory in a relatively important country, was itself one of the first signs of decomposition. This upsurge of religion in a number of third-world countries cannot be considered as a return to the golden age of religion's dominant influence on social life. The wheel of history never turns backwards. The third world countries, like certain countries of the Eastern bloc which are particularly infested with religion, are not returning to feudalism. Capitalism has long since subjected these countries to its laws - not of course through any significant development of their productive forces on a capitalist basis, but by the irreversible destruction of their 'natural' economy. In these countries, the upsurge of religious fundamentalism is a sign of the decomposition of capitalist society's ideological superstructures which should be put on the same level as the spread in the developed countries of mysticism and drug addiction.
We can thus note that the first signs of decadent capitalism's entry into its phase of decomposition appear at the end of the 70's, to reach full fruition throughout the 80's (in this sense, these years were indeed years of truth both for the bourgeoisie and for the working class, both of which began to be confronted with the final phase of the capitalist mode of production). It is important to take account of this if we are to understand both the causes and the perspectives of the upheavals that have shaken the world in the last two years. It also determines, as we will see later, a clear understanding of the dynamic of the class' struggle and development of consciousness since the beginning of the 1980's.
The collapse of the Eastern bloc
.... The historic tendency towards state capitalism, which is a precondition for understanding Stalinism, appears first, not in backward countries, but on the contrary in the most advanced. For revolutionaries during WWI (and for Lenin in particular), Germany was the typical example. Classically, the state's control over the whole economy appeared as an organic process of the national capital, affecting first and foremost the most developed sectors both of the economy and of the bourgeoisie, in particular through an increasing inter-penetration of the bourgeoisie and the state apparatus. The organic and generally gradual development of the state's control over civil society (although in some cases it was accompanied by a violent settling of accounts within the bourgeois political apparatus, as in the case of fascism) made it possible for the advanced countries to maintain the classic mechanisms of the capitalist economy, and especially the market sanction as a stimulant to company competitivity and the 'rational' exploitation of labor. It also had the merit of keeping in place most of the ruling class' economic personnel, which allowed the national capital to benefit from their experience.
The development of the Stalinist form of state capitalism is quite different, and had nothing 'organic' about it. On the contrary, it appears as a sort of historical 'accident' as a result of the revolution and counter-revolution in Russia. Inasmuch as the state which arose after the revolution in Russia also led the counter-revolution, it was obliged to take exclusive control of the national capital. As a result, it abolished the internal market mechanism, and for the most part deprived itself of the services of the one-time specialists of capitalist exploitation. The criteria for belonging to the exploiting class are no longer economic as under classical capitalism (which makes it possible to select and train competent personnel for this task of valorization), but political. Economic power is essentially determined by rank in the 'nomenklatura' - the Party-State hierarchy. Servility, cunning, and lack of scruples are the essential talents for rising in the party, but are not necessarily the most useful in running the national capital, especially since there is no internal market sanction to provoke emulation and weed out the incompetents from among those 'responsible' for the economy. The whole management personnel is completely uninterested in valorizing the national capital. This cynicism and lack of interest infects the whole productive apparatus, and especially the workers. This kind of 'management', where the main 'stimulant' for the workforce consists of police compulsion, may work in a relatively backward and self-sufficient economy; it is completely inadequate to meet the demands of the world market. The Stalinist regime owed its extreme fragility in the face of the economic crisis, as well as its brutal collapse, essentially to this 'accidental' way in which it was formed.
The reasons behind the Eastern bloc's weakness are much the same. Traditionally, imperialist blocs have been formed gradually; their component bourgeoisies have been willing to associate themselves with, or at least to rally behind, the dominant economic power, whose preeminence depended first and foremost on its economic potential. This was not at all the case with the formation of the Russian bloc. On the contrary, this too appears as a sort of historical accident. At the head of the bloc is a backward country with a low level of industrialization, less developed than many of its vassals and so totally unfitted to hold its rank. It owes this privilege solely to the peculiar circumstances at the end of WWII, when the allies 'compensated' it for opening a second front against Germany by handing over control of the countries of central Europe. It was thus only military force that rallied the bourgeoisies in these countries to the Russian bloc. And for the most part, the USSR only maintained its grip on its 'allies' by continued military force (Hungary 56, Czechoslovakia 68), even when the latter were run by Stalinist parties. The fact the bloc had to be held together in this way was an expression of its extreme weakness. And it was this weakness that was revealed in 1989.
We should therefore emphasize the gulf separating the central capitalist countries from those of the ex-Eastern bloc, in their relative ability to resist the crisis. Even if the chaos that is becoming endemic to the latter is indicative of capitalism's evolution worldwide, it would be wrong to think that the advanced countries will undergo the same kind of situation in the short term.
.... This being said, it is clear that the specific weakness of the Stalinist state and of the ex-Russian bloc does not explain everything. In particular, it does not explain why this collapse happened at the end of the 80's and not at the beginning, for example. It is here that the framework of decomposition becomes indispensable.
"The absence of any perspective (other than day-to-day stop-gap measures to prop up the economy) around which it could mobilize as a class, and at the same time the fact that the proletariat does not yet threaten its own survival, creates within the ruling class, and especially within its political apparatus, a growing tendency towards indiscipline and an attitude of 'every man for himself'. This phenomenon allows us in particular to explain the collapse of Stalinism and the entire Eastern imperialist bloc.
".... The spectacle which the USSR and its satellites are offering us today, of a complete rout within the state apparatus itself, and the ruling class' loss of control over its own political strategy is in reality only the caricature (due to the specificities of the Stalinist regimes) of a much more general phenomenon affecting the whole world ruling class, and which is specific to the phase of decomposition" ('Decomposition, Final Phase of the Decadence of Capitalism, point 9, International Review no. 62).
The collapse of the Stalinist regimes is thus one of the expressions of decomposition. In particular, it is an expression of one essential element: capitalist society's utter lack of perspective. Similarly, the present situation of the USSR itself (and of parts of Eastern Europe), disintegrating under the blows of nationalist movements, is another illustration of one major result of this absence of perspective: the tendency towards the breakup of social life, towards 'every man for himself' (...)
The new pattern of imperialist conflicts
As with the examination of the collapse of Stalinism and the eastern bloc, when we analyse the evolution of imperialist conflicts we have to take into account what derives from the general framework of decadence, and what derives more particularly from the phase of decomposition. This is obviously true for the Gulf war (...) Unlike the EFICC, for example, who identify imperialism, imperialist blocs, and state capitalism, we pointed out that while imperialism (as well as state capitalism) is a permanent and universal feature of decadence, the same isn't true for the imperialist blocs. This is why we were able to announce that the collapse of the eastern bloc would lead to the disappearance of the western bloc, while at the same time we could foresee that the end of the blocs would not at all inaugurate an era of peace.
Having said this, it is important to underline the fact that even though you don't need blocs for wars to erupt, and even though the formation of imperialist blocs isn't an automatic product of imperialism, the latter does exert a very strong pressure towards their formation. This is why we wrote in Jan 90 "the disappearance of the two imperialist constellations which emerged out of the second world war carries with it the tendency towards the formation of two new blocs" ('After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, decomposition and chaos', in IR 61). This is an important point for understanding what was at stake in the Gulf war. If we don't take it into account, we will miss the real antagonisms operating in the present period and which were lurking underneath this war.
One of the essential aims of the USA's show of force was to issue a preemptive warning against any ambition to set up a new imperialist bloc. It's obvious that the conditions for this aren't there at the moment (...) However (...) it is important right now for the worlds' first power - in reality the only superpower - to bar the way to such a perspective, to dissuade any country from pursuing it. In more concrete terms, a certain number of sectors of the bourgeoisie may have been counting, following the collapse of the Eastern bloc, on the strengthening of the 'European Community' and the setting up of an EC armed force which could eventually form the basis of a bloc led by Germany ....
The Gulf war has destroyed any hope in an eventual European bloc. If there was a particularly clear result of this conflict, which all sectors of the bourgeoisie have underlined, it was, apart from the military non-existence of Japan and Germany, the total political non-existence (not even to mention military) of Europe: there were almost as many positions on the war as there were states in Europe ... We can thus say that, at least on the level of squashing any move towards the formation of a new bloc, the USA has for the moment achieved its aims even beyond what it might have hoped for.
Understanding this function of the Gulf war as a barrier against the formation of a new bloc is essential faced with the false interpretations that have developed (...) in particular, it is important to refute the thesis, dear to the leftists, that it was a North-South conflict, a conflict between the advanced countries and the underdeveloped ones.
A conflict between advanced countries and backward ones?
.... It's true that there are common interests among the great powers to limit the spread of the chaos now present in the third world. This was in fact one of the keys to the Gulf war. The crusade for 'world order' and 'international law' was able (though with difficulties of all kinds) to gain the assent of all the permanent members of the Security Council and the financial support of Germany and Japan thanks to the pressure exerted by the USA on their former allies and their former rival.
But what was this pressure based upon? Partly on economic and financial aspects (attitudes adopted in the negotiations about the customs duties for Europe and Japan, the financial aid accorded to the USSR). But this was only the visible part of the iceberg. In reality, the USA's deal with its 'allies', notably during Baker's tour in November 1990, which allowed the US to get the Security Council to vote in favor of military intervention, involved recognizing that the US would play the role of world cop in exchange for its 'protection' and 'aid' in case of difficulties resulting from global instability. In order to make a really convincing demonstration, the US acted like any other racketeer: you break the shop window (this was the trap laid for Iraq) in order to convince the shopkeeper that he has an interest in paying for 'protection'. In the chaotic world that has emerged from the end of the 'cold war', there are plenty of opportunities for regional 'disorders' - in Africa, in Indochina, between India and Pakistan, as well as, with the break up of the Eastern bloc and of its leader, in central Asia, central Europe and the Balkans. Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons (which, at the moment, as well as the five 'big' powers who are permanent members of the Security Council, are already in the hands of countries like Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and will tomorrow be owned by still more) is another dangerous factor. The big advanced countries obviously have an interest in limiting this instability which threatens what remains of their spheres of influence and markets. This is why they ended up lining up behind the only power which really has the means to be the planet's policeman, as it showed precisely through the Gulf war.
But the 'world order' proposed by this policeman is not entirely convenient to other countries because it is designed to suit its interests to the detriment of other imperialist interests. In the chaos now opening up, the world's most powerful bourgeoisie has to play this role because it has most to lose from this chaos and it alone has the means to do anything about it. And this is what it has done. But the way it has done it, the spectacular and brutal nature of its action, also signals that it will not tolerate any 'disorders' (ie encroachments on its own interests) by the advanced countries any more than by countries like Iraq. This is why, contrary to most of the 'allies' who preferred to rely on economic and political pressure, the American bourgeoisie had no option but to destroy the essential military and economic potential of the 'wrongdoer' (an option which these other countries were trying to sabotage up to the last moment)[1]. With the classic method of gangsters, the boss of the bosses rubbed out a second rate hood in order to win the allegiance of the other bosses. And for the lesson to be well understood, for the demonstration to have a weight well beyond the sort of thing it did in Panama for example, the USA couldn't just use any old scapegoat. It required the 'enemy' to have a certain credibility, to be powerfully armed in order to justify the enormous deployment of US military power: spy satellites, AWACS, 6 aircraft carriers, huge guns firing 1200kg shells, cruise missiles and Patriots, 7 ton bombs, fuel air bombs, Abrams tanks, etc, all of this serviced by 600,000 soldiers. It was also necessary that the intervention involved a part of the world which has a real strategic importance: with Operation Desert Storm, the USA has demonstrated to the countries of Europe and to Japan, which are more dependent on Middle East oil, that supplies of this raw material so vital to their military and economic power are dependent on American good will.
In fact, the thesis of a 'holy alliance' of the advanced countries against the instability and chaos reigning in the third world is close to an extremely dangerous theory that has long been fought by revolutionaries: the theory of super-imperialism. It is based on the hypothesis that the great powers can overcome, or at least contain, their imperialist antagonisms in order to establish a sort of 'condominium' over the world. This is a thesis which has been refuted by the whole history of imperialism and which certainly won't become correct in the phase of decomposition. In reality, since the existence of capitalism and particularly since the system established its domination over the whole world, all the major phenomena of its way of life didn't start in the periphery and then affect the center, but on the contrary first appeared in the central countries. This is particularly true with all the major features of decadence such as imperialism, militarism and state capitalism, whose first major manifestations affected the advanced countries of old Europe before extending to the rest of the world where they often took on a caricatured form. It's the same for the open crisis of the capitalist economy, notably the one that began to develop in the mid 60s, even if the most disastrous effects were for a while pushed onto the countries of the periphery. In fact, like all societies in history, capitalism does not collapse from its periphery but from its center. And decomposition is no exception to this; it's a phenomenon that we first identified in the advanced countries even if has taken on the most caricatured forms in the third world.
Imperialist conflicts in the phase of decomposition
As for imperialist antagonisms, a typical manifestation of capitalist decadence that can only be exacerbated by decomposition, they don't escape the rule. It is first of all and fundamentally the central countries which are going to unleash them, even if they will find in the instability and chaos of the peripheral countries a particularly suitable terrain for expressing these antagonisms (especially since they can't directly involve wars between the advanced countries given that the proletariat is not defeated). To give any credit to the thesis of a 'North-South ' conflict or to one of its variants is in the end to conclude that capitalism can overcome its fundamental contradictions. This means falling into a reformist view ....
Thus, as we saw with the collapse of the eastern bloc, we have to understand the imperialist conflicts of today in the framework of decadence before we can examine the particularities of the phase of decomposition. These particularities are not foreign to decadence; it is their exacerbation and accumulation on an ever wider scale which introduces a new quality into the life of capitalism today, and it is here that we find the differences between the phase of decomposition and the preceding phases of decadence.
The Gulf war clearly illustrates this reality. In particular it is a striking confirmation of the profoundly irrational character of war in the period of decadence ....
This economic irrationality of war is not a recent 'discovery' by the ICC. In particular, it was dealt with at length in IRs 52 and 53: 'War, Militarism, and Imperialist blocs'). In fact, it isn't even a discovery of the ICC because more than 45 years ago the Gauche Communiste de France could write: "the decadence of capitalist society is strikingly expressed by the fact that whereas wars were once a factor for economic development (ascendant period), today, in the decadent period, economic activity is geared essentially towards war. This does not mean that war has become the goal of capitalist production, which remains the production of surplus value; it means that war, taking on a permanent character, has become decadent capitalism's way of life." (see International Review no. 59)
In this sense, it is necessary to reject any conception that looks for directly economic causes behind the Gulf war, such as oil or the opening up of new markets for the 'winners' etc. We have already seen how inadequate the argument about oil is: even though it was an element for putting pressure on America's 'allies', fixing the price of oil or the revenues this would represent for American capital would not have been sufficient motivation for such a huge and costly military operation. Similarly, while the American firms have obviously taken the lion's share of contracts for the reconstruction of Kuwait, it would be absurd to see the recent war as a means of reviving the economy of the US or the rest of the world. The figures speak for themselves: the profits that would flow back from these contracts are well below the cost of the war, even if you take into account the cheques handed out by Germany and Japan. As for the 'revival' of the world economy, it's clear that this isn't on the agenda. As we have underlined on a number of occasions, war and militarism are in no way antidotes to the capitalist crisis, but on the contrary major factors in aggravating it.
Furthermore, it would be wrong to present the accentuation of imperialist antagonisms, of which the Gulf war is up to now the most obvious expression, as the result of the immediate aggravation of the economic situation, and particularly of the open recession now developing. While it is clear that in the last instance imperialist war derives from the exacerbation of economic rivalries between nations, itself the result of the aggravation of the crisis of the capitalist mode of production, we must not make a mechanistic link between the different manifestations of the life of decadent capitalism[2]. In fact, the major cause explaining why this war broke out in 90-91 is to be found in the situation created by the collapse of the Russian bloc. Similarly in the future the factor which will further accentuate imperialist antagonisms won't be constituted by each successive development of the crisis, but by the increasingly absolute historic impasse in which the capitalist mode of production finds itself.
While the Gulf war is an illustration of the irrationality of the whole of decadent capitalism, it also contains an extra and significant element of irrationality which is characteristic of the opening up of the phase of decomposition. The other wars of decadence could, despite their basic irrationality, still take on apparently 'rational' goals (such as the search for 'lebensraum' for the German economy or the defense of imperialist positions by the allies during the second World War). This isn't at all the case with the Gulf war. The objectives of this war, on one side or the other, clearly express the total and desperate impasse that capitalism is in today:
- on the Iraqi side, the invasion of Kuwait undoubtedly had a clear economic objective: to grab hold of the considerable wealth of this country while hoping that the great powers, as they had done on a number of previous occasions, would turn a blind eye to such a hold-up. On the other hand, the objectives of the war with the 'allies' which was accepted by the Iraqi leaders as soon as they remained deaf to the ultimatum of 15 January 1991, were simply to 'save face' and inflict the maximum damage on the enemy, at the price of considerable and insurmountable damage to the national economy;
- on the 'allied' side, the economic advantages obtained, or even aimed for, were nothing, including for the main victor, the USA. The central objective of the war, for this power - to put a stop to the tendency towards generalized chaos, dressed up in grand phrases about the 'new world order' - did not contain any perspective for any amelioration of the economic situation, or even for preserving the present situation. In contrast to the time of the Second World War, the USA did not enter into this war to improve or even preserve its markets but simply to avoid a too-rapid amplification of the international political chaos which could only further exacerbate economic convulsions. In doing this, it could not avoid aggravating the instability of a zone of prime importance, while at the same time aggravating the difficulties of its own economy (especially its indebtedness) and of the world economy (...)
For some, the present situation of the USA is similar to that of Germany before the two world wars. The latter tried to compensate for its economic disadvantages, illustrated by the fact that it didn't have a significant colonial empire (in fact it was smaller than Belgium's, Holland's or Portugal's before the first world war and nothing at all before the second) by overturning the imperialist division of spoils through force of arms. This is why, in both world wars, it took on the role of 'aggressor' because the better-placed powers had no interest in upsetting the apple-cart. Similarly, the USA's essential advantage faced with the economic threat from Germany and Japan is its crushing military superiority. As long as the Eastern bloc existed, the US could use this superiority as a way of holding its allies together, which enabled it, in exchange, to impose its 'views', especially at the economic level. In such a context, the USA had no a priori need to make great use of its weapons because the essential part of the protection accorded to its allies was of a defensive nature (even though at the beginning of the 80s the USA began a general offensive against the Russian bloc). With the disappearance of the Russian threat, the 'obedience' of the other great powers was no longer guaranteed (this is why the western bloc fell apart). To obtain obedience, the US has had to adopt a systematically offensive stance on the military level (as we have just seen with the Gulf war), which looks a bit like the behavior of Germany in the past. The difference is that today the initiative isn't being taken by a power that wants to overturn the imperialist balance but on the contrary the world's leading power, the one that for the moment has the best slice of the cake.
This difference is significant. The fact that at the present time the maintenance of 'world order', ie basically of American order, doesn't imply a 'defensive' attitude (which was adopted by the Entente or the Allies in the past) on the part of the dominant power, but by an increasingly systematic use of the military offensive, and even of operations that will destabilize whole regions in order to ensure the submission of the other powers, expresses very clearly decadent capitalism's slide into the most unrestrained militarism. This is precisely one of the elements that distinguish the phase of decomposition from previous phases of capitalist decadence ...
The balance of forces between proletariat and bourgeoisie
The proletariat in the period of decomposition
" .... We must be especially clear on the danger of decomposition for the proletariat's ability to raise itself to the level of its historic tasks (...) the decomposition of society, which can only get worse, may in the years to come cut down the best forces of the proletariat and definitively compromise the perspective of communism. This is because, as capitalism rots, the resulting poison infects all the elements of society, including the proletariat.
In particular, although the weakening grip of bourgeois ideology as a result of capitalism's entry into decadence was one of the conditions for revolution, the decomposition of the same ideology, as it is developing appears essentially as an obstacle to the development of proletarian consciousness. ('Decomposition, Final Phase ...', point 14, IR 62)
"Throughout the 1980's, the proletariat has been capable of developing its struggles against the consequences of the crisis despite the negative weight of decomposition, which has been systematically exploited by the bourgeoisie" (IR 59: 'Presentation of the Resolution on the International Situation to the 8th ICC Congress').
Until the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the difficulties resulting from the weight of decomposition had not fundamentally called into question the overall dynamic of the class struggle. But the event was to determine a marked break in this dynamic ....
Already in 1989, the ICC highlighted the new difficulties that this immense historic event would create for the proletariat's consciousness (see the 'Theses on the Economic and Political Crisis in the Eastern Countries', IR 60) ....
This was the context when the working class was dealt another brutal blow: the Gulf war.
The impact of the Gulf War
.... The paralysis of the workers' struggle as a result of the war has been greater, and has lasted longer that which accompanied the collapse of Stalinism. This is because the working class in the central countries has felt itself much more directly affected by the Gulf war, in which these countries were more or less directly involved, than by events in the East, which could appear, as we have seen, as somewhat 'external' (which is why we saw no demonstrations around these events in the West). The collapse of Stalinism, while it encouraged a whole series of highly dangerous illusions in the class (illusions in democracy and a 'world at peace'), and a considerable retreat of any idea of capitalism's replacement by another kind of society, provoked a feeling not so much of anxiety as of euphoria. By contrast, the Gulf crisis and open warfare provoked amongst tens of millions of workers a profound disquiet, which pushed worries about declining living conditions into the background far more strongly, and more durably, than the collapse of the Eastern bloc had done; at the same time, the war created a strong feeling of impotence.
Apparently then, the Gulf war had a still more negative impact on the working class than the collapse of the eastern bloc. But it is precisely the responsibility of revolutionary organizations - the most conscious fraction of the working class - to see behind appearances to the true underlying tendencies within society.
When we consider they way in which the bourgeoisie's main forces maneuvered to make the working class in the central countries accept the military intervention in the Middle East, we cannot help but be struck by their extreme skillfulness:
- at the beginning of the crisis, while most of the population, and especially the working class, was reticent about such an intervention, the Western 'democracies', with the USA in the lead, focused attention on the embargo on Iraq, while at the same time setting up on the spot the most massive military arsenal since WWII;
- at the same time, the pacifist movements set to work to channel into a dead-end all those (workers especially) who refused to have anything to do with this crusade for 'international law';
- when the war did break out, it was presented as a 'clean war', which was causing no civilian victims in Iraq and no casualties among the 'Coalition';
- on the eve of the ground offensive we heard a different story, with the insistence on the heavy losses it would provoke amongst the Coalition forces; the speed of the offensive, and the limited losses thus provoked a feeling of relief in the population (and so the working class) of the countries concerned;
- after the war was over, the horrible massacre of the Kurds, which was planned by the victors, was exploited to justify the military intervention against Iraq, and to provoke the feeling that the offensive should have been continued until Saddam Hussein was overthrown and his military forces completely destroyed.
These maneuver, systematically supported by a servile media, attained their goal - but their very sophistication demonstrated that the bourgeoisie did not have its hands free for warmongering. In particular, it was aware that although this policy was vital in defending its interests (with different nuances according to country, as we have seen), unlike the collapse of the Eastern bloc it could be a non-negligible factor in the clarification of the proletariat's consciousness (...)
Whatever the appearances, the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the Gulf war (not in itself but because of what it announces for the future) have quite opposite dynamics as far as the process of coming to consciousness in the class is concerned (...) in the latter we were confronted by a real anxiety, and fundamental questions, which followed the euphoria that accompanied the events in the East ... and in contrast to this kind of euphoria, anxiety, although at first it may paralyze the workers' combativity, is a powerful stimulant in the present period, for reflection in depth.
It is therefore important to insist on the fact ... that the events of the last two years do not at all call into question the historic course that the ICC has highlighted for more than two decades.
The historic course
The reversal of the historic course would presuppose, in fact, a serious defeat for the working class and the ability of the bourgeoisie to take this defeat as a basis to enroll the working class under its ideological banners. Neither the collapse of the Eastern bloc, nor the Gulf war can be considered as defeats for the proletariat, or as opportunities for the bourgeoisie to bring it under control.
The first event occurred independently of the proletariat's action (and this indeed is why it provoked a reflux in the development of consciousness within it). It has put difficulties on the road towards a revolutionary confrontation, but it has not pushed the proletariat back in any lasting way (this is what we said a year ago when we pointed out that the dynamic of the reflux had come to an end). In particular, the decisive sectors of the proletariat have not really been drawn into the mystifications which have weakened its consciousness, since "the sectors of the class which are today in the front line of these mystifications, those in the Eastern bloc, are relatively peripheral. The western proletariat must confront these difficulties today because of the 'wind from the east', but not because it is itself 'in the eye of the storm'" (IR 61, 'After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, destabilization and chaos').
As for the second event, it is, as we have seen, fundamentally an antidote to the ideological poison poured out with the collapse of Stalinism, and strengthens the healthy effects of the increasingly obvious economic bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production. The Gulf war could only happen because the proletariat in the advanced countries did not have the strength to oppose it. But it was not a direct defeat, since the masses were not mobilized in a war conducted solely by professionals, and accompanied by a great insistence on the fact that the conscript workers in uniform (in those countries where conscription exists) were not being sent to fight. This insistence, and the low number of 'Coalition' casualties is one of the best proofs that the bourgeoisie fears the war becoming a factor in the development of the working class' struggle and consciousness ....
This is the case because although today imperialist war is fully a part of decomposition, it is not its most typical expression; rather it is capitalism's way of life throughout the decadent period; and it is this decadence which is the necessary objective condition for the system's overthrow.
This being said, although the consequences of decomposition will be wholly negative for the working class right up to the revolutionary period, this does not imply any calling into question of the historic course. Certainly, as we have seen, it is an extremely serious threat for the working class and for the whole of humanity, since it can lead to their destruction. And this danger is all the more serious in that "while unleashing the world war demands the proletariat's adherence to the bourgeoisie's ideals ... this is not a precondition for decomposition to destroy humanity" (IR 61, op cit). But unlike world war, the effects of decomposition (apart, of course, from the collapse of Stalinism) are relatively slow to act, and have not to date been able to block the development of the struggle and of proletarian class consciousness (as we saw during the 80's with the development of the 3rd wave of struggles). Moreover, the permanent state of war combined with the growing collapse of the capitalist economy will necessarily provoke the proletariat's mobilization on its own class terrain, which is a powerful antidote to the typical poisons secreted by decomposition ....
Similarly, the combat that the proletariat will be forced to engage, through the class solidarity which it implies, will be a prime factor in overcoming the tendencies towards the atomization of the workers, and the 'every man for himself' attitude prevalent especially in corporatism.
This does not mean that decomposition will not henceforward put a negative pressure on the working class. It simply means that decomposition has not to date, and is not likely to provoke a defeat of the proletariat and its enrolment under the bourgeoisie. This is why revolutionaries have the responsibility of putting forward all the potential within the class for the development of its struggle and consciousness.
ICC 20.4.91
[1] The unremitting loyalty of the British bourgeoisie to the policies of the USA expresses both the particular intelligence of the former, which has understood that the stakes are too important, for capitalism as a whole, to risk participating in the aggravation of global instability by trying to oppose the US, and a carefully considered defense of its national interests, which, since the first world war, have been firmly associated with the American bourgeoisie which supplanted it. Through this loyalty to the most powerful bourgeoisie, the British bourgeoisie has at the same time acquired a 'right hand man' status from which it can expect certain guarantees. Such an alliance also has the advantage that there is no threat of a simple colonization (as is the case in Canada) to the extent that 'big brother' is 5000 km away. If a country like France has not, in general, shown such docility towards the US, it's because there's no place for two 'right hand men' next to the US. This is why France has had a particular alliance with Germany for over 30 years, an alliance which, with the rise to power of its big neighbor, is threatening to become a bit of a burden. This is another barrier to the formation of a 'European bloc'.
[2] This was already true for the First World War which did not break out as a direct result of the crisis. There was, in 1913, a certain aggravation of the economic situation but this was not especially greater than what had happened in 1900-1903 or 1907. In fact, the essential causes for the outbreak of world war one in August 1914 resided in:
- the end of the dividing up of the world among the great capitalist powers. Here the Fashoda crisis of 1898 (where the two great colonial powers, Britain and France, found themselves face to face after conquering the bulk of Africa) was a sort of symbol of this and marked the end of the ascendant period of capitalism;
- the completion of the military and diplomatic preparations constituting the alliances which were going to confront each other;
- the demobilization of the European proletariat from its class terrain faced with the threat of war (in contrast to the situation in 1912, when the Basle congress was held) and the dragooning of the class behind the flags of the bourgeoisie, made possible above all by the open treason of the majority of the leaders of social democracy, a point that was carefully verified by the main governments.
It was thus mainly political factors which, once capitalism had entered into decadence, had proved that it had reached an historic impasse, determined the actual moment for the war to break out.
The same phenomenon could be seen at the time of the Second World War. The objective conditions for the war were there at the beginning of the 30s when the system, the reconstruction over, once again faced an impasse. Once again, it was mainly political factors of the same order which ensured that the war did not break out until the end of that decade.
In the same way, while the main reason that capitalism did not unleash a third world war during the 50s was that the reconstruction gave it a certain margin of maneuver, we must also take into account another factor: the weakness of the Eastern bloc and especially of its leader. The latter, which found itself in a similar situation to Germany prior to the two world wars since it was worst placed in the division of the imperialist cake, made a certain number of attempts to improve its position (Berlin blockade of 48, Korean war in 52). But these attempts were easily repulsed by the US and its bloc, which preventing them from leading to a third world war.
IR67, 4th Qtr 1991
With the violent massacres of the Persian Gulf, world capitalism has revealed its true face and what its 'new world order' is all about: chaos, barbarism and war.
The reality of imperialist war - which has involved, although not in a direct fashion, the whole of the proletariat in the imperialist metropoles - has stimulated a healthy decantation in the proletarian political camp.
On the one hand, a group like the Internationalist Communist Organisation, which has been specialising for many years in the position of support to the 'oppressed bourgeoisies', has fully integrated itself, bag and baggage, into the Iraqi imperialist camp, demonstrating how totally alien and opposed this group is to the very interests of the proletarian political camp.
On the other hand, the milieu as a whole has demonstrated the ability to respond to the challenge posed by the war, in defending clearly the two criteria essential to remaining solidly within the borders of proletarian internationalism:
1) No to the imperialist war. No support to any imperialist camp involved in the war, even and above all if this camp claims to be 'anti-imperialist';
2) No to pacifism, capitalism is war! Only a war against capitalism, only the proletarian revolution can allow a future without war.
By unanimously defending these two solid proletarian basics, the internationalist groups have demonstrated a similar exemplary approach to the one adopted by the revolutionary minorities which, in the full swing of World War 1, intervened to speak against the imperialist massacre.
There is however a striking difference:
In 1916, the huge divergences which existed between the various currents opposed to the war did not prevent these currents launching a unified appeal to the proletariat of all countries, with the famous Zimmerwald Manifesto, which represented a ray of light for millions of workers facing death in the trenches.
Today, the internationalist groups have defended with the same words opposition to the war, showing an even greater level of unity than the one which existed at Zimmerwald. Nonetheless, all this has not been enough to allow them, at least on this occasion, to speak with one voice to the proletariat of all countries.
This is a shame which weighs on the whole of the present communist movement and one which can't be minimised. It's not enough to say that we state the same things and that's good enough. The threat today posed to the working class by capitalism in decomposition is the destruction of the proletariat's class unity in a thousand fratricidal confrontations, from the sands of the Gulf to the frontiers of Yugoslavia. It's for this reason that the defence of its unity is a question of life or death for our class. But what hope can the proletariat have to maintain this unity, if even its conscious avant garde renounces the fight for its unification? Don't anyone tell us that this an appeal to 'kiss and make up', an 'opportunistic avoiding of divergences'. Remember that it was precisely the participation at Zimmerwald which allowed the Bolsheviks to unify the left of Zimmerwald, embryo of the Communist International, and make the definitive separation with Social Democracy. It's precisely because profound divergences exist between internationalists, differences which prevent them talking with the same voice, that it's necessary that these divergences are openly discussed between revolutionaries. The example of discussions between Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, and other revolutionaries before them shows this. Finally don't anyone tell us that we are wasting our breath, that we're just doing this to show that we're not sectarian and others are.
In l983, our appeal towards the proletarian milieu, which was in the midst of a profound crisis, illustrated by the explosion of Programma Comunista, the transformation of their ex-Algerian section, El-Oumami, into a nationalist Arab group, went almost unnoticed in a general climate of backwardness and sectarianism. Our appeal was an invitation to fight the tendencies which were then dominant in the milieu.
Today, the situation is different. With the integration of the ICO into the camp of the bourgeoisie, the internationalist groups of the Bordigist tradition have responded with an explicit rejection of support to 'oppressed national bourgeoisies', a rejection which marks an important clarification for the whole of the milieu. Instead of a total sectarian isolation, we find today in the different groups a greater will to air their reciprocal critiques in the press or in public meetings. Furthermore, there is an explicit appeal from the comrades of Battaglia Comunista to overcome the present dispersion; an appeal whose arguments and aims we largely share. Finally, there exists - and this must be encouraged to the full - a 'push from below' against sectarian isolation, which comes from a new generation of young elements that the earthquake of these last two years has pushed towards communist positions and who remain baffled by this politically unexplained dispersion.
We are well aware that the difficulties are enormous, and that, for the moment, openness to discussion - when it exists - is very limited. There are those who say that the debate must include only those groups which descend from the communist left of Italy, thus excluding the ICC. There are those who see the debate exclusively as an annihilation of other groups in their press. There are those who think that the real debate won't be possible until a pre-revolutionary phase and there are who are open to discuss with new elements but not with 'old-timers'. As we can see, the roots of sectarianism are too profound for over-ambitious propositions to be made, whether in their content (work toward the reconstruction of the party) or in their form (an international conference for example). What can be done then to concretely overcome this present state of dispersion? It's necessary to facilitate everything that goes towards the increase of contact and debate between internationalists [1] [75]. It's not a question of hiding divergences in order to rush into 'marriages' between groups, but of beginning to openly discuss the divergences that are at the origins of the existence of different groups.
The point of departure is to systematise the reciprocal critique of positions in the press. That may appear a banality, but there are still revolutionary groups who, in their press, seem to be alone in the world.
Another step that can be taken immediately is to systematise the presence and intervention at public meetings of other groups.
A more important step is the confrontation of positions in jointly convoked public meetings by several groups faced with particularly important events, such as the war in the Gulf.
It's clear that all this, and in particular the last point, will not be immediately realisable everywhere and between all the groups. But even if there are only two organisations who meet to publicly discuss their agreements and divergences, that will in any case be a step forward for the whole milieu and we would support it with conviction, even if the ICC wasn't amongst the direct participants at this particular discussion.
Our propositions may appear modest, in fact they are. But faced with decades of unbridled sectarianism, it's already ambitious to only want TO BEGIN a process of confrontation and regroupment between internationalists. And it's the only road that can lead to the decantation and programmatic demarcation which will enable communist minorities to fully play their essential role in the class battles which are being prepared.
ICC July 1991.
[1] [76] It's clear that for us that the groups and organisations of a leftist type (Trotskyists, Maoists, anarchists) are not internationalists. As for the myriad of little groups that gravitate parasitically around the principal currents of the proletarian milieu, the dispersion of militants and the confusion which they nourish means that they can contribute nothing to such a debate.
A torrent of chaos and decomposition is sweeping the world, and has laid low the crumbling walls of one of world capitalism's main bastions. The world's second imperialist power, whose nuclear arsenal alone could have destroyed the whole planet, the "land of the great lie" where the cynical perpetrators of the greatest anti-communist massacre in history have ruled for decades in the name of communism, the ultimate model of the most statified form of capitalist exploitation, has collapsed in convulsions following a still-born coup d'état.
Notwithstanding the hysterical lies of the ruling order's hired propagandists, it is not communism that is dying in the USSR, but Stalinism, and its death-throes are plunging a whole section of capitalism into ever-growing chaos. The violent tremors that are shaking the biggest country in the world are not even the birth pangs of a new, rejuvenated "democratic bourgeois revolution" of capitalism, but a sundering of this world order's weakest links. Just as in Yugoslavia, drowning in blood under the pressure of its nationalist antagonisms, the devastating breath of capitalist decomposition offers no perspective but a headlong decline into chaos.
A government that no longer knows what are its powers, nor whom it is governing; a country which does not know where its frontiers are, because it is exploding into autonomous republics; an army 4 million strong, with 30,000 nuclear warheads, but whose command is completely paralyzed by the threat of an 80% cut in numbers and hardly knows whose orders to obey; a moribund economy strangled by conflicts between its constituent parts, its organs of decision paralyzed. This is the state the USSR finds itself in after the "conservatives'" failed coup d'état, and the triumph of the "forces of democracy".
The coup undertaken by the nomenklatura's conservative fractions, nostalgic for the lost grandeur of empire, had long been denounced as an imminent threat by "reformist" leaders such as Shevardnadze and Yakovlev. Now it has happened. The determining element which forced the "conservatives" to undertake such a desperate adventure seems to have been the signature of the new "Union Treaty", planned for 20th August, which would have been an irreversible step in the USSR's breakup[1]. But the coup was no more than a ludicrous fiasco whose main result was to strengthen the hand of the "reformists", and allow them to regain the offensive. The stalinist straitjacket, or what was left of it, was torn apart in a few days, and the chaos which the old state power had had so much difficulty reining in went completely out of control.
After the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, stalinism is now collapsing at the very heart of its one-time empire. The hurricane which the USSR's weakness unleashed on the stalinist fortresses of central Europe, from Warsaw to Bucharest and from Berlin to Prague, has returned with a vengeance to strike the centre, in Moscow and Leningrad themselves. But here the phenomenon is clearer and of greater significance. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the political upheavals which accompanied the overthrow of stalinism were strongly marked by local specificities: anti-Russian feeling, the idea that all that need be done was to get rid of Russian domination for everything to work better, the fact that stalinism was not the result of a local counter-revolution, but imported by Russian tanks, the active presence of pro-Western political and economic forces impatient for the fruits, however tattered, of the decomposing empire: all this undoubtedly attenuated the anti-stalinist specificity of events. By contrast, Russia is the cradle of Stalinisn, as well as the scene for the 1917 October Revolution. Here, the full extent of stalinism's putrefaction appears in all its sordid reality.
As a result, the ideological campaign that was launched two years ago with the aim of presenting the collapse of stalinism as the bankruptcy of communism, marxism, and the class struggle has plumbed new depths of ignominy.
The bourgeoisie all over the world has taken a delight in showing the "crowds" in the "socialist fatherland" destroying the statues of Lenin, Marx, and Engels: workers spitting on the images of those who declared the possibility of a world without classes or exploitation; the memory of the greatest revolution ever undertaken by the exploited classes utterly deformed from being identified with the stalinist counter-revolution, and trodden under foot in the same streets where the workers in arms once "shook the world"; the bourgeois press indulging in the luxury of full column headlines declaring that "communism is dead!".
Stalinism has been riddled with falsehood since its inception. It could only die, drowned in lies.
The events of 19th-24th August in Moscow, which marked the final downfall of stalinism, are themselves cloaked in falsehood: as to the nature of the confrontations, presented as a "popular revolution"; as to what was at stake in the fighting, presented as a "struggle against communism"; lies as to the future, presented as a world where (after a few inevitable upheavals and sacrifices) peace and prosperity will reign thanks to the miraculous virtues of free competition and the electoral games of bourgeois democracy.
A popular revolution?
"We have won! Thanks to the Muscovites, and especially the youth, the coup d'état has been defeated, democracy has beaten reaction, and the USSR has been saved" (Yeltsin[2]).
"What we are seeing today is a true popular revolution. At last, liberty has triumphed" (Yakovlev[3]).
This is how the events in Moscow are presented by Yeltsin and Yakovlev, two figureheads of the bureaucratic "reformers". And this is the same tale that has been taken up by all the international media: against an attempted coup d'état by those elements most attached to the old stalinist forms, the "people" and the workers of Moscow rose as one, behind the great Yeltsin. Some journalists have gone one better, and even call the events a "new 1789 French revolution", and Yeltsin "a new Danton".
What is the truth? What part was played by the millions of proletarians in Moscow's suburbs? Who defeated the coup?
The image of Yeltsin on the day of the coup, standing on a tank denouncing the putsch's illegality and calling for a general strike, has been published ad nauseam all over the world. What is less known, is that Yeltsin's call to the workers of Moscow and the USSR was hardly followed, and that the mobilization in the demonstrations were timid, to say the least.
"If there's no heating this winter, then neither Gorbachev, nor Yeltsin, nor Ianaev will heat my home! In my opinion, they're all playing the same game, and the loser will be the people, as always". Such remarks, on the very day of the putsch and from an ordinary Russian "woman in the street"[4] well reflect the two dominant emotions among Russian workers: anxiety faced with a terrible decline in living conditions, and a profound distrust, born of decades of experience, of anything to do with the world of the Nomenklatura and its apparatchiks[5]. The preponderance of such ideas largely explains the low level of "popular" mobilization in response to Yeltsin's appeals.
It is more than likely that had the confrontations been more violent - for example, had the army really attacked the Russian parliament - then the workers in Moscow and elsewhere in the USSR would have played a larger part. Illusions in democracy, nationalism, and the virtues of "market capitalism" still weigh heavily on workers who anyway think that "there can't be anything worse than stalinism". But this time, with the exception of the mines (where Yeltsin controls an influential trade union), and of some large enterprises in big cities like Moscow, there was no massive "popular" mobilization (to the extent that this bourgeois term includes the working class).
Contrary to the official fairy-tale, the coup d'état was not defeated by a "popular revolution", but by the disrepair of the entire political apparatus, and the divisions within the ruling class. The soldiers in the tanks that protected the Russian parliament had not broken with the military hierarchy to fraternize with the demonstrators: they were obeying the orders of General Lebedev, who himself came under the command of the air force chief Shaposhnikov[6] who had gone over to the Yeltsin camp. If the military offensive against the Russian parliament never happened, this was not, as Ianaiev afterwards claimed, to avoid a bloodbath, but because high-ranking officers in both the army and the KGB refused to obey their superiors. The 300 cars and buses used to make barricades around the parliament building were not seized from the Moscow traffic: they were supplied by banks, enterprises, and the Moscow stock exchange. The Russian parliament's telephone links were kept open, not by decision of the telephone workers, but because the American company Sovamer Trading kindly made available its own telephone links through Finland[7].
The real protagonists of events in Moscow were two fractions of the ruling class. Five years of hesitant perestroika have only succeeded in creating profound divisions amongst the apparatchiks, as well as a new layer of enterprise managers who are no longer directly integrated into the state structure. The so-called "conservative" camp, represented by Genady Ianaiev, Pugo, Yazhov, and the other conspirators, consists of that fraction of the nomenklatura which resists the dismantling of the old Stalinist organizational forms, because they see in them a suicide both for themselves and for the empire[8]. Like its "reforming" rival, this fraction is recruited throughout every state institution, for the entire state machine is split from top to bottom: the military-industrial complex, the KGB, the army staff, and above all in the gigantic apparatus of the CPSU. The opposing fraction, whose most flamboyant spokesman is Boris Yeltsin, also springs from the same bureaucratic cesspit, as the putsch itself revealed. Amongst others, it includes the representatives of the "alternative economy" and the leaders of the new economic structures. As Arkady Volski, one of the reforming clique's most representative members, recently stated "In the USSR, the non-state sector of the economy is much larger than is generally thought"[9]. The creed of this gathering of businessmen and repented apparatchiks is to destroy the rigid stalinist machine, to try to save the machine of exploitation itself, and with it their own position as exploiters.
What we have just seen is thus not a "people's revolution" against "reactionary putschists", but a confrontation between two cliques of the same reactionary class, long since condemned by history and infested to the core with divisions and treachery, desperately trying to keep afloat their inexorably sinking "ship of state".
Only the venal stupidity of the ruling class' hired hacks could see a "popular revolution", a "new fall of the Bastille", in the Moscow events or a "new Danton" in the Russian president. The bourgeois heroes of 1789 had the historic stature of men taking part in the revolutionary birth of a new society. By comparison, Yeltsin's apparatchiks are nothing but historic midgets, offspring of the stalinist nomenklatura which is one of the most monstrous and degenerate forms of the capitalist class, confronted with the impossible task of maintaining an "order" in a state of complete putrefaction.
A combat against Leninism?
But the biggest, most gigantic lie, the cornerstone of the whole gigantic edifice of propaganda erected since the collapse of stalinism in the USSR, is the idea that the putschist thugs of Genady Ianaiev are "the last defenders of communism". The same communism whose principles were defined by Marx and Engels. The communism for which the Russian proletarians fought, with Lenin and the Bolshevik party at their head, alongside their class brothers in Germany, Hungary, and Italy.
Only ignorance, and decades of totalitarian lies, scientifically organized and propagated in every country in the world, still gives credit to the identification of stalinism and communism. The most elementary confrontation between the reality of stalinism and communist principles immediately reveals the enormity of the falsehood.
The starting point for the 1917 Russian Revolution was the struggle against war, in other words the struggle against the militarization of the working class under the national flag. Unlike the whimpering pacifists, who as always dreamed of peaceful capitalist nations, the revolutionary struggle against war was fought under the banner of Marx' and Engels' Communist Manifesto: "The workers have no fatherland! Workers of all countries, unite!". Over and over again, the Bolsheviks proclaimed: "The revolution is only a detachment of the world socialist army, and the success and triumph of the revolution which we have accomplished depends on the action of this army. This is a fact which none of us forgets (...) The Russian proletariat is aware of its revolutionary isolation, and it sees clearly that a vital precondition and a fundamental premise for its victory is the united intervention of workers of the whole world" (Lenin, 23rd July, 1918). From the start, the communism of marxists, both in the struggle and as an objective, has never been imagined as anything other than worldwide. By contrast, stalinism as a current was born historically with the rejection, after Lenin's death, of internationalist principles and with its becoming the spokesman for the theory of "socialism in one country". It wallowed in the most abject patriotism and nationalism. During World War II, Stalin took pride in his "democratic" allies' compliments for his "military genius", and in the USSR's 24 million corpses slaughtered on the altar of imperialism.
Communist society is defined by the abolition of wage labor and all forms of exploitation. Stalinism will go down in history a regime where capitalist exploitation reached an unprecedented degree of intensity and barbarity. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels wrote: "The old bourgeois society, with its classes and class conflicts, gives way to an association where the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". In Russia, the "free development" of the state bourgeoisie, the nomenklatura, took place at the price of the direst poverty for the workers.
In the marxist conception, the struggle for communism goes through a phase of "dictatorship of the proletariat", whose first precondition is the massive and active participation of all workers in wielding political power. In 1905, the workers in Russia spontaneously created the "finally discovered form" of this dictatorship (the Soviets, councils of delegates elected and instantly revocable by factory and district committees); in 1917, the Soviets took power. Stalinism only developed on the corpse of these organs, keeping only their name to disguise the institutions of the totalitarian dictatorship of capitalism[10].
Stalinism is not the negation of capitalism, but capitalism statified to the point of absurdity[11].
Today's "conservative" nomenklatura is not the last expression of communism, but like the "reformist" fraction, the direct heir of the stalinist executioners who massacred all the real protagonists of the communist October revolution[12].
The conflict between cliques of bureaucrats in the USSR has nothing to do with "communism". The real antagonism only concerns how to manage the exploitation of the workers and peasants of the USSR: poverty and scarcity under the heel of stalinism, or poverty and unemployment under the whip of the "businessmen".
The only part that the exploited classes can play in this conflict is that of cannon fodder. To join the "democratic" or the "conservative" forces is to run head first into a massacre, and to desert the only struggle which can offer a way out of capitalism's nightmare: the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat against all the fractions of the exploiting class.
On the way to prosperity, peace, and freedom?
Prosperity?
The economic question lies at the heart of the "victors'" democratic lies: before the putsch, Yeltsin did not hesitate to promise that he would bring the country out of disaster in "500 days".
And with good reason. The USSR's economic situation has been getting consistently worse during the five years of perestroika, with an abrupt acceleration since the beginning of 1991[13]. During the last six months, domestic production has fallen by 10%; imports have fallen by 50%, and exports by 23.4%. By August 1991, inflation had already reached an annual rhythm of 100%. On the financial level, the USSR was no longer able to repay its debts. At the beginning of September, Volski declared that the USSR was "on the brink of financial collapse"[14] - while the oxygen of Western capital, its masters made more and more uneasy by the advancing chaos, has become more and more rarified. The economy is suffering from the effects of political and social instability: the conflicts between republics, and between national groups within the republics, end up in a state of mutual strangulation in wars where economic pressure (eg blocking lines of communication) is constantly used as a weapon; institutional and political instability (accompanied since the putsch by a constant fear of purges) leads to a complete paralysis of the bureaucracy in the decision-making centers of the economy. Famine looms this winter.
The economic crisis is indeed at the centre of the situation in the USSR. It is no accident that the first organ of central power created by the "victors" has been a "Committee for economic management", nor that this same committee has been given the job of forming a new government for the USSR, or what is left of it.
But what of the future, now that the "500 day man" is in power? Now that Yavlinsky, the author of Yeltsin's famous plan, is a member of what serves as a government, his proposal has become a... 5-year plan. Its content? "Shock therapy", "Bolivian-style" as the IMF experts say: "real prices", which means an explosion of inflation (inflation is expected to reach 1000% in four months); a faster privatization of the economy[15], which will mean redundancies for the workers in enterprises considered uncompetitive (unemployment is expected to rise to 30 million by 1992); an increase in the number of people living below the poverty line, to the tune of 170,000 every month.
This is the future that is forecast. The reality will certainly be far worse: bloody civil wars between and within the republics, and the consequent exodus of civilian populations, can only aggravate the disaster. The much proclaimed emergence from the quagmire will not happen in 500 days, nor in 5 years, not just because of the world's dramatic economic situation, but also because the chaos into which the USSR is plunging will make it impossible to master the economic machine.
Freedom?
"Freedom has triumphed at last" proclaimed the father of perestroika, Yakovlev, when it was certain that the putsch had failed. But the freedom he is talking about is the freedom of the new sharks: the converted apparatchiks, the businessmen, the black marketers, the leaders of the powerful mafia, in fact all the scum which has been raised, Reagan-style, to the rank of "hero" in the cult of "free enterprise". What does this "freedom" which "has triumphed at last" mean for the workers and poor peasants? What does freedom mean for the unemployed? What does freedom mean for those who spend most of their time in endless queues in front of empty shops? What does liberty mean when life is a daily struggle to survive in the midst of uncontrolled chaos? Liberty in wretched poverty is only a cynical lie. The only thing which will change for soviet workers, and then only in the industrialized zones, will be the introduction of a chaotic caricature of bourgeois democracy: instead of the gross falsification of stalinist propaganda, they will be treated to the sophistication of democratic falsehood (of elections, media, and trade unions), which lets its own professionals "criticize" freely, the better to stifle any real social criticism, and which encourages a "credible" network of trade union and political organizations within the working class, the better to sabotage its combats from within.
Peace in the USSR?
Even as the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, and lost its control over Eastern Europe, nationalist conflicts began to explode within its borders. The peripheral republics began to arm themselves, and to proclaim their independence of the centre and the other republics.
The new conquerors also have a plan (though this time without any dates) to restore peace and harmony to the nation: the "Union treaties", which are supposed to give freedom to all and establish new, amicable, ties based on voluntary cooperation. Certainly, the impulsive Yeltsin did let slip a few explicit threats on the renegotiation of borders, but only to withdraw them immediately after.
The putschists intended to prevent the signature of the new Union treaty drawn up by Gorbachev and those republics willing to go along with him. The main effect of the putsch's failure and the triumph of the "democrats" has been to destroy what little coherence remained in the relations between the republics[16]. In the space of a few days, the map of the world has been redrawn, and nobody knows where it will stop: the three Baltic states have had their independence recognized by the Western powers, all the other republics have proclaimed their independence. In a few days, the USSR has ceased to exist.
Most of the republics aim to form, or to reinforce, their own political institutions and their own army. The already catastrophic degree of anarchy is becoming more and more widespread (13). The antagonisms between different republics are getting worse, for example between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorny Karabakh. And the same centrifugal tendencies are increasing the general disorder within the republics themselves. Minority populations, whether Russian[17], "national" or "ethnic", are all declaring their "autonomy", confronting each republic with the same problem that exists for the USSR as a whole. Moldavia is an especially good example: the new local authorities have declared their intention to integrate their region with the Romanian state, but are confronted with the active resistance of the "authorities" of the Dniestr region (where the majority of the population is Russian or Ukrainian), who are threatening the Romanian part of Moldavia with "economic sanctions"[18]; at the same time, the latter must contend with the Gaugauz region and its russified turkic population; in Georgia, Ossetians are subjected to a merciless repression by the local authorities; the tiny zone of Crimea, which is an integral part of the Ukraine, has proclaimed itself "autonomous", and declared that "Only the people of Crimea have the right to use and possess the land and its riches"[19].
There will be no return to peace in what was once the USSR. The underlying forces which are throwing all these nationalist antagonisms are the same that are plunging the entire planet into chaos. Economic paralysis, the development of poverty and the consequent disintegration of the social fabric, the explosion of antagonisms between different capitalist factions, this entire course of decomposition of the "capitalist order", has become irreversible in the USSR and everywhere else. It can only be stopped by the revolutionary action of the world proletariat.
World peace?
The promise of peace plays an important part in the gamut of mystifications of the "democratic forces". To announce the reduction of military spending thanks to a thawing in international relations is an effective propaganda argument, in the USSR even more than in other countries. By announcing their continued pursuit of Gorbachev's policy in this respect, the "reformists" are making the most of it.
This is an argument which in fact makes a virtue out of necessity: if Gorbachev's USSR has become less of a threat, it is because it has no choice in the matter. The days when the USSR could ensure its allies' victory in Vietnam against the USA are indeed long gone. The complete impotence of Gorbachev's government against the US diktat during the Gulf war is eloquent in this respect. On the international stage, the leaders of the Kremlin have been reduced to the status of beggars, kept waiting on the doorstep at the "great powers'" summits. Under such conditions, the USSR is hardly in a position to conduct an aggressive policy.
This does not mean that the "reformers'" victory will bring peace with it: quite the reverse. It is impossible to measure all the consequences of the disintegration of the biggest country in the world. From the Baltic Sea to the North Pacific, a huge powder-keg is just waiting to erupt. As the "Russian bear" lets its prey slip, the greed of the surrounding countries, but also of the great powers, increases correspondingly. And even if the pickings are often bereft of any economic value, the permanent conflict of imperialism forces all countries, and especially the dominant powers, to do all they can if only to prevent their rivals getting stronger. Moreover, the USSR's political instability and centrifugal nationalisms will prove contagious.
The list of "trouble spots" created by the empire's collapse is a long one: Japan is demanding the return of the Kurile islands, seized by the USSR at the end of World War II[20]; the longest frontier in the world, between China and the USSR, is one of the planet's greatest military concentrations, and the object of a series of quarrels just waiting to spring to life; China itself, the last major bastion of stalinism, is also subject to the same internal political and nationalist tensions as the USSR; the enmity between India and Pakistan has been still further intensified; the frontier zones with Iran and Turkey are already seriously destabilized by the conflicts in the Caucasus (Azerbaidjan, Armenia, Georgia); and last but not least, the whole of Central Europe, from Romania to the Baltic, is a veritable jigsaw of nationalities (Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and... Russians), riven with archaic nationalisms and ancient feuds, which will create still more centers of tension.
The tremors are already being felt well beyond the confines of the empire's frontier. The process of dislocation of the ex-Western bloc, begun with the collapse in the East, is bound to accelerate with the disappearance of the "common enemy", and the conflicting appetites for the shreds of the USSR. The effects have already spread as far as Cuba.
The fires of the Gulf war revealed the lie of the "peace" that our rulers promised after the destruction of the Berlin Wall. The new promises of peace that are being made as the USSR disintegrates are no less hollow. The shockwave of the USSR's collapse is only beginning to make itself felt.
Yugoslavia
The bloody civil war in Yugoslavia is a crying demonstration of the destructive tendencies sweeping capitalism, and which the USSR's collapse has only served to accelerate. Yugoslavia's dislocation is partly a result of the movement of destabilization which began two years ago with the end of the Eastern bloc and of blocs in general. The defeat of the putsch in Moscow has also encouraged the separatism of the Croats. But this nationalist bloodbath is above all an expression of the destructive tendencies which are present throughout capitalism: the tendency to "look after number one", towards the dislocation of capitalism's organization under the pressure of the economic crisis, and to "settle" problems through military means[21].
As we go to press, the war is both spreading and intensifying: the "federal" army and Serb forces are starting new offensives against Croatia with naval blockades and aerial bombardments. The fighting has reached Zaghreb, which lives in constant fear of air-raids. In their turn, the Croat armies have launched a "general offensive". In Montenegro and Voivodina the federal government has called up its reservists. The slaughter has taken a qualitative step forward.
In this war, proletarians and peasants, unable to free themselves from the poison of nationalism are massacring each other for the sordid and absurd interests of the bourgeois cliques that rule them. The war is no longer limited to the "Third World": it is happening in Europe, only a few kilometers from Austria and Italy, which, like Hungary, are already receiving refugees from the civil war.
Combining cynicism and hypocrisy, the governments of Western Europe claim to play a "peacekeeping" role, when in fact some of them (Germany and Austria in particular) are directly supporting the Slovene and Croat separatists. The ceasefires "brokered" by the European powers have all collapsed, while the idea of sending a European peacekeeping force has only served to highlight the imperialist antagonisms between them (the opposition between Germany and Britain on this question, in fact conceals the fundamental and growing antagonism between US and German capital)[22].
This is the peace that the "pacifist reformers" and champions of the "new world order" have to offer us.
Yugoslavia is not "an isolated case". It is the future, not only for the USSR, but for the whole planet, unless the capitalist mode of organization is destroyed, unless the working class puts an end to a system which is plunging head first into suicide.
The end of the class struggle?
But is the proletariat capable of carrying out this gigantic task? The lynchpin of the deafening ideological campaign around the events in the USSR is to reply "no!" to this crucial question. Pushing their ignominy a step further, the bourgeoisie's ideologues, who had already announced two years ago the "end of communism", are now finding new arguments to tell us, not only that the final goal of communism has collapsed in the USSR, but that marxism and the very idea of the class struggle are dead. And if they occasionally recognize a difference between stalinism and the October revolution, it is only to describe the latter as "utopian", and to conclude that "the class struggle, even with the finest ideals can only lead to the gulag". The media repeat endlessly: "class struggle has come to an end".
After the "Third World" and the Eastern bloc, the Western industrial powers - less affected until now - are in their turn plunging into an open recession, heralding new and violent attacks against the living conditions of the entire world proletariat. And the world bourgeoisie expects us take its dreams for reality: a definitively beaten and apathetic working class, workers ready to slaughter each other in wars to defend "their nation", and to sacrifice themselves to save the profits of "their company".
This propaganda is based on the limitations of the workers in the East, mired in "nationalist" ideology[23] and illusions in "capitalist democracy, the source of well-being and freedom", and on the low level of combativity, especially during the last two years, among the workers in the West.
But for the proletarians in the East, the opening of a class perspective depends essentially on their class brothers in the Western powers. As long as Western workers have not shown clearly, in struggle, their rejection of capitalism and the democratic lie, the workers in the ex-stalinist countries will keep their illusions in the possibilities offered by the creation of "new democratic nations". The precondition for the workers in the East to overcome their ideological limits is essentially the same as the condition that could have prevented the October revolution from dying of suffocation: the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in the central countries.
It is true that the Western, and especially European proletariat has suffered a retreat in its combativity, under both the weight of the new ideological campaigns and the confusion they have created, and the daily and ubiquitous repression of unemployment or the threat of unemployment. But it is neither defeated, nor apathetic, nor gangrened by nationalism and democratic illusions. The oldest proletariat in the world, because it has suffered at the forefront of two centuries of capitalist war, because it lives in the part of the world where the interdependence of the international economy is the most obvious, is the least subject to the mystifications of nationalism[24]. This is why, during the Gulf war, the governments of these countries did not take the risk of using conscripts, and used professional armies to conduct their massacres. The same is true for the democratic lie: after more than a century of experience, the general disgust for politicians, the high level of abstention at elections (unless the vote is... obligatory), the workers' rejection of the union machines, all demonstrate how worn out these mystifications are.
After reducing the proletariat of the "Third World" and the Eastern countries to misery, the Western bourgeoisie is now attacking the living conditions of this fraction of the world proletariat, more violently than at any time since the beginning of the 1980's. Even if conditions today, marked by the weight of ideological campaigns and the debilitating atmosphere of capitalist decomposition, make a proletarian mobilization more difficult at first, it is nonetheless inevitable as the bourgeoisie's attacks increase.
No, whatever the claims of bourgeois propaganda, the time has not come for an "end to class struggle", but on the contrary its intensification, and its development at a higher level. It is the struggle of the workers in the central countries which will open a perspective for the world proletariat, for it will sweep away the nationalist lies and the illusions in a "better capitalism". This alone will open the way to the decisive confrontations which will put an end to capitalism, not only in its stalinist form, but in all its forms.
RV, 20/09/1991
[1] Other immediate factors help to explain the putschists' decision: the violent acceleration of the economic crisis, especially since the beginning of 1991, and the fear of further destabilization as a result, especially during next winter; Gorbachev's improved relations with Yeltsin during recent months, which directly threatened the government positions conquered last winter by the "conservatives".
[2] Le Monde, 24/08/91
[3] International Herald Tribune, 23/08/91
[4] Liberation, 21/08/91
[5] The Russian workers know that today's anti-stalinist heroes are nothing but ex-stalinists, who owe their position today to their skill in navigating through the quagmire of the bureaucracy. They know that Yeltsin had no hesitation in flirting with the anti-Semitic Pamyat organization, that Shevardnadze used to be a three-star KGB general, and that Gorbachev's most powerful protector was Suslov, one-time favorite of Stalin.
[6] Nezavissimaia Gazeta, 22/08/91. An article in the same issue declared that "The putschists' biggest problem was probably the elite troops".
[7] Liberation, 27/08/91
[8] See International Review no 60, September 1989, "Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the Eastern countries"
[9] A year ago, Arkady Volski founded the "Scientific and Technical Union", designed to bring together the country's main industrial managers; today, it claims to represent 60% of Soviet industry. This association, a sort of bosses' and bankers' union, along with the Union of businessmen and proprietors, is a veritable spearhead for the adepts of the market. Its role has grown constantly, during and since the putsch. It comes as no surprise that Volski should be one of the co-founders, along with Edward Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev, of the "Movement for the union of the forces for democracy and reform".
[10] For an analysis of the nature of the October revolution and of stalinism, see our pamphlet Russia 1917, the start of the world revolution.
[11] Capital is possessed by the state, and managed by the bureaucracy. The nomenklatura's income is made up of surplus-value extorted from the workers. Profit is distributed, not in the form of dividends or private property, but in the form of "wages" and "perks".
[12] The persecution of the "old Bolsheviks", hunted down, deported, pushed to suicide, assassinated and shot down by stalinism; the monstrous Moscow trials of the 1930's, organized with the same methods as used by the Nazis and conscientiously broadcast by all the "democratic" media, putting on show the old Bolshevik leaders condemned to death after being forced to accuse themselves of the worst crimes: all this will remain forever one of the blackest and bloodiest pages of working-class history. When the GPU - the forerunner of the KGB - assassinated Trotsky in 1940, not one member of the 1917 Bolshevik central committee was left alive... except Stalin.
[13] See "The USSR in tatters" in the previous issue of the International Review.
[14] International Herald Tribune, 02/09/91.
[15] "Privatizing" the Soviet economy is altogether more difficult than in the other ex-Eastern bloc countries. Here, the whole of social life is oriented towards one goal: military power. What can it mean to "privatize" the only thing the economy is capable of producing: weapons, military and space research, millions of soldiers and their equipment, tanks, aircraft, warships, submarines, satellites, etc?
[16] The resulting chaos at the centre has been all the more dramatic in that the backbone of central power, the CPSU, has been outlawed. After five years of perestroika, the constitution had already become illegible, so much had it been modified and remodified following the twists and turns of the struggle for power amongst different fractions of the political apparatus. It is trodden under foot daily, both by the various republican governments declaring their independence, and by the central authorities completely incapable of following a coherent line. The day after the coup d'état, the central institutions plunged into the domain of the "temporary" without any idea whether they will ever emerge from it. And this is true both for the USSR as a whole, and for the republics, as they all try to establish some kind of rules in the midst of chaos.
[17] There are almost 25 million Russians living in the different republics of the USSR.
[18] The Dniestr controls almost 80% of Moldavia's gas and electricity supplies.
[19] International Herald Tribune, 6/9/91
[20] In theory, the USSR and Japan have been at war since 1945.
[21] See "Militarism and Decomposition" in the International Review no.64, October 1990.
[22] For an analysis of the war in Yugoslavia, see the ICC's different territorial publications (list on the back cover of this issue).
[23] There is a great difference at this level between the workers in the USSR's great industrial centers, who are less affected by the nationalist poison if only because they live in the empire's metropoles, and those in the USSR's peripheral republics or the countries of the ex-Eastern bloc, where "anti-Russian" feeling has been extensively used by the local ruling class to create a feeling of a "unity of national interest" between the exploited and their exploiters.
[24] This does not mean that it has been immunized for ever. The bourgeoisie takes every opportunity to try to infect it with the most abject "nationalism" against immigrant workers, or against the refugees flooding in from the East.
A few weeks before the events in the USSR, the ICC held its ninth International Congress. As the reader will see from the documents presented at this meeting which are published below, the break-up of the USSR, as well as the war in Yugoslavia, which are clear products of the dynamic opened up by the disappearance of the eastern imperialist bloc, did not surprise us and are an illustration of the orientations that we had drawn up at this Congress. They are in fact a confirmation of what we have been saying since the very beginning of the explosion of the eastern bloc, in the summer of 1989: throughout this period, our organization has shown itself capable of analyzing the main tendencies of the new historic situation that was opening up, in particular the perspective of chaos and of the disintegration of the eastern bloc and the USSR.
As the real general assembly of the ICC, the most important expression of its centralized and international character, a congress has to draw up a balance sheet of the work accomplished in the preceding period, and, on this basis, define the perspectives for future activity in line with the analysis of the international situation, particularly with regard to the worldwide balance of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Consequently, this Congress had the essential task of discussing the validity of our analyses (in particular the general analysis about the historic phase of decomposition that capitalism has entered) and of the positions we have taken up in response to the huge historic convulsions that we have been through since the end of 1989:
- the collapse of the Stalinist regimes
- the disappearance of the east-west imperialist configuration that came out of Yalta in 1945
- the Gulf war, which was a product of this situation, and which led to the destruction of Iraq and Kuwait
- the growth of chaos in a number of countries, and particularly in the countries of eastern Europe
- the reflux in the international class struggle.
The new situation: a historic break and a reflux in the class struggle
What balance sheet did the Congress draw about the analyses and positions developed by the ICC - all of them published in the press, and which we shall be referring to - in the face of the gigantic events we have been living through? As the resolution on activities that we adopted put it:
"The events of historic significance which have marked out the last two years have put the organization to the test, obliging it to re-examine the whole of its analyses and activity in the light of the conditions of the international situation ...
"The central criterion for evaluating the ICC's activity over the last two years is, necessarily, given the importance of events, its ability to understand and analyze the significance and implications of the latter."
What do these events signify? What do they imply? This is what the Congress had to return to and take a position on.
The historic phase of capitalist decomposition is at the root of the disappearance of the eastern bloc and the USSR
In the dramatic and catastrophic conditions of the open, irreversible crisis of capitalism, the bourgeoisie has been incapable of imposing on the world proletariat the only perspective that it could offer humanity: a devastating third world war. But at the same time, the proletariat has itself been unable to outline or present its own revolutionary perspective, the destruction of capitalist society. Given this lack of any historical perspective, capitalist society - whose economic crisis has not stopped - is in an impasse and is rotting on its feet like an overripe fruit. This is what we call the new historic phase of the decomposition of capitalism (see 'Decomposition, Final Phase of the Decadence of Capitalism', in International Review 62, third quarter, 1990).
This phase of decomposition, of historic impasse and blockage, is at the root of the collapse of the eastern bloc and the USSR and of the death of Stalinism, as we were able to see as early as October 1989:
"Already the eastern bloc is in a state of profound dislocation. For example, the invective traded between East Germany and Hungary, between 'reformist' and 'conservative' governments, is not just a sham. It reveals real splits which are building up between different national bourgeoisies. In this zone, the centrifugal tendencies are so strong that they go out of control as soon as they have the opportunity. And today, this is being fed by fears from within the parties led by the ‘conservatives' that the movement which started in the USSR, and grew in Poland and Hungary, should contaminate and destabilizes them.
"We find a similar phenomenon in the peripheral republics of the USSR. These regions are more or less colonies of Tsarist or even Stalinist Russia (eg the Baltic countries annexed under the 1939 Germano-Soviet pact). ... The nationalist movements which today are profiting from a loosening of central control by the Russian party are developing more than half a century late relative to the movements which hit the British and French empires; their dynamic is towards separation from Russia.
"In the end, if the central power in Moscow does not react, then we will see the explosion, not just of the Russian bloc, but of its dominant power. The Russian bourgeoisie, which today rules the world's second power, would find itself at the head of a second-rate power, a good deal weaker than Germany for example." ('Theses on the Economic and Political Crisis in the Eastern Countries', adopted in October 1989, IR 60, first quarter 1990).
The decomposition of capitalism further aggravates
imperialist antagonisms, wars and militarism
The effects of this historic phase, in this case the explosion of the eastern bloc and the USSR, in their turn accentuate and reinforce the decomposition of society. This phase is marked by the exacerbation of all the characteristics of decadent capitalism, in particular war, imperialism and militarism (as we showed in the text 'Militarism and Decomposition' in October 1990, IR 62), and state capitalism, all this in a context of growing chaos. This is what we wrote just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the world bourgeoisie was singing loudly about the virtues of capitalism and claiming that it could offer humanity an era of peace and prosperity...and announcing its victory over marxism:
"Does this disappearance of the eastern bloc mean that capitalism will no longer be subjected to imperialist confrontations? Such a hypothesis would be entirely foreign to marxism...In the period of capitalist decadence, all states are imperialist, and take the necessary measures to satisfy their appetites: war economy, arms production. etc. We must state clearly that the deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level. The difference, in the coming period, will be that these antagonisms which were previously contained and used by the two great imperialist blocs will now come to the fore. The disappearance of the Russian imperialist gendarme, and that to come of the American gendarme as far as its one-time 'partners' are concerned [Note: by this we meant the disappearance of the western bloc following the death of its eastern rival] opens the door to the unleashing of a whole series of more local rivalries. For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (even supposing that the proletariat were no longer capable of putting up a resistance). However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent and more violent, especially of course in those areas where the proletariat is weakest". ('After the Collapse of the Eastern bloc, Decomposition and Chaos', IR 61, second quarter 1990).
This is exactly what was to happen in the most bloody manner a few months later, with the war in the Gulf.
The collapse of the eastern bloc: a historic break in the world situation
The disappearance of the eastern imperialist bloc, the death agony of Stalinist state capitalism, the imperialist war in the Gulf, marks a clear break in the evolution of history. In particular for the class struggle of the world proletariat.
The end of the 1960s had opened up a period of slow, non-linear, but real development of workers' struggles throughout the world in response to the attacks resulting from the inexorable aggravation of the economic crisis: 1968-75 (France, Italy, Poland, etc); Poland 1980; the struggles of 1983-88 in Western Europe. This relative strength, this resistance by the world working class, by preventing the different national bourgeoisies from mobilizing the proletariat behind them, is at the origins of the historic blockage which has seen the phenomenon of decomposition become a determining factor in the life of capitalism. The collapse of the Stalinist regimes, which has to be understood in the framework of decomposition, was to lead to a profound reflux in the consciousness of the working class (see IR 60, 'New Difficulties for the Proletariat', and thesis 22 of the 'Theses on the Economic and Political Crisis in the Eastern Countries', already cited). It was still weighing on the working class when the Gulf war came in its turn to influence the balance of forces between the classes:
"Today, this development of consciousness continues to be hampered by the after-effects of the collapse of Stalinism and the eastern bloc. The discredit suffered, for over a year and a half, under the effect of a huge campaign of lies, by the very idea of socialism and the proletarian revolution, is still far from having been overcome ... Likewise the crisis and war in the Gulf, while they've had the merit of silencing all the prattle about 'eternal peace', have also engendered in the first instance a feeling of impotence and an indisputable paralysis in the broad mass of workers in the advanced countries," ('Resolution on the International Situation', adopted by the Congress and published in this IR).
And it's hardly necessary to point out that, since the Congress, the failure of the 'conservative' coup in the USSR in August, the death of the Stalinist CP in the USSR, the break-up of the USSR itself, have provided the world bourgeoisie with an opportunity to relaunch its campaign against the working class about the 'death of communism', using and abusing the greatest lie in all history, the identification between Stalinist state capitalism and communism. No doubt this campaign will prolong a little longer the negative effects that the nauseating putrefaction of Stalinism is having on the proletariat. The world proletariat will have paid very dearly indeed for the Stalinist counter-revolution, in its flesh and its mind.
The 9th Congress of the ICC declared itself in agreement with this analysis and with the various positions taken up in reponse to the events. It thus drew up a positive balance sheet of its activities at the level of the theoretical analysis of the international situation, and of the positions this analysis led it to take up.
Balance sheet of activities
This historic break, the events we have been through since the collapse of the eastern bloc, and the reflux in the class struggle, have demanded an adaptation of our general intervention. From this point of view as well, the Congress drew a positive balance sheet. In all our interventions we have been able to take up a militant position in response to the main questions posed by the present situation, in particular through: the uncovering of the new historic phase of decomposition and of the gravity of what's at stake; the explanation of the historic and particular causes of the collapse of the Stalinist regimes; the denunciation of the bourgeoisie's campaigns, in particular the identification between the Russian revolution and Stalinist barbarism, between communism and Stalinist state capitalism; the denunciation of the murderous and cynical barbarism of the bourgeoisie, of its system and of 'democracy' during the Gulf war, and so on.
At the same time, with the reflux in the struggle and the circumstances in which it took place, "the aspect of propaganda has been uppermost in our intervention, with the press as the main instrument for this ... The territorial publications were on the whole able to respond to the eruption of major events, by advancing the date of their appearance, and by bringing out supplements when necessary" (Resolution on Activities). The ICC, as a unified and centralized whole, distributed an international supplement to its publications at the time of the collapse of the eastern bloc, and two international leaflets in the 12 countries where it is present, and anywhere else it was able to intervene, denouncing the imperialist conflict in the Gulf both at the beginning and the end.
At the level of its organizational life, the ICC has been able to reinforce its international links and centralization, thereby following the orientations adopted at the previous International Congress. The mobilization of the organization, of all its militants, and the strengthening of the links between all its parts and territorial sections, were an essential means for the organization to face up to the demands of the present situation.
While the Congress drew a positive balance sheet of our activities, this didn't mean that we have not shown any weaknesses, notably through delays in the various territorial presses, in particular in our response to the collapse of the Stalinist regimes. These weaknesses were basically a result of the real difficulty there has been in grasping the full breadth of the historic break that has taken place; in putting into question the framework of analyses that corresponded to the period preceding the disappearance of the eastern bloc; in rapidly seeing and understanding the collapse of the bloc; in grasping the negative repercussions that the downfall of Stalinism would have for the working class; in recognizing the reflux in the class struggle.
Facing up to the dramatic acceleration of history
History is accelerating dramatically. There's no point in going back over all the events and over the most recent of them, which is taking place at the time of writing: the end of the USSR. You only have to read the papers and watch the TV. The decomposition of capitalist society is the cause of this acceleration. It affects the whole of society, all classes, including the proletariat. The characteristics of the phenomenon of decomposition are such that they exert on the working class and on revolutionary organizations - the ICC included - a particular weight of petty bourgeois ideology which undermines confidence and conviction in the historic strength of the proletariat and in the role of revolutionary political organizations.
The pressure of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology in full decay, and the resulting flight into the most reactionary illusions, such as nationalism, corporatism and even racism; the fact that huge numbers of workers are being thrown into unemployment, with no perspective of finding any other work, or, in the case of the young, of finding any work in the first place, with all the lumpenisation, marginalization and despair that follows (drug addiction, crime, prostitution...): these and many others are dangers that threaten the world proletariat more and more violently, more and more massively. They hinder the development of its consciousness, of its confidence in its revolutionary strength. This situation is developing in a terribly wide-scale manner in the countries of the former eastern bloc. The disorientation, blindness and despair hitting the broad mass of workers in these countries is particularly dramatic. And there's no doubt that the explosion of the USSR, the independence of the republics and the resulting nationalism - all the illusions in democracy and the 'prosperity' of the western countries - will further reinforce the disarray and impotence of the proletariat in this part of the world.
The same kinds of dangers weigh on communist militants and their political organizations. Doubts, skepticism, demoralization, lack of confidence in the working class, go hand in hand with the temptation to take flight into 'private life', into individualism, with the bitter and cynical denigration of any collective and organized militant activity, or the rejection of thought and theory.
Similarly at the collective level, at the level of the functioning of the revolutionary organisation, dilettantism, localism, attitudes of laxity and of 'every man for himself' are also dangers which are a much greater threat to the functioning of communist political organizations than they were in the past.
This pressure also operates at the theoretical-political level. The absence of historical perspective which results from this unprecedented situation of decomposition also manifests itself in a lack of rigorous thought, in a loss of method, in a tendency to mix up categories, in an immediatist, a-historical vision. For communist organizations, this pressure expresses itself in a growing tendency towards immediate and superficial approaches to events, a day-to-day, immediatist approach which fails to understand or even to try to see the unity of the historical process as a whole.
A lack of rigorous thinking, a lack of interest in theory - characteristics which affect the whole of capitalist society and which are in fact getting stronger all the time - manifest themselves through the pressure to give up reading theoretical and historical works, to ignore or forget the 'classics' of marxism and the history of the workers' movement and of capitalist society.
This pressure is also illustrated - we can see it in a number of revolutionary groups - by the tendency to call into question the theoretical and political acquisitions of the workers' movement, and even - whether openly or not - by the rejection of marxism.
It was for this reason that the 9th Congress called upon all parts of the organization, on all its militants, to strengthen the international centralization of the ICC, to be extremely vigilant about matters of organisation and militant life, but also to involve ourselves with all our strength in theoretical reflection and deepening and in the elaboration of our analyses. These are indispensable conditions for being able to make the most effective intervention in the working class.
Intervention in the coming period
In this situation of the growing pressure of decomposition on the proletariat and revolutionaries, of a terrible acceleration of history, the 9th Congress of the ICC drew out the perspectives for its general activities, in particular the perspectives for intervention towards the working class and the proletarian political milieu.
Obviously, the disappearance of the USSR and the disgusting campaign of the bourgeoisie against communism are going to prolong the effects of the reflux that the proletariat has suffered for over two years now. It will also reinforce the necessity for us to strengthen our denunciation of the lie that Stalinism is the same as communism. Since it corresponded to our framework of analysis, this event didn't surprise us and has confirmed the orientations for our intervention as defined by the 9th Congress:
"Our intervention must confront both the need to help the working class overcome the ever-present aftermath of the retreat in consciousness that followed the collapse of the eastern bloc, and the need to facilitate the decantation of consciousness brought about by the Gulf war, which can only be deepened by the fact that the threat of war is more and more present. This is why the main axis of our intervention is to contribute as much as possible to the deepening of consciousness, through the general denunciation of the bourgeoisie and its system, and by highlighting what are the stakes in the new historic situation, linked to the general perspective for the class struggle. Because of this, the question of war must remain a central axis of our intervention" (Resolution on Activities).
The working class is going to have to struggle in a situation dominated by the development of chaos, wars and economic crisis. And this is also the context in which we will have to develop our activity and our intervention:
"The general chaos which characterizes the final phase of capitalist decadence, the phase of decomposition, can only be marked by an unleashing of the dominant characteristic of the period of decadence: imperialist conflicts and militarism" (Resolution on the International Situation).
The imperialist wars that are going to break out, even if they don't take the form of a world war between two blocs - at least not for the moment - will be no less murderous. They will give rise to the most awful ravages, and, combined with the other effects of decomposition - pollution, famines, epidemics - they could very well lead to the destruction of humanity. Sharpened more and more by the blows of the economic crisis, imperialist antagonisms between the former allies of the ex-western bloc will spark off and fuel the numerous fires of war that will break out in the phase of decomposition.
This perspective of a multiplication of bloody imperialist conflicts, of a catastrophic development of the effects of decomposition - especially in the countries of Eastern Europe - cannot fail to have consequences for the working class. As we have said, the working class is going through a reflux in its consciousness and its combativity. But as a world class it is not defeated and the historic course still points towards decisive class confrontations. In particular, and this is a crucial point, the experienced and concentrated working class of western Europe has not been mobilized behind the banners of the bourgeoisie.
"In reality, if the disarray provoked by the events of the Gulf may resemble, on the surface, that resulting from the collapse of the eastern bloc, it obeys a different dynamic: while what came from the east (elimination of the remains of Stalinism, nationalist confrontations, immigration, etc) can only, and for a good while yet, have an essentially negative effect on the consciousness of the proletariat, the more and more permanent presence of war in the life of society is tending, by contrast, to reawaken this consciousness...
"The growing evidence of the irreversible bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production, including and above all its 'liberal' form, the irremediable militarism of this system, will constitute, for the central sectors of the proletariat, a powerful factor in the exhaustion of illusions coming from the events at the end of 1989," (ibid).
The barbarity of war and the multiplication of economic attacks will push the proletariat to return to the path of struggle, and to develop its awareness of the terrible historical stakes being played for. The aim of the 9th Congress was to prepare the ICC for this perspective.
Appeal to the proletarian political milieu
It is in this increasingly dramatic world historic situation that the 9th Congress addressed an 'Appeal to the proletarian political milieu' (published in this issue). Despite the important difficulties of the proletarian milieu, the ICC must participate and work towards the political clarification and unification of what constitutes the political avant-garde of the proletariat. Since its foundation, our organisation has always put this task at the heart of its preoccupations.
"The ICC, because of the importance of its place in this milieu, possesses a primary responsibility ... to use every occasion to help overcome the present situation of dispersion and sectarianism. The Gulf war, which gave rise to a clear internationalist position by revolutionary groups, but in a very dispersed way, and to a lesser extent the collapse of the eastern bloc, whose capitalist nature was affirmed by the groups, albeit in an insufficient and confused framework, provides such an occasion ...
"The 9th Congress of the ICC has decided to address the groups whose existence has a real historic basis, to the exclusion of parasitic groups, with an appeal putting forward the necessity:
- to take heed of the importance of the present historical stakes and the class positions shared by these groups
- to fight attitudes marked by sectarianism
- to work towards a development of contacts and open debate through the press ... through taking part in public and open meetings of groups in the milieu, and eventually through common interventions (leaflets for example) on particularly important occasions," (Resolution on the Proletarian Political Milieu).
The 9th Congress, a moment in the homogenization and strengthening of the ICC
We draw a positive balance sheet of this Congress. It was a moment in the homogenization and strengthening of the ICC. After the overturning of the capitalist order which emerged from the second world war, it has been necessary to 'digest' this historical rupture, to verify our analyses and regroup behind our perspectives, in order to be able to confront the intense period to come.
History continues to accelerate. Dramatic events follow each other at a breakneck pace. The immense majority of the world population lives in extreme misery under the deadly menace of wars, disease, famine and catastrophes of all kinds.
The world proletariat faces redoubled economic attacks in a growing atmosphere of decomposition and war. Even if today it is suffering from a reflux in its consciousness and also in its combativity, it is the only force capable of getting rid of the cesspool that capitalism in decay has become. Inevitably, under the blows of capital, it's going to have to engage in a fight to the death with the world bourgeoisie. The stakes of this gigantic confrontation? The destruction of capitalism, the creation of a communist society, the survival of humanity.
ICC, 1.9.91
9th Congress of the ICC
Imperialist war, crisis and the perspectives for the class struggle in the decomposition of capitalism
We are publishing below the Resolution on the International Situation adopted by the 9th Congress. This text is the synthesis of the two reports presented at this Congress - on the economic situation and the other aspects of the international situation. In order to make more precise and explicit certain points in the Resolution, we reproduce after it extracts from the second report. Owing to lack of space, the passages retained are not always in continuity and fall short of dealing with all the elements covered either by the report or in the discussions at the Congress. At the same time, these passages don't always concern the most important points in the international situation, which have already been amply discussed in other articles from the International Review. Rather we have given priority to the questions that the report deals with more explicitly than these articles.
Resolution on the international situation
The acceleration of history, already identified by the ICC at the beginning of the 1980s, has considerably accentuated since the last congress. Never, since the constitution of our organization, and even since the Second World War, have events of such historic importance unfolded - and in less than two years. In a few months the configuration of the world since the Second World War has been overthrown. In fact, the collapse of the imperialist bloc of the east, which closed the eighties, opens the door to an end-of-the- millennium dominated by an instability and chaos that humanity has never known before. It's up to revolutionaries, if they want to be at the level of their role as the avant-garde of the world proletariat, to fully understand the significance of the convulsions opening up, in order to draw out the resulting perspective for the whole of society and, in the first place, for the working class. In particular, it's up to them to show that the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Gulf War are the signs of the entry of the capitalist system into the final phase of its period of decadence: that of the general decomposition of society.
1) As shown in several other texts of the organization, the phase of decomposition:
- "constitutes the final point of convergence for all the fantastic convulsions which have shaken society and the different classes within it since the beginning of the century, in an infernal cycle of crisis-war-reconstruction-new crisis (...); it appears [to the extent that the contradictions and manifestations of the decadence of capitalism...haven't disappeared with time, but have continued and even deepened] as the result of the accumulation of all the characteristics of a moribund system, completing the 75-year death agony of a historically condemned mode of production. Concretely, not only do the imperialist nature of all states, the menace of the world war, the absorption of civil society by the state Moloch, and the permanent crisis of the capitalist economy all continue in the phase of decomposition, but they reach a synthesis and an ultimate conclusion within it."
- "is fundamentally determined by unforeseen and unprecedented historic conditions: the situation of momentary impasse of society, of 'blockage', as a result of the mutual 'neutralization' of its two fundamental classes which prevents either of them from making a decisive response to the open crisis of the capitalist economy...; the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to offer the least perspective for the whole of society and the incapacity of the proletariat to openly affirm itself at the present time." ('Decomposition, Final Phase of the Decadence of Capitalism', International Review 62)
This incapacity of the capitalist mode of production to offer the least perspective to society, outside of a day-to-day resistance to the inevitable advance of its economic convulsions, leads necessarily to the growing tendencies toward generalized chaos, toward a headlong flight of the different components of the social body to "each for himself".
Besides, this phase of decomposition didn't begin with its most spectacular manifestation: the collapse of Stalinism and the Eastern Bloc in the second half of l989. Throughout the eighties the phenomenon of the general decomposition of society bloomed and impregnated in a growing way all the aspects of social life.
2) An event as considerable and unforeseen as the collapse of a whole imperialist bloc outside of a world war or proletarian revolution, such as one saw in l989, cannot be explained fully without taking into consideration the entrance of decadent capitalism into a new phase of its existence: the phase of decomposition. However, the particularities of decomposition alone do not permit an understanding of such an event. The latter finds its origins in the existence of a phenomenon, Stalinism, which can only be analyzed within the general framework of the decadence of the capitalist mode of production and the history of this decadence throughout the 20th Century:
a) Stalinism constitutes a particular manifestation of the general tendency of state capitalism, which is precisely a characteristic of decadent capitalism.
b) However, contrary to the manifestations of this tendency in the majority of other countries (particularly the most advanced), it does not develop in a progressive and organic way within the bowels of capitalist society, but results from specific and 'accidental' circumstances (from the point of view of the bourgeoisie) but which could only be produced in decadence: the temporarily victorious proletarian revolution in a country where the counter revolution was taken in hand by the apparatus of the post-revolutionary state and not by the classical sectors of the dominant class.
c) This same 'accidental' character is found in the constitution of the bloc led by the state which saw the birth of Stalinism. In effect, it's the specific circumstances of the second World War (the most salient manifestation to this day of capitalist decadence) which allowed this backward state to establish its domination over a part of the world with the sole instrument of the same brute force which it utilized within its frontiers. It led to the formation of a particularly rickety imperialist bloc.
The aberrant characteristics of the Stalinist form of state capitalism (total centralization of the economy, absence of the market sanction, elimination of unprofitable enterprises, selection of personnel to manage the national capital on uniquely political criteria), linked to its historical origins, was compatible with the circumstances of world war. But, in revenge, they imposed radical limits on this type of regime with the prolongation of the open crisis of capitalism, when the latter didn't end up in a new generalized holocaust. With the aggravation of the commercial war between nations, these characteristics, in depriving the Stalinist economy of all competivity and of any motivation by its agents, could only end up in its implosion.
In this sense, the economic collapse of the USSR and its 'satellites', which is at the origin of the dislocation of the eastern bloc, finds its roots in the same historic conditions which permitted the entry of capitalism into its phase of decomposition: the prolongation of the open crisis to which neither of the two fundamental classes of society could affirm their own perspective. Thus, it confirms that the collapse of the eastern bloc, the most important historical fact since the worldwide resurgence of the class struggle at the end of the 60s, is a clear manifestation, beyond the particularities of this bloc and the USSR, of the entry of decadent capitalism into its final stage, that of its decomposition.
3) If there's a domain where the tendency to growing chaos is immediately confirmed, of which the break-up of the eastern bloc constitutes the first great manifestation on the world scene, it's that of imperialist antagonisms.
The end of the Russian bloc was presented by the western bourgeoisie as the dawn of a 'new world order' supposed to promote peace and prosperity. In less than a year, the Gulf War has dealt a resounding blow to this lie. It has shown the reality of a phenomenon which, as the ICC immediately brought to light, would necessarily flow from the disappearance of the eastern bloc: the dissolution of its imperialist rival, the western bloc.
This phenomenon was already behind the Iraqi 'hold-up' of Kuwait in August 90. It's because the world had ceased to be carved up by two imperialist constellations that a country like Iraq thought it possible to grab an ex-ally of the same bloc. This same phenomenon was revealed in a clear way during October 90, with the diverse attempts of European countries (notably France and Germany) and of Japan to torpedo American policy in the Gulf, through separate negotiations led in the name of the liberation of hostages. This American policy was to punish Iraq and was supposed to discourage all future attempts to imitate the behavior of this country (and it was to create the conditions for this example that the US did everything, before the 2 August, to provoke and encourage Iraq's adventure).
Washington's policy applies to the countries of the periphery where the level of convulsions are a powerful factor giving rise to this type of adventure. But it is far from limited to this objective. In reality, its fundamental aim was much more general: faced with a world more and more dominated by chaos and 'each for himself', it was a question of imposing a minimum of order and discipline, in the first place, on the most important countries of the western ex-bloc. It's for this reason that these countries (with the exception of Great Britain which chose long ago to make an unbreakable alliance with Uncle Sam) did more than simply drag their feet in aligning with the position of the US and the war effort.
If they needed American power as the world cop, they dreaded a too important show of its power, (inevitable during a direct armed intervention), which would put their own power in the shade. And indeed the military operations at the beginning of the year have clearly shown that only one superpower exists today - other countries can only dream of becoming effective military rivals of the US.
4) In fact, here is the essential key to the Gulf War and the whole world perspective. In a world where the total economic impasse of the capitalist mode of production can only fan the flames of military conflict between nations, the disappearance of the two blocs coming out of the Second World War has put on the agenda the tendency to the reconstitution of two new military blocs. The latter is the classical structure given to the principal states, in the period of decadence, to 'organize' their armed confrontations. Even before the Gulf War, it was clear that neither of the two possible pretenders to the leadership of an eventual new rival bloc to one which would be directed by the US - Japan and above all Germany - was for the moment capable of fulfilling such a role as a result of its extreme military weakness. But taking account of the economic power and dynamism of these countries, which already make them formidable commercial competitors for the United States, it is important for Washington to take the initiative faced with any evolution of international relations that could orientate toward such a redistribution of imperialist forces. That's why the Gulf War could not be reduced to a 'war for oil' or a 'North-South' war. Such a vision, (notably defended by the leftists who used it to justify their support for Iraqi imperialism) only lessens its importance and significance. In the same way all the manifestations of decadent capitalism (militarism, state capitalism, open crisis, etc), all the fundamental antagonisms which are ripping the world apart, find their origin at the heart of capitalism and necessarily set the most important powers on the world scene against each other.
From this point of view, the Gulf War, imposed by the United States on its allies, has delivered the intended results: it has given glaring proof of the immense gap between America and its potential rivals. Notably, it has brought out the total incapacity of the European countries to put forward a common, independent, external policy which in time could have politically prefigured a 'European bloc' led by Germany.
5) However, this immediate success of American policy is not a durable factor stabilizing the world situation to the extent that it could arrest the very causes of the chaos into which society is sinking. If the other powers have had to reign in their ambitions, their basic antagonism with the United States has not disappeared: that's what is shown by the latent hostility that countries like France and Germany express vis-a-vis the American projects for the re-utilization of the structures of NATO in the framework of a 'rapid reaction force' commanded, as if by chance, by the only reliable ally of the US: Great Britain.
Besides, in the Middle East itself, the consequences of the Gulf War (chaos in 'free' Kuwait, revolts of the Kurds and Shiites) have shown that the means employed by the US to impose its 'new world order' are factors in the aggravation of disorder. In this sense, capitalism has no perspective of moderating, still less eliminating, military confrontations. On the contrary, the general chaos which characterizes the final phase of capitalist decadence, that of decomposition, can only be marked by an unleashing of the dominant characteristic of the period of decadence: imperialist conflicts and militarism.
In this situation, contrary to the past, (and here is a major indicator of the qualitative step taken by capitalism in putrefaction) it will no longer be those powers with the smallest share of the imperialist booty which will play the role of 'firelighter', but the power which retains the dominant position, the United States. The preservation by the US of this position will necessarily lead it to increasingly watch out for, and take the initiative in, military confrontations, since it's on this terrain in particular where it can affirm its superiority. In this situation, and even if the conditions for the establishment of a new division of the world into two imperialist blocs - that is, the indispensable premise for military confrontations to end up in a third world war - never exist again, these confrontations, which can only amplify, risk provoking considerable devastation, including, in combination with other calamities specific to decomposition (pollution, famines, epidemics. etc), the destruction of humanity.
6) The end of the 'cold war' and the disappearance of the blocs has thus only exacerbated the unleashing of the imperialist antagonisms specific to decadent capitalism and aggravated in a qualitative new way the bloody chaos into which the whole of society is sinking. But, if it is necessary to underline the extreme gravity of the present situation on the world level, and not just in this or that part of the globe, it is also important to say that these antagonisms don't manifest themselves everywhere in an identical and immediate way. This can be seen in the way the new world configuration unfolded, and in particular in the demise of the eastern bloc and the western bloc. These were not two identical phenomena: in particular, there has not been a parallel process of weakening of each of the two imperialist blocs leading to their simultaneous disappearance. One of the blocs collapsed brutally under the pressure of the total economic bankruptcy of its dominant power while the leader of the other bloc still conserved the core of its capacities. It's the disappearance of the first which has provoked that of the second, not as the result of an internal collapse, but simply because it had lost its essential reason to exist. This difference allows a full comprehension of the present characteristics of imperialist conflicts: like Japan and Germany after the Second World War, the USSR can no longer play a leading role in the world imperialist arena. Henceforth, the fundamental antagonisms will be played out between the 'victors' of the 'cold war'. That's why it's up to the dominant power of the victorious camp to play, for itself, but also for the whole of capitalism, the role of 'world cop'
7) On the other hand, this difference in the process of the disappearance of the two blocs is also mirrored in their internal evolution. Globally, the states of the ex-western bloc are still capable of controlling the political and even economic situation inside their frontiers. But it's by no means the same for the states of the ex-eastern bloc or other Stalinist regimes. From now on, these countries will show in a caricatural way what the phase of decomposition brings - economic chaos will deepen the wounds of rotting capitalism at a stunning pace: massive unemployment provoking the lumpenisation of important sectors of the working class; explosion of drug abuse; criminality, corruption.
The economic and political chaos which is spreading through the countries of the east hits primarily the country that found itself at their head less than two years ago, the USSR. In fact, this country has practically ceased to exist as such since the organs of central power are more and more incapable of exercising control over less and less parts of its territory. The only perspective left for what was the second world power is that of an unrelieved dislocation. A dislocation which the reaction of 'conservative' forces, and particularly the security forces such as those which were mobilized in the Baltic countries and in the Transcaucases, can hold back only a little. In time an even more considerable chaos will be unleashed and with it' bloodbaths.
As for the ex-'people's democracies', while they won't degenerate to the same degree as the USSR, they too can only plunge toward growing chaos as revealed by the catastrophic figures of production (falling 40% in certain countries) and political instability which has manifested itself these last months in practically all the countries of the region (Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania) and particularly in Yugoslavia which is beginning to crack up.
8) The crisis of capitalism which, in the final analysis, is at the origin of all the convulsions of the world at the present time, is itself aggravated by these convulsions:
- the war in the Middle East, the resulting growth of military expenses, the necessary credits for the reconstruction of a part of the destruction (basically a country like Iraq will never overcome the enormous damage suffered during the war) can only affect the economic situation in a negative way (contrary to the Vietnam War which at the end of the l960s delayed the entry of the American and world economy into recession), to the extent that the war economy and generalized indebtedness, have already been primary factors in aggravating the crisis for some time;
- the dislocation of the Western bloc can only give a mortal blow to the coordination of economic policies at the level of the bloc, which in the past could slow the rhythm of the collapse of the capitalist economy. The perspective is a merciless commercial war, in which all countries will lose their feathers;
- the convulsions in the zone of the ex-eastern bloc will increasingly aggravate the world crisis by helping to amplify general chaos. In particular, it will force the western countries to devote important credits to limit this chaos (for example the sending of 'humanitarian aid' designed to delay massive emigration to the west).
9) That said, it's important that revolutionaries put forward what constitutes the ultimate factors aggravating the crisis:
- generalized overproduction specific to a mode of production which cannot create enough outlets to absorb all the commodities produced, and of which the new open recession, today hitting most of the advanced countries, along with the first world power, constitutes a flagrant illustration;
- the unbroken flight into external and internal debt, public and private, of this same power throughout the l980s, which, if it has allowed the momentary relaunching of production in a certain number of countries, has made the United States by far the biggest debtor in the world;
- the impossibility of pursuing this course eternally - buying without paying, selling against promises which more and more evidently will never be kept. It can only make the contradictions still more explosive, notably by a growing weakening of the international financial system.
Underlining this reality is all the more important in that it constitutes a primary factor in the coming to consciousness of the proletariat against the ideological campaigns which have been unleashed these last months, pretending to 'show' that only 'liberal' capitalism can offer prosperity to the population. The causes of economic difficulties are put down to the ambitions of the 'megalomanic and bloody dictator' Saddam Hussein. It is thus indispensable that revolutionaries clearly underline that the present recession, no more than those of l974-75 and l980-82, didn't result from political or military convulsions in the Middle East, but had begun before the Gulf Crisis and that it reveals the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.
10) More generally, it is important that revolutionaries bring out, from the present reality, the most essential elements favorable to the coming to consciousness of the proletariat.
Today, this coming to consciousness continues to be hindered by the repercussions of Stalinism's collapse and that of the eastern bloc. The set-back this process has suffered for a year and a half, particularly under the weight of a gigantic campaign of lies discrediting the very idea of socialism and proletarian revolution, is still far from having been overcome.
Besides, the threatened massive influx of immigrants from a chaotic eastern Europe can only create additional disarray in the working class from both sides of the 'iron curtain': among the workers imagining that they will be able to escape intolerable misery by fleeing to the western 'Eldorado' and among those who will think that this immigration risks depriving them of the meager 'benefits' which remain and who will therefore be more vulnerable to nationalist mystifications. Such a danger will be particularly strong in countries like Germany, which are on in the front line against a flood of immigrants.
However the growing evidence of the irreversible bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production, including and above all in its 'liberal' form, plus the irremediable militarism of this system, is going to constitute, for the central sectors of the proletariat, a powerful factor in the exhaustion of illusions coming from the events of the end of l989. In particular, the promise of a 'peaceful new world' made to us after the disappearance of the Russian bloc, has suffered a decisive blow in less than a year.
11) In fact, the militarist barbarism into which decomposing capitalism is more and more sinking is going to make its mark in a growing way on the development in the class of the consciousness of the stakes and perspectives of its combat. War is not in itself, and automatically, a factor of clarification of the consciousness of the proletariat. Thus, the Second World War ended with the reinforcement of the ideological grip of the counter-revolution. Likewise, the crisis and war in the Gulf, if they've had the merit of silencing all the prattle about 'eternal peace', have also engendered, in the first instance, a feeling of impotence and an indisputable paralysis in the great masses of workers in the advanced countries. But the present conditions of the development of the struggle of the working class mean such a disarray won't last:
- because the proletariat of today, contrary to that of the 30s and 40s, has emerged from the counter-revolution, and has not been mobilized, at least not in its decisive sectors, behind bourgeois banners (nationalism, defense of the 'socialist fatherland', democracy against fascism);
- because the working class of the central countries is not directly mobilized in the war, or gagged by military authority, it has more latitude to develop a profound reflection on the significance of the militarist barbarism which it has to support through redoubled austerity and poverty;
- because the considerable and more and more evident aggravation of the capitalist crisis, of which the workers will evidently be the principal victims and against which they will be constrained to develop their class combativity, will in a growing way develop the conditions that will allow them to make the link between the capitalist crisis and the war, between the fight against the latter and the struggles of resistance against economic attacks, strengthening their capacity to protect themselves against the traps of pacifism and inter-classist ideologies.
12) In reality, if the disarray provoked by the events in the Gulf may superficially resemble that resulting from the collapse of the eastern bloc, it obeys a different dynamic: while what came from the East (elimination of the remains of Stalinism, nationalist confrontations, immigration, etc) can only for a good while yet have an essentially negative impact on the consciousness of the proletariat, the more and more permanent presence of war in the life of the society is tending, by contrast, to reawaken this consciousness. Likewise, if the collapse of Stalinism has had only a limited impact on the combativity of the working class, already shown by a trend toward the revival of struggles in spring 90, the crisis and the war in the Gulf, through the feeling of impotence that it has created amongst the workers of the principal advanced countries (which were practically all implicated in the 'coalition') have provoked an important ebb of combativity - the longest since the winter of 89-90. However, this pause in the workers combativity, far from constituting in itself an obstacle on the road to the historic development of class combats, is above all a moment of decantation, of profound reflection in the whole of the proletariat.
It's for this reason that the apparatus of the left of the bourgeoisie has already for several months been attempting to launch movements of premature struggle in order to short-circuit this reflection and sow more confusion in the workers ranks
13) If despite a temporary disarray, the world proletariat still holds the keys to the future in its hands, it is important to underline that all its sectors are not at the same level in the capacity to open a perspective for humanity. In particular, the economic and political situation which developed in the countries of the ex-eastern bloc testifies to the extreme political weakness of the working class in this part of the world. Crushed by the most brutal and pernicious form of the counter-revolution, Stalinism; hammered by democratic and trade unionist illusions; ripped apart by nationalist confrontations and conflict between bourgeois cliques, the Russian proletariat, of the Ukraine, of the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, etc, find themselves confronted by the worst difficulties in developing their class consciousness. The struggles undertaken by workers of these countries, faced with unprecedented economic attacks, will collide, when they aren't directly derailed onto a bourgeois terrain such as nationalism (which was partly the case for the miners' strike in the USSR last spring), with developing social and political decomposition, stifling their capacity to germinate consciousness. This will continue as long as the proletariat of the great capitalist metropoles, and particularly those of Western Europe, is not up to putting forward, even in an embryonic way, a general perspective of struggle.
14) In reality, today's considerable difficulties of the workers in the eastern countries caused by rampant social decomposition in this part of the world, reveals the impact that the decomposition of capitalism exercises on the development of the struggle and consciousness of the world proletariat.
The confusion and a-classist illusions that a certain number of aspects of decomposition (such as ecological disasters, 'natural' catastrophes, rise of criminality, etc) provoke within it, through the attack on its self-confidence and its vision of the future through the atmosphere of despair which pervades society, through the obstacle to solidarity and the unification of struggles from the ideology of 'each for himself' which is omnipresent today, the growing decomposition of society, the 'rotting on its feet' of capitalism - all this is fundamentally a supplementary difficulty that confronts the proletariat on the road to its emancipation. But the fact that:
- the proletariat of the central countries of capitalism, which will be at the heart of the decisive battles with the bourgeoisie, will be less affected by the most extreme and brutal forms of decomposition than other sectors of the world proletariat;
- that the proletariat for the most part of the eighties developed its struggles and its consciousness when the effects of decomposition were already felt...
These two elements illustrate that the working class still holds the key to the future. And it's particularly true to the extent that the two major manifestations of the life of capitalism with which it will be confronted, the capitalist mode of production's economic crisis and the imperialist war (which are not typical manifestations of the phase of decomposition, but belong to capitalist decadence), will force it to develop its struggles on its class terrain, become conscious of the bankruptcy of this system and the necessity to overturn it.
15) The new level in the maturation of consciousness in the proletariat, which the present situation of capitalism determines, is for the moment only at its beginnings. In particular, the class must travel a difficult road in order to disengage itself from the sequels to the blow of the implosion of Stalinism and the use made of it by the bourgeoisie. Likewise, it's not in an immediate way that the whole of the proletariat will be up to drawing out from the growing military barbarism the historic perspective of its struggles.
In this process, revolutionaries will have a growing responsibility:
- to warn against all the dangers that decomposition represents, and particularly the unleashing of military barbarism which it brings;
- in the denunciation of all bourgeois maneuvers. One of the essential aspects of the latter will be to disguise or denature, the fundamental link between the struggle against the economic attacks and the more general combat against the greater and greater presence of imperialist war in the life of society;
- in the struggle against the campaigns to sap the self-confidence of the proletariat in itself and in its future;
- in putting forward, against all the pacifist or inter-classist mystifications, and more generally, against the whole ideology of the bourgeoisie, the only perspective which can oppose the aggravation of war: the development and generalization of class combat against capitalism as a whole in order to overthrow it and replace it with a communist society.
ICC
Marx said that the truth of a theory is demonstrated in practice. For the proletariat, 70 years of bitter experience have clearly resolved the debate on the national question in favour of the position developed by Rosa Luxemburg and then by the groups of the Communist Left, especially Bilan, Internationalisme and our Current. In the first part of this article we saw how support for "national liberation of the people" played a crucial role in the defeat of the first international proletarian revolutionary wave between 1917 and 1923 (see International Review no 66 [81]). In this second part we will see that the "national liberation" struggles have been an instrument of the imperialist wars and confrontations that have wracked the planet for the last 70 years.
The First World War marked the end of the ascendant period of capitalism and its plunge into the cesspit of the struggle between nation states for the division of the saturated world market. In this context the formation of new national states and the national liberation struggles were no longer an instrument for the expansion of capitalist relations and the development of the productive forces. Instead, they were converted into a cog in the generalised imperialist tensions between the different capitalist bandits. Already before the First World War, with the Balkan wars which gave Serbia, Montenegro, Albania etc their independence, Rosa Luxemburg had argued that these new nations were as imperialist as the old powers and were clearly insinuated into the bloody spiral towards generalised war:
"... Serbia is formally engaged in a national war of defence. But its monarchy and its ruling classes are filled with expansionist desires as are the ruling classes in all the modern states... Thus Serbia is today reaching out towards the Adriatic coast where it is fighting out a real imperialistic conflict with Italy on the backs of the Albanians... But above all this we must not forget: behind Serbian nationalism stands Russian imperialism" (The Junius Pamphlet, Chapter VII).
The world which emerged from the First World War was marked by the development of the revolutionary proletariat and this implied two counter posed historical perspectives: the extension of the world revolution or the survival of a decadent capitalism trapped in a spiral of crisis and wars. The crushing of the international proletariat's revolutionary wave signalled the frenzied sharpening of the tensions between the victorious bloc (Great Britain and France) and its powerful neighbour (Germany), aggravated by the expansion of the United States that threatened them all.
In this historical/world context 'national liberation' can not be seen from the point of view of the situation of just one country: "From the point of view of Marxism, in discussing imperialism it is absurd to restrict oneself to conditions in one country alone, since all capitalist countries are closely bound together. Now, in time of war, this bond has grown immeasurably stronger. All humanity is thrown into a tangled bloody heap from which no nation can extricate itself on its own. Though there are more or less advanced countries, this war has bound them all together by so many threads that escape from this tangle for any single country acting on its own is inconceivable," (Lenin, 'Intervention on the Report on the Present Situation, at the 7th (April) Conference of the RSDLP(B), Collected Works, Vol. 2, page 73).
Using this method we can understand how 'national liberation' has been turned into the saviour of the imperialist policy of all states: the direct victors of the First World War, Great Britain and France, used it to justify their dismemberment of the defeated empires (the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and Czarist) and to build a cordon sanitaire around the October Revolution. The United States elevated it to a universal doctrine, the 'principal' of the Society of Nations, in order, on the one hand, to combat the Russian Revolution, and on the other, to undermine the colonial empires of Great Britain and France which constituted the main obstacle to their own imperialist expansion. From the early 1920s, faced with the Treaty of Versailles, Germany used its 'national liberation' as the banner for the recovery of its imperialist potential. The 'just' and 'progressive' principle of the 'national liberation of Germany’, which was defended in 1923 by the KPD and the Communist International after the Second Congress, was transformed by the Nazi Party into the 'Germany's right to living space'. For its part, Mussolini's Italy considered itself a 'proletarian nation' (a concept taken up later by the 'Marxist-Leninist' Mao-Tse-Tung) and demanded its 'natural rights' in Africa, the Balkans, etc.
During the first years of the 1920's the victorious powers tried to implement a 'new world order' to serve their own interests. Its principle tool was the Treaty of Versailles (1919) officially based on 'democratic peace' and the 'right of self-determination', which granted independence to all the countries in Eastern and Central Europe: Finland, the Baltic countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland...
The independence of these countries served two objectives of British and French imperialism: on the one side, as we analysed in the 1st part of this series, to confront the Russian Revolution and, on the other, to create around defeated German imperialism a chain of hostile nations that would block its expansion into a zone which, for strategic, economic and historical reasons, constituted its natural area of influence.
The most devious machiavellianism could not have conceived of more unstable states, racked from the beginning by violent internal and external conflicts, obliged to submit to the tutelage of the great powers and to serve in their war games. Czechoslovakia contained two historical rivals, Czechs and Slovaks, and an important German minority in the Sudetenland; the Baltic states encompassed important Polish, Russian and German minorities; Romania housed Hungarians, Bulgaria had Turks; Poland the Germans... But the culmination of this work, without doubt, was Yugoslavia (today again rocked by a terrible bloodbath). This 'new' nation contained 6 nationalities with the most absurdly different levels of economic development one could imagine (from the economically developed Slovenia and Croatia to the semi-feudal Montenegro), whose areas of economic integration lay on the borders of neighbouring countries (Slovenia was complementary with Austria; Voivodina - part of Serbia - is a natural extension of the Hungarian plain; Macedonia is separated from the rest by mountains which connect it with Bulgaria and Greece), and it also contained Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims who are longstanding religious rivals! Even worse, each of these 'nationalities' contains minorities of a neighbouring nationality and more ludicrous still, of neighbouring states - Serbia has Albanians and Hungarians; Croatia is home to Italians and Serbs; Bosnia-Herzegovina has Serbs, Muslims and Croats.
"The recently created small bourgeois states are merely the by-products of imperialism. A whole series of little nations have been created to give temporary support to imperialism - Austria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bohemia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, etc. Whether openly oppressed or officially protected, in reality they remain vassals. By dominating them by means of the banks, the railways, the monopoly of coal, imperialism condemns them to suffer from intolerable economic and national difficulties, interminable quarrels and bloody conflicts" (Second Congress of the Communist International: 'The Capitalist World and the Communist International, Part 1, International Relations since Versailles’).
From the start, these new nations behaved in a clearly imperialist way, as the CI pointed out: "These artificially created small states, divided, exhausted from the economic point of view, within the limits to which they have been prescribed, struggle amongst themselves in order to gain ports, provinces, small cities, anything. They look for protection from the stronger powers, whose antagonisms grow daily" (ibid). Poland manifested its ambitions over the Ukraine provoking the war against the proletarian bastion in 1920. It also exerted pressure on Lithuania by appealing to the Polish minority in that country. In order to counter-act Germany, it allied itself with France faithfully serving its imperialist designs.
'Liberated' Poland fell under the iron dictatorship of Pilsudski. This tendency to annul the formalities of 'parliamentary democracy' which also took place in other countries (with the exception of Finland and Czechoslovakia) give the lie to the illusion - upon which the degenerating CI fed - that ‘national liberation' would lead to 'more open democracy'. On the contrary, in the milieu of world imperialism, the newly 'liberated' states' own imperialist tendencies, the chronic economic crisis and their congenital instability lead them to express in an extreme and caricatured way - through military dictatorship - the general tendency of decadent capitalism towards state capitalism.
The 1930's saw imperialist tensions reach fever pitch, demonstrating that the Treaty of Versailles was not an instrument for 'democratic peace' but the kindling for new and more terrible imperialist fires. A rebuilt German imperialism undertook the struggle against the 'order of Versailles', aimed at the re-conquest of Central and Eastern Europe. Its main ideological weapon was 'national liberation': it invoked 'the rights of national minorities' in order to work with the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia; it fostered Croatian 'national liberation' in order to counter Serbian hostility and to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean; in Austria its argument was 'union with Germany', while it offered the Baltic states protection against Russia...
The 'order of Versailles' collapsed. The claim that the new states could be a guarantee of 'peace and stability' - which the Kautskyists and Social Democrats had used to support the 'peace of Versailles' - was totally destroyed. Increasingly sucked towards the imperialist whirlwind, these states had no other option than to plunge right into it, thus contributing to its amplification and aggravation.
Along with Eastern and Central Europe, China was another hot spot of international imperialist tensions. In 1911 the Chinese bourgeoisie attempted a late and weak democratic revolution, which rapidly became a fiasco. The collapse of the imperial state lead to the general disintegration of the country into a thousand gangster territories dominated by warlords fighting amongst themselves, while at the same being manipulated by Great Britain, Japan, the USA and Russia in a bloody battle for the strategic domination of the Chinese subcontinent.
For Japanese imperialism, China was crucial for its domination of the Far East. With this aim it 'disinterestedly' supported the cause of independence for Manchuria, one of the most industrialised areas of China and the nerve centre for controlling Siberia, Mongolia and all of central China. Between 1924-28 they used the services of Chang-Tso-Ling, an old gangster who they converted into a Major-General and then into the Viceroy of Manchuria. In 1931 the Japanese bourgeoisie dispensed with him (by assassination), and used this as a pretext for their invasion and occupation of the whole of Manchuria, which they then converted into a sovereign state and elevated to an 'empire' placing Pou-Yi, the last decadent remnant of the Manchu dynasty, at its head.
This Japanese expansion clashed with Stalinist Russia that had a natural field of expansion in China. To satisfy the interests of Russian imperialism, Stalin openly betrayed the Chinese proletariat. This demonstrated unequivocally the irreconcilable antagonism between 'national liberation' and the proletarian revolution and, vice versa, the complete solidarity between 'national liberation' and imperialism. "In China where a proletarian revolutionary struggle developed, the Russian Stalinists looked for an alliance with the Kuomintang of Chiang-Kai-Chek, ordering the young Communist Party of China to renounce its organisational autonomy, forcing it to adhere to the Kuomintang, and inventing for the occasion the 'front of 4 classes'... However, the desperate economic situation pushed millions of workers, lead by the workers of Shanghai, to insurrection; they took over the city against both the imperialists and the Kuomintang. The insurrectionary workers, organised by the rank and file of the Chinese CP, decided to confront Chaing-Kai-Chek's liberation army, which was supported by Stalin. The latter then ordered the cadres of the International to carry out the disgraceful task of placing the workers, once again, under the orders of Chaing-Kai-Chek. This was to have terrible consequences" (Internacionalismo no 1: 'Democratic Peace, Armed Struggle and Marxism', 1964).
This crossfire of imperialist interests, fired also by British and Yankee imperialism also fanned, provoked a war that inflicted 30 years of death and destruction on the workers and peasants of China.
Italian imperialism's invasion of Ethiopia, along with its occupation of Libya and Somalia, not only threatened British imperialism's position in Egypt but also its imperialist domination of the Mediterranean and Africa, and its communications with India.
The Ethiopian war, along with the Spanish Civil War [1] [82], thus marked a decisive step in the build-up to World War II. An important aspect of this massacre was the enormous propaganda effort and ideological mobilisation of the population, which was carried out by both sets of bandits and especially by the 'democracies' (France and Great Britain). Their interest in the 'independence' of Ethiopia was wrapped in the banner of 'national liberation', while Italian imperialism invoked its 'humanitarian' and 'liberating' mission in order to justify its invasion: the Negus had not fulfilled his promise to abolish slavery.
The Ethiopian war revealed 'national liberation' as the ideological recruiting sergeant for imperialist war, as a preparation for the orgy of nationalism and chauvinism which both imperialist gangs were to unleash, a means of mobilisation for the terrible slaughter of World War II. It was a trick that Rosa Luxemburg had already denounced: "Today the nation is but a cloak that covers imperialist desires, a battle cry for imperialist rivalries, the last ideological measure with which the masses can be persuaded to play the role of cannon fodder in imperialist wars" (The Junius Pamphlet Chapter VII).
The Allied imperialists' victory in World War II marked a qualitative aggravation of decadent capitalism's tendencies towards militarism and the permanent war economy. The victorious bloc divided into two rival imperialist blocs - headed by the United States and the USSR - which rigidly controlled their spheres of influence through a network of military alliances - NATO and the Warsaw Pact - and ensured submission through a forest of organisations for 'economic cooperation', monetary regulation etc. All of which was backed up by the development of mind-boggling nuclear arsenals, which by the beginning of the 1960s could destroy the whole world.
In such conditions it is a macabre joke of talk of 'national liberation'. "Concretely, national liberation is impossible and unrealisable in the present framework of capitalism. The great blocs command the whole of capitalist life and no country escapes from one imperialist bloc without falling under the domination of the other... Of course, the national liberation movements are not merely pawns that Truman or Stalin move about as they please. Nonetheless, the end result is the same. If Ho-Chi-Minh, an expression of Vietnam's wretchedness, wants to consolidate his own wretched power, then while his own men fight with the bitterness born of desperation, he will be at the mercy of imperialist competition and will have to resign himself to joining with one or the other (...)" (Internationalisme no 21, page 25, May 1947, 'The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination').
In this historical period regional wars, systematically presented as "national liberation movements" were nothing but different episodes in the bloody confrontations between the two blocs.
The wave of 'independence for nations' in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, which swept the world between 1945-60 was in fact part of the larger struggle by American imperialism to dislodge the old colonial imperialisms from their positions, especially its most direct rival given the economic riches and strategic position of its colonies and naval power: British imperialism.
At the same time, the old colonial empires had turned into fetters for their metropoles: the saturation of the market and the development of world-wide competition, along with the increasing cost of colonial armies and administration, had transformed these fountains of profit into millstones around their necks.
Certainly, the local bourgeoisies wanted to wrest power from their former masters. They tended to organise in guerrilla movements or in parties of 'civil disobedience' - demanding of course the submission of the local proletariat to the struggle for 'national liberation' - and thus played an active role in the decolonisation process. However, this role was essentially secondary and always subordinated to the designs of the American or Russian bloc. The latter made good use of these conflicts of 'decolonisation' in order to conquer strategic positions outside its Euro-Asisatic zone of influence.
The decolonisation of the British empire clearly illustrates this process: "The British withdrawals from India and Palestine were the most spectacular moments in the break-up of the Empire, and the Suez Fiasco in 1956 marked the end of any illusions that Britain was still a 'first class power'” ('The Evolution of the British Situation Since the Second World War,' International Review 17).
The newly 'decolonised' countries were born in an even worse state than the 1919 Versailles vintage. Their frontiers were artificially drawn with set rule and square; ethnic, tribal, and religious divisions abounded; economies were dependent on just one crop or mineral; the bourgeoisie was weak or nonexistent; technical and administrative elites were ill-prepared and dependent on the old colonial powers...
India is an example of this catastrophic situation: in 1947 the newly born state suffered an apocalyptical war between Muslims and Hindus, which resulted in the secession of Pakistan, with the vast majority of the Muslim population. Ever since, these two states have been involved in devastating wars and today the imperialist tensions between them are a major source of world instability. Both states - whose populations suffer some of the worst living conditions in the world - maintain, regardless of cost, nuclear installations that allow them to produce atomic bombs. In this context of permanent imperialist confrontation, India in 1971 supported the war of 'national liberation' by the eastern 'part' of Pakistan - Bangladesh. This region itself was another absurd creation of imperialism, since it was more than 2000 kilometres from West Pakistan! However the war, which cost hundreds of thousands of lives, lead to the creation of an 'independent' state which has in its turn known nothing but coups, massacres, dictatorships, while the population has died from hunger or through devastating floods.
For 50 years, the Middle East has been a focus of imperialist tensions due to its enormous oil reserves and its vital strategic position. In the hands of the moribund Ottoman Empire before the 1914 war it was prey to the expansionist ambitions of Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain. After the World War, British imperialism took the largest part of the cake and left only crumbs for the French (Syria and Lebanon).
If in this period the local bourgeoisies began to push towards independence, it was the manoeuvres of British imperialism that determined the configuration of the region. Far from calming already existing rivalries these machinations lead to their explosion on a much vaster scale: "British imperialism, as we know, drew the Arab landowners and bourgeoisie onto its side during the World War by promising then an Arab national state. The Arab revolt was indeed a decisive element in the downfall of the Turkish-German front in the Near East" (Bilan 32, 'The Arab-Jewish Conflict in Palestine', June/July 1936). As a 'reward' Great Britain created a series of 'sovereign' states in Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Arabia, Yemen... confronting each other, with economically incoherent territories, undermined by ethnic and religious divisions: a well-known and typical manipulation by British imperialism which kept them all divided and constantly at loggerheads to subject the whole region to its designs. However it did not stop there: "As a counter-weight it solicited the support of the Jewish Zionists, telling them that Palestine would be given over to them both for administration and colonisation" (ibid).
If in the Middle Ages the Jews were expelled from many countries, during the 19th century they were in the process of integration, as much at the 'upper' levels of society - in the bourgeoisie - as at the 'lower' levels - the proletariat - into the nations in which they lived. This reveals the dynamic of integration and overcoming of racial and religious differences that took place in the capitalist nations during their period of progress. It was only at the end of the century, that is to say with the growing exhaustion of capitalism's dynamic of expansion, that sectors of the Jewish bourgeoisie launched the ideology of Zionism (the creation of a state in the 'promised land'). Its creation in 1948 not only constituted a manoeuvre by American imperialism to dislodge Britain from this zone and to stop Russia's meddling tendencies there, it also revealed - in connection with that imperialist objective - the reactionary character of the formation of new nations: it was not a manifestation of a dynamic of integration of populations as in the last century but of the separation and isolation of an ethnic group in order to use them as a lever to exclude another group - the Arabs.
The Israeli state from the beginning has been an immense barracks for permanent war which uses the colonisation of the desert lands as a military tool: the colonists are under military command, and receive military training; the state of Israel is a ruinous economic enterprise supported by enormous credits from the USA and based on a draconian exploitation of the workers, the Jews as much as the Palestinians [2] [83].
American support for Israel led the most unstable Arab states with major internal and external contradictions to ally themselves with Russian imperialism. Their ideological banner from the beginning was the 'Arab cause' and the 'national liberation of the Palestinian people’, which was converted into a favourite theme for the propaganda of the Russian bloc.
As in many other cases the Palestinians themselves were of the least importance. They were housed in wretched refugee camps in Egypt, Syria etc and were used as cheap labour in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, just as they were in Israel. The PLO was created in 1963 as a 'national liberation' movement; from its beginnings it has been a bunch of gangsters who have exacted a tribute from the miserable wages of the Palestinian workers in Israel, Lebanon and elsewhere. The PLO is a mere labour broker that controls the Palestinian work force and extorts up to half its pay. Its methods of discipline in the refugee camps and in the Palestinian communities are no better than those of the Israeli army and police.
Finally we must remember that the worst massacres of the Palestinians have been perpetrated by their 'brother' Arab governments: in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and, above all, in Jordan, where their 'friend' Hussein in September 1970 brutally bombed the Palestinian camps causing thousands of deaths.
It is important to underline in this respect the systematic utilisation by imperialism, as much by the great powers as the small ones, of the religious and ethnic divisions which are especially important in the most underdeveloped regions of the world: "That the Jewish and Palestinian populations are pawns in the international imperialist intrigues, is beyond doubt. That in order to carry out this work, these manipulators stir up and exploit the anachronistic and backward national prejudices and sentiments, which are so strong in the masses due to the persecutions to which they have been subjected, is no surprise to us. As can be seen in one of these local flare ups: the war in Palestine, where in an increasingly bloody frenzy, Jews and Arabs have slaughtered each other" ('On Particular Cases', Internationalisme 35, June 1948, page 18). Imperialism has played the sorcerer's apprentice with these conflicts: stimulating them, radicalising them and making them insoluble, because essentially the historical crisis of the system offers no terrain for absorbing them and in extreme cases they have finished up aggravating and making even worse the chaos and contradictions of the imperialist tensions, because they have taken on a 'life of their own'.
The wars in the Middle East have not had as their aim either 'Palestinian rights' or the 'national liberation' of the Arab people. The 1948 war served to dislodge British imperialism from the region. That of 1956 marked the reinforcement of American control. While those of 1967, 1973 and 1982 represented the American imperialism's counter-offensive against the growing penetration of Russian imperialism, which had made more or less stable alliances with Syria, Egypt and Iraq.
In all of this, the Arab states came off the worst, while the Jewish state was militarily strengthened. However the real victor was the United States.
At stake in this open war between the Russian and American imperialist blocs was America's ability to halt Russian expansion in the Far East. In the event, the American camp was successful.
The Russian gang presented its enterprise as a 'national liberation movement': "The Stalinist propaganda has especially insisted that its 'democrats' are supposed to be struggling for national emancipation and within the framework of the right of peoples to self-determination. Their arguments are lent indisputable weight by the extraordinary corruption which reigns inside the ruling clique in South Korea, its 'Japanese' methods of policing, its feudal inability to resolve the agrarian question. They even go so far as to present Kim Il Sung as the 'new Garibaldi'” (Internationalisme no 45, page 23: 'The Korean War').
Another element that marks the Korean War is the formation, as a direct result of inter-imperialist confrontation, of two national states on the same national territory: North and South Korea. This was also the case with East and West Germany, North and South Vietnam. From the point of view of the historical development of capitalism, this is a complete aberration that highlights the bloody and ruinous farce that is 'national liberation'. The existence of these states was directly linked not to a real 'nation' but to a real imperialist struggle between the blocs. These 'nations' were sustained as such, in a majority of cases, by means of brutal repression while their self-defeating and artificial character has been made clear by the spectacular collapse - within the general framework of the historic collapse of Stalinism - of the East German state.
The 'national liberation' struggle in Vietnam, which began in the 1920's, always fell into the orbit of one imperialist gang or the other. During World War 2 the Americans and British armed Ho-Chi-Minh and his Vietcong because he fought Japanese imperialism. After the Second World War, the Americans and British supported France - a Colonial power in Indo-China - given the pro-Russian inclination of the Vietnamese leaders. However, in 1946 both sides came to a 'compromise': confronted with a series of workers revolts which exploded in Hanoi, and in order to smash them, "The Vietnamese bourgeoisie still needs French troops to keep its affairs in order" (Internationalisme 13, 'The National and Colonial Question', September 1946).
However, from 1952-53, after its defeat in the Korean War, Russian imperialism turned towards Vietnam and for 20 years, the Vietcong confronted first the French and then the United States in a savage war where both sides committed the most appalling atrocities. The result was a devastated country which today, 16 years after its 'liberation', has not only been unable to rebuild but is increasingly sinking into catastrophe. The degeneracy and absurdity of this war is made clear when we see that Vietnam was made 'free' and 'united' because the United States had gained for its imperialist bloc the enormous prize constituted by Stalinist China and consequently, the Vietnamese pigmy became secondary in its plans.
It is important to underline the practice of the 'new anti-imperialist Vietnam', including before 1975, as a potential regional imperialist power in the whole of Indo-China: it submitted Laos and Cambodia to its influence. In Cambodia, under the pretext of 'liberating' the country from the barbarity of the Khmer-Rouge - which through its link to Peking was already tied to the American bloc - it invaded the country and installed a regime based on the occupying army.
The Vietnam War, especially in the 1960s, stirred up a formidable campaign by the Stalinists, Trotskyists, along with the old campaigners of the 'liberal' fractions of the bourgeoisie. This campaign presented this barbarity as the spear-head which would awaken the proletariat of the industrialised countries. In this grotesque way the Trotskyists tried to resuscitate the errors of the CI on the national and colonial question about the "unity between the workers' struggles in the metropolis and the struggle for national emancipation in the Third World" (for a critique of this idea see the first part of this series).
One of the arguments used to support this mystification was that the growing number of demonstrations against the Vietnam War in the US and Europe were a factor in the historical awakening of the workers’ struggle from 1968. In reality the defence of 'national liberation' struggles, along with the defence of the 'socialist countries', which was so fashionable in the student milieu, played on the contrary a role of mystification and thus constituted a barrier of the first order against the recovery of the proletarian struggle.
During the 1960's, Cuba was a major link in all the 'anti-imperialist' propaganda. A poster of the "heroic guerrilla" Che Guevara was an obligatory decoration for the room of any politically-minded student. Today, Cuba's disastrous economic situation (mass emigration, shortages of everything, even bread) perfectly illustrate the complete impossibility of any kind of 'national liberation'. At first, the bearded gangsters of the Sierra Maestra had no particular sympathy for Russia. Their desire to conduct a policy that would be ‘autonomous’ with regard to the United States inevitably pushed them into the arms of Russia capital.
In reality Fidel Castro headed a nationalist fraction that adopted ‘scientific socialism’, liquidating many of is former 'comrades' - who finished up in the Miami gang, i.e., the American bloc - because his only way of surviving was in the Russian bloc. This 'help' was amply paid for, amongst other things, by making the Cuban army the imperialist sergeant in Ethiopia - in support of the pro-Russian regime - in South Yemen and above all, in Angola, where Cuba sent 60,000 soldiers. This sub-imperialist role of providing cannon fodder for the wars in Africa has cost the lives of many Cuban workers - to which we must add the Africans who died for their 'liberation' - and which has contributed as much as to the atrocious misery to which the proletariat and Cuban population has been subject, as the actions of the American bloc.
After up-rooting the Russians from their positions in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, the American bloc continued its offensive to completely encircle the USSR. The war in Afghanistan has to be understood in this context. When the Soviets rolled into Afghanistan in 1979, the USA responded by forming a coalition of 7 Afghan guerrilla groups whom it armed with the most sophisticated weapons. This trapped the Russian troops in a dead end, which fed the enormous discontent that already existed in throughout the USSR and which was to contribute - within the global framework of the decomposition of capitalism and the historic collapse of Stalinism - to the spectacular collapse of the Russian bloc in 1989.
Arising out of this important strengthening of the American bloc, it was able to tear away from the Russians the mantle of defenders of 'national liberation’, which for 30 years Russia had monopolised.
As we have shown throughout this article, all the different imperialisms have been able to use 'national liberation' as a tool: the fascist gang employed it in every imaginable concoction and so has 'democracy'. However, from the 1950's, Stalinism tried to present itself as the 'progressive' and 'anti-imperialist' bloc, covering its criminal plans with ideological clothes which represented the 'socialist countries' not as 'imperialists' but on the contrary as 'militant anti-imperialists' and reaching the height of delirium, when it presented 'national liberation' as a direct step towards 'socialism'. This was a fraud which, despite its errors, the Thesis on the National and Colonial Question denounced: "A determined fight is necessary against the attempt to put a communist cloak around revolutionary liberation movements that are not really communist in the backward countries" (Theses on the National and Colonial Question, point 11, 2nd Congress of the CI, March 1920).
This entire strategy came undone in the 1980's. Along with the principal factor - the development of the workers' struggles and consciousness - the interminable twists and turns dictated by the imperialist necessities of Russia caused its decline: let us recall, amongst many others, the case of Ethiopia. Until 1974, when the Negus' regime was in the Western gang, Russia supported the National Liberation Front of Eritrea - converting it into a champion of 'socialism'. However with the fall of the Negus, replaced by nationalist officers orientated towards Russia, things changed: now Ethiopia was converted into a 'Marxist-Leninist socialist' regime and the Eritrean Front overnight was transformed into an 'agent of imperialism' when it allied itself to the American bloc.
The events of 1989, the thunderous fall of the Eastern bloc and the disintegration of the Stalinist regimes, has lead to the disappearance of the previous configuration of world imperialism, characterised by the division into two great enemy blocs and, therefore to an explosion of nationalist conflicts.
The Marxist analysis of this new situation - which is set in the understanding of the process of the decomposition of capitalism (see International Review's 57 and 62) - allows us to confirm conclusively the positions of the Communist Left against 'national liberation'.
In respect to the first part of the question - the nationalist explosion - we can see that the whirlwind Stalinism's collapse has created a bloody spiral of inter-ethnic conflicts, massacres and pogroms [3] [84]. This phenomenon is not specific to the old Stalinist regimes. The majority of African countries have old tribal and ethnic conflicts that - in the framework of the process of decomposition - have been accelerated in the last few years leading to massacres and interminable wars. In the same way India has suffered similar nationalist, religious and ethnic tensions, which have caused thousands of deaths.
"The absurd ethnic conflicts where populations massacre each other because they do not have the same religion or the same language, because different folk traditions which have been perpetuated for decades, appeared to be confined to the countries of the 'Third World', Africa, the Middle East... But now it is in Yugoslavia, only a few hundred kilometres from the industrial centres of Northern Italy and Austria, that we are seeing these absurdities unleashed... All these movements reveal an even greater absurdity: in a period where the internationalisation of the economy has reached levels never known before in history, where the bourgeoisie of the advanced countries has tried, without success, to give itself a framework beyond that of the nation in order to manage its economy - the EEC is an example of this - the dissolution of the nations which were bequeathed by the 2nd World War into a multitude of petty states is a pure aberration, even from the mere point of view of the capitalists' interests. As far as the fate of the population of these regions is concerned it is not going to be better but much worse: growing economic disorder, submission to chauvinist demagogues and xenophobia, the settling of accounts and pogroms between communities which have lived together until now and, above all, tragic divisions between different sectors of the working class. Yet more misery, oppression, terror, the destruction of class solidarity between workers in front of their exploiters, this is the meaning of nationalism today" (Manifesto of the 9th Congress of the ICC).
This nationalist explosion is the extreme consequence, of the aggravation of the contradictions of the imperialist politics of the last 70 years towards their culminating point. The destructive and chaotic tendencies of 'national liberation', which have been hidden by the mystifications of 'anti-imperialism' and 'developing economies' etc. and which had been clearly denounced by the Communist Left, have in their annihilating fury surpassed the most pessimistic visions. 'National liberation' in the phase of decomposition represents the rotten fruit of all the aberrant and destructive work carried out by imperialism.
"The phase of decomposition appears as the result of an accumulation of all of the characteristics of a moribund system, completing the 75-years death agony of a historically condemned mode of production. Concretely, not only do the imperialist nature of all states, the threat of world war, the absorption of civil society by the state Moloch, and the permanent crisis of the capitalist economy continue during the phase of decomposition, they reach a synthesis and an ultimate conclusion within it." (International Review 62: 'Decomposition, Final Phase of the Decadence of Capitalism, point 3, page 16).
The mini-states emerging from the dislocation of the ex-USSR and Yugoslavia are the first characteristic steps of this more brutal imperialism. Yeltsin the 'democratic hero' of the Russian Federation threatens his neighbours and savagely represses the move towards independence by the autonomous Chechen Republic. Lithuania represses the Polish minority; Moldavia its Russian minority. Azerbaijan openly confronts Armenia... The immense ex-Soviet sub-continent is giving way to 16 mini-imperialist states, which could well become involved in mutual conflicts that will make the slaughter in Yugoslavia look like a tea party. Amongst other dangers, they could bring into play the nuclear arsenals dispersed throughout the ex-USSR.
This heightened utilization of 'national liberation' will produce even more chaotic and catastrophic consequences than in the past. And this in turn can only lead to a bloody pandemonium of increasingly fierce conflicts.
The proletariat must recognise 'national liberation' more than ever as a policy, a slogan, a standard, which has been totally integrated by the reactionary and decadent capitalist order. Against it must develop the proletariat's own policy: Internationalism, the struggle for the world revolution.
Adalen 18.11.1991
[1] [85] In this article we do not analyse the War in Spain since we have published many articles in the Review on this (see International Reviews nos 7, 25, 47) as well the pamphlet which collects together the texts of Bilan on this question. The nationalist and anti-fascist mystifications which, in large dosages, fell on the local and international proletariat hid from them the reality that the Spanish war was a crucial episode, along with Ethiopia, in the maturation of World War Two.
[2] [86] "These latest events have rewarded us with a new state: the state of Israel. We have no intention within the framework of this article, to develop on the Jewish problem... The future of the Jewish 'people' does not consist in the reinstallation of its autonomy and its national rights but in the disappearance of all frontiers and all ideas of national existence. The bloody persecution of the Jews these last years and in the last war, though they were tragic, are not a particular case but a manifestation of the barbarity of a decadent society, which is struggling in the convulsions of its agony and of a humanity which has not been able to advance to its salvation: socialism," (Internationalisme no 35, June 1948).
[3] [87] For an analysis of these events see 'Nationalist Barbarity' in International Review no 62.
The American economy's plunge into recession continues, dragging the rest of the world down in its wake. The US leaders' official optimism of spring 1991 has died with the summer. Since September, the figures have made it impossible to maintain the illusion. There is no longer any room for confidence in a constantly rejuvenated capitalism, rising like a phoenix from its own ashes after each passing recession and continuing down in its pathless of endless growth[1]. Barely two years ago, the ruling classes triumphantly hailed liberal capitalism as humanity's only means of survival after its victory over the collapsing Stalinist "model" of state capitalism. Today, they are eating their words.
JJ, 28/11/91
Only the international working
class
can take humanity out of this barbarism
The 'new world order' announced less than two years ago by President Bush goes on accumulating horrors and corpses. Hardly had the massacre in the Gulf finished (ie those provoked directly by the coalition, because the massacre of the Kurds is still going on), when war began to flare up in Europe itself, in what used to be Yugoslavia. The horror that was uncovered when the Serbian army took Vukovar illustrates once again what lies were all the speeches about the 'new era' of peace, prosperity and respect for human rights which was supposed to accompany the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Europe and the disappearance of the old eastern bloc.
At the same time, the independence of Ukraine and, even more, the constitution of a 'commonwealth' of states comprising the Ukraine, Russia and Bylorussia[1] have underlined something that has been evident since the summer: the USSR no longer exists. What's more, this has not prevented the different bits of this ex-country from decomposing even further: today the Russian Federation itself, ie the most powerful republic of the former Soviet empire, is threatened with a break-up.
Faced with the chaos that the planet is sinking into more and more, the most advanced countries, and particularly the most powerful one, the USA, try to present themselves as islands of stability, as guarantors of world order. But in reality these countries themselves are not safe from the deadly convulsions shaking human society. In particular, the most powerful state on earth may be taking advantage of its enormous military superiority to emphasize its role of world policeman, as we have just seen with the Middle East 'peace' conference, but it can do nothing about the inexorable aggravation of the economic crisis, which is at the root of all the convulsions that humanity is now experiencing.
The barbarism at loose in the world today highlights the huge responsibility that lies on the shoulders of the world proletariat, a proletariat that is currently faced with an unprecedented campaign of maneuvers aimed at diverting it not only from its historic perspective, but also from the defense of its most basic interests.
In this Review we have regularly analyzed the evolution of the situation in the former USSR[2]. In particular, since the end of summer 1989 (ie, nearly two months before the fall of the Berlin Wall), the ICC stressed the extreme gravity of the convulsions shaking all the so-called 'socialist' countries[3]. Today, every day that passes further illustrates the breadth of the catastrophe which is unfolding in this part of the world.
The ex-USSR sinks into the abyss
Since the aborted putsch of August 1991, events have precipitated more and more in the former USSR. The departure from the 'Union' of the Baltic countries now seems to belong to the distant past. Today, it is the Ukraine that has become independent, ie the second republic of the Union, with 52 million inhabitants; the 'granary' of the Union which also made up 25 % of its industrial production.
Furthermore, this country has on its territory a considerable quantity of the old USSR's atomic weapons. By itself it has a capacity for nuclear destruction more than that of France and Britain combined. In this sense, Gorbachev's decision on 5 October to reduce the 'USSR's' tactical nuclear weapons from 12,000 to 2,000 was not simply the response to the similar decision adopted by Bush a week before, nor the simple concretization of the disappearance of the imperialist antagonism which had dominated the world for four decades, ie the one between the USA and the USSR. It also represented a move of elementary precaution aimed at preventing the republics which now hold these weapons, and Ukraine in particular, from using them as an instrument of blackmail. It is for the same reason that the Ukrainian authorities have for the moment refused to hand over these weapons.
And it hasn't taken long for events to show how justified were the anxieties of Gorbachev and the majority of the world's leaders about the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For at the beginning of November, we saw the conflict between the central authority of Russia and the autonomous republic of Checheno-Ingushia which had just announced its own 'independence'. In response to Yeltsin's decision to declare a state of emergency to be imposed by the special forces of the KGB, Doudev, an ex-general of the 'Red' Army turned small-time 'independentist' potentate, threatened to carry out terrorist actions against the nuclear installations in the region.
What's more, faced with the threat of bloody confrontations, the troops sent to carry out the repression refused to obey, and in the end it was the Russian Parliament which saved Yeltsin's skin by annulling his decision.
This event, apart from underlining the real danger represented by the huge nuclear forces distributed throughout the USSR at a time when this former power is falling to pieces, also highlights the degree of chaos in which this part of the world now finds itself. It's not only the USSR which is about to disintegrate: it's the ex-Union's biggest republic, Russia itself, which threatens to explode, without having any way of imposing order - except through veritable bloodbaths whose outcome is in any case entirely uncertain.
This tendency towards the dislocation of Russia itself is also expressed by the dissensions now developing within the 'reforming' clique now at the head of this republic. Thus, the measures of 'wildcat' liberalization announced by the Russian president at the end of October led the mayors of the two biggest cities of the country to put up their shields. Gavril Popov, the mayor of Moscow, declared that "he bore no responsibility for the liberation of prices", and his colleague in St Petersburg, Anatoli Sobchak accused Yeltsin of "wanting to starve Russia". In fact, these conflicts between politicians about economic matters simply reveal the total impasse facing the former Soviet economy. All these political leaders, beginning with Gorbachev, continue raising the alarm about the threat of famine in the winter ahead. On 10 November Sobchak: warned: "We have not set up sufficient food reserves, and without them the big Soviet cities and the main industrial centers simply won't be able to survive"
On the financial level, the situation has also become a nightmare. The central bank, the Gosbank, has been forced to turn out masses of funny money, which has resulted in a devaluation of the rouble by 3 % every week. On 29 November, this same bank announced that the salaries of its functionaries would not be paid. At the origin of this decision was the refusal by the majority Russian deputies at the Soviet parliament to authorize the 90 billion roubles of credit demanded by Gorbachev. The next day, Yeltsin, in order to be able to mark a further step in his struggle for influence against Gorbachev, promised that Russia itself would take care of paying these salaries.
In fact, the bankruptcy of the central bank doesn't only result from the refusal by the republics to pay their taxes to the 'centre'. They themselves are incapable of collecting the funds needed for their own functioning. Thus, the republics of Yakutia and Buratia, which belong to the Russian Federation, have for several months been blocking their deliveries of gold and diamonds which had formerly helped to fill the coffers of Russia and the Union. The various enterprises are also less and less paying their dues, either because their own coffers are dry, or because they consider (as is the case with the more 'prosperous' private enterprises, that 'liberalization' means the end of all fiscal responsibilities.
Thus, the ex-USSR is caught in an infernal spiral. Both the reforms and the political conflicts that derive from the economic catastrophe can only further aggravate this catastrophe, which will lead to a new headlong rush into new stillborn 'reforms' and clashes between cliques.
The governments of the most advanced countries are well aware of the scope of this catastrophe; it is quite clear to them that its repercussions do not stop at the borders of the former USSR[4]. It is for this reason that urgent plans have been drawn up to supply this region with basic necessities. But there is no guarantee that this aid will reach its destination because of the incredible corruption that reigns at all levels of the economy and because of the paralysis of the entire administrative and political apparatus (faced with political instability and the threat of being kicked out, the main concern of most of the 'decision-makers' is to ... not take any decisions), and the total disorganization of the means of transport (lack of spare parts, of fuel, and all the troubles that regularly affect the various territories).
In order to loosen the financial strangulation of the ex-USSR, the G7 agreed to a year's delay in the repayment of the interest on the Soviet debt, which now stands at 80 billion dollars. But this will be like putting a plaster on a wooden leg because in any case all the credits simply disappear down a huge hole. Two years ago there were all sorts of illusions floating around about the 'new markets' that were being opened up by the collapse of the Stalinist regimes. Today, when one of the expressions of the world economic crisis is a sharp crisis of liquidity[5], the banks are more and more reluctant to place their capital in this part of the world. As a French banker recently deplored: "We don't know whom we are lending to nor whom to ask for the repayments".
Even for the most optimistic bourgeois politicians, it is difficult to imagine how the situation of what was once the world's number two power can be redressed, whether on the political or the economic level. The independence of each of the republics, presented by the different local demagogues as a 'solution', a way to avoid going down with the rest of the ship, can only further aggravate the difficulties of an economy which for decades was based on an extreme division of labor (certain articles were only produced in one factory for the entire USSR).
In addition, the independence[6] of the republics brings with it all the particular demands of the various minorities spread all over the territory (there are now 40 or so 'autonomous regions' and even more ethnic groups). We can already see what lies in store for the whole territory of the ex-USSR when we look at the bloody confrontations between the Armenians and the Azeris over High-Karabakh, between Ossetians and Georgians in South Ossetia, between Kirghizes, Uzbeks and Tadjiks in Kirghistan. And the Russian populations spread throughout the Union (for example 38 % of the population of Kazakhstan, 22% of Ukraine) run the risk of paying the price of all these expressions of ‘independence'.
On top of which Yeltsin has warned that he considers himself the 'protector' of the 26 million Russians living outside Russia and that it is necessary to reexamine the question of Russia's frontiers with certain other republics. We heard similar talk not long ago from the Serbian leader Milosevic: we only have to look at the present situation in Yugoslavia to understand what sinister reality lurks behind all that, and this time on a far vaster scale.
Barbarism in Yugoslavia and antagonisms between the great powers
In just a few months, Yugoslavia
has descended into hell. Every day the television news sends us images of the
unspeakable barbarism which is being unleashed a few hundred kilometers from
the industrial metropoles of Northern Italy and Austria. Entire towns
destroyed, dismembered bodies littering the streets, mutilation, torture; a
huge slaughterhouse. Not since the Second World War has a European country seen
such atrocities. The horror which up till now seemed to be reserved for the
countries of the 'third world' is now reaching the zones immediately next to
the heart of capitalism. This is the 'great progress' that bourgeois society
has just realized: creating a Beirut-on-Danube one hour away from Milan and
Vienna. The hell that the least well-established countries have lived through
for decades was always an atrocity, a source of shame for humanity. The fact
that this hell is now at our gates is not in itself more scandalous. However,
it is the undeniable sign of the degree
of putrefaction reached by a system which for forty years managed to push onto
the peripheries the most abominable aspects of the barbarism that it engenders.
It is an evident expression of world capitalism's entry into a new phase, the
last phase, of its decline: that of the general decomposition of society[7].
One of the illustrations of this decomposition is the total irrationality of most of the political forces involved.
On the side of the Croatian authorities, the demand for independence is not based on any possibility for improving the position of the national capital. You only have to read the map for example to see the extra difficulties that will arise when this 'nation' accedes to its 'independence', owing to the position and form of its frontiers. Supposing that Vukovar and Dubrovnik were rebuilt, which today seems rather unlikely, and came back to Croatian hands, you couldn't get there via Zagreb (unless you wanted to travel another 500 kilometers) - you'd have to go via Sarajevo, the capital of another republic, Bosnia Herzegovina.
As for the 'Federal' (ie Serb) authorities, the attempt to subdue Croatia, or at least to conserve inside a 'Greater Serbia' the control of those Croat provinces inhabited by Serbs, does not give rise to great hopes on the economic front: the cost of the present war and the destruction it has brought about can only plunge the country further into a total economic shambles.
Since the beginning of the massacres in Yugoslavia, the media's professional purveyors of fine feelings have been wailing that 'something ought to be done!' It's true that the horror doled out to the Kurds of Iraq doesn't sell as well as it did a few months back[8]. However, 'concern' has gone well beyond the confines of the 'charity business' because the European Community has organized a special conference, the so-called La Haye conference, to put an end to the war. After about twenty derisory cease-fires and numerous voyages by the negotiator Lord Carrington, the massacres have just gone on and on. In fact, Europe's powerlessness to end a conflict whose absurdity is obvious to everyone is a flagrant illustration of the dissensions between the states that make it up.
These dissensions are in no way circumstantial or secondary. They hide definite and antagonistic imperialist interests. In particular, the fact that, since the beginning, Germany has been in favor of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia is not fortuitous. For Germany this is a precondition for its gaining access to the Mediterranean, whose strategic importance does not have to be demonstrated[9]. For their part, the other imperialist powers who do have a presence in the Mediterranean have no interest in seeing Germany's return to this zone. This is why, at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict, the USA, Britain and France (not to mention the USSR, the traditional 'protector' of Serbia, but which today has other things on its plate) came out in favor of keeping a unified Yugoslavia[10].
Thus the Yugoslav tragedy has shown that the 'new world order' is synonymous with the sharpening of tensions, not only between national and ethnic groups in regions like central and eastern Europe, where the late development of capitalism has prevented the formation of viable and stable nation states, but also between the oldest capitalist states, states set up a long time ago and which up till recently were allies against the Soviet imperialist power.
The chaos into which the planet is now falling is not the simple product of the peripheral countries of capitalism. It also involves, and will more and more involve, the central countries, to the extent that it has its origins not in problems specific to the underdeveloped countries but above all in a world-wide phenomenon: the general decomposition of capitalist society, which can only be aggravated by the irreversible crisis of its economy.
The Middle East conference: America affirms its leadership
With the world tipping over into chaos, the leading power has to play the role of gendarme. Quite obviously, the USA has its own interests in taking up this task. The one which profits the most from the present 'world order' is the one most interested in preserving it. The Gulf war was an exemplary police action aimed at dissuading all other countries be they small or great, from taking any part in destabilizing the situation. Today the 'peace conference' in the Middle East is another wing of American strategy, complementary to war. After demonstrating that they are ready to 'maintain order' in the most brutal possible manner, the USA must now prove that it alone is capable of regulating the conflicts which have bloodied the planet for decades. And here the question of the Middle East is obviously one of the most significant.
It is indeed necessary to underline the considerable historic importance of this event. It is the first time in 43 years (since the partition of Palestine by the UN in November 1947 and the end of the British mandate in May 1948) that Israel finds itself sitting at the same table as the totality of its Arab neighbors, with whom it has already been involved in five wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982).
In fact, this international conference is a direct consequence of the collapse of the Russian bloc in 1989 and of the Gulf war of the beginning of 1991. It has been possible because both the Arab states (including the PLO) and Israel can no longer play on east-west rivalries in order to advance their interests.
The Arab states which have tried to confront Israel have definitely lost their Soviet 'protector'. Because of this, Israel has been deprived of an advantage that won it the unfailing support of the US - it could act as the main gendarme of the US bloc in the region against the pretensions of the Russian bloc[11].
However, although the question of the Middle East, because of itS historic and strategic importance, gives a particular importance to the Madrid conference, which is to be continued in Washington this December, its significance goes well beyond the problems of this part of the world. The US is not only asserting its authority towards the countries of this region, but also, and above all, the other great powers which are being tempted to play the card of 'independence' from the US.
In Madrid, because the UN[12] had no place (at Israel's request, but this suited the Americans very well), the only, other great power present, apart from the US was ... the USSR (if we can refer to it as a 'great power'!). The simple fact that Bush proposed Gorbachev as co-president of the conference, when the latter is the discredited 'ruler' of a country that hardly exists any more, was a real slap in the face for those-countries which still have some ambitions in the Middle East. This is notably the case with France (which has been definitively kicked out of the Lebanon) and even Britain (the main power in the region up to the Second World War and the ex-protector of Palestine, Egypt and Jordan). Things aren't so bad for the UK because it cannot conceive of defending its imperialist interests outside the framework of an alliance with its American big brother. But for France, its further proof of the second-rate role the US wants to give it despite (and partly because of) its efforts to have an independent policy.
And apart from France, Germany is an indirect target here. Even if the latter has for a long time had no interests (apart from economic ones, of course) in this region, the slap given to the country it was banking on to advance its own interests will also hit home. Furthermore, the role given to Europe at the Madrid conference - the presence, as an observer, of the foreign minister of the Netherlands - says a lot about how the US aims to deal with the European states or any alliances between them in world affairs. All they'll get is a walk-on part.
Finally, holding the conference on the Middle East at a time when, day after day, the European states were showing their powerlessness in the face of the Yugoslav situation once again underlines that the only gendarme capable of ensuring any order in the world is Uncle Sam. While the latter is offering a 'solution' to one of the oldest and most serious conflicts on the planet, 10,000 km away from its own territory, the European states can't even do a policeman's job on the other side of their borders.
Thus, through the Middle East conference, the USA has affirmed the message of the Gulf war: 'world order' depends entirely on American power, on its enormous military (and also economic) superiority. All countries, including the ones trying to play their own game, need this gendarme[13]. Their interest is thus to facilitate the policies of the world's first power.
Having said this, the discipline that the leading power is still managing to impose should not obscure the catastrophic situation which the capitalist world is in today, and which can only get worse. In particular, the method employed to guarantee this discipline itself generates new disorders. We have already seen this with the Gulf war with all its catastrophic consequences for the region (especially as regards the Kurdish question), and we are now seeing it with Yugoslavia, where the maintenance of American authority has meant plunging the country into fire and blood.
As marxists have always affirmed, there is no place in decadent capitalism for any 'Universal peace'. Even if they are blunted in the Middle East, tensions between rival bands of capitalist gangsters will only rise up somewhere else. And this is all the more true because the economic crisis of the capitalist mode of production, which in the final analysis is at the root of imperialist confrontations, is insoluble and can only get worse. Which is exactly what we are seeing today.
Aggravation of the crisis and attacks on the working class
While Bush celebrates his diplomatic and military triumphs, his 'internal front' gets worse and worse, in particular through a new aggravation of the recession. For several months, the American bourgeoisie, and with it the entire world bourgeoisie had been dreaming that the open recession which began to get going before the Gulf war would be of short duration. Today everyone is disappointed: despite all the efforts of the governments (who continue to pretend, while doing the very opposite, that you shouldn't intervene in the economy and that the laws of the market should be allowed to rule), the economy is still stuck in the mud and there's no sign of any way out. What we are really seeing is a new and considerable aggravation of the capitalist crisis. Already, numerous sectors of the bourgeoisie have been sent into a panic.
This aggravation of the crisis can only lead to intensified attacks on the working class. Right now, these attacks being unleashed all over the world: massive lay-offs (including the high-tech sectors, such as computers), wage freezes, the erosion of social benefits (retirement pensions, unemployment allocations, sick pay, etc), the intensification of work rates: it would take too long to make a list of all the different attacks in various countries are now feeling the impact of the crisis in their flesh and blood.
These attacks obviously create a lot of discontentment within the working class. And, in many countries, we are seeing a good deal of social agitation. But what is significant is the fact that, in contrast to the big struggles which marked the mid-80s, and which were subjected to an almost total black-out by the media, the present agitation is being dealt with in a spectacular manner by all the media. In fact we are at present seeing a vast maneuver by the bourgeoisie of most of the more developed countries, aimed at undermining the possibility of real class combats.
For the working class, there is no identity between anger and combativity, or between combativity and consciousness, even if there is a link between them. The situation in the former 'socialist' countries demonstrates this to us daily. These workers are today confronted with living conditions, with a level of poverty that has not been seen for decades. However, their struggles against exploitation are limited in breadth, and when they do develop, they fall into the most gross traps laid by the bourgeoisie (notably the trap of nationalism, as with the Ukrainian miners' strike in Spring 1991).
The situation is obviously far less catastrophic in the 'advanced' countries, as regards both the attacks on living conditions and the mystifications that weigh on the workers' consciousness. However, it is necessary to show the difficulties which the proletariat in these countries is faced with, precisely because the enemy class is using all its means to use them and reinforce them.
As our publications have stressed on numerous occasions, the major events of the past two years have been amply used by the bourgeoisie to strike at the combativity and above all the consciousness of the working class. By repeating over and over again that Stalinism was 'communism', that "the Stalinist regimes, whose bankruptcy became quite evident, were the inevitable consequence of the proletarian revolution, the campaigns of bourgeois propaganda had the aim of diverting the workers from any perspective of a different society and of making them accept that 'liberal democracy' was the only viable model for society.
Even though it was a particular form of capitalism which collapsed in the eastern countries under the pressure of the general crisis of the system, all the media have continually presented these events as the 'triumph' of capitalism.
This campaign has had a real impact on the workers, affecting their combativity and above all their consciousness. Although this combativity began to pick up again in the Spring of 1990, especially as a result of the attacks that went with the beginning of the open recession, it was again hit by the crisis and war in the Gulf.
These tragic events certainly put paid to the lies about the 'new world order' announced by the bourgeoisie at the time of the disappearance of the eastern bloc, which was supposed to be the main source of military tensions in the world. The massacres perpetrated by the 'great democracies', by the 'civilized countries', against the Iraqi population allowed many workers to understand the falsity of all the speeches by these same 'democracies' about 'peace' and 'human rights' .
But at the same time, the great majority of the working class in the advanced countries, following a new round of bourgeois propaganda campaigns, submitted to this war with a strong sense of powerlessness, which considerably weakened its struggles. The August 1991 putsch in the USSR and the new destabilization it provoked, as well as the civil war in Yugoslavia, contributed in their turn to reinforce this feeling of powerlessness. The break-up of the USSR and the barbaric war unfolding in Yugoslavia are expressions of the advanced decomposition of capitalist society today. But thanks to all the lies spread by the media, the bourgeoisie has managed to hide the real cause of these events and present them as a further manifestation of the 'death of communism' or as a question of 'the right of nations to self-determination', in the face of which workers have nothing to do but be passive spectators trusting to the wisdom of their governments.
After suffering a barrage like this for two years, the working class was bound to experience a real disarray and a strong sense of powerlessness. And it is precisely this feeling of powerlessness that the bourgeoisie is trying to use and reinforce through a series of maneuvers aimed at nipping in the bud any rebirth of combativity. The strategy has been to provoke premature confrontations on a terrain chosen by the bourgeoisie itself, so that the struggle is worn down by isolation and winds up in a dead end. The methods used vary, but their common point of departure is the intense involvement of the trade unions. .
Thus in Spain the putrid terrain of nationalism was used by the unions (especially the Workers Commissions close to the CP, and the UGT close to the SP) in order to lead the workers into a state of isolation. On 23 October, they called for a general strike in the Asturias, where nearly 50,000 jobs were to go with the 'rationalization' plans in the mines and steel. The slogan for the strike was 'Defend the Asturias'. With a slogan like that, the 'movement' got the support of shopkeepers, artisans, peasants, priests and even football players.
Because of the anger and concern within the working class, the movement got a big following, but with such a demand it could only serve to imprison the workers in their particular provinces or even localities. We saw this in the Basque country where they were called upon to mobilize behind a motion of the provincial parliament to 'save the left bank of the Bilbao River'.
In Holland and in Italy, the unions used other methods. They called for a national mobilization with big street demonstrations as soon as they heard about the budget for the year 1992, which contains major attacks against social benefits, wages and jobs. In Holland the movement was a success for the unions: the two demonstrations of 17 September and 5 October were the biggest since the Second World War. It was an occasion for the union machines to strengthen their control over the working class in preparation for future struggles, in particular by derailing discontent onto the terrain of 'defending the social gains of Dutch democracy'. In Italy, whose proletariat is one of the most militant in the world and where the official unions are largely discredited, the maneuver was more subtle. It consisted mainly in dividing and discouraging the workers thanks to a division of labor between, on the one hand the three big union federations (COIL, CSIL, UIL) who called for a strike and demonstrations for the 22 October and, on the other hand, the 'base' unions, (the COB AS) who called for an 'alternative strike' for the ... 25 October.
In France the tactic was different. It consisted above all in imprisoning the workers in corporatism. Thus the unions launched a whole series of 'movements' which got a lot of coverage in the media; these movements took place at different times and had different demands: in the railways, air transport, urban transport, the ports, steel, the schools, social services, etc. There was a particularly repulsive maneuver in the health sector where the official unions, who are largely discredited, called for 'unity' between the different categories while the coordinations, which had already shown their true face in the strikes of Autumn 1988[14] cultivated corporatism and 'specificities', especially among the nurses. The government did its bit to 'radicalize' the movement through a well-publicized violent police attack on one of the demonstrations. The peak was reached when the workers of this sector were called on to demonstrate alongside liberal doctors, health managers and pharmacists ' for the defense of the health service'. At the same time, the unions, with the active support of the leftist organizations, launched a strike in the Renault factory at Cleon, ie the enterprise which is the 'beacon' for the French proletariat. For weeks they came out with all kinds of radical talk, while shutting the workers up in this factory, only to suddenly change their tune and call for a return to work even though the bosses had made hardly any concessions. And as soon as work started at Cleon, they launched a strike in another factory of the same group, at Mans.
These are only some examples among many, but they are significant of the general strategy of the bourgeoisie against the workers. And it is precisely because it knows that it has not had a definitive success with the campaigns of the past two years that the ruling class is using all these maneuvers based on the present difficulties of the working class.
And indeed these difficulties are not final. The intensification and increasingly massive character of the attacks which capitalism will have to unleash will compel the working class to take up the struggle again on a grand scale. At the same time, and this is what the bourgeoisie fears the most when it comes down to it, the evident bankruptcy of a capitalist system which is supposed to be enjoying its greatest triumph will undermine the lies that have been dished out since the death of Stalinism.
Finally, we know that there is going to be an inevitable intensification of warlike tensions, involving not only the small states on the periphery but also the central countries of capitalism, the countries where the strongest detachments of the proletariat are concentrated (the Gulf war was a foretaste of this). This process will deal heavy blows to the lies of the bourgeoisie and highlight the fact that the survival of capitalism is a grave threat to the survival of humanity.
It's a long and difficult road that awaits the working class. It is up to the revolutionary organizations, through their denunciation both of the ideological campaigns about the 'death of communism', and of the maneuvers aimed at leading the workers' struggle into a dead-end, to contribute actively to the future revival of struggles, to help the class take the road that leads to its emancipation. FM 6.12.91
[1] News of the formation of this 'commonwealth' came when this Review was being put together. So we have integrated this event at the last moment in note 6.
[2] See in particular nos. 66 and 67 of the IR.
[3] " ... however the situation in the eastern bloc evolves, the events that are shaking it today mean the historic crisis, the definitive collapse of Stalinism ... In these countries, an unprecedented period of instability, convulsions and chaos has begun, whose implications go far beyond their frontiers ... The nationalist movements (which) today are profiting from a loosening of central control by the Russian party ... their dynamic is towards separation from Russia. In the end, if the central power in Moscow does not react, then we will see the explosion, not just of the Russian bloc, but of its dominant power. The Russian bourgeoisie, which today rules the world's second power, would find itself at the head of a second-rate power, a good deal weaker than Germany for example." ('Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the eastern countries, IR 60).
[4] See the editorial in IR 67
[5] See the article on the recession in this issue.
[6] The constitution on 8.12.91 of a 'commonwealth of states' by Russia, Ukraine and Bylorussia can only aggravate this situation. This erzatz Union which only regroups the Slav republics can only sharpen nationalism among the non-Slav populations, both in the other republics of the ex-USSR and in Russia itself. Far from stabilizing the situation, the agreement between Yeltsin and his acolytes will lead to further deterioration in a region of the world stuffed full of nuclear weapons.
[7] For our basic texts on the decomposition of capitalism see IRs 57, 62 and 64.
[8] As winter approaches, the situation of the Kurdish populations is even worse than it was after the Gulf war. But as the ruling class obviously doesn't know what to do about them, and as they are an encumbrance for the neighboring countries (notably for Turkey, which, even though it was one of the 'goodies' during the Gulf war, doesn't hesitate to use against them the same methods as Saddam Hussein, such as aerial bombing), it is preferable to suspend discretely all international aid and to withdraw on tiptoes with the advise that they should go back to their original homes, ie throw themselves into the arms of their executioners. The massacre of the Kurds by Hussein's soldiers was an excellent TV news story when it was a question of giving an after-the-event justification of the war against Iraq. This is one of the reasons that the 'coalition' prepared this massacre during the war by inciting these populations to rise up .against Baghdad, and then, after the war, leaving Saddam with the troops he needed to carry out his 'police operation'. But today the Calvary of the Kurds has lost all interest for the propaganda campaigns: for the 'civilized' bourgeoisie, it is better that they die in silence.
[9] See 'Towards the greatest chaos in history' in this issue.
[10] This doesn't mean that there will be a real 'harmony' between these other powers. Thus France, for example, which has ambitions about resisting US leadership, has formed, mainly against Britain, an alliance with Germany in the EC, the aim of which is to form a counter-weight to US influence and also to 'contain' the great power ambitions of its German ally (over which it at least has the advantage of the atomic bomb). It's also for this reason that France is the most ardent partisan of projects that allow the EC as a whole to assert a certain military independence: construction of a European space shuttle; constitution of a joint Franco-German division; strengthening of the diplomatic competence of the European executive; subjecting the Western European Union (the only European organism which has any military attributes) to the Council of Europe (and not NATO which is dominated by the US). And this, of course, is what Britain doesn't want.
[11] Having said this, even if Israel no longer has the same margin of maneuver as in the past, this country, which showed its 'sense of responsibility' during the Gulf war to the advantage of the USA, remains the essential pawn of American policy in the region: it has the most powerful and modem army (with more than 200 nuclear warheads) and is continually - mainly thanks to 3 billion dollars of US aid a year - strengthening its military potential. On top of this, it is managed by a regime which is much more stable than those in the Arab countries. This is why the USA isn't prepared to let go of what it's got by reversing its primary alliances, and all Israel's prevarications in response to the pressure by the USA prior to the Madrid and Washington meetings in recent months was more a way of raising the stakes vis-a-vis the Arab countries than the expression of a fundamental clash between Israel and the USA.
[12] Here we can see to what point the UN has become a simple instrument of US policy; it is given a big role when it comes to softening up recalcitrant allies (as during the Gulf war) but it's put on the shelf aa soon as it could be used by these same allies to playa role on the international arena.
[13] This is why, despite the disappearance of the western bloc (as a result of the collapse of its eastern rival) there is no immediate threat to this fundamental structure that the bloc set up, and which is totally dominated by the US - NATO. This was clearly expressed in the document adopted on November 8 at the NATO summit: "the threat of a massive and simultaneous attack on all of NATO's European fronts has been eliminated ... the new risks derive from the negative consequences of the instability which could be produced by the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, faced by a number of central and eastern European countries." In the world context of the disappearance of blocs, we are thus seeing a reconversion of NATO, which allowed Bush to say with satisfaction at the end of the meeting: "We have shown that we don't need the Soviet threat to exist".
[14] See 'France: the 'coordinations sabotage the struggle' in IR 56.
Since its foundation, but above all since the momentous events that have brought about the collapse of the eastern imperialist bloc and of the USSR itself, the ICC has published numerous articles attacking the lie that the Stalinist regimes were an example of ‘communism', and consequently that the death of Stalinism means the death of communism.
We have demonstrated the enormity of the lie by contrasting the reality of Stalinism with the real aims and principles of communism. Communism is international and internationalist and aims at a world without nation states; Stalinism is ferociously nationalist and imperialist. Communism means the abolition of wage labor and all forms of exploitation; Stalinism imposes the most savage levels of exploitation precisely through the wage labor system; communism means a society without a state, a classless society in which human beings freely control their own social powers; Stalinism means the overwhelming presence of a totalitarian state, a militaristic and hierarchical discipline imposed on the majority by a privileged minority of bureaucrats. And so on[1]. In sum, Stalinism is nothing but a brutal, aberrant expression of decadent capitalism.
We have also shown how this campaign of lies has been used to disorient and confuse the only social force capable of constructing a genuine communist society: the working class. In the east, the working class has lived directly under the shadow of the Stalinist lie, and this has had the disastrous effect of filling the vast majority of them with hatred for everything to do with marxism, communism, and the proletarian revolution of 1917. As a result, with the downfall of the Stalinist prison-house, they have fallen into the clutches of the most reactionary ideologies - nationalism, racism, religion, and the pernicious belief that salvation lies in following the ways of the ‘democratic west'. In the west itself, this campaign has above all been used to block the maturation of consciousness that was going on in the working class throughout the 80s. The essential trick has been to deprive the working class of any perspective for its combats. Much of the triumphant blather about the victory of capitalism, the ‘new order' of peace and harmony following the end of the ‘Cold War' may already be ringing very hollow in the wake of the catastrophic events of the last two years (Gulf war, Yugoslavia, famine, recession ... ). But what really matters for capitalism is that the negative side of this message gets through: that the end of communism 'means the end of any hope of changing the present order of things; that revolutions inevitably end in creating something even worse than what you started off with; that there's nothing to do but submit to the dog-eat-dog ideology of decomposing capitalism. In this bourgeois philosophy of despair, not only communism, but class struggle itself is an outmoded, discredited utopia.
The strength of bourgeois ideology lies mainly in the fact that the bourgeoisie monopolizes the means of mass dissemination, endlessly repeats the same lies and allows no real alternative views to be aired. In this sense Goebbels is indeed the ‘theoretician' of bourgeois propaganda: a lie repeated often enough becomes a truth, and the bigger the lie the better it works. And the lie that Stalinism equals communism certainly is a big lie - on the face of it, a stupid, obvious, despicable lie at that.
So evident is the lie to anyone who stops to think for a' few minutes that the bourgeoisie can't afford to leave it unprotected. In all kinds of political discourse, people who are extremely confused about the Stalinist regimes, who refer to them as communist and contrast them with capitalism, will in the next breath admit ‘of course, that's not real communism, that's not the idea that Karl Marx had about communism'. This contradiction is potentially dangerous for the ruling class, and that's why it needs to nip such things in the bud before they can lead to any real clarifications.
It does this in various ways. Faced with the more politically conscious elements, it offers sophisticated ‘marxist' alternatives like Trotskyism, which specialize in denouncing the ‘counter revolutionary role of Stalinism' - only to argue simultaneously that there are still ‘conquests of the workers' to be defended in the Stalinist regimes, such as the state ownership of the means of production, which for some obscure reason is supposed to mean that these regimes are ‘in transition' towards authentic communism. In other words, the same lie about the identity between Stalinism and communism, but in a ‘revolutionary' wrapping.
But we live in a world where the majority of workers want little or nothing to do with politics (in no small measure this is itself a result of the Stalinist nightmare, which has for decades served to turn workers in disgust from any kind of political activity). Bourgeois ideology, if it is to buttress its great lie about Stalinism, needs something a little more mass produced, a lot less overtly political than Trotskyism or its variants. And what it offers most of all is a benign cliche which can be relied on to entrap even, and especially, those who have seen that Stalinism is not communism: we refer to that oft-repeated refrain - ‘it's a nice idea, but it could never work' .
The first aim of the series of articles we are beginning here is to reaffirm the marxist position that communism is not a nice idea. As Marx put it in The German Ideology, "Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself.
We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The condition of this movement result from premises now in existence".
Twenty five years later, Marx expressed the same thought in his reflections on the experience of the Paris Commune:
"The working class has no readymade utopias to introduce par decret du peuple. They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, trans- forming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant" (The Civil War in France).
Against the notion that communism is no more than a "readymade utopia" invented by Marx or other good souls, marxism insists that the tendency towards communism is already contained in this society. Just before the passage from the GI cited above, Marx outlines the "premises now in existence" for the communist transformation:
In the passage from the Civil War in France, Marx strikes another note which is more than ever relevant today: the proletariat has merely to set free the potential contained in the "old collapsing bourgeois society". As we will develop elsewhere, communism here is revealed both as a possibility and a necessity: a possibility because it has created the productive capacities that can satisfy the material needs of humanity, and the social force; the proletariat, which has a direct and ‘selfish' interest in overturning capitalism and creating communism; and a necessity, because at a certain point in their development, these very productive forces revolt against the capitalist relations within which they previously developed and prospered, and inaugurate a period of catastrophe which threatens the very existence of society, of humanity itself.
In 1871 Marx was premature in declaring bourgeois society to be in state of collapse; today, in the last stages of decadent capitalism, the collapse is all around us, and the necessity for the communist revolution has never been greater.
Communism is the real movement, and the real movement is the movement of the proletariat. A movement which begins on the terrain of the defense of material interests against the encroachments of capital, but which is compelled to call into question and ultimately confront the very foundations of bourgeois society. A movement which becomes conscious of itself through its own practice, advances towards its goal by constant self-criticism. Communism is thus "scientific" (Engels); it is "critical communism" (Labriola). The main purpose of these articles will be to demonstrate precisely that, for the proletariat, communism is not a ready made utopia, a static idea, but an evolving, developing conception which has grown older and wiser both with the objective development of the productive forces and the subjective maturation of the proletariat through its· accumulated historical experience. We will therefore examine how the notion of communism and the means to achieve" gained in depth and in clarity through the work of Marx and Engels, through the contributions of the left wing of social democracy, through the reflections on the triumph and failure of the October revolution by the left communist fractions, . and so on. But communism is older than the proletariat: according to Marx, we can even say that "the entire movement of history is the act of genesis" of communism (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts). To show that communism is more than an ideal, it is necessary to show that communism arises from the proletarian movement and thus predates Marx; but to understand what is specific to ‘modem', proletarian communism, it is also necessary to compare and contrast it with the forms of communism that predated the proletariat, and with the first immature forms of proletarian communism itself, which mark a process of transition between pre-proletarian communism and its modem, scientific form. As Labriola put it,
"Critical communism has never refused, and does not refuse, to welcome the rich and multiple ideological, ethical, psychological and pedagogical suggestions which can come from the knowledge and study of all forms of communism, from Phales the Calcedonian to Caber. What's more, it's through the study and knowledge of these forms that we can develop and establish an understanding of the separation of scientific socialism from all the rest" (In Memory of the Communist Manifesto, 1895).
According to the conventional wisdom, communism can never work because it is ‘against human nature'. Competition, greed, the need to do better than the next man, the desire to accumulate wealth, the need for the state - these, we are told, are inherent in human nature, as basic as the need for food or the sexual drive. The slightest acquaintance with human history dispels this version of human nature.
For the longest part of its history, for hundreds of tho.~ L sands, perhaps millions of years, humanity lived in a classless society, formed by communities where the essentials of wealth were shared without the medium of exchange and money; a society organized not by kings, priests, nobles or a state machine but by the tribal assembly. This society is what marxists refer to as primitive communism.
This notion of primitive communism is profoundly dis- concerting for the bourgeoisie and its ideology, and so it does everything it can to deny it or minimize its significance. Aware that the marxist conception of primitive society was greatly influenced by the work of Lewis Henry Morgan on the Iroquois and other ‘American Indian' tribes, modem academic anthropologists pour scorn on Morgan's work by discovering this or that factual inconsistency in his findings, this or that secondary error, and thus call the whole of his contribution into question. Or, again lapsing into the most narrow- minded empiricism, they deny that it is possible to know anything at all about human prehistory from the study of surviving primitive peoples. Or they point to the many and various limitations and shortcomings of primitive societies in order to knock down a straw man: the idea that these societies were a kind of paradise free of suffering and alienation.
Marxism, however, does not idealize these societies. It is aware that they were a necessary result not of some innate human goodness but of the low development of the productive forces, which compelled the earliest human communities to adopt a ‘communist' structure simply in order to survive. The appropriation of surplus labor by a particular part of society would have meant the disappearance pure and simple of the other part. In these conditions, it was impossible to produce a sufficient surplus to nourish the existence of a privileged class. Marxism is aware that this communism was, as a result, a restrictive one which did not allow the full flowering of the human individual. That is why, having spoken about the "personal dignity, straightforwardness, strength of character and bravery" of the surviving primitive peoples, Engels in his seminal work The Origin of the Family, Private Property And the State added the qualification that in these communities "the tribe remained the boundary for man, in relation to himself as well as to outsiders: the tribe, the gens and their institutions were sacred and inviolable, a superior power, instituted by nature, to which the individual remained absolutely subject in feeling, thought and deed. Impressive as the people of this epoch may appear to us, they differ in no way from one another, they are still bound, as Marx says, to the umbilical cord of the primordial community."
This communism of small groups, often hostile to other tribal groupings; this communism in which the individual was dominated by the community; this communism of scarcity is very different from the more advanced communism of tomorrow, which will be the unification of the human species, the mutual realization of individual and society, and a communism of abundance. This is why marxism has nothing in common with the various ‘primitivist' ideologies which idealize the archaic condition of man and express a nostalgic yearning to go back to it[2].
Nevertheless, the very fact that these communities existed, and existed as a result of material necessity, provides further proof that communism is neither a mere ‘good idea' , nor something that could ‘never work'. This point was stressed by Rosa Luxemburg in her Introduction to Political Economy:
"Morgan has provided new and powerful support to scientific socialism. Whereas Marx and Engels, through their economic analysis of capitalism, demonstrated the inevitable passage of society, in the near future, to a world communist economy, and thus gave a solid scientific foundation to socialist aspirations, Morgan has to a certain extent emphatically underlined the work of Marx and Engels by demonstrating that democratic communist society, albeit in its primitive forms, has encompassed all the long past of human history before the present civilization. The noble tradition of the distant past thus extends its hand to the revolutionary aspirations of the future, the circle of knowledge is harmoniously completed, and in this perspective, the existing world of class rule and exploitation, which pretends to be the nec plus ultra of civilization, the supreme goal of universal history, is simply a miniscule, passing stage in the great forward movement of humanity".
Primitive communism was not static. It evolved through various stages, and finally, faced with irresolvable contradictions, dissolved and gave birth to the first class societies. But the inequities of class society in turn gave rise to myths and philosophies that expressed a more or less conscious desire to do away with class antagonisms and private property. Classical mythographers such as Hesiod and Ovid recounted the myth of the Golden Age when there was no distinction be- tween ‘mine' and ‘thine'; some of the later Greek philosophers ‘invented' perfect societies where all things were held in common. In these musings, the not-so-ancient memory of a real tribal community was fused together with far older myths about man's fall from a primordial paradise.
But communistic ideas always became more widespread and more popular, and gave rise to actual attempts to realize them in practice, during times of social crisis and of mass re- volt against the class system of the day. In the great Spartacus revolt against the decadent Roman Empire, the rebellious slaves made some desperate, short-lived attempts to set up communities based on brotherhood and equality; but the paradigmatic ‘communist' trend of this epoch was of course Christianity, which, as Engels and Luxemburg have pointed out, began as a revolt of the slaves and other classes crushed by the Roman system before it was adopted by the decadent Roman Empire and then became the official ideology of the emerging feudal order. The early Christian communities preached universal human brotherhood and tried to institute a thorough-going communism of possessions. But as Luxemburg argued in her text ‘Socialism and the Churches', this was precisely the limitation of Christian communism: it was not posited on the revolutionary expropriation of the ruling class and the communisation of production, like modem communism. It merely advocated that the rich be charitable and share out their goods with the poor; it was a doctrine of social pacifism and class collaboration that could easily be adapted to the needs of a ruling class. The immaturity of this vision of communism was a product of the immaturity of the productive forces. This applies both to the productive capacities of the time, because in a society dying from a crisis of underproduction those rebelling against it could envisage nothing better than a sharing out of poverty; and to the character of the exploited and oppressed classes who were the original motor force behind the Christian revolt. These were classes with no common objectives and no historical perspective. "There was absolutely no common road to emancipation for all these elements. For all of them paradise lay lost be- hind them; for the ruined free men it was the former polis, the town and the state at the same time, of which their forefathers had been free citizens; for the war-captive slaves the time of freedom; for the small peasants the abolished gentile social system and communal landownership." This is how Engels, in ‘On the history of early Christianity' (Die Neue Zeit, Vol 1, 1894-5), points to the essentially backward-looking, nostalgic vision of the Christian revolt. It is true that Christianity, in continuity with the Hebrew religion, had marked a step forward from the various pagan mythologies in that it embodied a rupture with the old cyclical visions of time and asserted that humanity was caught up in a forward- moving, historical drama. But the inbuilt limitations of the classes behind the revolt ensured that this history was still seen in mystified, messianic terms, and the future salvation it promised was an Eschaton, an absolute and final end beyond the borders of this world.
Broadly the same can be said of the numerous peasant revolts against feudalism, although the fiery Lollard preacher John Ball, one of the leaders of the great Peasants' Revolt in England in 1381, was reported to have said that "matters cannot go well in England until all things be held in common; when there shall be neither vassals nor lords ...": such demands take us a step beyond a mere communism of possessions towards a vision of all social wealth becoming common property (this may well be because the Lollards were already a forerunner of later movements characteristic of the emergence of capitalism). But in general the revolts of the peas- ants suffered the same fundamental limitations as the rebel- lions of the slaves. The famous motto of the 1381 revolt - "When Adam delved and Eve span, who then was the gentleman?" - had a marvelous poetic power, but it also summed up the limitations of peasant communism, which like the early Christian revolt was condemned. To look back to an idyllic past - to Eden itself, to the first Christians, to ‘true English freedom before the Norman yoke'[3] ... Or, if it did look forward, it looked with the eyes of the first Christians to an apocalyptic millennium that would be installed by Christ returning in his glory. The peasants were not the revolutionary class of feudal society, even if their revolts could help to undermine the foundations of feudal order and so pave the way for the emergence of capitalism. And since they themselves carried no project for the reorganization of society, they could only see salvation coming from the outside - from Jesus, from the ‘Good Kings' misadvised by treacherous counselors, from people's heroes like Robin Hood.
The fact that these communistic dreams could grip the masses shows that they corresponded to real material needs, in the same way that the dreams of the individual express deep if unfulfilled desires. But because the conditions of history could not permit their realization, they were condemned to be no more than dreams.
"From its origin the bourgeoisie was saddled with its antithesis: capitalists cannot exist without wage workers, and in the same proportion as the medieval burgher of the guild developed into the modern bourgeois, the guild journeyman and the day-laborer, outside the guilds, developed into the proletarian. And although, upon the whole, the bourgeoisie, in their struggle with the nobility, could claim to represent at the same time the interests of the different working classes of the period, yet in every great bourgeois movement there were independent outbursts of that class which was the forerunner, more or less developed, of the modern proletariat. For example, at the time of the German Reformation and the Peasants' War, the Anabaptists and Thomas Munzer.' in the great English Revolution, the Levellers; in the great French Revolution, Babeuf" (Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific).
In The Peasant War in Germany, Engels elaborates his thesis about Munzer and the Anabaptists. He considered that they represented an embryonic proletarian current within a much more eclectic ‘plebeian-peasant' movement. The Anabaptists were still a Christian sect, but an extremely heretical one, and Munzer's ‘theological' teachings veered dangerously close to a form of atheism, in continuity with previous mystical trends in Germany and elsewhere (eg Meister Eckhart). On the social and political level, "his political program approached communism, and even on the eve of the February Revolution more than one present-day communist sect lacked as comprehensive a theoretical article as was ‘Munzer's' in the sixteenth century. This program, less a compilation of the demands of the plebeians of that day than a visionary anticipation of the conditions for the emancipation of the proletarian elements that had scarcely begun to develop among the plebeians - this program demanded the immediate establishment of the kingdom of God, the prophesied millennium, by restoring the Church to its original condition and abolishing all the institutions that conflicted with this allegedly early-Christian but , in fact, very novel church. By the kingdom of God Munzer understood a society in which there would be no class differences or private property and no state authority independent of or foreign to the members of society. All the existing authorities, in so far as they re- fused to submit and join the revolution, were to be over- thrown, all work and all property shared in common, and complete equality introduced. A union was to be established to implement all this, not only throughout Germany, but throughout Christendom. "
Needless to say, since this was only the dawn of bourgeois society itself, the material conditions for so radical a transformation were completely lacking. Subjectively this was reflected in the grip that messianic-religious conceptions still defined the ideology of this movement. On the objective side, the ineluctable approach of capital's domination twisted all of its radical communist demands into practical suggestions for the development of bourgeois society. This was demonstrated beyond a doubt when Munzer's party was catapulted into power in the city of Muhlhausen in March 1525:
"Munzer's position at the head of the ‘eternal council' of Muhlhausen was indeed much more precarious than that of any modern revolutionary agent. Not only the movement of his time, but the age was not ripe for the ideas of which he himself had only a faint notion. The class which he represented was in its birth throes. It was not yet capable of assuming leadership over, and transforming society. The social changes that his fancy evoked had little ground in the then existing conditions. What is more, these conditions were paving the way for a social system that was diametrically opposite to what he aspired to. Nevertheless, he was bound to his early sermon of Christian equality and evangelical com- munity of ownership, and was compelled at least to attempt its realization. Community of ownership, universal and equal labor, and abolition of all rights to exercise authority were proclaimed. But in reality Muhlhausen remained a republican imperial city with a somewhat democratized constitution, a senate elected by universal suffrage and controlled by a forum, and with a hastily improvised system of care for the poor. The social upheaval that so horrified its Protestant burgher contemporaries actually never transcended a feeble, unconscious and premature attempt to establish the bourgeois society of a later period" (ibid).
The founders of marxism were not so well acquainted with the English bourgeois revolution as with the German reformation or the French revolution. This is a pity because as historians like Christopher Hill have shown, this revolution gave rise to a tremendous outburst of creative thought, to a dazzling profusion of audaciously radical parties, sects and movements. The Levellers to whom Engels refers were a heterogeneous movement rather than a formal party. Their moderate wing were no more than radical democrats who ardently defended the right of the individual to dispose of his property. But given the depth of the social mobilization that pushed the bourgeoisie's revolution forward, it inevitably gave birth to a left wing that concerned itself more and more with the needs of the propertyless masses and which took on a clearly communist character. This wing was represented by the ‘True Levellers' or Diggers, and their most coherent spokesman was Gerrard Winstanley.
In the writings of Winstanley, especially his later work, there is a much clearer move away from religious-messianic conceptions than Munzer could ever have made. His most important work, The Law of Freedom in Platform, represents, as its name implies, a definite shift onto the terrain of explicitly political discourse: the subsisting references to the Bible, particularly to the myth of the fall are essentially allegorical or symbolic in their function. Above all, for Winstanley, as opposed to the moderate Levellers, "there cannot be universal liberty till this universal community be established" (cited by Hill in his introduction to The Law of Freedom and other Writings, 1973 Penguin edition, p 49): political-constitutional rights that left the existing property relations untouched were a sham. And thus he outlines, in very great detail, his vision of a true commonwealth where all wage labor and buying and selling have been abolished, where education and science are promoted in place of religious obscurantism and a state church, and where the functions of the state have been reduced to a bare minimum. He even looked forward to the time when the entire "earth be- comes a common treasury again, as it must ... then this enmity of all lands will cease, and none shall dare to seek dominion over others", since "pleading for property and single interest divides the people of a land and the whole world into parties, and is the cause of all wars and bloodshed and contention everywhere" (cited by Hill in The World Turned Upside Down, p 139, 1984 Peregrine edition).
And yet, of course, what Engels says about Munzer remains the case with Winstanley: the new society emerging out of this great revolution was not the "universal community", but the society of capitalism. Winstanley's vision was a further step towards ‘modem' communism, but it remained entirely utopian. This was expressed above all in the inability of the True Levellers to see how the great transformation could come about. The Digger movement which appeared during the civil war restricted itself to attempts by small bands of poor and landless people to cultivate the wastes and commons. The Digger communities were to serve as a non- violent example to all the poor and dispossessed, but they were soon dispersed by the forces of Cromwellian order, and in any case their horizons did not really go beyond the time- honored assertion of ancient communal rights. Following the suppression of this movement, and of the Leveller current in general, Winstanley wrote the Law of Freedom in order to draw the lessons of the defeat. But it was a significant irony that while this work expressed the highpoint of communist theory at the time, it was dedicated to none other than Oliver Cromwell, who only three years before, in 1649, had crushed the Leveller revolt by force of arms in order to safeguard bourgeois property and order. Seeing no homogeneous force able to bring about the revolution from below, Winstanley was reduced to the vain hope of a revolution from above.
A very similar pattern appeared in the great French revolution: in the ebb tide of the movement there emerged an extreme left wing which expressed its dissatisfaction with the purely political freedoms allegedly enshrined in the new constitution, since they above all favored the freedom of capital to exploit the propertyless majority. The ‘Babeuvist' current expressed the efforts of the emerging urban proletariat, which had made so many sacrifices for the bourgeoisie I s revolution, to strike out in favor of its own class interests, and thus it ineluctably arrived at the demand for communism. In the Manifesto of the Equals it proclaimed the perspective of a new and final revolution: "The French Revolution is but the forerunner of another revolution, far more grand, far more solemn, and which will be the last ... ".
On the theoretical level, the Equals were a more mature expression of the communist impulse than the True Levellers of a century and a half before. Not only were they almost completely free of the old religious terminology, they also groped towards a materialist conception of history as the history of class struggle. Perhaps more significantly, they recognized the inevitability of armed insurrection against the power of the ruling class: the ‘Conspiracy of the Equals' in 1796 was the concretization of this understanding. Basing themselves on the experiences of direct democracy which had developed in the Paris sections and the ‘Commune' of 93, they also envisaged a revolutionary state that went beyond conventional parliamentarism by imposing the principle of revocability on its elected officials.
And yet, once again, the immaturity of the material conditions could not help but find their expression in the political immaturity of the Babeuvist ‘party'. Since the proletariat of Paris had not yet clearly emerged as a distinct force among the ‘sans culottes', the urban poor in general, the Babeuvists themselves were unclear about who the revolutionary subject could be: the Manifesto of the Equals was addressed not to the proletariat, but to the ‘People of France'. Lacking any clear vision of the revolutionary subject, the Babeuvist view of insurrection and revolutionary dictatorship was essentially elitist: a select few would seize power on behalf of the form- less masses, and would subsequently hold onto the power until these masses were truly able to .govern themselves (views of this kind were to persist in the workers' movement for some decades after the French revolution, above all in the Blanquist tendency which was organically descended from Babeuvism, particularly through the person of Buonarroti).
But the immaturity of Babeuvism was expressed not only in the means it advocated (which in any case ended in the total fiasco of the 1796 putsch), but also in the crudeness of its conception of communist society. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Marx lambasted the heirs of Babeuf as expressions of this "crude and thoughtless communism"; which is "only the culmination of this envy and of this level- ling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum ... How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not even reached it" (from the chapter ‘Private Property and Communism'). Marx even went so far as to say that this crude communism would really be a continuation of capital- ism: "The community is only a community of labor, and of equality of wages paid out by communal capital - the com- munity as the universal capitalist."[4] Marx was quite justified in attacking Babeuf s heirs whose views were by now quite obsolete, but the original problem was an objective one. At the end of the 18th century France was still largely an agricultural society and the communists of the day could not easily have seen the possibility of a society of abundance. Hence their communism could only be "ascetic, denouncing all the pleasures of life, Spartan" (Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific), a mere "leveling down proceeding from the preconceived minimum". It was another irony of history that it took the immense deprivations of the industrial revolution to awaken the exploited class to the possibility of a society in which sensuous enjoyment would replace Spartan self-denial.
The retreat of the great revolutionary tide at the end of the 1790s, the incapacity of the proletariat to act as an independent political force, did not mean that the virus of communism had been eradicated. It took on a new form - that of the Utopian Socialists. The Utopians - Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen and others - were far less insurrectionary, far less related to the revolutionary struggle of the masses than the Babeuvists had been. At first sight they could therefore look like a step backwards. It is true that they were the characteristic product of a period of reaction, and represented a flight away from the world of political combat. Nevertheless Marx
and Engels always recognized their debt to the Utopians, and considered them to have made. Significant advances over the ‘crude communism' of the Equals, above all in their criticisms of capitalist civilization and their elaboration of a possible communist alternative:
"These Socialist and Communist publications contain' also a critical element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence they are full of the most valuable material for the enlightenment of the working class. The practical measures proposed in them - such as the abolition of the distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system, the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the functions of the state into a mere superintendence of production, all these proposals point solely to the disappearance of class antagonisms which were, at that time, only just cropping ‘up, and which, in these publications, are recognized in their earliest and undejiite4 forms only" (Communist Manifesto, section on ‘Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism').
In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific Engels goes into more detail about the specific contributions of the main Utopian thinkers: Saint-Simon is credited with recognizing the French revolution as a class war, and with foretelling the complete absorption of politics by economics, and thus the eventual abolition of the state. Fourier is presented as a brilliant critic and satirist of bourgeois hypocrisy, misery and alienation, and with having made masterly use of the dialectical method to uncover the principal stages of historical development. We might add that with Fourier in particular there is a definite rupture with the ascetic communism of the Equals, above all in his profound concern to replace alienated labor with joyful, creative activity. Engels' brief biography of Robert Owen focuses on his more practical, Anglo-Saxon search for an alternative to capitalist exploitation, whether in the ‘ideal' cotton mills at New Lanark or in his various experiments in cooperative and communal living. But Engels also recognizes Owen's bravery in breaking away from his own class and throwing in his lot with the proletariat; his later efforts to set up a grand trade union for all the workers of England marked a step beyond benevolent philanthropy in favor of participating in the proletariat's earliest attempts to find its own class identity and organization.
But in the final analysis, what applied to the earlier stirrings of proletarian communism applied in equal measure to the Utopians: the crudeness of their theories was the result of the crude conditions of capitalist production in which they emerged. Unable to see the social and economic contradictions that would ultimately lead to the downfall of capitalist exploitation, they could only envisage the new society coming about as the result of plans and inventions hatched in their own brains. Unable to recognize the revolutionary potential of the working class, they "consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every member of society even that of the most favored. Hence they habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they understand their system, fail to see in. it the best possible plan of the best possible state of society. Hence, they reject all political and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social gospel" (Communist Manifesto, op cit).
Thus the Utopians ended up not only building castles in the air, but also preaching class collaboration and social pacifism. And what was understandable given the immaturity of the objective conditions in the first decades of the 19th century was no longer forgivable when the Communist Manifesto was being written. By this time, the descendants of Utopianism constituted a major obstacle to the development of the scientific communism embodied in the Marx-Engels fraction of the Communist League.
In the next article in this series we will examine the emergence and maturation of the marxist vision of communist society and of the road that leads to it. CDW.
[1] See for example the editorial to International Review 67, ‘It's not communism that's collapsing but the chaos of capitalism that's accelerating'; the article ‘Stalinism is the negation of communism' in World Revolution no. 148 and Revolution Internationale 205); and the Manifesto of the 9th Congress of the ICC: ‘Communist revolution or the destruction of humanity'.
[2] Today these ideologies are most often the characteristic expression of the decomposing petty bourgeoisie, in particular of anarchist currents disillusioned not only with the working class, but with the whole of history since the dawn if civilization, and seeking solace in a projecting the myth of the lost paradise onto the first human communities. Typical examples are the American paper The Fifth Estate and Freddy Perlman's book Against Leviathan. Against His-story. An irony often lost on these elements is that once you investigate the beliefs of the primitive peoples themselves, it be- comes clear that they too had their ‘lost paradise' buried in a far-past mythic age. If we take such myths to reflect an unresolved desire to transcend the boundaries of alienation, then it is obvious that primitive man also experienced a form of alienation, a conclusion consistent with the marxist view of these societies.
[3] The conservative nature of these revolts was reinforced by the fact that in all the class societies that preceded capitalism, vestiges of the old primordial communal bonds remained in existence to a greater or lesser extent. This meant that the revolts of the exploited classes were always heavily influenced by a desire to defend and preserve traditional communal rights that had been usurped by the extension of private property.
[4] In this critique of Babouvism, we can see that Marx already emphasized that capitalism was not just based on individual private property, since he talked about "collective capital". We can thus measure how far his conception of communism has nothing to do with the greatest lie of the 20th century, which tells us that state capitalism in the USSR was ‘communist' simply because the private bourgeoisie had been expropriated.
Towards the greatest chaos in history
Will the gigantic convulsions provoked by the collapse of the eastern bloc and the break-up of the USSR open up a more peaceful period? Faced with the threat of chaos, will the ferocity of relations between capitalist powers be attenuated? Is the constitution of new imperialist blocs still possible? What new contradictions will arise from capitalist decomposition at the level of world imperialism?
Rivalries between the powers aren't disappearing, they are being exacerbated
While the world has indeed been profoundly modified since the collapse of the western bloc, the barbaric laws which keep this moribund system going are still present. And, as capitalism sinks further and further into decomposition their destructive character, the threat they pose to the very survival of humanity, grow more and more pronounced. The scourge of war, that monstrous but natural offspring of imperialism, is still there and will continue to be there; the plague of chaos, which has already plunged the populations of the ‘third world' into an unspeakable hell, is now ravaging the whole of eastern Europe.
In fact, behind the pacifist proclamations of the great imperialist powers of the now-defunct American bloc, behind the masks of respectability and good intentions they all wear, relations between states are in fact regulated by gangster law. Like any bunch of thugs, it all comes ·down to nabbing the other's strip of territory, getting together to rid themselves of a rival whose claws are too sharp, figuring out ways of escaping the clutches of a boss who's become too powerful. These are the real questions which are the subject for ‘debate' between the bourgeoisies of these great ‘civilized' and 'democratic' countries.
"Imperialism is not the creation of . one country or one group of countries. It is the product of the world-wide evolution of capitalism ... an innately international phenomenon ... from which no state can hold aloof," (Rosa Luxemburg, Junius Pamphlet).
When capitalism entered its decadent epoch, imperialism dominated the entire planet, it became "the means of survival of every nation, large or small, " (ICC Platform). It's not a policy ‘chosen' by the bourgeoisie, or this or that fraction of the bourgeoisie. It's an absolute necessity imposed upon them all.
This is why the collapse of the eastern bloc, and the resulting disappearance of the western bloc, in no way signifies the' end of the reign of imperialism. The end of the division of the world into' the ‘blocs' which arose after World War Two has on the contrary unleashed a whole series of new imperialist tensions, of local wars, sharpening the rivalries be- tween the great powers formerly disciplined by the western bloc.
Rivalries within the blocs themselves always existed, and sometimes broke out openly: for example between Turkey and Greece, both members of NATO, over Cyprus in 1974. However, these rivalries were kept under the firm control of the bloc. Once the iron corset of the bloc has gone, these tensions, held in for so long, can only be exacerbated.
American capital faced with the new appetite of its vassals
For decades, the submission of Europe and Japan to the US was the price paid for the military protection Washington provided against the ‘Soviet' threat. Since this threat has now disappeared, Europe and Japan no longer have the same interest in following American diktats. The tendency towards ‘every man for himself has been unchained.
This is what we saw very clearly in the autumn of 1990, when Germany, Japan and France tried to prevent the out- break of a war which could only reinforce American superiority[1]. The USA, by forcing the war through, by obliging Germany and Japan to pay up and by compelling France to take part in it, won a clear victory. For all this provided proof of the weakness of those who might be tempted to dispute America's domination. It demonstrated the US's vast military superiority, making it plain that no state, however economically powerful, could hope to rival it on the military level.
The ‘Desert Shield' and ‘Desert Storm' operations of sinister memory, a war imposed and taken to its logical conclusion by Bush and his team, by momentarily halting the rush towards ‘every man for himself amongst the central countries, had the essential aim of preventing and counter-acting the potential reconstitution of a rival bloc, of maintaining the USA as the sole super-power. "However, this immediate success of American policy is not a durable factor stabilizing the world situation to the extent that it could arrest the very causes of the chaos into which society is sinking. If the other powers have had to reign in their ambitions, their basic antagonism with the United States has not disappeared: ~ what is shown by the latent hostility that countries like France and Germany expresses vis a vis the American projects for the re-utilization of the structures of NATO in-the framework of a ‘rapid reaction force', commanded, as if by chance, by the only reliable ally of the US: Britain," (lR 67, ‘Resolution on the International Situation', 9th ICC Congress).
The subsequent evolution of the situation has fully confirmed this analysis. Deteriorating relations between the states of the European Community, and particularly France and Germany one the one hand, and the USA on the other - whether it's about the future of NATO and ‘European Defense' or the Yugoslav crisis - is an illustration of the limits of the blow struck by the Gulf war against the tendency to- wards ‘every man for himself among the main capitalist powers.
Today, challenging the present imperialist status quo, which has always been imposed by force, necessarily means confronting the world's leading power, the USA, which is the main beneficiary of this status quo. And since the ex- USSR no longer has the means to compete in the front ranks of the imperialist arena, the biggest imperialist tensions are now between the ‘victors of the Cold War' themselves, ie: between the central states of the now-defunct Western bloc[2].
But in the imperialist battle-ground, the disappearance of one system of blocs organically engenders a tendency to- wards the constitution of new blocs, since each state need allies in the struggle to assert itself on a global scale. Indeed, blocs are "the classic structure used by the main states in the period of decadence to ‘organize' their armed confrontations," ('Resolution on the International Situation', ibid).
Towards new blocs?
The present growth of imperialist tensions contains the tendency towards the constitution of new blocs, one of which would have to be directed against the USA. However, the interest in forming such a bloc varies considerably according to the states.
Who?
As far as Britain is concerned, it has no such interest, since it has decided on an unbreakable alliance with the USA[3].
For a whole series of countries like, for example, Holland and Denmark, there is the fear of being virtually absorbed if they allied with a German super-power in Europe, which would be facilitated by the economic links which already exist and by their geographical and linguistic proximity. Following the old principle of military strategy, which recommends that you shouldn't ally yourself with a too-powerful neighbor, they have very little interest in challenging American domination.
For a more important, but still middle-ranking power like France, contesting American leadership and participating in a new bloc isn't a very obvious option, because in order to do . this, it would have to follow German policies, whereas for France, German imperialism is the most immediate and dangerous rival, as the two world wars have shown.
Caught between the German anvil and the American hammer, France's imperialist policies can only oscillate between the two. However, like the mode of production which it reflects, imperialism is not a rational phenomenon. France, even though it has a lot to lose and though its potential gains are looking increasingly hazardous, is for the moment tend- ing to play the German card, opposing American domination vis-a-vis NATO and through the formation of a Franco-German brigade. This however doesn't exclude future changes of direction.
On the other hand, things are a lot clearer for first-rank: powers like Germany and Japan. For them, finding an imperialist rung in conformity with their economic strength can only mean disputing the world domination exerted by the USA. Moreover, only these two states have the potential means to play a world role.
But the chances of one or the other becoming leaders of a bloc opposed to the USA are not the same.
We shouldn't underestimate the strength and ambition of Japanese imperialism. It is also coming back to the imperialist arena. Evidence of this can be found in the plan to modify the constitution in order to permit Japanese troops to be sent abroad, the considerable strengthening of its navy, its determination to recoup the Kuile Islands, or some unambiguous declarations by Japanese officials (eg "it's time that Japan freed itself from its links with the USA,' T Kunugi, ex-Joint Secretary of the UN, quoted in Liberation 27.9. 91).
But Japan is very far away from the world's main industrial concentration, ie Europe, which remains the main focus for imperialist rivalries. At this level, it can't really rival Germany. Japanese imperialism is thus trying to extend its influence and increase its elbow room without too openly challenging the US muscle-man.
Germany, on the other hand, because of its central situation in Europe and its economic power, is being obliged more and more to oppose American policies, and now finds itself at the center of imperialist tensions, as can be seen from its reticence towards the US plans for NATO, its aim to set up an embryonic ‘European Defense Force', and above all, its attitude over Yugoslavia.
German capital stirs the pot in Yugoslavia
German imperialism has played the role of stirring the pot in Yugoslavia by supporting the secessionist demands of the Slovenians and above all the Croats, as can be seen from Germany's repeated intention to unilaterally recognize Croatian independence. Historically, the Yugoslav state was cobbled together to counter Germany's imperialist expansion and deny it access to the Mediterranean[4]. We can thus see why Croatian independence could open a whole new era for the German bourgeoisie and why the latter has been doing its best to profit from it. Given its close links with the leaders in Zagreb, Germany was hoping that, in case of independence, it would be able to use the precious Croatian ports in the Adriatic. It could thus have realized a vital strategic objective: access to the Mediterranean. This is why Germany, with the aid of Austria[5], has been stoking the fires by openly or covertly supporting Croatian secessionism, which could only accelerate the dislocation of Yugoslavia.
The US thwarts Germany
Conscious of what's at stake here, the American bourgeoisie, despite its apparent discretion, has done everything it could to block this attempted thrust by German imperialism, calling on the aid of Britain and Holland. Its Trojan Horse inside the EC, Britain, has systematically opposed any sending of a European military intervention force. The Serbian Stalinist military apparatus, which has signed and violated any number of cease-fires organized by the powerless, whinging EC, has been able to wage a methodical war of conquest in Croatia, tinder the consenting silence of the US.
It's already clear that Germany has failed in Yugoslavia; the divisions and impotence of the EC are equally clear. This failure shows all the strong points of the world's leading power in its fight to preserve its hegemony, and underlines the enormous difficulties German imperialism will have in disputing this hegemony.
However, this does not mean that there will be a return to some kind of stability in Yugoslavia, because the dynamic unleashed there will condemn the country to sink: further and further into a Lebanese type of situation. Nor does it mean that from now on, Germany Will submit tamely to all the diktats of Uncle Sam. German imperialism has lost a battle but it can't stop trying to undermine the USA's hegemony. This can be seen from its decision to set up an armed unit in collaboration with France, a clear expression of its intention to gain more autonomy from NATO and thus the USA.Chaos is holding back the constitution of new blocs
While it is necessary to recognize that there is already a tendency towards the constitution of new imperialist blocs, a process within which Germany occupies[6], and will. More and more occupy, a central place, it is not possible to assert that this tendency can really reach its conclusion. Because of decomposition, it comes up against a series of particularly significant obstacles and contradictions - most of them without precedent.
First of all, and this is a fundamental difference with the situation that preceded the First and Second World Wars, Germany does not have the military strength to match its imperialist ambitions. It is almost defenseless in the face of the formidable American superpower[7]. In order to develop the necessary muscle, it would take time, a minimum of 10 to 15 years, and the USA is doing everything it can to prevent Germany from developing in this direction. But there's also the fact that, in order to install the war economy required for such a rearmament, the German bourgeoisie would have to get the proletariat to submit to a real militarization of labor. And it could only do this by inflicting a total defeat on the working class. For the moment, however, the conditions for such a defeat are lacking. Even if we stop there, it's obvious that the obstacles are quite considerable.
But there's another equally essential factor which is acting against the evolution towards the reconstitution of a ‘bloc' under German leadership: the chaos that is now invading a growing number of countries. Not only does this make it more difficult to obtain the discipline needed to set up a ‘bloc' of imperialist alliances, but also the German bourgeoisie, like all the bourgeoisies of the most developed countries, is afraid of the advance of chaos - all the more so because of its geographic position. It's this fear, combined with the pressure exerted by the USA, which ensured that despite all its reservations the German bourgeoisie finally sup- ported Bush in the Gulf War, as did Japan and France.
Despite its desire to escape American ‘protection' the Ger- man bourgeoisie knows that for the moment only the US has the capacity to put some kind of block on the advance of chaos.
None of the great imperialist powers has any interest in the spread of chaos: the massive arrival of immigrants, immigrants who can hardly be integrated into production at a time when there are already massive lay-offs going on; the uncontrolled spread of armaments, including enormous stocks of atomic weapons; the risk of major industrial catastrophes, in particular nuclear ones, and so on. All this can only destabilize the states exposed to it, and make the management of their national capital even more difficult. If the system's rotting on its feet is, in present conditions, profoundly negative for the entire working class, it also threatens the bourgeoisie and the running of its system of exploitation.
In the front line of the most dangerous consequences of the collapse of the eastern bloc and the implosion of the USSR, Germany is, in part at least, forced to rally behind the in- junctions of the only power which can play the role of world cop: the USA.
Thus, in this period of decomposition, each national bourgeoisie of the most developed countries is faced with a new contradiction, in that it is compelled:The tendency towards the constitution of new imperialist blocs, which is built into the general tendency in imperialism towards confrontations between the biggest powers, is thus faced with a contradiction which means it will probably never reach its conclusion.
Even the ‘world cop', the USA, for whom the struggle against chaos is most completely and immediately identical to the struggle for the preservation of the current status quo, one in which it has a dominant position, can't escape from this dilemma. By unleashing the Gulf war, the USA wanted to make an example of its capacity to ‘maintain order' and so bring to heel anyone who might contest its world leadership. The result of this war has been even more instability in the region, from Turkey to Syria. In particular, we've seen the continuation of massacres of the Kurdish population, not only by the Iraqi army but also by the Turkish army!In Yugoslavia, the USA's implicit support for the Serbian camp has blocked Germany's push towards the Mediterranean, but it has also thrown oil on the fire, helping barbarism spread throughout Yugoslavian territory and destabilizing the entire ‘Balkans.' The only real resort of the ‘world cop' - militarism and war - inevitably aggravates the development of barbarism and pushes it to a point of paroxysm.
The dislocation of the USSR, because of its dimensions, its depth (Russia itself is now threatened with disintegration), is a major factor aggravating chaos on a world scale: the risk of the biggest population exodus in history, of major nuclear disasters ...[8]. Faced with such a cataclysm, the contradiction confronting the great powers can only be raised to the nth degree. On the one hand, there's a need for a minimum of unity faced with such a situation; on the other hand, the collapse of the former Soviet empire can only sharpen imperialist appetites.
Here again, Germany finds itself in a particularly delicate position. Eastern Europe, including Russia, is a traditional sphere of influence and expansion for German imperialism. Alliances and confrontations with Russia have always been at the nub of the history of German capitalism. History as well as geography is pushing German capital to extend its influence to the east, and it can't help trying to profit from the collapse of the eastern bloc and its leader. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, it's obviously German capital which has had the greatest presence, both diplomatically and economically, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and throughout the east, with the exception of Poland which, despite the economic links, is attempting to resist German influence for historical reasons.
But faced with the total dislocation of the USSR, the situation is becoming much more complex and difficult for Eu- rope's leading economic power. Germany may try to profit from the situation to defend its interests, it may in particular try to create a ‘Mittel Europa' a ‘Central Europe' under its influence, but the dislocation of the USSR and the collapse of all the eastern countries IS at the same time a more direct and dangerous threat to Germany than to any other country at the heart of the international capitalist system.
‘Unification' with the ex-GDR is already a heavy burden which is holding back the competitiveness of German capital and will more and more do so. The massive arrival of immigrants for whom Germany is the promised land, plus the nu- clear risks already mentioned, are provoking deep disquiet in the German ruling class.
Contrary to the situation in Yugoslavia which, despite its gravity, affects a country of no more than 22 million inhabitants, the situation in the ex-USSR makes the German bourgeoisie much more cautious.
This is why, while attempting to extend its influence, it is trying by all means at its disposal, to bring a minimum of stability to the situation, and for the moment is carefully avoiding throwing oil on the fire[9]. This is why it continues to be Gorbachev's strongest supporter and the main provider of economic aid to the ex-Empire. It has, in general, fol- lowed the USA's policies towards the ex-USSR. It could not but support the recent initiatives towards a ‘disarmament' of tactical nuclear weapons, since the aim of this was to help and compel the vestiges of central power in the USSR to get rid of weapons whose spread is a real sword of Damocles hanging not only over the ex-USSR, but also a good part of Europe[10].
The breadth of the dangers of chaos is forcing the most developed states to maintain a certain unity to try to deal with it, and for the moment none of them is playing the card of ‘the worse the better' in the ex-USSR. However, this unity is very temporary and limited. There's no way that the threat of chaos can allow the great powers to stifle their imperialist rivalries. This means that German capitalism cannot and will not renounce its imperialist appetites, any more than any other central power.
Even when confronted with the grave dangers brought about by the disintegration of the eastern bloc and the USSR, each imperialism will still try to defend its own interests as best it can. Thus, at the recent Bangkok summit on the subject of the economic aid to be given to the fallen leader of the ex-eastern bloc, all the governments present were aware of the necessity to strengthen this aid, in order to prevent the outbreak of catastrophes in the near future. But each one was also trying to ensure that this costs it as little as possible, and that it is the other, the rival, which hears the heaviest burden. The USA ‘generously' proposed to annul part of the Soviet debt, an offer firmly refused by Germany for the simple reason that it is already owed nearly 40 % of this debt itself!
This contradiction between the need of the major powers to hold back chaos, to limit its extension, and the equally vital need to defend their own imperialist interest, will reach a state of paroxysm the more what's left of the ex-USSR falls to pieces.
The tidal wave of chaos
Decomposition, by sharpening all the traits of decadence, in particular those of imperialism, has qualitatively overturned the world situation, especially at the level of inter-imperialist relations.
In a context of increasingly bloody barbarism, whose horror is more and more matched by its absurdity - an absurdity which reflects a mode of production which is totally obsolete from a historic point of view - the only future which the exploiting class can offer humanity is one marked by the greatest chaos in history.
The imperialist rivalries between the most developed states of the defunct western bloc are unfolding in the context of the generalized putrefaction of the capitalist system. Tensions between the ‘great democracies' can only sharpen, in particularly between the USA and the dominant power of the European continent, Germany. The fact that up till now this antagonism has been expressed in a covert manner does not lessen its reality.
Even if the most powerful national fractions of the world bourgeoisie have a common interest in the face of chaos, this community of interests can only be circumstantial and limited. It cannot eliminate the natural and organic tendency of imperialism towards sharpened competition, rivalry and military tensions. Today, this tendency participates to the hilt in . chaos and its aggravation. The imperialist free-for-all that the great powers are now involved in can only result in chaos advancing to the heart of Europe, as illustrated tragically by the barbaric war in Yugoslavia.
The oscillating and incoherent policies of the most solid states of the capitalist world will result in a growing instability of alliances. The latter will be more and more circumstantial and subject to all kins of changes of direction. Thus France, after to some extent playing the German card, could very easily play the American card tomorrow, and the day after start again. Germany, which has been supporting the ‘center' in Russia, could tomorrow choose the secessionist republics. The contradictory and incoherent character of the imperialist policies of the great powers expresses in the final analysis the tendency for the ruling class to lose control of a system ravaged by its advanced decadence, by its decomposition.
Putrefaction, the growing dislocation of the whole of society, this is the ‘radiant' perspective that this dying system offers humanity. This can only underline the extreme gravity of the present historic period, and the immense responsibility of the only class that can offer a real future: the proletariat. RN 18.11.91
[1] On the false unity between the industrialized countries during the Gulf war, see the editorial article in IR 64.
[2] See ‘The USSR in Pieces', IR 66: ‘Ex-USSR, it's not Communism that's collapsing' IR 67.
[3] On the respective attitudes of Britain and France vis a vis the USA, see ‘Report on the International Situation (Extracts)' in IR 67.
[4] See the article 'Bilan of 70 years of 'National Liberation" in this issue
[5] With their interminable oscillations, France and Italy have also contributed to this murderous destabilization.
[6] Germany is no more able than any other capitalist sate to escape the laws ruling all capitalist life in decadence. The problem faced by the push of German imperialism is not in itself the desire or will of the German bourgeoisie. No doubt this bourgeoisie, or at least some of it fractions, are concerned faced with this push, this plunge into the imperialist scramble. But whatever the concerns, the hesitations, it will be constrained (if only to prevent an adversary occupying its place) to more and more affirm its imperialist aims. This was the case with the Japanese bourgeoisie in 1940, where many of its fraction were reticent to enter the war. What counts is not the will but what the bourgeoisie is forced to do.
[7] Germany is still militarily occupied by the USA and in the main control over the German army's munitions is exerted by the American command. German troops have no autonomy beyond a few days. The Franco-German brigade has the aim of giving a greater autonomy to the German army.
[8] Recently the ‘Chechen' nationalists threatened to attack nuclear reactors; armored trains which may contain tactical nuclear weapons are circulating the frontiers of the USSR, outside of any control.
[9] See on the one hand the attitude to Germany towards the ‘Baltic' countries, and its ambitions to push for a ‘German republic of the Volga' and on the other hand its support to what remains of the ‘center' in the ex-USSR.
[10] This doesn't alter the fact that this 'disarmament' is a lie because it only aims to suppress weapons which have become obsolete and would in any case have had to be replaced by more modern and sophisticated ones.
Throughout the 20th century,
all the ‘new nations’ are no sooner born than dying. At the beginning of the century there were
about 40 independent nations in the world, today there are 169, to which we
have to add the 20 coming out of the explosion of the USSR and Yugoslavia.
The fiasco of the chain of ‘new nations’
created throughout the 20th century, and the certain ruin of the most recent ones,
are the clearest expressions of capitalism’s bankruptcy. From the beginning of
the century the order of the day for revolutionaries has not been the creation
of new frontiers, but their destruction through the proletarian world revolution.
This is the central axis of the present series on the balance sheet of 70
years of ‘national liberation’ struggles.
In the first article of the series (International Review 66) we demonstrated how ‘national liberation’ acted as a deadly poison for the international revolutionary wave of 191 7-23; in the second part (IR 68) we showed how ‘national liberation’ wars and the new states form inseparable cogs of imperialism and imperialist wars. In this third part we want to demonstrate the tragic economic and social disaster caused by the existence of the 150 nations created in the 20th century.
Reality has pulverised all the brave words about the ‘developing countries’ which were supposed to become new, dynamic poles of economic development. All the blather about the new ‘bourgeois revolutions’ which were supposed to bring about an explosion of prosperity based on the natural wealth contained in the former colonies has ended up in a gigantic fiasco: one in which capitalism has shown itself to be incapable of making use of two thirds of the planet, of integrating into global production the billions of peasants it has ruined.
The essential criterion for judging whether the proletariat should or shouldn’t support the formation of new nations is this: what is the historical dynamic of capitalism? If it is one of expansion and development, as in the 19th century, then workers could support it - but only for certain countries, which really represented a movement of expansion, and on condition of maintaining the autonomy of the proletarian class. However, with capitalism’s entry into its epoch of mortal decadence, that is, since the First World War, this support no longer has any validity and must be emphatically rejected.
“The national programme could play an historic role only so long as it represented the ideological expression of a growing bourgeoisie, lusting for power, until it had fastened its class rule, in some way or the other, upon the great nations of central Europe and had created within them the necessary tools and conditions of its growth. Since then, imperialism has buried the old bourgeois democratic programme completely by substituting expansionist activity irrespective of national relationships for the original programme of the bourgeoisie in all nations. The national phrase, to be sure, has been preserved, but its real content, its function has been perverted into its very opposite. Today the nation is but a cloak that covers imperialistic desires, a battle cry for imperialistic rivalries, the last ideological measure with which the masses can be persuaded to play the role of cannon fodder in imperialistic wars” [1] [100].
This historical and global criterion is quite opposite to those based on abstract speculation and on a partial and contingent vision. Thus, the Stalinists, Trotskyists and even certain proletarian groups have cited, in support of the call for ‘national independence’ for countries in Africa, Asia etc, the argument that these countries have important feudal and pre-capitalist leftovers. From this they deduce that the ‘bourgeois revolution’ and not the proletarian revolution is on the agenda.
What these gentlemen deny is that the integration of all of the essential territories of the planet into the world market closes off the possibility of capitalist expansion, resulting in a permanent and insoluble crisis. This is a state of affairs which dominates the life of all countries: “If it survives, the old formation retains control over society, guiding it not towards new fields of development of the productive forces, but, in line with its new and henceforth reactionary nature, towards their destruction” [2] [101].
Another argument in favour of the creation of new nations is that they possess immense natural resources which could and should be developed to free them from foreign tutelage. This argument falls into the same localist and abstract vision. Enormous potentialities certainly exist, but they cannot be developed because every country is dominated by decadence and chronic crisis.
From its origins, capitalism has been based on furious competition, as much at the level of nations as of individual firms. This has produced an unequal development of production according to country. However, while “the law of the unequal development of capitalism, on which Lenin and his epigones based their theory of the weakest link, was expressed in the ascendant period of capitalism through a powerful push by the backward countries towards catching up with and even overtaking the most developed ones ... this tendency tends to reverse itself as the system as a whole reaches its objective historical limits and finds itself incapable of extending the world market in relation to the necessities imposed by the development of the productive forces. Having reached its historical limits, the system in decline no longer offers any possibility of an equalisation of development: on the contrary it entails the stagnation of all development through waste, unproductive labour and destruction. The only ‘catching up’ that now takes place is the one that leads the most advanced countries towards the situation existing in the backward countries - economic convulsions, poverty, state capitalist measures. In the 19th century, it was the advanced country, Britain, which showed the way forward for the rest: today it is the third world countries which, in a way, indicate the future in store for the advanced ones. However, even in these conditions, there cannot be a real ‘equalisation’ of the situation of the different countries in the world. While it does not spare any country, the world crisis exerts its most devastating effects not on the most powerful, developed countries, but on the countries which arrived too late in the world economic arena and whose path towards development has been definitely barred by the older powers” [3] [102].
This is concretised in the way that “the law of supply and demand works against the development of new countries. In a world where markets are saturated, supply exceeds demand and prices are determined by the lowest production costs. Because of this, the countries with the highest production costs are forced to sell their commodities at reduced profits or even a loss. This ensures that they have an extremely low rate of accumulation and, even with a very cheap labour force, they are unable to realise the investments needed for the massive acquisition of modern technology. The result of this is that the gulf which separates them from the great industrial powers can only get wider” [4] [103].
Therefore “the period of capitalist decadence is characterised by the impossibility of any new industrial nations emerging. The countries which didn’t make up for lost time before World War I were subserviently doomed to stagnate in a state of total underdevelopment, or to remain chronically backward in relation to the countries at the top of the sand-castle”. In this framework, “in the 20th century protectionist policies have been a total failure. Far from allowing the less developed economies to have a breathing space, they have led to the asphyxiation of the national economy” [5] [104].
In these global economic conditions, war and imperialism -fundamental features of decadent capitalism - are imposed as an implacable law on all counties and act as a millstone around the neck of the new nations. In the situation of stagnation, which reigns over the world economy, each national capital can only survive if it arms itself to the teeth. As a consequence, each national state is obliged to make the appropriate alterations to its economy (creation of heavy industry; location of industries in strategic areas, which has grievous results for global production; subordination of the infrastructure and communications to military activity; enormous ‘defence’ costs, etc) - all of which produces serious consequences for the whole national economy in countries whose social base is underdeveloped at all levels (economic, cultural, etc):
- the artificial injection of very advanced technologies into this social fabric results in a squandering of resources and an increasingly aggravated disequilibrium of economic and social activity;
- likewise, the necessity to confront spiralling costs, which can never be paid, produces growing indebtedness and ever-increasing fiscal pressure: “The capitalist state, under the imperious necessity to establish a war economy, is a huge insatiable consumer which creates its buying power through massive borrowing that drains all national savings, under the control of and with the self-seeking assent of finance capital; it pays for all this by mortgaging the future incomes of the proletariat and small peasants” [6] [105].
In Oman, the defence budget absorbs 46% of public spending, in North Korea it is not less than 24% of GNP. In Thailand, in 1991 production fell, agriculture only grew by 1% and the education budget was cut, but “the military have shown their willingness to cooperate with Europe and the United States in the modernisation of the army and have even more clearly allied themselves with the Western camp, proposing to buy German transport helicopters, various Franco/British-built Lynx helicopters, a squadron (12 planes) of F16 fighter bombers and 5(%) American M60, A1 and M48 AS tanks” [7] [106]. Burma has an infant mortality rate of 64.5 per 1000 (it is 9 per 1000 in the USA), a life-expectancy of 61 years (75.9 in the US), while only 673 books were published (for a population of 41 million) “From 1988 to 1990 the Burmese army grew from 170,000 to 230,000) men and its arsenal was also improved. In October 1990 it ordered 654 Yugoslavian planes and 20 Polish helicopters. In November it signed a $1200 million contract - its foreign debt is $417.1 million - with China to buy, amongst other things, 12 F7 planes, 12 F6 and 60 armoured personnel carriers” [8] [107].
India is a particularly serious example. The huge military machine in this country is in a great measure responsible for the fact that “between 1961 and 1970, the percentage of the rural population which lived below the physical minimum rose from 52 to 70%. While in 1880 each Indian had available 270 kgs of cereals and dried pulses, by 1966 this had fallen to l34kgs” [9] [108]. “In 1960 the military budget was the equivalent of 2% of GNP or $600 million. In order to renew its arsenal and military equipment arms factories have multiplied, increasing and diversifying their production. A decade later, the military budget is equal to $1600 million or 3.5% of GNP ... to this we can add the strengthening of the infrastructure, in particular strategic routes, naval bases
The third military programme, which covers 1974 to 79, will absorb $2500 million annually” [10] [109]. Since 1973 India has produced an atomic bomb and developed a programme of nuclear research, power stations for the fusion of plutonium etc. This has produced one of the highest percentages of GNP dedicated to ‘scientific research’ in the world (0.9%!).
The disadvantage of the new countries compared to the more developed ones is accentuated by militarism. The 16 largest countries of the third world (India, China, Brazil, Turkey, Vietnam, South Africa etc) went from having 7 million soldiers in 1970 to 9 million in 1990, an increase of 32%. On the other hand, the four most industrialised countries (the USA, Japan, Germany and France) reduced their number of troops from 4.4 million in 1970 to 3.3 million in 1990, a reduction of 26% [11] [110]. It’s not that the latter have relaxed their military effort: they have merely made it more productive by economising on human expenses. The opposite tendency has been unfolding in the less developed countries: despite increased spending on sophisticated technological weapons, they have had to increase their dependence on manpower.
This necessity to give priority to the military effort has grave political consequences, which further aggravate economic and social chaos, and the general weakness of these nations: it imposes an inevitable and forced alliance with the remnants of feudal society and all the other backward sectors, because it is more vital to maintain national cohesion in the face of the imperialist world jungle than to ensure the ‘modernisation’ of the economy, which becomes a secondary and indeed utopian objective compared to the requirements of imperialist competition.
The survival of feudalism and pre-capitalist formations expresses the burden of the colonial and semi-colonial past, which has left these countries as specialised economies dependent upon the production of minerals and basic agricultural products, thus monstrously deforming them: “Hence the contradictory phenomenon whereby imperialism exports the capitalist mode of production and systematically destroys pre-capitalist: economic formations - while simultaneously holding back the development of native capital by ruthlessly plundering the colonial economies, subordinating their industrial development to the specific needs of the metropolitan economy, and bolstering up the most reactionary and submissive elements in the native ruling class ... In the colonies and the semi-colonies there were to be no fully formed, independent national capitals with their own bourgeois revolutions and healthy economic bases, but rather stunted caricatures of the metropolitan capitals weighed down by the decomposing remnants of the previous mode of production, industrialised in pockets to serve foreign interests, with bourgeoisies that were weak, born senile, both at the economic and at the political level” [12] [111].
The old metropoles - France, Britain etc - along with their competitors - the USA, the USSR, Germany, exacerbated these problems by ensnaring the ‘new nations’ in a thick spiders web of investments, loans, occupation of strategic enclaves, “treaties of assistance, cooperation and mutual defence”, integrating them into their international organisations for defence, commerce etc, all of which has tied them hand and foot and created a practically insurmountable handicap.
The Trotskyists, Maoists and all types of third worldists call this reality ‘neo-colonialism’. This term is a smokescreen that hides the decadence of world capitalism and the impossibility of the development of new nations. They blame the problems of the third world on ‘foreign domination’. Foreign domination certainly blocks the development of these new nations, but it is not the only factor and above all it can only be understood as a constituent element of the global conditions of decadent capitalism, dominated by militarism, war and stagnant production.
To complete this tableau, it should be said that the new nations are born with an original sin: their territories are incoherent, made up of a chaotic mixture of ethnic, religious, economic and cultural remnants; their frontiers are usually artificial and incorporate minorities from neighbouring countries. All of which can only lead to disintegration and permanent conflicts.
A revealing example of this is the gigantic anarchy of races, religions and nationalities which coexist in such a strategically important region as the Middle East. Along with the three most important religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam (and each of these is sub-divided into a multitude of sects in conflict with each other: there are Maronite, Orthodox and Coptic Christian minorities, Alawite, Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims) - “there also exist ethnic-linguistic minorities. In Afghanistan there are Persian speakers (Tadjikr) and Turkish speakers (Uzbeks, Turkomans) as well as other more particular groups ... The turbulent politics of the 20th century have produced minorities of ‘stateless peoples’. There are 22 million Kurds: 11 million in Turkey (20% of the population), 6 million in Iran (12%), 4.5 million in Iraq (25%), 1 million in Syria (9%), without forgetting the Kurdish diaspora in Lebanon. There is also the Armenian diaspora in Lebanon and Syria. And finally, the Palestinians, who constitute another ‘stateless people’, 5 million are divided between Israel (2.6 million), Jordan (1.5 million), Lebanon (400,000), Kuwait (350,000), Syria (250,000)” [13] [112].
In these conditions, the new nations are a caricature of the general tendency towards state capitalism, which does not overcome the antagonistic contradictions of decadent capitalism, but acts as a heavy fetter, exacerbating the problem even more: “In the most backward countries, the confusion between the political and economic apparatus allows and encourages the development of a wholly parasitic bureaucracy, whose sole concern is to fill its own pockets, systematically to pillage the national economy in order to build up the most colossal fortunes: the cases of Battista, Marcos, Duvalier, and Mobutu are well known and far from unique. Pillage, corruption and extortion are endemic in the underdeveloped countries, at every level of the state and economy. This situation is obviously a still greater handicap for these economies, and helps to push them still further into the mire” [14] [113].
Thus, all the new nations, far from reproducing the development of the youthful capitalism of the 19th century, have from the beginning run up against the impossibility of real accumulation and have sunk into an economic morass and a wasteful and anarchic bureaucracy. Far from providing a framework where the proletariat could improve its situation, the latter has found itself up against constant pauperisation, the threat of starvation, militarisation of labour, forced work, banning of strikes etc.
In the 60’s and 70’s politicians, experts, bankers went on ad nauseam about the ‘development’ of the countries of the third world. From being ‘underdeveloped countries’ they were presented as ‘countries on the way to development’. One of the levers of this so-called ‘development’ was the concession of massive credits, which accelerated above all after the recession of 1974-75. The great metropoles bestowed buckets full of credit to the new countries so that they could buy brand new machinery and installations. The only problem was that what these factories produced could not then be sold on a world market that was already suffering from generalised overproduction.
This did not produce the slightest development (as can be clearly seen today), but instead mortally indebted these new countries and plunged them into endless crises throughout the 80’s.
Our publications have made clear this widespread disaster; it is enough to record some figures: in Latin America GNP per head fell in 1989 to the level of 1977. In Peru income per capita in 1990 was that of 1957! Brazil, which in the 70s was presented as the ‘miracle economy’ suffered in 1990 a 4.5% fall in GNP and inflation of 1657%. Argentina’s industrial production fell in 1990 to the level of 1975 [15] [114].
The population, and especially the working class, has suffered cruelly. In Africa 60% of the population were living below the vital minimum in 1983, and in 1995 the World Banks says it will be 80%. In Latin America 44% are poor. In Peru 12 million people (out of a total population of 21 million) are chronically poor. A third of the population of Venezuela do not have enough income to buy basic products.
The working class has been viciously attacked: in 1991 the government of Pakistan closed or privatised public enterprises, throwing 250,000 workers onto the streets. A third of public employees in Uganda were made unemployed in 1990. In Kenya “the government in 1990 decided not to fill 40% of the vacant posts in the public utilities, and decreed that those who used public services would have to pay for them” [16] [115]. In Argentina the proportion of national income taken up by wages has fallen from 49% in 1975 to 30% in 1983.
The clearest manifestation of the total failure of world capitalism is the agricultural disaster which the majority of the independent nations of the 20th century have suffered: “Capitalism’s decadence has simply pushed the peasant and agrarian problem to its limits. From the worldwide viewpoint, it is not the development but the under-development of modern agriculture that has been the result. The peasantry today constitutes a majority of the world population, as it did a century ago” [17] [116].
The new countries, through the state, have created a web of bureaucratic organisations for ‘rural development’, extending the relations of capitalist production to the countryside and destroying the old forms of subsistence agriculture. But this hasn’t produced the least ‘development’ but instead total disaster. These ‘development’ mafias, which unite the headmen, landowners and rural usurers, ruin the peasants, forcing them to introduce export crops which they buy at absurdly low prices, while charging the peasants extortionate prices for seed, machinery etc.
With the disappearance of subsistence crops: “The threat of hunger is as real today as it was in previous economies; agricultural production per head is below its 1940 level ... A sign of the total anarchy of the capitalist economy: since World War II most of the one-time productive agricultural countries of the third world have become importers. Iran, for example, imports forty per cent of the foodstuff it consumes” [18] [117].
A country like Brazil - with the largest agricultural potential in the world - has seen “since February 1991 shortages of meat, rice, beans, milk products and soya oil” [19] [118]. Egypt - the granary of empires throughout history - today imports 60% of basic food items. Senegal only produces 30% of its consumption of cereals. In Africa food production is hardly 100kgs per head, whereas the vital minimum is 145kgs.
Furthermore, the channelling of production towards mono-culture for export coincided with the general fall in prices of raw materials, a tendency aggravated by the accentuation of the economic recession. In the Ivory Coast income from the sale of cocoa and coffee fell by 55% between 1986 and 1989. In the countries of West Africa the production of sugar fell by 80% between 1960 and 1985. Senegal, a producer of peanuts, earned less in 1984 than in 1919. Coffee production in Uganda fell from 186,000 metric tons in 1989 to 139,000 in 1990 [20] [119].
The result of this is the increasing destruction of agriculture, both subsistence agriculture and industrialised export agriculture.
In this context, the majority of African, Asian and Latin American countries have been forced by falling world prices, and the massive indebtedness in which they were trapped in the 70’s, to extend even more their industrial export crops.
This has meant the massacre of forests, Pharaoh-like projects for draining swamps and costly irrigation schemes. As a result, harvests are being continually reduced and the soil has been almost totally exhausted; deserts are advancing, and the once generous natural resources have been annihilated.
This catastrophe is of incalculable proportions: the Senegal river in 1960 had a flow of 2400 million cubic meters; by 1983 it had fallen to 7000. In 1960, 15% of Mauritania was covered by vegetation, by 1986 it was only 5%. In the Ivory Coast (a producer of precious woods) the area covered by forest has fallen from 15 million hectares in 1950 to only 2 million in 1986. 30% of the cultivatable soil in Nigeria has been abandoned, while cereal production on what is left declined from 600kgs per hectare in 1962 to 350 in 1986. UN figures for 1983 shows that the Sahara desert is advancing towards the south by 150 km a year [21] [120].
The peasants are expelled from their land and crowded into in the shanty towns of the great cities: “Lima, which in the 1940’s was a garden city, has used up all its subterranean water supplies and is being invaded by desert. Its population grew sevenfold between 1940 and 1981. It now has a surface area of 400 square kilometres and accounts for a third of the Peruvian population. The former oasis is now covered by rubbish dumps, cement and advancing sand ... On the rubbish dump of Callao barefoot children and entire families work in the middle of a hell infested by millions of flies and an unbearable stench” [22] [121].
“Capital likes its pre-capitalist clients just as the ogre ‘likes’ children: it eats them. The worker of a pre-capitalist economy who has had ‘the misfortune to have dealings with the capitalists’ knows that sooner or latter, he will end up, at best proletarianised and at worst - and this has become more and more frequent since capitalism slid into decadence - reduced to misery and bankruptcy in the now sterilised fields, or marginalised in the vast slums of urban conglomerations” [23] [122].
This incapacity to integrate the peasant masses into productive work is the clearest demonstration of the bankruptcy of world capitalism, whose essence is the generalisation of wage labour by uprooting the peasants and artisans from the old pre-capitalist forms of labour and transforming them into proletarians. In the 20th century this capacity to create new jobs has been blocked and turned back on a global scale. The new countries overwhelmingly express this phenomenon: in the 19th century the average rate of unemployment in Europe was between 4-6% and could be absorbed after the cyclical crises; while in the countries of the third world it reaches 20-30% and has become a permanent structural phenomenon.
The first victims of capitalism’s entry into its terminal stage of world decomposition from the end of the 70s have been the chain of ‘young nations’ which during the 60’s and 70’s were presented to us as the ‘nations of the future’ by the champions of the bourgeois order - from the liberals to the Stalinists.
The terrible situation into which these ‘nations of the future’ have sunk has been pushed into second place by the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in 1989. The countries which lived under the Stalinist boot belong to the group of countries which arrived too late on the world market. They manifest all of the features of the ‘new countries’ of the 20th century. However, their specificities [24] [123] have made their collapse much more serious and chaotic, and the repercussions of this are of far greater historical and global importance, especially as regards the exacerbation of international imperialist chaos [25] [124].
Nevertheless, without underestimating the particularities of the Stalinist countries, today the other underdeveloped countries express the same basic characteristics: chaos, anarchy and generalised decomposition.
The explosion of states
In Somalia the northern tribal chiefs announced on the 24th of April 1991 the partition of the country and the creation of the state of ‘Somaliland’. Ethiopia has been dismembered; on the 28th of May 1991 Eritrea declared ‘sovereignty’; Tigre, Oromos and Ogaden have totally escaped the control of the central authority. Afghanistan has been divided up between four different governments: the one in Kabul, a radical Islamic one, a moderate Islamic one and a Shi’ite one. Almost two thirds of Peru is controlled by the narco-mafias and the guerrilla mafias of Sandero Luminoso or Tupac Amaru. The war in Liberia has caused 15,000 deaths and more than a million people have fled (out of a total population of 2.5 million). Algeria, because of the open confrontation between the FLN and FIS (behind which lurks an imperialist struggle between France and the USA) is sinking into indescribable chaos.
Collapse of the army
The soldiers’ revolt in Zaire, the explosion of the Ugandan army into a multitude of gangs who terrorise the population, the widespread gangsterisation of the police in Asia, Africa and South America express the same tendency - though in a less spectacular way - as the present explosion of the army in the ex-USSR.
General paralysis of the economic apparatus
Food supplies, transport and services are collapsing and economic activity is reduced to the barest minimum: in the Central African Republic - the capital, Bangui “has become to-tally isolated from the rest of the country; the ex-colony lives on subsidies from France and the traffic in diamonds” [26] [125].
In these conditions of widespread starvation, misery and death, life has no value. In Lima very fat people are being kidnapped by gangs who kill them and sell their grease to pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies in the United States. In Argentina half a million people live by selling their livers, kidneys and other visceral organs. In Cairo (Egypt) a million people live in the tombs of the Coptic cemetery. Children are kidnapped in Peru and Colombia and sent to the mines or agricultural exploitation where they work in such conditions of slavery that they die like flies. The fall of the price of raw materials on the world market leads the local capitalists to use such atrocious practices in order to compensate for the fall in their profits. In Brazil the impossibility of integrating the new generations into wage labour has resulted in the savagery of the police gangs and thugs who are paid to exterminate street kids who have been pulled into mafia-like gangs involved in all kinds of traffic. Thailand has been turned into the world’s largest brothel, and AIDS is widespread: 300,000 cases in 1990, and this is forecast to rise to over 2 million in the year 2000.
The wave of emigration which has accelerated since 1986, principally from Latin America, Africa, and Asia, demonstrates the historical bankruptcy of these nations and through this, the bankruptcy of capitalism.
The disintegration of these social structures, which were born as degenerate cells of a mortally ill body - decadent capitalism - literally vomits human masses fleeing from disaster to-wards the old industrial countries. These countries, for some time, have had the ‘closed’ signs up and only offer these starving masses the language of repression, threats and deportation.
The new nations of the 20th century have not enlarged the proletarian army, but - and this is most dangerous for the revolutionary perspective - they have placed the proletariat of these ‘new nations’ into conditions of extreme fragility and weakness. The proletariat is a minority in the great majority of the underdeveloped countries, hardly making up 10-15% of the population (whereas in the large industrialised countries it is over 50%). The workers are dispersed into centres of production which are often far away from the nerve-centres of political and economic power. They live immersed in an enormous mass of marginals and lumpens who are very vulnerable to the most reactionary ideas and who are a very negative influence on them.
Also, the way in which the collapse of capitalism is manifested in these countries makes it much more difficult for the proletariat to become conscious of its tasks:
- the overwhelming domination of the great imperialist powers increases the influence of nationalism;
- widespread corruption and the incredible waste of economic resources hides the real roots of the bankruptcy of capitalism;
- the openly terrorist control by the capitalist state, even when it has a ‘democratic’ mask, adds weight to democratic and union mystifications;
- especially barbaric and archaic forms of exploitation facilitate unionism and reformism.
This situation does not mean that the proletariat in these countries are not an inseparable part of the struggle of the world proletariat [27] [126], or that they don’t have the strength and potential necessary to fight for the destruction of the capitalist state and the international power of the workers’ councils: “The strength of the proletariat in a capitalist country in infinitely greater than its numerical proportion in the population. This is because the proletariat occupies a key position in the heart of the capitalist economy and also because the proletariat expresses, in the economic and political domain, the real interests of the immense majority of the working population under capitalist domination” (Lenin).
The real lesson is that the existence of these ‘new nations’, instead of contributing anything to the cause of socialism, has done just the opposite: it poses new obstacles, new difficulties to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.
“It is not possible to maintain, as the anarchists do, that a socialist perspective could remain open even though the productive forces were in regression. Capitalism represents an indispensable and necessary stage for the establishment of socialism to the extent that it brings about the sufficient development of the objective conditions. However, just as in the present stage it has become a brake on the development of the productive forces, the prolongation of capitalism beyond this stage could bring about the disappearance of the conditions for socialism. It is in this sense that the historical alternative of socialism or barbarism is posed today” [28] [127].
The new nations favour neither the development of the productive forces, nor the historic tasks of the proletariat, nor the dynamic towards the unification of humanity. On the contrary, they are - as an organic expression of the agony of capitalism - a blind force which leads towards the destruction of the productive forces, towards difficulties and dispersion for the proletariat, towards the division and atomisation of humanity.
Adalen, 8.2.92
[1] [128] Rosa Luxemburg, The crisis of social democracy (The Junius Pamphlet), chap. 7.
[2] [129] Internationalisme, ‘Report on the International Situation’, June 1945.
[3] [130] International Review 31, ‘The proletariat of western Europe at the heart of the international generalisation of the class struggle’.
[4] [131] IR 23, ‘The proletarian struggle in the decadence of capitalism’.
[5] [132] ibid.
[6] [133] Bilan 11, ‘Crises and cycles in the economy of dying capitalism’.
[7] [134] El Estado del Mundo, 1992.
[8] [135] ibid.
[9] [136] Revolution Internationale 10, ‘India, an open cemetery’.
[10] [137] ibid.
[11] [138] These facts have been taken from statistics on the armies in the publication El Estado del Mondo. The choice of countries and the calculations of percentages are done by us.
[12] [139] IR 19, ‘On imperialism’.
[13] [140] El Estado del Mundo.
[14] [141] IR 60, ‘Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the eastern countries’.
[15] [142] El Estado del Mundo.
[16] [143] ibid.
[17] [144] IR 24, ‘Notes on the agrarian and peasant question’.
[18] [145] ibid.
[19] [146] El Estado del Mundo.
[20] [147] From the book by Reno Dumfound, Pour l’Afrique, j‘accuse
[21] [148] ibid.
[22] [149] From the article ‘The cholera of the poor’, in El Pais, 27 May 1991.
[23] [150] IR 30, ‘Critique of Bukharin’, part II.
[24] [151] See IR 60, ‘Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR’.
[25] [152] On the other hand, the equation Stalinism = communism, which the bourgeoisie uses today to convince the proletariat that there is no alternative of the capitalist order, is more persuasive if it amplifies the phenomena in the east, while relativising or even trivialising what is happening in the nations of the ‘third world’.
[26] [153] El Estado del Mundo, 1992.
[27] [154] The great concentrations of workers in the industrialised countries constitute the centre of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat: see IR 31 ‘The proletariat of western Europe at the heart of the international generalisation of the class struggle’.
[28] [155] Internationalisme 45, ‘The evolution of capitalism and the new perspective’.
"The theoretical conclusions of the communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes." (Communist Manifesto)
In the first article in this series, we attempted to counter the bourgeois cliché that 'communism is a nice idea, but it will never work' by showing that communism was not an 'idea,' invented by Marx or any "would-be universal reformer", but was the product of an immense historical movement which stretched back to the earliest human societies; and above all, that the demand for a society without classes, private property or the state had been raised in every great upheaval of the proletariat from its very beginnings as a social class.
There was a proletarian communist movement before Marx was born, and when the young student Marx was just beginning to enter the arena of radical democratic politics in Germany, there was already a plethora of communist groups and tendencies, notably in France, where the working class movement had made the greatest strides towards developing a communist outlook. Thus Paris in the late 1830s and early 1840s was the stamping ground of such currents as Cabet's utopian communism, the prolongation of the views outlined by Saint-Simon and Fourier; there were Proudhon and his followers, forerunners of anarchism but who at that time were making a rudimentary attempt to criticize bourgeois political economy from the standpoint of the exploited; the more insurrectionary Blanquists, who had led an aborted rising in 1839 and were the heirs of Babeuf and the 'Equals' in the great French revolution. In Paris too there was a whole milieu of exiled German intellectuals and workers. The communist workers were mainly grouped in the League of the Just, animated by Weitling.
Marx entered into the political fray from the starting point of critical philosophy. During the course of his university studies he fell - reluctantly at first, because Marx did not enter his commitments lightly - under the spell of Hegel. Hegel at that time was the acknowledged 'Master' in the field of philosophy in Germany, and in a more profound sense his work represented the very summit of bourgeois philosophical endeavor, because it was the last great attempt of this class to grasp the entire movement of human history and consciousness, and because it aimed to accomplish this by means of the dialectical method.
Very rapidly, however, Marx joined up with the 'Young Hegelians', (Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, etc) who had begun to recognize that the Master's conclusions were not consistent with his method, and even that key elements of his method were deeply flawed. Thus while Hegel's dialectical approach to history showed that all historical forms were transitory, that what was 'rational' in one period was completely 'irrational' in another, he ended up positing an 'End of History' by presenting the existing Prussian state as the incarnation of Reason. Similarly - and here the work of Feuerbach was particularly important - it was clear to the Young Hegelians that, having effectively undermined theology and unreasoning faith with his philosophical rigor, Hegel ended up reinstating God and theology in the guise of the Absolute Idea. The aim of the young Hegelians was, first and foremost, to take Hegel's dialectic to its logical conclusion and arrive at a thorough-going critique of theology and religion. Thus for Marx and his fellow Young Hegelians it was literally true that "the criticism of religion is the beginning of all criticism" ('A contribution to the critique of Hegel's philosophy of right', 1843-44).
But the Young Hegelians were living in a semi-feudal state where the criticism of religion was forbidden by the state censor: therefore the criticism of religion very quickly turned into the criticism of politics. Having given up all hope of gaining a university teaching post after Bauer was dismissed from his, Marx turned to political journalism, and soon began formulating his attack on the wretched Junker stupidity of the prevailing political system in Germany. His sympathies were immediately republican and democratic, as can be seen from his first articles for the Deutsche Jahrbuche and the Rheinische Zeitung, but they were still couched in terms of a radical bourgeois opposition to feudalism, and concentrated very much on matters of 'political liberty', such as freedomof the press and universal suffrage. In fact, Marx explicitly resisted the attempts of Moses Hess, who had already gone over to an overtly communist standpoint, if of a rather sentimental variety, to smuggle communist ideas into the pages of the Rheinische Zeitung. In answer to a charge by the Augsburger Allgemeiner Zeitung that Marx's paper had adopted communism, Marx wrote that "The Rheinische Zeitung, which cannot even concede theoretical reality to communistic ideas in their present form, and can even less wish or consider possible their practical realization, will submit these ideas to thorough criticism" ('Communism and the Augsburger Allgemeiner Zeitung'). Later on, in a famous, almost programmatic letter to Arnold Ruge, (September 1843) he wrote that the communism of Cabet, Weitling etc was a "dogmatic abstraction".
In fact, these hesitations about adopting a communist position were similar to Marx's hesitations when initially confronted with Hegel. He was really being won over to communism, but refused any superficial adhesion, and was well aware of the weaknesses of the "actually existing" communist tendencies. Thus in the same article which appeared to reject communist ideas, he went on to say that "if the Augsburger wanted and could achieve more than slick phrases, it would see that writings such as those by Leroux, Considerant, and above all Proudhon's penetrating work, can only be criticized after long and deep study, not through superficial and passing notions". And in the above-mentioned letter to Ruge, he went made it clear that his real objection to the communism of Weitling and Cabet was not that it was communist but that it was dogmatic, ie that it saw itself as no more than a good idea or a moral imperative to be brought to the suffering masses from a redeemer on high. In contrast to this, Marx outlined his own approach:
"Nothing prevents us, therefore, from lining our criticism with a criticism of politics, from taking sides in politics, ie from entering into real struggles and identifying ourselves with them. This does not mean that we shall confront the world with new doctrinaire principles and proclaim: here is the truth, on your knees before it! It means that we shall develop for the world new principles from the existing principles of the world. We shall not say: abandon your struggles, they are mere folly; let us provide you with the true campaign slogans. Instead we shall simply show the world why it is struggling, and consciousness of this is a thing it must acquire whether it wishes or not".
Having broken from the Hegelian mystification which posited an ethereal 'self-consciousness' standing outside the real world of men, Marx was not about to reproduce the same theoretical error at the level of politics. Consciousness did not pre-exist the historical movement; it could only be the coming-to-consciousness of the real movement itself.
The proletariat as a communist class
Although in this letter there is no explicit reference to the proletariat and no definite adoption of communism, we know from its date that Marx was in the process of doing just that. The articles written in the period 1842-3 about social questions - the Prussian wood theft law and the situation of the Mosel wine growers - had led him to recognize the fundamental importance of economic and class factors in political affairs; indeed Engels said later that he had "always heard from Marx that it was precisely through concentrating on the law of thefts of wood and the situation of the Mosel winegrowers that he was led from pure politics to economic relationships and so to socialism" (Engels to R Fischer, 1885, Marx and Engels, Werke xxxix 466). And Marx's article 'On the Jewish question', also written in late 1843, is communist in all but name, since it looks forward to an emancipation that goes beyond the purely political domain to the emancipation of society from buying and selling, from the egoism of competing individuals and of private property.
But it should not be thought that Marx came to these views simply through his own capacities for study and reflection, enormous though they were. He was not an isolated genius contemplating the world from on high, but was engaged in constant discussion with his contemporaries. In the process of his 'conversion' to communism, he acknowledged his debt to the contemporary writings of Weitling, Proudhon, Hess and Engels; and with the latter two in particular, he had engaged in intense face to face discussions when they were communists and he was not. Engels above all had the advantage of having witnessed firsthand the more advanced capitalism of England, and had begun to develop a theory of capitalist development and crisis which was vital to the elaboration of a scientific critique of political economy. Engels had also seen firsthand the Chartist movement in Britain, which was no longer a small political group but a veritable mass movement, clear evidence of the capacity of the proletariat to constitute itself as an independent political force in society. Perhaps most important of all in convincing Marx that communism could be more than a utopia was his direct contact with the groups of communist workers in Paris. The meetings of these groups made a tremendous impression upon him:
"When communist artisans form associations, education and propaganda are their first aims. But the very act of associating creates a new need - the need for society - and what appears to be a means has become an end. The most striking results of this practical development are to be seen when French socialist workers meet together. Smoking, eating and drinking are no longer simply means of bringing people together. Company, association, entertainment which also has society as its aim, are sufficient for them; the brotherhood of man is no empty phrase but a reality, and the nobility of man shines forth upon us from their toil-worn bodies" (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 1844).
We may forgive Marx a certain exaggeration here; communist associations, workers' organizations, are never actually an end unto themselves. The real point is elsewhere; that in participating in the emerging proletarian movement, Marx was able to see that communism, the real and concrete brotherhood of man, could be not just a high-minded phrase but a practical project. It was in Paris, in 1844, that Marx first explicitly identified himself as a communist.
Thus, what above all else allowed Marx to overcome his hesitations about communism was the recognition that there was a force in society which had a material interest in communism. Since communism had ceased to be a dogmatic abstraction, a mere 'Good Idea', the role of the communists would not be reduced to preaching about the evils of capitalism and the benefits of communism. It would involve identifying themselves with the struggles of the working class, showing the proletariat "why it is struggling" and "how it must become conscious" of the ultimate goals of its struggle. Marx's adhesion to communism was identical to his adhesion to the cause of the proletariat, because the proletariat was the class that bore communism within itself. The classic exposition of this position is the concluding passage to the 'Critique of Hegel's philosophy of right'. Although this article was attempting to deal with the question of what social force could bring about the emancipation of Germany from its feudal chains, the answer it gave was actually more appropriate to the question of how mankind could be emancipated from capitalism, since the "positive possibility of German emancipation" lay "in the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general; a sphere of society which can no longer lay any claim to a historical title, but merely to a human one ... and finally, a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and therefore emancipating - all the other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat."
Despite the fact that the working class was only beginning to form in Germany itself, Marx's acquaintance with the more developed workers' movement in France and Britain had already convinced him of the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Here was a class which embodied all the sufferings of humanity; in this it was not unlike previous exploited classes in history, though its "loss of humanity" was taken to an even more advanced level. But in other respects it was quite unlike previous exploited classes, and this became clear once the development of modern industry had given rise to a modern industrial proletariat. In contrast to the earlier exploited classes such as the peasants under feudalism, the working class was first and foremost a class of associated labor. This meant, to begin with, that it could only defend its immediate interests by means of an associated struggle -by uniting its forces against all the divisions imposed by the enemy class. But it also meant that the ultimate solution to its condition as an exploited class could only lie in the creation of a real human association, of a society based on free cooperation instead of competition and domination. And because this association would be based on the enormous progress in the productivity of labor brought about by capitalist industry, it would not collapse back to a lower form under the pressures of scarcity, but would be the basis for the abundant satisfaction of human needs. Thus, the modern proletariat contained within itself, within its very being, the dissolution of the old society, the abolition of private property, and the emancipation of the whole of humanity:
"When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing world order, it is only declaring the secret of its own existence, for it is the actual dissolution of that order. When the proletariat demands the negation of private property, it is only elevating as a principle for society what society has already made a principle for the proletariat, what is embodied in the proletariat, without its consent, as the negative result of society" (ibid).
This is why, in The German Ideology, written a couple of years later, Marx was able to define communism as "the real movement which abolishes the present state of affairs": communism was none other than the real movement of the proletariat, which was led by its innermost nature, by its most practical material interests, to demand the collective appropriation of all social wealth.
To such arguments the Philistines of the day responded in the same way as they do today: 'how many workers do you know who want a communist revolution? The vast majority of them seem quite resigned to their lot under capitalism'. But Marx was ready with his response in The Holy Family (1844): "It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will be historically compelled to do". Here he warns against taking a purely empiricist snapshot of the proletariat as represented by the views of a particular worker, or by the consciousness of the vast majority of the class at a given moment. Instead, the proletariat and its struggle must be seen in a context which encompasses the whole sweep of its history - including its revolutionary future. It was precisely his capacity to see the proletariat in this historic frame which enabled him to predict that a class which up till then was still a minority of the society around him, and had only troubled bourgeois order on a local scale, would one day be the force that would shake the entire capitalist world to its very foundations.
"The philosophers only interpreted the world,
The point is to change it"
The same article which announced Marx's recognition of the revolutionary nature of the working class also had the temerity to proclaim that "philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat". For Marx, Hegel had marked the supreme point in the historical evolution not only of bourgeois philosophy, but of philosophy in general, of all philosophy since its very beginnings in ancient Greece. But after reaching the mountain top, the descent was very quick. First came Feuerbach, the materialist and humanist, to unmask Hegel's Absolute Idea as the last manifestation of God; and having unmasked God as the projection of man's suppressed powers, to elevate the cult of man in his place. This was already a sign of the coming end of philosophy as philosophy. All that remained was for Marx, acting as the avant-garde of the proletariat, to deliver the coup de grace. Capitalism had established its effective dominion over society; philosophy had had its last word, because now the working class had (albeit in a more or less crude form) formulated a realizable project for the practical emancipation of humanity from the chains of all the ages. From this point onwards, it would be perfectly correct to say, as did Marx, that "philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as masturbation and sexual love" (German Ideology, 1845). The ensuing nullity of virtually all bourgeois 'philosophy' after Feuerbach only bears this out[1].
The philosophers had made their various interpretations of the world. In the field of 'natural philosophy', the study of the physical universe, they had already had to cede their place to the scientists of the bourgeoisie. And now, with the arrival of the proletariat, they had to cede their authority in all matters pertaining to the human world. Having found its material weapons in the proletariat, philosophy was dissolved as a separate sphere. In practical terms, for Marx, this meant a break both with Bruno Bauer and with Feuerbach. With regard to Bauer and his followers, who had retired to a true ivory tower of self-contemplation, known under the grandiose term of 'Critical Criticism', Marx was sarcastic in the extreme: this truly was philosophy as self-abuse. Towards Feuerbach, Marx had a far deeper respect, and never forgot the contribution he had made to 'turning Hegel on his feet'. The basic criticism he made of Feuerbach's humanism was that its 'man' was an abstract, unchanging creature, divorced from society and its historical evolution. For this reason Feuerbachian humanism could do no more than propose a new religion of humanity's oneness. But as Marx insisted, humanity could not really become one until class divisions had reached their ultimate point of antagonism, and so all the honest philosopher could do from now on was to throw in his lot with the proletarian side of the divide.
But the whole sentence reads: "Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy". The effective suppression of philosophy by the proletarian movement did not imply that the latter had carried out a crude decapitation of intellectual life. On the contrary. It had now assimilated the best of 'philosophy' - and by extension the accumulated wisdom of the bourgeoisie and of previous social formations -and had embarked upon the task of transforming it into a scientific critique of existing conditions. Marx did not come empty-handed into the proletarian movement. He brought with him in particular the most advanced methods and conclusions elaborated by German philosophy; and, along with Engels, the discoveries of the bourgeoisie's most lucid political economists: in both fields, these represented the intellectual apogee of a class which not only retained a progressive character, but had only just completed its heroic, revolutionary phase. The entry of men like Marx and Engels into the ranks of the workers' movement marked a qualitative step in the latter's self-clarification, a move from intuitive, speculative, half-formed theoretical groping to the stage of scientific investigation and comprehension. In organizational terms, this was symbolized by the transformation of the sect-like, semi-conspiratorial League of the Just into the Communist League, which adopted The Communist Manifesto as its program in 1847.
But let us repeat: this did not signify that class consciousness was being injected into the proletariat from some higher astral plane. In the light of what we have written above, it can be seen more clearly that the Kautskyite thesis, according to which socialist consciousness is brought to the working class by bourgeois intellectuals, is actually a continuation of the utopian error criticized by Marx in the 'Theses on Feuerbach' :
"The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator himself needs educating. Hence this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, of which one is superior to society (in Robert Owen, for example).
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice."
Put in other terms: the Kautskyite thesis - which Lenin took up in What is to be done but later abandoned[2] - starts off with a crude materialism, seeing the working class as eternally conditioned by the circumstances of its exploitation, unable to become conscious of its real situation. To break out of this closed circle, vulgar materialism then turns itself into the most abject idealism, positing a 'socialist consciousness' that for some mysterious reason is invented ... by the bourgeoisie! This approach completely reverses the way that Marx himself posed the problem. Thus, in The German Ideology he wrote:
"From the conception of history we have sketched we obtain these further conclusions: in the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under the existing relationships only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive forces ... and connected with this a class is called forth, which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which, ousted from society, is forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes; a class which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course, arise among the other classes too through the contemplation of the situation of this class".
Clear enough: communist consciousness emanates from the proletariat, and as a result of this, elements from other classes are able to attain communist consciousness. But only by breaking with their 'inherited' class ideology and adopting the standpoint of the proletariat. This latter point in particular is stressed in a passage in The Communist Manifesto:
"In times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole."
Marx and Engels could only 'bring' to the proletariat what they did by "cutting themselves adrift" from the ruling class; they could only "comprehend theoretically the historical movement" by examining critically bourgeois philosophy and political economy from the standpoint of the exploited class. In fact a better way to put this is to say that the proletarian movement, by winning over the likes of Marx and Engels, was able to appropriate the intellectual wealth of the bourgeoisie and use it to its own ends. Furthermore, it would not have been able to do this if it had not already embarked upon the task of developing a communist theory. Marx was quite explicit about this when he described the workers Proudhon and Weitling as the theoreticians of the proletariat. In sum: the working class took bourgeois philosophy and political economy and forged them with hammer and anvil into the indispensable weapon that bears the name of marxism, but which is none other than the "fundamental theoretical acquisition of the proletarian struggle the only conception which really expresses the viewpoint of that class" (ICC platform). CDW
***
In subsequent parts of this series, we will examine further Marx's protest against the condition of the proletariat in bourgeois society, and his initial definitions of the communist society that would overcome these conditions.
[1] Henceforward, only those philosophers who recognize the bankruptcy of capitalism have anything at all to say. But traumatized by the growing barbarism of the declining capitalist system, and yet unable to conceive that anything but capitalism could exist, they decree that not only present-day society, but existence itself, is a complete absurdity! Unfortunately, the cult of despair is not a very good advertisement for the health of an age's philosophy.
[2] See our article in International Review, 43, 'Reply to the Communist Workers Organization: On the subterranean maturation of consciousness'. The CWO, and the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party to which it is affiliated, continues to defend a slightly watered-down version of the Kautskyite theory of class consciousness.
Wars, barbarism, class struggle: The only solution to the spiral of wars and barbarism is the international class struggle
Since the beginning of the 'era of peace and prosperity' opened by the fall of the Berlin wall, the disappearance of the eastern bloc and the break-up of the USSR, there have never been so many wars and local conflicts; never has militarism been more omnipresent, never have arms sales of all kinds reached, such a scale, never has the threat of nuclear proliferation been so great, never have the plans for new weapons, including ones to be used in space, been so far advanced; never have so many human beings suffered such hunger, poverty, exploitation and wars; never since capitalism began has such a large proportion of the world population been thrown out of the productive process, most of them condemned to permanent unemployment, to absolute pauperization, to begging, to all kinds of illicit trades, to crime, to wars and nationalist or inter-ethnic massacres ... The open economic recession is getting deeper in the big industrial countries, the great world powers, and in particular the biggest one of all, the USA; hundreds of thousands of workers are being hurled into the jaws of unemployment and misery. The era of peace and prosperity promised by President Bush, by the whole world bourgeoisie, is proving itself to be an era of wars and economic crisis.
Chaos and Anarchy In every corner of the planet
The USSR is gone. Exit Gorbachev. The CIS is still-born. Tensions between the republics get sharper and more aggressive every day. The emerging states squabble over what's left of the ex-Union. The main thing at stake is the remains of the Red Army, its conventional weapons of course, but also its nuclear ones (33,000 to 35,000 warheads!). It's a question of forming the strongest possible national armies in order to ensure the imperialist interests of each state against its neighbors. The ex-USSR is under the bloody reign of every man for himself; nuclear threats are being issued by rote. Despite the (western) international pressure, Kazakhstan refuses to say whether or not it is going to hand over the tactical and above all strategic weapons on its territory; Ukraine has grabbed a division of nuclear bombers (17 February) and is trying to keep the Black Sea fleet for itself. Yeltsin's Russia, in command of the 'unified' army of the CIS, ie in a position of strength vis-a-vis the others, has even expressed its fears about a future nuclear conflict with Ukraine[1]. This tells us a lot about the nature of the relations between the new states and the role played by the military within them. These relations are imperialist and antagonistic: the balance of forces rests on military and especially nuclear power.
This conflict-ridden situation is made more acute by the catastrophic state of the economy. 90% of the Russian population is living below the poverty line. Famine is spreading despite the aid from the west. Industrial production is falling brutally while the liberation of prices has led to three-figure, South American style inflation. This total bankruptcy will in turn throw oil on the fire of the conflicts between the new states. "Economic war between the republics has already begun" affirmed Anatoli Sobtchak, the mayor of St Petersburg on January 8.
This conflict of interests, both political and economic, is going to accelerate the chaos, and multiply tensions and conflicts, local wars and massacres, among the various nationalities of what we can already call the ex-CIS. The republics are at odds over the military heritage left by the defunct USSR. Nearly all of them are in conflict over the question of frontiers: the case of Crimea - Russian or Ukrainian -is the best known. Each republic in turn has one or more national minority declaring its independence, taking up arms, forming militias: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan; the Chechenes in Russia, who have been attacking barracks in order to get weapons; and everywhere the Russian minorities who are getting increasingly anxious, in Moldova, in Ukraine, in the Caucasus and in the central Asian republics. And then there's Georgia, torn in two by murderous combats between partisans of the 'democratically elected' president Gamsakhurdia on the one hand, and his former leading ministers and their militias on the other. Everywhere there are dead, wounded, massacres of civilians, destruction, nationalist hatred and terror between small peoples who previously lived together, and who together suffered the terror of Stalin's version of state capitalism. Today, desolation and chaos rule without any challenge.
This explosion of the ex-USSR, this situation of bloody anarchy, has reawakened local imperialist appetites that for a long time were contained by the all-powerful 'Soviet' apparatus; and they hold the seeds of even bigger confrontations. Iran and Turkey are engaged in a real race to establish the first embassies in the Muslim republics. The Iranian press accuses Turkey of wanting to 'impose the western model' on these republics by making them lose their 'Muslim identity'. Turkey, supported by the USA, uses the Turkish-speaking nationalities (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkomens) to get one step ahead of Iran, which in turn tries to enlist the aid of Pakistan in this imperialist contest ...
The disappearance of the division of the world into two great imperialist blocs has meant the end of the discipline that used to reign, the end of the established, 'stable' rules that regulated local imperialist conflicts. Today, they are breaking out everywhere and in all directions. The explosion of the USSR can only further aggravate this phenomenon. Everywhere, on all the continents, new conflicts are breaking out, developing, while the old hot spots have not cooled down either, on the contrary.
The Philippines and Burma suffer from bloody and permanent guerilla warfare (China has sold more than a billion dollars worth of arms to Burma!). A state of anarchy is developing in central Asia. Military confrontations of all kinds (Kurdistan, Lebanon) continue in the Middle East despite the 'calm' in the region since the terrible crushing of Iraq in the Gulf war.
Africa as a continent is sinking into a nightmare: bloody repression of riots by hungry populations; coups d'Etat, guerilla wars and inter-ethnic clashes, proliferating in the midst of an economic disaster. Imperialist tensions between Egypt and Sudan are exacerbating. Social chaos is spreading in Algeria, the fighting goes on in Chad, Djibouti is shaken by confrontations between Afars and Issas.
"Africa cannot rid itself of the spectre of alimentary insecurity ... Aid is urgently needed for Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and even for Zaire. Civil wars, massive de-placements of populations, drought, these are the causes invoked by the FAD"[2]. Do we need to explain that the term "alimentary insecurity" is an elegant way of avoiding the more brutal word famine?
In comparison, Latin America seems a haven of peace. It should be said that it does enjoy the particular attention of its great northern neighbor. The sub-continent is still the USA's backyard. The numerous antagonisms between Argentina and Chile, and between Ecuador and Peru, to cite only two of the various frontiers that have given rise to military skirmishes, have so far been contained. But the continent is still marked by violence. Guerilla violence (Peru, Colombia, Central America); the violence of state repression against populations which are also hungry (eg the riots in Venezuela); violence resulting from the advanced decomposition which is hitting the states: drug gang wars in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia; the massive assassination by the police and various militia of the street children abandoned in their millions and subjected to the miseries of hunger and drug addiction, left to themselves in the slums, vast shit-heaps that ring the cities.
This list of chaos and wars, of killing and terror, would not be complete if we didn't mention Yugoslavia. This country no longer exists. It has exploded in a fracas of fire and blood. For months, Serbs and Croats killed each other and tensions grew between the three nationalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. New confrontations are brewing a few hundred kilometers from the big industrial centers of Europe! Like the explosion of the USSR, the explosion of Yugoslavia has reawakened old tensions and created new ones. For example, Macedonia's desires for independence have dangerously revived antagonisms between Greece and Bulgaria. And above all it has sharpened tensions between the great powers, Germany and the USA, and within Europe.
Here is a rapid and incomplete, and yet frightening and dramatic, photograph of the world (for the moment we are excluding the situation in the big industrial countries, the USA, Japan and western Europe; we will be coming back to this later). Here in a few words is the reality of the capitalist world. A capitalist world that is rotting and decomposing. A capitalist society that can only offer humanity wars and misery.
Arms sales at fever pitch
If anyone doubted this war-like perspective, the explosion of arms sales must convince them of it.
Arms sales of every kind, from the most simple to the most sophisticated and murderous, are now escaping any control. The planet has become an immense supermarket of weapons, where competition between the merchants is becoming sharper all the time. The disappearance of the eastern bloc and the economic catastrophe which is hitting the countries of Eastern Europe and of the CIS have thrown the incredible arsenal of the Warsaw Pact onto the market, with prices tumbling daily: hundreds of armored cars are being sold by weight, at 10,000 dollars a ton![3]
In 1991, the ex-USSR sold 12 billion dollars in arms. Russia and Kazakhstan sold 1000 T-72 tanks and also submarines to Iran. "Information gathered by the western services would give one to believe that the Glavosmos company, which is shared by both states, offered its foreign clients the propulsive sections of the SS-25, SS-24 and SS-18 ballistic missiles, that could if need be serve as space launchers".[4]
Czechoslovakia under the 'humanist' Vaclav Havel sold the bulk of the 300 tanks it put on the market to Syria. The latter, plus Iran and Libya, are buying from North Korea Scud missiles "much more precise and effective than the Soviet Scuds that Iraq launched during the Gulf war".[5]
Although they are worried about these massive and feverish sales, the great powers also take part in this huge bazaar. The USA wants to sell more than 400 tanks cheap to Spain.
"Germany has promised to deliver to Turkey, for around one billion dollars, materials that comes from the stocks of the former 'eastern' army".[6]
All states being imperialist, when one buys weapons others are forced to follow, thus further sharpening tensions: "Iran has bought at least two new attack submarines built by the Russians. Saudi Arabia wants to buy 24 F-15E McDonnel Douglas fighters in order to transform its aerial forces in such a way that they can deal with Iranian submarines".[7]
All capitalist states, big or small, weak or powerful, are involved in these imperialist rivalries, in these growing tensions, in the arms race, in the bottomless pit of militarism.
Although the fear of chaos forces the great powers into joint action behind the USA ...
There is a real concern about the growing chaos sweeping the capitalist world. This is forcing the most powerful national bourgeoisies to try to limit the expression of their imperialist appetites.
With the break-up of the eastern bloc, the USA, Germany and the other European countries were at first very careful not to accelerate the disorder in the former Warsaw Pact countries. In particular, they all supported the efforts of Gorbachev to maintain the unity and stability of the USSR, and to keep himself in power. Nevertheless, their worst fears have already been realized. Their concern now is the economic and social chaos that is unfolding: the threat of famine, and as a result of massive emigration, the risk of all kinds of military confrontations, and above all the burning question of the control over tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. There is an extremely grave risk of nuclear proliferation. Now four unstable states, instead of one, are in possession of weapons of mass destruction. And while it is easy for the USA to survey 'strategic' weapons, it's not the same with 'tactical' weapons. The 'small' atomic bombs are highly mobile, dispersed, and anyone could get hold of them, use them or sell them given the prevailing state of anarchy. This is why we are seeing conferences about aid to the CIS, proposals for the dismantling of nuclear weapons, agreements between the USA and Germany to employ the atomic scientists of the ex-USSR. The aim is to maintain a minimum degree of control over nuclear weapons and limit the extension of chaos.
... Imperialist antagonisms grow stronger all the time and exacerbate tensions
Presenting to the US Congress the war scenarios that the USA might have to confront in the future, the Pentagon chief General Powell made it clear that "the real threat we face today is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain".[8] It's in order to face up to this unknown that the US is changing its military strategy and is setting up a version of Reagan's Star Wars more adapted to the current international situation and to its fear of surprise, uncontrollable nuclear wars. This is called GPALS, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, the aim of which is to completely neutralize any nuclear missile no matter where it is launched from or where it is going.
The US defends its hegemony
The USA has a particular interest in the struggle against chaos in general, and against nuclear proliferation and the risk of uncontrolled local nuclear conflicts in particular, because such things could undermine its position as dominant imperialism. We saw this during the Gulf war[9], and during the Middle East peace conferences, from which the European countries were excluded[10]. We have just seen it again at the conference about aid to the CIS held in Washington, in which the USA organized everything, dictated the agendas, nominated the commissions and their presidents at its convenience. It once again reduced the European countries, Germany and above all France, to an impotent walk-on role; in the media presentation of the first airlifts of food to Russia these countries were made to look quite ridiculous.
The GPALS program, which, we might say in passing, says a lot about the world, and especially about the American, bourgeoisie's belief in the 'era of peace' that is supposed to reign under Bush's new world order - this new Star Wars program is also the latest expression, and it is a considerable one, of the USA's aim to preserve its hegemony. It wants to ensure "collective security from Vancouver to Vladivostok". Translation: it wants to maintain, definitively or at least for a very long time, American military supremacy "from V to V" over Europe and Japan.
As for the 'reductions' in arms expenditures, the so-called 'peace dividend' for the American bourgeoisie, there's no question here of it reducing its armaments and its war effort. It's simply a matter of dispensing with all that is obsolete. That is to say, the part of its arsenal that was concentrated on the USSR and which has less reason to exist. They will try to sell some of this at unbeatable prices. The rest? A mountain of metal which cost a fortune (it's the lion's share of the huge American deficit). On the other hand the Star Wars program (SDI) is increasing by 31%. The total cost of the program will be 46 billion dollars ... the arms race continues.
Germany is more and more a factor in the world imperialist scene
A whole series of events have confirmed the inevitable tendency for Germany to come forward as the main imperialist rival to the USA[11]. And the American bourgeoisie knows this quite well. Since the month of September 1991, a few months after the US demonstration of force in the Gulf, the Washington Post pointed to the various expressions of Germany's new "assertiveness":
"Germany threatens to recognize Croatia and Slovenia; it led Europe to ratify the independence of the Baltic states; it sharply criticizes its western allies for their hesitations about aid to the USSR; it is calling for a rapid ban on short range missiles; proposes that the CSCE creates its own peacekeeping force, and calls on its allies to give it more control over the troops stationed on its own soil".[12]
"In December, Germany forced the hand of its European partners by recognizing the two republics barely a month after the Maastricht summit where the principle of a joint foreign policy and defense was accepted at Bonn's request; the Bundesbank has unilaterally raised its interest rates by half a point, ten days after this same summit, which had rated a process of monetary union; Germany did not facilitate discussion at the GAIT, despite Helmut Kohl's promise to make concessions over agricultural subsidies. Finally, the diplomats of Federal Germany are adopting an increasingly imperious attitude in Europe and the USA. We know that Kohl wants to impose German as the working language of the EEC ...".[13]
The American, British and French bourgeoisies, even though in different ways, are all offended by the new German "assertiveness". They are no longer used to it. The former appearance of unity is cracking up more and more as Germany is inevitably forced to defend its own imperialist interests, which are antagonistic to those of the USA. In particular, it urgently feels the need to revise the Constitution which forbids it from sending troops abroad: "The engagement of military means to realize political objectives in Europe and the nearby regions should not be excluded".[14]
In fact, after the Gulf war, Germany also revealed its current limitations in the Yugoslav affair: without any military weight, and above all absent from the UN Security Council, it could not give the aid it wanted to Croatia. The USA, by paralyzing the EEC's efforts to establishing a cease-fire, and by delaying the decision to send in the UN Blue Helmets, gave a free hand to the Serbian army to wage a bloody war and push back Croatia's territorial ambitions.
French imperialism, caught between two evils, chooses the lesser
The French bourgeoisie, which finds no consolation in being a second-rate imperialist power, is caught between its desire to break free of the onerous protection of the USA, and its 'eternal' fear (ie, since the beginning of capitalism) of Germany's power. It believes that it has found a solution to its problem in Europe, in the EEC. In the framework of a United Europe, it could rival the USA, and at the same time, among twelve nations, it could juggle with Germany and control it.
For the moment, it is playing the German card and is playing it very seductively: it has proposed putting its nuclear forces in the service of European defense. The German minister of foreign affairs has responded "with interest" to this proposal. The USA gave itself all the main parts in the conference on aid to the CIS - which Mitterrand judged to be superfluous - and in the organization of Operation Provide Hope (the delivery of food supplies to Russia). In response France proposed that it should be the G7 that organized this operation. The G7 is currently presided over by ... Germany.
The latter has not been immune to the charms of the French: after the creation of the Franco-German brigade, there was an agreement to cooperate on a 'Eurocopter' (a military one of course) and Germany is keen on buying the French fighter, the Rafale.
But if any marriage takes place, it will be one of convenience. The love between them doesn't go that deep, as we saw over Yugoslavia, when France, a 'Mediterranean power', leaned at first towards the US-British side, since it wasn't too happy about Germany getting to the shores of the Mediterranean as it was attempting to do via Croatia. However, for the moment, the idyll continues. But it is bound to pose problems for France.
Tensions between the USA and Europe get sharper
In fact, France is now at the center of a battle which goes beyond it. "The revival of tension between the USA and France marks the dawn of a new era in which the old allies seem to be turning into new rivals in areas such as trade, military strategy and the new world balance, according to certain high officials of America and France".[15]
The weak point of the French-German alliance, on which the American bourgeoisie is concentrating its strength, is of course France. America is pushing all the harder because France could help Germany to acquire nuclear weapons.[16]
The events in Algeria, Chad and Djibouti, the social and political instability of these countries, are being exploited by the US to put pressure on France, putting into question the latter's presence in its historic spheres of influence, and this after France has already been expelled from Lebanon. This is taking place through the FIS, which is financed by Saudi Arabia; through the government of Djibouti which, under Saudi influence, is challenging the presence of the French army on its territory; and through Hissene Habre, the American protégé in Chad. The hand of the USA is there, making use of the frightful chaos in these countries, a chaos which it is exacerbating in the pursuit of its own imperialist interests, just as the defense of German imperialist interests in Yugoslavia has only amplified the decomposition that reigns there.
American pressure is also very strong at the economic level, via the GATT negotiations with the EEC. Here again, it's France which is the main target on the question of agricultural subsidies. Linking together questions of security, of American engagement in Europe, to the resolution of the differences in the GATT, the USA is blackmailing the European countries and trying to divide them.
As a Bulgarian journal Douma, put it: "While Europe is building the 'common European home from the Atlantic to the Urals', brick by brick, the USA is destroying it brick by brick under the banner of from Vancouver to Vladivostok".[17]
Japan, another rising imperialist power
More and more, Japan is playing an international political role which, is of course still far below its real ambitions, but which is getting there bit by bit. Bush's journey to Asia and Japan in particular, which had the fundamental objective of redeploying American military forces in the Pacific (the military base in Singapore) gave rise to all sorts of declarations by the Japanese leaders about the 'illiteracy of American workers', their 'lack of ethics'. This was following US pressure to open the Japanese market to American products. Apart from these secondary matters, which do however reveal the current climate and the new "assertiveness" of the Japanese bourgeoisie, Japan is more and more demanding that it should play an important political role in the imperialist arena: it is increasingly posing the question of the reorganization of the permanent council of the UN; it heads the UN force in Cambodia; it is intervening more and more on the Asian continent (China, Korea), which has made the USA more than a little anxious[18]; and it is demanding with growing insistence that Russia should restore the Kurile Islands to it (here it is supported by Germany).
Japan is moving much faster than Germany on military questions. The revision of the Constitution limiting the dispatch of foreign troops abroad is much more advanced. And above all, "it is amassing enormous quantities of plutonium. A hundred tons. Much more than it could consume in its 39 nuclear reactors ... The prospect of a pacifist and stable Japan being transformed into a nuclear power isn't a priori alarming. However, Japan is giving itself the means to build nuclear weapons, and each step it takes will be heavy with international consequences".[19]
There can be no doubt about it: the new world order, which was supposed to bring humanity peace, is heavy with menace. On the one hand chaos and decomposition invade the planet and exacerbate all kinds of local conflicts, rivalries and regional imperialist wars; on the other hand, imperialist antagonisms between the great powers are getting increasingly acute. On the surface still relatively 'soft', measured, even polite and courteous, they are going to deepen and they will aggravate and accelerate - in fact they are already doing so - the effects of the decomposition of the capitalist world, the chaos and the growing social and economic catastrophe.
One alternative to capitalist barbarism: communism
Faced with the barbarism of the capitalist world, where the tragic disputes with the absurd, the only force capable of offering an alternative to this historic impasse is still suffering from the effects of the events which marked the end of the eastern bloc and of the USSR. The international ideological campaigns about the 'end of communism' (which falsely amalgamate communism with Stalinism), about the 'definitive victory of capitalism' have momentarily succeeded in depriving the workers of any perspective of another society, of an alternative to the hell of capitalism.
This disarray affecting the proletariat, and the decline of its militancy[20], add further weight to the growing difficulties resulting from the decomposition of society. Lumpenisation, despair, nihilism, which already affect large portions of the world proletariat (especially in the east) are a real danger for those workers who have been thrown out of production. This is particularly true for the young. The cynical way that the bourgeoisie uses this despair adds up to a further difficulty. In particular, the ruling class is developing and heightening anti-immigrant and racist feelings, which risk being further fuelled by the massive waves of immigration to come (especially from the eastern countries). The false opposition between racism and anti-racism, totalitarianism and democracy, fascism and anti-fascism, is part of an attempt to divert the workers away from their own struggles, from the anti-capitalist terrain of the defense of their living conditions and of opposition to the bourgeois state. This is why revolutionaries have to denounce these campaigns implacably.
Nevertheless, times are changing and the economic crisis, the open recession which is hitting the biggest world powers, above all the USA, has returned to first place in the workers' concerns. Attacks against the working class are accelerating brutally in the main industrial countries. Wages have been blocked for a long time and in the USA "the real average wages of the workers are lower than they were 10 or 15 years ago".[21] But above all, there is a dramatic increase in redundancies, particularly in the central branches of the world economy. In the computer industry, IBM cut 30,000 jobs in 1991 and intends to do the same in 1992; in the car industry, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler have built up huge losses (7 billion dollars) and are also pushing through massive layoffs; the same goes for the arms industries (General Dynamic, United Technologies). Thousands of jobs have been chopped in these sectors. Thousands more in the service industries (banks, insurance): "The number of people requesting unemployment benefit leads to the conclusion that 23 million people had no jobs last year."
Out of a population of 250 million in the USA, 9% of the population, 23 million people are living from 'food stamps'. More than 30 million live below the poverty line and so qualify for health insurance, 'Medicaid'. But 37 million, who live just above the poverty line, don't qualify even though they still can't afford to pay for health care. For these people, the smallest illness becomes a family catastrophe. All together that's 70 million people living in poverty! This is the much vaunted 'prosperity' of 'triumphant capitalism'.
Of course, the massive redundancies don't only hit the American workers. Unemployment rates are particularly high in countries like Spain, Italy, France, Canada, Britain. This involves the central sectors of the economy, cars, steel, armaments. Even the flowers of German industry, Mercedes and BMW, are laying off workers.
The working class of the industrialized countries is being subjected to a truly terrible attack, an attack which aims to bring its living conditions to the lowest possible level.
Redundancies, wage-cuts, the general deterioration of living conditions, will compel the working class to return to the fray, to the path of massive struggles. These struggles will again have to confront the political barriers erected by the left parties and the leftists; they will have to deal with union maneuvers and corporatism, and look again for the extension and unification of the struggles. In this political combat, revolutionary groups and the most militant workers will have a crucial role, intervening to help the movement go beyond the traps laid by the political and union forces of the bourgeoisie.
At the same time, these attacks against working class living conditions will give the lie to the myth of capitalist prosperity, and will expose to the mass of workers the real bankruptcy of capitalism, its historic failure on the economic level. This development of consciousness will push workers once again to look for an alternative to capitalism; bit by bit it will undo the effects of the bourgeoisie's campaigns about the 'end of communism' and accelerate the search for a wider and deeper perspective, for the historic and revolutionary struggle. In this process, communist groups have an indispensable role in reminding workers of the historical experience of their class, in reaffirming the perspective of communism, its necessity and possibility.
The future will be at stake in the class confrontations which will inevitably take place. Only the proletarian revolution and the destruction of capitalism can take humanity out of the daily hell that it is living through. This alone can prevent the barbarism of capitalism going on to its ultimate, dramatic conclusion. This alone can lead to the establishment of a human community where exploitation, poverty, famines and wars will be eradicated once and for all. RL 23.2.92
"In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and with it also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but itself life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly - only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs ! " (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program)
[1] Le Monde 31.1.92
[2] Le Monde 19.1.92
[3] According to the Czech press translated in Courier Internationale 66 and Le Monde 11.2.92
[4] Le Monde 16.2.92
[5] International Herald Tribune 21.2.92
[6] Le Monde 16, 2.92
[7] Baltimore Sun, cited in International Herald Tribune 12.2.92
[8] International Herald Tribune 19.2.92
[9] See International Review 63, 64, 65
[10] See International Review 68
[11] See 'Towards the greatest chaos in history' IR 68
[12] Washington Post 18.9.91, translated into French by Courier International 65
[13] Editorial of Courier International 65, 30.1.92
[14] Declaration by the German Minister of Defense, G Stoltenberg, Le Monde 18.1.92
[15] Washington Post, cited by the International Herald Tribune, 23.1.92
[16] See the declarations of the US Vice President, Dan Quayle, Le Monde, 11.2.92
[17] cited by Le Monde, ibid
[18] International Herald Tribune, 3.2.92
[19] Financial Times, translated into French by Courier International 65
[20] See IR 67, 'Resolution on the international situation', 9th congress of the ICC
[21] International Herald Tribune, 13.1.92
As capitalism undergoes the most serious crisis in its history, all the defenders of the established order proclaim incessantly the death of Marxism: the only theory which is able to understand this crisis' reality, and which foresaw it. They are wringing the last drop out of that old and vile lie which equates Marxism and Stalinism, revolution and counter-revolution. The ruling class aims to dress up the bankruptcy of Stalinist state capitalism as the bankruptcy of communism, and of its theory: Marxism. This is one of the most violent ideological attacks that the working has been subjected to for decades. But no amount of hysterical exorcism by the bourgeoisie's hired hacks can change the bare truth: their theories have shown themselves completely incapable of explaining the present economic disaster, while the Marxist analysis of capitalist crises finds itself strikingly verified.
It is remarkable to see the most lucid of the ruling class' "thinkers" and "commentators" merely observe the extent of the disaster which grips the planet, without being able to offer even the beginnings of an explanation for it. They occupy hours of television, fill pages in the newspapers, on the ravages of poverty and disease in Africa, the destructive anarchy which is threatening the old "soviet" empire with famine, the ecological devastation of the planet which is putting the very survival of the human race in peril, on the damage done by the drugs trade, which has reached the same scale as trade in oil, on the absurdity of sterilising cultivable land in Europe while famine proliferates throughout the world, on the desperation and decomposition eating away at the suburbs of the major countries, on the all-pervasive feeling that society is going nowhere... All their "sociological" and economic studies, in every field, make not a jot of difference: the why and the wherefore of it all remain a complete mystery.
The less shortsighted of them vaguely perceive that at the heart of it all lies some kind of economic problem. Without saying so, without even realising it, they are coming round to that old discovery of Marxism: that, to this day, the economy has always been the key to the anatomy of social life. But this merely adds to the puzzlement. In the mish-mash which serves as their theoretical framework, the blockage of the world economy remains a complete mystery.
The dominant ideology is founded on the myth of the permanence of capitalist relations of production. The little that is left standing of its philosophical edifice would be laid low for good, were it to be though even for an instant that these relations - wage labour, profit, nations, competition - not only are not the only possible form of economic organisation, but have become the one calamity at the source of all the scourges that have befallen a suffering humanity.
For twenty years, the economists have used a more and more incomprehensible language to try to "explain" the constant decline of the world economy. These "explanations" all have two characteristics in common: the defence of capitalism as the only possible system, and the fact that reality has made a laughing stock of each in turn, no sooner than they had been announced.
As the "prosperity" of the post-war reconstruction drew to a close at the end of the 60's, there were two recessions: in 1967 and in 1970. Compared to the economic earthquakes that we have experienced since then, these recessions seem insignificant enough,[1] but at the time they were a relatively new phenomenon. The ghost of the economic crisis, which had been thought exorcised for good since the slump of the 1930's, returned to haunt the bourgeoisie's economists.[2] Reality spoke for itself: with reconstruction finished, capitalism was plunging once again into economic crisis. Decadent capitalism's post-1914 cycle was verified: crisis -war - reconstruction - renewed crisis. The "experts" explained that this was quite untrue. These tremors were due to nothing but "the rigidity of the monetary system inherited from World War II", the famous Bretton Woods agreement based on the dollar-standard and fixed exchange rates. And so a new international currency was created (the IMF's Special Drawing Rights - SDRs) and exchange rates allowed to float.
But only a few years later world capitalism was once again hit by two new recessions, much longer and deeper than those before them: 1974-75, and 1980-82. The "experts" found a new explanation: scarce energy supplies. These new convulsions were called the "oil shocks". Twice, it was explained that the system had nothing to do with these new difficulties. They were the result of the greed of a few Arab sheiks, or even of the revenge of a few under-developed oil producers. And as if they wanted to convince themselves of the system's eternal vitality, the economic "recovery" of the 1980's was baptised a return to "pure" capitalism. "Reaganomics" would restore to private businessmen the freedom and authority that the state had supposedly confiscated, and this would at last allow the full creative power of the system to burst forth. Privatisation, the merciless elimination of unprofitable businesses, destruction of job security the better allow the "free play of the market" to regulate labour power, the naked affirmation of "unrestrained capitalism", were all supposed to show that the foundations of the capitalist system remained healthy, and indeed offered the only perspective possible. Yet already, at the beginning of the 80's the economies of the Third World were in collapse. In the mid-80's, the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe set off down the road to "liberalism", trying to break free from the most rigid forms of their ultra-statified capitalism. The decade came to an end with a still worse disaster, as the ex-Soviet bloc plunged into unparalleled chaos.
At first, the Western democracies' ideologues presented all this as a confirmation of the truth of their gospel: the USSR and the Eastern bloc countries were collapsing because they had not managed to become really capitalist, and the "Third World" countries because they managed capitalism badly. But the beginning of the 1990's revealed the economic crisis striking violently at the most powerful nations on the planet, capitalism's very heart. And right in the forefront of this new plunge into crisis stood the champions of liberalism: the countries which were supposed to serve an example to the rest of the world of the miracles accomplished by the "market economy" - Great Britain and the USA.
At the beginning of 1992, we saw the fine flower of Western capitalism, the best-managed companies in the world, announced that their profits were melting away and that they were preparing to shed tens of thousands of jobs: IBM, the world's biggest computer manufacturer, which has never had any losses since its creation; General Motors, the world's biggest industrial company, whose power could be summed up in the saying that "what is good for General Motors is good for America", announced the biggest losses ever recorded in the history of capitalism, at $4 billion; United Technologies, one of America's most modern industrial groups; Ford; Mercedes Benz, the symbol of the power of German capital, which boasted of being the only car manufacturer to take on workers during the 80's, Sony, the champion of Japanese dynamism and efficiency... As for the banking and financial sectors, which had experienced the greatest "prosperity" during the 1980's and which had benefited most from the most gigantic level of speculation and indebtedness ever seen in history, it has been struck to the heart by the recession, to the point where it is even in danger of collapse, worn out by its own abuses. Some economists seem only to have "discovered" these abuses today. In reality, they have been world economy's lifeline for the last two decades: headlong flight into credit. The "machine for pushing problems into the future" has broken down, crushed by the weight of accumulated debt.[3]
What is left of the explanation that the crisis was caused by the "rigidity of the monetary system", when the anarchy of exchange rates has become a major factor in world economic instability? What is there left of all the chatter about "oil shocks" when oil prices are drowning in an oil-slick of overproduction? What is left of the speeches about "liberalism" and "the miracles of the market economy" as the economy collapses in the midst of a bitter commercial war for the planet's shrinking markets? And what can they be worth, these "explanations" that the crisis is the fault of debt, when it is precisely this suicidal debt that, alone, has kept this dying economy alive?
In decadent capitalism, the economists have become high priests of the absurd. They can no more explain the crisis, than they can give any perspective for the medium or long term.[4] Their job is to defend capitalism and this prevents them, however "intelligent" they may be, of understanding this most elementary reality: the problem with the world economy has nothing to do with this or that country, this or that way of managing capitalism. It is the system itself, capitalism, which is the problem. All their "reasons" and "ideas" will undoubtedly go down in history as some of the most sinister examples of the blindness and stupidity of a decadent class.
Before Marx, human history appeared generally as a series of more or less disparate events, evolving at the mercy of battles, or the religious or political convictions of the world's great men. In the final analysis, the only logical thread in history had to be sought outside the material world, in the ethereal spheres of divine Providence, or at best in the development of Hegel's Absolute Idea.[5] Today's ruling class economists and "thinkers" have got no further. There is even one who, since the collapse of what they call "communism", has repeated a caricature of Hegel's thought and announced the "end of history": since all countries have now reached the most developed form of liberal, "democratic" capitalism, and since there can be nothing after capitalism, we have reached the end of the road. With such "ideas", today's chaos, the blockage of the economy, the generalised disintegration, can only remain a mystery... of Providence. Those who believe that nothing can exist after capitalism must be struck with stupor and despair in humanity as they contemplate the terrible bankruptcy that is the result of several centuries of capitalist domination.
But for Marxism, today's events are a striking confirmation of the historic laws which it first discovered and formulated. From the viewpoint of the revolutionary proletariat, capitalism is no more eternal than any of the other modes of exploitation that went before: feudalism, slavery, and so on. Indeed, Marxism is distinguished from the communist theories which preceded it precisely by the fact that it bases the communist project on an understanding of the history's dynamics. Communism becomes historically possible because capitalism has created both the material conditions which make it possible to achieve a true society of abundance, and the class which is capable of undertaking the communist revolution: the proletariat. The revolution has become a necessity because capitalism has reached a dead end.
The more this dead end disconcerts the bourgeois and their economists, the more it confirms the Marxists in their revolutionary convictions.
But how do Marxists explain this "historic cul-de-sac"? Why should capitalism not develop into infinity? One sentence of Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto sums up the answer:
"The institutions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them".
What does this mean? Is it confirmed by reality?
'The institutions of Bourgeois Society'
One of the traps of bourgeois ideology, into which the economists fall themselves, is to think that capitalist relationships are "natural". Egoism, greed, hypocrisy and the cynical cruelty of capitalist exploitation are only the most refined forms attained by the always "bad", "human nature".
But whoever so much as glances at history can see that this is nonsense. Today's social relationships have only lasted some 500 years, if we, like Marx, place the beginning of their domination in the 16th Century, when the discovery of America and the explosion of world trade which followed allowed the capitalist merchants to begin definitively imposing their power on the economic life of the planet. Humanity had known other class societies, such as slavery or feudalism, and before them it lived for millennia under various forms of "primitive communism", in other words classless societies without exploitation.
"In the social production of their life" Marx explains,[6] "men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness".
The institutions of bourgeois society, capitalist relations of production and their "legal and political superstructure", far from being eternal realities, are nothing but a particular, temporary form of social organisation, which "correspond to a definite stage of development of (...) material productive forces". Marx used to say that the hand mill stood for slavery, the water mill for feudalism, and the steam mill for capitalism.
But what do these relationships consist of? In the mythology that identifies communism with Stalinism, it is common to define capitalist social relations in opposition to those which reigned in the so-called communist countries, like the ex-USSR. The determining criterion was supposedly the question of ownership of the means of production by private capitalists, or by the state. But as Marx and Engels has already shown in their battle against Lassalle's state socialism, the fact that capitalist state owns the means of production, only makes this state the "ideal collective capitalist".
Rosa Luxemburg, one of the greatest theoreticians since Marx, insists on two main criteria, two aspects of social organisation, in determining the specificities of one mode of exploitation relative to others: the aim of production, and the relationship that ties the exploited to the exploiters. These criteria, defined well before the Russian revolution and its defeat, leave no doubt as to the capitalist nature of the Stalinist economies.[7]
Rosa Luxemburg sums up the specificity of the capitalist mode of production thus: "The slave-owner bought slaves for their usefulness, or for his pleasure. The feudal lord extorted payment in kind from his serfs with the same aim: to live well off his inheritance. The modern businessman does not make workers produce food, clothing, or luxury goods for his own enjoyment: he makes them produce goods for sale, in order to make a profit".[8]
The aim of capitalist production is the accumulation of capital, to the point where, in its early radical days, the puritan bourgeoisie condemned the spending on luxuries of the exploiting classes. Marx speaks of such spending as a "theft of capital".
The bourgeois bureaucrats claim that in their regimes, they do not pursue capitalist objectives, and that the income of the "leaders" comes in the form of "wages". But the fact that revenue is distributed as fixed income (falsely called a "wage" in this case) and privileges, rather than as share dividends or individual savings, is quite irrelevant in determining whether the mode of production is capitalist or not.[9] The revenue of the high state bureaucrats is nonetheless made of the workers' sweat and blood. The Stalinists' "planning" pursued the same objectives as the investors on Wall Street: feed the god National Capital with the surplus labour extracted from the exploited, increase the power of capital and ensure its defence against other national capitals. The hypocritical "Spartan" face put on by the Stalinist bureaucrats, especially when they have just seized power, is no more than a degenerate caricature of the puritanism of capitalism's stage of primitive accumulation, a caricature deformed by the gangrene of decadent capitalism: bureaucracy and militarism.
The specific capitalist relation between exploited and exploiter is no less important, nor less present in Stalinist state capitalism.
In ancient slave society, the slave was food just like the animals belonging to his master. From his exploiter, he received the minimum necessary for him to live and reproduce. This quantity was relatively independent of the amount he produced. Even if he did no work, or the crop was destroyed, the master would feed him, just as he would feed a horse to avoid losing it.
Under feudal serfdom, though less strictly, the serf remained like the slave, attached personally to his exploiter, or to a property: a chateau would be sold with its lands, its cattle, and its serfs. However, the serf s revenue was no longer truly independent of his labour. He had a right to a share (a percentage) of what was actually produced.
Under capitalism, the exploited proletarian is "free". But this "freedom" which is so vaunted by bourgeois propaganda in fact comes down to the fact that their is no personal tie between the exploited and his exploiter. The worker belongs to nobody, he is attached to no land or property. His ties with his exploiter are reduced to a purely commercial transaction: he sells, not himself, but his labour power. His "freedom" is to have been separated from his means of production. It is the freedom of capital to exploit him anywhere, to make him produce whatever it wants. The worker's share of what is produced (when he has any right to it at all) is independent of the product of his labour. His share is equivalent to the price of the only commodity that he possesses and reproduces: his labour power.
"Like any other commodity, 'labour power' has a definite value. The value of any commodity is determined by the quantity of labour required to produce it. To produce the commodity 'labour power', a determined quantity of work is also necessary: the work which produces food, clothing, etc for the worker. A man's labour power is worth what it costs in labour to maintain him in a state to work, to maintain his labour power".[10]
This is wage labour.
The Stalinists claim that there is no exploitation under their rule, because there is no unemployment. It is true that, generally speaking, in the Stalinist regimes the unemployed are "put to work". The labour market is a state monopoly, where the state buys everything that comes on the market, in exchange for miserably low wages. But the state, the "collective capitalist", is no less buyer and exploiter for that. The proletariat pays its guaranteed employment in the ban on any demands, and wretched living conditions. Stalinism is not the negation of wage labour, but its totalitarian form.
Today, the Stalinist countries' economies are not "turning capitalist". They are merely trying to jettison the most rigidly statified forms of decadent capitalism.
Production exclusively for sale in order to accumulate capital, workers remunerated by wage-labour: obviously this does not define all the "institutions of bourgeois society", .but it highlights the most specific of them, and in particular those which allow us to understand why capitalism is condemned to go nowhere.
'The wealth created by them... '
At the twilight of feudal society, capitalist production relations - the "institutions of bourgeois society" - made possible a gigantic leap forward in society's productive forces. At a time when the labour of one man could barely feed more than himself, and when society was still divided up into a multitude of virtually autonomous fiefdoms, the development of "free" wage labour and the unification of the economy through trade were powerful factors of social development.
"The bourgeoisie (...) has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals (..) The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together".[11]
Contrary to pre-Marxist communist theories, which thought that communism was a possibility at any moment in history, Marxism recognised that only capitalism creates the material means for such a society. Before becoming "too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them", bourgeois institutions were capable, "in blood and filth", of creating two vital conditions for the erection of a truly communist society: a worldwide productive network (the world market), and a sufficient development of labour productivity. As we will see, these were to become a nightmare for capital's survival.
"Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way... The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, ie to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image".[12]
This unification of the world economy was both a stimulant and a product of the greatest progress ever seen in labour productivity. The very nature of capitalist relationships, the competition to the death between different fractions of capital, whether nationally or internationally, forces them to a permanent race for productivity. Lowering production costs to improve competitivity is a condition for survival on the market.[13]
Despite the destructive weight of the war economy, which became quasi-permanent after World War I, and despite the irrationality introduced by its increasingly difficult, contradictory, and militarised functioning since the definitive formation of the world market at the beginning of this century,[14] capitalism has continued to develop the technical productivity of labour. It has been calculated[15] that around 1700, a French agricultural labourer could feed 1.7 people: in other words, he could feed himself, and provide three quarters of the nourishment for one other person. In 1975, an American farm worker could feed 74 people as well as himself! In 1708 in France, the production of one quintal of wheat cost 253 hours of labour; in 1984, it cost 4 hours. Progress has been no less spectacular on the industrial level: to produce a bicycle in France in 1891 cost 1500 hours of labour; in the USA of 1975, it cost 15 hours. The production time of an electric light bulb in France was divided by more than 50 between 1925 and 1982, that of a radio by 200. During the last decade, marked by an unrestrained exacerbation of trade wars - which have only become still more bitter with the collapse of the Eastern bloc[16] - computerisation and the increasing introduction or robots into industry have accelerated still further the development of productivity.[17]
But these conditions, which make it possible consciously to organise production worldwide for the benefit of humanity, and which would in a few years make it possible to wipe hunger and poverty from the face of the earth forever by giving free rein to the development of science and the other productive forces - in short, the material conditions which make communism a possibility - are, from the bourgeois point of view, a veritable torment. And from the point of view of humanity, the survival of bourgeois production relations becomes a nightmare.
"Institutions which are too narrow..."
"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters".[18] In the case of pre-capitalist exploitative societies, as in capitalism, this "collision" between the "development of the productive forces" and the "property relations" are concretised by scarcity and famine. But whereas, in ancient slave society or feudalism, when production relations became "too narrow", society found itself materially incapable of producing enough goods or food from the earth, in capitalism we find a quite new kind of economic blockage: "over-production".
"Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce" (Communist Manifesto).
What Marx and Engels described in the mid-19th century in analysing the commercial crises of ascendant capitalism, has become a virtually chronic situation in decadent capitalism. Since World War I, the "over-production" of armaments has become a permanent disease of the system. Famines are developing in the under-developed countries at the same time as US and "soviet" capital compete in space with the most costly and sophisticated technology. Every year since the crisis of 1929, the US government has devoted part of its farm support subsidy to pay farmers not to cultivate land.[19] At the end of the 80's, as the UN Secretary General announced more than 30 million deaths from starvation in Africa, almost half the American orange crop was destroyed (intentionally!) by fire. At the beginning of the 1990's, the EEC began an enormous plan to take 15% of cereal lands out of cultivation. The new open recession, which is only a worsening of the crisis in which the system has been mired since the end of the 60's, is hitting every sector of the economy, and all over the world the sterilisation of land is being accompanied by the closure of mines and factories.
Between humanity's needs and the means to satisfy them, there is an "invisible hand" which forces the capitalists not to produce but to lay-off, and the exploited to exist in poverty. This "invisible hand" is the "miraculous market economy", the capitalist relations of production which have become "too narrow".
Cynical and merciless as the capitalist class is, it does not create such a situation voluntarily. It could ask no better than to have industry and agriculture running at full capacity, to extort a constantly growing mass of surplus-value from the exploited, to sell without limits and to accumulate profit into infinity. If it does not do so, this is because it is prevented by capitalist relations of production. As we have seen, capital does not produce to satisfy human need, not even that of the ruling class. It produces to sell. But since it is based on wage labour, it is incapable of giving its own workers, and still less those it does not exploit, the means to buy all that it is able to produce.
As we have also seen, the share of production which goes to the worker is determined not by what he produces, but by the value of his labour power, and this value (ie the work needed to clothe and feed him, etc) is constantly diminishing as the overall productivity of labour increases.
By reducing the value of commodities, increases in productivity allow one capitalist to seize the markets of another, but it does not create new markets. On the contrary, it reduces the market which is constituted by the producers themselves.
"The workers' power of consumption is limited partly by the laws of wages, and partly by the fact that they are only employed as long as their employment is profitable to the capitalist class. The sole reason for all real crises, is always the poverty and limited consumption of the masses, faced with the tendency of the capitalist economy to develop the productive forces as if their only limit were society's absolute power of consumption".[20]
This is the fundamental contradiction which condemns capital to a dead end.[21]
Capitalism has born this contradiction - the inability to create its own outlets - since its beginnings. At first, it could be overcome by selling to feudal markets, then through the conquest of colonial markets. The search for outlets drove the bourgeoisie to "invade the whole planet". Once the world market was formed, and shared out amongst the great powers, it led to the First, then the Second World Wars.
Today, twenty years after the 'respite' provided by the recon struction of the gigantic destruction during World War II, after twenty years of flight into debt, pushing back the deadline with credit after credit, capitalism is once again faced with its old contradiction: but with a year and a half of debts into the bargain.
The narrowness of bourgeois institutions has finally made the world economy into a monster, where less than 10% of the population produces 70% of the wealth! Contrary to the hymns of praise to the future "miracles of the market economy" that the bourgeoisie is singing solemnly over the grave of Stalinism, reality has revealed in all its horror the barbaric scourge of humanity that is the continued existence of capitalist social relations. More than ever, the very survival of the human species demands the emergence of a new society. To overcome the dead-end of capitalism, this society will have to be based on two essential principles:
More than ever, the struggle for a society founded on the old communist principle "From each according to his abilities,to each according to his needs", opens up the only way out for humanity.
The economists' attachment to the capitalist mode of exploitation blinds them, and prevents them from seeing and understanding its bankruptcy. The revolt against exploitation, by contrast, pushes the proletariat towards a historic lucidity. By looking from the viewpoint of this class, Marx, and the real Marxists, have been able to rise to a coherent historical vision. A vision which is capable not only of grasping what is specific in capitalism relative to past societies, but of understanding the contradictions which make this mode of production as transitory as those of the past. Marxism places the possibility and necessity of communism on a scientific footing. Far from being buried, as the defenders of the established order would like to think, it remains more current than ever.
RV 6/3/1992
[1] In 1967, it was above all Germany that was marked by the recession. For the first time since the war, its GDP stopped growing. The "German miracle" was replaced by a 0.1% drop in GDP. In 1970, it was the turn of the world's most powerful economy, the USA to suffer a 0.3% fall in production.
[2] In 1969, the cover of the French economic review L'Expansion titled "Can 1929 begin again?"
[3] Some estimates put total world debt at 30,000 billion dollars (Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1992). This is equivalent to seven years of America's GNP, or of the EEC's, or a year and a half of labour (under present conditions) of the whole of humanity!
[4] In December 1991, the OECD presented its Economic Perspectives, to the press: they announced an imminent economic recovery, encouraged amongst other things, by the drop in German interest rates. The same day, the Bundesbank announced a substantial increase in rates, and the OECD immediately revised its forecasts downwards, emphasizing how great were the unknowns which dominate the epoch....
[5] See the article in this issue "How the proletariat won Marx to communism"
[6] In the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ed. Lawrence and Wishart)
[7] Economists have difficulty understanding that the capitalist nature of these economies can in fact only be understood from a Marxist viewpoint.
[8] Rosa Luxemburg, Introduction to Political Economy, Chapter 5, Wage Labour"
[9] By contrast, this difference is important for an understanding of the difference in efficiency between Stalinist state capitalism and so-called "liberal" variety. The fact that the leaders' income is irrespective of the production for which they are supposed to be responsible has made them veritable monsters of irresponsibility, corruption, and inefficiency (see "Theses on the economic and political crisis in the Eastern countries" in International Review n°60).
[10] Rosa Luxemburg, op, cit.
[11] The Communist Manifesto, "Bourgeois and proletarians"
[12] idem
[13] In the case of a country like the USSR, where internal competition is blunted by the state monopoly, the constant pressure to improve productivity appears at the level of international military competition.
[14] See our pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism [161] .
[15] The data on productivity are drawn from various works by Jean Fourastié La Productivité (ed. PUF, 1987); Pourquoi les prix baissent (ed. Hachette, 1984); Pouvoir d'achat, prix et salaires (ed. Gallimard, 1977)
[16] See the article in this Review: "Trade wars: the infernal mechanism of capitalist competition".
[17] We can get some idea of the increase in labour productivity from the evolution of the number of "unproductive" people supported by truly productive labour (productive in the general sense of the term, ie useful to human existence). The farmworkers, and the workers in industry, services, and building who produce goods or services destined for consumption or the production of consumer goods, allow an ever-growing number of people to live without doing any really productive work: the military, the police, workers in all the industries producing weapons or military equipment, a large part of the state bureaucracy, workers in the finance, banking, marketing and advertising sectors, etc. The share of truly productive labour is constantly diminishing in capitalist society, to the benefit of activities which are vital to the survival of each national capital, but useless if not downright destructive from the point of view of the needs of humanity.
[18] Marx, Preface to The Critique of Political Economy.
[19] From the purely technical viewpoint, the USA alone could feed the entire planet.
[20] Marx, Capital, Vol III
[21] This is not the only contradiction that the Marxist analysis uncovers within capitalist relations of production: the law of the falling rate of profit, the contradiction between the need for ever more massive investment and the demands of capital circulation, the contradiction between the worldwide character of production and the national nature of the appropriation of capital, etc, are all among the essential contradictions which Marxism has shown to be both motive power and brake in the life of capital. But all these other contradictions only become a real barrier to the growth of capital once it comes up against the most fundamental reason for the crisis: capital's inability to create its own markets.
The trade war: The infernal machinery of capitalist competition
'War, 'battle', 'invasion': the language of war has taken over the sphere of trade and the economy. As the economic crisis gets more severe, competition for shrinking markets gets sharper and sharper, and is now turning into a real trade war. Economic competition is a constant feature in the life of capitalism, one of its foundations, inherent to its being. But there is a fundamental difference between periods of prosperity during which capitalist enterprises fight to open up new markets and increase their profits, and periods of acute crisis, like the one we're in now, where the question isn't so much to increase profits but to limit losses and ensure your survival in an increasingly savage economic brawl. Irrefutable proof of the economic dogfight going on today: the record number of bankruptcies in all countries of the world. In 1991 they rose by 56% in Britain, by 20% in France. It's a cull that has hit all sectors of the economy.
One example among many: Air transport
One example among others, but a particularly significant pointer to the trade war, is the air transport sector. The airplane has for decades been the symbol of the development of the most modern aspects of world trade.
From the Second World War to the beginning of the 1970s, the boom in this sector enabled the air companies to carve up a market in full expansion, leaving each other with a wide margin for development in a situation where competition was not severe. The biggest companies grew steadily under the cozy protection of the laws and regulations introduced by the state acting in the role of patron. Bankruptcies were rare and only affected second-rate companies.
With the return of the capitalist crisis, competition becomes increasingly rough. The rise of the 'charter' companies which came along to compete with the big companies for the most profitable routes, thus breaking their monopoly, was the harbinger of the terrible crisis which really got going in the 80s. Under the growing pressure of competition, the regulations which had previously limited it broke down. The deregulation of the American domestic market, at the beginning of the Reagan presidency, brought the curtain down on the period of prosperity and security which the big air companies had enjoyed up till then. In one decade, the number of big US domestic companies fell from 20 to 7. In the last few years, some of the biggest names in US air transport have crash-landed into bankruptcy: TWA has recently joined Pan Am, Eastern, Braniff and others in the cemetery of broken wings.
Losses are accumulating: In 1990, Continental lost $2,343 million; US Air $454 million; TWA $237 million. In 1991 the situation was even worse. United Airlines and Delta Airlines, which were the only big American companies to announce a profit in 1990, have just declared respectively losses of $331 million for the year and $174 million for the first two months.
In Europe, the situation of the air companies is no brighter. Lufthansa has just announced provisional losses of 400 million DM; Air France consolidated losses of 1.15 billion francs in the first two months of 1991;. SAS 514 million crowns of losses for the first quarter of 1991. Sabena is up for sale, while the small regional companies are going down like flies.
As for the world's biggest air company, Aeroflot, it doesn't have enough kerosene for its planes and is threatened with break-up by the disappearance of the USSR.
At first, this somber balance-sheet was officially explained as the result of the Gulf War, which did of course reduce the frequency of flights for several months. But once the war was over, the situation didn't improve, and the excuse wore thin. The recession in the world economy wasn't caused by the Gulf War; air transport merely provides us with a perfect resume of its devastating effects.
The least profitable airlines have gone to the wall and entire regions of the globe, the most underdeveloped ones, are less and less linked up to the industrial centers of capitalism.
On the most profitable routes, competition is intense. North Atlantic flights have multiplied, resulting in overcapacity and a reduction in maintenance standards, while the price war is leading to a policy of dumping that is reducing the profit on fares.
In order to make themselves more competitive, at a time when the market was flourishing more, the air companies had, over a period of some years, launched ambitious programs of buying new planes, getting deep into debt in the perspective of future prosperity. Today they're landed with brand new planes which they can't use and are obliged to cancel their orders or to ask the plane makers to delay delivery. The planes have no takers on the market and dozens of jets are standing idle in the airplane parking lots.
In order to plug the hole in their treasuries, the air companies are trimming their budgets in all sorts of ways:
- they are laying off workers in droves: over the last two years, there's not one company which hasn't laid off workers. Tens of thousands of highly qualified workers are out of work with no prospect of re-employment;
- flight crews are subjected to more severe conditions of exploitation.
Such measures lead only to a deterioration of air safety and a multiplication of accidents.
While on the one hand the companies are involved in a policy of drastic economies in order to patch up their balance sheets, the same laws of competition force them to make massive expenditures. One of the laws of survival in a situation of exacerbated competition is the search for the ideal size through the development of commercial alliances, fusions and the buying up of other companies. But while this policy eventually leads to 'economies of scale' through a better management of personnel and planes, it can also involve heavy initial outlays. One example among others: Air France, which has just bought up UTA, fused with Air Inter, and is participating in the newly privatized Czech company, now wants to buy the Belgian firm Sabena, not because the latter is particularly interesting economically, but above all because the competition mustn't be allowed to grab it. Such policies are very costly and mean big increases in debt. In their will to survive, all the companies are playing this game of 'the loser wins', where victories are purely Pyrrhic affairs that merely mortgage the future.
The trade war shaking up the air transport sector is one illustration of the absurdity of a system based on competition, of the catastrophic contradictions into which capitalism is sinking. This reality dominates all sectors of the economy and all firms, from the smallest to the biggest. But it also lays bare another reality, characteristic of capitalism in its decadent phase: the dominant role of state capitalism.
The state at the heart of the trade war
The air transport sector is strategically essential to any capitalist state, not only on the strict economic level, but also on the military level. When it comes to transporting troops, as in the Gulf conflict, the requisition of civil aviation by the army becomes a necessity. Every state, as soon as it has the means to do so, sets up an air company bearing its colors and enjoying a quasi-monopoly over internal routes. All the airlines of any importance are under the control of one state or another. This is obviously the case of companies like Air France which is the direct property of the French state, but it's also true for the private airlines which are totally dependent on the juridical-administrative arsenal which each state has set up to keep a strict control over them. And sometimes this involves capitalism's most esoteric lines of control, as during the Vietnam war, where the Air America company turned out to be owned by the CIA. Behind the trade war in the air transport sector, as in all other spheres, it's not just firms confronting each other, but states.
The offensive discourse of American capitalism, which drapes itself in the standard of 'liberalism', of the sacrosanct 'law of the market' and 'free competition', is a complete lie. Each state needs to protect its internal market, its enterprises, its economy. Here again, air transport is a good example. While the USA pretends to be the champion of deregulation in order to allow 'free competition', the US domestic market is protected and reserved for US aircraft. Each state passes a panoply of laws, rules and norms whose essential aim is to limit the penetration of foreign products. The speeches about liberalism are mainly aimed at getting other states to open their internal markets. The state everywhere is the main economic agency and companies are no more than the champions of one or other brand of state capitalism. The juridical form of property, private or public, doesn't change this. The myth of 'multinationals' propagated by the leftists in the 70s is well-worn by now. These firms aren't independent from the state; they are simply the vectors of the economic imperialism of the world's great states.
Economic rivalries in the Logic of imperialism
The collapse of the Russian bloc, by putting an end to the military threat of the Red Army, has taken away the cement which enabled the USA to impose its discipline on the countries that made up the western bloc. Countries like Germany or Japan, which were the USA's main economic rivals, had still been its faithful allies. In exchange for America's military protection, they accepted the economic discipline their guardian imposed on them. Today, this is no longer the case. The dynamic towards every man for himself, towards unrestrained trade war, has now been unleashed. Logically, the weapons of economic competition will go together with the weapons of imperialism. This reality was expressed very clearly by US Vice President Dan Quayle when he declared in Germany in early February: "We mustn't replace the cold war with a trade war," then adding, to make himself quite clear, that "trade is a question of security" and "national and international security requires a coordination between political, military and economic security."
In the economic battle, all the propaganda arguments about 'liberalism' have little connection with reality. The last meeting of the G7 and the GATT negotiations are a striking example of the current situation of trade war in which, in the name of 'liberalism', it's the states which do the negotiating.
The time when the USA could impose its diktat is over. The G7 didn't come to any agreement about an ordered 'relaunch' of the world economy. Germany, preoccupied with inflation, acted the lone cavalier by maintaining high bank rates, limiting the capacity of other countries to lower theirs and so facilitate this hypothetical recovery. President Bush's trip to Japan, whose explicit aim was to open the Japanese market to American exports, was a fiasco. The GATT negotiations got bogged down despite the pressure from the US, who were using all their economic and imperialist strengths to try and impose economic sacrifices on their European rivals.
It's significant that these negotiations have taken on the appearance of a free-for-all between the USA and the EEC. Each one accuses the other of subsidizing their exports and thus of subverting the holy laws of free exchange, and both are right. The European states directly subsidize the makers of the Airbus through grants, loans, guarantied sales, while the American state directly subsidizes its aeronautic construction firms through military orders or research budgets. In 1990, the OECD countries dedicated $600 billion to assist their industries. In the agricultural sector, in the same year, subsidies in the OECD grew by 12%. The average American farmer gets $22,000 in subsidies; in Japan it's $15,00; in Europe $12,000.
All the fine liberal words about the 'magic of the market' are pure hypocrisy: we're seeing the heightened, permanent intervention of the state at all levels.
Despite all the phrases about 'free competition', 'free trade', the 'fight against protectionism', every nation state uses any means at hand to ensure the survival of its economy and its enterprises in the world market free-for-all: subsidies, dumping, bribes are all current practices of firms acting under the benevolent eye of their guardian state. And when that's not enough, the statesmen become representatives of commerce, adding their imperialist strength to arguments about economics. At this level, the USA sets a fine example.
Although its economy is deep in recession and less competitive than those of its rivals, its resort to the concrete arguments provided by its imperialist strength has become an essential means for opening up markets that the game of economic competition doesn't permit it to obtain. And all the other states do the same thing, as far as their means allow.
The only law is survival, and in this battle all means are justified. This is the law of the trade war, as it is in any war. 'Export or die' said Hitler: this has become the obsessive slogan of all the states of the world. Anarchy and disorder reign on the world market. Tension is mounting and a formal GATT agreement isn't going to stop this slide into chaos. Although negotiations have been going on for years, with knives drawn, to try and put some order into the market, the situation is already out of control. There are more and more underhand deals which don't follow GATT regulations. Each state is already looking for ways of getting round future agreements.
The prospect isn't the attenuation of tension. The more the world economy sinks into recession, the sharper international competition will be.
With the dive into recession, The trade war can only intensify
Despite the hopes and expectations of the world leaders, the American economy has not climbed out of the recession in which it's been stuck officially for a year. The measures aimed at initiating a recovery - the lessening of the bank rate by the Federal bank - have merely slowed down the slide and limited the damage. In the end, the year 1991 saw a 0.7% fall in GNP for the USA. The other industrialized countries are about to follow the American economy in its descent into the Hades of recession.
In Japan, industrial production fell by 4% during the twelve months preceding January 1992. Out of the first three months of the year 1991, industrial production fell by 4% in the western part of Germany, by 29.4% in Sweden (!), by 0.9% in France. In 1991, the British GNP diminished by 1.7% in comparison to the previous year. The dynamic of the recession affects all the industrialized countries.
President Bush's recent speech about the state of the Union, which was supposed to announce measures that would take the US economy out of the mire, was a great disappointment. Essentially it was a sprinkling of recipes which have already proved ineffective for months, and which had more to do with electoral demagogy than economic efficiency. The tax reductions will basically have the effect of increasing the budget deficit which already stood at $270 billion in 1991 and which according to official predictions will reach $399 billion in 1992, posing the problem of America's debt even more dramatically. As for the reduction in the arms budget, the famous 'peace dividend', its sole result will be to push the US economy deeper into the mud, by diminishing state orders for a sector that's already in crisis - 400,000 redundancies are envisaged in the coming .years.
In fact, the only slightly positive aspect for American capital in 1991 is an improvement in its balance of trade, even though it's still mainly in deficit. In the first eleven months of 1991, it stood at $64.7 billion, a 36% improvement over the same period in the previous year when it reached $101.7 billion. However, this isn't the result of the American economy becoming more competitive, but of the USA's capacity to use all its economic and imperialist strengths at the same time. It's this which gives it its status as the world's number one economy in the current global trade war. The improvement in the US balance of trade means above all the deterioration of those of its rivals, and thus an aggravation of the world crisis and even sharper competition on the world market.
The nationalist lie - a danger for the Working class
The other side of the trade war is economic nationalism. Each state has to mobilize 'its' workers in the economic war, calling on them to pull in their belts in the name of solidarity with the national economy, launching campaigns to get them to buy home-produced goods. "Buy American" is the new slogan of the protectionist lobbies in the USA.
For years workers have been asked to show wisdom and responsibility by submitting to austerity measures, so that 'tomorrow' things will get better; and for years, things have been going from bad to worse. Everywhere, in all countries, the working class has been the first victim of the trade war. Its wages, its buying power, have been amputated in the name of economic competition, lay-offs have been pushed through in the name of the survival of the firm. It would be the worst of all traps for workers to believe that the lie of economic nationalism is a solution to the crisis, or a lesser evil. This nationalist propaganda, which today aims to get workers to give more sweat for the capitalists, will tomorrow be used to get them to give up their lives for the 'defense of the country'.
The trade war, with its ravages on the world economy, is the expression of the absurd dead-end reached by global capital, now stuck in the greatest economic crisis in its history. At a time when poverty and penury rule over the major part of mankind, production is falling, factories are closing, land is being sterilized, workers reduced to unemployment, the means of production left unused. This is the logic of capitalism, of a system based on competition. It is leading to the desperate struggle of each against all, to wars, to destruction after destruction. Only the working class, which has no particular interests to defend, whatever country it is in; which everywhere suffers from exploitation and misery - only the struggle of this class can offer an alternative future to humanity. By defending itself, by going beyond all the divisions and frontiers of capitalism, by forging its international unity and solidarity, the working class alone can show the way out of the increasingly awful tragedy which capitalism is lining up for the planet. JJ 28.2.92.
Notes
The law by which a constantly increasing quantity of means of production, thanks to the advance in the productiveness of social labor, may be set in movement by a progressively diminishing expenditure of human power, this law, in a capitalist society -where the laborer does not employ the means of production, but the means of production employ the laborer - undergoes a complete inversion and is expressed thus: the higher the productiveness of labor, the greater is the pressure of the laborers on the means of employment, the more precarious, therefore, becomes their condition of existence." (Marx, Capital, Vol 1, part 7, chap xxv)
The bourgeoisie celebrates 500 years of capitalism
The ruling class is celebrating the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' discovery in style. The Universal Exhibition in Seville - the port of departure for this first expedition to reach the Caribbean islands - is the high point for all these hyper-media festivities. But the show will not stop there. The biggest fleet of sailing ships ever to cross the Atlantic is retracing the course of the renowned discoverer; there will be several films of the Columbus epic; dozens of historical novels and university studies have been published, recounting the story of the discovery of America and analyzing its significance. TV programs all over the world have been devoted to the historic event, and the press has not been left behind, since it also has printed hundreds of articles all over the world. Rarely have such resources been devoted to celebrating an event which figures in every child's history book. And this is no accident. Christopher Columbus' arrival on the shores of the New World opened the doors to a period which the historians of the ruling class paint in glowing colors; they call this historical period, beginning in the mid-15th century, the Age of Discovery, or the Renaissance. For this is when capitalism got into its stride in Europe, and began its conquest of the world. The ruling class is not just celebrating the 500th anniversary of a particularly important historical event, but symbolically, half a millennium of capitalist rule.
A discovery made possible by the development of capitalism
The wind swelling the sails of the Caravelles and driving them on to new horizons was mercantile capitalism in search of new trade routes to India and Asia, and the spices and silks "more valuable than gold". This was so true that Columbus believed, to the day he died in 1506, that the shores where his ships had beached were those of India, the land that he had tried so obstinately to reach via a new Western route. The new continent, that he had in fact discovered without ever realizing it, was never to bear his name, but that of America after the navigator Amerigo Vespucci who in 1507 was to be the first to establish that the lands they had discovered were in fact a new continent.
Today we know that the Vikings had already landed on the coast of North America several centuries before, and it is even probable that at other moments in human history, bold navigators had already crossed the Atlantic from East to West. But these "discoveries" fell into oblivion, because they did not correspond to the economic needs of their age. This did not happen to Columbus. His discovery of America was not an accident, a merely individual and extraordinary adventure. Columbus was no isolated adventurer, but one navigator among many launched on the conquest of the ocean. His discovery was a product of the needs of developing capitalism in Europe; it was part of an overall movement which pushed the navigators to seek out new trade routes.
The origins of this overall movement are to be found in the economic, cultural, and social upheavals shaking Europe, with the decadence of feudalism and the rise of mercantile capitalism.
Since the 13th century, commercial, banking, and financial activity had flourished in the Italian republics which held the monopoly of trade with the East. "From the 15th century, the bourgeoisie in the towns had become more vital to society than the feudal nobility... the needs of the nobles themselves had grown and been transformed to the point where even they could not do without the towns; did they not depend on the towns for their only instruments of production, their armor and weapons? Local cloth, furniture and jewellery, the silks of Italy, the lace of Brabant, the furs from the North, the perfumes of Arabia, the fruits of the Levant, the spices of India: all must be bought in the towns... A certain degree of world trade had developed; the Italians roamed the Mediterranean and beyond, to the Atlantic coasts right up to Flanders; despite the appearance of Dutch and English, the Hansa merchants still dominated the North Sea and the Baltic... While the nobility became increasingly superfluous and even a hindrance on social evolution, the bourgeois were becoming the class that personified the advance of industry and commerce, as well as of culture and the political and social institutions," (Engels: The Decadence of Feudalism and the Rise of The Bourgeoisie).
The 15th century was marked by the increase in knowledge which signaled the beginning of the Renaissance, characterized not only by the rediscovery of the texts of antiquity, but also by the wonders of the Orient, like gunpowder, which merchants were bringing back to Europe, and by new discoveries like printing, and the advance of new techniques in metal-working or textiles made possible by the development of the economy. One of the sectors most affected by the new knowledge was that of navigation, a central sector for the development of commerce, since most trade went by water. With new knowledge came the invention of new ships, more sturdy, bigger, and better adapted to navigating the high seas, better sailing techniques, and a better understanding of geography. "Moreover, navigation was a clearly bourgeois industry, which has marked even modern fleets with its anti-feudal nature" (Engels, op cit).
At the same time, the great feudal states were created and strengthened. This movement, however, expressed not the reinforcement of feudalism but its regression, crisis and decadence. "It is obvious that... the crown was a factor of progress. It represented order in disorder, the nation in formation against the fragmentation of rival vassal states. All the revolutionary elements which were forming below the surface of feudal society were as much forced to rely on the crown, as the latter was forced to rely on them." (Engels, op cit).
The extension of Ottoman rule into the Middle East and Eastern Europe, concretized in the fall of Constantinople in 1453, led to the war with the Venetian Republic in 1463, and cut the Italian merchants off from the lucrative trade routes to Asia which had virtually been their monopoly. The economic necessity of opening new routes to the treasures of the mythical Indies, Cathay (China), and Cipango (Japan), and the hope of laying hands on the source of Genoan and Venetian wealth, were enough to encourage the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal to finance their maritime expeditions.
And so, during the 15th century, the conditions and the means came together in Europe, which were to make possible the sea-borne exploration of the world:
* the creation of a mercantile and industrial class, the bourgeoisie,
* the development of new knowledge and techniques, especially in the field of navigation,
* the formation of the states which would support seafaring expeditions,
* the end to the traditional trade with Asia, which encouraged the search for new routes.
From the beginning of the 15th century, Henry the Navigator, King of Portugal, financed expeditions down the coast of Africa, and set up the first trading posts there (Ceuta in 1415). The African off-shore islands were colonized in passing: Madeira in 1419, the Azores in 1431, the Capo Verde islands in 1457. Then under the reign of John II, the Congo was reached in 1482, and in 1498 Bartolomeo Diaz rounded the Cape of Storms (later to become the Cape of Good Hope), opening the route to India and its spices which Vasco da Gama was to follow in 1498. Columbus' expedition was thus one among many.
At first, he offered his services to the Portuguese, to explore a Western route to the Indies, but the latter (who had probably reached Newfoundland in 1474) refused, because they were concentrating on opening a route around southern Africa. Just as Columbus benefited from the experience of the Portuguese sailors, so his own experience was to help John Cabot who reached Labrador in 1496 in the service of England. For Spain, Pinzon and Lope in 1499 discovered the mouth of the Orinoco; Cabal reached the coast of Brazil in 1500, while searching for a way round Africa. In 1513, Balboa admired the waves of what was to be called the Pacific Ocean. And in 1519 began the Magellan expedition: the first to circumnavigate the world. "But despite the feudal or semi-feudal forms in which it appeared at first, this urge to seek adventure far away was already incompatible at heart with feudalism, whose basis was agriculture, and whose wars of conquest basically aimed at the conquest of territory." (Engels, op cit).
Thus it is not the great discoveries which provoked the development of capitalism, but on the contrary the development of capitalism in Europe which made these discoveries possible, whether on the level of geography or of technique. Like Gutenberg, Columbus was the product of capitalism's historic development. Nonetheless, these discoveries were to be a powerful factor in accelerating the development both of capitalism and the class which it embodies it: the bourgeoisie.
"The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a new development." (Marx, Engels: The Communist Manifesto).
"From the 16th to the 17th centuries, the great geographical discoveries provoked profound upheavals in trade and accelerated the growth of mercantile capital. It is certain that the passage from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production was also accelerated, and it is precisely this fact which is at the source of certain thoroughly erroneous conceptions. The sudden extension of the world market, the proliferation of commodities in circulation, the rivalry between European nations to seize the products of Asia and the treasures of America, and finally the colonial system, made a great contribution to liberating production from its feudal chains. However, in its manufacturing period, the modern mode of production only appeared where the appropriate conditions had been formed during the Middle Ages, for example if we compare Portugal to Holland. If, during the 16th, and in part also during the 17th centuries, the sudden extension of trade and the creation of a new world market played a preponderant role in the decline of the old mode of production and the rise of capitalist production, this is because it took place, inversely, on the basis of an already existing capitalist production. On the one hand, the world market formed the basis for capitalism; on the other, it is the latter's need to produce on a constantly wider scale that pushed it continually to extend the world market: here, it is not trade that revolutionized industry, but industry which constantly revolutionized trade" (Marx, Capital).
"Manufacture and the movement of production in general received an enormous impetus through the extension of intercourse which came with the discovery of America and the sea-route to the East Indies. The new products imported thence, particularly the masses of gold and silver which came into circulation, had totally changed the position of the classes towards one another, dealing a hard blow to feudal landed property and to the workers; the expeditions of adventurers, colonization, and above all the extension of markets into a world market, which had now become possible and was daily becoming more and more a fact, called forth a new phase of historical development..." (Marx, The German Ideology)
With the discovery of America in 1492, symbolically, a new page was turned in the history of humanity. A new epoch opened, where capitalism began its triumphal march towards world domination. "World trade and the world market inaugurate, in the 16th century, the modern biography of capitalism," (Marx). "The modern history of capital dates from the creation of trade and a market between the old and new world in the 16th century," (Marx). "Although the first outlines of capitalist production appeared early in some towns of the Mediterranean, the capitalist era only starts with the 16th century," (Marx, Capital VIII).
Today, the bourgeoisie's sumptuous festivities are celebrating the opening of this new era, the era of its own domination, the beginning of the construction of the capitalist world market. "Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the development of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages." (The Communist Manifesto).
Before the great discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries, the Incas and Aztecs were of course completely unknown, but the civilizations of India, China and Japan were almost as much so, and what was known contained as much fable as fact. The discovery of America marked the end of a historical period characterized by the development of multiple civilizations, which either knew nothing of each other, or barely communicated by means of a relatively limited trade. Now came not only the exploration of new sea-lanes, but the opening of new trade routes to European commodities. The development of trade put an end to the separate development of civilizations outside Europe. "The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate." (ibid). "The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country... [Industry's] products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature." (ibid).
This is the eminently revolutionary role that the bourgeoisie has played: it has unified the world. By celebrating, as it does today, the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus and the first significant step in this unification by the creation of the world market, the bourgeoisie is only singing its own praises.
The bourgeoisie enjoys honoring this 16th century, which witnessed its own affirmation in Europe, and heralded its worldwide rule to come, as the century of the Renaissance, of the Age of Discovery, of the flourishing of science and the arts. The ruling class likes to see itself in those Renaissance men who symbolize the prodigious advances in technique, concretized in the tumultuous development of the productive forces that capitalism was to make possible. In them, it salutes the quest for universality which is its specific characteristic, and which it has imposed on the world, by fashioning the world in its own image. The ruling class could not ask for a more flattering picture of itself, and one that best epitomizes the progress that the bourgeoisie once represented for humanity.
But there is another side to every coin, and the other side to the wonderful adventure of Columbus discovering the new world is the brutal colonization and merciless enslavement of the Indians, the reality of capitalism as a system of exploitation and oppression. The treasures that left the colonies for the mother-country, there to make capital run smooth, were extorted "by the forced labor of the indigenous population reduced to slavery, by violence, pillage, and murder" (Marx, Capital VIII).
The colonization of America: capitalist barbarity at work
Capitalism did not only provide the techniques and the accumulated knowledge which made possible the voyage of Columbus and the discovery of America. It also provided the new God, the ideology which drove the adventurers on, to the conquest of the seas.
Columbus was driven, not by the love of discovery, but by the lust for profit: "Gold is the best thing in the world, it can even send souls to paradise", he declared, while Cortes went further: "We Spaniards suffer from a sickness of the heart whose only cure is gold". Thus: "It was gold that the Portuguese sought on the African coast, in the Indies, and throughout the Far East; gold was the magic word which drove the Spaniards across the Atlantic to America; gold was the first thing the white man asked for, as soon as he accosted on a newly discovered shore" (Engels, op cit).
"Following Columbus' report, the Council of Castille decided to take possession of a country whose inhabitants were quite unable to defend themselves. The pious project of making converts to Christianity sanctified its injustice. But the hope of finding treasure was the real motive behind the enterprise ... All the Spaniards' other enterprises in the New World, after Columbus, seem to have had the same motive. This was the sacrilegious thirst for gold ..." (Adam Smith).
The great civilizing work of European capitalism initially took the form of genocide. In the name of this "sacrilegious thirst for gold", the Indian populations were subjected to pillage and forced labor, to slavery in the mines, and decimated by the diseases imported by the Conquistadors (syphilis, tuberculosis, etc). Las Casas estimated that between 1495 and 1503, the islands' population fell by more than 3 million, massacred in the wars, sent as slaves to Castille or exhausted in the mines and other forced labors: "Who will believe this in future generations? Even I, who write these lines, who have seen with my own eyes and know everything that happened, can hardly believe that such a thing was possible." In just over a century, the Indian population fell by 90% in Mexico (from 25 to 1.5 million), and by 95% in Peru. The African slave trade was developed to make up for the dearth of labor as a result of the massacre, and throughout the 16th century hundreds of thousands of negroes were deported to repopulate America, the movement only increasing in intensity during the centuries that followed. To this should be added the transportation of thousands of Europeans condemned to forced labor in the mines and plantations of America. "The discoveries of gold and silver in America; the extirpation of the indigens in some instances, their enslavement or their entombment in the mines in others; the beginnings of the conquest and looting of the East Indies; the transformation of Africa into a precinct for the supply of the negroes who were the raw material of the slave trade - these were the incidents that characterized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24)
The thousands of tons of gold and silver that flooded into Europe from the American colonies, and which served to finance the gigantic upsurge of European capitalism, were soaked in the blood of millions of slaves. But this violence, characteristic of capitalism's colonial enterprise, was not reserved for far-off countries. It is proper to capitalism in every aspect of its development, including in its European homeland.
Capitalism's violent conquest of Europe
The methods used, without restraint in the ferocious exploitation of the indigenous population in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, were used in Europe to drive the peasants from the land and transform them into wage slaves to satisfy the demands of the rapidly expanding manufactures. For millions of peasants and laborers, the period of the Renaissance which the bourgeoisie likes to display in the agreeable light of scientific discovery and artistic achievement was a time of poverty and terror.
Capitalism's development in Europe was characterized by the expropriation of land; millions of peasants were thrown off the land, to wander the highways. "The expropriation of the immediate producers is effected with ruthless vandalism; and under the stimulus of the most infamous, the basest, the meanest, and the most odious of passions" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24). "A whole series of thefts, outrages, and tribulations ... accompanied the forcible expropriation of the people in the period that lasted from the end of the 15th century to the end of the 18th" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24). "The spoliation of the property of the church, the fraudulent alienation of the state domains, the theft of the common lands, the transformation of feudal property and clan property into modern private property (a usurpation effected by a system of ruthless terrorism) - these were the idyllic methods of primary accumulation. They cleared the ground for capitalist agriculture, made the land part and parcel of capital, while providing for the needs of urban industry the requisite supply of masterless proletarians" (Marx, Capital).
"Thus it comes to pass that a greedy and insatiable cormorant and very plague of his native country, may encompass about and enclose many thousand acres of ground together within one pale or hedge, the husbandmen be thrust out of their own, or else, either by cunning and fraud, or by violent oppression, they be put besides it, or by wrongs and injuries they be so wearied that they be compelled to sell all: by one means, therefore, or by other, either by hook or crook, they must needs depart away, poor, silly, wretched souls, men, women, husbands, wives, fatherless children, widows, woeful mothers with their young babes, and their whole household, small in substance, and much in number, as husbandry requireth many hands. Always they trudge, I say, out of their known, accustomed houses, finding no place to rest in. All their household stuff, which is very little worth, though it might well abide the sale, yet being suddenly thrust out they be constrained to sell it for a thing of naught. And when they have wandered abroad till that be spent, what can they then else do but steal, and then justly, pardie, be hanged, or else go about begging. And yet then also they be cast in prison as vagabonds because they go about and work not; whom no man will set a work though they never so willingly proffer themselves thereto" (Thomas More's Utopia, quoted by Marx in Capital, Chap 24).
"A masterless proletariat had been created by the breaking-up of the bands of feudal retainers, and by successive acts of forcible expropriation of the land. But it was impossible that those who had been thus hunted off the land could be absorbed by the rising system of manufactures as quickly as they were "set free. ... Large numbers of them became beggars, thieves, and vagabonds; in part from inclination, but far more often under pressure of circumstances. In the end of the 15th century, and throughout the 16th, there were enacted all over Western Europe cruel laws against vagrancy. The ancestors of the present working class were punished for becoming vagabonds and paupers, although the condition of vagabondage and pauperism had been forced on them" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24).
Punished, and how! In England under Henry VIII (1509-1547), healthy vagabonds were condemned to flogging and imprisonment. On a second offence, the sentence was a further flogging and the loss of half an ear, while at the third offence the vagabond was considered as a felon and executed as an enemy of the state. During Henry's reign, 72,000 poor devils were executed in this way. Under his successor Edward VI, a law passed in 1547 declared that any individual unwilling to work would be judged a slave of the person who had denounced him; should he try to run away, he would be branded with an "S" on the cheek, while a second attempt to escape was punished by death. "In Elizabeth's time, 'rogues were trussed up apace, and that there was not one year commonly wherein three or four hundred were not devoured and eaten up by the gallows'" (Holinshed's Chronicles of England, quoted by Marx). Meanwhile, in France, "it was prescribed that every man in good health from 16 to 60 years of age, if without means of subsistence and not practicing a trade, was to be sent to the galleys. Of like nature are the statute of Charles V for the Netherlands, dated October 1537 ...Thus was the agricultural population - forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from home, coerced into vagrancy, and then whipped, branded, and tortured by grotesque and terrible laws - constrained to accept the discipline required by the wage system" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24).
"Throughout the developed countries, the number of vagabonds has never been so great as it was during the first half of the 16th century. Some of these vagabonds joined the army in time of war, others roamed the country begging, others went to the towns to try to scrape a wretched living out of day labor, or other occupations not regulated by the guilds" (Friedrich Engels, The Peasant War, Chap I).
The peasants, stripped of their lands and thrown out to wander the country were thus not only reduced to beggary or obliged to submit to wage labor, they were also abundantly used as cannon fodder. The new canons and arquebuses were infinitely more destructive than the pikes, swords, bows and crossbows of the old feudal wars, and demanded an ever growing mass of soldiers to assuage their bloody appetites; the technical and scientific progress of the Renaissance were used to good effect in perfecting both weapons and the means of producing them. The 16th century was a warlike one: "...wars and devastation were day-to-day phenomena at the time" (Engels, ibid). Wars of colonial conquest, but also and above all wars in Europe itself: the "Italian" wars of Francois I of France, the Hapsburgs' wars against the Turks, who besieged Vienna in 1529 and were defeated by the Spanish navy at the battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Dutch war for independence from Spain from 1568 onwards, the war between England and Spain which led to the annihilation in 1588 of the Spanish Armada, the greatest war fleet ever to sail, by the English navy and bad weather. The innumerable wars between German princelings, the wars of religion... These wars were the product of the upheavals shaking Europe with the development of capitalism. "Even in what are called the wars of religion during the 16th century, it was really a matter above all of very positive material class interests, and these wars were class wars, just as much as the internal collisions which occurred later in England and France" (ibid). But the bitter conflicts (behind the banners of religion) among the national states emerging from the Middle Ages, the feudal princes, and the new bourgeois cliques, were all forgotten when it came to putting down, with utter ferocity, the peasant revolts provoked by poverty. Faced with the peasants revolts in Germany, "Bourgeois and princes, nobility and clergy, Luther and the Pope, all united against 'these peasant bands, looting and murdering'" (the title of a pamphlet by Luther published in 1525 in the midst of the peasant rising, as Engels noted). "They must be torn apart, strangled, their throats cut, in secret and in public, as we strike down rabid dogs!" cried Luther. ‘And so, my dear lords, cut their throats, strike them down, strangle them, liberate here, save there! If you fall in the struggle, you could never have a holier death!'" (ibid).
The 16th century was not one of emerging liberty, as the bourgeoisie would have us think. It was one of a new oppression that rose from the ruins of disintegrating feudalism, of religious persecution and the bloody suppression of plebeian revolt. It is certainly no accident that the Spanish Inquisition was founded in 1492, the same year as the discovery of the New World. Millions of Jews and Muslims were forcibly converted to Christianity, or forced into exile in fear for the lives. This was not unique to Spain, still deeply marked by feudalism, and the intransigent Catholicism that was its ideological mainstay; throughout Europe, pogroms and religious massacres were commonplace, the persecution of religious or racial minorities a constant, and the oppression of the masses the rule. The horror of the Inquisition was echoed by Luther's rage against the rebellious peasants in Germany: "The peasants have their heads full of oat-straw; they do not hear the words of God, they are stupid; this is why they must be taught the whip, and the arquebuse, and it is their own fault. Pray for them, that they are obedient. Otherwise, no mercy!". Thus spoke the father of the Reformation, the new religious ideology which covered the bourgeoisie's advance in its struggle against feudal Catholicism.
At this price, by these methods, capitalism imposed its law, and by undermining the foundations of the old feudal order, liberated the development of the productive forces and produced a wealth that humanity had never dreamt of. But if the 16th century enormously increased the wealth of the bourgeois merchants and the states, the same could not be said for the workers. "In the 16th century, the situation of the workers had, as we know, got much worse. Money wages had risen, but not at all in proportion to the devaluation of money and a corresponding rise in the price of commodities. In reality, they had therefore fallen." In Spain, between 1500 and 1600 prices increased three or four-fold; in Italy between 1520 and 1599, the price of wheat was multiplied by 3.3; in England, between the first and the last quarter of the 16th century prices were multiplied by 2.6, and in France by 2.2. The fall in real wages as a result has been estimated at 50%! The merchant bourgeoisie and the reigning princes were quick to act on Machiavelli's advice: "In a well-organized government, the state should be rich and the citizen poor" (Machiavelli, The Prince, 1514).
"So much pains did it cost to establish the 'eternal natural laws' of the capitalist method of production, to complete the divorce of the workers from the means of labor, to transform at one pole the social means of production and the social means of subsistence into capital, while transforming at the other pole the masses of the population into wage workers, into 'free laboring poor', that artificial product of modern history. As Augier said, money 'comes into the world with a birthmark on the cheek'; it is no less true that capital comes into the world soiled with mire from top to toe, and oozing blood from every pore" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24). Rosa Luxemburg, writing about the relationship between capital and non-capitalist modes of production, which take place "on the international stage", notes that: "Its predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system - a policy of spheres of interest - and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process.
Bourgeois liberal theory takes into account only 'peaceful competition', the marvels of technology and pure commodity exchange; it separates it violently from the other aspect: the realm of capital's blustering violence which is regarded as more or less incidental to foreign policy and quite independent of the economic sphere of capital.
"In reality, political power is nothing but a vehicle for the economic process. The conditions for the reproduction of capital provide the organic link between these two aspects of the accumulation of capital. The historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together. 'Sweating blood and filth with every pore from head to toe' characterizes not only the birth of capital but also its progress in the world at every step, and thus capitalism prepares its own downfall under ever more violent contortions and convulsions," (The Accumulation of Capital).
Today's bourgeois humanists, who are celebrating so fervently the discovery of America, would like us to think that the extreme brutality of the colonization which followed was only an excess of emerging capitalism, in its mercantile forms, and still entangled in the meshes of a brutal Spanish feudalism - hardly more than a youthful misdemeanor. But this violence was not limited to the Spanish and the Portuguese. The work begun by the conquistadors was to be continued by the Dutch, the French, the British and by the young North American democracy that emerged from the war of independence against British imperialism in the 18th century: slavery survived until 1868, and in North America the massacre of the Indians continued until the very eve of the 20th century. And as we have seen, such violence was not limited to the colonies. It was universal, indelibly stamped on the whole life of capital. It was carried over from capital's mercantile phase into the brutal development of large-scale industry, where the methods tried out in the colonies were used to intensify exploitation in the metropolis. "The cotton industry, while introducing child slavery into England, gave at the same time an impetus towards the transformation of the slave system of the United States, which had hitherto been a more or less patriarchal one, into a commercial system of exploitation. Speaking generally, the veiled slavery of the European wage earners became the pedestal of unqualified slavery in the New World" (Marx, Capital, Chap 24).
Obviously, as it celebrates the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America, the bourgeoisie is not celebrating these great deeds, this merciless massacre driven on by criminal greed. The bourgeoisie prefers to sweep capitalism's barbaric reality under the carpet, and to offer us only the agreeable image of the progress of the Renaissance, with its artistic, geographical, technical, and scientific discoveries.
Half a millennium after Columbus: capitalism in its crisis of decadence
Today, the ruling class is singing its own praises as it celebrates Columbus' discovery of America; it is using this historic event in its ideological propaganda, in order to justify its own existence. But times have changed since the Renaissance.
The bourgeoisie is no longer a revolutionary class, rising to overthrow a decadent and disintegrating feudalism. It is long time since it imposed its rule on the farthest corners of the planet. Columbus' discovery heralded the creation of the world capitalist market, and this was completed at the turn of the century. The dynamic of colonization inaugurated in the New World has spread everywhere. Like the pre-Columbian civilizations of America, the ancient pre-capitalist civilizations of Asia collapsed under the blows of the development of capitalist exchange. By the beginning of the 20th century, there was not a single pre-capitalist market that was not either directly controlled or under the influence of one or other of the great capitalist powers. The dynamic of colonization, which enriched mercantile Europe through pillage and the ferocious exploitation of native populations, and which opened new markets to the tumultuous expansion of capitalist industry, had itself come up against the limits of planetary geography. "From the geographical viewpoint, the market is limited: the internal market is limited in relation to the internal and external market, which in turn is limited in relation to the world market, and this, although it can be expanded, is itself limited in time" (Marx, 'Mat‚riaux pour l'‚conomie: limites du march‚ et accroissement de la consommation'). Confronted for more than a century with this objective limit to the market, capitalism can no longer find solvent outlets in proportion to its productive capacity, and is sinking into an inexorable crisis of over-production. "Over-production is a particular consequence of the law of general production of capital: produce in proportion to the productive forces (ie, according to the possibility of exploiting, with a given mass of capital, the maximum mass of labour), without taking account of the real limits of the market nor of solvent needs..." (Marx, Mat‚riaux pour l'‚conomie: besoins, surproduction, et crise).
"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters." (Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy).
This reality, which once determined the end of the feudal system and the necessity for the development of capitalism as a progressive factor in the liberation of the productive forces, has today come home to capitalism itself. It is no longer a source of progress. It has become a barrier to the development of the productive forces. In its turn, it has entered its epoch of decadence.
The consequences have been dramatic for the whole of humanity. In the days of Columbus and the Renaissance, until the construction of the world market was finally completed, capitalism, despite its barbarity and violence, was synonymous with progress, because it was identified with the growth of the productive forces, and with the resulting fantastic explosion of discoveries. Today all this is finished, and capitalism has become a barrier to the development of the productive forces. It no longer embodies progress, and only its barbaric side is left.
The 20th century has amply demonstrated this sinister reality: constant imperialist conflicts, punctuated by two World Wars, massive repression, famines such as humanity has never suffered before - these have caused more deaths in the last eighty years than in centuries of brutal development. The permanent crisis has plunged the majority of the world's population into hunger. Throughout the world, the population is being subjected to a process of accelerated pauperization, and a tragic degradation of living conditions.
Characteristically, whereas the 19th century was marked by the development of medicine, the ebb of the great epidemics, and the rise in life expectancy, in this last quarter of the 20th century, the epidemic diseases have returned in strength: cholera, malaria, and of course AIDS. The development of cancer is the symbol of capitalism's present impotence. Just like the great epidemics of bubonic plague which demonstrated the decadence of feudalism, today's epidemics are dramatic expressions of the decadence of capitalism, and its inability to defeat the disasters that have plunged humanity into suffering. Life expectancy is now stagnant in the developed countries, and is declining in the under-developed ones.
The capacity for discovery and innovation which needs to be mobilized to confront these diseases are increasingly held back by the contradictions of a system in crisis. Austerity budgets are imposing more and more cuts in funds for research. The greatest efforts of invention are devoted to military research, sacrificed on the altar of the arms race, devoted to the manufacture of ever more sophisticated and barbaric means of destruction. The forces of life have been press-ganged into the service of death.
We see this reality, of a capitalism which has become decadent and a barrier to human progress, at every level of social life. And this the ruling class absolutely has to hide. For centuries, the fantastic progress of discovery and new exploits was there for all to see, and upheld the bourgeoisie's ideological rule over the exploited masses, which it subjected to the brutal law of profit. Today, there are no such exploits any more. Let us take just one, significant, example: the conquest of the moon. Presented twenty years ago as a repetition of Columbus' adventure, it has remained sterile. The conquest of space, the new frontier which was to fire the ambitions of today's generation and make them believe in the constantly renewed possibilities of capitalist expansion, has dwindled away under the weight of the economic crisis and technological failure. Today, it looks like an impossible Utopia. The hope of travelling to other planets and far-off stars, the great project, has been reduced to a plodding and routine commercial or military use of earth's upper atmosphere. Capitalism is incapable of carrying out humanity's leap out of our earthly garden, because in near space there are no markets to conquer, no natives to reduce to slavery. There is no more America, and no more Christopher Columbus.
The New World has aged. North America, which for centuries represented a new world for the oppressed of the entire planet, an escape from poverty where anything was possible (even if this was in large part an illusion), has now become the symbol of the rotten decomposition of the capitalist world and its aberrant contradictions. In America, that classic symbol of capitalism, the dream is dead and only the nightmare is left.
The bourgeoisie no longer has anything, anywhere, to show to justify its criminal rule. To justify today's barbarity, it can only glorify its past. This is the meaning of all the din over Columbus' journey five hundred years ago. To polish up its blemished image, the bourgeoisie only has its past glories to offer, and since this past is itself none too magnificent, it has to embellish it with virtues it never had. Like a senile old man, the bourgeois are lost in their memories; they are trying to forget themselves, and to forget that they are frightened of the present, because they have no future. JJ, 1.6.92.
Chaos and massacres: Only the working class can find the answer
We are publishing below (starting on page 9) a resolution on the international situation adopted by the ICC in April 1992. Since this document was written, events have amply illustrated the analyses contained in it. Decomposition and chaos, particularly at the level of inter-imperialist antagonisms, have become more and more aggravated, as we can see for example with the massacres in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the world economic crisis has continued on its catastrophic path, creating the conditions for a revival of the class struggle - something the bourgeoisie is actively preparing against.
*****
The collapse of the eastern bloc in the second half of 1989 continues to make its consequences felt. The 'new world order', which according to President Bush was supposed to emerge in its wake, can be seen in reality to be an even more catastrophic disorder than the previous one, a bloody chaos which day after day piles up ruins and corpses, while at the same time the old antagonisms between great powers have given way to new and increasingly explosive ones.
The unleashing of imperialist antagonisms
In decadent capitalism, and particularly when the open economic crisis bears decisive witness to the impasse facing the system, there is no possibility for any attenuation of conflicts between different national bourgeoisies. Since there is no way out for the capitalist economy, since all the policies aimed at overcoming the crisis only make the catastrophe worse, since all the remedies prove to be poisons which aggravate the sickness, there is no alternative for the bourgeoisie, whatever its power and the means at its disposal, other than to rush headlong towards war and preparations for war.
This is why the disappearance in 1989 of one of the two military blocs which had divided up the world since the end of the Second World War has not at all brought about the 'new era of peace' promised us by the sirens of the bourgeoisie. In particular, since the threat of the 'Evil Empire' no longer weighed on them, yesterday's 'allies' - ie the main countries of the western bloc - have begun to flap their wings and put forward their own specific interests against the US 'big brother'. Alliances contracted by the different national bourgeoisies have never been marriages of love but of necessity, marriages of convenience. Just as we can witness spectacular 'reconciliations', in which the reciprocal hatred which the states had for decades inculcated in their respective populations gives way to a 'new-found friendship', so yesterday's allies, 'united for ever by history', by their 'common values', by 'shared trials' and the rest, don't hesitate to convert themselves into bitter enemies as soon as their interests no longer converge. This was the case during and after the second world war, when the USSR was presented by the western 'democracies' first as a henchman of the devil Hitler, then as a 'heroic companion in the struggle', then once again as the incarnation of evil.
Today, even if the basic structures of the American bloc (NATO, OECD, IMF, etc) still formally exist, if the speeches of the bourgeoisie still talk about the unity of the great 'democracies', in fact the Atlantic Alliance is finished. All the events which have unfolded over the last two years have only confirmed this reality: the collapse of the eastern bloc could only result in the disappearance of the military bloc set up to oppose it, and which won the victory in the cold war waged between them for over 40 years. Because of this, not only has the solidarity between the main western countries fallen to pieces, we can already see, in embryonic form, the tendencies towards the formation of a new system of alliances, in which the main antagonism is between the US and its allies on the one hand, and a coalition led by Germany on the other. As the ICC press has shown at length, the Gulf war at the beginning of 1991 had its main origin in the USA's attempt to block the process of the disintegration of the western bloc and to nip in the bud any effort to set up a new system of alliances. The events in Yugoslavia since the summer of 91 have shown that the enormous operation launched by Washington has only had limited effects, and that no sooner was the fighting over in the Gulf than the solidarity between the members of the coalition ceased to apply and all the antagonisms came back to the surface.
The present renewal of confrontations in ex-Yugoslavia, this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is, whatever the appearance, confirming this aggravation of tensions between the great powers which used to make up the western bloc.
Massacres and speeches about peace in ex-Yugoslavia: war at the heart of Europe
At the time of writing, war is again raging through ex-Yugoslavia. After months of massacres in different parts of Croatia, and when the situation seems to be easing off in that region, fire and blood is descending on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In two months, the number of dead has already gone past 5,000. There are tens of thousands wounded and hundreds of thousands have been forced to leave the combat zones; the UN mission to Sarajevo, which was supposed to bring a minimum of protection to the population, has also left.
Today, Serbia is being made a 'pariah' among nations as the journalists put it. On 30 May, the UN adopted rigorous measures of embargo against this country, comparable to those imposed on Iraq before the Gulf war, in order to force it, along with the Serbian militias, from laying waste Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it's Uncle Sam which has taken the lead in this big campaign against Serbia, while at the same time proclaiming itself the defender of 'democratic Bosnia'. On 23 May Baker didn't hesitate to evoke the possibility of a military intervention to make Serbia tow the line. And it was under very heavy American pressure that the members of the Security Council who could have had reticences, like France and Russia, finally rallied to a 'hard' motion against Serbia. At the same time, the USA hasn't missed an opportunity to make it clear that the maintenance of order in ex-Yugoslavia is fundamentally up to the European countries and the EEC, and that the US was only mixing in this situation to the extent that the Europeans were showing their impotence.
For those who have followed the games being played by the big powers since the beginning of the confrontations in Yugoslavia, the current position of the leading world power might seem to be a mystery. For months, notably after the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 91, the USA has appeared to be a real ally of Serbia, in particular by condemning the dismantling of Yugoslavia, which was the inevitable result of the secession of the two northern republics. Within the EEC, the two countries traditionally closest to the US, Britain and Holland, did everything they could to leave Serbia with a free hand in its operations to crush Croatia, or at least to amputate a good third of its territory. For months, the USA railed against 'European impotence' which they had done a great deal to aggravate, only to finally appear on the scene like Zorro and obtain through the UN emissary, American diplomat Cyrus Vance (what a stroke of luck), a cease-fire in Croatia, when Serbia had already achieved its essential war aims in the region.
In fact, this action by American diplomacy can be perfectly well understood. If Croatian independence had been strongly encouraged by Germany, it's because it coincided with the new imperialist ambitions of this country, whose power and position in Europe makes it the most serious claimant to the role of leader of a new coalition directed against the USA, now that the threat from the east is over. For the German bourgeoisie, an independent and 'friendly' Croatia was the condition for opening up access to the Mediterranean, which is an indispensable prize for any power aiming to play a global role. And this is what the USA wanted to avoid at any price. Its support to Serbia during the confrontations in Croatia, which seriously ravaged the latter, enabled the US to show both Croatia and Germany what it costs to follow policies that don't suit the USA. But precisely because the world's leading power didn't have to get mixed up in this situation in the second half of 91 and the beginning of 92, and was letting the EEC reveal its impotence, it could then come onto the scene in force and make a scapegoat out of yesterday's ally, Serbia.
Today, the USA's sudden passion for the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina obviously has nothing to do with the fact that the authorities of the latter are more 'democratic' than those in Croatia. The same race of gangsters rule in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade and ... Washington. In reality, from the USA's point of view, the great superiority of Bosnia-Herzegovina over Croatia lies in the fact that it can act as a major counter-weight to German presence in the region. For both historic and geographical reasons, Germany was from the start the country best placed to pull an independent Croatia into its sphere of influence. This is why the USA did not immediately try to compete for influence in Croatia, but on the contrary did all it could to oppose this country's independence. But once Germany had played its cards in Croatia, it fell to the American bourgeoisie to reaffirm its position as world cop and thus to arrive in force in a region normally left to the European states. The cynicism and brutality of the Serbian state and its militias have given it an ideal opportunity. By declaring itself the great protector of the populations of Bosnia who are victims of this brutality, Uncle Sam aims to achieve a number of things:
* it has once again shown, as it did during the Gulf war and the Madrid conference on the Middle East, that no important problem in international relations can be dealt with without the intervention of Washington;
* it has issued a message to the leading circles of the two big neighbours of ex-Yugoslavia, states of considerable strategic importance, Italy and Turkey, in order to convince them to remain loyal;
* it is reopening the wounds caused by the Yugoslav question in the special alliance between Germany and France (even if these difficulties are not great enough to call into question the convergence of interest between these two countries)[1];
* it is preparing its implantation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to deprive Germany of free access to the Croatian ports in Dalmatia.
Concerning the latter point, you only have to look at the map to see that Dalmatia is made up of a narrow strip of territory between the sea and the heights held by Herzegovina. If Germany, thanks to its alliance with Croatia, dreamed of setting up military bases in the ports of Split, Zadar and Dubrovnik as points of support for a Mediterranean fleet, it would be confronted by the fact that these ports are respectively 80, 40 and 10 km from the 'enemy' frontier. In case of an international crisis, it would be easy for the USA to blockade these ports, as Serbia has already shown, cutting off these German positions from their rear and rendering them useless
Concerning the 'message' transmitted to Italy, it takes on its whole importance at a time when, like other European bourgeoisies (for example the French bourgeoisie in which the neo-Gaullist party, the RPR, is divided between partisans and adversaries of a closer alliance with Germany within the EEC), the bourgeoisie in Italy is divided about its international alignments, as can be seen from the current paralysis in its political apparatus. Taking into account the important position of this country in the Mediterranean (control of the passage between east and west in this sea, the presence in Naples of the US 6th fleet), the USA is ready to do what is necessary to dissuade it from joining the Franco-German tandem.
Similarly, the US warning to Turkey can be well understood at a time when this country is aiming to combine its own regional ambitions vis-a-vis the Muslim republics of the ex-USSR (which it wants to detach from the influence of Russia, now an ally of the US), with an alliance with Germany and support for the imperialist ambitions of this country in the Middle East. Turkey also occupies a highly strategic position since it controls the passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Thus, its current rapprochement with Germany (highlighted notably by the 'scandal' of the delivery of military material destined for the repression of the Kurds, a scandal revealed thanks to the 'good offices' of Washington) represents a very serious threat for the USA. The latter has already begun to react by supporting the Kurdish nationalists and they are ready to use even more significant means to stop this rapprochement. In particular, the 'protection' now being given by the world's first power to the Muslim populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina (a majority in this country) is seen as a slap in the face to Turkey which is supposed to be the big protector of the Muslims of the region[2].
Thus the present situation in ex-Yugoslavia reveals, behind all the speeches about the return of peace and the protection of populations, the continuation and aggravation of the antagonisms between the great powers. Antagonisms which have been fed by the chaos that the collapse of Stalinism has engendered in this country and which have in their turn aggravated this chaos. Even if the pressure from the US, or even a direct intervention, might momentarily calm things down (for example by obliging Serbia to renounce some of its pretensions), the future of ex-Yugoslavia, like that of the rest of this part of the world (Balkans, eastern Europe) can only be one of new antagonisms and increasingly violent conflicts, given its strategic importance for the great powers. It's an illustration of the irreversible advance of the general decomposition of capitalist society. A new Lebanon is being created at the very gates of the great European metropoles.
However, what the massacres in Yugoslavia show is that even if decomposition is a phenomenon which escapes the control of all sectors of the bourgeoisie, including those in the most developed and powerful countries, these latter sectors do not remain inactive and passive faced with such a phenomenon. Contrary to the new government teams set up in the countries of the old eastern bloc (not to mention, of course, the situation in the 'third world'), who are completely swamped by the economic and political situation (notably by the explosion of nationalisms and ethnic conflicts), the governments of the most developed countries are still capable of taking advantage of decomposition for the defense of the interests of their national capital. This was demonstrated in particular at the beginning of May by the riots in Los Angeles.
How the bourgeoisie uses its own decomposition
As the ICC has shown[3], the general decomposition of capitalist society developing today reveals the total historic dead-end reached by this system. As with crises and wars, decomposition is not a matter of the good or bad intent of the bourgeoisie, or of some erroneous policy on its part. It is imposed on it in an insurmountable and irreversible manner. The fact that decomposition, in the same way as a third world war, can only lead, in the context of capitalism, to the extinction of humanity doesn't change any of this. This is what was shown by the 'Earth Summit' held in Rio in June. As could have been predicted, the mountain gave birth to a molehill despite the increasing gravity of the environmental problems demonstrated by the majority of scientists. At a time when, as a result of the Greenhouse Effect, terrible famines are looming on the horizon, and even the disappearance of the human species, everyone is passing the buck to make sure that nothing gets done (North against South, Europe against the USA, etc).
But while the bourgeoisie is proving itself to be absolutely incapable of arriving at any long-term, global policy, even when its own survival is threatened, along with that of the rest of humanity, it is still capable of reacting against the effects of decomposition in the short term and for the defense of its national interests. Thus, the riots in Los Angeles have revealed that the most powerful bourgeoisies still have a considerable ability to maneuver.
Los Angeles is a sort of concentrate of all the characteristics of American society: opulence and poverty, hi-tec and violence. Symbol of the American dream, it's also become a symbol of the American nightmare. As we have already pointed out in our texts on decomposition, this phenomenon, like the economic crisis which lies behind it, has its starting point in the heart of capitalism, even if it takes its most extreme and catastrophic forms in the peripheries. And LA is the heart of the heart. For a number of years now, decomposition has ravaged it in a tragic manner, especially in the black ghettoes. In most American cities, these ghettoes have become real hells, dominated by unbearable poverty, by 'third world' conditions of housing and health (for example, infant mortality has reached levels typical of the most backward countries; AIDS has taken an immense toll, etc), and above all by a generalized despair which has led a considerable proportion of young people, from the very beginning of adolescence, towards drugs, prostitution and gangsterism. Because of this, violence and murder are part of daily life in these areas: the main cause of death among black males between 15 and 34 is homicide; nearly a quarter of black males between 20 and 29 are in prison or on remand; 45% of the prison population is black (blacks make up 12% of the total population). In Harlem, the black ghetto of New York, as a result of drug overdoses, murder and illness, the life expectancy of a man is lower than it is in Bangladesh.
This situation has got worse and worse through the 80s, but the current recession, with its dizzying rise in unemployment, is magnifying it even more. As a result, for months now numerous 'specialists' have been predicting riots and explosions of violence in these areas. And this is precisely the threat the American bourgeoisie has reacted against. Rather than allowing itself to be surprised by a succession of spontaneous and uncontrollable explosions, it has preferred to organize a veritable fire-brake, enabling it to choose the time and place of such an upsurge of violence and so to prevent future outbreaks as much as possible.
The place: Los Angeles, the paradigm of urban hell in the USA, where more than 10,000 young people live by the drug trade, and where the ghettoes are patrolled by hundreds of armed gangs who slaughter each other for the control of a street or a sales pitch for crack.
The moment: at the beginning of the presidential campaigns, which are well underway, but at a respectable distance from the election itself, so that there are no uncontrolled outbreaks coming at the last minute to put President Bush in a bad light, especially after the opinion polls have not put him in a very strong position.
The method: first, a very broad media campaign around the trial of four white cops who had been filmed savagely beating up a black motorist: television viewers were shown this revolting scene over and over again. Then the cops were acquitted by a jury deliberately set up in a town known for its conservatism, its 'taste for order' and its sympathies for the police. Finally, as soon as the predictable disturbances arose after the result of the trial was announced, the police received orders from on high to desert the 'hot' neighborhoods, thus allowing the riot to achieve a considerable breadth. At the same time these same police forces remained very much in view in the nearby bourgeois neighborhoods, such as Beverly Hills. This tactic had the advantage of depriving the rioters of their traditional enemy, the cops, which meant that their anger was more than ever channelled towards pillaging shops, burning houses belonging to other communities, or the settling of scores between gangs. This tactic meant that the majority of the 58 deaths resulting from this explosion were not due to the police force but to confrontations between the inhabitants of the ghettoes (particularly between young rioters and small shopkeepers determined to protect their property with guns in their hands).
The means and conditions of the return to order were also part of the maneuver: the same soldiers who, hardly a year and a half ago were defending 'international law' and 'democracy' in the Gulf were now participating in the pacification of the riotous neighborhoods. The repression was not very bloody but it was on a wide-scale: 12,000 arrests, and for weeks after, the TV showed hundreds of trials in which rioters were sent to prison. The message was clear: even if it did not behave like some 'third world' regime that simply slaughters those who threaten public order (this was all the easier because, thanks to their provocation, the authorities were at no point overrun by the events), 'US democracy' showed that it can be as firm as it needs to be. It was a warning against those who might want to get involved in riots in the future.
The 'management' of the LA riots allowed the leading team of the American bourgeoisie to show all the other sectors that, despite all the difficulties it's facing, despite the cancerous growth of the ghettoes and of urban violence, it is still capable of discharging its responsibilities. In a world more and more subject to all kinds of convulsions, the question of the authority, both internal and external, of the planet's biggest power is of the highest importance for the bourgeoisie of this country. By provoking Saddam Hussein in the summer of 1990, then by mounting Operation Desert Storm at the beginning of 91, Bush showed that he could display such authority at the international level. Los Angeles, with all the spectacular media campaigns around it, comparable to the ones launched during the Gulf war, proved that the present administration also knows how to react on the 'domestic' level, and that no matter how catastrophic it is, the internal situation in the USA is still under control.
However, the riots provoked in LA were not only a means for the state and the government to reaffirm their authority faced with the various expressions of decomposition. They were also instruments in a wide-scale offensive against the working class.
The bourgeoisie prepares for a revival of the class struggle
As the resolution points out, "the considerable aggravation of the capitalist crisis, and particularly in the most developed countries, is a prime factor in refuting all the lies about the 'triumph' of capitalism, even in the absence of any workers' struggles. In the same way, the accumulation of discontent provoked by the multiplication and intensification of attacks resulting from the aggravation of the crisis will eventually open the way to broad movements which will restore a sense of confidence to the working class ... For the moment, workers' struggles are at their lowest level since the second world war. But we must be certain of the fact that right now the condition for future upsurges are developing ..." (Point 16).
In all the advanced countries, the bourgeoisie is well aware of this situation, and this applies particularly to the US bourgeoisie. This is why the LA riots were also aimed at a preventative weakening of future workers' struggles. In particular, thanks to the images which allowed them to present the blacks as real savages (such as the pictures of young blacks attacking white truck drivers), the ruling class has succeeded in reinforcing one of the weak points of the American working class: the division between white workers and black workers, or workers from other ethnic groups. As a bourgeois expert put it: "the level of sympathy that whites might have had for the blacks has considerably diminished because of the fear provoked among whites by the constant increase in black criminality" (C Murray of the American Enterprise Institute, 6.5.92). In this sense, the image that the bourgeoisie gave of a re-establishment of order against gangs of black delinquents, looter and dealers could be welcomed by a proportion of white workers, who are often victims of urban insecurity. On this occasion, the 'efficiency' of the forces sent by the Federal state (which was supposedly in contrast to the 'inefficiency' of the local police forces) could only increase the authority of the former.
At the same time this upsurge of racism has been exploited by the professionals of anti-racism in order to launch new diversionary a-classist campaigns, which far from facilitating the class unity of the proletariat, tend to dilute it in the population as a whole and tie it to the chariot of 'democracy'. Meanwhile, the unions and the Democratic Party have taken advantage of the situation in order to denounce the social policies of the Republican administration since the beginning of the 80s, which are blamed for the growth of urban poverty. In other words, for things to get better, you have to go and vote for the 'best candidate' - an idea which gives a boost to an electoral campaign which hasn't mobilized many people so far[4].
The different manifestations of decomposition, such as the urban riots in the 'third world' and the advanced countries, will be used by the bourgeoisie against the working class as long as the latter is not able to put forward its own class perspective - the overthrow of capitalism. And this is true whether such events are spontaneous or provoked. But when the bourgeoisie is able to choose the moment and the circumstances of such explosions, it's much more effective for the defense of its social order. The fact that the LA riots came at a very good time for using them against the working class is confirmed by all the other maneuvers being used by the ruling class against the exploited class in other advanced countries. The most significant example of this bourgeois policy has been given to us recently in one of the most important countries of the capitalist world, Germany.
Offensive of the bourgeoisie against the working class in Germany
The importance of this country does not only derive from its economic weight and its growing strategic role. This is also a country in which one of the most powerful working classes in the world lives, works and struggles, a proletariat which, given its numbers and concentration in the heart of industrial Europe, as well as its incomparable historical experience, holds many of the keys to the future movement of the working class towards the world revolution. It's precisely for this reason that the political offensive of the bourgeoisie against the working class in Germany, which was spearheaded by the biggest public sector strike in 18 years, a strike masterfully led by the unions, was not only aimed at the working class of this country. The considerable echo which this strike had in the media of the various European countries (whereas, normally, workers' struggles are subject to an almost complete black-out abroad) demonstrated that the whole European proletariat is the target of this offensive.
The specific conditions of Germany at the present moment allow us to understand why such an action was launched now in this country. Apart from its economic and historic importance, which are permanent factors, apart from the fact that the German bourgeoisie, like all its class brothers, has to deal with a new and major aggravation of the economic crisis, the bourgeoisie of this country is currently confronted with the problem of reunification (in fact, the 'digestion' of the east by the west). This reunification is a bottomless pit for billions of Deutsch Marks. The state deficit has risen to unprecedented levels for this 'virtuous' country. For the bourgeoisie then, the important thing is to prepare the working class for unprecedented attacks in order to make it accept the costs of reunification. It's a question of making it understand that the fat years are over and that it must be ready to make major sacrifices. This is why the wage offers in the public sector (4.9%), at a time when taxes of all kinds are being imposed, was below the level of inflation. This was the battle cry of the unions, who were more radical than they had been for decades, organizing massive rolling strikes (more than 100,000 workers a day), which on some days led to real chaos in transport and other public services (which had the consequence of isolating the strikers from other sectors of the working class). After raising wage demands of 9%, the unions lowered their claim to 5.4%, presenting this figure as a 'victory' for the workers and a 'defeat' for Kohl. Obviously, the majority of workers considered that after three weeks on strike, this was hardly sufficient (only 0.5% more than the original offer, around 20DM a month) and the popularity of the very mediagenic Monika Mathies, president of the OTV, suffered a few dents. But, for the bourgeoisie, several important objectives had been attained:
* demonstrating that, despite a very massive strike and some 'hard' actions, it was impossible to undermine the bourgeoisie's determination to limit wage rises;
* presenting the unions which had systematically organized all the actions, and kept the workers in the greatest possible passivity, as real protagonists of the struggle against the bosses, and also as the social insurance you had to join in order to get your strike pay (during the strike, the workers queued up to get a union card valid for two years);
* reinforcing a little bit more the division between the workers of the east and those of the west: the former didn't understand why the western workers were asking for higher wages, since in the west wages are already much higher and unemployment is much lower; the latter, meanwhile, don't want to pay for the 'ossies' who are presented as lazy and incompetent.
In other countries, the image of Germany as a 'model' was a bit tarnished by the strikes. But the bourgeoisie was quick to bang in the nail against the consciousness of the working class:
* the strike by the 'privileged' German workers was supposed to be worsening the financial and economic situation of the west;
* despite all their strength (which was identified with that of the unions) and the prosperity of their country, the German workers weren't able to win much, so what's the point of fighting against the decline in living standards?
Thus, the most powerful bourgeoisie in Europe has given the keynote for the political offensive against the working class which will inevitably accompany economic attacks of an unprecedented brutality. For the moment, the maneuver has succeeded, but the breadth it has assumed is in proportion to the fear that the proletariat inspires in the bourgeoisie. The events of the past two years, and all the campaigns which have accompanied them, have significantly weakened the combativity and consciousness of the working class. But the class has not spoken its last word. Even before it has engaged in wide-scale struggles on its own terrain, all the preparations of the ruling class demonstrate the importance of its coming battles. FM, 14.6.92
[1] As the resolution points out, Germany and France don't have exactly the same expectations from their alliance. In particular, the latter country is counting on its military advantages to compensate for its economic inferiority to the former, so that it doesn't end up as a vassal. It wants to have a sort of co-leadership of an alliance of the main European states (with the exception of Britain, obviously). This is why France is not at all interested in a German presence in the Mediterranean, which would considerably diminish the value of its own fleet there and deprive it of a major card in its trade-offs with its 'friend'.
[2] It should not be ruled out that the US support for the Croatian populations in Bosnia, who are currently victims of Serbia, is aimed at showing Croatia that it has every interest in swooping German 'protection', which has proved to be of very limited usefulness, for a much more effective American protection.
[3] See in particular the articles in IR 57 and 62
[4] The media-based ascent of the Texan clown Perrot is also part of this maneuver aimed at giving a lease of life to the democratic game.
The conditions for a resurgence of class struggle are developing
Two and a half years after the collapse of the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe and the USSR, the world situation continues to be determined to a large degree by this historic event. In particular, it has proved an unprecedented aggravating factor in the decomposition of capitalism, especially on the level of imperialist antagonisms, which are increasingly marked by the chaos which springs from it. However, the economic crisis of the capitalist mode of production, which is worsening sharply as we write, and first and foremost in the capitalist metropoles, is tending to return to centre stage. By destroying the illusions in the "superiority of capitalism" poured out since the collapse of Stalinism, by highlighting more and more the system's utter lack of perspective, and by forcing the working class to mobilize to defend its economic interests against the increasingly brutal attacks unleashed by the bourgeoisie, the crisis constitutes a powerful factor in allowing the working class to overcome the difficulties it has encountered since the collapse of the Eastern bloc.
1) The invasion of the whole life of capitalism by the phenomenon of decomposition is a process going back to the beginning of the 1980s, and even to the end of the 1970s (for example, the convulsions in Iran which led to the formation of an "Islamic" republic and the loss of control over this country by its bloc overlord, the USA). The death agony of the Stalinist regimes, their final demise, and the collapse of the imperialist bloc dominated by the USSR are expressions of this process. But at the same time, these immense historic events have seriously accelerated it. This is why we can say that these events mark capitalism's entry into a new phase of its decadence - the phase of decomposition - in the same way that World War I was the first great convulsion of the system's entry into its decadence, and was enormously to amplify the different expressions of this decadence.
Thus, the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe marks the opening of a period of catastrophic convulsions in the countries they once ruled. But the characteristics of the new period, and chaos especially, take form still more at the level of worldwide imperialist antagonisms. Chaos is the best way to describe the present situation of imperialist relations between states.
2) The Gulf War in early 1991 was the first large-scale sign of this new "state of affairs":
* it was a result of the disappearance of the Eastern bloc, and of the first signs of its inevitable consequence: the disappearance of the Western bloc as well;
* the world's greatest power undertook a massive campaign in order to limit this phenomenon, by forcing its erstwhile allies (and primarily, Germany, Japan, and France) to show their "solidarity" under its own leadership, against the world's destabilization;
* the barbaric bloodletting it provoked has given an example of what the rest of humanity can expect henceforward;
* despite the huge resources set in motion, this war has only slowed, but certainly not reversed, the major tendencies at work since the disappearance of the Russian bloc: the dislocation of the Western bloc, the first steps towards the formation of a new imperialist bloc led by Germany, the increasing chaos in international relations.
3) The barbaric war unleashed in Yugoslavia only a few months after the end of the Gulf War is a striking and irrefutable illustration of this last point. In particular, although the events which triggered this barbarity (the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia) are themselves an expression of chaos and the sharpening of nationalism which characterize all the regions previously under Stalinist control, they could never have happened had these nations not been assured of support from Germany, the greatest power in Europe. The German bourgeoisie's diplomatic maneuvering in the Balkans (much more than its indiscipline during the Gulf crisis, as evidenced by Brandt's voyage to Baghdad with Kohl's blessing), was aimed at opening up a strategic outlet to the Mediterranean through an "independent" Croatia under its control, and was its first decisive act as candidate to the leadership of a new imperialist bloc.
4) For the moment, the USA's enormous military superiority, which was spectacularly and murderously demonstrated during the Gulf War, will obviously force the German bourgeoisie to keep a tight rein on its ambitions. Still on the leash on the diplomatic and military level (treaties forbidding military intervention outside its frontiers, the presence of US troops on its territory), without nuclear weapons or a high-grade armaments industry, Germany is still only at the beginning of a road which could lead it to take the head of a new imperialist bloc. Moreover, as we have seen in Yugoslavia, Germany's pushing its own new ambitions can only destabilize the situation in Eastern Europe still further, and so aggravate the chaos in that part of the world. Given its geographical position, this region is a huge threat for Germany (notably in the form of massive immigration), even more than for the other major Western powers. It is largely for this reason that Germany continues to take part in NATO. As it made clear at its last summit, NATO's objective is no longer to confront a Russian imperialism in total disarray, but to provide a shield against the convulsions in Eastern Europe. Germany's need to remain faithful to NATO can
only limit its room for maneuver in relation to the US which dominates the alliance.
5) Lastly, to attain the status of a world power, Germany needs top flight allies in Western Europe, and this for the moment has come up against some substantial obstacles. Within the EEC, it cannot count at all on Great Britain (the USA's most faithful ally), nor on Holland (whose very close economic links with its neighbor incite it precisely to turn to Britain and the USA to avoid becoming a mere German province). Of all the great European countries, France is the most interested in closer links with Germany, given that it cannot take the place of the USA's favored lieutenant in Europe, since a common language and above all geography have definitively attributed this position to Britain. However, the Franco-German alliance cannot be as solid as that uniting the two Anglo-Saxon powers, in that:
* the two partners are looking for something different from the alliance (Germany aspiring to a dominant position, while France wants to maintain its equality, relying on its nuclear arsenal and its imperialist positions in Africa to compensate for its economic inferiority), which can lead to the adoption of divergent diplomatic positions, as we saw in the case of Yugoslavia;
* the US power has already made France pay dearly for its infidelity (France's eviction from the Lebanon, the support for Hissen Habre in Chad and support for the FIS in Algeria, etc).
6) Nonetheless, neither its enormous military backwardness, nor the obstacles that the US power will place in its way, nor the danger of worsening chaos, will turn Germany from the path down which it has started. As the capitalist crisis gets worse, so inevitably will imperialist tensions. The tendency for these tensions to end in a new division of the world into two imperialist blocs, Germany's economic power and its place in Europe, can only push it still further down the same path, which will constitute a further factor of instability in the world today.
More generally, although the threat of chaos may at times restrain the great powers from asserting their own imperialist interests, the dominant tendency is towards an exacerbation of these antagonisms, however disastrous this may be. In particular, the USA's determination, openly declared in the Gulf War, to play "world cop" can in the final analysis only lead to an increased use of military force and blackmail when faced with the threat of chaos - which will only make the latter worse (as we can see, for example, with the Kurdish problem in the post-war Middle East situation). Whatever attempts the great powers may make to improve matters; it is chaos which will increasingly dominate international relations: chaos will be at the origin and the conclusion of armed conflicts, and can only get worse with the inevitable aggravation of the crisis.
7) The open recession which has engulfed the world's greatest power for the last two years has tolled the knell of many illusions sown by the ruling class during most of the 1980's. The vaunted "Reaganomics" which allowed the longest ever period of continuous growth in those figures which supposedly express a country's wealth (such as GNP) stand revealed as a stunning failure, which has left the USA the world's most indebted country, and finding it increasingly difficult to finance its debt.
The state of the US economy is a clear sign of the catastrophic situation facing the whole world economy: $10 trillion of debt, a fall of 4.7% in investment during 1991 despite a historic low in interest rates, a 1992 budget deficit of $348 billion. Since the end of the 1960s, the world economy has only been able to confront the ineluctable contraction of solvent markets thanks to a headlong flight into debt. The serious world recession of 1974-75 was only overcome with a massive injection of credit to the "Third World" and the Eastern bloc, so that for a short period their purchases could get production going again in the industrialized countries. This rapidly led the debtor countries into effective bankruptcy. The recession of 1981-82, which was the inevitable result of this situation, was only surmounted by a new flood of debt, not in the peripheral countries this time but in the world's greatest power. The US trade deficit served as the new "locomotive" for world production, while: internal "growth" was stimulated by ever more colossal budget deficits. This is why the economic swamp in which the US bourgeoisie is struggling today is a serious danger for the whole world economy.
Henceforth, there are no "locomotives that capitalism can count on. Stifled by debt, it will less and less be able to escape, either worldwide or in individual countries, from the inevitable consequences of the crisis of overproduction: falling production, the scrapping of ever wider sectors of the productive apparatus, a drastic reduction in the labor force, strings of bankruptcies especially in the financial sector, alongside which those of the last few years will look like chickenfeed.
8) This perspective will not be altered in the slightest by the upheavals in the old self-styled "socialist" countries. In these countries, the measures of "liberalization" and privatization have only added utter disorganization and massive falls in production to the dilapidation and low productivity which lay at the heart of the Stalinist regimes' collapse. Already, or in the very short term, the population in some of these countries is threatened with famine. What most of these countries can expect, especially those emerging from the ex-USSR where inter-ethnic and nationalist conflicts can only make things worse, is a descent into the Third World. We have not had to wait even two years for the mirage of the miraculous "markets" opening up in the East to be swept away. These countries are already up to their necks in debt, and will not be able to buy much from the more developed countries. As for the latter, they are already confronted with an unprecedented cash flow crisis and will be sparing in pouring credits down what looks like a bottomless pit. There will be no "Marshall Plan" for the ex-Eastern bloc, no real reconstruction of their economies which would make it possible to relaunch production, by however little, in the most industrialized countries.
9) The increasing gravity of the world economic situation will mean unprecedented capitalist attacks against the working class in all countries. With the unleashing of trade wars and competition for ever more restricted markets, falling real wages and worsening working conditions (faster production lines, cutbacks in safety, etc) will be accompanied by a sharp drop in the social wage (education, health, pensions, etc) , and in the numbers of those in work. Unemployment, which has risen abruptly in 1991 (to 28 million in the OECD against 24.6 million in 1990) is going to exceed by far its worst levels of the early 80s. The working class can expect a sordid and unbearable poverty, not just in the less developed countries but in the richest ones as well. The fate of the workers in the ex -" socialist" countries is an indication for workers in the West of what they can expect. However, it would be quite wrong to "see in poverty nothing but poverty", as Marx put it in criticizing Proudhon. Despite, and indeed because of the terrible suffering that this will mean for the working class, the present and future aggravation of the capitalist crisis will bring with it the recovery of the class' combat and the advance of consciousness in the ranks of the working class.
10) It is paradoxical, but quite understandable and already foreseen by the ICC in the autumn of 1989, that the collapse of Stalinism, in other words of the spearhead of the counter-revolution that followed the post-World War I revolutionary wave, should have caused a serious retreat in the consciousness of the working class. This collapse allowed the ruling class to unleash an unprecedented series of campaigns on the theme of the "death of communism", "the victory of capitalism" and "democracy", which could only increase the disorientation of a great majority of workers as to the perspectives for their combats. Nonetheless, this event's impact on workers' combativity was limited, both in depth and duration, as we could see from the struggles of spring 1990 in various countries. By contrast, from the summer of 1990 onwards, the crisis and then the war in the Gulf developed a strong feeling of impotence within the working class of the advanced countries (which were all involved, directly or indirectly in the action of the "coalition"), and proved an important factor in paralyzing its activity: At the same time, these latest events laid bare the lies about the "new world order", and unveiled the criminal behavior of the "great democracies" and all the certified "defenders of human rights"; in doing so, they continued to soften the blow on workers' consciousness of the campaigns in the preceding period. This indeed is why the main fractions of the bourgeoisie were very careful to cover up their "exploits" in the Middle East with such a screen of lies, media campaigns, and fraudulent "humanitarian" operations, especially with regard to the Kurds whom they had themselves handed over for repression by Saddam Hussein's regime.
11) The last act in this series of events affecting conditions for the development of consciousness and combativity in the working class has been played out since summer 1991 with:
* the failed putsch in the USSR, the disappearance of its leading Party, and the country's disintegration;
* the civil war in Yugoslavia.
These two events have provoked a real reflux in the working class, both at the level of consciousness and of combativity. Although its impact has not been comparable to that exercised by the events of late 89, the collapse of the self-styled "communist" regime in the USSR and the disintegration of the country which saw the first victorious proletarian revolution, attacked still more profoundly the perspective of communism in the consciousness of the working masses. At the same time, new threats of catastrophic military confrontations, including nuclear conflicts, have emerged from this disintegration, and have only sharpened still further the feeling of impotent anxiety. Matters were made still worse by the civil war in Yugoslavia, a few hundred kilometers from the great working-class concentrations of Western Europe, where the workers could only look on as spectators at this absurd massacre, and leave it to the good offices of governments and international institutions (EEC, UN) to bring it to an end. Moreover, the temporary end to this conflict, with the dispatch by the great powers of their troops with a "mission of peace" under the aegis of the UN, has refurbished their image, which had been somewhat tarnished by the Gulf War.
12) The events in Yugoslavia have highlighted the complexity of the links between war and the development of proletarian consciousness. Historically, war has been a powerful factor both in mobilizing the proletariat and in raising its consciousness. The Paris Commune, the revolutions of 1905 and of 1917 in Russia, the 1918 revolution in Germany, were all the results of war. But at the same time, as the ICC has pointed out, war does not create the most favorable conditions for the extension of revolution on a world scale. In the same way, World War II has shown that it would henceforth be illusory to expect a proletarian upsurge during a generalized imperialist conflict, and that this on the contrary is another factor plunging the working class further into the counter-revolution. Nonetheless, imperialist war has not altogether lost its ability to point out for workers the profoundly barbaric nature of decadent capitalism, the threat it represents for the whole of humanity, the banditry of all those "men of good will" who rule the bourgeois world, and the fact that the working class is their principal victim. This is why the Gulf War acted in part as an antidote to the ideological poison poured out during 1989. But for war to have such a positive impact in the consciousness of the working masses, it is necessary that the proletariat should be clearly
aware of what is at stake, which presupposes:
* that the workers are not enrolled en masse under the national flag (which is why all the different conflicts in the regions once ruled by Stalinism only serve to increase the disarray of the workers there); .
* that the responsibility for the barbarity and massacres should lie clearly at the door of the advanced countries, and not be hidden by local circumstances (ethnic conflicts, ancient hatreds), or by "humanitarian" operations (like the UN's "peace" missions).
In the coming period, we cannot expect any increase in class consciousness to spring from events like those in Yugoslavia or the Caucuses. By contrast; the need for the great powers to become more and more directly involved in military conflicts will be an important factor in developing workers' consciousness, especially in the decisive sectors of the proletariat which live in these countries.
13) More generally speaking, the various consequences of the historic dead-end in which the capitalist mode of production is stuck do not act in the same direction from the viewpoint of the development of consciousness throughout the working class. The specific characteristics of the decomposition period and of chaos will for the moment be a factor in increasing confusion within the working class. This is the case, for example, with the dramatic convulsions affecting the political apparatus of certain countries emerging from the so-called "real socialism", or in certain Muslim countries (with the rise of fundamentalism). In the more advanced countries, the various upheavals of the political apparatus, though of course they are on a much smaller scale and do not escape the control of the bourgeoisie's dominant forces (rise of xenophobic movements in France, Belgium, East Germany, electoral success for regional parties in Italy, and of the ecologists in France and Belgium), are effectively used to attack workers' consciousness. In reality, the only elements which act favorably on workers' consciousness are those which are characteristic of decadence as a whole, and not specific to its phase of decomposition: imperialist war, with the direct participation of the great capitalist powers, and the crisis of the capitalist economy.
14) Just as we must be able to distinguish how different aspects of the tragic dead-end in which society finds itself affect the development of consciousness throughout the working class, so it is necessary to ascertain the various ways in which this situation can affect the different sectors of the class. In particular, it should be clear, as the ICC has already pointed out at the beginning of the 80s, that the proletariat in the ex-"socialist" countries faces enormous difficulties in the development of its consciousness. Despite the terrible attacks it has already undergone, and which will only get worse, and despite even the large-scale struggles it has conducted against these attacks, this sector of the working class remains politically weak and a relatively easy prey for the demagogic maneuvers of bourgeois politicians. Only the experience and the example of workers' combats in the most advanced sectors of the class, especially in Western Europe, against the bourgeoisie's most sophisticated pitfalls, will make it possible for East European workers to take decisive steps forward' in developing their own consciousness.
15) In the same way, within the world working class as a whole, we must establish a clear distinction, in the way that the upheavals since 1989 have been perceived, between the great mass of the proletariat and the vanguard minorities. Whereas the former has suffered the full extent of the bourgeoisie's campaigns, to the point of turning away altogether from any perspective of overthrowing capitalism, the same events and campaigns have revived an interest for revolutionary positions on the part of small minorities which have refused to be taken in by the deafening barrage on the "death of communism". This is a new illustration of the fact that there is only one antidote to the despair, the disarray that different aspects of decomposition impose on the whole of society: the affirmation of the communist perspective. The recent growth in the audience for revolutionary positions is also a confirmation of the nature of the historic course, as it has developed since the end of the 1960s: a course towards class confrontations, not towards counter-revolution; a course which the events of the last few years have not been able to overturn, however bad they may have been for the consciousness of the majority of the proletariat.
16) And it is precisely because the historic course has not been overthrown, because the bourgeoisie despite all its campaigns has not succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the proletariat in the advanced countries, and enrolling it under the national banner, that the class' retreat, both in consciousness and in combativity, must necessarily be overcome. Already, the worsening of the capitalist crisis, especially in the developed countries, is a prime factor in overturning all the lies about capitalism's "triumph". Similarly, the accumulation of discontent provoked by the intensification and proliferation of attacks as a result of the crisis will eventually open the way to large-scale movements, which will give the working class back its confidence, will remind the workers that they are a power in society and will make it possible for growing masses of workers to turn once more to the perspective of overthrowing capitalism. Obviously, it is still too early to see when such movements will break out. For the moment, workers struggles are at their lowest level since World War II. But we are certain, that in the depths are brewing the conditions for their resurgence: it is for revolutionaries to keep a constant watch; not to be taken by surprise by the upsurge of struggle when it comes; to be ready to intervene in it to put forward the communist perspective. ICC 29/03/92
In the first two articles in this series (IR 68 and 69), we began our refutation of the claim that communism is no more than the invention of a few "would-be universal reformers" by examining the historical development of communist ideas and showing them to be the product of profoundly material forces in society - above all, of the rebellion of the oppressed and exploited classes against the conditions of class domination. In the second article in particular we showed that the marxist conception of communism, far from being a schema hatched out in Marx's brain, only became possible when the proletariat won over men like Marx and Engels to its struggle for emancipation.
The next two articles in this series deal with Marx's first definitions of communist society, and in particular with his vision of communism as the overcoming of man's alienation. The article that follows therefore pays particular attention to the concept of alienation. At first sight this might appear to be a detour from the main argument in the series: i.e., that communism is a material necessity imposed by the inner contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. Superficially, the question of alienation would seem to be a purely subjective factor, something that concerns ideas and feelings rather than the solid material bases of society. But as we argue in the columns below, it was precisely the merit and strength of Marx's conception of alienation that he took it down from the clouds of woolly speculation and located its roots in the fundamental social relationships between human beings. And, by the same token, Marx made it perfectly clear that the communist society that would allow man to overcome his alienation could only come about through a thorough-going transformation of these social relationships; in sum, through the revolutionary struggle of the working class.
It is often said that Marx was never interested in drawing up blueprints for the future communist society. This is true insofar as, unlike the utopian socialists, who saw communism as the pure invention of enlightened minds, Marx realised that it was fruitless to draw up detailed plans of the structure and mode of operation of communist society, since the latter could only be the creation of a massive social movement which would have to find practical solutions to the unprecedented task of constructing a social order qualitatively superior to any that had gone before it.
But this perfectly valid opposition to any attempt to cram the real movement of history into the straitjacket of ready-made schemas did not at all mean that Marx, or the marxist tradition in general, had no interest in defining the ultimate goals of the movement. On the contrary: this is one of the distinguishing functions of the communist minority, that "they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement" (Communist Manifesto). What separates marxism from all brands of utopianism is not that the former has no vision of the "ultimate general results", but that it draws out the real connection between these results and the "conditions" and the "line of march" which lead towards them. In other words, it bases its vision of the future society on a thorough analysis of the concrete conditions of the existing society; so that, for example, the demand for the abolition of the market economy is not derived from a purely moral objection to buying and selling, but from the recognition that a society founded on generalised commodity production is doomed to break down under the weight of its own inner contradictions, thus posing the necessity for a higher form of social organisation, founded on production for use. At the same time, marxism takes its conception of the path, the line of march towards this higher form from the actual experiences of the proletariat's struggle against capitalism. Hence while the call for the dictatorship of the proletariat appeared at the very beginning of the marxist movement, the shape that this dictatorship would have to assume was made much more precise by the great revolutionary events of working class history, in particular the Paris Commune and the October revolution.
Without a general vision of the kind of society it is aiming for, the communist movement would be blind. Instead of being the highest embodiment of that unique human capacity to plan ahead, to "raise his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality" [1], communism would be no more than an instinctive reaction against capitalist misery. In its permanent battle against the domination of bourgeois ideology, it would have no power to convince workers and all the other oppressed strata of society that their only hope lies in the communist revolution, that the apparently insoluble problems posed by capitalist society can find practical solutions in a communist one. And, once the revolutionary transformation had actually got underway, it would have no yardstick by which to measure the progress being made towards its final goals.
And yet we must not forget that there is a distinction between these final goals, the "ultimate general results", and the "line of march towards them". As we have already said, the latter is subject to constant clarification by the practical experience of the class movement: the Paris Commune made it clear to Marx and Engels that the proletariat had to destroy the old state machine before erecting its own apparatus of power; the appearance of the soviets in 1905 and 1917 convinced Trotsky and Lenin that they were the finally discovered form of the proletarian dictatorship, and so on. With regard to the higher goals of communism, on the other hand, they must remain very general conclusions based on a critique of capitalist society until such point as the real movement has begun to put them on the practical agenda. This is all the more true in that the proletarian revolution is by definition a political revolution first, a social and economic transformation second. Since the authentic instances of working class revolution have, hitherto, gone no further than the conquest of political power in a given county, the lessons they have bequeathed to us relate fundamentally to the political problems of the forms and methods of the proletarian dictatorship (relations between party, class, and state, etc); only to a limited extent have they left us any definite guidance about the social and economic measures that need to be taken to lay the foundations of communist production and distribution, and these are largely negative ones (for example, that statification does not equal socialisation). Concerning the fully-fledged communist society that will only emerge after a more or less long period of transition, the historical experience of the working class has not and could not have brought about any qualitative break-throughs in the communists' own portrayal of such a society.
It is thus no accident that the most inspired and inspiring descriptions of the higher goals of communism occur at the beginning of Marx's political life, coinciding with his adhesion to the cause of the proletariat, with his explicit identification of himself as a communist in 1844 [2]. These first pictures of what humanity could be like once the shackles of capitalism and of preceding class societies had been thrown off were rarely improved upon in Marx's later writings. We will shortly be replying to the argument that Marx abandoned these early definitions as mere youthful folly. But for the moment we simply want to say that Marx's approach to this problem is entirely consistent with his overall method: on the basis of a profound critique of the impoverishment and deformation of human activity under the prevailing social conditions, he deduced what was required to negate and overcome this impoverishment. But once he had sketched out the ultimate goals of communism, what was essential was to plunge into the emerging proletarian movement, into the grime and din of its political and economic struggles, which alone had the capacity to make these distant goals a reality.
In the summer of 1844, Marx was living in Paris, surrounded by the numerous communist groupings which had been such an important element in winning him to the communist cause. It was here that he wrote the now famous Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which he later referred to as the groundwork both for the Grundrisse and Capital itself. Here he attempted to come to grips with political economy from the standpoint of the exploited class, making his first forays into such questions as wages, profits, ground rent and the accumulation of capital, questions which were to occupy such an immense part of his later work; even though, in his introductory remarks to the Manuscripts, he announces his plan for a monumental series of 'brochures' of which the sections on economics were only the beginning. In the same notebooks there is also Marx's most thorough attempt to settle scores with the idealistic Hegelian philosophy which had now outgrown its usefulness, having been 'put the right way up' by the emergence of a materialist theory of historical evolution. But the Manuscripts are certainly best known for their treatment of the problem of alienated labour, and (though perhaps less so) for their efforts to define the kind of human activity that would replace it in the future communist society.
The EPM were not published until 1927: in other words, they were not known about during the most crucial, revolutionary period in the history of the workers' movement; their publication coincided with the last gasps of the revolutionary wave that shook the capitalist world in the decade after 1917. 1927 was the year which saw the defeat both of the Chinese revolution and of the left opposition within the Communist Parties; one year later the Communist International was to announce its own demise by adopting the infamous theory of 'socialism in one country'. As a result of this irony of history, it is the bourgeoisie rather than the workers' movement which has had the most to say about the EPM and their significance. In particular, there has been a great controversy in the sterile halls of academic and left-bourgeois 'theory' over the alleged break between the 'Young Marx' and the 'Old Marx'. Since Marx never published the EPM himself, and since he covered areas in them which were seemingly undeveloped in later writings, it is alleged by some that the EPM represent an immature, Feuerbachian, even Hegelian Marx which the later, more mature and scientific Marx decisively rejected. The main proponents of this view are ... the Stalinists, and above all that arch-obscurantist Althusser. According to them, what Marx abandoned above all was the conception of human nature found in the EPM, and in particular the notion of alienation.
It should be obvious that such views can't be separated from the class nature of Stalinism. The critique of alienated labour in the EPM is intimately linked to a critique of 'barracks communism', a communism in which the community became an abstract, wage-paying capitalist - the vision of communism propounded by the genuinely immature proletarian currents of the day, such as the Blanquists [3]. Marx roundly condemned such visions of communism in the EPM because for him communism only made sense if it put an end to the suppression of man's creative capacities and transformed the drudgery of labour into joyful, free activity. The Stalinists, on the other hand, are defined by the notion that socialism is consistent with a regime of destitution and back-breaking exploitation, typified by the conditions in the factories and labour camps of the so-called 'socialist' countries. Here however we are no longer dealing with an immature expression of the proletarian movement, but a full blown apologia for the capitalist counter-revolution. Since alienated labour clearly existed in spades in the 'really existing socialism' of the east, it is hardly surprising that the Stalinists should feel somewhat uncomfortable with the whole notion. We could continue here: for example, Marx's vision of the proper relationship between man and nature in the EPM does not sit too well alongside the ecological catastrophe brought about by Stalinism's 'interpretation' of this question. But in any case this boils down to the same point: the vision of communism elaborated in the EPM undermines the fraud of Stalinist 'socialism' because the two start from alien class standpoints.
At the opposite end of the bourgeois political spectrum, various strands of liberal humanism, including Protestant theologians and a whole gaggle of sociologists, have also made an attempt to separate the 'two Marx's'. Only this time they definitely prefer the warm-hearted, romantic idealist young Marx to the cold, materialistic author of Capital. But at least such interpretations don't usually claim to be marxist ...
Bordiga, writing in the 50s, is one of the few elements in the proletarian movement to have attempted to make a commentary on the EPM, and he clearly rejected this artificial division: "Another very vulgar commonplace is that Marx was a Hegelian in his youthful writings and it was only afterwards that he was a theoretician of historical materialism, and that, when he was older, he ended up a vulgar opportunist" [4]. Against such clichés, Bordiga rightly defended the continuity of Marx's thought from the point that he first joined the proletarian cause. But in doing so, and in reaction against the various theories of the day, which either proclaimed the obsolescence of marxism or tried to spice it up with various additions, such as existentialism, Bordiga mistook this continuity for "the monolithism of the whole system from its birth to the death of Marx and even afterwards (the fundamental concept of invariance, the fundamental rejection of the enriching evolution of the party doctrine)" [5]. This conception reduces marxism to a static dogma, like Islam - for the true Muslim, the Koran is the word of God precisely because not a jot or a comma has been changed since it was first 'dictated'. It is a dangerous notion which has made the Bordigists forget the real 'enrichments' made by the very current from which they are descended - the Italian Left Fraction - and return to positions made obsolete by the onset of the epoch of capitalist decay. In relation to the matter at hand, the EPM, it also makes no sense. If we compare the EPM to the Grundrisse, which was if you like the second draft of the same great work, the continuity is absolutely clear: against the idea that Marx abandoned the concept of alienation, both the word and the concept appear again and again throughout this work of the 'mature' Marx, just as they do in Capital itself. But there is no doubt that the Grundrisse represents an enrichment with regard to the EPM. For example, it clarifies certain fundamental questions such as the distinction between labour and labour power, and is thus able to uncover the secret of surplus value. In its analysis of the phenomenon of alienation, it is able to pose the problem more historically than the earlier work, because it draws on a deep study of the modes of production that preceded capitalism. For us, the correct way of looking at this problem is to affirm both the continuity and the progressive enrichment of the 'party doctrine', because marxism is both a deeply historical tradition and a living method.
We remain convinced that the concept of alienation is essential to the elaboration of a communist critique of the present social order. Without a thorough-going examination of the problem we are trying to solve, without a grasp of how deep the problem is, there can be no question of formulating a solution. We will therefore follow Marx's method in the EPM: in order to define the final goals of the communist transformation, in order, that is to say, to draw the outlines of a really human society, we must first establish how far man has strayed from his own humanity.
The notion that man has become estranged or alienated from his own true powers is very old. But in all the societies that preceded capitalism, the concept was bound to be enveloped in mythical or religious forms - above all in the myth of man's fall from a primordial paradise in which he enjoyed godlike powers.
This myth predates class society and is indeed central to the beliefs and practises of the primitive communist societies. The Australian aborigines, for example, believed that their ancestors were the prodigiously creative beings of the primordial 'dreamtime', and that since the closing of this mythical epoch, human beings have greatly diminished in power and knowledge.
Like religion, which descends from it, myth is both a protest against alienation and an expression of it. In both, man projects powers that are really his own onto supernatural beings outside himself. But myth is the characteristic ideology of society prior to the emergence of class divisions. In this immensely long historical epoch, alienation only exists in an embryonic form: the harsh conditions of the struggle for survival impose the harsh domination of the tribe over the individual, via the unchanging customs and traditions laid down by the mythical ancestors. But this is not yet a relationship of class domination. Ideologically, this situation is reflected in a second aspect of the dreamtime beliefs: the dreamtime can be periodically restored through the collective festivals, and each member of the tribe retains a secret identity with the dreamtime ancestors. In short, man does not yet feel totally divorced from his own creative powers.
With the dissolution of the primitive community and the development of class society, the onset of alienation properly speaking is mirrored in the emergence of the strictly religious outlook. In societies like ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, the outward form of the old cyclical festivals of renewal is retained; but now the masses are mere spectators of an elaborate ritual performed by the priests with the aim of glorifying a divinised despot. A gulf has opened up between man and the gods, reflecting the growing gulf between man and man.
In the Judaeo-Christian religions, the deeply conservative cyclical conceptions of primitive and Asiatic society are replaced by the revolutionary idea that the drama of man's fall and redemption is a historical progression through time. But parallel to this development, the gulf between man and God becomes almost unbridgeable: God orders Adam to depart from Eden precisely for the sin of trying to raise himself to the divine level.
Within the western religious traditions, however, there emerged a number of esoteric and mystical currents which saw the Fall not so much as man's punishment for disobeying a distant Father figure, but as a dynamic cosmic process in which the original Mind 'forgot' itself and plunged into the world of division and apparent reality. In this conception, the estrangement between the created world and the ultimate ground of being was not absolute: the possibility remained for the properly trained initiate to 'remember' his underlying unity with the supreme Mind. Such views were held, for example, by the Jewish Kabbalistic tradition and its numerous Christian, alchemical and hermetic offshoots. It is significant that such currents - which frequently tipped over into the heresies of pantheism and atheism - became more and more influential with the breakdown of feudal-Catholic orthodoxy and were, as Engels points out in The Peasant War in Germany, often associated with subversive social movements in the period of nascent capitalism.
There is a definite, though seldom explored, link between the thinking of Hegel and some of these esoteric traditions, particularly through the works of a radical Protestant, visionary artisan whom Marx himself once referred to as "the inspired Jakob Boehme" [6]. But Hegel was also the most advanced theoretician of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, and consequently an heir to the rationalising philosophy of the Ancient Greeks. As such he made a grandiose attempt to take the whole problem of alienation away from the terrain of myth and of mysticism, and to pose it scientifically. For Hegel this meant that what had once been esoteric, locked up in the secret mental recesses of a privileged few, had to be grasped consciously, clearly and collectively: "Only what is perfectly determinate in form is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. Intelligibility is the form in which science is offered to everyone, and is the open road to it made plain for all" [7]. With Hegel, therefore, there is the attempt to grasp man's estrangement from a consciously dialectical and historical standpoint, and Marx even credits him with having achieved certain insights into the key role of labour in man's self-genesis. And yet, as Marx, following Feuerbach, pointed out, the Hegelian system takes only one or two steps towards science before falling back into mysticism. It can be readily seen that Hegel's notion of history as the 'alienation of the Absolute Idea' is a restatement of the Kabbalistic version of the original cosmic fall. Whereas for Marx, the issue was not God's history, but the history of "nature developing into man" [8]; not the descent from a primordial Consciousness into the vulgar realms of matter, but the material ascent from unconscious being to conscious being.
In so far as Hegel dealt with alienation as an aspect of concrete human experience, here again it became timeless and ahistorical, in that it was posed as an absolute category of man's relationship to the external world: in Marx's terms, Hegel confused objectification - the human capacity to separate subject from object - with alienation. Consequently, if this estrangement between man and the world could be overcome at all, it could only be done so in the abstract realm of thought - the philosopher's own realm, which for Marx was itself no more than a reflection of alienation.
But Marx did not abandon the concept of alienation to the Hegelians. Instead he attempted to restore it to its material foundations by locating its origins in human society. Feuerbach had explained that Hegel's Absolute Idea, like all previous manifestations of God, was really the projection of man unable to realise his own powers, of man alienated from himself. But Marx went further, recognising that the fact that "the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis" (Theses on Feuerbach). The concept of alienation remained vital to Marx because it became a weapon in his assault on the "secular basis", i.e. on bourgeois society, and above all on bourgeois political economy.
Confronted with the triumphant march of bourgeois society, with all the 'miracles of progress' that it had brought about, Marx utilised the concept of alienation to show what all this progress meant for the real producers of wealth, the proletarians. He showed that the increasing wealth of capitalist society meant the increasing impoverishment of the worker. Not only his physical impoverishment, but also the impoverishment of his inner life:
" ...the more the worker exerts himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself - his inner world - becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the greater is the worker's lack of objects. Whatever the product of his labour is, he is not; therefore the greater this product, the less he is himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien" [9].
Here Marx's approach is plain: against the abstractions of Hegel (which took on a caricatural form in the work of the Young Hegelians around Bruno Bauer), Marx roots his concept of alienation in "present day-economic facts " [10]. He shows that alienation is an irreducible element of the wage labour system, which can only mean that the more the worker produces, the more he enriches not himself, but capital, this alien power standing over him.
Thus alienation ceases to be a mere state of mind, an inherent aspect of man's relationship to the world (in which case it could never be overcome) and becomes a particular product of man's historical evolution. It did not begin with capitalism: wage labour, as Marx points out in the Grundrisse, is merely the final and highest form of alienation. But because it is its most advanced form, it provides the key to understanding the history of alienation in general, just as the appearance of bourgeois political economy made it possible to examine the economic foundations of previous modes of production. Under bourgeois conditions of production, the roots of alienation are laid bare: they lie not in the clouds, not in man's head alone, but in the labour process, in the concrete and practical relations between man and man and man and nature. Having made this theoretical break-through, it then becomes possible to show how man's alienation in the act of labour extends outwards to all his other activities; by the same token, it opens up the possibility of investigating the historical origins of alienation and its evolution through previous human societies - although it must be said that Marx and the marxist movement have done no more than lay down the premises for such an investigation, since other tasks necessarily took precedence over this one.
Although Marx's theory of alienation is far from complete, his treatment of it in the EPM shows how concerned he was that it should be far removed from any vagueness and uncertainty. In the chapter on 'Estranged labour' he therefore examines the problem in a very precise manner, identifying four distinct but interconnected aspects of alienation.
The first aspect is the one dealt with in the previous citation from the EPM and briefly summarised in another passage: "The relation of the worker to the product of labour as an alien object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to him". Under conditions of alienation, the products of men's own hands turn against them, and though this applies to previous modes of class exploitation, it reaches its peak under capitalism which is a completely impersonal, inhuman power, created by men's labour but utterly escaping their control, and periodically plunging the whole of society into catastrophic crises. This definition obviously applies to the immediate act of production: capital, in the form of machinery and technology, dominates the worker, and instead of increasing his leisure, intensifies his exhaustion. Furthermore, the critique of wage labour as by definition alienated labour defies all the bourgeoisie's attempts to separate the two: for example, the fraudulent schemes popular in the 1960s, which aimed at creating 'job satisfaction' by reducing the extreme specialisation characteristic of factory work, by instituting work teams, 'workers' participation' and all the rest. From the marxist point of view, none of this alters the fact that the workers are creating objects over which they have no control and which serve only to enrich others at their expense - and this remains true no matter how 'well paid' the workers are judged to be. But this whole problematic can also be given a much wider application than the immediate process of production. It is increasingly apparent, for example, especially in the period of capitalism's decadence, that the entire political, bureaucratic and military machinery of capital has taken on a bloated life of its own, that it crushes human beings like a vast juggernaut. The nuclear bomb typifies this tendency: in a society regulated by inhuman forces, the forces of the market and capitalist competition, what man produces has so far escaped his control that it threatens him with extinction. The same can be said about the relation between man and nature in capitalism: the latter did not in itself produce the alienation between man and nature, which has a far older history, but it takes it to its ultimate point. By 'perfecting' the hostility between man and nature, by reducing the whole natural world to the status of a commodity, the development of capitalist production is now threatening to destroy the very fabric of planetary life [11].
The second dimension of alienation traced by Marx is "the relation of labour to the act of production within the labour process ... here we have self-estrangement, as previously we had the estrangement of the thing". In this process, labour "does not belong to (the worker's) essential being ... in his work, therefore he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague."
Anyone who has had a 'normal' job in the day-to-day life of capitalist society, but above all anyone who has ever worked in a factory, can recognise himself and his feelings in these words. In a capitalist society that has long established its domination over the world, the fact that work should be a hateful experience for the vast majority of mankind is presented almost as a law of nature. But for Marx and marxism there was and is nothing natural about this. Previous forms of production (for example, primitive communal labour, artisan labour) had not completed this divorce between the act of production and sensuous enjoyment; this in itself was proof that the total separation achieved by capital was a historical and not a natural product. Armed with this knowledge, Marx was able to expose the truly scandalous quality of the situation brought about by wage labour. And this leads on to the next aspect of alienation: alienation from the life of the species.
This third aspect of Marx's theory of alienation is almost certainly the most complex, profound, and little understood. In this section of the same chapter, Marx asserts that man has become estranged from his human nature. For Althusser and other critics of the 'Young Marx', such ideas are proof that the 1844 Manuscripts do not represent a decisive break with Feuerbach and radical philosophy in general. We disagree. What Marx rejected in Feuerbach was the notion of a fixed and unchanging human nature. Since nature itself is not fixed and unchanging, this would clearly be a theoretical dead-end, a form of idolatry in fact. Marx's conception of human nature was not this. It was dialectical: man was still a part of nature, nature was "man's inorganic body" as he put it in one passage in the EPM; man was still a creature of instincts, as he put it elsewhere in the same work[12]. But man distinguished himself from all the other natural creatures by his capacity to transform this body through conscious creative activity. Man's most essential nature, his species being, as Marx put it, was that of the creator, the transformer of nature.
Vulgar critics of marxism sometimes claim that Marx reduced man to 'homo faber', a mere drudge, an economic category. But these critics are blinded by the proximity of wage labour, by the conditions of capitalist production. In defining man as the conscious producer, Marx was actually elevating him to the gates of heaven: for who is God but the estranged image of man when truly man - of man the creator? For Marx, man was only truly man when he was producing in a state of freedom. Whereas the animal "produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom from it" [13].
This is certainly one of the most radical statements that Marx ever made. While capitalist ideology pretends that is an eternal fact of nature that work should be a form of mental and physical torture, Marx says that man is only man, not simply when he is producing, but when he produces for the sheer joy of producing, when he is free of the whip of immediate physical need. Otherwise, man is living a purely animal existence. Engels made the same point many years later, in the conclusion to Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, when he said that man won't really mark himself off from the rest of animal kind until he has entered the realm of freedom, the highest stages of communist society.
It could even be said that alienated labour reduces man to a level below that of the animals: "In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labour tears from him his species life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over the animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him. Similarly in degrading spontaneous, free, activity, to a means, estranged labour make's man's species life a means to his physical existence" [14].
In other words: man's capacity for conscious labour is what makes him human, what separated him from all the other creatures. But under conditions of alienation this advance becomes a disadvance: man's capacity to separate subject from object, which is a fundamental element in the specifically human consciousness, is perverted into a relation of hostility to nature, to the sensuous 'objective' world. At the same time, alienated labour, above all capitalist wage labour, has turned man's most essential and most exalted characteristic - his spontaneous, free, conscious life activity - into a mere means of survival, has in fact turned it into something to be bought and sold on the market place. In sum, the 'normality' of working under capitalism is the most refined insult to man's "species being".
The fourth facet of alienation flows directly from the previous three:
"An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species being is the estrangement of man from man. When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man."
The alienation of labour in its fully fledged form implies a relationship of exploitation: the appropriation of surplus labour by a ruling class. In the first class societies (in this chapter Marx mentions Egypt, India, Peru, examples of what he later called the Asiatic mode of production), although this surplus was formally consecrated to the gods, the real alien power ruling over the labour of the exploited was not the gods but other men: "The alien being, to whom labour and the product of labour belongs, in whose service labour is done and for whose benefit the product of labour is provided, can only be man himself" (15).
This fundamental cleavage at the heart of social life inevitably creates a fundamental estrangement between human beings. From the point of view of the ruling class in any class society, the producers of wealth, the exploited, are so many things, mere chattel who only exist for their benefit (although here again it must be said that only under capitalism is this alienation complete, since in this mode of production relations of exploitation lose all personal character and become utterly inhuman and mechanical). From the point of view of the exploited class, the rulers of society are also hidden behind a fog of mystification, appearing now as gods, now as devils according to circumstance; it is not until the emergence of proletarian class consciousness, which is the negation of all ideological forms of perception, that it becomes possible for an exploited class to see its exploiters in the clear light of day, as the mere product of social and historical relationships [15].
But this cleavage is not restricted to the direct relationship between exploiter and exploited. For Marx, man's species being is not an isolated essence locked up in each individual; it is the 'Gemeinwesen' a key term implying that man's nature is social, that communal existence is the only really human form of existence. Man is not the isolated, individual producer. He is by definition the social labourer, the collective producer. And yet - and this element is developed in the pages of the Grundrisse in particular - man's history since tribal times can be seen as the continuous dissolution of the original communal bonds which held the first human societies together. This process is intimately linked to the development of commodity relations, since these above all are the dissolving agent of community-existence. This could already be seen in classical society, where the unprecedented growth of mercantile relations had profoundly undermined the old gentile ties and were already tending to make society a 'war of each against all ' a fact noted by Marx as early as his doctoral thesis on Greek philosophy. But the domination of commodity relations of course reached its apogee under capitalism, the first society to generalise commodity relations to the very heart of the social organism, the productive process itself. This aspect of capitalism society as the society of universal egoism, in which competition and separation set all men at war with each other, was emphasised particularly in the article 'On the Jewish Question', where Marx makes his first critique of the bourgeois conception of a purely political emancipation.
" ... not one of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as a member of civil society, namely an individual withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his private desires and separated from the community. In the rights of man it is not man who appears as a species being; on the contrary, species life itself, society, appears as a framework extraneous to the individuals, as a limitation of their original independence ..."
This atomisation of man in civil, i.e. bourgeois society, is an indispensable key for analysing all the social questions that lie outside the immediate process of production: the relations between the sexes and the institution of the family; the phenomenon of 'mass loneliness' which has so intrigued the sociologists and which seems so characteristic of 20th century civilisation; and in general the whole sphere of interpersonal relations. But it also has a more direct meaning for the struggle of the proletariat, since it relates to the way in which capitalism divides the proletariat itself and makes each worker a competitor with his fellow worker, thus inhibiting the proletariat's inherent tendency to unite in defence of common interests against capitalist exploitation.
The phenomenon of atomisation is particularly acute today, in the final phase of capitalist decadence, the phase of the generalised break-up and decomposition of social relations. As we have said in numerous texts[16], this phase is above all typified by the flight into individualism and 'every man for himself', by despair, suicide, drug addiction and mental illness on a scale never before seen in history. It is the phase whose motto could be Thatcher's claim that "there's no such thing as society, only individuals and their families"; it is, as the bloody events unfolding in the ex-USSR confirm, a phase of universal cannibalism, in which masses of human beings are being driven into the most irrational and murderous conflicts, into pogroms, fratricides, and wars that pose a dire threat to the very future of the human race. It goes without saying that the roots of this irrationality lie in the fundamental alienations at the centre of bourgeois society; and that their solution lies solely at this centre, in a radical change in the social relations of production.
For it must not be forgotten that Marx did not elaborate the theory of alienation in order to bewail the misery that he saw around him, or to present, as did the various brands of 'true' and feudal socialism, human history as nothing but a regrettable fall from an original state of fullness. For Marx the alienation of man was the necessary product of human evolution, and as such contained the seeds of its own supercession: "The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world" [17]. But the creation of this vast "outer wealth", this wealth estranged from those who have created it, also finally makes it possible for human beings to emerge from alienation into freedom. As Marx puts it in the Grundrisse:
"It will be shown ...that the most extreme form of alienation, wherein labour appears in the relation of capital and wage labour, and labour, productive activity, appears in relation to its own conditions and its own product, is a necessary point of transition - and therefore contains in itself, in a still only inverted from, turned on its head, the dissolution of all limited presuppositions of production, and moreover creates and produces the unconditional presuppositions of production, and therewith the full material conditions for the total, universal development of the productive forces of the individual" [18].
There are two aspects to this: in the first place, because of the unprecedented productivity of labour achieved under the capitalist mode of production, the old dream of a society of abundance, where all human beings, and not just a privileged few, have the leisure to devote themselves to the "total, universal development" of their creative powers, can cease to be a dream and become a reality. But the possibility of communism is not simply a matter of technological possibility. It is above a social possibility linked to the existence of a class which has a material interest in bringing it about. And here again Marx's theory of alienation shows how both in spite and because of the alienation it suffers in bourgeois society, the proletariat will be driven to rebel against its conditions of existence:
"The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this estrangement, it recognises estrangement as its own power and has in it the semblance of human existence. The latter feels annihilated in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. It is, to use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the indignation at that abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradictions between its human nature and its conditions of life, which is the outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature" [19].
The theory of alienation is thus nothing if it is not a theory of class revolt, a theory of revolution, a theory of the historic struggle for communism. In the next chapter we will look at the first sketches of communist society that Marx 'deduced' from his critique of capitalist alienation. CDW
[1] Marx, Capital, Chapter seven, Section one. In this passage the 'mature' Marx develops a fundamental question addressed in the EPM: the distinction between human labour and the "life-activity" of other animals.
[2] See the previous article in this series, 'How the proletariat won Marx to communism', IR 69
[3] On Marx's criticisms of 'crude communism', see the first article in this series, in IR 68.
[4] Bordiga, 'Commentary on the 1844 Manuscripts'. In Bordiga et le passion du communisme, compiled by Jacques Camatte, Spartacus Editions, 1974
[5] Ibid
[6] Marx, 'The leading article of no. 179 of Kolnische Zeitung', published in the Rheinische Zeitung, 1842
[7] Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, 1807, Preface; p. 76 in the Harper Colophon edition
[8] EPM, chapter on 'Private property and communism'
[9] EPM, chapter on 'Estranged labour'
[10] ibid
[11] See 'It's capitalism that's poisoning the Earth', in IR 63
[12] EPM: the phrase cited is from the chapter on 'Estranged Labour'. The reference to man's instincts occurs in the chapter called 'Critique of Hegelian philosophy'
[13] ibid, chapter on 'Estranged labour'
[14] ibid
[15] On the specificities of proletarian consciousness, see in particular Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness; and the ICC pamphlet, Class Consciousness and Communist Organisations
[16] See especially, 'Decomposition, final phase of the decadence of capitalism', in IR 62
[17] EPM, chapter on 'Private property and communism'
[18] Grundrisse (Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Rough Draft, written in the winter of 1857-8), Section 2, 'The circulation process of capital'; sub-heading 'Exchange of labour for labour rests on worker's propertylessness'
[19] Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, 1844, chapter IV
From political irresponsibility to the void
The proletarian political milieu is composed of a certain number of organizations which, despite their confusions and analytical errors, sometimes very serious ones, represent the real historical effort of the working class to become conscious of itself. However, on the margins of this milieu, there is a whole series of small groups which are not part of any real historical tradition and whose only basis for existing is the sectarian spirit, personal questions and other petty issues. Such groups are basically parasites of the genuinely revolutionary organizations. Not only is their existence devoid of any foundation from the point of view of working class interests; they also serve to discredit, in the eyes of the workers, the positions and activity of serious organizations. The EFICC ('External Fraction of the International Communist Current') is a particularly significant example of a parasitic group. This has been illustrated to a tragi-comic degree by the way this group has responded to the major historical events which have shaken the world over the past two years. In nos 44 and 45 of this Review, we dealt with the circumstances in which the EFIC was formed. We will only very briefly go over this ground again here.
The EFICC was formed by a certain number of former militants of our organization who voluntarily left it at its 6th Congress in November 1985. A few months before, these comrades had formed themselves into a tendency around a document which attempted to make a synthesis of different and contradictory viewpoints that had been developed against the ICC's orientations. But apart from their lack of homogeneity and coherence, the positions expressed at this time by these comrades were characterized by a lack of firmness, by concessions to councilist ideas - in short, by a centrist attitude towards councilism. Although such positions could have had pernicious consequences if they had won over the whole organization, they did not at all justify an organizational separation. This is why we saw this split as a real desertion which showed all the signs of irresponsibility and sectarianism. What's more, the splitters themselves were well aware that their attitude was unjustifiable because, from the time they left to the present day, they have stuck to the fable that they were expelled from the ICC. We lack the space in this article to go back over this lie (which we have already amply dealt with in IR 45). Rather like primitive communities, sects usually need a founding myth to justify their existence. The 'expulsion from the ICC' is one of the founding myths of this sect called the EFICC.
However, lies are not the only characteristic of the EFICC. We also have to add stupidity. That's because it gives you the stick to beat it with by confirming that it was in no way expelled from the ICC but left under its own steam.
"Staying in a degenerating organization like the ICC means cutting yourself off from the possibility of facing and eventually overcoming the crisis of marxism ... And all this is covered over with a thin veneer of respectability by a new dogma the ICC conveniently invented 6 or 7 years ago: that militants supposedly have to stay in an organization until it has crossed the class line to the capitalist class enemy. Prisoners for life. Like battered women who pathetically claim that 'he loves me', the militants of the ICC have discovered the sanctity of marriage" (IP 20, 'For a living practice of marxist theory').
The reader can form his own opinion of the comparison between the ICC and a brutal husband. Since it began the EFICC has habitually used this kind of language. What it shows however is that the EFICC (does it consider itself as a battered wife?) vehemently demanded a divorce whereas the ICC was opposed to it.
Once again, we don't have the space to refute all the many stupid and lying accusations made by the EFICC against our organization. In particular, we will if it's still necessary return in another article to one of the battle-cries of the EFICC: the ICC's supposed abandonment of its programmatic principles. However, there's one accusation whose inanity has been very sharply revealed by the events of the last two years: the accusation of theoretical regression.
The EFFIC and theoretical development
Alongside the accusation that we have abandoned our principles, the EFICC has also decreed that "the ICC had not only ceased to be a laboratory for the development of marxist theory/praxis (the sine qua non for an organization of revolutionaries), but ... it was even incapable of maintaining the theoretical acquisitions on which it was founded" (IP 3, 'Why do we call ourselves a Fraction?'). The EFICC on the other hand has given itself the task of safeguarding and enriching these acquisitions: "For an organization to live and develop, it is not enough to put its platform in the archives ... History goes forward and raises old questions in new forms, and those who are unable to keep up are condemned to fall by the wayside" ('The tasks of the Fraction', IP 1). Obviously the EFICC doesn't know the story of the pot that called the kettle black. This is clearly demonstrated by the great events that have taken place since the autumn of 89.
As the EFICC wrote in December 89: "The events that have been shaking Eastern Europe for several months require the elaboration, on the part of revolutionaries, of a clear marxist analysis of the real causes and consequences at the level of the inter-imperialist balance of forces and of the class struggle." And indeed, the EFICC has observed that: "Russia has no bloc anymore. For the moment, it has stopped being a major player on the world scene, a challenger of US imperialism ... The division of the world into two rival blocs, which was not only a characteristic of the last half century but also a precondition for global conflict, today does not exist." Bravo! This is almost exactly what we wrote in the late summer of '89, ie nearly two months before the fall of the Berlin wall[1]. The only problem is that this analysis of the EFICC's doesn't date from the same period, but only appeared for the first time in IP 21 ('The future of imperialism'), dated winter of 91-92 - that is more than two years after we adopted our analysis.
As Marx said in the Theses on Feuerbach: "Man must prove the truth, ie the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice." When the theoretical capacities of revolutionary organizations were put to the test in practice, we were able to see how far the EFICC had succeeded in taking up the torch of theoretical elaboration, allegedly dropped by the ICC. This is what it wrote on 16 December 89 (over a month after the fall of the Berlin wall):
"The events of Eastern Europe are part of the 'perestroika' begun in Russia four years ago when Gorbachev took power ... The objectives of perestroika are ... Militarily, on an imperialist level, to stop the Western offensive with an ideological counter-offensive whose aim is to divide the Western bloc and make it reduce arms spending, while trying to gain the technological and economic mastery needed to eventually compete with the West militarily ... In the imperialist sphere, Russia had no choice but to try to destabilize Europe in the hopes of gaining some benefit. Europe has always been the ultimate theatre of world imperialist conflicts and it remains so, more than ever, for Russia ... By accelerating the reforms in Eastern European countries, Russia is trying to modify the ground rules of the European problem, and open the EEC to the East in order to divide and neutralize it. The destruction of the Berlin Wall, far from a sign of peace, is a time bomb planted in the heart of Europe ... The dissolution of Stalinism in Eastern Europe as a form of the domination of capital is an eventual possibility which cannot be excluded[2] because of the history of these countries and the possibility of their being pulled into the Western orbit. But it is a different matter for Russia itself." (Resolution of the EFFIC on the upheavals in Eastern Europe, supplement to IP 15)
Luckily, you can't die of ridicule, or the members of the EFICC would be six feet under. We can however grant them one quality: pluck. You must have a lot of it to go on defending an organization which has adopted such inept positions, which has managed to get the historic situation so wrong. The proletarian political milieu as a whole has had great difficulties in arriving at a clear and correct analysis of the events of the second half of 89 (see our article 'Faced with the events in the east, a vanguard that came late', IR 62). But one has to admit that the EFICC is way ahead of them all. It's also true that we can't really place them in the political milieu strictly speaking.
In fact, a blindness as monumental as the EFICC's has few equivalents in the history of the political milieu[3]: the only comparable example is that of the FOR (Ferment Ouvrier Revolutionaire) which, for over 20 years, has denied the existence of the economic crisis of capitalism. Because even when the force of circumstances compelled it to admit its initial errors, the EFICC still had no understanding of what was going on. Thus, at its IVth Conference in summer 91, the EFICC still hadn't recognized the disappearance of the eastern bloc. What's more, the way it dealt with this question in IP 20 is typical of its congenital centrism: on the one hand, it noted "The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of COMECON" (which is the least it could do since they had by now formally dissolved, merely confirming a collapse which had taken place well beforehand); it discovered that: "In effect, the events of the past two years have constituted a veritable revocation of the Yalta treaty!" ('The evolution of inter-imperialist tensions: an orientation for the 1990s')[4]; it pointed out that Russian imperialism had lost all its former positions of influence (Central Europe, Middle East, South East Asia, Africa, Central America and Cuba). But, on the other hand, the EFICC refused to talk explicitly of the 'disappearance' or even the 'collapse' of the eastern bloc. In this document, the "American bloc" is set against "Russian imperialism" or its "potential Russian adversary" without at any moment talking about what has happened to the Russian bloc[5]. For centrism, there are words that must not be spoken, as if one can thereby avoid taking a clear and definite position. And since the essence of a centrist position is that it's untenable, you are forced, one day or another, under the pressure of reality, because "facts are stubborn" (as Lenin put it), to chuck them into the bin. This is what IP 21 did, two years late. Bravo, comrades, a great effort.
The house of straw
Obviously, the exploits of the EFICC concerning the events which have shaken the world in the recent period are not limited to the 'elaboration' of an 'analysis' so wrong that it had to be put into question month after month. It has given further proof of its stupidity and blindness in its criticism of revolutionary organizations, the ICC in particular. Thus in IP 16, we can find an explicit article called 'The ICC and eastern Europe: a degenerating organization makes a 180 degree turn', which proposed to make a "denunciation" of the ICC's position because it not only "reflects profound confusions but also because of the dishonest way in which it was arrived at: like Stalinist organizations, the ICC changes positions monolithically, without any open debate". No more or less, if you please.
The article is scandalized by the fact that "According to the ICC, the Eastern bloc is disappearing through 'implosion', as a result of the economic crisis". This is indeed, in broad outline, the conception defended by the ICC from the start, one which we didn't put into question at any moment. But for the EFICC: "This analysis implicitly rejects the concept of decadence." It's a "fundamental theoretical regression because it concerns the comprehension of one of the basic mechanisms of capitalism and its crisis"; it's "negating purely and simply the framework of imperialism and the very nature of the bourgeoisie"; it's "certainly giving credit to the bourgeois ideological barrage, but it certainly isn't understanding reality with a marxist framework"; it's "denying the warlike character of imperialist states," etc. Obviously we can't reproduce all the accusations of this kind. It would bore the reader rigid. But what the article basically shows is that for the EFICC, its "framework of analysis" (which one, actually?) is more important than reality itself. And if the latter doesn't fit into its schemas, well it doesn't exist. And all this in the name of 'marxism', thank you very much.
As it happens, it's not enough to pull out quotes from Marx and Rosa Luxemburg, as the article does, in order to develop a marxist line of thought (the Stalinists have proved that long ago). You also have to understand what they mean and to avoid getting into theoretical nonsenses like the confusion between imperialism and imperialist blocs. This is however precisely what the article does when it takes a perfectly correct statement by Rosa Luxemburg: "Imperialist policies are not the work of one country or group of countries. They are the product of the worldwide evolution of capitalism at a given moment of its maturation. By its nature, it is an international phenomenon, an indivisible whole which can only be understood by its reciprocal relations and from which no country can escape" - and assumes that this demonstrates the permanent character of the division of the world into two blocs (something not verified by history). Comrades of the EFICC - you'd better go back to primary school and learn how to read[6].
If theoretical rigor isn't the EFICC's strongpoint, it's not really a problem for them. The main aim of the article, as announced in the title and the introduction, is to denigrate our organization. At all costs they have to illustrate the thesis of the 'degeneration of the ICC', which is one of the founding myths of the EFICC. The conclusion can't stress this enough: "Swept away by the dominant ideology, unable to grasp daily events with class principles and marxist methodology, the ICC is becoming a vehicle for the class enemy. ... We hope that (these articles) will contribute to the debate in the revolutionary milieu and, who knows, even act as a salutary shock among the healthy elements still in the ICC". The "healthy elements" of the ICC are really grateful for the EFICC's concern ... and for the way it has, throughout the recent period, demonstrated the absurdity of its accusations against the ICC.
Seriously though, while we can't ask the EFICC to realize its plans for 'theoretical development' (its analyses over the past two years have shown that this is way beyond their capacities), it is high time, for the sake of dignity in the relations between revolutionaries, that it stopped making these ridiculous but repellent insults about the 'Stalinist tactics' of the ICC. In IR 45 we have already dealt with these accusations about the way the ICC reacted to the appearance within its ranks of the minority that went on to form the EFICC. Today, the EFICC tries to give a new twist to this legend by pointing out that the ICC press did not publish any texts by members in disagreement with its analysis of the events in the east. But this is absurd. The fact that the EFICC's successive changes of position provoked numerous disagreements[7] in its ranks is easily understood: when your positions are so removed from reality, it's hard for them to be accepted unanimously or even for them to lead to a minimum of homogeneity in the organization. The EFICC knows quite well that there have been debates within the ICC throughout the events of the last period. But it also knows, because its members agreed with the principle when they were militants of the ICC that these debates, if they are to lead to a real clarification in the class, are only taken to the outside world when they have reached a certain level of development. Now, while the analysis of the events in the east adopted by the ICC at the beginning of October 89 (and put forward for discussion in mid-September) provoked some disagreements at the time, these were reabsorbed very quickly because, day after day, reality was confirming the validity of the analysis. Is it a proof of the 'degeneration of the ICC' that its analysis and its understanding of marxism enabled it, much more quickly than the other groups in the political milieu, to grasp the significance and the implications of the events in the east?
Before finishing with the EFICC's accusations against the ICC over the events in the east, there are two pearls deserving of mention (among many others that we can't talk about due to lack of space): our so-called "180 degree turn" and the question of "superimperialism."
Incapable of recognizing the changes which have taken place on the international scene (despite all its speeches about the 'sclerosis' of the ICC), changes which have really amounted to a "180 degree turn", the EFICC was only able to see the positions adopted by the ICC as a renunciation of its fundamental framework of analysis. Here again, the criticism ("denunciation", to use the EFICC's terms) is imbecilic and in bad faith. All the more so because, in the orientation text on the events in the east, published in IR 60, we leant heavily on the analysis of the Stalinist regimes and the eastern bloc which the ICC had developed at the beginning of the 80s (and which in turn were based on the advances made by the Gauche Communiste de France), following the military coup in Poland (cf IR 34). On the other hand, in the numerous 'analyses', all the geometrically varied positions (minority, majority, majority of the minority or minority of the majority) advanced by the EFICC, there's not one reference to this framework, even one putting it into question - despite the fact that the members of the EFICC had themselves adopted this framework since they were still militants of the ICC at the time[8]. The next time the EFICC tries to write that the ICC "is incapable of maintaining its theoretical acquisitions" we will advise it to begin by looking at itself in the mirror.
We can give the same advice if it is again tempted (as it was for example in the article in IP 19 'The revolutionary milieu and the Gulf war') to accuse us of holding a typically bourgeois position like "superimperialism". This theory, outlined by Kautsky and the reformists on the eve of and during the First World War, sought to show that the dominant sectors of world capital would be able to unify in order to impose their rule over the whole planet, thus ensuring global peace and stability. The EFICC knows quite well, when it attributes such a theory to us, that since the very beginning of the events in the east, we have clearly rejected it:
"Does this disappearance of the Eastern bloc mean that capitalism will no longer be subjected to imperialist confrontations? Such a hypothesis would be entirely foreign to marxism ... Today, the collapse of this bloc does not give any support to analyses of this type (ie 'superimperialism'): the collapse of the eastern bloc also means the disappearance of the western bloc ... The deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level ... The disappearance of the two major imperialist constellations which emerged from World War 2 brings with it the tendency towards the recomposition of two new blocs." ('After the collapse of the eastern bloc, destabilization and chaos', IR 61)
But it's precisely this conception of superimperialism which appears in IP 21 ('The Future of imperialism'):
"Only one bloc survived the crisis. It has no challenger at this point. Yet, contrary to the predictions of the ICC and others, for the moment it shows no signs of falling apart. Its existence is no longer based upon imperialist rivalry with Russia but on ruling the world according to the needs of the strongest capitals."
The editorial of this issue of the International Review, following on a number of other articles, puts paid to this idea of the cohesion of the western bloc: once again, the EFICC refuses to see reality. But what's even more serious is that in doing so it puts into question one of the essential acquisitions of marxism this century.
Thus, to support the idea that powers like Germany and Japan can do nothing but stay firmly inside the 'American bloc', the EFICC tells us that: "The states of the American or Western bloc have become economically dependent on the functioning of these institutions (World Bank, IMF, GATT etc) and the network of trade and financial links they have forged."
This is a modern version of the conception held by the reformists at the beginning of the century, and denounced vigorously by the revolutionaries of the day: the idea that the development of economic, financial and commercial links between countries was a fetter on their imperialist antagonisms and would do away with the danger of war between them. The EFICC is very well placed to talk about the ICC's 'denial of marxism', its 'capitulation' to bourgeois ideology. When you go to wipe someone else's' nose, better check first that your own isn't snotty. In fact, this is one of the favorite practices of the EFICC - in order to hide its own faults, it attributes them generously to the ICC. It's a procedure as old as politics but it's never exalted those who've used it, particularly when they're revolutionaries.
What use is the EFICC?
If we accept, as the EFICC quite rightly says itself, that "the events shaking Eastern Europe require, on the part of revolutionaries, a clear marxist analysis of their real causes and consequences" then there's no element of denigration to conclude that the EFICC has completely failed in this task. It recognizes it itself: "This new reality led us to recognize the insufficiency of our prior analyses, which in important respects remained imprisoned by outdated stereotypes" (IP 20, report on the 4th Conference of the EFICC), even if it adds a bit further on (you have to swagger a bit and keep up the morale of the militants) that "considering our capacity to analyze the situation to be positive ... we decided to continue on the same path as previously."
More generally, we must affirm that the EFICC has failed completely in its attempts to preserve and develop the theoretical acquisitions of the ICC, a task which it claims we have abandoned. When its pretensions were confronted with the proof of events, it's evident that it didn't even manage to hang on to the ICC's coat-tails. It wanted to give us a lesson in theoretical far-sightedness, it has attacked our analyses in the most defamatory terms for two years, but in the end it has been forced to accept, to all intents and purposes, though without recognizing it, the point of view which we have defended from the start[9] - a point of view which it presented as the irrefutable proof of the 'degeneration' of our organization. The only difference it now has with the analysis we put forward two and a half years ago is that it has now taken up the bourgeois position of superimperialism, which it had lyingly attributed to us. Thus, its whole demonstration of the 'regression of the ICC' has turned against it: it's not the ICC which has regressed, it's the EFICC; it has understood nothing of the situation despite its self-proclaimed theoretical superiority. And if an incapacity to grasp what was at stake in the events in the east was a sign of regression, as it has rightly affirmed over the past two years, it's certainly not our organization which has regressed but the EFICC itself.
To the question 'what use is the EFICC?' one is thus tempted to reply 'no use at all.' Unfortunately this isn't the case. Even if the EFICC's influence is insignificant, it does have the capacity to do harm. This is why we have written this article. To the extent that its magazine has a certain number of readers, or that some people go to its public meetings, or that it intervenes in the political milieu, all the while reclaiming the platform of the most important organization in this milieu, the ICC, it constitutes an added element of confusion within the working class. In particular, its councilist tendencies and its lack of theoretical rigor can't help gaining an echo in a country like the USA which is marked by the weakness of its political milieu and by a strong impregnation of councilist and libertarian ideas. Thus a group like the EFICC undoubtedly helps preserve and aggravate the under-developed nature of the proletarian milieu in such a country.
But even more fundamental is the fact that the EFICC serves to discredit serious revolutionary work, and in the first place, marxism itself. In the name of 'marxism' this group has been coming out with so many inept ideas that it has given marxism a bad name. Thus the EFICC makes its own little contribution to the present campaign about the 'death of communism'. It's true that there's a text in IP 17 'Is Marxism Dead?' which denounces these lies, and, in its way, reaffirms the validity of marxism. But once again revolutionaries have to prove the validity of marxism in practice, through the verification of their analyses. And the EFICC is very poorly placed to do this. But, unfortunately its contribution to the repulsive campaigns against marxism doesn't stop at an inadequate defense of marxist theory. In IP 20 it participates in it deliberately. The front cover is already ambiguous: '"Communism" must die that communism can live'. As if there weren't already enough confusions between communism and Stalinism, as if the latter's death-agony can somehow be seen as a 'victory' for the working class, whereas it has been turned against it by the entire 'democratic' bourgeoisie. On top of that, the editorial joyfully proclaims: 'Let the statues [ie of Lenin] fall'. It's obviously true that the working class doesn't need statues of revolutionaries (the bourgeoisie put them up precisely to turn them into "inoffensive icons", as Lenin himself put it); but we shouldn't make any mistake about the significance of such actions in the recent period: they correspond to a rejection of the very idea of proletarian revolution, and the bourgeoisie has promoted and encouraged this.
This editorial tells us that revolutionaries "must rid themselves of the tendency to look for a model in the Bolshevik revolution." In the present circumstances, the term "Bolshevik revolution" is already pernicious because it gives the impression, as the bourgeoisie repeats in an obsessive manner, that the October revolution was a purely Bolshevik affair. This can only add weight to the theory that this revolution was nothing but a coup d'état by Lenin and Co against the will of the population, or even of the working class. And to bolster these confusions, the editorial is headed by a drawing which shows Lenin shedding tears which have Stalin's head: in other words, Stalin really is in some ways the heir of Lenin. Once again: the communist left, and the ICC in particular, has never been afraid of shedding light on the errors of revolutionaries which have facilitated the work of the counter-revolutions. But they have always been able to see the priorities of the moment: today, it's certainly not to 'run with the pack' but to stand against the bourgeoisie's campaigns and to reaffirm the fundamental validity of the experience of the post-World War One revolutionary wave. All the rest is just opportunism.
Finally, the same issue of IP contains an article ('For a living practice of marxist theory') which goes on at length about the "crisis of marxism." We can understand that the EFICC is feeling a bit uneasy after its inability to understand the events in the east has been so blatant. This is no reason for peremptorily affirming that "no one in this (revolutionary) milieu predicted these events." Certainly the EFICC didn't manage to foresee anything, but it's not alone in the world and our own organization does not feel concerned by such assertions. In this sense, it's not marxism as developed by the communist left and then by the ICC which is responsible for the failure of the EFICC's analyses. We mustn't aim at the wrong target: it's not marxism that's in crisis, it's the EFICC. But articles like this, which put the whole proletarian milieu in the same sack, and which generously attribute one's own nothingness to all the other groups, can only add grist to the mill of those who claim that it's marxism 'in general' which has failed.
But the EFICC's contribution to spreading confusion in the ranks of the working class and its political milieu isn't limited to these meanderings about the 'crisis of marxism'. It's also shown by its current rapprochement with the Communist Bulletin Group (CBG). This group came out of the 1981 split by the secret tendency formed around the dubious element Chenier (who, a few months after his expulsion, was carrying a CFDT banner and is now an official of the Socialist Party which governs France). At the time they left, the members of this 'tendency', including those who were to form the CBG, stole material and funds from our organization. This is what the ICC wrote about this group in 1983, with the full agreement of the comrades who later formed the EFICC:
"In the first issues of The Bulletin they covered all this up with baseless personal attacks against the ICC of the vilest and most stupid sort[10]. Today (probably because this attitude did not bring the results they counted on) they have changed their tune and hypocritically discovered 'the need for healthy polemic' ... How can they talk about 'solidarity' and the 'recognition of the political milieu of the proletariat' when the very basis for this doesn't exist for them? The CBG actually put pen to paper to write 'the existence of the milieu engenders a community of obligations and responsibilities'. But what these words actually mean is: watch out the day after we disagree with you, because stealing, or whatever else comes into our head, will then automatically become 'anti-petty bourgeois' activity. Or perhaps their view can be formulated as follows: when one splits, one can take whatever is at hand but when, at last, one is one's own master, with one's 'own' little group, the ex-highwayman joins the circle of property owners ... What are its positions? The same (more or less) as the ICC! Another group whose existence is politically parasitical. A provincial version of the ICC platform minus the coherence and plus the stealing ... Most little circles which split before first clarifying their positions follow the path of least resistance at first and adopt the same platform as the group they left. But quite soon, to justify their separate existence once the drama has died down, all kinds of secondary differences are discovered and before you know it, principles are changed ... the CBG is already following the same route by rejecting any coherence on the organization question." (IR 36, 'Address to proletarian political groups: in answer to the replies')[11].
This is how the EFICC itself described the CBG in 1986: "Those who left in 1981 used deceit to appropriate ICC material. Some of those who later formed the CBG made matters even worse by threatening to call the police against ICC members that recuperated the stolen material ... In the pages of The Bulletin 5, the CBG has condemned such threats as 'behavior totally alien to revolutionary practice'. It also states that 'splitters should return hardware belonging to the group and any funds of the organization. This self-critique is however, at best half-hearted. So far as we are aware, the CBG still has funds that it held in escrow for the ICC when it was still part of that organization. ... In practice, the CBG has not unequivocally repudiated gangsterist behavior in the milieu" ('The revolutionary milieu and Internationalist Perspective)
At the beginning, the EFICC was more than a little reticent about the CBG's approaches to it. But much water has flown under the bridge since then and the CBG was guest of honor at the EFICC's 4th Conference since the two of them "as a result of prior discussions and meetings ... share agreement on basic questions of principle"
It's true that in the meantime, after nearly 9 years, the CBG returned the funds and material it stole from the ICC. The EFICC had made this a sort of precondition: "At our insistence, and as a precondition of the meeting, the CBG agreed to return the material in their possession to the ICC" (IP 15, 'Report on a meeting with the CBG').
As we can see, it's not because it's suddenly become honest that the CBG has given back what it stole from us. It has simply bought its respectability, in Pounds Sterling, from the EFICC, which can now close its eyes to its past "gangsterist behavior" (to use its own phrase). The EFICC has behaved like the daughter of a good family who, afraid of remaining a spinster after several failed love affairs[12] is ready to accept the advances of a former thief. But because she has a sense of honor she insists that they can only get engaged if her suitor returns his ill-gotten gains to his victims. The EFICC may think that opportunism can't exist in the period of decadence: in fact it's a living proof of the contrary, And this is all the more true when it claims that the ICC took on many of the features of the 1981 tendency: "Many aspects of the ICC's programmatic degeneration in 1985 (the search for immediate influence, the tendency to substitutionism, the blurring of the class nature of rank and file unionism, etc) were precisely points that were defended by Chenier and other splitters in 1981" (IP 3, 'The revolutionary milieu and Internationalist Perspective').
In the final analysis, it's obviously not accidental that the EFICC is now involved in a perfectly opportunist regroupment with a group which the whole ICC (including the comrades of the future EFICC) have recognized as 'parasitic'. This is because the EFICC cannot, fundamentally, be distinguished from the CBG (except that it knows that you don't steal material from revolutionary organizations). Both of them are parasitic groups which in no way correspond to a historical effort towards consciousness, even an incomplete one, by the proletariat and its political organizations. Their only reason for existing is precisely to act as parasites on organizations of the proletariat (in the real sense of living off them while at the same time weakening them).
One of the proofs that the EFICC has no autonomous existence, as a political group, vis-a-vis the ICC, is the fact that, on average, one third of its publications (and sometimes virtually entire issues) is devoted to attacking and denigrating our organization[13].
This parasitic approach also enables us to understand the huge difficulties the EFICC has had in understanding the events in the east: since it must at all costs distinguish itself from the ICC in order to justify its existence (and 'demonstrate' the degeneration of the ICC) it's been forced to talk nonsense about these events since the ICC was the first organization in the political milieu to analyze them clearly. The only chance for the EFICC to say something sensible is if we start going in the wrong direction. But this is a bit much to ask of us. In fact, it's the fate of parasitic groups to wallow in incoherence and aberrant analyses - and this is even more the case when the group that is their reference point has correct and coherent positions. Systematic opposition to coherence can only give rise to incoherence.
What's more, the parasitic nature of the EFICC appears in its very name. For a worker who is not well up on the arcana of the political milieu, to receive a leaflet or a publication which refers itself to the ICC without being the ICC can only sow disquiet. The absurdities written by the EFICC risk being wrongly attributed to our organization and even if the EFICC writes things that are correct (this happens sometimes because its platform is the ICC's), it can only lead to the conclusion that revolutionaries are people who are not very serious and who take a malign pleasure in sowing confusion.
Fundamentally, the function of such groups is to weaken the activity of revolutionaries in the class, to discredit revolutionary ideas themselves. This is why we think today as we thought in 1986 that: "What we said about the CBG goes for the EFICC: 'another group whose existence is politically parasitic'. The best thing we could hope for, both for the working class and the comrades who comprise it, is that the EFICC disappears as quickly as possible".
And if the EFICC won't do this service to the working class, we can at least ask it to let go of the bone in its mouth and stop referring to our organization in its own name: we have no wish to go on enduring the discredit which the stupidities and opportunism of the EFICC bring to the name of the ICC. FM, March '92
Notes: Due to lack of space, this article, written in March 92, didn't appear in the previous issue of our Review. Since then, the EFICC has published a new issue of IP, which we couldn't refer to without further lengthening our article. However, it's worth citing a text from IP 22, written by a former member of the EFICC, who knows very well the state of mind that reigns in this group: "The Fraction didn't want to use the notion of decomposition, no doubt because that would mean going in the same direction as the ICC (our emphasis). It's difficult to understand why the Fraction criticizes the use of the term 'decomposition' and accuses the ICC of abandoning the framework of marxism when this organization uses and develops this notion. It's as if there was an orthodoxy of decadence, an invariance of decadence which it would be fatal to alter. Instead of being critical, thought turns into a form of immobilism, a magical formula struggling to unlock the mysteries ... As a result, we're heading straight towards the kind of situation caused by our insufficiencies in analyzing the events in the east. We recognized the disappearance of the eastern bloc two years late; we'll recognize the reality of social decomposition after an equally stunning delay" ('Decadence of capitalism, social decomposition and revolution'). We couldn't have put it better ourselves!
[1] "... however the situation in the Eastern bloc evolves, the events that are shaking it today mean the historic crisis, the definitive collapse of Stalinism, this monstrous symbol of the most terrible counter-revolution the proletariat has ever known ... In these countries, an unprecedented period of instability, convulsions, and chaos has begun, whose implications go far beyond their frontiers. In particular, the weakening, which will continue, of the Russian bloc, opens the gates to a destabilization of the whole system of international relations and imperialist constellations which emerged from World War II with the Yalta Agreements ...The events presently shaking the so-called 'socialist countries', the de facto disappearance of the Russian bloc ... constitute, along with the international resurgence of the proletariat at the end of the sixties, the most important historic facts since the second world war" ('Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the eastern countries', IR 60).
"The world's geopolitical configuration as it has lasted since World War II has been completely overturned by the events of the second half of 1989. There are no longer two imperialist blocs sharing the world between them ... at the present time, a course towards world war is excluded by the non-existence of two imperialist blocs" ('After the collapse of the eastern bloc, destabilization and chaos', IR 61).
[2] A reminder: this text was written when the only Stalinist regimes in Europe still standing were Albania and Rumania. In the latter, we were only two weeks away from Ceausescu's overthrow. No comment.
[3] However, we can say that the events in the east have shown the EFICC to be right on certain points: as we predicted at the beginning of our analyses, these events have indeed provoked the division of the western bloc and the EEC. But it's not very probable that this is what Gorbachev had planned, unless we think he adopted the attitude of a betrayed husband who kills himself in order to plunge his wife into guilt and despair ... The EFICC can think about this hypothesis in the context of its theory of the battered wife, an integral part of its effort to "deepen marxism".
[4] As is often the case, the EFICC is funny without meaning to be. Given the fact that it's been obliged to modify its analyses throughout the last two years (in virtually every issue of IP, but without managing to arrive at a correct analysis), the idea of proposing an orientation for a whole decade is positively demented. If the EFICC's pretensions were not as overblown as its capacities for analysis were rickety, in other words if it had the slightest sense of the ridiculous, it would have been able to propose "an orientation for the next three months", ie until its next issue came out. It would then have avoided the embarrassment in IP 21 of having to throw out (without recognizing it) the long-term predictions of IP 20.
[5] To be honest, we should say that in its presentation of its conference, the EFICC is still going on about the eastern bloc: "COMECON has disappeared as a system of imperialist relations between the head of the bloc, the USSR, and its satellites, which have ceased to be simple vassals". This is at least clear - clear that the EFICC wants to drown the fish. COMECON has disappeared, certainly (that's just observing what has already been officially announced), but is there another "system of imperialist relations between ... the USSR and its satellites"? This is a mystery. What 'bloc' are we talking about here the one that's disappeared, or the one that will survive under a different form? The reader can only guess. And what's happened to the satellites? Are they still vassals, but no longer "simple" ones? And when will the EFICC stop treating its readers as though they were simple?
[6] There is no limit to the theoretical ignorance and paucity of the EFICC (especially when it's trying to show up the ICC). Thus, in IP 17 ('Grasping the significance of the events in eastern Europe') we read that "the theory of state capitalism is based on the existence of military blocs". This is idiocy. The two phenomena certainly have a common origin: imperialism or, more generally, capitalist decadence, but this doesn't mean there's a cause and effect relation between them. If measles gives you spots and a fever, are we to conclude that it's the spots that are responsible for the fever? In the same article, the EFICC says with fine irony: "How intriguing to conjecture about the end of an entire imperialist bloc without a war or even a shot fired. Either bloc would undoubtedly be overjoyed if the other were to disappear due to the economic effects of the crisis alone, without even having to fire a missile. Think how much time and effort could be saved!" And yes, it is "intriguing". Especially for those who write that "history advances, poses new problems, poses old problems in a new form". But this is what did happen, even if it took two years for the authors of these lines to recognize it. Think of the time and energy which could be spared revolutionary organizations (and the working class) if they weren't encumbered by stupid and pretentious parasites like the EFICC! And to prove that misplaced irony is a specialty of the EFICC, and particularly the author of the previous lines (JA), there's a jibe at the same level in IP 20, and by the same author: "Some even tell us that imperialist rivalry between the US bloc and the Russian bloc is a thing of the past. Oh brave new world!" ('For a living practice of marxist theory'). Three months later the EFICC was singing the same song. Better late than never - but does it understand the words?
[7] See IP 16, where it seems that there are as many positions as members of the EFICC (which confirms that the latter reproduces the same heterogeneity that already existed in the old 'tendency').
[8] It should be noted that, in the two texts (the EFICC's and the text of the minority at the time) of December 89, there is no reference to the document 'Theses on Gorbachev' published in IP 14 and which was supposed to represent the framework for understanding perestroika. In particular, there is no reference to the question of the passage from the 'formal to the real domination of capital', which is the latest hobbyhorse of the EFICC and presented as one of its great 'theoretical contributions' (see IR 60 for our article refuting the meanderings of the EFICC and other groups on this question). It would seem that the EFICC's 'discoveries' aren't much use to it for understanding the world today. It was only later on, when it was trying to pick up the pieces, that it made a rather lukewarm reference to it.
[9] There is evidently a fundamental difference in the way the EFICC ended up understanding the implications of the events in the east and the way the ICC did two and a half years ago. The EFICC came to recognize reality in a totally empiricist way, under the massive pressure of irrefutable realities. On the other hand, if the ICC managed to identify the new historic reality at a time when its outward expressions were still practically imperceptible to the majority of observers (whether they belonged to the capitalist camp or the proletarian camp), it's not because we had recourse to a medium or the prophecies of Nostradamus. It was because we based ourselves on our previous analyses and relied firmly on the marxist method when it came to reconsidering certain aspects of this framework. Empiricism (at best) against the marxist method - this is the real distinction between the EFICC and the ICC at the level of theoretical reflection.
[10] To get an idea of the level of 'polemic' that the CBG engages in, here's a little extract from its prose at the time: "a process of maneuvering in which X and his then bedfellow Y played a prominent part" ('Open letter to the proletarian milieu on the Chenier affair', The Bulletin 1).
[11] It's a bit ironical that this article was written by JA, today a member of the EFICC and the main critic of our organization in the columns of IP. At that time she still defended the principles of the ICC. We wish her much pleasure, and the 'highwaymen' of the CBG, in the close relations now developing between the EFICC and the CBG.
[12] See IP 13 ('International Review of the Communist Movement: the limits of an initiative') for an account of its attempts to participate, in 1987, in a rapprochement between various confused and parasitic political groups.
[13] This is why we find it hard to believe it when it writes: "Our critique of the way the 'new style' ICC thinks and acts has only sharpened, not because of 'anti-ICC' obsessions, but because it is essential for us to speak out on revolutionary principles" (IP 10, 'What kind of 'struggle groups').
As far as the economy is concerned, the whole world seems to be hanging on one question: will there be a recovery in the United States? Does the locomotive that has drawn the world economy for two decades have the strength to start up one more time?
The relevance of Bilan's method
Following the electoral successes of extreme right parties in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria, or during the violent pogroms carried out by more or less manipulated extreme right-wing gangs against immigrants and refugees in the one-time East Germany, the "democratic" bourgeoisie's propaganda, with the left and leftist parties in the forefront, have once again been brandishing the specter of the "fascist danger".
It is the same tune as at every outrage by the racist and xenophobic scum of the far right. The "forces of democracy", no matter what their political hue, are all unanimous in their condemnation. Everybody loudly condemns the far right's "popular" success at the polls, deplores the population's passivity, which is gladly depicted as sympathy for the thugs' disgusting behavior. The democratic state can then dress up its own repression as the guarantor of "freedom", the only force capable of halting the racist scourge, and or preventing a return to the horrors of fascism. All this is part of the propaganda of the ruling class, which today is calling for the defense of capitalist "democracy", in continuity with the ideological campaigns vaunting the "triumph of capitalism and the end of communism".
These "anti-fascist" campaigns are in fact largely based on two lies: the first claims that the institutions of bourgeois democracy and the political forces that defend it are in some way ramparts against "totalitarian dictatorship", while the second pretends that the emergence of fascist regimes is a real prospect in Western Europe today.
Against these lies, the lucidity of the revolutionaries of the 1930s allows to understand better the reality of today's historic course, as we can see from the article by Bilan, extracts of which are reproduced here.
This article was written almost sixty years ago, in the midst of the Nazi victory in Germany and one year before the arrival of the Popular Front in power in France. Its analysis of the attitude of the "democratic forces" to the rise of fascism in Germany, and of the historic preconditions for the triumph of such regimes, is still completely valid in the struggle against the supporters of "anti-fascism".
The Left Fraction of the Italian Communist Party, forced into exile (especially in France) by Mussolini's fascist regime, defended against the entire "workers' movement" of the day, the proletariat's independent struggle for the defense of its interests and its revolutionary perspective: the fight against capitalism in its entirety.
Against those who urge the workers to support the bourgeoisie's democratic forces to prevent an upsurge of fascism, Bilan demonstrated how in reality the "democratic" institutions and political forces, far from serving as a rampart against fascism in Germany, in fact prepared its arrival:
" ... there is a perfect, organic continuity in the process that leads from Weimar to Hitler". Bilan made it clear that the Hitler regime was not an aberration, but a form of capitalism made both possible and necessary by historic conditions: " ... fascism has thus been built on the dual foundation of proletarian defeats and the imperious demands of an economy driven to the wall by a profound economic crisis" .
Fascism in Germany, like the "emergency powers democracy" in France, expressed the acceleration during the 1930's of state control ("disciplinisation", as Bilan called it) over the whole of capitalist social and economic life, confronted with an unprecedented economic crisis which· sharpened inter-imperialist antagonisms. But the fact that this tendency was concretely expressed in fascism, rather than in "emergency powers democracy", was determined by the balance of forces between the main classes in society: the bourgeoisie and the working class. For Bilan, the establishment of fascism was based on the previous defeat of the proletariat, both physically and ideologically. Fascism's task in Germany and Italy was to finish off the crushing of the proletariat already begun by the "social-democracy".
Those who prattle today about 'the imminent threat of fascism, apart from the fact that they are copying the anti-proletarian policies of the "anti-fascists" of the 1930's, "forget" this historical condition highlighted by Bilan. Today's generations of workers, especially in Western Europe, have neither been defeated physically, nor subdued ideologically. In these conditions, the bourgeoisie cannot do without the weapons of "democratic order". Official propaganda waves the fascist scarecrow, the better to tie the exploited class to the established order, and its "democratic" capitalist dictatorship.
In this text, Bilan still speaks of the USSR as a "workers' state", and of the Communist Parties as "centrist". It was not until World War II that the Italian Left adopted a final analysis of the capitalist nature of the USSR and the Stalinist parties. Nonetheless, this did not prevent these revolutionaries, by the 1930's, from denouncing the Stalinists, vigorously and without hesitation, as forces "working for the consolidation of the capitalist world as a whole", and as "an element in the fascist victory". Bilan was working in the midst of the rout of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle, and right at the beginning of an enormous theoretical task, of analyzing critically the greatest revolutionary experience in history: the Russian revolution. It was still full of confusions linked to revolutionaries' enormous devotion to this unique experience, but it was nonetheless a precious and irreplaceable moment in revolutionary political clarification. It was a crucial stage, whose method remains entirely valid today: the method of analyzing reality without any concessions, from the historic and worldwide viewpoint of the proletarian struggle.
ICC
The crushing defeat of the German proletariat and the rise of fascism
Bilan no. 16, March 1935
Only through the critical analysis of post-war events, of revolutionary victories and defeats, will we be able to a historical vision of the present period, a vision global enough to embrace all the fundamental phenomena that it expresses. While it is true to say that the Russian revolution lies at the centre of our critique, we must immediately add that Germany is the most important link in the chain that today is strangling the world proletariat.
In Russia, the structural weakness of capitalism, and the consciousness of the Russian proletariat represented by the Bolsheviks, prevented an immediate concentration of the world bourgeoisie's forces around one threatened sector. In Germany, by contrast, all the events since the war reveal this intervention, made easier by the strength of its democratic traditions and the speed with which the proletariat became aware of its tasks.
The events in Germany (from the crushing of the Spartakists to the arrival of fascism) already contain a critique of October 1917. They demonstrate capitalism's response to positions which were often less developed than those which made possible the Bolsheviks' victory. This is why a serious analysis of Germany should begin with an examination of the theses of the 3rd and 4th Congresses of the Communist International; these contain elements which, rather than going beyond the Russian revolution, are determined by their opposition to the ferocious assault by bourgeois forces against the world revolution. These Congresses put forward positions for the defense of the proletariat grouped around the Soviet state, when in fact the destruction of the capitalist world required a constantly growing offensive of workers in all countries, and at the same time an ideological advance by their international organization. The events of 1923 in Germany were stifled precisely thanks to these positions, which were directly against the workers' revolutionary efforts. These events were in themselves the most striking disavowal of the Congresses.
Germany has clearly proven the inadequacy of the ideological heritage bequeathed by the Bolsheviks; it is not just their efforts that were inadequate, but those of communists all over the world, and especially in Germany. So, when and where has any historical critique been made of the Spartakists ideological and political struggle? In our opinion, apart from a few stale repetitions of Lenin's general appreciations, nothing has been done. It is thought enough to castigate "Luxemburgism", and to denounce the crimes of Noske and Scheidemann, but there is not a trace of any serious analysis. And yet, if 1917 contains a categorical negation of bourgeois democracy, 1919 does so on a far more advanced level. While the Bolsheviks proved that the proletarian party can be a victorious guide only if it rejects, during its formation, any dilution by opportunist currents, the events of 1923 have proved that the fusion of the Spartakists with the Independents [ie, the USPD: translator's note] at Halle only injected greater confusion into the Communist Party [the KPD] before the decisive battle.
To sum up, instead of raising the level of the proletarian struggle above that of October, and of rejecting still more profoundly the forms of capitalist domination and any compromise with the forces of the enemy in preparation for an imminent revolutionary assault, lowering the proletariat's positions beneath those which had ensured the triumph of the Russian workers could only make the regroupment of the capitalist forces easier. In this sense, comrade Bordiga's position against parliamentarism at the 2nd Congress was an attempt to push forward the attacking positions of the world proletariat, while Lenin's position was an attempt to use in a revolutionary way a historically outmoded position in a situation which did not yet contain all the elements for an attack. Events proved Bordiga right, not on this point, but on a critical appreciation of the German events of 1919, which aimed to enlarge the proletariat's destructive effort before new battles which were to decide the fate of the proletarian state and the world revolution.
In this article, we will try to examine the evolution of the German proletariat's class positions, in order to highlight the principals which can complete the contributions of the Bolsheviks, criticize the latter's mechanical application to new situations, and contribute to a general critique of events since the war.
oOo
In Article 165 of the Weimar Republic's constitution, we find the following passage: "Workers and employees collaborate [in the workers' councils] on an equal footing with the employers, in the regulation of questions relating to wages and working conditions, and to the general economic development of the productive forces". We could not better characterize a period where the German bourgeoisie had understood that not only did it have to widen its political organization to the most extreme democracy, even to the point of recognizing the "Rate" [workers' councils], it also had to give the workers the illusion of economic power. From 1919 to 1923, the proletariat felt that it was the dominant political force in the Reich. Since the war, the trades unions incorporated into the state apparatus had become pillars supporting the whole capitalist edifice, and the only elements capable of directing the proletariat's efforts towards the reconstruction of the German economy and a stable apparatus of capitalist domination. The bourgeois democracy demanded by the social-democracy proved here to be the only means of preventing the development of the workers' struggle towards revolution, spurring it instead towards a political power that was in reality led by the bourgeoisie with the support of the trades unions, and aimed at setting industry back on its feet. This period saw the blooming of the "the world's first social legislation": labor contracts, the enterprise cells which sometimes tended to oppose the reformist trades unions, or even concentrate the workers' revolutionary efforts as for example in the Ruhr during 1921-22. In Germany, reconstruction carried out in the midst of such an upsurge of workers' liberties and rights led, as we now know, to the inflation of 1923, where there appeared at the same time the difficulty for a defeated and terribly impoverished capitalism to set its productive apparatus in motion again, and the reaction of a proletariat seeing its real wages, its "kolossal" social legislation, and its apparent political power, all reduced to nothing. If the German proletariat was beaten in 1923, despite the "workers' governments" of Saxony and Thuringia, despite an influential Communist Party, that was not yet gangrened by opportunism and moreover was still led by veteran Spartakists, and despite the favorable conditions created by the difficult position of German imperialism, then the reasons for this defeat must be sought in Moscow, in the theses of the 3rd and 4th Congresses, which were accepted by the Spartakists, but which far from completing the 1919 "Spartakus Program" did not come up to the same level as the latter. Despite occasional ambiguities, Rosa Luxemburg's speech contains a ferocious negation of capitalism's democratic forces, a real economic and political perspective and not just vague "workers governments" and united fronts with counter-revolutionary parties.
In our opinion, the defeat of 1923 is the revenge of events for the stagnation of communism's critical thought; it was prepared to apply theories mechanically, refusing to extract from real life new programmatic rules, while world capitalism, by occupying the Ruhr at the same time came objectively to the aid of the German bourgeoisie by determining a wave of nationalism capable of channeling, or at least obscuring the consciousness of the workers, and even of the leaders of the Communist Party.
Once this dangerous moment had been passed, German capitalism benefited at last from the financial help of countries like the USA, which were now convinced that any danger revolutionary had for the moment disappeared. There followed an unprecedented movement of industrial and financial concentration and centralization, on the basis of a frantic rationalization, while Stresemann headed a series of socialist or "socialistic" governments. The social-democracy supported this structural consolidation of a capitalism which was trying, by imposing a tighter discipline on the workers, to gather the strength to confront its Versailles opponents, and distracted the workers with the myths of economic democracy, the preservation of national industry, the advantages of negotiating with fewer bosses, and the first steps to socialism that this represented.
During 1925-26, until the first symptoms of the world crisis appeared, the organization of the German economy grew apace. We might almost say that German capitalism, which had been able to stand against the entire world thanks to its industrial strength and the militarization of a fabulously powerful economic apparatus, continued, once the post-war social upheaval was over, with the ultra-centralized economic organization indispensable in the phase of inter-imperialist war, and that it did so thanks to a continued organization of a war economy, under the pressure of the difficulties in the world economy as a whole. Already, 1926 saw the formation of the great Konzerns: the Stahlwerein, IG Farben-industrie, the Siemens electricity Konzern, the Allgemeine Electrizitat Gesellschaft whose formation was made easier by inflation and the resulting rise in industrial shares.
Even before the war, Germany's economic organization - the Cartels, the Konzerns, the fusion of financial and industrial capital - had reached a very high level. But from 1926 onwards, the movement accelerated and Konzerns like Thyssen, the Rheinelbe-Union, Phoenix, Rheinische Stahlwerke, came together to form the Stahwerein which controlled the coal industry and all its subsidiary products, as well as everything to do with the steel industry. The Thomas smelters requiring iron ore (which Germany had lost with the Lorraine and Upper Silesia) were replaced by Siemens-Martin smelters capable of using scrap iron.
These Konzerns soon gained a tight control over the entire German economy, and set themselves up as a dam, against which the proletariat's strength was broken. Their development was accelerated by the investment of American capital and partly by orders from Russia. But from this moment on, the proletariat, which in 1923 had lost any illusions in its real political power, was drawn into a decisive struggle. The social-democracy supported German capitalism, demonstrated that the Konzerns were socialism in embryonic form, and advocated conciliatory labor contracts as the road towards economic democracy. The CP underwent its "Bolshevization", which led to the idea of "social fascism" and was to coincide with the five year plans in Russia, but which led it to play a role similar - though not identical - to that of the social-democracy.
Nonetheless, it was during this epoch of rationalization, and of the formation of the gigantic Konzerns, that there appeared in Germany the economic bases and the social necessity for the arrival of fascism in 1933. The increased concentration of masses of proletarians as a result of the tendencies of capitalism, a costly social legislation offered as bait to avoid dangerous revolutionary movements, permanent unemployment unsettling social relations, heavy cost abroad (Reparations), all demanded continued attacks on wages already forced down by inflation. Above all, what brought on the domination of fascism was the threat from the proletariat after the war, and which it still represented. Thanks to the social-democracy, capitalism had managed to survive this threat, but it still needed a political structure which corresponded to the discipline required on the economic terrain. Just as the unification of the Reich was preceded by the industrial concentration and centralization of 1865-70, so the revival of fascism was preceded by a highly imperialist reorganization of the German economy, which was necessary to save the whole ruling class from the effects of Versailles. When people today talk about fascist economic interventionism, about "its" managed economy, "its" autarchy, they deform reality. Fascism is merely the social structure which proved necessary to capitalism at the end of a whole social and economic evolution. German capitalism could hardly bring fascism to power in 1919, in its then lamentable state of decomposition, especially faced with the proletarian menace. This is why the Kapp putsch was fully conscious of its own weakness, which made it withdraw during the factory occupations, and put its fate in the hands of the socialists, only to react quickly once the storm was past, and bring in the fascist regime.
In short, all the fascist economic "innovations" are nothing but an accentuation of the increase in economic discipline and of the links between the state and the great Konzerns (the nomination of commissars to various branches of industry): a consecration of the war economy.
Democracy cannot be the banner of capitalist domination in an economy shattered by war, shaken by the proletariat, and whose centralization is a position of resistance in preparation for a new slaughter, a way of transposing onto the world level its own internal contrasts; this is all the more true in that democracy supposes a certain mobility in economic and political relationships, which although it revolves around the maintenance of class privileges nonetheless gives every class a feeling that it can raise itself up. In the German economy's post-war development, the Konzerns link to the state, and requiring of the latter that it repay the concessions which had been wrung out of them by the struggle of the working class, removed any possibility of democracy's survival, since the perspective was no longer one of juicy colonial exploitation, but of a bitter struggle against the Versailles treaty and its reparations rather than for a right to a place in the world market. This path was one of a brutal and violent struggle against the proletariat, and here, as well as from the economic viewpoint. German capital showed the way which other countries were to take by other means. It is obvious that without the aid of world capital, German capitalism would never have been able to carry out its objectives. For the workers to be crushed, it was necessary to remove all the American labels preventing the exclusive exploitation of the workers by the German bourgeoisie; consent to moratoria on debt repayments; and in the end, abandon the payment of Reparations. It was also necessary that the Soviet state intervene, abandoning the German workers for its five year plans, and confusing their struggle, to become in the end an element of the fascist victory.
An examination of the situation from March 1923 to March 1933 allows us to understand that there is a perfect, organic continuity in the process that leads from Weimar to Hitler. The defeat of the workers came in the midst of the full flowering of the Weimar "socialistic" bourgeois democracy, and allowed capitalism to reconstitute its forces. And so, little by little the vice was tightened. Soon it was Hindendurg, in 1925, who became the defender of the Constitution, and as capitalism rebuilt its armor, so democracy became more and more restricted. Although it might widen in moment of social tension, even to the point of allowing socialist coalition governments (H. Muller), the more socialists and centrists increased the workers' confusion, the more it tended to disappear (the Bruning government and its rule by decree), to give way, in the end to a fascism which encountered no resistance from the working class. No opposition appeared between democracy's finest flower - Weimar - and fascism: one made it possible to crush the threat of revolution, dispersed the proletariat and befuddled its consciousness; the other, once the job was done, finished it off as capitalism's iron heel, bringing about the rigid unity of capitalist society on the basis of a complete suffocation of any proletarian threat.
We are not going to imitate all the scribblers and pedants who try to "correct" history with hindsight, and try to find an explanation of some formula or other. It is obvious that the German proletariat could not conquer unless it could liberate the Communist International (through its left fractions) from the disintegrating influence of centrism, and regroup around slogans which rejected any form of democracy or "proletarian nationalism", in defense of its own interests and conquests. From this point of view, the position of "social-fascism" did not go beyond the democratic swamp, since it did not explain the unfolding of events but only confused them, although it was an explanation of the trade union split carried out in the name of RUO[1]. No struggle for a united democratic front could save the proletariat, only a struggle that rejected it; but such a struggle was bound to be dissipated once it was attached to a proletarian state working for the consolidation of the capitalist world as a whole.
If today we can speak of the "nazification" of "democratic" capitalist states with "emergency powers", then it would have been correct to use this description of capitalist evolution in Germany, if by that we mean the gradual contraction of democracy until it got to March 1933. Democracy played a vital part in this historic course, and disappeared under the blows of fascism when it proved impossible to stifle the fermentation of the masses without another mass movement. Germany, more than Italy, already shows us a legal transition from Von Papen to Schleicher, and from the latter to Hitler, all under the aegis of the defender of the Weimar constitution, Hinderburg. But, as in Italy, the fermentation of the masses required other masses to demolish the workers' organizations and decimate the workers' movement. It is possible that the development of the situation in our countries still marks a certain progression relative to these experiences, and that the "emergency powers democracies", which do not confront proletariats which have carried out large-scale revolutionary assaults, and which moreover enjoy a privileged (colonial) situation relative to Germany and Italy, may succeed both in disciplining the economy and stifling the proletariat without being forced to sweep away entirely the traditional democratic forces, which will moreover make an appreciable effort to adapt (the CGT plan in France, the de Man plan in Belgium).
Fascism cannot be explained either as a distinct class under capitalism, nor as an emanation of the exasperated middle class. It is the form of domination that capitalism adopts when it is no longer able, through democracy, to rally all the classes in society around the defense of its own privileges. It does not bring it with it a new form of social organization, but a superstructure appropriate to a highly developed economy compelled to destroy the proletariat politically in order to annihilate any correspondence between the ever-sharper contrasts rending capitalism apart, and the workers' revolutionary consciousness. Statisticians may talk about the substantial number of petty-bourgeois in Germany (five million, including state employees), to try to represent fascism as "their" movement. The fact remains that the petty bourgeoisie is caught in a situation where it is crushed by the productive forces and thereby made to understand its own impotence. With social antagonisms polarized around the two main classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie cannot even waver from one to the other, but instinctively gravitates towards whichever class guarantees his hierarchical position in the social scale. Rather than standing up to capitalism, the petty bourgeois, whether he be a starched-collar employee or shopkeeper, is naturally drawn to the social armor which he thinks solid enough to maintain "law and order", and respect for his own dignity, in opposition to workers' struggles without any perspective, and which only confuse the situation. But if the proletariat stands up and goes on the attack, the petty bourgeois can only keep his head down and accept the inevitable. To present fascism as the movement of the petty bourgeoisie is therefore to deny historical reality, by hiding its real breeding ground. Fascism channels all the contrasts that endanger capitalism, towards its consolidation. It contains the petty bourgeois' desire for calm, the exasperation of the starving unemployed, the blind hatred of the disoriented worker, and above all the capitalist's determination to eliminate any element that might disturb a militarized economy, and to reduce to the minimum the cost of maintaining a permanent army of unemployed.
In Germany, fascism has thus been built on the dual foundation of proletarian defeats and the imperious demands of an economy driven to the wall by a profound economic crisis. It grew especially under Bruning, while the workers' proved incapable of defending their wages from ferocious attacks, and the unemployed their dole from the blows of government decrees. The Nazis build their own cells in the factories and the construction sites, and did not even hesitate to make use of strikes for economic demands, convinced that these would not go too far thanks to the socialists and centrists; and just as the proletariat was half defeated, in November 1932 when Von Papen had just dismissed the socialist government of Prussia and was about to call elections, there broke out the public transport strike in Berlin, led by Nazis and communists. This strike divided the Berlin proletariat, because the communists proved incapable of expelling the fascists and widening the strike to make it a signal for revolutionary struggle. The disintegration of the German proletariat was accompanied on the by a development of fascism, turning the workers own weapons against them, and on the other by economic measures in favor of capitalism. (We should remember here that it was Von Papen who adopted the measures of support of industries which took on the unemployed, giving them the right to lower wages).
In short, Hitler's victory in 1933 did not need any violence: it was brought to fruition by the socialists and centrists, a normal result of the outmoded democratic form. Violence was only useful after the arrival of the fascists in power, not in response to a proletarian attack, but to prevent it forever. Disintegrated and dispersed by force, the proletariat was to become an active element in the consolidation of a society oriented towards war. This is why the fascists could not simply tolerate the class antagonisms, even though they were led by traitors, but on the contrary had to wipe out the slightest trace of the class struggle, in order to pulverize the workers and transform them into the blind instruments of German capitalism's imperialist ambitions.
We can consider 1933 as marking the phase of systematic fascist domination. The trade unions were wiped out, and replaced with the enterprise councils controlled by the government. In January 1934, this work was given the final juridical seal of approval: the Labor Charter, which regulates wages, forbids strikes, institutionalizes the omnipotence of the bosses and Nazi commissars, and completes the fusion of the centralized economy with the state.
In fact, whereas Italian capitalism took several years to give birth to its "corporatist state", the more developed German capitalism did so more rapidly. The backward state of the Italian economy, in comparison with the Reich, made it difficult to build a social structure capable of repressing automatically any workers' resistance: by contrast, Germany's economy is of a much higher type, and it was able immediately to discipline the social relations closely linked to the branches of production controlled by the state commissars.
In these conditions, the German proletariat - like the Italian - no longer has an independent existence. To recover its class consciousness, it will have to wait until new situations rip apart the straitjacket that capitalism has forced on it. In the meantime, this is certainly not the moment to sound off about utopian possibilities of carrying out illegal mass work in the fascist countries, which has already delivered many heroic comrades into the hands of the executioners of Rome and Berlin. We must consider the old organizations which claim to be proletarian dissolved by the grip of capitalism, and go on to a theoretical work of historical analysis. This is the precondition for the reconstruction of new organisms which will be able to lead the proletariat towards victory, through the living critique of the past.
[1] The Revolutionary Union Organization was part of the Comintern
In the previous article in this series, we saw how, in order to define the ultimate goals of the communist social transformation, Marx in his early work examined the problem of alienated labor. In particular, we concluded that, for Marx, capitalist wage labor was both the highest expression of man's estrangement from his real powers and capacities, and the premise for the supersession of this alienation, for the emergence of a truly human society. In this chapter we intend to look at the actual contours of a fully developed communist society as traced by Marx in his early writings, a picture given more depth, but never renounced in the work of the mature Marx.
Having examined the various facets of man's alienation, the next task Marx took up in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts was to criticize the crude and inadequate conceptions of communism which predominated in the proletarian movement of his time. As we showed in the first article in this series, Marx rejected the conceptions inherited from Babeuf and still propagated by the followers of Blanqui because they tended to present communism as a general leveling-down, as a negation of culture in which "the category of worker is not abolished but extended to all men" (EPM, 'Private property and communism'). In this conception, all were to become wage laborers under the domination of a collective capital, of "the community as universal capitalist" (ibid). Marx's rejection of such conceptions was already an anticipation of the arguments used by latter-day revolutionaries to demonstrate the capitalist nature of the so-called 'Communist' regimes of the ex -eastern bloc (even if the latter were the monstrous offspring of a bourgeois counter-revolution rather than expressions of an immature working class movement).
Marx also criticized more "democratic", more sophisticated versions of communism, such as those put forward by Considerant and others, because they were "still of a political nature", ie, they did not propose a radical alteration in social relations, and were thus "still held captive and contaminated by private property" (ibid).
Against these restrictive or deformed definitions, Marx was anxious to show that communism was not the general reduction of all men to an uncultured philistinism, but the elevation of humanity to its highest creative capacities. This communism, as Marx announced in a passage often quoted but seldom analyzed, set itself the most exalted goals:
"Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, ie human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution" (EPM, ibid).
Crude communism had grasped, correctly enough, that the cultural realizations of previous societies had been posited on the exploitation of man by man. But in doing so, it wrongly rejected these achievements. Marx's communism, on the contrary, sought to appropriate, to bring to their real fruition, all the previous cultural and, if we may use the term, spiritual strivings of humanity, freeing them of the distortions with which they had inevitably been encrusted in class society. By turning these achievements into the common property of all mankind, it would fuse them into a higher and more universal synthesis. It was a profoundly dialectical vision, which, even before Marx had developed a clear understanding of the communal forms of society which had preceded the formation of class divisions, recognized that historical evolution, particularly in its final, capitalist phase, had robbed and deprived man of his original, 'natural' social connections. But what Marx aimed at was not a simple return to a lost primitive simplicity, but the conscious attainment of man's social being, an accession to a higher level which integrated all the advances contained in the movement of history.
By the same token, this communism, rather than merely generalizing the alienation imposed on the proletariat by capitalist social relations, saw itself as the "positive supersession" of the multiple contradictions and alienations that have hitherto plagued mankind.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Marx's critique of alienated labor had various aspects:
Marx's first definitions of communism approached these aspects of alienation from different angles, but always with the concern to show that communism provided a concrete and positive solution to these ills. In the concluding passage of his 'Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy', a commentary written in the same period as the EPM, Marx explains why the replacement of capitalist wage labor, which produces for profit alone, by associated labor producing for human need, provides the basis for going beyond the alienations enumerated above:
"In the framework of private property labor is the alienation of life since I work in order to live, in order to procure for myself the means of life. My labor is not life ... In the framework of private property my individuality has been alienated to the point where I loathe this activity, it is torture for me. It is in fact no more than the appearance of activity and for that reason it is only a forced labor imposed on me not through an inner necessity but through an external arbitrary need." Against this, Marx asks us to "suppose that we had produced as human beings. In that event each of us would have doubly affirmed himself and his neighbor in his production. (1) In my production I would have objectified the specific character of my individuality and for that reason I would both have enjoyed the expression of my own individual life during my activity and also, in contemplating the object, I would experience an individual pleasure, I would experience my personality as an objectively sensuously perceptible power beyond all shadow of doubt. (2) In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate satisfaction and knowledge that in my labor I had gratified a human need, ie, that I had objectified human nature and hence had procured an object corresponding to the needs of another human being. (3) I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the species, thus I would be acknowledged by you as the complement of your own being, as an essential part of yourself. I would thus know myself to be confirmed both in your thoughts and your love. (4) In the individual expression of my own life, I would have brought about the immediate expression of your life, and so in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my human, communal nature.
Our productions would be as many mirrors from which our natures would shine forth.
My labor would be the free expression and hence the enjoyment of life ... ".
Thus, for Marx, human beings would only be producing in a human way when each individual was able to find genuine fulfillment in his work: the fulfillment that comes from the active enjoyment of the productive act; from producing objects which not only have a real use for other human beings but which are also worthy of contemplation in themselves, because they have been produced, to use a phrase from the EPM "according to the laws of beauty"; from working in common, and to a common end, with one's fellow human beings.
Here it becomes clear that for Marx, production for need, which is one of the defining characteristics of communism, is far more than the simple negation of capitalist commodity production, production for profit. From its beginning, the accumulation of wealth as capital has meant the accumulation of poverty for the exploited; in the epoch of moribund capitalism, this is doubly so, and today it is more obvious than ever that the abolition of commodity production is a precondition for the very survival of humanity. But for Marx, production for need was never a mere minimum, a purely quantitative satisfaction of the elementary needs for food, shelter etc. Production for need was also the reflection of man's need to produce - for the act of production as delightful and sensual activity, as the celebration of mankind's essential communality. This is a position that Marx never altered. As the 'mature' Marx put it in the Critique of the Gotha Program (1874) for example, when he talks about "a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and with it also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but itself life's prime want; after the productive forces, have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly .... "
" ... after labor has become not only a means of life but itself life's prime want ... ". Such affirmations are crucial in replying to a typical argument of bourgeois ideology - that if the incentive of monetary gain is removed, there is simply no motive for the individual, or society as a whole, to produce anything. Again, a fundamental element of the reply is to point to the fact that without the abolition of wage labor, the simple survival of the proletariat, of humanity itself, will be untenable. But this remains a purely negative argument unless communists insist that in the future society the main motive for work is that it will have become "life's main want", "the enjoyment of life" - the central core of human activity and the fulfillment of man's most essential desires.
Notice how Marx, in the latter citation, begins his description of the higher phase of communist society by envisaging the abolition of the "enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and with it also the antithesis between mental and physical labor". This is a constant theme in Marx's denunciation of capitalist wage labor. In the first volume of Capital, for example, he spends page after page fulminating against the way that work in the factories of the bourgeoisie reduced the worker to a mere fragment of himself; the way that it turned men into bodies without heads and others into heads without bodies; the way that specialization had degraded labor to the repetition of the most mechanical and mind-numbing actions. But this polemic against the division of labor is there in the early work also, and it is clear from this point on that, with Marx, there could be no talk of overcoming the alienation implicit in the wage system unless there was a profound reversal of the existing division of labor. A famous passage from The German Ideology deals with this point:
" ... the division of labor offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic" (from Part One, Feuerbach: section headed 'Private property and communism').
This wonderful picture of daily life in a highly evolved communist society does of course employ a certain poetic license, but it conveys the essential point: given the development of the productive forces that capitalism itself has brought about, there is absolutely no need for any human being to spend the best part of their lives in the confines of a single kind of activity - above all in the kind of activity that only gives expression to a tiny fraction of that individual's real capacities. By the same token, we are talking about the abolition of the ancient division between the tiny minority of individuals privileged to live by really creative and rewarding work, and a vast majority condemned to experience labor as the alienation of life:
"The exclusive concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this, is a consequence of the division of labor with a communist organization of society, there disappears the subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from the division of labor, and also the subordination of the artist to some definite art, thanks to which he is exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc, the very name of his activity adequately expressing the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on the division of labor. In a communist society there are no painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities" (German Ideology, part three, section headed' Artistic talent').
The heroic image of bourgeois society in its youthful dawn is that of the Renaissance Man - individuals like Da Vinci who combined the talents of artist, scientist and philosopher. But such men could only be exceptional examples, extraordinary geniuses, in a society whose art and science was sustained by the backbreaking toil of the vast majority. Marx's vision of communism is that of an entire society of 'Renaissance Men'[2]
For that breed of 'socialist' whose function is to reduce socialism to a mild cosmetic change within the existing system of exploitation, such visions can never be a real anticipation of humanity's future. To the supporter of 'realistic' socialism (ie state capitalism a la social democracy, Stalinism or Trotskyism), they are indeed nothing but visions, unrealizable utopian dreams. But for those who are convinced that communism is both a necessity and a possibility, the sheer audacity of Marx's conception of communism, its adamant refusal to put up with the mediocre and the second rate, can only be an inspiration and a stimulus to carry on the unrelenting struggle against capitalist society. And the fact is that Marx's descriptions of the ultimate goals of communism are daring in the extreme, far more so than the 'realists' usually suspect, for they not only look forward to the profound objective changes involved in the communist transformation (production for use, abolition of the division of labour, etc); they also delve into the subjective changes that communism will bring about, positing a dramatic alteration in man's very perception and sense experience.
Here again Marx's method is to begin with the real, concrete problem posed by capitalism and point to the resolution contained in the existing contradictions of society. In this case, he describes the way that the reign of private property restricts man's capacity for real sensuous enjoyment. In the first place, this restriction is a consequence of simple material poverty, which dulls the senses, reduces all the basic functions of life to their animal level, and prevents human beings from realizing their real creative powers:
"Sense which is a prisoner of crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For a man who is starving the human form of food does not exist, only its abstract form exists; it could just as well be present in its crudest form, and it would be hard to say how this way of eating differs from that of animals. The man who is burdened with worries and needs has no sense for the finest of plays .... " (EPM, 'Private property and communism').
By contrast, "the senses of social man are different from those of non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature can the wealth of subjective human sensitivity - a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short senses capable of human gratification - be either cultivated or created ... the society that is fully developed produces man in all the richness of his being, the rich man who is profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the senses, as its constant reality" (ibid).
But it is not only quantifiable material deprivation that restricts the free play of the senses. It is something more deeply entrenched by the society of private property, the society of alienation. It is the "stupidity" induced by this society, which convinces us that nothing is 'really real' until we own it:
"Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital or when we directly possess, eat, drink, wear, inhabit it etc, in short when we use it. Although private property conceives all these immediate realizations of possession only as means of life, and the life they serve is the life of private property, labor and capitalization. Therefore all the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple estrangement of all these senses - the sense of having" (ibid).
And, once again, in contrast to this: " ... the positive supersession of private property, ie the sensuous appropriation of the human essence and human life, of objective man and of human works by and for man, should not be understood only in the sense of direct, one-sided consumption, of possession, of having. Man appropriates his integral essence in an integral way, as a total man. All his human relations to the world - seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, loving - in short all the organs of his individuality, like the organs which are directly communal in form, are in their objective approach or in their approach to the object the appropriation of that object ... The supersession of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes; but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes helve become human, subjectively as well as objectively. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object, made by man for man. The senses have therefore become theoreticians in their immediate praxis. They relate to the thing for its own sake, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man and vice versa. Need or enjoyment 'helve therefore lost their egoistic nature, and nature has lost its mere utility in the sense that its use has become human use" (ibid).
Interpreting these passages in all their depth and complexity would take a book in itself. But what is clear straight away is that, for Marx, the replacement of alienated labor by a really human form of production would lead to a fundamental modification in man's state of consciousness. The liberation of the species from the crippling costs of the struggle against scarcity, the transcendence of the anxiety and craving bound up with the rule of private property, release man's senses from their prison and enable him to see, hear, and feel in a new way. It is difficult to discuss such forms of consciousness, because they are not 'merely' rational: i.e., they have not regressed to a point prior to the development of reason - they have gone beyond rational thought as it has hitherto been conceived as a separate and isolated activity, attaining a condition in which "Man is affirmed in the objective world not only in thought but with all the senses" (ibid).
One way of understanding such inner transformations is to refer to the state of inspiration that lies at the heart of any great work of art[3]. In his inspired state, the painter or poet, dancer or singer, is granted. a glimpse of a world transfigured, a world of resplendent color and sound, a world of heightened significance which makes our 'normal' state of perception seem partial, blinkered and even unreal - rightly so, when we recall that 'normality' is precisely the normality of alienation. Of all the poets, perhaps William Blake has succeeded best in conveying the distinction between the 'normal' state, in which "man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern", and the inspired state which, in Blake's messianic but in many ways very materialist perspective, "will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment" and by cleansing the "doors of perception". If humanity could only accomplish this, "everything would appear to man as it is, infinite" (from 'The marriage of heaven and hell').
The analogy with the artist is by no means fortuitous. When he was writing the EPM, Marx's most valued friend was the poet Heine, or that all his life Marx was a passionate devotee of the works of Homer, Shakespeare, Balzac and other great writers. For him, such figures, with their unbounded creativity, served as enduring models of humanity's true potential. As we have seen, Marx's goal was a society where such levels of creativity would be a 'normal' human attribute; it follows therefore that the heightened state of sense perception described in the EPM would increasingly become social humanity's 'normal' state of consciousness.
Later on in Marx's work, the analogy for creative activity is less with the artist than with the scientist, but the essential remains: liberation from drudgery, the overcoming of the separation between work and free time, produces a new human subject:
"It goes without saying ... that labor time cannot remain in the abstract antithesis to free time in which it appears from the perspective of bourgeois economy ... Free time - which is both idle time and time for higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject. This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming; and at the same time, practice, experimental science, materially creative and objectifying science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society. For both, in so far as labor requires practical use of the hands and free bodily movement, as in agriculture, at the same time exercise" (Grundrisse, The chapter on Capital; section headed 'Real saving - economy = saving of labor time = development of productive force. Suspension of the contradiction between free time and labor time').
The awakening of the senses by free human activity also entails the overturning of the individual's relationship with the social and natural world around him. This is the problem Marx is referring to when he argues that communism will resolve the contradictions "between man and nature ... between objectification and self-affirmation ... between individual and species". As we saw in the chapter on alienation, Hegel, in his examination of the relationship between subject and object in human consciousness, recognized that man's unique capacity to see himself as a separate subject was experienced as an alienation: the 'other', the objective world, both human and natural, appeared to him as hostile and alien. But Hegel's error was to see this as an absolute rather than a historical product; as a result he could see no way round it except in the rarified spheres of philosophical speculation. For Marx, on the other hand, man's labor had created the subject-object distinction, the separation between man and nature, individual and species. But labor hitherto had been "man's coming to being within alienation" (EPM, 'Critique of the Hegelian philosophy'). And that is why, up until now, the distinction between subject and object had also been experienced as an alienation. This process, as we have seen, had reached its most advanced point with the lonely, atomized ego of capitalist society; but capitalism had also established the basis for the practical resolution of this estrangement. In the free, creative activity of communism, Marx saw the basis for a state of being in which man sees nature as human and himself as natural; a state in which the subject has achieved a conscious unity with the object: .
" ... it is only when objective reality universally becomes for man in society the reality of man's essential powers, becomes human reality, and thus the reality of his own essential powers, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, objects that confirm and realize his individuality, his objects, ie he himself becomes the object" (EPM, 'Private property and communism').
In his comments on the EPM, Bordiga was particularly insistent on this point: the resolution of the enigmas of history was only possible "once we have left behind the millennia-old deception of the lone individual facing the natural world, stupidly called 'external' by the philosophers. External to what? External to the 'I', this supreme deficiency,' but we can no longer say external to the human species, because the species man is internal to nature, part of the physical world." And he goes on to say that "in this powerful text, object and subject becomes, like man and nature, one and the same thing. We can even say that everything becomes object: man as a subject 'against nature' disappears, along with the illusion of a separate ego." ('Tables immuables de la theorie communiste de parti', in Bordiga et Ie passion du communisme. edited by J Camatte, 1972).
Hitherto, the intentional cultivation of states (or rather stages, since we are not talking about anything final here) of consciousness which go beyond the perception of the isolated ego has been largely restricted to the mystical traditions. For example, in Zen Buddhism, accounts of the experience of Satori, which expresses an attempt to go beyond the split between subject and object into a vaster unity, bear a certain resemblance to the mode of being that Bordiga, following Marx, is attempting to describe. But while communist humanity will perhaps find elements that can be reappropriated from these traditions, it is not correct to deduce from these passages in Marx and Bordiga that communism should be described as the "mystical society" or to posit a "communist mysticism", as in certain texts on the question of nature that have been published recently by the Bordigist group II Partito Comunista[4]. Inevitably, the teachings of all the mystical traditions were more or less - bound up with various religious and ideological misconceptions resulting from - immature historical conditions, whereas communism will be able to take the 'rational kernel' from these traditions and incorporate them into a real science of man. With equal inevitability, the insights and techniques of the mystical traditions were almost by definition limited to an elite of privileged individuals, whereas in communism there will be no secrets to be hidden from the vulgar masses. And as a result, the expansion of awareness that will be achieved by the collective humanity of the future will be incomparably greater than the individual flashes of illumination attained within the horizons of class society.
These are the furthest reaches of Marx's vision of the future of humanity; a vision that stretched even beyond communism, since at one point Marx says that communism is "the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future," but is "not as such the goal of human development" (EPM, 'private property and communism'). Communism, even its fully developed form, is really only the beginning of human society.
But having ascended to these Olympian heights, it is necessary to come back to the solid ground; or rather, to recall that these soaring branches are firmly rooted in the soil of Earth.
We have already provided several arguments against the charge that Marx's various 'pictures' of communist society are purely speculative and utopian schemas: first by showing that even his earliest writings as a communist are based on a very thorough and scientific diagnosis of man's estrangement, and most particularly of the form taken by this estrangement under the reign of capital. The cure, therefore, flows logically from this diagnosis: communism must provide the positive supersession of all the various manifestations of man's alienation.
Secondly, we saw how these initial descriptions of a humanity that had been restored to health were always based on real glimpses of a world transformed, authentic moments of inspiration and illumination that can and do occur to flesh and blood human beings even within the boundaries of alienation.
But what was still little developed in the EPM was the conception of historical materialism: the examination of the successive economic and social transformations which were laying the material foundations of the future communist society. In his more mature work, therefore, Marx was to expend a considerable part of his energies studying the underlying operations of the capitalist system and contrasting them with the modes of production that had preceded the bourgeois epoch. In particular, having uncovered the contradictions inherent in the extraction and realization of surplus value, Marx was able to explain that whereas all previous class societies had perished because they could not produce enough, capitalism was the first to be threatened with destruction because it 'overproduced'. But it was precisely this inherent tendency towards overproduction that signified that capitalism was laying the bases for a society of material abundance, a society which was capable of freeing the immense productive forces developed by capital of the fetters imposed by the latter once it had reached its period of historical decline; a society capable of developing the productive forces for the concrete needs of man rather than the abstract and inhuman needs of capital,
In the Grundrisse, Marx examined this problem with specific reference to the question of surplus labor time, observing that capitalism is, "despite itself, instrumental in creating the means of social disposable time, in order to reduce labor time for the whole society to a diminishing minimum, and thus to free everyone's time for their own development. But its tendency always, on the one side, to create disposable time, on the other to convert it into surplus labor. If it succeeds too well at the first, then it suffers from surplus production, and then necessary labor is interrupted, because no surplus labor can be realized by capital. The more this contradiction develops, the more does it become evident that the growth of the forces of production can no longer be bound up with the appropriation of alien labor, but that the mass of workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus labor. Once they have done so - and disposable time thereby ceases to have an antithetical existence - the, on one side, necessary labor time will be measured by the needs of the social individual, and on the other, the development of the power of social production will grow so rapidly that even though production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all. For real wealth is the developed productive power of all individuals. The measure of wealth is then not any longer, in any way, labor time, but rather disposable time".
We will return to this question in subsequent articles, particularly when we come to examine the economics of the period of transition. The point we want to make here is this: no matter how radical and far-reaching were Marx's portraits of humanity's future, they were based on a sober assessment of the real possibilities contained in the existing system of production. More than this: the emergence of a world which measured wealth in terms of "disposable time" rather than labor time was not just a possibility; it was a burning necessity if mankind was to find a path out of the devastating contradictions of capitalism. These later theoretical developments thus show themselves to be in perfect continuity with the first audacious descriptions of the communist society: they demonstrated quite plainly that the "positive supersession" of alienation described in such depth and with such passion in Marx's early works was not one choice among many for humanity's future, but the only future.
In the next article in this series, we will follow the steps taken by Marx and Engels after the early texts outlining the
ultimate goals of the communist movement: the assumption of the political struggle which was the inevitable precondition for the social and economic transformations they envisaged. We will therefore look at how communism became an explicitly political program before, during and after the great social upheavals of 1848. CDW
[1] The French word for labor, 'travail', derives from the Latin 'trepalium' , an instrument of torture ...
[2] The terminology used here is inevitably sexually biased, because the history of the division of labor is also the history of the oppression of women and of their effective exclusion from so many spheres of social and political activity. From his earliest works, Marx insisted that "it is possible to judge from this relationship (ie, the relationship between man and woman) the entire level of development of mankind. It follows from the character of this relationship how far man as a species being, as man, has become himself and grasped himself... " (EPM, 'Private property and communism'). It was thus evident for Marx that the communist abolition of the division of labor was also the abolition of all the restrictive rules imposed on men and women. Marxism has therefore never required the advice of the so-called 'women's liberation movement', whose claim to fame was that it alone saw that 'traditional' (ie, Stalinist and leftist) visions of revolution were too limited to narrow political and economic ends and so 'missed out' the need for a radical transformation in relations between the sexes. For Marx, it was evident from the very beginning that the communist revolution 'meant precisely a profound alteration in all aspects of human relationships.
[3] In his autobiography, recalling the heady days of the October insurrection, Trotsky points out that the revolutionary process is itself equivalent to a massive outburst of collective inspiration:
"Marxism considers itself the conscious expression of the unconscious historical process. But the 'unconscious' process. But the ‘unconscious' process in the historico-philosophical sense of the term - not the psychological - coincides with its conscious expression only at its highest point, when the masses, by sheer elemental pressure, break through the social routine and give victorious expression to the deeper needs of historical development. And at such moments the highest theoretical consciousness of the epoch merges with the immediate action of those oppressed masses who are furthest away from theory. The creative union of the conscious with the unconscious is what one usually calls 'inspiration'. Revolution is the inspired frenzy of history. Every real writer knows creative moments, when something stronger than himself is guiding his hand; every real orator experiences moments when someone stronger than the self of his everyday existence speaks through him. This is 'inspiration '. It derives from the highest creative effort of all one's forces. The unconscious rises from its deep wells and bends the conscious mind to its will, merging with it in some greater synthesis.
The utmost spiritual rigor likewise infuses at all times personal activity connected with the movement of the masses. This was true for the leaders in the October days. The hidden strength of the organism, its most deeply rooted instincts, its power of scent Inherited from animal forebears - all these rose and broke through the psychic routine to join forces with the higher historico-philosophical abstractions in the service of the revolution. Both these processes, affecting the individual and the masses, were based on the union of the conscious with the unconscious the union of instinct - the mainspring of the will- with the higher theories of thought.
Outwardly it did not look very imposing men went about tired, hungry and unwashed, with inflamed eyes and unshaven beards. And afterwards none of them could recall much about those most critical days and hours" (Trotsky, My Life, an attempt at an autobiography, chapter 29, 'In power').
This passage is also noteworthy because, in continuity with Marx's writings about the emancipation of the senses, it raises the question of the relationship between marxism and psychoanalysis. In the view of the present writer both Marx's conception of alienation and his notion of sensual human need were confirmed, from a different starting point, by the discoveries of Freud. Just as Marx saw man's alienation as an accumulative process reaching its final culmination in capitalism, so Freud describes the process of repression reaching its point of paroxysm in present-day civilization for sensual enjoyment - the erotic connection to the world which we savor in early childhood but which is ‘progressively' repressed both in the history of the species and of the individual. Freud also understood that the ultimate source of this repression lay in the struggle against material scarcity. But whereas Freud, as an honest bourgeois thinker, one of the last to make a real contribution to the science of man, was unable to envisaged a society which had overcome scarcity and thus the necessity for repression, Marx's vision of the emancipation of the senses points to the restoration of the ‘infantile' erotic mode of being at a higher level. As Marx himself put it, "A man cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does he not find joy in the child's naiveté, and must he himself not strive to reproduce its truth at a higher stage?" (Grundrisse, last paragraph of the introduction)
[4] See in particular the report of the meeting of February 3-4 in Florence, Communist Left no. 3, and the article 'Nature and communist revolution' in Communist Left no. 5. We should not be surprised that the Bordigists cross the line into mysticism here: their whole notion of the invariant communist program is already strongly charged with it. We should also be aware that in some his formulations about the overcoming of the atomized ego, Bordiga strays towards the negation of the individual pure and simple, that Bordiga's view of communism, and also of the party which he saw as in some sense a prefiguration of it, often slid toward a totalitarian one. Marx however talked about communism resolving the contradiction between individual and species - not the abolition of the individual, but his realization within the collective, and the realization of the collective within each individual.
Through the "live" reports on the TV screens, the barbarism of today's world has become a day-to-day feature in hundreds of millions of sitting rooms. "Ethnic purification" camps and endless massacres in ex-Yugoslavia, at the heart of "civilized" Europe; murderous famines in Somalia; new air incursions by the big western powers over Iraq: war, death, terror - this is how the "world order" of capital presents itself at the end of this millennium. If the media convey to us such an intolerable image of capitalist society, it is obviously not aimed at inciting the only class which can do away with it, the proletariat, to become conscious of its historic responsibility and to engage in decisive struggles against this system. On the contrary, the aim of the "humanitarian" campaigns that surround these tragedies is to paralyze the working class, to make it believe that the powerful are really concerned about the catastrophic state of the world, that they are doing everything necessary, or at least everything possible, to make things better. The aim is also to hide the sordid imperialist interests which really motivate their actions and which are tearing them apart. It is to raise a smokescreen in front of their own responsibility in the barbarism going on today and to justify new escalations in this barbarism.
For over a year, what used to be called Yugoslavia has been drowned in fire and blood. Month after month, the list of martyred towns gets longer and longer: Vukovar, Osijek, Dubrovnik, Gorazde and now Sarajevo. New slaughter- houses open up before others have closed. There are already more than two million refugees on the roads. In the name of "ethnic purification", we have seen the proliferation of concentration camps both for soldiers and civilian prisoners. Here people are subjected to starvation, torture and summary executions. A few hundred kilometers from the big industrial concentrations of western Europe, the "new world order" announced by Bush and other "great democrats" when the Stalinist regimes of Europe fell apart, once again reveals its true face: one of massacres, terror, and ethnic persecution
The games of the great powers in Yugoslavia
The governments of the advanced countries and their tame media have continuously presented the barbarism being unleashed in ex-Yugoslavia as the result of the ancestral hatreds which have set the different populations of this region against each other. And it is true that, like the other countries formerly dominated by the Stalinist regimes, notably the ex- USSR, the iron grip in which these populations were held in no way got rid of the old antagonisms perpetuated by history. On the contrary, although a late development of capitalism in these regions did not allow them really to transcend the ancient divisions left by feudal society, the so-called "socialist" regimes did nothing but exacerbate these divisions. These divisions could only be overcome by an advanced capitalism, by a high level of industrialization, by a bourgeoisie that was strong both economically and politically, capable of unifying itself around the nation state. But the Stalinist regimes have had none of these characteristics. As revolutionaries have underlined for a long time[1], and as has been strikingly confirmed over the last few years, these regimes were at the front rank of the underdeveloped capitalist countries, with a particularly weak bourgeoisie which from the very beginning bore all the stigmata of capitalist decadence[2]. Born out of the counter- revolution and the imperialist war, this type of bourgeoisie based its power almost exclusively on terror and armed force. For some decades these instruments gave it an appearance of strength and could make it seem that it had done away with the old nationalist and ethnic divisions. But in reality, the image of monolithism was not backed up by any real unity in its ranks. In fact there was a permanent division between the various cliques which composed it, and only the iron hand of the party-state kept these divisions from blowing the whole thing to pieces. The immediate explosion of the USSR into as many republics as soon as the Stalinist regime had collapsed, the unchaining of a whole series of ethnic conflicts within these republics (Armenians against Azeris, Ossetians against Georgians, Chechene-Ingouchians against Russians etc) express . the fact that smothering these divisions has only exacerbated them. And today they are expressing themselves by the same means as they were contained: force of arms.
Having said all this, the collapse of the Stalinist regime in ex-Yugoslavia does not in itself explain the present situation in this part of the world. As we have shown, the collapse of these regimes was itself a manifestation of the final phase of the decadence of the capitalist mode of production, the phase of decomposition[3]. We cannot understand the barbarism and the chaos sweeping the world, the Balkans included, without taking account of this unprecedented historical situation represented by decomposition. The "new world order" can only be a chimera: capitalism has irreversibly plunged humanity into the greatest chaos in history, a chaos which can lead only to the destruction of humanity or the overthrow of capitalism.
However, the big imperialist powers are not standing with folded arms faced with the advance of decomposition. The Gulf war, prepared, provoked, and led by the USA, was an attempt by the world's major power to limit this chaos and the tendency towards "every man for himself" resulting from the collapse of the eastern bloc. To some extent, the USA attained its ends, in particular by further reinforcing its grip on a zone as important as the Middle East and by forcing the other great powers to follow it and even support it in the Gulf war. But this operation to "maintain order" very quickly revealed its limitations. In the Middle East itself, it helped to encourage the Kurdish nationalist uprising against the Iraqi state (and, after that, against the Turkish state), as well as facilitating the Shi'ite uprising in the south of Iraq. All over the planet, the "new world order" proved to be a mirage, especially with the beginning of the conflict in Yugoslavia during the summer of 91. And what the latter demonstrated was that the contribution of the great powers to this so-called "world order" not only had nothing positive about it, but simply served to aggravate chaos and antagonisms.
Such a statement is particularly obvious vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, where the current chaos flows directly from the action of the great powers. At the origin of the process which has led this region into the present conflict was the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 91. Now it is clear that these two republics would not have taken such a risk if they had not received the firm support (diplomatic, but also in weapons) of Austria and its big boss, Germany. In fact we can say that in its aim of opening up an outlet onto the Mediterranean, the German bourgeoisie took the initial responsibility of provoking the break-up of Yugoslavia, with all the consequences we can see today. But the bourgeoisies of the other powers did not remain passive. Thus, the violent response by Serbia to the independence of Slovenia, and above all of Croatia, where an important Serbian minority was living, from the start had the solid support of the USA and its closest European allies, in particular Great Britain. We have even seen France, which, in other respects has made an alliance with Germany to try to form a sort of condominium over Europe, lining up with the USA and Britain and supporting the "integrity of Yugoslavia", ie, Serbia and its policy of occupying Croatian regions peopled by Serbs. Here again it is clear that without this initial support, Serbia would have been much less ambitious in its military policy, both against Croatia last year, and against Bosnia-Herzegovina today. This is why the sudden "humanitarian" concern by the USA and other great powers about the atrocities committed by the Serbian authorities hardly hides the immense hypocrisy which lies behind it. In some ways, the French bourgeoisie takes the biscuit because while it has kept up its close relations with Serbia (a long-established alliance this) it has also done its best to appear as the champion of "humanitarian" action, with Mitterrand's trip to Sarajevo in June 92, just before the Serbian blockade of Sarajevo airport was lifted. it is obvious that this "gesture" by Serbia had already been secretly negotiated with France in order to allow these two countries to draw the maximum advantage from the situation: it allowed Serbia to delay the UN ultimatum while saving face, and gave a nice boost to French diplomacy in this region, enabling it to juggle between the policies of the USA and of Germany.
In fact, the failure of the recent London conference on ex-Yugoslavia, a failure demonstrated by the continuation of military confrontations, simply expresses the great powers' inability to come to an agreement when their interests are so antagonistic. While they have all been united in making grand declarations about "humanitarian" needs (you have to save face after all), and in condemning the Serbian "black sheep", it is clear that each one has its own "solution" to the confrontations in the Balkans.
On one side, the USA's strategy is to counter-balance Germany. For the world's leading power it is a question of trying to limit the extension of pro-German Croatia and, in particular, to preserve, as far as possible, the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This strategy, which explains the sudden turn of US diplomacy against Serbia in the spring of 92, is aimed at depriving the Croatian ports of Dalmatia of their territories at the rear, which belong to Bosnia- Herzegovina. At the same time, supporting the latter country, which has a Muslim majority, can only benefit US policy towards the Muslim states in general. In particular, it aims to draw back into its orbit a Turkey which is more and more turning towards Germany.
On the other side, the German bourgeoisie has no interest in maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, it has an interest in its partition, with the Croats controlling the south of the country, as is already the case today, so that the Dalmatian ports have a rearguard territory wider than the narrow band that officially belongs to Croatia. Moreover, this is why there currently exists a complicity between yesterday's enemies, Serbia and Croatia, in favor of the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This obviously does not mean that Germany is now ready to line up behind Serbia, which remains the "hereditary enemy" of its Croatian ally. But at the same time, it can only look askance at all the "humanitarian" gesticulations, which it knows are primarily aimed at countering German interests in the region.
For its part, the French bourgeoisie is trying to play its own card, both against the perspective of increased American influence in the Balkans, and against German imperialism's policy of creating an outlet to the Mediterranean. Its opposition to the latter policy does not mean that the alliance between Germany and France is being called into question. It simply means that France is trying to maintain certain of the advantages which it has held onto for a long time (such as the presence of a Mediterranean fleet, something Germany does not have at the moment) so that its association with its powerful neighbor does not mean mere submission to it. In fact, leaving aside all the contortions around humanitarian themes, all the speeches denouncing Serbia, the French bourgeoisie is the latter's best western ally in its ambition to create its own sphere of influence in the Balkans.
In this context of rivalries between the great powers, there can be no "peaceful" solution for ex-Yugoslavia. The competition between these powers in the domain of "humanitarian" action is just the continuation of their imperialist competition. In this situation of unchained antagonisms between capitalist states, the world's leading power has tried to impose its Pax Americana by putting itself at the head of the threats and the embargo against Serbia. And indeed the USA, with its war planes based on the aircraft-carriers of the. 6th Fleet, is the only power capable of dealing decisive blows against Serbia's military potential and its militias. But at the same time, the US is not prepared to put its ground troops into a conventional war against Serbia. Here the terrain is very different from the one in Iraq which allowed the GIs to mark such a resounding victory a year and a half a go. Thanks to the contributions of all the imperialist sharks, this situation has become so inextricable that it could turn into a real quicksand for the world's major army, that is unless it were to unleash massacres on a scale far outweighing the ones presently going on. This is why, for the moment, even if a precisely targeted air strike cannot be ruled out, the USA's repeated threats against Serbia have not been put into practice. Up till now they have served essentially to force the hand of the USA's recalcitrant allies within the framework of the UN, in order to make them vote for sanctions against Serbia (this applies in particular to France). They have also had the merit, from .the American point of view, of showing up the total impotence of "European Unity" faced with a conflict that is taking place within its own area of competence, and thus to dissuade the states who might be dreaming of using the structures of "Europe" to move towards the constitution of a new imperialist bloc rivaling the USA. In particular, the USA's attitude has had the effect of widening fissures within the Franco-German alliance. Finally, the menacing stance of the US is also a call to order to two important countries in the region - Italy and Turkey[4], who are being tempted to make a rapprochement with the German imperialist pole to the detriment of their alliance with the USA.
However, while the policy of American imperialism towards the Yugoslav question has managed to attain some of its objectives, it is mainly been by sharpening the difficulties of its rivals, and not by a massive and incontestable display of American supremacy. Now this is precisely what the USA has been looking for in the skies over Iraq.
In Iraq as elsewhere, the USA reasserts its role as the world's gendarme
You would have to be particularly naive, or completely sold on the bourgeoisie's ideological campaigns, to believe in the "humanitarian" purposes of the present "Allied" intervention in Iraq. Had the American bourgeoisie and its accomplices been the slightest bit interested in the fate of the populations of Iraq, they would not have begun by giving their solid support to the Iraqi regime when it was making war on Iran and at the same time gassing the Kurds. In particular, they would not have unleashed a bloody war in January 1991, whose first victims were the civilians and conscripted troops - a war that the Bush administration had deliberately provoked, first by encouraging Saddam Hussein, prior to 2 August, to get his hands on Kuwait and then by not leaving him any means of retreat[5]. In the same way, you would have to look very hard to find anything humanitarian in the way the USA ended the Gulf war - leaving intact the Republican Guard, Saddam Hussein's elite troops, who proceeded to drown in blood the Kurdish and Shi' ite populations which US propaganda had encouraged to rise up all through the war. The cynicism of this policy has been openly admitted by one of the most eminent bourgeois specialists on military questions:
"It was a deliberate decision by President Bush to allow Saddam Hussein to proceed to crush the rebellions which, in the eyes of the American administration, contained the risk of a Lebanisation of Iraq. A coup d'état against Saddam was desired, but not the break-up of the country. " (F Heisbourg, director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, in an interview with Le Monde, 17 January 1992).
In reality, the humanitarian dimension of the "air exclusion zone" in southern Iraq is of the same order as the operation carried out by the "Coalition" in spring 1991 in the north of the country. For several months, after the end of the war, the Kurds were left to be massacred by the Republican Guard; then, when the massacre was well advanced, in the name of "humanitarian intervention" they set up an "air exclusion zone" while at the same time launching an international charity campaign on behalf of the Kurds. At the time, it was done in order to give a justification for the Gulf war by showing what a swine Saddam was. The message that was aimed at those who did not approve of the war and its massacres was as follows: "there wasn't "too much" war, but "not enough"; we should have continued the offensive until Saddam was removed from power". A few months after this very highly publicized operation, the "humanitarians" left the Kurds to shiver in their tents through the winter. As for the Shi'ites, at this time they did not benefit from the solicitude of the professional tear-shedders and still less from any armed protection. It would seem that they were being kept in reserve (ie, Saddam was allowed to go on massacring and repressing them) so that an "interest" in their sad lot could be displayed at a later date. And now the moment has arrived.
It arrived with the perspective of presidential elections in the US. Although certain fractions of the American bourgeoisie are in favor of a change which could give a fillip to the democratic mystification[6], Bush and his team still have the confidence of the majority of the ruling class. Through the Gulf war in particular, Bush and Co. have proved themselves to be ardent defenders of the national capital and the imperialist interests of the USA. However, the opinion polls indicate that Bush is not assured of re-election. So a nice sharp bit of action would revive patriotic sentiments and rally wide layers of the American population around the President, as it did during the Gulf war. However, the electoral context alone does not explain the present actions of the American bourgeoisie in the Middle East. The elections might determine the precise moment chosen for such an action, but the underlying reasons for it go well beyond such domestic contingencies.
In fact, the USA's new military engagement in Iraq is part of a general offensive by this power aimed at reasserting its supremacy in the world imperialist arena. The Gulf war already corresponded to this objective and it did serve to hold back the tendency towards "every man for himself" among the USA's former partners in the western bloc. When the threat from the east disappeared with the collapse of the Russian bloc, countries like Japan, Germany and France began to spread their wings, but the Desert Storm operation forced them to make an act of allegiance to the American gendarme. The first two had to make important financial contributions and the third was "invited" along with a whole series of other not very enthusiastic countries (such as Italy, Spain, and Belgium) to participate in the military operations. However, the events of the last year, and particularly the German bourgeoisie's assertion of its imperialist interests in Yugoslavia, showed the limits of the impact of the Gulf war. Other events confirmed the USA's inability to impose its own imperialist interests in a definitive or long-lasting manner. Thus, in the Middle East, even a country like France, which had been ejected from the region at the time of the Gulf war (losing its Iraqi client and being pushed out of Lebanon, as Syria, with US permission, took control of the country), is attempting a come-back in the Lebanon (cf the recent interview between Mitterrand and the Lebanese prime minister, and the return to the country of the pro-French former president Amine Gemayel). In fact, in the Middle East there is no lack of bourgeois factions (like the PLO for example) interested in lightening the weight of US supremacy, which was made all the heavier by the Gulf war. This is why the USA is regularly and repeatedly forced to reassert its leadership in the way it does most clearly - through force of arms.
Today, with the creation of an "air exclusion zone" in south Iraq, the USA is reminding the states of the region, but also and above' all the other big powers, who is boss. At the same time it is dragging in a country like France, whose participation in the Gulf war was far from enthusiastic, and which has not shown much enthusiasm for the latest action either - it has only sent over a few reconnaissance planes. Nevertheless, France has been forced to submit to US policy here. And of course, beyond France there stands Germany, France's main ally and the USA's biggest potential rival. It is above all Germany that this call to order is addressed to.
The offensive being waged by the world's leading power to bring its "allies" to heel is not restricted to the Balkans and Iraq. It is also aimed at other "hot spots" like Afghanistan and Somalia.
In the former, the bloody offensive by the Hezbollah led by Hekmatyar for the control of Kabul is resolutely supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, i.e. two close allies of the USA. Thus in the last resort it is the USA which is behind the attempt to get rid of the current strong man in Kabul, the "moderate" Massoud. And this can easily be understood when you remember that the latter is the chief of a coalition made up of Farsi-speaking Tadjiks (supported by Iran whose relations with France are getting warmer) and Turkish-speaking Uzbeks (supported by Turkey which is close to Germany).[7]
Similarly, the sudden "humanitarian" enthusiasm for Somalia in reality conceals imperialist antagonisms of the same kind. The Horn of Africa is a strategic region of the first importance. For the USA, it is a priority to have complete control over this region and to chase out any potential rival. As it happens one of the main obstacles to this is French imperialism, which holds in Djibouti a military base of some importance. That is why there has been a real "humanitarian" race between France and the USA to "get help" to the Somali population (the aim in fact being to get to the driving seat in a country that has already been smashed to pieces). France won a point by being the first to arrive with "humanitarian aid" (sent precisely from Djibouti), but, since then, the USA, with all the means that it has at its disposal, has sent in its "aid" in far greater quantities. In Somalia, for the moment, the imperialist balance of forces is not being expressed in tons of bombs but in tons of cereals and medicines; even if tomorrow, when the situation has moved on, the Somalis will again be left to die like flies amid a general indifference.
Thus, it is in the name of "humanitarian" feelings, in the name of virtue, that the world cop is affirming its conception of the "new world order" on three continents. This does not of course prevent it from acting like a gangster, like all the other fractions of the bourgeoisie. In fact the American bourgeoisie has no hesitation in quietly using forms of action which the bourgeois class normally refers to as "organized crime" (in reality, the main "organized crime" is the kind carried out by all the capitalist states, whose crimes are more monstrous and more "organized" than those of any bandit). This is what we have seen recently in Italy with a series of bombings which, in the space of two months, cost the life of two anti-Mafia judges in Palermo and the chief of police in Catane. The "professionalism" of these bombings show, and this' was clear to everyone in Italy, that there was a state apparatus, or part of one, behind them. In particular, there is definite evidence showing the complicity of the secret services whose job was to ensure the judges' safety. These murders were brilliantly used by the present government, by the media and the unions to make workers put up with the unprecedented attacks being launched to improve the health of the Italian economy. The bourgeois campaigns associate the latter with the drive to "clean up" political life and the state ("to have a clean state, you have to pull in your belts"), at a time when there have been a whole series of corruption scandals. Having said this, because these bombings have also shown up its impotence, we can see that the present government is not directly behind them, even if certain elements in the state apparatus are implicated. What we are seeing here is some brutal settling of scores between different factions of the bourgeoisie and its state apparatus. And behind all this, it is clear that there are issues of foreign policy. In fact, the clique which has just been pushed out of the new government (Andreotti and Co.) was both the one closest to the Mafia (this was a matter of public notoriety) and also the one most involved in the alliance with the US.
Today it is not surprising that the Americans, in their effort to dissuade the Italian bourgeoisie from lining up with the Franco-German axis, are using one of the organizations which have already rendered them many services in the past: the Mafia. In 1943, the Sicilian Mafiosi had received orders from the famous Italian-American gangster, Lucky Luciano, then in prison, to facilitate the landing of US troops on the island. In exchange, Luciano was freed (even though he'd been sent down for 50 years) and returned to Italy to organize the traffic in cigarettes and drugs. Later on, the Mafia was regularly associated with the activities of the Gladio network (set up during the Cold War, with the complicity of the Italian secret service, by the CIA and NATO) and of the P2 Lodge (linked to American freemasonry), with the aim of combatting "Communist subversion" (i.e. activities favorable to the Russian bloc). The declarations of the Mafiosi who "repented" during the grand anti-Mafia trial of 1987, organized by Judge Falcone, clearly demonstrated the connivance between the Cosa Nostra and the P2 Lodge. This is why the recent bombings cannot just be connected to problems of internal politics but must be seen as part of the current offensive of the USA, which is using these methods to put pressure on Italy, which is of such prime strategic importance, not to break out of its "protection".
Thus, behind the grand phrases about the "rights of man", about "humanitarian" action, about peace and morality, what the bourgeoisie is asking us to preserve is the most unmitigated barbarism, the most advanced putrefaction of the whole of social life. The more virtuous its words, the more repulsive are its actions. This is the way of life of a class and a system condemned by history, a system which in its death agony threatens to drag the whole of humanity with it if the proletariat does not find the strength to overthrow it, if it allows itself to be pulled off its class terrain by all the fine speeches of the class that exploits it. And it can find this class terrain by waging a determined fight against the increasingly brutal attacks which are being imposed on it by a capitalism confronted with an insoluble economic crisis. Because the proletariat has not suffered a decisive defeat, and despite the difficulties which the convulsions of the past three years have brought to its combativity and its consciousness, the future remains open to gigantic class confrontations. Confrontations in which the revolutionary class must develop the strength, the solidarity and the consciousness it will need to carry through its historical mission: the abolition of capitalist exploitation and of all forms of exploitation. FM 13.9.92
[1] See in particular the article "Eastern Europe: the weapons of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat" in International Review 34 (third quarter 1983).
[2] An important factor in the overcoming of the old ethnic cleavages is obviously the development of a modem, concentrated proletariat, educated for the needs of capitalist production; a proletariat which has an experience of struggle and class solidarity and which has broken away from the old prejudices left by feudal society, in particular religious prejudices which are so often the soil for the growth of ethnic hatred. It is clear that in the economically backward countries, there is little chance of such a proletariat developing. However, in this part of the world, the weakness of economic development is not the main factor behind the political weakness of the working class and its vulnerability to nationalism. For example, the proletariat of Czechoslovakia is much closer, from the point of view of its economic and social development, to that of Western Europe than to the proletariat of ex-Yugoslavia. This does not prevent it accepting, or even supporting, the nationalism which has led to the partition of this country into two republics (it's true that in Slovakia, the less developed part of the country, nationalism is stronger). In fact, the enormous political backwardness of the working class in the countries that were under a Stalinist regime for several decades comes essentially from the workers' almost visceral rejection of the central themes of the class struggle, because of the way they were abused by these regimes. If the "socialist revolution" means the ferocious tyranny of party-state bureaucrats, then down with the socialist revolution! If "class solidarity" means bowing down to these bureaucrats and putting up with their privileges, then sold them and every man for himself! If "proletarian internationalism" is synonymous with the intervention of Russian tanks, then death to internationalism and long live nationalism!
[3] On our analysis of the phase of decomposition, see in particular International Review 62, ‘Decomposition, final phase of the decadence of capitalism'.
[4] The strategic importance of these two countries for the US is obvious: Turkey, with the Bosphorus, controls communication between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; Italy, thanks to Sicily, controls the passage between the east and the west of the Mediterranean. Also, the 6th Fleet is based in Naples.
[5]On this point, see the articles and resolutions in the International Review nos. 63-67.
[6] As we showed in our press at the time, the arrival of the Republicans to the head of the state in 1981 corresponded to a global strategy of the most powerful bourgeoisies (particularly in Britain and Germany, but also in a number of other countries), aiming at putting the left parties in opposition. This strategy sought to allow the latter to be in a better position to keep control over the working class at a time when it was developing significant struggles against the growing economic attacks demanded by the crisis. The retreat in the world wide class struggle that followed the collapse of the eastern bloc and the campaigns that accompanied it temporarily put this need to keep the parties of the left in opposition on a back burner. This is why having a Democratic president for a period of four years, before the working class has fully rediscovered the path of struggle, has found favor in certain sectors of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, a possible victory by the Democratic candidate in November 92 should not be considered as a loss of control by the bourgeoisie over its political game, as was the case for example with election of Mitterrand in France in 1981.
[7] The present offensive by Russia aimed at maintaining control over Tadjikstan is obviously not unconnected to this situation: for several months, the loyalty to the US of Yeltsin's Russia has been shown to be very solid.
Summer 1992 has brought with it an avalanche of announcements and disturbing occurrences, which paint a particularly black picture of the international economic situation. The bourgeoisie has promised time and time again, and in a variety of forms, that the recovery of economic growth is on the horizon. They clutch at the smallest indices that are apparently positive in order to justify their optimism. But facts are stubborn; they promptly step forward to set the record straight. Evidently the recovery is somewhat scatterbrained; it has managed to miss every appointment it has been given. As early as the summer of 1991, one year ago now, President Bush and his team felt confident enough to announce the end of the recession: in autumn 1991 American production fell and the illusion was swept away. Then in spring 1992, their hand forced by the electoral campaign, they played out the same scene again: once more reality sprang forward to sound the death knell of such a hope. After two years of playing the same old refrain about the recovery while the economic situation internationally continues to worsen, it has all begun to wear a bit thin. Summer 1992 has proved deadly for any illusions in the recovery.
A deadly summer for illusions in the recovery
It is not just that growth has failed to take off again, but that production has actually experienced another collapse. Following a disastrous year in 1991, the American bourgeoisie declared victory at the end of the third quarter of 1992 when growth rose to an annual rate of 2.7 %. They were a bit premature in doing this and were rapidly forced to change their tune when a pathetic 1.4 % growth was registered for the second quarter, which promised negative figures for the end of the year. Nor is it only the USA, which is after all the foremost economic power in the world, which is unable to re-launch its economy. It is now the turn of Germany and Japan, which up till now have been presented as real capitalist success stories, to be pulled down into the mire of recession. In West Germany, GDP dropped 0.5% in the second quarter of 1992; from June 1991 to June 1992, industrial production fell by 5.7%. In Japan, from July 1991 to July 1992, steel production fell by 11.5 % and production of motor vehicles by 7.2%. The situation is the same in every industrialized country; since the middle of 1990 Britain, for example, has been experiencing its longest recession since the war. There no longer exists on the entire geographic map of capitalism, a single haven of prosperity, a single "model" of a healthy national capital. Its inability to turn up any example of a place where things are going well shows that the ruling class has no solution.
The fact that the heart of the world economy has plummeted into recession weakens the whole system, and growing tensions are tearing at the very fabric of capitalist economic organization. Instability is gaining the upper hand over the financial and monetary system. This summer the stock exchanges, the banks and the dollar - classic symbols of capitalism - have been caught right in the eye of the storm.
The Kabuto-Cho, the Tokyo stock exchange, which overtook Wall Street in importance at its pinnacle in 1989, reached a low point in August, when the Nikkei, its main index of value, fell by 69 % relative to its glory days, returning to its 1986 levels. Its years of speculation are over and hundreds of millions of dollars have evaporated. Following in its footsteps, the stock exchanges of London, Frankfurt and Paris have lost 10 % to 20 % since the beginning of the year. The banks and insurance companies which fed speculation in the 1980s are having to carry the can: profits are in free fall, losses are accumulating and bankruptcies are proliferating throughout the world. Lloyds, which is of such repute and which handles the world's shipping insurance, is on the brink of bankruptcy. The downward movement of King dollar accelerated over the summer and reached its lowest level in relation to the Deutschmark since the latter was created in 1945, thereby shaking the equilibrium of the international money markets. King dollar and speculation on the stock-exchange - symbols of the strength and triumph of capitalism, according to the euphoric propaganda of the 1980s - have become instead symbols of its bankruptcy.
The most savage attacks since the Second World War
But the ever-deepening crisis is more than the abstract economic indices and dramatic episodes in the life of capitalist institutions which fill the pages of the newspapers. It is lived every day by the exploited who suffer increasing pauperization under the repeated blows of austerity programs.
Over the last few months the increase in redundancies, and therefore of unemployment, at the heart of the industrialized world has accelerated brutally. Unemployment in the OECD countries grew by 7.6% in 1991 to reach 28 million and, according to the forecasts, it is set to overtake 30 million in 1992. It is increasing in every country. In Germany in July 1992, it reached 6 % in the west and 14.6 % in the east, from 5.6% and 13.8% respectively the previous month. In France companies have laid off 26,000 workers in the first quarter, 43,000 in July 1992. In Britain, 300,000 job losses were announced at the end of the year in the construction industry alone. In Italy 100,000 jobs must go in industry in the months to come. In the EEC the official number of people living below the "poverty line" is 53 million; in Spain it is nearly a .quarter of the population; in Italy it is 9 million people or 13.5 % of the population. In the USA 14.2 % of the population is in this situation, 35.7 million people. The average income of American families fell by 5 % in three years!
Traditionally the bourgeoisies of the developed countries take advantage of the summer months, the classic period of demobilization for the working class, to institute their austerity programs. Summer 1992 has been no exception to the rule: in fact it has served as an opportunity for an unprecedented wave of attacks against the living conditions of the exploited. In Italy the wage indexation has been abandoned with the agreement of the unions. Wages in the private sector have been frozen and taxes increased massively; inflation has reached 5.7 %. In Spain, taxes have gone up by 2 % per month and were backdated to the beginning of January. Consequently, wages for September will be cut by 20%! In France unemployment benefit has been reduced, while national insurance contributions for workers who still have jobs have been increased. In Britain and Belgium new austerity packages have brought a reduction in social benefits and an increase in the cost of medical care, etc. This list is by no means exhaustive.
Every aspect of the living conditions of the working class in the developed countries is under the most savage attack since the end of the Second World War.
Recovery is impossible
The ruling class has been waiting for nearly three years for the recovery but has seen no sign of it. Doubt is creeping in and they are getting increasingly worried as the economy slides downhill: a social crisis must inevitably follow. The bourgeois believe that they can exorcise the fear that grips them by constantly asserting that the recovery is around the corner that the recession is like the night that turns into day and that finally, inevitably, the sun of economic growth will appear over the horizon. In other words, they assure us, nothing is out of the ordinary, we must be patient and accept the necessary sacrifices.
It is not the first time since the end of the 60s, when the crisis opened up, that the world economy has experienced periods of open recession. In 1967, in 1970-71, in 1974-75, in 1981-82 the world economy underwent turbulent falls in production. Each time policies for recovery managed to stimulate growth again, each time the economy seemed to emerge from the mire. The bourgeoisie depends upon this optimistic view of things to make us believe that growth will inevitably recover, that it is all part of the normal cycle of the economy. But this is an illusion. The return to growth in the 80s did not reach the whole of the world economy. The economies of the "third world" never reversed the fall in production that they experienced at the beginning of the 80s; they never came out of recession. Meanwhile the countries of the "second world", the ex-eastern bloc, became gradually weaker and their economies finally collapsed at the end of the 80s. The famous recovery of the Reagan period during the 80s was therefore partial, limited and essentially reserved for the countries of the "first world", the most industrialized ones. What we must especially bear in mind is that these successive recoveries were produced by artificial economic policies which constituted so many tricks and distortions of the sacred "law of the market" that the "liberal" economists have turned into an ideological dogma.
The ruling class is confronted with a crisis of overproduction and the solvent market is too narrow to absorb the over-abundance of goods produced. In order to face up to this contradiction, to sell its products and extend the boundaries of the market, the ruling class has essentially had recourse to a flight into credit. During the 70s, the underdeveloped countries in the peripheries were given more than $1,000 billion of credit, which they used mainly to buy goods produced in the industrialized countries, thus allowing the latter to increase their growth. However by the end of the 70s the most debt-ridden countries in the peripheries were unable to pay their debts: this sounded the death knell for this policy. The periphery of the capitalist world has definitively sunk into the mire. This forced the bourgeoisie to find another solution. The USA, under the Reagan administration, became the outlet for the world's excess production by creating a mass of debt which made that of the under-developed countries look like a trifle. At the end of 1991 the US debt reached the astronomical figure of $10,481 billion internally and $650 billion with other countries. Such a policy was only possible because the USA was the foremost imperialist power in the world and was, at that time, leader of a bloc comprising the principal economic powers. It therefore took advantage of its position to cheat the laws of the market and bend them to its needs by imposing an iron discipline upon its allies. But this policy has its limits. When it was time to pay the bill, the USA, just like the under-developed countries a dozen years before, was found to be insolvent.
So prescribing the credit medicine to cure the ailing capitalist economy comes up against objective limits. This is why the open recession that has been developing at the heart of the most industrialized countries for more than two years now is qualitatively different from previous recessionary periods. The economic stratagems that made recovery possible previously have been proved ineffective.
For the 22nd consecutive time this summer, the Federal Bank of America has lowered the base rate at which it lends to other banks. It has therefore been reduced from 10 % to 3 % since spring 1989. This rate is now less than the rate of inflation. In other words, the real rate of interest is zero or even in negative figures; the state is lending at a loss! However this policy of easy credit has not produced any result either in the USA or in Japan, where the central bank rate is also down to 3%.
The banks that have been so open handed with their loans over the years are confronted with more and more unpaid debts; company bankruptcies proliferate, leaving debts to the tune of billions of dollars. The collapse of speculation on the stock exchange and in construction worsens the situation further for bank balances that are already veering into the red. Losses pile up, bankruptcies in the banking sector proliferate and the coffers are bled dry. In short, the banks can lend no more. Recovery by means of credit is no longer possible - which means, quite simply, that recovery is impossible.
The sole hope for the ruling class is to slow down the decline and limit the damage
The lowering of the discount rate on the dollar or the yen at first served to restore the profit margins of the American and Japanese banks, as they borrowed from the state at this low rate but offered a lending rate to individuals and companies that was somewhat higher. By this means they managed to avoid a too-dramatic increase in the number of bank failures and a catastrophic collapse of the international banking system. But this policy too has its limits. The rate can hardly go down any further. The state is forced more and more to intervene directly to come to the aid of the banks, which have always managed to seem independent from the state. By seeming to be so they have served as a "liberal" cover for state capitalism in a situation where, in fact, the state maintains a very tight control over the credit supply. In the USA, the federal budget has to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to support banks threatened with bankruptcy, and in Japan the state has just bought back the housing stock of the banks most under threat in order to keep them afloat. In fact this is a nationalization of sorts. It is very different from the pseudo-liberal cant of "less state control" which they have drummed into us over the years. More and more the state is forced to intervene openly to save the banks from the bailiffs. A recent example of this is the recovery program set up in Japan: the government has decided to break into its reserves and release $85.4 billion to support the private sector, which is in a very shaky state. But this policy of recovery on the basis of internal consumption is bound to have at the most no more than temporary success. Just as all Germany's expenditure on re-unification has done no more than slow down, and very temporarily at that, the recession in Europe.
The ruling class is attempting to limit the damage and slow down the plunge into disaster. In a situation in which the markets are tight, as are their diminishing assets, the lack of credit, the search for competitivity through more and more draconian austerity programs in order to increase exports, has become the refrain of every state -. The world market is tom apart by commercial war were anything goes, where each state uses every means at its disposal to ensure its outlets. The policy of the USA illustrates this tendency particularly well; its fist brought down hard on the table at the GATT negotiations; the creation of a privileged and protected market with Mexico and Canada, who have been persuaded as much through coercion as incentives; the artificial lowering of the dollar to give a shot in the arm to exports. However, this out-and-out commercial war can only aggravate the situation further and destabilize the world market even more. Moreover, this progression towards destabilization has been further aggravated by the disappearance of the eastern bloc. Without it, the discipline that the USA used to impose upon its erstwhile imperialist partners, who are at the same time its main economic rivals, has been shot to pieces. The tendency is towards everyone for himself. The dollar's recent adventures are a good illustration of this reality. The American policy of keeping the dollar low has reached the limit imposed by the German policy of high interest rates because, faced with the risk that inflation will explode in the wake of re-unification, Germany is playing its own card. The result is that the Mark has attracted an enormous amount of speculation internationally against the American currency, and in the general rush, the central banks have had immense difficulty maintaining sufficient stability to prevent an uncontrollable collapse of the dollar. The whole of the international monetary system is tottering. The Finnish mark has had to free itself from the European Monetary System, while the Italian lira and the English pound are in turmoil and are having great difficulty staying in. This warning shot is a clear indication of the turbulence to come. Occurrences in the economy during the summer of 1992 show that the perspective is certainly not towards the recovery of world growth. It is rather towards an accelerated plunge into recession, towards the brutal collapse of the whole economic and financial apparatus of capitalism world-wide.
Disaster at the heart of the industrialized world
It is indicative of the seriousness of the crisis that it is now the great capitals at the industrialized heart of the system that is experiencing the full blast of the open recession. The economic collapse of the eastern countries brought about the demise of the Russian imperialist bloc. Contrary to all the propaganda put about at the time, this was not proof of the futility of communism, because the Stalinist regimes had nothing to do with communism. It was the death agony of an under-developed part of world capitalism. This bankruptcy of • capitalism in the east was a manifestation of the insurmountable contradictions which eat away at the capitalist economy, whatever form the latter takes. Ten years after the economic collapse of the under-developed countries of the periphery, the economic bankruptcy of the eastern countries heralded the worsening of the effects of the crisis at the heart of the world's most developed industrial nations. It is here that the bulk of world production is concentrated (more than 80% in the OECD countries), and it is here that the insurmountable contradictions of the capitalist economy are crystallized most acutely. The fact that the effects of the crisis have been creeping from the peripheries towards the center for more than twenty years shows that the most developed countries are less and less able to throw back its effects upon the economically weakest states. Like a boomerang, it has returned to ravage the epicenter where it originates. This development of the crisis shows the future that lies in store -for capitalism. Just as the countries of the ex-eastern bloc see taking shape the specter of economic disaster comparable with that of Africa and Latin America, the same horrifying future also threatens the rich industrialized countries.
The ruling class obviously cannot acknowledge that the development of the crisis is a journey towards disaster. It has to believe in the immortality of its own system. But this self-delusion is constrained by the urgent need to conceal, as much as it can, the reality of the crisis from the exploited of the whole world. The exploiting class must hide its impotence from itself and from those it exploits, under pain of revealing to the whole world that its historic mission was finished long ago and that the continuance of its power can only lead the whole of humanity into a barbarism that is even more terrible. For all workers the wretched reality of the effects of the crisis, effects that they feel to their very core, is a powerful stimulus to reflect and understand the situation more clearly. The stab of misery which becomes more agonizing every day can only impel the proletariat to show its discontent more openly, to express its combativity through struggles for the defense of its living conditions. This is why a constant theme of the bourgeoisie's propaganda, for the twenty odd years that the crisis has been developing, has been to conceal the fact that this crisis is insoluble within the framework of the capitalist economy.
But reality is ever-present and it sweeps away illusions and eats away at lies. History exposes those who thought that Reaganomics had enabled them to definitively bring the crisis to heel. It exposes those who have made shameless use of the collapse of the Russian imperialist bloc to declaim about the futility of the marxist critique of capitalism, and to pretend that this system is the only viable one, the only path humanity can take. The ever more disastrous bankruptcy of capitalism raises, and will continue to raise all the more urgently, the need for the working class to put forward its own solution: the communist revolution.
JJ, 14.9.92
The struggle of the working class and the communist revolution are notions that many today reject as outmoded, disproved by historical experience. The collapse of the state capitalist regimes in the USSR and the whole former eastern bloc into the whirlpool of the world economic crisis has provided all the detractors of the Russian revolution of 1917 with an opportunity to reinforce all the old lies which have been poured out for decades about this historic event. Among these lies is the one that presents the seizure of power by the proletariat in Russia as a vulgar coup d'etat, the manipulation of the backward masses of Tsarist Russia by the Bolshevik party. We have already devoted a number of texts to the nature of the revolution and of the capitalist counter-revolution in Russia[1]. In this series, which we are beginning with this article, we want to go over and deepen the fundamental aspects of this experience of the proletariat and its revolutionary organisations. In this issue, we deal first with the fact that the Russian revolution of 1917 was above all the collective work of the proletariat in the international framework of a wave of revolts by the working class against the war and the capitalist system, an experience which, for all its limits, remains rich with lessons that can help us understand the capacity of the working class to take us own destiny into its hands, in subsequent articles, we will go back over the role of the Bolshevik party in 1917, then look at the defeat of the revolution and the triumph of the capitalist counter-revolution in Russia itself.
"The Russian revolution of 1917 was above all a magnificent action by the exploited masses in order to try to destroy the bourgeois order, which reduced them to the state of beasts of burden of an economic machine and cannon fodder for the wars between the capitalist powers. An action where millions of proletarians, bringing behind them all the other exploited layers of society, managed to tear down their atomisation by consciously unifying, by giving themselves the means to act collectively as a single force. An action to make them masters of their own destinies, to begin the construction of another society, a society without exploitation, without wars, without classes, without nations, without poverty: a communist society" (International Review n°51: ‘70 years ago, the Russian Revolution')
In 1914 the governments, kings, politicians, the military, as agents of a social system which had entered its decadent period, led the world into the cataclysm of the First World War. The slaughter of 20 million people; levels of destruction never seen until then; destabilisation, penury and starvation on the home front; death, savage military discipline and untold suffering at the military front; all of Europe drowned in a sea of chaos, barbarism, the devastation of industries, buildings, monuments ...
The international proletariat, after it had stopped being dragged along by the patriotic poison and democratic falsehoods of the different governments, supported by the treason of the majority of the Social Democratic parties and the unions, began to react against this military barbarity. From the end of 1915, strikes, revolts against hunger, demonstrations against the war, exploded in Russia, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere. At the front, mutinies, collective desertions, fraternisation between the soldiers of both gangs took place, above all in the Russian and German armies... The internationalists were at the head of this movement - the Bolsheviks, the Spartakists, the whole left of the 2nd International. From the outbreak of the war in August 1914, they unhesitatingly denounced it as imperialist robbery, as a manifestation of the debacle of world capitalism, as the signal for the proletariat to complete its historic mission: the international socialist revolution.
At the vanguard of this international movement, which would end the war and open up the possibility of the world revolution, were the Russian workers, who from the end of 1915 engaged in economic strikes which were severely repressed. Nevertheless, the movement grew: the 9th of January 1916 - the anniversary of the first revolution in 1905 - was commemorated by the workers with massive strikes. New strikes broke out all through the year, accompanied by meetings, discussions, the raising of demands and clashes with the police: "By the end of 1916 prices are rising by leaps and bounds. To the inflation and the breakdown in transport, there is added the actual lack of goods. The population's level of consumption has been cut in half The curve of the workers' movement rises sharply. In October the struggle enters its decisive phase, uniting all forms of discontent into one. Petrograd draws back from the February leap. A wave of meetings runs through the factories. The topics: food supplies, high cost of living, war, government. Bolshevik leaflets are distributed; political strikes begin; improvised demonstrations occur at factory gates; cases of fraternisation between certain factories and the soldiers are observed; a stormy protest strike flares up over the trial of the revolutionary sailors of the Baltic fleet ... The workers all felt that no retreat was possible. In every factory an active nucleus was forming, oftenest around the Bolsheviks. Strikes and meetings went on continuously throughout the first two weeks of February. On the 8th, at the Putilov factory, the police received ‘a hail of slag and old iron'... On the 19th, a mass of people gathered around the food shops, especially women, all demanding bread. A day later bakeries were sacked in several parts of the city. These were the heat lightening of the revolution, coming in a few days" (Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, Vol 1, ‘The Proletariat and the Peasantry', pages 56, 57, 58. Sphere Books edition, 1967).
These were the successive stages of a social process which today many workers see as being utopian, the workers' transformation from an atomised, apathetic, divided mass, into a united class which acted as one man and therefore was able to launch a revolutionary combat, as was shown by the five days from the 22nd to the 27th of February 1917: "The workers came to the factories in the morning; instead of
going to work they hold meetings; then begin processions towards the centre. New districts and new groups of the population are drawn into the movement. The slogan ‘bread' is crowded out or obscured by Louder slogans of ‘down with the autocracy', ‘down with the war' ... Continuous demonstrations on the Nevsky prospect ... the masses will no longer retreat, they resist with optimistic brilliance, they stay on the street even after murderous volleys ... ‘don't shoot your brothers and sisters!' cry the workers. And not only that: ‘Come with us!' Thus in the streets and squares, by the bridges, at the barrack-gates, is waged a ceaseless struggle -
now dramatic, now unnoticeable - but always a desperate struggle, for the heart of the soldier... The workers will not surrender or retreat; under fire they are still holding their own. And with them their women - wives, mothers, sisters, sweethearts. Yes, this is the very hour they had so often whispered about: ‘if only we could all get together?'" (Trotsky, op. cit, Vol 1, ‘Five days', pages 110, 117, 129).
The ruling classes could not believe it: they thought that it was a question of a revolt which would disappear once it had been taught a good lesson. When the terrorist actions of the small elite corps sent by the colonels of the gendarmerie ended in a noisy fiasco, the deep roots of the movement were made very clear: "The revolution seems defenceless to these colonels, because it's still terrifically chaotic ... But that is an error of vision, It is only seeming chaos. Beneath it is proceeding an irresistible crystallization of the masses around new axes" (Trotsky: idem, page 136).
Once the first chains had been broken, the workers did not want to go back, and in order to go forward on firm ground they took up again the experience of 1905 by creating Soviets, unitary organizations of the whole class in struggle. However, the Soviets were immediately grabbed hold of by the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary parties, old workers' parties which had gone over to the bourgeois camp through their participation in the war and which were now serving to form the Provisional Government of ‘great personalities' such as Miliukov, Rodiazno, Kerensky ...
This government's first obsession was to convince the workers that they should "return to normality", "abandon their dreams" and transform themselves into a submissive, passive, atomised mass, which the bourgeoisie needed in order to carry on business and the war. The workers would have none of it. They wanted to live and develop the new politics, which they all exercised, uniting in a tight knot the
struggle for immediate interests with the struggle for the general interests of the whole of humanity. So, against the insistence of the bourgeoisie and social traitors that "the task is to work and not to demand, because now we have political
freedom", the workers demanded the 8 hour day in order to have "freedom" to meet, discuss, read, to be part of "a wave of strikes which recommenced after the fall of absolutism. In each factory or workshop, without waiting for agreements signed by their superiors, they presented demands about wages and the working day. The conflicts deepened day by day and created an atmosphere of struggle" (Ana Penkratova Los Consejos de Fabrica en Ia Rusia de 1917, ‘Los comites de Fabrica obra de la Revolucion')
On the 18th of April, Miliukov, a Kadet minister in the Provisional Government, published a note reaffirming Russia's commitment to its allies in the continuation of the war. This was a real provocation. The workers and soldiers responded immediately: there were spontaneous demonstrations; mass assemblies were held in the working class districts, in the barracks and factories: "The commotion which had overflowed the city, however, did not recede to its banks. Crowds gathered, meetings assembled, they wrangled at street corners, the crowds in the tramway divided into partisans and opponents of Miliukov... The commotion was not limited to Petrograd. In Moscow workers abandoned their machines and the soldiers left their barracks; they took over the streets with their tumultuous protests" (Trotsky: idem, ‘The April Days', p 321). On the 20th of April a gigantic demonstration forced the resignation of Miliukov and the bourgeoisie had to draw back from its war plans.
May saw frantic organizational activity. There were fewer demonstrations and strikes, but this did not express a reflux in the movement: quite the contrary, it marked an advance and development, because the working class was concentrating on its mass self-organization, an aspect of its struggle which had been little developed until then. The Soviets spread to the furthest corners of Russia, while around them grew up a multitude of mass organs: factory committees, peasants' committees, neighbourhood Soviets, soldiers' committees. Through these the masses regrouped, discussed, thought, decided. Through contact with these organs, the most backward workers woke up: "The servants used to being treated like animals and paid next to nothing were getting independent. A pair of shoes cost more than a hundred rubles, and as wages averaged about thirty-five rubles a month the servants refused to stand in queues and wear out their shoes... The izvozchiki (cab-drivers) had a union; they were also represented in the Petrograd Soviet. The waiters and hotel servants were organised, and refused tips" (John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, page 39).
The workers and soldiers began to tire of the never-ending promises of the Provisional Government and its Menshevik and SR supporters, promises which were shown to be empty by growing unemployment and hunger. They could see that in front of the questions of the war and the peasants all they were being offered was pompous speeches. They were becoming fed up with bourgeois politics and began to glimpse the ultimate consequences of their own politics: the demand of ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS was transformed into an aspiration for wide masses of workers[2].
June was a month of intense political agitation that drew together all that had previously taken place and which culminated in armed demonstrations by the workers and soldiers of Petrograd on the 4th and 5th of July. "The factories moved into the front rank Moreover, those plants had been drawn in to the movement which yesterday stood aside. Where the leaders wavered or resisted, younger workers had compelled the member-on-duty of the factory committee to blow the whistle as a signal to stop work ... All factories struck and held meetings. They elected leaders for the demonstrations and delegates to present their demands. From Kronstadt, from New Peterhoff, from Krasnoe Selo, from the Krasnaia Gorka fort, from all the near-by centres, by land and sea, soldiers and sailors were marching with music, with weapons, and, worst of all, with Bolshevik standards" (Trotsky: op cit, Vol 2, ‘The "July Days": Culmination and Rout', page 44).
However, the July days ended up being a bitter fiasco for the workers. The situation was not yet ripe for the taking of power since the soldiers did not fully identify with the workers; the peasants were full of illusions about the Social
Revolutionaries and the movement in the provinces was backward compared to the capital.
In the following two months - August and September - spurred on by the bitterness of defeat and the violent force of the bourgeoisie's repression, the workers began to resolve these obstacles practically. Not through a preconceived plan but as the product of an "ocean of initiatives", of struggles, and discussions in the Soviets which materialized the coming to consciousness of the movement. Thus, the actions of the workers and soldiers became fully fused: "a phenomenon of osmosis appeared, especially in Petrograd. When the agitation united the workers' quarter of Vyborg and the regiments stationed in the capital, a fermentation took place between them. The workers and soldiers regularly went into the street to express their feelings. The street belonged to them. No force, no power, could at those moments stop them from agitating for their demands or singing their revolutionary hymns at the top of their lungs" (G. Soria, Los 300 dias de la Revolucion Rusia, Chapter IV, ‘Un era de crisis').
After the defeat of July, the bourgeoisie finally thought that they could finish with this nightmare. Therefore, they organized a military coup, dividing the task up between Kerenski's ‘democratic' bloc and the openly reactionary bloc of Kornilov - commander-in-chief of the army. The latter brought in the Cossack and Caucasian regiments who still appeared to be loyal to the bourgeois order and tried to launch them against Petrograd.
However, the attempt was a resounding failure. The massive hand of the workers and soldiers, firmly organized by the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution - which under the control of the Petrograd Soviet would be transformed into the Revolutionary Military Committee, the organ of the insurrection in October - made Kornilov's troops surrender or stay immobilized - or else, as happened in the majority of cases, they deserted and united with the workers and soldiers.
"The conspiracy was conducted by those circles who were not accustomed to know how to do anything without the lower ranks, without labour forces, without cannon-fodder, without orderlies, servants, clerks, chauffeurs, messengers, cooks, laundresses, switchmen, telegraphers, stablemen, cab drivers. But all these little human bolts and links, unnoticeable, innumerable, necessary, were for the Soviet and against Kornilov. The revolution was omnipresent. It penetrated everywhere, coiling itself around the conspiracy. It had everywhere its eyes, its ears, its hands. The ideal of military education is that the soldier should act when unseen by the officer exactly as before his eyes. But the Russian soldiers and sailors of 1917, without carrying out official orders even before the eyes of the commanders, would eagerly catch on the fly the commands of the revolution, or still oftener fulfil them on their own initiative before they arrived .... For them [the masses] it was not a case of defending the government but of defending the revolution. So much the more resolute was their struggle. The resistance of the rebels grew out of the very road beds, out of the stones, out of the air. The railroad workers of the Luga stations stubbornly refused to move the troop trains. The Cossack echelons also found themselves immediately surrounded by armed soldiers from the Luga garrison, 20,000 strong. There was no military encounter, but there was something far more dangerous: contact, social exchange, interpenetration." (Trotsky: Vol 2, ‘The Bourgeoisie Measures Strength with the Democracy', pages 222 and 229-230).
The bourgeoisie sees workers' revolutions as acts of collective madness, a spontaneous chaos that finishes spontaneously. Bourgeois ideology cannot admit that the exploited can act on their own initiative. Collective action, solidarity, conscious action by the majority of workers, such notions bourgeois thought considers to be unnatural (since what is "natural" for the bourgeoisie is the war of each against all and the manipulation of the great mass of humanity by a small elite).
"In all past revolutions those who fought on the barricades were workers, apprentices, in part students, and the soldiers come over to their side. But afterwards the solid bourgeoisie, having cautiously watched the barricades through their windows, gathered up the power. But the February revolution of 1917 was distinguished from former revolutions by the incomparably higher social character and political level of the revolutionary class ... and the consequent formation at the very moment of victory of a new organ of revolutionary power, the Soviet, based upon the armed strength of the masses" (Trotsky: vol 1, ‘The Paradox of the February Revolution', page 162 - 163)
This totally new nature of the October revolution corresponds to the nature of the proletariat, an exploited and revolutionary class at the same time, which can only liberate itself if it is capable of acting in a collective and conscious way.
The Russian revolution was not the mere passive product of dreadful objective conditions. It was also the product of a collective development of consciousness. The drawing of lessons, the reflections, slogans, and memories were part of a continuum of proletarian experience which connected up with the Paris Commune of 1871, the revolution of 1905, the battle of the Communist League, of the First and Second Internationals, of the Zimmerwald Left, of the Bolsheviks ... Clearly it was a response to the war, to hunger and the barbaric agony of Tsarism, but it was a conscious response, guided by the historical and global continuity of the proletarian movement.
This was concretely manifested in the enormous experience the Russian workers had gained from the great struggles of 1888, 1902, the 1905 Revolution and the battles of 1912 - 1914. At the same time this process had given birth to the Bolshevik party on the left-wing of the 2nd International. "It was necessary that there should be not masses in abstract, but masses of Petrograd workers and Russian workers in general, who had passed through the revolution of 1905, through the Moscow Insurrection of December 1905 ... It was necessary that throughout this mass should be scattered workers who had thought over the perspectives of the revolution, meditated hundreds of times about the question of the army" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘Who Led the February Insurrection?' pages 152 - 153).
More than 70 years before the 1917 revolution, Marx and Engels had written that "a revolution ... is necessary therefore, not only because the ruling class can be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew" (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, chapter 1, ‘Feuerbach'). The Russian revolution fully confirms this position: the movement brought with it the materials for the self-education of the masses: "A revolution teaches and teaches fast. In that lies its strength. Every week brings something new to the masses. Every two months creates an epoch. At the end of February, the insurrection. At the end of April, a demonstration of armed workers and soldiers in Petrograd. At the beginning of July, a new assault, far broader in scope and under more resolute slogans. At the end of August, Kornilov's attempt at an overthrow beaten off by the masses. At the end of October, conquest of power by the Bolsheviks. Under the these events, so striking in their rhythm, molecular processes were taking place, welding the heterogeneous parts of the working class into one political whole" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘Shifts in the Masses', page 390).
"All Russia was learning to read, and reading politics, economics, history - because the people wanted to know ... The thirst for education, so long thwarted, burst with the Revolution into a frenzy of expression. From Smolny Institute alone, in the first six months, went out every day tons, carloads, trainloads of literature, saturating the land. Russia absorbed reading matter like hot sand drinks water ... Then the Talk, beside which Carlyle's ‘flood of French speech' was a mere trickle. Lectures, debates, speeches - in theatres, circuses, school-houses, clubs, Soviet meeting-rooms, Union headquarters, barracks ... meetings in the trenches at the front, in village squares, factories ... What a marvelous sight to Putilovsky (the Putilov Factory) pour out its forty thousand to listen to Social Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, Anarchists, anybody, whatever they had to say as long as they could talk! For months in Petrograd, and all over Russia, every street corner was a public tribune. In railway trains, street-cars, always the spurting of impromptu debates, everywhere ... At every meeting, attempts to limit the time of speakers were voted down, and every man free to express the thought that was in him" (John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, pages 39 - 40).
The "democratic" bourgeoisie talks a lot about "freedom of expression", but experience tells us that all this means is manipulation, theatre and brainwashing: the authentic freedom of expression is that which the proletariat conquers for itself through its revolutionary action: "In each factory, in each guild, in each company, in each tavern, in the military hospital, at the transfer stations, even in the depopulated villages, the molecular work of revolutionary thought was in progress. Everywhere were to be found the interpreters of events, chiefly from among the workers, from whom one inquired ‘What's the news?' and from whom one awaited needed words... Their class instinct was refined by a political criterion, and though they did not think all their ideas through to the end, nevertheless their thought ceaselessly and stubbornly worked its way in a single direction. Elements of experience, criticism, initiative, self-sacrifice, seeped down through the mass and created, unwittingly to a superficial glance but no less decisively, an inner mechanics of the revolutionary movement as conscious process" (Trotsky, op cit, vol 1 ‘Who Led the February Revolution?', page 153).
This reflection, this coming to consciousness laid bare "all the material and moral injustice inflicted on the workers, the inhuman exploitation, the miserable wages, the systems of refined punishments and the offences to its human dignity by the capitalists and the bosses this network of ruinous and disgraceful conditions in which it traps them, this hell which represents the daily destiny of the proletariat under the yoke of capitalism" (Rosa Luxemburg, ‘In the Revolutionary Hour').
For the same reason, the Russian revolution presented a permanent, inseparable unity between the political and economic struggle: "After every foaming wave of political action a fructifying deposit remains behind from which a thousand shoots of economic struggle shoot forth. And conversely. The workers' condition of ceaseless economic struggle with the capitalists keeps their fighting energy alive in every political interval, it forms, so to speak, the permanent fresh reservoir of the strength of the proletarian classes, from which the political fight ever renews its strength and at the same time leads the indefatigable economic sappers of the proletariat at all times, now here and now there, to isolated sharp conflicts, out of which political conflicts on a large scale unexpectedly explode" (Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions).
This development of consciousness led the workers in June-July to the conviction that they should not waste and disperse their energies in a thousand partial economic conflicts, but instead should concentrate their energy on the revolutionary political struggle. This did not mean rejecting the struggle for immediate demands; on the contrary, it meant taking up their political consequences: "The soldiers and workers considered that all other questions - that of wages, of the price of bread, and of whether it is necessary to die at the front for nobody knew what - depended on the question who was to rule the country in the future, the bourgeoisie or their own Soviet" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 2, ‘The July Days: Preparation and Beginning', page 26).
This development of consciousness within the working masses culminated with the October insurrection, whose atmosphere Trotsky has so admirably described: "The masses felt a need to stand close together. Each wanted to test himself through the others, and all tensely and attentively kept observing how one and the same thought would develop in their various minds with its different shades and features. Unnumbered crowds of people stood about the circuses and other big buildings where the most popular Bolshevik would address them with the latest arguments and the latest appeals ... But incomparably more effective in that last period before the insurrection was the molecular agitation carried out by the nameless workers, sailors, soldiers, winning converts one by one, breaking down the last doubts, overcoming the last hesitations. Those months of feverish political life had created innumerable cadres in the lower ranks, had educated hundreds and thousand of rough diamonds, who were accustomed to look on politics from below and not above ... The mass would no longer endure in its midst the wavering, the dubious, the neutral. It was striving to get hold of everybody, to attract, to convince, to conquer. The factories joined with the regiments in sending delegates to the front. The trenches got into contact with the workers and peasants near-by in the rear. In the towns along the front there was an endless series of meetings, conferences, consultations in which the soldiers and sailors would bring their activity into accord with that of the worker and peasants" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 3 ‘Withdrawal from the Pre-Parliament and Struggle for the Soviet Congress', pages 73, 74-75).
"At the same time that the official society, all that many-storied superstructure of ruling classes, layers, groups, parties and cliques, lived from day to day by inertia and automatism, nourishing themselves with the relics of worn-out ideas, deaf to the inexorable demands of evolution, flattering themselves with phantoms and foreseeing nothing - at the same time, in the working masses there was taking place an independent and deep process of growth, not only of hatred for the rulers, but of critical understanding of their impotence, an accumulation of experience and creative consciousness which the revolutionary insurrection and its victory only completed" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘Who Led the February Revolution?', page 154).
While bourgeois politics are carried out by that small minority of society constituted by the ruling class, the politics of the proletariat do not pursue any particular benefit but that of the whole of humanity: "The proletariat can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it [the bourgeoisie] without at the same time freeing the whole of society from exploitation" (Engels, 1883 Preface to The Communist Manifesto).
The revolutionary struggle of the proletariat constitutes the only hope of liberation for all the exploited masses. As the Russian revolution showed, the workers were able to win over the soldiers (in their great majority peasants in uniform) and of the peasant population to its cause. The proletariat thus confirmed that the socialist revolution was not only a response to its own interests but was the only way to end the war and, in general, to capitalist relations of exploitation and oppression.
The desire of workers to give a perspective to the other oppressed classes was skilfully manipulated by the Mensheviks and SRs, who in the name of the alliance with the peasants and soldiers tried to make the proletariat renounce its autonomous class struggle and the socialist revolution. This thinking appears, at first glance, to be very "logical": if we want to win over other classes it is necessary to bend our demands, in order to find the lowers common denominator around which we can all unite.
However: "The lower middle classes, the small manufacturer, the shop keeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative, nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history" (Marx and Engels: The Communist Manifesto).
Therefore, in an inter-classist alliance, the proletariat has everything to lose. In such a situation, the proletariat will not win over the other oppressed classes but will push them into the arms of capital and decisively weaken its owns unity and consciousness. It will not put forward its own demands but dilute and negate them; it will not advance on the road towards socialism, but get bogged down and drowned in a swamp of decadent capitalism. In fact, it does not help the petit-bourgeois and peasant layers but contributes to them being sacrificed on the altar of capital, because "popular" demands are the disguise the bourgeoisie uses to pass off the contraband of its own interests. The "people" do not represent the interests of the "working classes", but the exploiting, national, imperialist interests of the whole bourgeoisie: "the union of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries meant not a co-operation of proletariat with peasants, but a coalition of those parties which had broken with the proletariat and the peasants respectively, for the sake of a bloc with the possessing classes" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘The Executive Committee', page 218).
If the proletariat wants to win the non-exploiting layers to its own cause it must steadfastly affirm its own demands, its own being, its class autonomy. It must win the other non-exploiting layers by showing that "if by chance they are revolutionary they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their own present, but their future interests, they desert their own stand-point to place themselves at that of the proletariat" (The Communist Manifesto).
The Russian proletariat, by centring its struggle on putting an end to the imperialist war; by putting forward a perspective for the solution of the agrarian problem[3]; by creating the Soviets as the organisation of all the exploited; and, above all, by posing the alternative of a new society faced with the bankruptcy and chaos of capitalist society, was able to become the vanguard of all the exploited classes. It knew how to give them a perspective around which they could unite and struggle.
The proletariat's affirmation of its autonomy did not separate it from the other oppressed layers; on the contrary, it allowed it to separate them from the bourgeois state. In response to the impact on the soldiers and the peasants of the Russian bourgeoisie's campaign about the "egotism" of the workers' demand for the 8-hour day, "The workers understood the manoeuvre and skilfully warded it off. For this it was only necessary to tell the truth - to cite the figures of war profits, to show the soldiers the factories and shops with the road of machines, the hell fires of the furnaces, their perpetual front where victims where innumerable. On the initiative of the workers there began regular visits by troops of the garrison to the factories, and especially to those working on munitions. The soldiers looked and listened. The workers demonstrated and explained. These visits would end in triumphant fraternization" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘The Executive Committee', page 235).
"The army was incurably sick. It was still capable of speaking its word in the revolution, but so far as making war was concerned, it did not exist" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘The Army and the War', page 250). The army's "incurable illness" was the product of the working class' autonomous struggle. Likewise, faced with the agrarian problem, which decadent capitalist is not only incapable of resolving, but unceasingly aggravates, the proletariat responded resolutely: "every day, legions of agitators, delegations from the factory committees, from the soviets left the industrial cities, in order to animate the struggle, in order to organize the agricultural workers and poor peasants. The soviets and factory committees adopted numerous resolutions declaring their solidarity with the peasants and proposing concrete measures for the solution of the agrarian problem; the Petrograd conference of factory and shop committees devoted their attention to the agrarian question, and ... drew up a manifesto to the peasants. The proletariat feels itself to be not only a special class, but also the leader of the people" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 3, ‘Withdrawal from the Pre-Parliament and Struggle for the Soviet Congress', page 77).
Bourgeois politics sees the majority as a mass to be manipulated in order to give a democratic façade to powers they have given to the state. Workers politics express the free and conscious work of the great majority for their own interests.
"The soviets, councils of deputies or delegations of the workers' assemblies appeared spontaneously for the first time in the great strike of the masses that took place in Russia in 1905. They were the direct emanation of thousands of workers' assemblies, in the factories and neighbourhoods, which multiplied everywhere, in the greatest explosion of workers' life that had been seen in history up until then. As if taking up the struggle where the Paris Commune had left off, the workers in practice generalized the form of organization which the Communards had intended: sovereign assemblies, centralized through elected and revocable delegates" (Revolution Internationale, organ of the ICC in France, no 190, ‘The proletariat will have to impose its dictatorship in order to lead humanity to its emancipation').
From the workers' overthrow of the Tsar in February, Soviets of workers' deputies were rapidly formed in Petrograd, Moscow, Karkov, Helsingfors, in all the industrial cities. They were joined by soldiers' delegations and, later on, those of the peasants. Around the Soviets the proletariat and exploited masses formed a network of struggle organizations, based on assemblies, on free discussion and decisions taken by all the exploited: neighbourhood soviets, factory committees, soliders' committees, peasants committees ... "the network of workers' councils and soldiers locals throughout Russia formed the spinal column of the revolution. With their support the revolution spread like a creeper throughout the country, their very existence posed an enormous difficulty to all the attempts of reaction" (D. Anweiler, The Soviets in Russia, Chapter 3, part 3).
Bourgeois "democracy" reduces the "participation" of the masses to the casting of a vote once every four or five years for a man who will do what is necessary for the bourgeoisie; opposed to this, the soviets constitute the permanent and direct participation of the mass of workers who in gigantic assemblies discuss and decide on all the questions of society. The delegates are elected and revocable at all times and participate in congress with definite mandates.
Bourgeois "democracy" conceives of "participation" in terms of the sham of the free individual who decides only through the ballot box. Thus, it is the consecration of atomization, individualism, all against all, the masking of class divisions, which benefit the minority and exploiting class. The soviets, by contrast, are based on collective discussion and decisions, in which each can feel the strength and force of the whole, developing all their capacities while at the same time reinforcing the collective. The soviets arise from the autonomous organization of the working class in order, from this platform, to struggle for the abolition of classes.
The workers, soldiers and peasants saw the soviets as their organization: "Not only the workers and soldiers of the enormous garrisons in the rear, but all the many coloured small people of the towns - mechanics, street peddlers, petty officials, cab-drivers, janitors, servants of all kinds - alien to the Provisional Government and its bureaux, were seeking a closer and more accessible authority. In continually increasing numbers, peasants' delegates were appearing at the Tauride Palace. The masses poured into the Soviet as though into the triumphal gates of the revolution. All that remained outside the boundaries of the Soviet seemed to fall away from the revolution, seemed somehow to belong to another world. And so it was in reality. Beyond the boundaries of the Soviet remained the world of the property owner, in which all colours mingled now in one grayish-pink defensive tint" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘The New Power', page 192).
Nothing could happen in the whole of Russia without the Soviets: the delegation of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets declared on the 16th of March that they would only obey the orders of the Provisional Government which were in accord with the decisions of the soviets. The 1720th Regiment was even more explicit: "The army and population should only submit to the decisions of the Soviet. Orders of the government which contravene the decisions of the Soviet are not to be carried out". The great capitalist and minister of the Provisional Government, Guchkov, declared that "unfortunately, the government does not yet have effective power: the troops, railways, post, telegraph are all in the hands of the soviet, which can show that government only exists in so far as the soviet permits it to exist".
The working class, as the class that aspires to the conscious and revolutionary transformation of the world, needs an organ that permits it to express all its tendencies, all its thinking, all its capacities; an extremely dynamic organ which in each moment synthesizes the evolution and advance of the masses; an organ that does not fall into conservatism and bureaucratism; which permits it to reject and combat all attempts to confiscate the direct power of the majority. An organ of work, where things are rapidly and agilely decided on, although at the same time in a collective and conscious manner; an organ whose form allows it feel a part of its work: "They [the Soviets] would not accommodate themselves to any theory of the division of power, but kept interfering in the administration of the army, in economic conflicts, in questions of food and transport, even in the courts of justice. The Soviets under pressure from the workers decreed the eight-hour day, removed reactionary executives, ousted the more intolerable commissars of the Provisional Government, conducted searches and arrests, suppressed hostile newspapers" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 1, ‘The First Coalition', page 335).
We have seen how the working class was capable of uniting itself, of expressing all its creative energy, of acting in an organized and collective way and finally, of raising itself up before society as the revolutionary class whose mission is to install a new society, without classes and without the state. But in order to do this the working class had to destroy the power of the enemy class: the bourgeois state, embodied by the Provisional Government. It had to impose its own power: the power of the soviets.
In the second part of this article we will examine how the class dealt with the sabotage carried out from inside the soviets by the old socialist parties which had passed to the bourgeoisie - the Mensheviks and the SRs; how it renewed the soviets from top to bottom in order to adapt them for the taking of power; and the role that the Bolshevik party played and the way that this culminated in the October insurrection.
Adalen 21.7.92
[1] In continuity with the contributions of the currents of the Communist Left which preceded us (Bilan and Internationalisme) we have published on the October Revolution and the causes of its degeneration the pamphlet "October 1917. the beginning of the world revolution", the articles ‘The degeneration of the Russian Revolution' and ‘The lessons of Kronstadt' in International Review no. 3, ‘The Left Communists in Russia; (International Review nos. 9 and 10); ‘In defence of the proletarian nature of the October Revolution' (International Review nos. 12 and 13); ‘Party and Councils' (no.17); ‘Russia 1917 and Spain 1936' (no.25); the polemic ‘Lenin as Philosopher' (international Review nos. 25 to 31) etc. Likewise, we have denounced from the beginning the Stalinist regimes and made clear their capitalist nature; see International Review nos. 11, 12, 23, 34 ... and especially the ‘Theses on the Economic and Political Crisis in the Countries of the East.' (International Review no. 60) and ‘The Russian Experience' (International Review no. 61).
[2] Two months before, in April, when Lenin formulated this slogan in his famous Theses, it was rejected, including by many inside the Bolshevik Party, as a utopian abstraction ...
[3] We have no space in the framework of this article to discuss whether the solution the Bolsheviks and the Soviets finally gave to the agrarian question - the division of the land - was the correct one. Experience, as Rosa Luxemburg rightly said, demonstrated that it was not. But this should not detract from the essential point: that the proletariat and the Bolsheviks seriously posed the necessity for a solution based on the power of the proletariat and the battle for the socialist revolution.
The previous two articles in this series[1] have to a large extent focused on the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 because they are a rich vein of material on the problem of alienated labor and on the ultimate goals of communism as envisaged by Marx when he first adhered to the proletarian movement. But although Marx had, as early as 1843, identified the modern proletariat as the agent of the communist transformation, the EPM are not yet precise about the practical social movement that will lead from the society of alienation to the authentic human community. This fundamental development in Marx's thinking was to come about through the convergence of two vital elements: the elaboration of the historical materialist method, and the overt politicization of the communist project.
The EPM already contain various reflections on the differences between feudalism and capitalism, but in parts they present a somewhat static image of capitalist society. Capital and its associated alienations sometimes appear in the text as simply existing, with no real explanation of their genesis. As a result, the actual process of capitalism's downfall also remains rather cloudy. But only a year later, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels had outlined a coherent view of the practical and objective bases of the movement of history (and thus of the various stages in humanity's alienation). History was now clearly presented as a succession of modes of production, from tribal community through ancient society to feudalism and capitalism; and the dynamic element in this movement was not men's ideas or feelings about themselves, but the material production of life's necessities:
"We must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to 'make history ', But life involves before anything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself."
This simple truth was the basis for understanding the change from one type of society to another
"a certain mode of product ion, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a 'productive force '. Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determine the nature of society, hence, that the 'history of humanity' must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange."
From this standpoint, ideas and the struggle between ideas politics, morality and religion cease to be the determining factors in historical development:
"We do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process ... Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (all quotes from the German Ideology, part one, 'Feuerbach'),
At the end point of this vast historical movement, the GI points out that capitalism, like previous modes of production, is doomed to disappear not because of its moral failings, but because its inner contradictions would impel it towards self-destruction, and because it had given rise to a class capable of replacing it with a higher form of social organization:
"In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, whim, under the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is called forth, whim has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, whim, ousted from society, is forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes, a class which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness ... " (ibid).
As a result, in complete contrast to all the utopian visions which saw communism as a static ideal that bore no relation to the real process of historical evolution, "Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of affairs".
Having established this general method and framework, Marx and Engels could then proceed to a more detailed examination of the specific contradictions of capitalist society. Here again, the critique of bourgeois economics contained in the EPM had provided much of the groundwork for this and Marx was to come back to them again and again. But a decisive step was marked by the development of the concept of surplus value since this made it possible to root the denunciation of capitalist 'alienation in the most solid of economic facts, in the very mathematics of daily exploitation. This concept was of course to preoccupy Marx in much of his later works (Grundrisse, Capital, Theories of Surplus Value), which contained important clarifications on the subject - in particular the distinction between labor and labor power. Nevertheless the essentials of the concept are already outlined in The Poverty of Philosophy and Wage Labor and Capital, written in 1847.
The later writings were also to study more closely the relationship between the extraction and realization of surplus value, and the periodic crises of overproduction which shook capitalist society to its foundations every ten years or so. But Engels had already grasped the significance of the 'commercial crises' in his Critique of Political Economy in 1844, and had rapidly convinced Marx of the necessity to understand them as the harbingers of capitalism's doom - the concrete manifestation of capitalism's insoluble contradictions.
Since communism had now been grasped as a movement and not merely as a goal- specifically, as the movement of the proletarian class struggle - it could now only develop as a practical program for the emancipation of labor - as a revolutionary political program. Even before he formally adopted a communist position, Marx had rejected all those high-minded 'critics' who refused to dirty their hands with the sordid realities of the political struggle. As he declared in his letter to Ruge in September 1843 "Nothing prevents us, therefore from lining our criticism with a criticism of politics ,from taking sides in politics, ie from entering into real struggles and identifying ourselves with them". And in fact the necessity to engage in political struggles in order to achieve a more thorough-going social transformation was embedded in the very nature of the proletarian revolution: "Do not say that social movement excludes political movement" wrote Marx in his polemic with the 'anti-political' Proudhon: "There is never a political movement which is not at the same time social. It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions" (Poverty of Philosophy).
Put in another way, the proletariat differed from the bourgeoisie in that it could not, as a propertyless, exploited class, build up the economic basis of a new society within the shell of the old. The revolution that would put an end to all forms of class domination could thus only begin as a political assault on the old order; its first act would be the seizure of political power by the propertyless class, which on that basis would proceed to the economic and social transformations leading to a classless society.
But the precisely defined political program of the communist revolution did not come into being spontaneously: it had to be elaborated by the most advanced elements of the proletariat, those who had organized themselves into distinctly communist groupings. Thus, in the years 1845-48 Marx and Engels were increasingly involved in building such an organization. Here their approach was again dictated by their recognition of the need to insert themselves into an already-existing 'real movement'. So instead of constructing an organization' ex nihilo', they sought to attach themselves to the most advanced proletarian currents with the aim of winning them over to a more scientific conception of the communist project. Concretely, this led them to a group composed mainly of exiled German workers, the League of the Just. For Marx and Engels, the importance of this group lay in the fact that, unlike the various brands of middle-class 'socialism', the League was a real expression of the fighting proletariat. Formed in Paris in 1836, it had been closely connected with Blanqui's Societe des Saisons and had participated along with it in the unsuccessful rising of 1839. It was, therefore, an organi- sation which recognised the reality of the class war and the necessity for a violent revolutionary battle for power. To be sure, along with Blanqui, it tended to see the revolution in conspiratorial terms, as the act of a determined minority, and its own nature as a secret society reflected such conceptions. It was also influenced, especially in the early 40s, by the semi-messianic conceptions of Wilhelm Weitling.
But the League had also exhibited a capacity to develop theoretically. One of the effects of its 'emigre' character was to confirm it, in Engels' words, as "the first international workers' movement of all time" ('On the history of the Communist League', MESW, p431). This meant that it was open to the most important international developments in the class struggle. In the 1840s, the League's main center had shifted to London and, through their contact with the Chartist movement, its leading members had begun to move away from the old conspiratorial conceptions towards a view of the proletarian struggle as a massive, self-conscious and organized movement in which the key role would be played by the industrial workers.
The concepts of Marx and Engels thus fell on fertile soil on the League, though not without a hard combat against the influences of Blanqui and Weitling. But by 1847, the League of the Just had become the Communist League. It had changed its organizational structure from one typical of a conspiratorial sect to that of a properly centralized organization with clearly defined statutes and run by elected committees. And it had delegated to Marx the task of drawing up the organization's statement of political principles - the document known as The Manifesto of the Communist Party[2], first published in German, in London in 1848, just before the outbreak of the February revolution in France.
The rise and fall of the bourgeoisie
The Manifesto of the Communist Party, along with its 'first draft', The Principles of Communism, represents the first comprehensive statement of scientific communism. Though written for a mass audience, and in a stirring, passionate style, it is never vulgar or superficial. Indeed it repays continual re-examination, because it condenses in a relatively few pages the general lines of marxist thought on a whole series of inter-connected questions.
The first part of the text outlines the new theory of history, announced from the very beginning in the famous phrase "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle"[3]. It briefly charts the various changes in class relations, the evolution from ancient to feudal to capitalist society, in order to show that "the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and exchange." Eschewing any abstract moral condemnation of the emergence of capitalist exploitation, the text emphasizes the eminently revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in sweeping away all the old parochial, hidebound forms of society, and replacing them with the most dynamic and expansive mode of production ever seen; a mode of production that, by so rapidly conquering and unifying the globe, and setting in motion such immense forces of production, was laying down the foundations for a higher form of society that will have finally done away with class antagonisms. Equally devoid of subjectivism is the text's identification of the inner contradictions that will lead to capitalism's downfall. .
On the one hand, the economic crisis: "Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past, the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on trial, more and more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of overproduction. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism,· it appears as if a famine, a universal war of destruction had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed,· and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much commerce".
In the Principles of Communism, the point is made that capitalism's inbuilt tendency towards crises of overproduction not only indicates the road towards its destruction, but also explains why it is creating the conditions for communism, in which" instead of generating misery, overproduction will reach beyond the elementary requirements of society to assure the satisfaction of the needs of all" .
For the Manifesto, the crises of overproduction are of course the cyclical crises which punctuated the whole of the ascendant period of capitalism. But although the text recognized that these crises could still be overcome "by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones", it also tends to draw the conclusion that bourgeois relations have already become a permanent fetter on the development of the productive forces - in other words, that capitalist society has already achieved its historic mission and has entered into its epoch of decline. Immediately after the passage describing the periodic crises, the text goes on: "The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered .... The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them".
This appraisal of the state reached by bourgeois society is not altogether consistent with other formulations in the Manifesto, especially the tactical notions that appear at the end of the text. But they were to have a very important influence on the expectations and interventions of the communist minority during the great upheavals of 1848, which were seen as the precursors of an imminent proletarian revolution. It was only later on, in drawing up a balance sheet of these upheavals, that Marx and Engels were to revise the idea that capitalism had already reached the limits of its ascendant curve. But we shall return to this matter in a subsequent article.
The gravediggers of capitalism
"Not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons - the modem working class - the proletariat".
Here in a nutshell is the second fundamental contradiction leading to the overthrow of capitalist society: the contradiction between capital and labor. And, in continuity with the materialist analysis of the dynamics of bourgeois society, the Manifesto goes on to outline the historical evolution of the proletarian class struggle from its first inchoate beginnings to the present and on to the future.
It chronicles all the major stage in this process: the initial 'Luddite' response to the rise of modem industry, where workers are still mainly scattered in small workshops and frequently "direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves"; the development of class organization for the defense of workers' immediate interests (trade unions) as the conditions of the class become more homogeneous and unified; the participation of the workers in the bourgeoisie's struggles against absolutism, which provided the proletariat with a political education and thus with "weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie"; the development of a distinctly proletarian political struggle, waged at first for the implementation of reforms such as the 10 Hour Bill, but gradually assuming the form of a political challenge to the very foundations of bourgeois society.
The Manifesto contends that the revolutionary situation will come about because the economic contradictions of capitalism will have reached a point of paroxysm, a point where the bourgeoisie can no longer even "assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him". At the same time, the text envisages an increasing polarization of society, between a small minority of exploiters and an increasingly impoverished proletarian majority: "society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great camps, into two great classes facing each other", since the development of capitalism increasingly propels the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and even parts of the bourgeoisie itself into the ranks of the proletariat. The revolution is therefore the result of this combination of economic misery and social polarization.
Again, the Manifesto sometimes makes it appear that this great simplification of society has already been accomplished; that the proletariat is already the overwhelming majority of the population. In fact this was only the case for one country at the time the text was written (Britain). And since, as we have seen, the text gives space to the idea that capitalism has already reached its apogee, it tends to give the impression that the final confrontation between the "two great classes" is very close indeed. In terms of the actual evolution of capitalism, this was very far from being the case. But despite this, the Manifesto is "an extraordinarily 'prophetic' work. Only a few months after its publication, the development of a global economic crisis had engendered a series of revolutionary upheavals all over Europe. And although many of these movements were more the last gasp of the bourgeoisies combat against feudal absolutism than the first skirmishes of the proletarian revolution, the proletariat of Paris, by making its own independent political rising against the bourgeoisie, demonstrated in practice all the Manifesto's arguments about the revolutionary nature of the working class as the living negation of capitalist society. The 'prophetic' character of the Manifesto is testimony to the fundamental soundness, not so much of Marx and Engels' immediate prognostications, but of the general historical method with which they analyzed social reality. And this is why, in essence, and contrary to all the arrogant assertions of the bourgeoisie about how history has proved Marx wrong, the Communist Manifesto does not date.
From the dictatorship of the proletariat to the withering away of the state
The Manifesto thus anticipates the proletariat being driven towards revolution by the whip of growing economic misery. As we have noted, the first act of this revolution was the seizure of political power by the proletariat. The proletariat had to constitute itself as the ruling class in order to carry through its social and economic program.
The Manifesto explicitly envisages this revolution as "the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie", the culmination of a "more or less veiled civil war". Inevitably, however, the details of the way in which the working class would overthrow the bourgeoisie remain vague, since the text was written prior to the first open appearance of the class as an independent force. The text actually talks about the proletariat winning "the battle of democracy"; the Principles say that the revolution "will establish a democratic constitution and through this the direct or indirect dominance of the proletariat". If we look at some of Marx's writings about the Chartists or about the bourgeois republic, we can see that even after the experience of the 1848 revolutions, he still entertained the possibility of the proletariat coming to power through universal suffrage and the parliamentary process (for example, in his article on the Chartists in The New York Daily Tribune of 25 August 1852, where Marx contends that the granting of universal suffrage in England would signify "the political supremacy of the working class"). This in turn opened the door to speculations about an entirely peaceful conquest of power, in some countries at least. As we shall see, these speculations were later seized upon by the pacifists and reformists in the workers' movement in the latter part of the century to justify all kinds of ideological liberties. Nevertheless, the main lines of Marx's thought go in a very different direction after the experience of 1848, and above all, the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871, which demonstrated the necessity for the proletariat to create its own organs of political power and to destroy the bourgeois state rather than capture it, whether violently or 'democratically'. Indeed, in Engels' later introductions to the Manifesto, this was the most important alteration that historical experience had brought to the communist program:
" ... in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this program has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz, that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready- made state machine and wield it for its own purposes'" .
But what remains valid in the Manifesto is the affirmation of the violent nature of the seizure of power and of the need for the working class to set up its own political rule - the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' as it was referred to in other writings of the same period.
Of equal validity to this day is the prospect of the withering away of the state. From his first writings as a communist, Marx had stressed that the real emancipation of humanity could not restrict itself to the sphere of politics. 'Political emancipation' had been the highest achievement of the bourgeois revolution, but for the proletariat this 'emancipation' only signaled a new form of oppression. For the exploited class, politics was only a means to an end, viz, a thorough-going social emancipation. Political power and the state were only necessary in a class-divided society; since the proletariat had no interest in forming itself into a new exploiting class, but was compelled to fight for the abolition of all class divisions, it followed that the advent of communism meant the end of politics as a particular sphere, and the end of the state. As the Manifesto puts it: "when in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by force of circumstance, to organize itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class" .
The international character of the proletarian revolution
The phrase "a vast association of the whole nation" raises a question here: did the Manifesto hold out the possibility of revolution, or even of communism, in a single country? It is certainly true that there are ambiguous phrases here and there in the text; for example when it says that" since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself as the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word". Actually, bitter historical experience has shown that there is only a bourgeois meaning to the term national, and that the proletariat for its part is the negation of all nations. But this is above all the experience of the decadent epoch of capitalism, when nationalism and struggles for nationhood have lost the progressive character they could have in Marx's day, when the proletariat could still support certain national movements as part of the struggle against feudal absolutism and other reactionary vestiges of the past. In general, Marx and Engels were clear that such movements were bourgeois in character, but ambiguities inevitably crept into their language and their thought because this was a period in which the total incompatibility of national and class interests had not yet been brought to a head.
That said, the essence of the Manifesto is contained not in the above sentence, but in the one immediately before it: "The working men have no country. You cannot take from them what they do not have"; and in the final words of the text: "Workers of all countries unite". Similarly, the Manifesto insists that" united action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat".
The Principles are even more explicit about this:
"Question: Will it be possible for this revolution to take place in one country alone? Answer: No. By creating the world market, big industry has already brought all the peoples of the earth, and especially the civilized peoples, into such close relation with one another that none is independent of what happens to the others. Further, it has coordinated the social development of the civilized countries to such an extent that in all of them bourgeoisie and proletariat have become the decisive classes and the struggle between them the great struggle of the day. It follows that the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries, that is to say, at least in England, America, France and Germany ... It is a universal revolution and will accordingly have a universal range"
From the beginning then the proletarian revolution was seen as an international revolution. The idea that communism, or even the revolutionary seizure of power, could become a reality within the confines of a single country, was as far from the minds of Marx and Engels as it was from the minds of the Bolsheviks who led the October revolution in 1917, and of the internationalist fractions who led the resistance to the Stalinist counter-revolution, which encapsulated itself precisely in the monstrous theory of 'socialism in one country'.
Communism and the road towards it
As we have seen in previous articles, the marxist current was from its inception quite clear about the features of the fully developed communist society it was fighting for. The Manifesto defines it briefly but significantly in the paragraph following the one on the withering away of the state: "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". Communism is thus not only a society without classes and without a state: it is also a society which (and this is unprecedented in all of human history up till now) has overcome the conflict between social needs and the needs of the individual, and which consciously devotes its resources to the unlimited development of all its members - all this being a clear echo of the reflections on the nature of genuinely free activity which appeared in the writings of 1844 and 1845. The passages in the Manifesto which deal with the bourgeoisie's objections to communism also make it plain that communism means the end not only of wage labor but of all forms of buying and selling. The same section insists that the bourgeois family, which is characterized as a form of legalised prostitution, is also doomed to disappear.
The Principles of Communism give more space than the Manifesto to defining other aspects of the new society. For example, they emphasize that communism will replace the anarchy of market forces with the management of humanity's productive forces "in accordance with a plan based on the availability of resources and the needs of the whole of society" . At the same time, the text develops the theme that the abolition of classes will be possible in the future because communism will be a society of abundance: "... existing improvements and scientific procedures will be put into practice, with a resulting leap forward which will ensure to society all the products it needs. In this way such an abundance of goods will be able to satisfy the needs of all its members. The division of society into different, mutually hostile classes will then become unnecessary".
Again, if communism is devoted to the "free development of all', then it must be a society which has done away with the division of labor as we know it: "People will no longer be, as they are today, subordinated to a single branch of production, bound to it, exploited by it,' they will no longer develop one of their faculties at the expense of all the other ... Industry controlled by society as a whole and operated according to a plan presupposes well-rounded human beings, their facilities developed in balanced fashion, able to see the system of production in its entirety" (Principles of Communism).
Another division to be dispensed with is the one between town and country: "the dispersal of the agricultural population on the land alongside the crowding of the industrial proletariat into the great cities is a condition which corresponds to an undeveloped state of both agriculture and industry and can already be felt to be an obstacle to further progress."
This point was considered so important that the task of ending the division between town and country was actually included as one of the 'transitional' measures towards communism, both in the Principles and the Manifesto. And it remains an issue of burning importance in today's world of swollen megacities and spiraling pollution. (We will return to this question in more detail in a subsequent article, when we come to consider how the communist revolution will deal with the 'ecological crisis').
These general descriptions of the future communist society are in continuity with the ones contained in Marx's early writings, and they need little or no modification today. By contrast, the specific social and economic measures advocated in the Manifesto as the means to attain these ends are - as Marx and Engels themselves recognized in their own lifetimes - are much more time bound, for two basic and intertwining reasons:
- the fact that capitalism at the time that the Manifesto was written was still in its ascendant phase, and had not yet laid down all the objective conditions for the communist revolution;
- the fact that the working class had had no concrete experience of a revolutionary situation, and thus either of the means whereby it could assume political power, or of the initial social and economic measures that it would have to take once power was in its hands.
These are the measures which the Manifesto envisages as being "pretty generally applicable in the most advanced countries" once the proletariat had taken power:
"1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rent of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of the right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc etc. "
It will be evident from the outset that the majority of these measures have, in the decadent period of capitalism, been shown to be perfectly compatible with the survival of capitalism - indeed that many of them have been adapted by capital precisely in order to survive in this epoch. The decadent period is the period of universal state capitalism: the centralization of credit in the hands of the state, the formation of industrial armies, the nationalization of transport and communication, free education in state schools ... to a greater or lesser extent, and at different moments, every capitalist state has adopted such measures since 1914, and the Stalinist regimes, those which claimed to be carrying out the program of the Communist Manifesto, have adopted practically all of them.
The Stalinists based their 'marxist' credentials partly on the fact that they had put into practice many of the measures advocated in the Manifesto. The anarchists, for their part, also stress this continuity, though in an entirely negative sense of course, and they can point to some 'prophetic' diatribes by Bakunin to 'prove' that Stalin really was the logical heir of Marx.
In fact this way of looking at things is completely superficial, and only serves to justify particular bourgeois political attitudes. But before explaining why the social and economic measures put forward in the Manifesto are, in general, no longer applicable, we should stress the validity of the method that lay behind them.
The necessity for a transition period. Such deeply ingrained elements of capitalist society as wage labor, class divisions and the state could not be abolished overnight as the anarchists of Marx's day pretended and as their latter-day descendants (the various brands of councilism and modernism) still pretend. Capitalism has created the potential for abundance, but this does not mean that abundance appears like magic the day after the revolution. On the contrary, the revolution is a response to a profound disorganization in society and, for an initial phase at least, will tend to further intensify this disorganization. An immense work of reconstruction, education and reorganization awaits the victorious proletariat. Centuries, millennia of ingrained habits, all the ideological debris of the old world, will have to be cleared away. The task is vast and unprecedented and pedlars of instant solutions are pedlars of illusions. This is why the Manifesto is right to talk about the need for the victorious proletariat to "increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible", and to do so, in the beginning, by means of "despotic inroads in the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures , therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which.in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production. " This general vision of the proletariat setting in motion a dynamic towards communism rather than introducing it by decree remains perfectly correct, even if we can, with the benefit of hindsight, recognize that this dynamic does not derive from placing capital accumulation in the hands of the state, but in the self-organized proletariat reversing the very principles of capital accumulation (eg, by subordinating production to consumption; by "despotic inroads" into the commodity economy and the wage labor form; through direct control by the proletariat over the productive apparatus etc).
The principle of centralization. Again, in contrast to the anarchists, whose espousal of 'federation' reflected the petty bourgeois localism and individualism of this current, marxism has always insisted that capitalist chaos and competition can only be overcome through the strictest centralization on a global scale - centralization of the productive forces by the proletariat; centralization of the proletariat's own political/economic organs. Experience has certainly shown that this centralization is very different from the bureaucratic centralization of the capitalist state; even that the proletariat must distrust the centralism of the post-revolutionary state. But the capitalist state apparatus cannot be overthrown, nor the counter-revolutionary tendencies of the 'transitional' state be resisted, unless the proletariat has centralized its own forces. At this level again, the general approach contained in the Manifesto remains valid today.
Nevertheless, as Engels said in his introduction to the 1872 edition, while "the general principles laid down in this Manifesto are, on the whole, as correct today as ever ... the practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section 1I. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today." It then goes on to mention "the gigantic strides of modern industry in the last 25 years", and as we have already seen, the revolutionary experience of the working class in 1848 and 1871.
The reference to the development of modern industry is particularly relevant here, because it indicates that, as far as Marx and Engels were concerned, a primary aim of the economic measures proposed in the Manifesto was to develop capitalism at a time when a number of countries had not yet completed their bourgeois revolutions. This can be verified by looking at the 'Demands of the Communist Party in Germany', which the Communist League distributed as a leaflet during the revolutionary upheavals in Germany in 1848. We know that Marx was quite explicit at this time about the necessity for the bourgeoisie to come to power in Germany as a precondition for the proletarian revolution. The measures proposed in this leaflet thus had the aim of pushing Germany out of its feudal backwardness and of extending bourgeois relations of production as rapidly as possible: but many of these measures - heavy progressive income tax, a state bank, nationalization of land and transport, free education - are exactly the same as the ones advocated in the Manifesto. We will discuss in a subsequent article how far Marx's perspectives for the revolution in Germany were confirmed or refuted by events; but the fact remains that if Marx and Engels saw the measures proposed in the Manifesto as already being outdated in their lifetimes, they have even less relevance in the period of decadence, when capitalism has long established its world-wide dominion, and long outstayed its welcome as a force for progress anywhere in the world.
This is not to say that either in Marx and Engels' day, or in the revolutionary movement that came after them, there was a real clarity about the kind of measures that a victorious proletariat would have to take in order to initiate a dynamic towards communism. On the contrary, confusions about the possibility of the working class using nationalizations, state credit and other state capitalist measures as stepping stones towards communism persisted throughout the 19th century and played a very negative role during the course of the revolution in Russia. It took the defeat of this revolution, the transformation of the proletarian bastion into a frightful state capitalist tyranny, and much subsequent reflection and debate among revolutionaries, before such ambiguities were finally set aside. But this will also have to be dealt with in future articles.
The final part of the Manifesto concerns the tactics to be followed by communists in different countries, particularly those where the main order of the day was, or appeared to be, the struggle against feudal absolutism. In the next article in this series, we will examine how the communists' practical intervention in the pan-European uprisings of 1848 clarified the perspectives of the proletarian revolution and confirmed or refuted the tactical considerations contained in the Manifesto. CDW
[1]See 'The alienation of labor is the premise for its emancipation' in International Review 70, and 'Communism, the real beginning of human society' in IR 71
[2] The term 'party' here does not refer to the Communist League itself: although the Manifesto rally was the collective work of that organization, its name did not appear in the first editions of the text, mainly for security reasons. The term 'party' at this stage did not refer to a specific organization but to a general trend or movement.
[3] In later editions of the text, Engels had to qualify this statement by saying that it applied to "all written history", but not to the communal forms of society that had preceded the rise of class divisions.
IR 72, 1st Quarter 1993
Up until the collapse of the eastern bloc in 1989, the alternative posed by the workers’ movement since the beginning of the century - war or revolution - clearly summarised what was at stake in the situation: through a dizzying aims race, the two rival blocs were preparing for a third world war, the only response that capitalism can have to its economic crisis. Today, humanity is confronted, not with a ‘new world order’ as they claimed in 1989, but with a world disorder in which chaos and barbarism has been developing everywhere, particularly in the regions which in 1917 saw the first proletarian revolution in history. The military forces of the great ‘democratic’ powers, which had been preparing for war with the eastern bloc, are now being sent in the name of ‘humanitarian aid’ to the countries ravaged by civil war. Faced with this turn-around in the world situation, and with all the lying campaigns which have accompanied it, the responsibility of communists is to draw out a clear analysis, a profound understanding of the new stakes of imperialist conflicts. Unfortunately, as we shall see in this article, most of the organisations of the proletarian political milieu are a long way from fulfilling this responsibility.
It is obvious that, amid all the confusion that the bourgeoisie tries to spread, revolutionaries have the task of reaffirming that the only force capable of changing society is the working class; that capitalism can never bring peace and cares nothing for the well-being of humanity; that the only ‘new world order’, an order without wars, famine and poverty, is the one that the proletariat can install by destroying capitalism: communism. However, the proletariat expects of its political organisations, however small they may be, more than simple declarations of principle. It must be able to count on them to offer, against all the hypocrisy and propaganda of the bourgeoisie, a capacity to analyse the situation and to show clearly what is at stake within it.
We have shown in this Review (no. 61) that the serious political groups, who publish a regular press, such as Battaglia Comunista, Workers Voice, Programma Comunista, Il Partito Comunista, Le Proletaire, reacted vigorously to the whole campaign about the ‘end of communism’ by reaffirming the necessity for communism and the capitalist nature of the Stalinist ex-USSR [1] [186]. Similarly, these groups responded to the outbreak of the Gulf war by taking a clear position denouncing any support for one camp or the other and calling on the workers to wage a struggle against capitalism in all its forms and in all countries (see International Review no. 64). However, beyond these positions of principle, which are the minimum that one can expect from proletarian organisations, you would look in vain for any framework for understanding the world situation today. Whereas, since the end of 1989, our organisation has made the effort, as was its elementary responsibility (and we don’t glory in this as though it was some kind of exceptional exploit for revolutionaries), to elaborate such a framework and stick to it [2] [187], one of the features of the ‘analyses’ put forward by these groups is their tendency to zigzag in all directions, to contradict themselves from one month to the next.
To get some idea of the inconsistency of the groups of the political milieu, it’s enough, for example, to follow their regular press in the period of the Gulf war.
Thus, the attentive reader of Battaglia Comunista could read in November 1990, in the midst of preparations for military intervention, that the war “had certainly not been provoked by the madness of Saddam Hussein but is the product of a conflict between that part of the Arab bourgeoisie which demands more power for the oil-producing countries, and the western bourgeoisie, particularly the American bourgeoisie, which aims to impose its law in matters of oil prices as has been the case up until now”. We should note that, at the same moment, there had been a whole procession of western political personalities (notably Willy Brandt and a collection of former Japanese prime ministers) who had come to negotiate openly for the liberation of the hostages, to the great annoyance of the USA. From this point on, it was clear that the USA and its western ‘allies’ were a long way from sharing the same objectives; that since the collapse of the eastern bloc, there was no longer the same convergence of interests among the ‘western bourgeoisie’; that, on the contrary, the imperialist antagonisms between the western bourgeois powers were growing more and more, above all from this moment. But all this escaped the ‘marxist’ analysis of BC.
At the same time, in this issue, it was correctly affirmed that “the future, even the most immediate, will be characterised by a new series of conflicts”. This was less than two months before the war broke out. However, this perspective was hardly the one announced in the December issue.
With the January 1991 issue, the reader would be greatly surprised to discover, on the front page, that “the third world war began on January 17”! However, the paper only devoted one article to this event: one might ask whether the comrades of Battaglia were themselves really convinced of what they had written in their press.
In February, a large part of the paper was devoted to the question of war. It reaffirmed that capitalism was war and that all the conditions were there for the bourgeoisie to impose its ‘solution’: a third world war. “In this sense, to affirm that the war which began on 17th January marks the beginning of the third world conflict is not a flight of fantasy, but a recognition of the fact that we are now in a phase in which trade conflicts, which began to sharpen at the beginning of the 70s, have no possibility of being resolved except through the prospect of generalised war”. In another article, the author is much less assertive and in a third which shows the “fragility of the anti-Saddam front”, there are questions asked about the protagonists of future conflicts: “with or without Gorbachev, Russia cannot tolerate an American military presence at its very gates, which would be the case if there was a military occupation of Iraq. Neither could it tolerate... the overturning of the present equilibrium in favour of the traditional pro-American Arab coalition”. Thus, what had already been obvious from the last months of 1989: the end of the antagonism between the USA and the USSR owing to the latter being KOed [knocked-out], to its definitive inability to contest the crushing superiority of its ex-rival, particularly in the Middle East - none of this had come into BC’s field of vision. With hindsight, now that Gorbachev’s successor has become one of the USA’s best allies, we can see the whole absurdity of Battaglia’ s analyses and ‘predictions’. To be fair to BC, in the same issue, it does state that Germany’s loyalty to the USA had become highly dubious. However, the reasons it gives for this assertion are to say the least insufficient: it was because Germany had “embarked upon the construction of a new sphere of influence in the East and in the establishment of new economic relations with Russia (a great oil producer)”. While the first argument is perfectly valid, the second is rather weak: frankly, the antagonisms between Germany and the USA go well beyond the question of who will benefit from Russia’s oil reserves.
In March, and one would like to say “at last” (the Berlin wall had fallen a year and a half before...), BC announced that with “the crumbling of the Russian empire, the whole world will be dragged into a situation of unprecedented uncertainty”. The Gulf war had engendered new tensions; instability had become the rule. In the immediate, the war continued in the Gulf, and the USA was still in the area. But what was seen as a source of conflict were the rivalries over the enormous ‘business’ to be made out of the reconstruction of Kuwait. This is called looking at the world from the wrong end of the binoculars: the stakes of the Gulf war were far higher than this little Emirate, or the markets for its reconstruction.
In the November 91 issue of Prometeo, BC’s theoretical review, an article is devoted to analysing the world situation after “the end of the cold war”. This article shows that the eastern bloc can no longer play the same role as before and that the western bloc itself is vacillating. The article focuses on the Gulf war and reaffirms that it is a war for oil and the control of “oil rents”. However, it goes on to say: “But this in itself is not enough to explain the colossal deployment of forces and the criminal cynicism with which the USA has picked on Iraq. To the fundamental economic reasons, and as a result of them, we must add political motives. In essence, it is a question of the USA affirming its hegemonic role, through the basic instruments of its imperialist policies (displaying the strength and efficiency of its destructive capacities), in the face of its western allies, who have been called to cooperate in an alliance of everyone against Saddam”. Thus, even though it still clings to the ‘oil hypothesis’, BC here begins to perceive, even though a year late, the real stakes of the Gulf war. Better late than never!
In the same article, the third world war still appears to be inevitable, but, on the one hand “the reconstruction of new fronts is being carried out around axes which are still confused”; and on the other hand, there is still a lack of the “great farce which can justify, in the eyes of the peoples, the perpetration of new massacres between the central states, which today appear to be so united and solid”.
Once the emotion of the Gulf war had passed, the third world war which had begun on January 17 had become no more than a general perspective ahead of us. After imprudently getting itself soaked at the beginning of ‘91, BC had decided, though without saying so, to put up a big umbrella. This saved it the trouble of examining in a precise manner to what extent this perspective was being concretised in the evolution of the world situation, and in particular in the conflicts ravaging the globe and Europe itself. In particular, the link between imperialist conflicts and the chaos developing in the world was not analysed, in contrast to what the ICC had tried to do [3] [188].
In general, the groups of the political milieu could hardly miss seeing the growing chaos and often made some very correct descriptions of it, but you would search in vain in their analyses to find out what were the underlying tendencies either behind the aggravation of chaos (even seen independently of imperialist conflicts), or behind the organisation of society for war.
Thus, in November ‘91, Programma Comunista (PC), no 6, in a long article, affirmed that the real responsibility for what was happening in Yugoslavia “should not be sought in Ljubljana or Belgrade, but in the capitals of the most developed nations. In Yugoslavia, through various interposed persons, there is a confrontation between the needs, necessities and the perspectives of the European market. It’s only when you see that an aspect of this intestinal war is the struggle for the conquest of markets, for the financial control of vast regions, for the economic exploitation required by the most advanced countries from the capitalist point of view; it’s only when you see this war as a struggle for new economic and military outlets, that it will appear, in the eyes of the workers, that there is no justification for fighting to free yourself either from the ‘Bolshevik’ Milosevic or from the Ustashe Tudjman”.
In May 92, in PC no. 3, the article ‘In the swamp of the new capitalist social order’, makes a lucid observation of the tendencies towards ‘every man for himself’ and of the fact that “the new world order is just the arena for the explosion of continuous conflicts”, that “the break-up of Yugoslavia has been as much an effect as a factor in Germany’s great expansionist push”.
In the following issue, PC recognised that “once again, we are seeing the Americans trying to assert their traditional right of pre-empting any possibility of European defence (or self-defence), a right conferred on Washington at the end of the second world war; and an analogous attempt (in the opposite direction) by Europe, or at least of the Europe ‘that counts’ to assert its own right to act by itself, or - if it really can’t do anymore - not to have its every movement depend on the will of the USA”. This article thus contains the essential elements for understanding the conflict in Yugoslavia: the chaos resulting from the collapse of the Stalinist regimes of eastern Europe and of the eastern bloc, the imperialist antagonisms dividing the great western powers.
Unfortunately, PC is not able to hold onto to this correct analysis. In the next issue (September 92), when a part of the US Mediterranean fleet was cruising the Yugoslav coast, we have a new version: “war has been ravaging Yugoslavia for two years: the USA has shown the most splendid indifference towards it; the EEC gives itself a good conscience by sending humanitarian aid and a few armed contingents to protect it, and by calling periodic meetings, or rather peace conferences, which always leave things exactly the way they were... Should we be astonished at this? It’s enough to think about the frenetic race, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, by the western merchants, in particular the Austro-German ones, to grab hold of economic, and thus political sovereignty over Slovenia and, if possible, Croatia”. Thus, having made a step towards clarification, PC goes back to the theme of ‘business’, so dear to the political milieu, to explain the great imperialist stakes of the current period.
BC intervenes on the same theme a propos of the war in Yugoslavia, explaining at great length the economic reasons which have pushed the different fractions of the Yugoslav bourgeoisie to take up arms to ensure “that quota of surplus value which hitherto went to the Federation”. “The splitting up of Yugoslavia is in the interest above all of the German bourgeoisie and also of the Italian bourgeoisie. And even the destruction wrought by the war can be useful when it comes to reconstructing: lucrative contracts, juicy orders which, who would believe it, are beginning to arrive in Italy and Germany. This is why, in contradiction with the principles of the common European household, the states of the EEC have recognised the ‘right of peoples to self-determination’. At the same time, they have got their economic operations underway: Germany in Croatia, and, in part, in Slovenia,~ Italy in Slovenia. Among these operations, the sale of arms and ammunition to replace those consumed during the war”. Of course, BC underlines, this doesn’t please the USA which doesn’t like to see the European countries strengthening themselves (BC no. 7/8, July/August 92).
One can only wonder about this ‘fabulous business’ that capitalism is going to do in Yugoslavia, in a country that collapsed at the same time as the Russian empire and is also ravaged by war. We’ve already seen the ‘fabulous business’ done over the reconstruction of Kuwait; now we can see on the horizon the ‘reconstruction of Yugoslavia’, with a special bonus to the wicked arms dealers, who go around stirring up wars.
We can’t go on with a chronological enumeration of the meanderings of the proletarian political milieu; these examples are eloquent and damning enough. The proletariat cannot content itself with statements of faith such as “Through continuous convulsions, and we don’t know when, we will arrive at the culmination indicated by marxist theory and the example of the Russian revolution” (Programma). We can’t even salute the fact that most of the organisations of the milieu identify the new potential ‘fronts’ of a third world war as being around Germany on one side and the USA on the other. Like a stopped clock, for decades they have seen as the only possible scenario the one that prevailed before the first two world wars. After the collapse of the eastern bloc, the situation does tend to present itself in that way, but it’s more or less by luck that the organisations can give the ‘right time’ today. A stopped clock can do this twice a day, but it’s still useless. The reasons for this overturning of history, the perspective - or lack of it - of a third world war are vague or totally ignored. What’s more, the attempts to explain why wars break out, when they are not frankly incoherent and variable from one month to the next, are almost surrealist and devoid of any credibility. As Programma puts it, it’s indeed true that marxist theory must guide us, must serve as a compass to measure the evolution of the world that we have to change, and above all, to grasp what’s at stake in this period. Unfortunately, for most of the organisations of the political milieu, marxism, as they understand it, resembles a compass gone awry because it’s sitting next to a magnet.
In reality, at the origin of the disorientation that afflicts these groups we find, to a very large extent, an incomprehension of the question of the historic course, i.e. of the balance of forces between the classes, which determines the direction assumed by a society that has been plunged into an insoluble economic crisis: either the bourgeois ‘solution’, world war, or the proletarian response - the intensification of class combats leading to the opening of a revolutionary period. The history of the revolutionary fractions on the eve of the second world war has shown us that the affirmation of basic principles is not enough, that the difficulty in understanding both the question of the course and the nature of imperialist wars profoundly shook and more or less paralysed them [4] [189]. To get to the roots of the incomprehensions of the political milieu, we must once again go back to the question of the historic course and of wars in the period of decadence.
It is surprising to say the least that BC, who refused to see the possibility of a third world war when there were fully formed military blocs, announced the war to be imminent as soon as the two blocs broke up. BC’s incomprehensions are at the basis of this volte-face. On several occasions (e.g. IRs nos. 50 and 59) explained the weaknesses of this organisation’s analyses and shown that they threaten to deprive it of any historical perspective.
Since the end of the 60s, the collapse of the capitalist economy could only push the bourgeoisie towards a new world war, all the more so because the blocs were already in place. For more than two decades, the ICC defended the view that the wave of workers’ struggles which began in 1968 marked the opening of a new period in the balance of forces between the classes, of a historic course favourable to the development of proletarian struggles. In order to send the proletariat to war, capitalism needs a situation characterised by “the growing adhesion of the workers to capitalist values, and by a combativity which either tends to disappear, or appears within a perspective controlled by the bourgeoisie” (IR 30, ‘The historic course’).
In answer to the question “why has the third world war not broken out, even though all the objective conditions for it are there?”, the ICC has argued, since the beginning of the open crisis of capitalism, that the balance of forces between the classes is what prevents the bourgeoisie from mobilising the proletariat of the advanced countries behind the banners of nationalism. What was the response given by BC, who, it should be said, recognised that “at the objective level, all the reasons for the outbreak of a third world war are present”? Refusing to consider the question of the historic course, this organisation offered us all sorts of ‘analyses’: the economic crisis wasn’t sufficiently advanced (which contradicted its affirmation about all the “objective reasons” being there); the framework of alliances was still “rather fluid and full of uncertainties”; and finally, the armaments were... too developed, too destructive. Nuclear disarmament was thus one of the necessary conditions for the outbreak of world war. We responded to all these arguments at the time.
Does today’s reality confirm BC’s analysis, according to which, this time around, we really are going towards world war?
Was the crisis not advanced enough before? At the time we warned BC about underestimating the gravity of the world economic crisis. Now, if BC has recognised that the difficulties of the ex-eastern bloc were due to the crisis of the system, for a whole period, and against all reality, it had illusions in the opportunities opening up in the east, which were supposed to provide a “shot of oxygen” for international capitalism… though this didn’t prevent BC, at the same time, from seeing the outbreak of the third world war as imminent. For BC, when the capitalist crisis is attenuated, world war comes closer. Like God, the logic of BC moves in a mysterious way.
Concerning the question of armaments, we have already shown how BC‘s position lacked all seriousness. But today nuclear weapons are still there, and are in fact in the hands of more states than before. But still, according to BC, world war is on the agenda.
When the world was divided into two blocs, BC thought that the framework of alliances was “fluid”. Today, the old division is finished and we are far away from a new one (even if the tendency towards the reconstitution of new imperialist constellations is affirming itself more and more). And yet, for BC, the conditions for a new world war are already ripe. A bit more rigour, please, comrades!
Our concern here is not to claim that BC always says whatever comes into its head (even though that is sometimes the case). It is rather to show that despite the heritage of the workers’ movement to which this organisation lays claim, in the absence of a real method, and without taking into account the evolution of capitalism and of the balance of forces between the classes, you end up being unable to provide the working class with any clear orientation. Having failed to understand the essential reason why generalised war did not break out in the previous period - the end of the counter-revolution, the historic course towards class confrontations; being, as a result, unable to show that the course had not been put into question, since the working class had not suffered a decisive defeat, BC ended up announcing the imminence of a third world war at the very time that the convulsions in the global situation have made the perspective of world war more distant than before.
In particular, this incapacity to take account of the resurgence of the working class at the end of the 60s in its examination of the conditions for the outbreak of a third world war prevents BC from seeing what’s really at stake in the current period - a situation where the social situation is blocked and society is rotting on its feet. “But although the proletariat was able to prevent the outbreak of a new imperialist slaughter, it was still unable to put forward its own perspective: the overthrow of capitalism, and the construction of communist society. Consequently, it could not help feeling more and more the effects of capitalist decadence. But history has not stopped during this temporary blockage of the world situation. For 20 years, society has continued to suffer the accumulation of all the characteristics of decadence, made still worse by the deepening economic crisis which the ruling class has proved utterly incapable of overcoming. All that the latter can offer is a day-by-day resistance, with no hope of success, to the irrevocable collapse of the capitalist mode of production. Incapable of offering the slightest way forward (even a way into suicide, such as a world war), capitalism has plunged deeper into a state of advanced social decomposition and generalised despair.
“If we do not destroy capitalism, then capitalism, even without a new world war, will destroy humanity, through an accumulation of local wars, epidemics, destruction of the environment, famines, and other supposedly ‘natural’ disasters” (Manifesto of the 9th Congress of the ICC).
Unfortunately BC is not alone in this total inability to grasp what’s at stake in the period opened up by the collapse of the eastern bloc. Le Proletaire says it clearly: “ In spite of what certain political currents write, not without a touch of hypocrisy, about the collapse of capitalism, ‘chaos’, ‘decomposition’ etc, that’s not where we are”. In fact “even if we have to wait years to destroy the domination of capitalism, its destiny has already been decided”. It’s sad that Le Proletaire has to console itself; but the fact that it hides from the proletariat the gravity of what’s at stake is far more serious.
Even if world war is not on the agenda today, this doesn’t at all minimise the gravity of the situation. The decomposition of society itself constitutes a mortal danger for the proletariat, as we have shown in this Review [5] [190]. It is the responsibility of revolutionaries to warn their class against this danger, to say clearly that time is running out and that if it waits too long to embark upon the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism, it risks being caught up in the system’s own putrefaction. The proletariat requires far more from the organisations which aim to form its vanguard than a total incomprehension of what’s at stake, still less a stupid ironic attitude to the situation.
At the root of the incomprehensions about the stakes of the present period among most of the groups of the political milieu, there’s more than just ignorance about the historic course. We also find an inability to understand all the implications of the decadence of capitalism for the question of war. In particular, it is commonly thought that war still has an economic rationality, as it did last century. Even though obviously, in the last instance, it is the economic situation of decadent capitalism which engenders wars, the whole history of this period shows us to what extent, for the capitalist economy itself (and not just for the exploited, who are turned into cannon fodder), war has become a real catastrophe, and not only for the defeated countries. Because of this, imperialist and military rivalries can’t be identified with the commercial rivalries between the various states.
It was no accident that BC considered that the division of the world between the eastern bloc and the western bloc was “fluid”, that it didn’t constitute a sufficient basis for war - the most important commercial rivalries were not between these two blocs but between the main western powers. Neither is it accidental that today, when we are seeing the open development of commercial rivalries between the USA and the great powers which were its former allies, such as Germany and Japan, BC sees war as being closer. Like the groups which don’t recognise the decadence of capitalism, BC - which doesn’t see all its implications - identifies trade wars with military wars.
This isn’t a new question and history has already proved Trotsky right when, at the beginning of the l920s, he fought the majority position in the Communist International, which held that the second world war would be between blocs headed by the USA and Britain, the two main commercial rivals. Later on, the Gauche Communiste de France, at the end of the second world war, reaffirmed that “there is a difference between the ascendant and decadent phases of capitalist society (in relation to war) ... The decadence of capitalist society is expressed most strikingly in the fact that, while in the ascendant period, wars had the function of stimulating economic development, in the decadent period economic activity is essentially restricted to the pursuit of war... war in the imperialist epoch is the highest and most complete expression of decadent capitalism, its permanent crisis, and its economic way of life ...“ (Report on the international situation, 1945, republished in IR no. 59). The more capitalism sinks into its crisis, the more the logic of militarism imposes itself, irreversibly and uncontrollably, even though militarism itself is no more capable than other policies of proposing the least solution to the economic contradictions of the system [6] [191].
By refusing to admit that, between the last century and this one, the significance of wars has changed, by failing to see the increasingly irrational and suicidal character of war, by trying at all costs to see the logic of war as being the same as the logic of commercial rivalries, the groups of the proletarian political milieu deprive themselves of any means of understanding what is really going on behind all the conflicts in which the great powers are involved, whether openly or not; more generally, these groups are thereby rendered incapable of understanding the evolution of the international situation. On the contrary, they are led into all kinds of absurd positions about the ‘hunt for profits’, the ‘huge business’ that the developed countries can supposedly make out of regions which are completely ravaged and ruined by war, such as Yugoslavia, Somalia, etc. War is one of the most decisive questions that the proletariat has to face, not only because it is the main victim of war, as cannon fodder and as a labour force subjected to unprecedented levels of exploitation, but also because it is one of the essential factors in the development of consciousness about the bankruptcy of capitalism, about the barbarism towards which it is leading the human race. It is therefore of the utmost importance that revolutionaries are as clear as possible on this question. War constitutes “the only objective consequence of the crisis, decadence and decomposition that the proletariat can today set a limit to (unlike any of the other manifestations of decomposition), to the extent that in the central countries it is not at present enrolled under the flags of nationalism” (‘Militarism and decomposition’, IR no. 64).
The historic course has not changed (but to see this, you first have to admit that there are different historic courses according to the period). Even though it has been paralysed and disoriented by the enormous convulsions of recent years, the proletariat is more and more being forced back onto the path of class combat, as can be demonstrated by the September-October struggles in Italy. The path will belong and difficult, and it will require all the forces of the working class to be mobilised in decisive battles. Within all this, the task of revolutionaries is primordial, otherwise they will not only be swept away by history, but will make their own contribution to the annihilation of any revolutionary perspective.
Me
[1] [192] For a more detailed analysis, refer to the article ‘The wind from the east and the response of revolutionaries’ in IR no. 61.
[2] [193] For the ICC, “we must affirm clearly that the collapse of the eastern bloc and the economic and political convulsions of its erstwhile members do not presage the slightest improvement in capitalist society’s economic situation. The Stalinist: regimes’ economic bankruptcy as a result of the general crisis of the world economy only heralds the collapse of the economy’s most developed sectors ... the deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level. The difference, in the coming period, will be that these antagonisms which were previously contained and used by the two great imperialist blocs will now come to the fore ... For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (even supposing that the proletariat were no longer capable of putting up a resistance). However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent and more violent, especially of course in those areas where the proletariat is weakest” (‘After the collapse of the eastern bloc, destabilisation and chaos’, IR no 61). Reality has amply confirmed these analyses.
[3] [194] For the ICC, the Gulf war, “despite the huge resources set in motion... has only slowed, but certainly not reversed, the major tendencies at work since the disappearance of the Russian bloc: the dislocation of the western bloc, the first steps towards the formation of a new imperialist bloc led by Germany, the increasing chaos in international relations ... The barbaric war unleashed in Yugoslavia only a few months after the end of the Gulf war is a striking and irrefutable illustration of this last point. In particular, although the events which triggered this barbarity (the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia) are themselves an expression of chaos and the sharpening of nationalism which characterise all the regions previously under Stalinist control, they could never have happened had these nations not been assured of support from Germany, the greatest power in Europe. The German bourgeoisie’s diplomatic manoeuvring in the Balkans... was aimed at opening up a strategic outlet to the Mediterranean through an ‘independent’ Croatia under its control, and was its first decisive act as a candidate to the leadership of a new imperialist bloc” (Resolution on the international situation, IR no 70). “Aware of the gravity of what was at stake, the American bourgeoisie, regardless of its apparent discretion, did everything it could, with the aid of Britain and Holland, to counter and parry this thrust by German imperialism” (IR no. 68). For a more detailed analysis, refer to the press of the ICC.
[4] [195] The reader can refer to our book on the history of the Communist Left of Italy, and the balance-sheet drawn up by the Gauche Communiste de France in 1945, published in IR no. 59.
[5] [196] See in particular ‘The decomposition of capitalism’ and ‘Decomposition, final stage of the decadence of capitalism’ in IRs no. 57 and 62 respectively.
[6] [197] The reader can refer to numerous articles on this question in this Review (nos. 19, 52, 59, etc).
From Somalia to Angola, from Venezuela to Yugoslavia, from famines to massacres, coups d'états to 'civil wars', the whirlwind of decomposing capitalist society can only create havoc. Not only do the promises of prosperity and liberty remain unrealized everywhere, but capitalism has put everything to the fire and the sword, unleashing militarism, reducing the immense majority of the world's population to destitution, poverty and death, and massively attacking the living conditions of the proletariat in the great urban and industrialized centers.
Chaos, lies and imperialist war
Even the most ardent defenders of the existing order are more and more forced to recognize that the 'new world order' is nothing other than generalized chaos. However, unable to hide the deterioration in every country of all the political, economic and social aspects of life, the newspapers, radio, television - mouthpieces of the dominant class - still compete to hide reality. Political scandals, ethnic genocide, deportations, pogroms and catastrophes of all kinds, epidemics and famines, it's all there. But instead of being explained for what they are, ie, at root, the consequence of the world crisis of capitalism[1], events are always presented as a sort of inevitability.
In showing the famine in Somalia, the massacres of 'ethnic cleansing' in Yugoslavia, the deportations and martyring of populations in the southern republics of the ex-USSR, or the political scandals, the propaganda recognizes how rotten things have become. But it does so by presenting phenomena without any link between them, thus distilling a sense of impotence, preventing the awareness that it is the capitalist mode of production as a whole which is responsible for the situation, and that in the front rank of the guilty are the bourgeoisies of the big capitalist countries.
Decomposition, which permeates all areas of society, is not an inevitability. It is the result of a blockage at the heart of society: an open, general world economic crisis of more than 25 years duration, and the absence of a perspective of emerging from it. The great powers, which with the end of Stalinism claimed that a period of peace and prosperity was opening up for capitalism, are locked in a war of each against all, which exacerbates social disintegration, on both the domestic and the international level.
Within the industrialized countries, the national bourgeoisies attempt to contain the manifestations of decomposition while using them to reinforce the authority of the state[2]. This is what the American bourgeoisie was doing at the time of the Los Angeles riots in the spring of 1992; it even controlled the time and extension of the riots[3]. It is what the German bourgeoisie has been doing since the autumn by developing an enormous campaign on 'immigrant bashing' . It controls and sometimes covertly provokes the events in order to pass measures reinforcing immigration controls - in order to do its own 'immigrant bashing'. It then tries to enroll the population in general, and the working class in particular, into the policy of the state, by the orchestration of demonstrations in defense of democracy ...
On the international level, the industrialized countries are less and less allies since the break-up of the western bloc discipline which had been imposed on them faced with the Russian imperialist bloc; this trend has been reinforced by the acceleration of the crisis, which is now hitting at the heart of the world economy. They are locked in a desperate confrontation between rival capitalist and imperialist interests. They are not going toward peace but are aggravating military tensions.
Somalia: a prelude to more difficult interventions
For more than a year and a half Germany has thrown oil on the Yugoslavian fire, breaking the status quo which assured American control of the Mediterranean, by its support for the constitution of an independent Slovenia and Croatia. The United States has tried, since the beginning of the conflict, to resist the extension of a zone of influence dominated by Germany. After their veiled support for Serbia, with the sabotage of European initiatives aimed at weakening its hegemony, the United States has moved into a higher gear. American military intervention will not bring peace to Somalia, nor will it alleviate the famine which has ravaged this country as well as others in the most destitute region of the world. Somalia is only the soil on which the United States is preparing military operations of a much wider scope, directed against the great powers liable to dispute its supremacy on the world arena, the first of which is Germany.
The 'humanitarian action' of the great powers is only another pretext serving to "mask the sordid imperialist interests which guide their actions and for which they attack each other ... and to hide their own responsibility for the present barbarism behind a smokescreen and to justify new escalations"[4].
The intervention of the US armed force in Somalia has nothing to do with the poverty, famine and massacres which blight this country, just as the Gulf War two years ago had nothing to do with the plight of the local populations. The situation of the latter has only worsened since this first victory of the 'new world order'.
The discipline which had been imposed on all concerned by the coalition under the American boot in the Gulf War has crumbled these past two years. The USA has had trouble in maintaining its 'world order', which has turned more and more into open disorder. Hemmed in by the weakening and bankruptcy of entire sectors of its economy, the American bourgeoisie needs a new offensive to reimpose its military superiority and thus to be able to impose its diktats over its old allies.
The first phase of this offensive consisted of dealing a blow to the pretensions of French imperialism: imposing US control in the Somalian operation, and consigning a walk-on part to the French military forces to Djibouti, without giving them any real role in Mogadishu. But this first phase is only a preparatory one for an intervention in ex-Yugoslavia, in Bosnia, which must be massive in order to be effective. The Chiefs of Staff of the American army, notably Colin Powell, one of the leaders of the Gulf War, already said this in the summer of 1992[5]. Because while the Horn of Africa does constitute, through its geographic position, a strategic zone of considerable interest, the size of the US operation[6] and all the media publicity around it serve above all to justify and prepare more important operations in the Balkans, in Europe: the prize in the imperialist stakes, as has been shown by two world wars.
The aim of the USA is not to smother Somalia under a carpet of bombs as it did Iraq[7], although it will certainly do nothing to stop the massacres or the famine in the region. The objective is first to try and establish an image of a clean war, in order to obtain the necessary adhesion of the population to difficult, costly and lengthy interventions. It also aims to give a warning to the French bourgeoisie; and behind it the German and Japanese bourgeoisies, of the determination of the US to maintain its leadership. Planned well in advance, it serves, finally, like all action to 'maintain order', to reinforce war preparations in the event of American military action in Europe.
The Franco-German alliance was not mistaken when its spokesman Delors demanded the increase in the participation of troops of the European countries in Yugoslavia. Not in order to establish peace as it pretended, but to be militarily present on the ground faced with the initiative of the US. Germany, for the first time since the Second World War, is sending 1500 troops outside of its frontiers. Under cover of protecting life in Somalia it is the first step towards a direct participation in the conflicts. And it is a message to the US about Germany's intention to be militarily present on the battlefield in ex-Yugoslavia, It is a new step which will go beyond this confrontation, particularly on the military level, but also in all aspects of capitalist politics. The election of Clinton in the US, while it does not modify the essential strategy of the US bourgeoisie, is a sign of the turning point in the world situation.
Clinton: a more muscular policy
In 1991, some months after the victory of Desert Storm, despite a fall in popularity linked to the worsening of the crisis in the USA, it seemed Bush would be re-elected easily. Clinton finally won because, little by little, he received support from significant fractions of the American bourgeoisie. This was shown, amongst other ways, by the support of influential organs of the press; then by the deliberate sabotage of the Bush campaign by Perot. The latter, who at first tried to rally support to the Republican party, later reemerged to directly confront Bush. With the revelation of the Iraqgate scandal[8], then the accusation against Bush, in front of tens of millions of viewers, that he encouraged Iraq to invade Kuwait, the American bourgeoisie effectively showed the door to the victor of Desert Storm, The relatively comfortable victory of Clinton over Bush showed that the desire for change was felt by a majority of the American bourgeoisie.
In the first place, faced with the catastrophe on the economic level, a majority of the US bourgeoisie resolved, after several hesitations, to shelve its ideology of liberalism. The latter had proven powerless to prevent the economic decline, and worse, was seen as being responsible for it. Since the open recession of 1991, the bourgeoisie has been obliged to recognize the bankruptcy of ultra-liberalism, which cannot justify the growing intervention of the state necessary to preserve what's left of the productive and financial apparatus. Most of the bourgeoisie rallied to the propaganda of 'more state' promised by Clinton, which accords better with reality than the language of Bush, who remained in continuity with 'Reaganomics'[9].
In the second place the Bush administration could not maintain the initiative of the US on the world arena. At the time of the Gulf War it could depend on the unanimous support of the American bourgeoisie, based on its undisputed role of world military superpower, which it clearly displayed through this war. But subsequently it began to run out of steam and could no longer find such spectacular and effective ways of imposing itself on the potential rivals of the USA.
In Yugoslavia, when the US envisaged an aerial intervention in Bosnia in the summer of 1992, the Europeans put a spoke in the wheel. The surprise trip of Mitterand to Sarajevo cut short the humanitarian propaganda preparing the bombardments. Moreover the imbroglio of the armed factions and the geography of the terrain made any military operation much more dangerous because it lessened the efficacy of the airforce, the central piece of the American army. The Bush administration was not able to deploy the necessary means. Even if a new action in Iraq took place with the neutralization of part of its airspace, it did not give the opportunity for a new demonstration of force. This time Saddam Hussein did not respond to the provocation.
Bush, in losing the elections, thus served as the symbol of the reverse of United States policy on the economic level as well as on the level of world military leadership. By being seen as responsible he rendered a last service to his class, hiding the fact that there could not be any other policy and that it is the system itself which is definitively rotten. Moreover the bourgeoisie faces a public opinion disenchanted with the disastrous economic and social results since the 1980s and skeptical about the 'new world order'. The alternation of Clinton after twelve years of the Republican party gives a dose of oxygen to the credibility of American democracy.
As far as stepping up military interventions is concerned, the bourgeoisie can have full confidence in the Democratic Party. The latter has a proven experience like the Republican Party, since it has governed the country before and during the second world war, led the Vietnam War, and relaunched the policy of militarization under Carter at the end of the 1970s.
With Clinton, the bourgeoisie is trying to turn the situation around, as regards both the economic crisis and the task of maintaining its world leadership on the imperialist level faced with the tendency for the constitution of a rival bloc led by Germany.
The abortion of Europe 1993
Before the collapse of the eastern bloc, various agreements and institutions guaranteed a certain degree of unity between the different countries of Europe. These countries took shelter under the American umbrella because they had a common interest faced with the menace of the Russian imperialist bloc. With the disappearance of this threat European unity has lost its cement and the famous 'Europe 1993' is about to abort.
In place of the monetary and economic union towards which the Maastricht Treaty constituted a decisive step, regrouping all the countries of the European Economic Community with others to follow, we now see a two-speed Europe. On the one hand the alliance of Germany with France, which is attempting to integrate Spain, Belgium and to some extent Italy, is pushing to take measures which confront American and Japanese competition and tries to combat American supremacy on the military level[10]. On the other hand countries like Britain and Holland, which resist the growing power of Germany in Europe and, allied to the US, are determined to oppose by all means the emergence of a rival bloc.
The conferences at European summits, parliamentary ratifications and referendums do not show greater unity or a greater harmony between the national bourgeoisies of the different European countries. There is an increasing row engendered by the necessity to choose between an alliance with the US, which remains the first world power, and one with its challenger Germany. The whole situation is propelled by an unprecedented economic crisis, and a social decomposition which is beginning to make its disastrous consequences felt at the heart of the industrialized countries. And if this row gives the appearance of a game between democracies concerned to find a common ground, the bloody war in ex-Yugoslavia, fed by the confrontation between the great powers behind the rivalries between the new independent states[11] gives the lie to the idea of unity between the great democracies and shows the barbarism which they are capable of when it comes to defending their imperialist interests[12]. Not only does the war continue in Bosnia, but it risks spreading to Kosovo and Macedonia where the population will also be swept into the whirlwind of barbarism.
If Europe is at the heart of conflicts between the principal powers and holds a central place in the tendency towards the formation of a German bloc, and if ex-Yugoslavia is the European military laboratory, it is the entire planet which is the theatre of tensions between the new imperialist poles, tensions which are helping to aggravate the armed conflicts in the third world and the ex-Russian bloc.
The increase of local conflicts
With the collapse of the old world order, the old local conflicts have not only continued, as in Afghanistan or Kurdistan. New conflicts, new civil wars arise between local fractions of the bourgeoisie previously obliged to collaborate for the same national interests. But the eruption of new areas of tension is never limited to the strictly local situation itself. All conflicts immediately draw fractions of the bourgeoisie from neighboring countries into their orbit, in the name of ethnic differences, contentious frontiers, religious quarrels, the danger of disorder and all the other pretexts. From the smallest local warlord to the great powers, all are pushed to throw themselves into the spiral of armed confrontation. No matter whether the war is civil or local it inevitability leads to a confrontation between the great imperialist powers.
Not all tensions are linked to the interests of the great powers from the beginning. But the latter, by the logic of imperialist war, always finish by joining the melee in order to prevent their competitors from doing it, and as a weapon in the general balance of forces.
Thus the United States intervenes in or follows closely the local situations which may serve its interests against potential rivals. In Africa, in Liberia, the war between rival gangs has today become the spearhead of the US offensive to evict the French presence from its hunting grounds in Mauritania, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast. In South America the US observed a kindly neutrality at the time of the Venezuelan coup d'état, looking to reverse Carlos Andres Perez, friend of Mitterand and of Willy Brandt, member of the Socialist International, and favorable to the maintenance of French, Spanish, as well as German interests. In Asia the US is closely interested in the pro-Chinese policy of the Khmer Rouge in order to keep China within its orbit, especially considering Beijing's opening to Japan.
The great powers are equally led to immerse themselves in the confrontations between regional sub-imperialisms which by their geographic situation, their dimension, and the nuclear arms they possess, weigh dangerously on the world imperialist balance of forces. Such is the case in the Indian sub-continent, where a catastrophic situation reigns, provoking all sorts of rivalries in each country between factions of the bourgeoisie, as testified by the recent massacres of Muslims in India. These rivalries are exacerbated by the confrontation between India and Pakistan, Pakistan supporting the Muslims in India, India fomenting the revolts against the Pakistani government in Kashmir. The putting into question of old international alliances, India with the USSR, Pakistan with China and the USA, does not calm the conflicts but risks worsening them.
The great powers are also sucked into new conflicts that initially they neither support nor foment. In the territory of the ex-USSR the tensions between republics continues to develop. Each republic is confronted with national minorities which proclaim independence, form militias, receiving the open or disguised support of other republics: the Armenians of Azerbaidjan, the Chechenes of Russia, the Russians in Moldavia and the Ukraine, the factions in the civil war in Georgia, etc. The great powers shrink from immersing themselves in the chaos of these local situations. But the fact that secondary powers like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan have their sights on these parts of the old USSR, and that today Russia itself is more and more tom apart by the struggle of conservatives against reformers, opens the way to the enlargement of the conflicts.
Decomposition intensifies the contradictions, engenders new rivalries and conflicts. All factions of the bourgeoisie, from the smallest to the largest, can only respond with militarism and wars.
War and crisis
The capitalist regimes of the Stalinist type have collapsed. Coming from the counter-revolution of the 20s and 30s in Russia, they installed a rigid and totally militarized form of capitalism. Bureaucrats of yesterday have spruced up their old nationalism with the phraseology of independence and democracy, but they have nothing more to offer than corruption, gangsterism and war. It is now the turn of the western capitalist regimes, which claimed that their economic superiority testified to the victory of capitalism. They now find themselves locked into the collapse of the system: slowing down of their economies, drastic purge of their profits, unemployment of tens of millions of workers and employees, unceasing and growing degradation of the conditions of work, housing, health, education and security.
But in these countries, unlike those of the third world or the ex-eastern bloc, the working class is not ready to submit without reacting to the dramatic consequences of this collapse of its living conditions. This was shown by the powerful anger of the working class in Italy in the autumn of 1992.
Towards a resurgence of working class struggles
After three years of passivity, demonstrations, stoppages, and strikes by hundreds of thousands of Italian workers and employees in the autumn of 1992, constituted the first signs of a change of considerable importance.
Faced with the most brutal attacks since the Second World War, the working class in Italy has responded. This movement reminds us not only that the economic crisis puts all the workers in the same boat by attacking everywhere its conditions of existence; above all it shows that, beyond the divisions that capitalism imposes, the working class constitutes the only social force which can oppose the consequences of this crisis. The workers' initiatives, the strikes, the massive participation in demonstrations of protest against the government's austerity plan, and the discontent against the official unions which support this plan, have shown that the proletariat's fighting spirit is still intact. Even if the bourgeoisie kept the initiative, and even if the initial massive movement was subsequently curtailed, a gain remains from these first important struggles of the proletariat in an industrialized country since 1989: the return of class combativity.
The events in Italy mark a stage for the working class in resuming the struggle on the common ground of resistance to the capitalist crisis, in developing confidence in its capacity to respond to the attacks of capitalism and to open up a perspective.
The black-out of information on the events in Italy, contrary to the publicity given to the steel workers' strikes, the transport strikes, and the public sector strikes contained within the great union maneuvers in Germany in the spring of 1992[13], is testimony to the fact that there was a real thrust from the workers in the movement in Italy. When the German bourgeoisie acted to stifle any workers' initiative in the previous year, its operation had the blessings of the medias of the international bourgeoisie. In the autumn of 1992 the Italian bourgeoisie got its support through the black -out, since the international bourgeoisie expected and feared that the reaction of the Italian workers to the austerity measures would not be limited to the Italian state.
However, the Italian movement was only the first step toward the resurgence of international class struggle. Italy is the country of the world where the proletariat has the greatest experience of class struggle and the greatest distrust of the unions; this is far from being the case in the other European countries. On this level the workers' reactions elsewhere in Europe and the US did not immediately take on the radical and massive character of those in Italy.
Moreover, in Italy itself, the movement was limited. On the one hand, the massive rejection of the big unions by the majority of the workers in this movement has shown that despite the break of the last three years the long experience of the working class in confrontation with unionism has not been lost. But on the other hand the bourgeoisie also expected this rejection. The bourgeoisie played on it to focus workers' anger on spectacular actions against the union leaders to the detriment of a large-scale reaction against the measures and against the whole of the state apparatus and all the union appendages.
Instead of taking the struggle in hand in the general assemblies where the workers can decide collectively on the objectives and means of their struggle, the radical organs of base unionism organized the stifling of the discontent. By throwing bolts and stones at the heads of the union leaders they maintained the trap of the false opposition between base and official unionism, sowing disarray and putting a brake on the massive and unified mobilization which alone can develop an effective response to the state's attacks.
The workers' struggles in Italy thus mark a recovery of combativity but they did not escape the difficulties which await the working class everywhere: most importantly, the difficulties in going beyond unionism, both official and unofficial, and corporatism.
The atmosphere of disorientation and confusion spread throughout the working class by the ideological campaigns on the bankruptcy of communism, the end of marxism and the end of class struggle is still a weight, and combativity is only the first condition for emerging from this atmosphere. The working class must also become conscious that its struggle must put into question capitalism as a world system, as the bearer of poverty, war and destruction.
Today, the passivity instilled by triumphant capitalism's promises of peace has begun to crumble. Desert Storm helped to uncover this lie of peace.
The participation of the great democratic countries in the wars in Somalia and ex-Yugoslavia is less clearly a demystification, since they pretend to be intervening to protect populations and give them food. But the cascade of attacks on the living conditions of the working class will create an ambiance where the humanitarian pretexts will start to war thin. Workers will start to question the humanitarian alibis for sending troops and the most costly, sophisticated and deadly armaments. They will begin to see that the real dirty work of the democratic armies is of the same ilk as that of all the gangs, militias and armies that they pretend to combat.
As for the promise of prosperity, catastrophe is everywhere. The unprecedented acceleration of the economic crisis is in the process of exposing the last refuges where the conditions of life have been relatively spared, countries like Germany, Sweden, or Switzerland. The massive unemployment spreading now in the highly skilled sectors which were the least affected until now, will add tens of millions to those already unemployed in areas of the world where the proletariat is most numerous and most concentrated.
The reawakening of the class struggle in Italy in autumn 1992 has signaled the revival of workers' combativity. The development of the crisis, and the increasingly omnipresent militarism in the social climate of the industrialized countries, are going to contribute to important struggles in the future. These struggles will provide the basis for the working class becoming aware of the need to reinforce its unity and, with the aid of its revolutionary organizations, to rediscover the authentic perspective of communism.
[1] See the article on the economic crisis in this issue.
[2] The bourgeoisie has tried to forestall decomposition which disturbs its social order. But it is a class which is totally incapable of eradicating the ultimate cause, since it is its own system of exploitation and of profit which is at the root of the latter. It can only saw off the branch on which it is sitting.
[3] See International Review no 71
[4] See International Review no 71. And as Liberation of 9.12.92 mentioned:
"Thus under an anonymous cover a very high functionary of the UN in Somalia (Onusom) has spoken his real thoughts: 'The American intervention stinks of arrogance. They consulted no one. The intervention was prepared long beforehand, humanity serving a pretext. In fact they are testing here, like a vaccine on an animal, their doctrine for resolving future local conflicts. Now this operation will cost by their own estimates between $400m-$600m in its first phase. For half of this sum, without a single soldier, I could return Somalia to stable prosperity. '"
[5] Colin Powell pronounced himself against intervention in Yugoslavia in September 1992.
[6] According to sources close to Boutros Ghali, secretary of the UN, the needs of intervention to provide food would require 5000 men. The USA sent 30,000...
[7] Close to 500,000 wounded and dead under the bombing.
[8] This scandal so named by its analogy with Watergate which brought Nixon' down, and then Irangate which rocked Reagan, reveals the importance of the financial aid given to the USA to Iraq through the intermediary of an Italian bank in the course of the year preceding the Gulf War. Aid used by this country to develop its research and infrastructure for creating atomic weapons ...
[9] See the article on the crisis in this issue.
[10] See the constitution of a Franco-German army corps as well as the project for an Italo-Franco-Spanish aero-naval force.
[11] On the war in Yugoslavia and the responsibility of the great powers see International Review nos 70 and 71.
[12] As for the economic agreements they are nothing to do with a real cooperation or agreement between national bourgeoisies, but economic competition does not mechanically engender political and military divergences. Before the breakup of the eastern bloc the US and Germany were very serious competitors on the economic terrain, which did not prevent them, being totally allied on the political and military level. The USSR has never been a serious rival of the US on the economic level, but their military rivalry nevertheless threatened the destruction of the planet for forty years. Today Germany can very well pass agreements with Great Britain, on the economic level in the framework of Europe, sometimes to the detriment of French interests. But that does not prevent Great Britain and Germany finding themselves in complete opposition on the political and military level, while France and Germany follow the same policy.
[13] See International Review no 70.
Far from going into the much prophesied 'recovery', the world economy continues to sink into the mire. At the heart of the industrialized world, the self-destructive ravages of capitalism in crisis have produced millions more unemployed and an even greater decline in the living conditions of those workers who still have jobs.
In spite of this however they are now claiming to have found a new way out. Confronted with the fact that all the old recipes to stimulate productive activity have proved useless, the governments of the big industrialized countries (with Clinton at the head) are proclaiming a 'new' doctrine: a return to "more state intervention". "Public works", financed by the nation states, this is to be the new magic formula to put new life into the decrepit machine of capitalist exploitation.
What lies behind this change in the way the western governments are talking? What chance of success do their 'new' policies have?
We ought to be well into the recovery of the world economy by now. For the last two years, the 'experts' have repeatedly promised it for "within six months"[1]. However 1992 has brought to fruition a truly catastrophic situation. At the heart of the system (that part of the globe which had been comparatively spared previously) those of the major economies who have been hit by the recession since 1990 - the United States, Great Britain and Canada - have never really managed to pull themselves out of it[2], while the economies of the other powers, Japan and the countries of mainland Europe, are being sucked into it.
Since 1990, the number of unemployed has risen by three and a half million in the United States and by one and a half million in Great Britain. The latter has experienced its deepest and longest recession since the thirties; the number of bankruptcies has increased by 40% during 1992. Japan has just 'officially' gone into recession for the first time in 18 years[3]. The same is true for Germany, where Kohl too has just' officially' recognized that the country is in recession. Government forecasts predict half a million more unemployed in 1993, while in what was East Germany it is estimated that 40% of the population who are in work do not have a stable job.
But leaving aside official predictions, the perspective for the coming years is clearly shown in the massive job losses announced in central sectors such as the steel or car industry, or in advanced sectors like computing or aeronautics. Eurofer, the EEC body responsible for steel, has announced that this sector is to shed 50,000 jobs in the next three years. General Motors, the leading industrial company in the world, which has already announced the closure of 21 of its factories world-wide, has just made it known that it has increased the number to 25. IBM, the giant of the computer industry internationally, which has already cut 20,000 jobs in 1991 and at the beginning of 1992 announced the loss of20,000 more, has just stated that it will in fact be 60,000. All the main civil aviation companies have announced redundancies (Boeing, one of the least affected by the crisis, has forecast the loss of 9,000 jobs in 1992 alone).
The reality of the crisis is making its relentless presence felt in every country[4] and in every sector, the basic ones and the more peripheral ones, in industry and in the services. The capitalist world is engulfed in a recession that is without precedent in its depth, geographic scope and in its duration. A recession which, as we have often demonstrated in these pages, is qualitatively different from the four that have preceded it since the 60s. A recession which reveals beyond doubt the chronic inability of capitalism to transcend its fundamental, historic contradictions (its inability to create sufficient outlets for its productive capacity). But this recession also reveals new difficulties for the bourgeoisie, difficulties that are the product of 'remedies' applied throughout two decades of a flight into credit and massive debt[5].
For the last two years the American government has had to get the economy going again by applying the old policy of facilitating credit by lowering interest rates. The interest rate of the Federal Bank of the United States has now been reduced 20 times and it has reached the point that, taking account of inflation, a private bank can borrow money and pay scarcely any interest in real terms. In spite of all these efforts, all signs of life in terms of growth remain horribly absent. The American economy is so hugely in debt that the private banks use these 'free' loans to repay a small part of their previous debts rather than using them for fresh investments[6].
Never has the economic perspective for capitalism been so bleak. Never has its impotence been so blatant. The miracle of 'Reaganomics', the miraculous return to 'pure' capitalism wallowing triumphant amid the ruins of 'communism' has culminated in a total fiasco.
More state intervention?
This is how the new, young democratic candidate for the presidency of the United States is presented with his new solution for the United States and the world.
"The only solution for the president (Clinton) is the one he's outlined throughout his campaign. That is, to boost the economy by increasing public spending on the infrastructure (road network, ports, bridges), on research and training. This will create jobs. What is just as important, this spending will contribute to accelerating growth in productivity in the long term and to real wages." (Lester Thurlow, one of the most noted economic advisors in the American Democratic party)[7]. Clinton has promised that the state would inject between 30 and 40 billion dollars into the economy in this way.
In Great Britain, the very conservative Major, responding to the first signs that the combativity of the working class is returning, and weighed down by economic bankruptcy, has suddenly abandoned his liberal creed 'against statification'. He too is chanting the same Keynesian refrain by announcing a "strategy for growth" and the injection of 1.5 billion dollars into the economy. Then it is turn of Delors, representative of the EEC, who goes further by insisting on the need to accompany the new policy with a strong dose of "co-operation between states": "This initiative to stimulate growth is not a classic Keynesian boost to the economy. It isn't simply a matter of putting money into circulation. We want above all to send the message that cooperation between states is on the agenda."[8]
At the same time, the Japanese government has decided to supply a massive amount of aid to the main sectors of its economy (90 billion dollars, which is the equivalent of 2.5 % GDP).
What is the significance of all this exactly?
The democratic propaganda in the United States, like that of some of the left parties in Europe, presents it as a change from the excessively 'liberal' policies of the Reagan period. After the verbiage of 'less state involvement' in that period, they are now claiming to return to greater fairness through the activity of that institution which is supposed to represent 'the common interests of the whole nation'.
In fact all it is, is the continuation of the tendency that is characteristic of decadent capitalism. The tendency, that is, to rely on the power of the state to keep the economic machine turning over, when left to itself the economy is increasingly paralyzed by the heightening of its internal contradictions.
The truth is that the capitalist economy has constantly increased the level of state control, ever since the First World War when each nation's survival began to depend upon whether it was able to carve a place for itself by force on a world market that had grown definitively too small. In decadent capitalism the tendency towards state capitalism is a universal tendency. It may be concretized at a different rate or in a different form, depending on which country and the historic period. But it never has stopped progressing, to the point where it has turned the state machine into the very heart of social and economic life in every country.
German militarism at the beginning of the century, Stalinism, fascism in the 30s, the public works of the New Deal in the United States that followed the economic depression of 1929, or those of the Popular Front in France in the same period, are simply manifestations of the same movement towards the statification of social life. This development did not stop after the Second World War. Quite the reverse. And 'Reaganomics', which were supposed to constitute a return to a 'liberal', less statified capitalism, did not interrupt this tendency either. The 'miracle' of the American recovery in the 80s was founded on the doubling of state debt and a spectacular increase in armaments expenditure. By the beginning of the 90s, after three Republican terms of office, the gross public debt represented nearly 60 % of American GDP (the figure was 40% at the beginning of the 80s) and the financing of this debt alone absorbs half of the national savings[9].
The policies of "deregulation" and "privatization" that were carried out throughout the 80s in all the industrialized countries did not produce a lessening of the role of the state in managing the economy[10]. These policies mainly served as a justification for redirecting state aid towards the more competitive sectors, eliminating less viable companies by reducing certain state grants and concentrating capital to an incredible degree (which has inevitably led to a growing fusion between the state and large 'private' capital in terms of management). At the social level, they inaugurated a trend towards redundancies and a tendency for jobs to become generally more insecure, as well as the reduction of so-called 'social' expenditure. After a decade of 'anti-statist liberalism', the state's grip on the economic life of society has not lessened. On the contrary, it has grown stronger because it has become more effective.
By the same token, the talk of "more state involvement" that is being put about today does not represent a reversal but a strengthening of this tendency.
What does the proposed change mean then?
Throughout the 80s, the capitalist economy went through the greatest orgy of speculation in its history. Now that the whole bubble has burst, the damage can only be limited by the iron hand of bureaucracy.[11]
But it also means that the state will constantly increase the amount of paper money it chums out. As the 'private' financial system cannot expand credit because it is so horrendously in debt and so totally devoid of speculative value, the state intends to get the machine going again by injecting money, by creating an artificial market. The state is to buy up "infrastructures" (road network, ports, bridges, etc), with the aim of orienting economic activity towards sectors more productive than speculation. It is to pay with ... paper, with money issued by the central banks without any cover whatsoever. In short, it means a further increase in the state deficit.
In fact, the policy of "public works" put forward today, is essentially the policy that Germany has been carrying out for the last two years in an attempt to 'reconstruct' the old GDR. And we can get some idea of the effect of this policy by considering what it has accomplished there. It has had a particularly marked effect in two areas: inflation and external trade. In 1989 Federal Germany had one of the lowest inflation rates in the world; it was in the forefront of the industrial countries. Today inflation there is the highest of the seven leading nations[12], with the exception of Italy. Two years ago West Germany had the biggest trade surplus globally, surpassing even that of Japan. Today it is cracking under the weight of a 50 % increase in imports.
Moreover in financial terms, Germany is one of the strongest and most 'stable' economies in the world[13]. This same policy applied in a country like the United States especially will have far more devastating effects in the short or medium term[14]. The state deficit and trade deficit, the two chronic ills that the American economy has suffered from for the last two decades are much higher than in Germany. Even if these deficits are at present lower than they were at the start of "Reaganomic" policies, their increase will have dramatic repercussions not only for the United States but also for the world economy, especially in terms of inflation and the anarchy in the exchange rates. On the other hand, the fragility of the American financial apparatus is such that an increase in the state deficit runs the risk of bringing about its' definitive collapse. In fact over the years the state has systematically taken responsibility for the bankruptcy of increasingly important and numerous banks and savings banks that have been unable to repay their debts. By giving a new boost to a policy of state debt the government is debilitating the last, and already feeble, guarantee of a financial order that everyone knows to be falling apart.
More cooperation between states?
It is no accident that Delors is insisting that the policy of public works ought to be accompanied by greater "cooperation between states". As the German experience shows, increased state expenditure is bound to result in an increase in imports and therefore worsen the trade imbalance. During the 30s the policy of public works was accompanied by a savage increase in protectionism - to the point of autarchy in Hitler's Germany. The same tendency is emerging today. No country wants to increase its own deficit in order to boost the economies of its neighbors and competitors. The statements of Clinton and his advisors, demanding a strong reinforcement of American protectionism, are particularly clear on the point.
Delors's appeal is no more than a pious wish. In the face of the aggravation of the world economic crisis, it is not the tendency towards more "co-operation between states" that is the order of the day; on the contrary it is an economic war waged by each against all. All the policies of co-operation, which are really aimed at making partial alliances to better confront other competitors, always work towards the strengthening of all these internal centrifugal forces. The heightening of the convulsions which are tearing the EEC apart, the most spectacular demonstration of which was the recent collapse of the EMS, bears witness to this. The same can be said of the tensions within the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, or the still-born attempts to establish a common market between the countries of the southern tip of Latin America or the countries of the "Andean pact".
Protectionism has developed unceasingly throughout the 80s. In spite of all their talk about "the free circulation of goods", in spite of this principle that western capitalism has trumpeted abroad as an expression of the "rights of man" (bourgeois man), the fetters on world trade have gone on and on multiplying[15].
The tendency is towards the exacerbation, rather than the attenuation, of the relentless trade war facing the large commercial powers, of which the GAIT negotiations are just a small part. The strengthening of the tendency towards state capitalism, aggravated by the policy of "public works" , can only make it all the more acute.
Obviously governments can never remain inactive in the face of the catastrophic state of their economies. For as long as the working class has not managed to definitively destroy the political power of the international bourgeoisie, the latter will go on running the machine of capitalist exploitation in one way or another, however decadent and decomposed it may be. Exploiting classes do not commit suicide. But the' solutions' that they are able to come up with are inevitably characterized by two things. Firstly, they resort more and more to intervention by the state that organized instrument of force controlled by the dominant class. It is the only instrument able to ensure by coercion the survival of mechanisms which tend towards paralysis and self-destruction. That is what all the current talk of "more state intervention" means. Secondly, these 'solutions' become increasingly aberrant and absurd, as we can see in the current GATT negotiations. Different fractions of world capital, bunched around their respective states, confront each other to decide how many million hectares of agricultural land is to be left barren in Europe (the 'solution' to the problem of agricultural overproduction). In the meantime every television screen in the world covers the numerous famines in Africa, Somalia, for the purpose of war propaganda.
Decades of Stalinist and 'socialist' ideology has inculcated workers with the lie that statification of the economy is synonymous with an improvement of workers' conditions of existence. But the state that exists within a capitalist society can only be a state that represents capital, the state of the capitalist class (rich owners or big bureaucrats, that is). The inexorable strengthening of the state that they are talking about will bring nothing to the working class except more misery, more repression, more wars.
RV
[1] In December 1991, no 50 of Economic perspectives for the OECD reads:
"Every country should experience an increase in demand as a similar expansion takes place more or less simultaneously in other countries; the recovery of world trade is in sight ... The acceleration in activity should be confirmed in Spring 1992 ... This development will produce a progressive growth in employment and a recovery in business investment ..." We should note that even at the time the same 'experts' had to conclude that, "Growth in activity within the OECD in the second quarter of 1991 seems weaker than the Economic perspectives predicted in July ..."
[2] The few signs of recovery that have been manifested up to now in the United States are very fragile and do not indicate a real reversal of the tendency. They have more the appearance of a temporary slowdown in the decline, a product of the desperate attempts on the part of Bush during the electoral campaign.
[3] The technical definition of entry into recession (according to the American criteria) is two consecutive quarters of negative growth in GDP (gross domestic product, which means all production including the salary of the state bureaucracy which is taken as producing the equivalent of its salary). In the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1992 Japanese GDP fell by 0.2 and 0.4%. But in the same period the fall in industrial production in relation to the previous year was more than 6%.
[4] We will not return here to the development of the situation in the 'third world' countries whose economies have been steadily sinking with no remission since the beginning of the 80s. However it is interesting to make some remarks about the development of the countries once called "communist", those countries whose entry into the "world market" was supposed to make them prosperous and turn them into a rich market for the western economies. The dislocation of the old USSR has been accompanied by an economic disaster that has no equal in history. By the end of 1992 the number of unemployed has already reached 10 million and inflation is increasing at an annual rate of 14,000% - a figure which surpasses all comment. As for the countries of Eastern Europe, the economies of all of them are in recession and Hungary, the most advanced, which was the first to implement "capitalist reforms" and which ought to find it easiest to enjoy the benefits of liberalism, is being swept by a devastating wave of bankruptcies. The unemployment rate has already reached 11 % officially and is forecast to double throughout next year. As for Cuba, the last bastion of so-called "real socialism", annual production in 1992 has fallen to half that of 1989! The only exception remaining is China which starts at a level which is already exceptionally low (industrial production in People's China is not much higher than that of Belgium). Its present rate of growth is relatively high because of the expansion of areas "open to the capitalist economy" where they burn the massive credits that Japan grants them.
As for the four little dragons of "capitalist" Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), their exceptional growth is beginning to fall in its turn.
[5] See in particular, 'A recession unlike the others' and 'Economic catastrophe at the heart of the industrialized world', in International Review, nos 70 and 71.
[6] The total debt of the American economy (the government plus businesses plus individuals) is equivalent to nearly two years' national product.
[7] Le Monde, 17 November 1992.
[8] Liberation, 24 November 1992.
[9] The development of the public debt is a phenomenon that has characterized this decade in particular. What it means concretely is that the state takes on the responsibility of supplying a regular return, a part of social surplus value, in the form of interest on an increasing volume of capital, which is invested in "treasury bonds". This means that a growing number of capitalists no longer derive their income from exploitation at businesses belonging to them but from taxes raised by the state.
We should note that the increase in the public debt for the EEC, as a percentage of GDP, is more than that of the United States (62%).
[10] Even if we look at it from a purely quantitative point of view, measuring the involvement of the state in the economy by the proportion of the gross national product that public administration costs represent, this rate is higher at the beginning of the 90s than at the beginning of the 80s. When Reagan was elected, the figure was in the order of 32 %; when Bush left the presidency it was over 37%.
[11] American banks and savings banks going bankrupt, Japanese banks in difficulties, the collapse of the Tokyo stock exchange (already equal to the 1929 crash), the bankruptcy of a growing number of finance companies, etc, these are the first direct consequences of the crazed speculation of yesterday. Only the state can cope with the financial catastrophes that are taking place.
[12] United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Canada.
[13] What is more, the German government is committed to financing the state deficit by means of international loans while attempting to keep inflation under control by restricting (with diminishing success, to be sure) the expansion of the monetary mass and keeping interest rates very high.
[14] In the case of countries like Italy, Spain or Belgium the state debt has reached such heights (over 100% of GDP in Italy, 120% in Belgium) that such a policy is quite simply unthinkable.
[15] These fetters on trade do not take the form of customs duties so much as restrictions pure and simple: import quotas, agreements on self-limitation, "anti-dumping" legislation, rules governing the quality of products, etc. " ... the proportion of commercial exchanges accompanied by non-tariff measures has greatly increased in the United States as well as in the European community, which together represent nearly 75% of imports within the OECD (excluding combustibles) n OECD, The development of structural reform: a view of the whole, 1992.
In the first part of this article (International Review 71 [200]), we saw how the Russian revolution was not, as the bourgeoisie's propaganda says, a ‘mere coup D'Etat', but constituted the most gigantic and conscious movements of the exploited masses in history - rich in experience, initiative and creativity. It was - despite its later defeat - the clearest proof that the working class is the only revolutionary class in society, the only one that is capable of saving humanity from the catastrophe which decomposing capitalism is rushing towards.
October 1917 gave us a fundamental lesson: the bourgeoisie will not stand aside faced with the revolutionary struggle of the labouring masses. On the contrary, it will try to sabotage it by any mean possible. Therefore, apart from the carrot and stick, it uses a very dangerous weapon: sabotage from the inside carried out by the bourgeoisie's forces dressed up in ‘working class' and ‘radical' clothes - then the ‘Socialist' parties, today the parties of the ‘left' and ‘extreme left', and the unions.
The sabotage of the Soviets by the Social-Traitor parties which allowed the apparatus of the bourgeois state to remain standing represented the principle threat to the revolution begun in February. In this second part we will elaborate on this problem and the means by which the proletariat overcame it through the renovation of the Soviets, the Bolshevik party and the insurrection.
The bourgeoisie present the February Revolution as a movement towards ‘democracy' violated by the Bolshevik coup. This myth consists in opposing February to October, presenting the first as an authentic ‘democratic' festival and the second as a coup d'Etat ‘against the popular will.'
This lie expresses the fury felt by the bourgeoisie because events between February and October did not work out in the way they wanted. The bourgeois thought that as time passed after the convulsions associated with the overthrow of the Czar in February, the masses would quietly return to their homes and leave the bourgeoisie to manage politics at their own leisure, legitimised from time to time by ‘democratic' elections. However, the proletariat did not take the bait. Instead it initiated an immense activity, became increasingly conscious of its historic mission and provided itself with the means to carry out its struggle: the Soviets. In this way it posed a situation of dual power, "either the bourgeoisie took hold of the old state apparatus, using it to its own ends, in which case the Soviets would have had to withdraw from the stage, or these would convert it into the basis of a new state, liquidating not only the old political apparatus but the regimen of the ruling classes for whose service it was founded" (Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution. Vol. 1, ‘The new power').
The ruling class used the card of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary Parties, former workers' parties which with the war had crossed over to the bourgeois camp, in order to destroy the Soviets and to impose the authority of the bourgeois state. At the beginning of the February Revolution, these parties gained an immense confidence in the workers' ranks, which they utilised in order to control the executive organs of the Soviets and to conceal the actions of the bourgeoisie: "Wherever a bourgeois minister could not appear in defence of the government before the revolutionary workers or in the Soviets, Stobelev, Tsereteli, Chernov or some other ‘socialist' minister appeared (or to be precise, was sent by the bourgeois) and faithfully performed their assignment; he would do his level best to defend the cabinet, whitewash the capitalists and fool the people by making promise after promise and by advising people to wait, and wait" (Lenin, ‘Lessons of the Revolution' Selected Works, Vol. 2, page 163).
From February an extremely dangerous situation developed for the working masses: they struggled (with the Bolsheviks in the vanguard) to end the war, to solve the agrarian problem, and for the abolition of capitalist exploitation. In order to do this they created the Soviets and had limitless confidence in them. However, the Soviets, which sprang from within the proletariat, were captured by the Menshevik and Social Revolutionary demagogues, who negated their most essential needs, using all kinds of sabotaging tactics.
1. They continually promised peace, while leaving the Provisional Government to continue the war.
On the 27th of March the Provisional Government tried to unleash the Dardanelles offensive whose objective was the conquest of Constantinople. On the 18th of April Miliukov, the foreign Minister, ratified the famous note confirming Russia's adhesion to the Entente gang (France and Great Britain). In May, Kerensky undertook a campaign at the front to raise the soldiers' moral and to make them fight, a campaign which plumbed the depths of cynicism: "you will bring peace on the point of your bayonets". Again in June and in August, the Social Democrats, in close collaboration with the hateful Czarist generals, tried to drag the workers and soldiers into a new military slaughter.
In the same way, these great peddlers of ‘human rights' tried to re-establish brutal military discipline in the army, restoring the death penalty, and persuading the soldiers' committees not to provoke the officers. For example, when the Petrograd Soviet published its famous ‘order no 1' that prohibited corporeal punishment for soldiers and defended their rights and dignity, the social traitors of the executive "sent to the printer, by way of antidote, an appeal to the soldiers, which under the pretence of condemning lynch law for officers, demanded the soldiers' subordination to the old commanding staff" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol. 1, ‘The Ruling Group and The War', page 265).
2. They endlessly spouted on about the "solution of the agrarian problem" while leaving the landlords' power intact and crushing the peasant revolts.
Thus, they systematically blocked even the most timid orders about the agrarian question - for example, the one which would have stopped the transferring of land. Instead they returned the land spontaneously occupied by the peasants to the landlords; punitive expeditions were sent to crush the peasants' revolts with blood and fire and the knout was restored to the headmen.
3. They blocked the application of the 8 hour day, and permitted the owners to dismantle the factories.
The bosses were allowed to sabotage production with the aim of, on the one hand, starving the workers to death and on the other, dispersing and demoralising them "Taking advantage of modern capitalist production's close relationship with the national and international banks and with the other organisations of unified capital (employers unions, trusts, etc.) the capitalists began to carry out carefully worked-out and widespread, systematic sabotage. They used whatever means they could, starting with the absence of administration in the factories, the artificial disorganisation of industrial activity, the hiding and flight of materials, finishing with the burning and closure of firms devoid of resources" (Ana M Pankratova, Los consejos de fabricas en Ia Rusia en 1917 ‘The development of the struggle between capital and labour and the first conference of factory committees').
4. They unleashed a ferocious repression of the workers' struggles.
"In Kharkov thirty thousand coal miners organised, adopting the preamble of the Industrial Workers of the World's constitution: "The working class and the employing class have nothing in common". Dispersed by Cossacks, some were locked out by the mine owners, and the rest declared a general strike. Minister of Commerce and Industry Konovalov appointed his assistant, Orlov, with plenary powers, to settle the trouble. Orlov was hated by the miners but the Central Executive Committee not only supported his appointment, but refused to demand that the Cossacks be recalled from the Don Basin" (John Reed, Ten Days That Shook The World, page 63).
5. They deceived the masses with empty words about "revolutionary democracy" while sabotaging the measures of the Soviets.
They tried to liquidate the Soviets from the inside: through not carrying out their resolutions; postponing plenary meetings and leaving it all to the conspiracy of small committees. They sought to divide and confront the exploited masses: "Already in April the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries had begun to appeal to the provinces against Petrograd, to the soldiers against the workers, to the cavalry against the machine-gunners. They had given the troops' representatives privileges in the Soviets above the factories; they had favoured the small and scattered enterprises as against the giants of the metal industry. Themselves representing the past, they sought support in backwardness of all kinds. With the ground slipping under their feet, they were now inciting the rear-guard against the advance guard" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol. 2, ‘The "July Days": Culmination and Rout', page 65).
They tried to get the Soviets to hand over their powers to the ‘democratic' organs: the Zemstvos - local organs setup under the Czar; the Moscow ‘democratic' conference of August, a real nest of vipers which united such ‘representative' forces as the nobles, military, old Black Hundreds, Kadets etc - all of whom blessed Kornilov's military coup.
In September they tried to regulate the Soviets through the calling of the Pre-Democratic Conference in which the delegates of the bourgeois and nobility had, through the express desire of the social traitors, 683 representatives compared to the Soviets' 230. Kerensky promised the American Ambassador "We will make the Soviets die a natural death. The centre of gravity of political life will progressively move from the Soviets to the new democratic organs of autonomous representation".
The Soviets that called for the proletariat to take power were ‘democratically' crushed by force of arms: "The Bolsheviks, having secured a majority in the Kaluga Soviet, set free some political prisoners. With the sanction of the Government Commissar the Municipal Duma called in troops from Minsk, and bombarded the Soviet headquarters with artillery. The Bolsheviks yielded, but as they left the building Cossacks attacked them crying ‘this is what we'll do to all the other Bolshevik Soviets, including those of Moscow and Petrograd" (Reed, op cit, page 63).
The workers saw how their class organs were being confiscated, denatured and chained to a policy that was against their interests. Thus, as we saw in the first part of this article, the political crises of April, June and, above all July posed the necessity to take decisive action: to renovate the Soviets in order to orientate them towards the taking of power.
The Soviets were - as Lenin said - organs based "on the direct initiative of the people from below" (Lenin, ‘Dual Power', Selected Works Vol. 2, page 34). This enabled the masses to rapidly change them from the moment they realised that they were not responding to their interests. From the middle of August the life of the Soviets accelerated at a dizzying pace. Meetings took place day and night without interruption. Workers and soldiers conscientiously discussed, passed resolutions, voted at various times throughout the day. In this climate of the masses' intense self-activity numerous Soviets (Helsingfors, the Urals, Kronstadt, Reval, the Baltic Fleet etc) elected revolutionary majorities formed by Bolsheviks, Internationalist Mensheviks, Maximalists, Left Social Revolutionaries, Anarchists etc.
On the 31st of August the Petrograd Soviet adopted a Bolshevik motion. Its leaders - the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries - refused to apply it and dismissed it. On the 9th of September the Soviet elected a Bolshevik majority. Moscow followed immediately afterwards and this continued throughout the rest of the country. The masses elected the Soviets they needed and thus prepared themselves for the taking and exercising of power.
In the masses' struggle for the control of their organisations against the sabotage of the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks played a decisive role.
The centre of the Bolsheviks' activity was the development of the Soviets: "The Conference repeats that it is necessary to carry out a many-sided activity within the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, to increase the number of Soviets, to consolidate their power and to weld together our party's proletarian internationalist groups within the Soviets" (Resolutions of the 8th Bolshevik Conference, April 1917).
This activity had as its central axis the development of class consciousness which "requires a patient work of clarification of proletarian class consciousness and of the cohesion of the proletarians of the city and country side" (idem). This meant having confidence, on the one hand, in the critical and analytical capacity of the masses[1]: "Where as the agitation of the Menshevik and Social Revolutionaries was scattered, self-contradictory and oftenest of all evasive, the agitation of the Bolsheviks was distinguished by its concentrated and well thought-out character. The Compromisers talked themselves out of difficulties; the Bolsheviks went to meet them. A continual analysis of the objective situation, a testing of slogans upon facts, a serious attitude to the enemy even when he was none too serious, gave special strength and power of conviction to the Bolshevik agitation" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol. 2, page 295). On the other hand, in its capacity for unity and self-organisation: "Don't put your trust in words. Don't be misled by promises. Don't overestimate our forces. Organise in every factory, in every regiment and every company, in every residential block. Work at your organising every day, every hour, do that work yourselves, for this is something you cannot entrust to anybody else" (Lenin, Introduction to the Resolutions of the 7th (April) All Russian Conference of the RSDLP(B) [201]).
The Bolsheviks did not try to force the masses to submit to a preconceived plan of action, leading them like a sergeant major leads his troops. They understood that the revolution was the work of the masses' direct action and that it was through this direct action that they carried out their historical mission: "The chief strength of Lenin lay in his understanding the inner logic of the movement and guiding his policy by it. He did not impose his plan on the masses, he helped the masses to recognise and realise their own plan" (Trotsky, op cit, vol. 1, ‘Re-arming the Party', page 306).
The party did not develop its role as the vanguard by saying to the class "here is the truth, on your knees". On the contrary, it was affected by all the uncertainties and worries that ran throughout the class; and as with the rest of the class, although in a different way, it was exposed to the destructive influence of bourgeois ideology. It was able to carry out its role as the motor in the development of class consciousness because, through a whole series of political debates, it overcame the errors and insufficiencies of its old positions and fought a life and death struggle to eradicate the opportunist deviations which could have pulled it down.
From the beginning of March an important section of the Bolsheviks had posed the necessity of reuniting with the Socialist parties (Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries). They put forward an apparently infallible argument, which in the first moments of general euphoria, and given the masses' lack of experience, had quite an impact on them: at a time when they are marching side by side why don't the Socialist parties unite? Why confuse the workers with 2 or 3 distinct parties claiming to represent the proletariat and socialism?
In fact this argument posed a serious threat to the revolution: the party which from 1902 had fought opportunism and reformism, which from 1914 had been the most consistent and dedicated in defending the international revolution against the First World War, was running dangerously close to diluting itself into the turbid waters of the social traitor parties. How was the proletariat to overcome within itself the confusions and illusions that it suffered? How was it going to combat the manoeuvres and traps of the enemy? How was it going to keep its struggles in the right direction faced with moments of vacillation or defeat? Lenin and the base of the party victoriously fought this false unity which really meant uniting itself behind the bourgeoisie.
To begin with the Bolshevik party was a small minority. Many workers had illusions in the Provisional Government and saw it as an emanation of the Soviets, when in reality it was their worst enemy. In March and April the leading Bolshevik organs in Russia adopted a conciliatory attitude to the Provisional Government, leading them to fall into open support for the imperialist war.
A movement at the base of the party (the Vyborg Committee) arose against this opportunist deviation, and it found its clearest expression in Lenin and his April Theses. For Lenin the key position was "No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion-breeding ‘demand' that this government, a government of capitalists should cease to be an imperialist government" (Lenin, The April Theses [202], no. 3, Selected Works, Vol 2, page 30).
Lenin similarly denounced the activities of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries against the Soviets: "The ‘mistake' of the leaders I have named lies in their petty-bourgeois position, in the fact that instead of clarifying the minds of the workers, they are befogging them; instead of dispelling petty-bourgeois illusions, they are instilling them; instead of freeing the people from bourgeois influence, they are strengthening that influence" (Lenin, The Dual Power [203], Selected Works Vol. 2, page 35).
Against those who said this work of denunciation was of "little practical use" Lenin argued "In reality it is most practical revolutionary work; for there is no advancing a revolution that has come to a standstill, that has choked itself with phrases, and that keeps ‘marking time'... because of the unreasoning trust of the people.
"Only by overcoming this unreasoning trust (and we can and should overcome it only ideologically, by comradely persuasion, by pointing to the lessons of experience) can we set our selves free from the prevailing orgy of revolutionary phrase-mongering and really stimulate the consciousness both of the proletariat and of the masses in general, as well as their bold and determined initiative in the localities" (Lenin, The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution [204], Selected Works, Vol. 2, page 42).
The defence of the proletariat's historical experience, of its class positions, means that one is in a minority inside the workers on many occasions. This is because "The masses vacillate between confidence in their old masters, the capitalists, and hatred for them; between confidence in the new class, which opens the road to a bright future and a continuing lack of confidence in its own world-historic role" (Lenin, ‘The Lessons of the Crisis', April 1917).
In order to help overcome these vacillations, "It is not a question of numbers, but of giving correct expression to the ideas and policies of the truly revolutionary proletariat" (Lenin ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution').
As with all authentic proletarian parties, the Bolsheviks were an intransigent part of the class movement. Bolshevik militants were the most active in the struggles, in the Soviets, in the factory councils, in meetings. The July Days made clear the party's unyielding commitment to the class.
As we saw in the first part of this article, at the end of June the situation was made intolerable by hunger, war, and chaos, exacerbated by the hidden policies of the bourgeoisie and by the fact that the Central Executive Committee, still in the hands of the social traitors, did nothing but sabotage the Soviets. The workers and soldiers, above all those in the capital, began to suspect the social traitors. Impatience, desperation, rage became stronger and stronger in the workers' ranks, pushing them towards taking power straight away. However, the conditions were not yet ripe:
- the workers and soldiers in the provinces were not at the same political level as their brothers in the capital;
- the peasants still had confidence in the Provisional Government;
- amongst the workers of the capital the dominant idea was not really to take power but to use an act of force to make the ‘Socialist' leaders "take real power". In other words, to ask the bourgeoisie's fifth column to take power in the workers' name.
In such conditions to launch a decisive confrontation with the bourgeoisie and its hirelings was to embark on an adventure that could have gravely compromised the destiny of the revolution. It was an action that could have led to a definitive defeat.
The Bolsheviks warned against such an action, but when they saw that the masses were not heeding their warning and carried on, they did not stand to one side and say "it's your funeral". The party participated in the action, trying to stop it being turned into a disastrous adventure, and trying to allow the workers to draw the maximum number of lessons from it, in order to prepare for the authentic moment of insurrection. It fought with all its might in order to ensure that the Petrograd Soviet, through serious discussion and by giving itself adequate leaders, would place itself in agreement with the political orientation that reigned in the masses.
However, the movement was unsuccessful and suffered a defeat. The bourgeoisie and its Menshevik and Social Revolutionary acolytes launched a brutal repression against the workers, and above all the Bolsheviks. The proletariat paid a heavy price: arrests, executions, exile... Nevertheless, the sacrifice decisively helped the class to limit the effects of the defeat it suffered and to pose the question of insurrection in a more conscious and organised way, in better conditions.
The party's commitment to the class allowed it, throughout August, once the worst moments of the bourgeoisie's reaction were over, to complete the party/class synthesis which was indispensable for the triumph of the revolution: "During the February overturn all the many preceding years' work of the Bolsheviks came to fruition, and progressive workers educated by the party found their place in the struggle, but there was still no direct leadership from the party. In the April events the slogans of the party manifested their dynamic force, but the movement itself developed independently. In June the enormous influence of the party revealed itself, but the masses were still functioning within the limits of a demonstration officially summoned by the enemy. Only in July did the Bolshevik Party, feeling the pressure of the masses, come out into the street against all the other parties, and not only with its slogans, but with its organised leadership, determine the fundamental character of the movement. The value of a close-knit vanguard was first fully manifested in the July Days, when the party - at great cost - defended the proletariat from defeat, and safeguarded its own future revolution" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol. 2, ‘Could the Bolsheviks have seized the Power in July?', page 91).
The situation of dual power which dominated the whole period from February to October was an unstable and dangerous time. Its excessive prolongation, due to neither class being able to impose itself, was above all damaging for the proletariat: if the impotence and chaos that marked this period accentuated the unpopularity of the ruling class, it at the same time exhausted and disorientated the working masses. They were getting drained in sterile struggles and all this began to alienate the sympathies of the intermediate classes towards the proletariat. This, therefore, demanded the taking of power through the insurrection to decant and decide the situation: "either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy and resolute tempo, breaking all barriers with an iron hand and place its goals ever farther ahead, or it will quite soon be thrown backwards behind its feeble point of departure and suppressed by the counter-revolution" (Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution [205]).
Insurrection is an art. It has to be carried out at a precise moment in the evolution of the revolutionary situation, neither too soon, which would cause it to fail, nor too late, which would mean an opportunity being missed, leaving the revolutionary movement to become a disintegrating victim of the counterrevolution.
At the beginning of September the bourgeoisie, through Kornilov, tried to carry out a coup - the signal for the bourgeoisie's final offensive to overthrow the Soviets and to fully restore its power.
The proletariat, with the massive cooperation of the soldiers, thwarted the bourgeoisie's plan and at the same time accelerated the decomposition of the army: soldiers in numerous regiments pronounced themselves in favour of the expulsion of officers and of the organisation of soldiers' councils - in short, they came out on the side of the revolution.
As we have previously seen, the renewal of the Soviets from the middle of August was clearly changing the balance of forces in favour of the proletariat. The defeat of the Kornilov coup accelerated this process.
From the middle of September a tide of resolutions calling for the taking of power flooded in from the local and regional Soviets (Kronstadt, Ekaterinoslav etc). The Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region held on the 11-13th of October openly called for the insurrection. In Minsk the Regional Congress of Soviets decided to support the insurrection and to send troops of soldiers loyal to the revolution. On the 12th "Workers of one of the most revolutionary factories of the capital (the old Parviainen) made the following answer to the attacks of the bourgeoisie: "We declare that we will go into the street when we deem it advisable. We are not afraid of the approaching struggle, and we confidently believe that we will come off victorious" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol 3, ‘The Military Revolutionary Committee', page 91). On the 17th October the Petrograd Soldiers' Soviet decided that "The
Petrograd garrison no longer recognises the Provisional Government. Our government is the Petrograd Soviet. We will only carry out the orders of the Petrograd Soviet issued through its Military Revolutionary Committee" (J Reed, Ten Days That Shook The World [206]). The Vyborg district Soviet called a demonstration in support of this resolution, which sailors joined in. A Moscow Liberal paper - quoted by Trotsky - described the atmosphere in the city thus: "In the districts, in the factories of Petrograd, Novsld, Obujov and Putilov, Bolshevik agitation for the insurrection has reached its highest level. The animated state of the workers is such that they are disposed to carry out demonstrations at any time".
The increase of peasants' revolts in September constituted another element in the maturation of the necessary conditions for the insurrection: "It would be sheer treachery to the peasants to allow the peasant revolts to be suppressed when we control the Soviets of both capitals. It would be to lose, and justly lose every ounce of the peasants' confidence. In the eyes of the peasants we would be putting ourselves on a level with the Lieberdans and other scoundrels" (Lenin, ‘The Crisis Has Matured', SW Vol. 2, page 348).
However, the international situation was the key factor for the revolution. Lenin made this clear in his letter to the Bolshevik comrades attending the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region (8-10-17): "Our revolution is passing through a highly critical period. This crisis coincides with the great crisis - the growth of the world socialist revolution and the struggle waged against it by world imperialism. A gigantic task is being presented to the responsible leaders of our party, and failure to perform it will involve the danger of a complete collapse of the internationalist proletarian movement. The situation is such that, in truth, delay would be fatal" (Lenin, SW, vol. 2, page 395). In another letter (1.10.17) Lenin made it clear that "The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets, they must take power at once. By so doing they will save the world revolution (for otherwise there is danger of a deal between the imperialists of all countries, who, after the shootings in Germany, will be more accommodating to each other and will unite against us), the Russian revolution (otherwise a wave of real anarchy may become stronger than we are) and the lives of hundreds of thousands of people at the front" (Lenin, SW, vol. 2, page 391).
This understanding of the international responsibility of the Russian proletariat was not confined to Lenin and the Bolsheviks. On the contrary, many sectors of workers recognised it:
- on the 1st of May 1917, "throughout Russia, side by side with soldiers, prisoners of war were taking part in the processions under the same banners, sometimes singing the same song in different voices ... The Kadet minister Shingarev, during one of the Conferences with the trench delegates, defended the order of Guchkov against ‘unnecessary indulgence' towards prisoners of war... this remark did not meet with the slightest sympathy. The Conference decisively expressed itself in favour of relieving the conditions of the prisoners of war" (Trotsky, op cit, Vol. 2, pages 313, 269);
- "A soldier from the Romanian front, thin, tragical, and fierce cried: "comrades! we are starving at the front, we are stiff from cold. We are dying for no reason. I ask the American comrades to carry word to America that the Russians will never give up their revolution until they die. We will hold the front with all our strength until the peoples of the world rise up and help us! Tell the American workers to rise and fight for the social revolution" (J Reed, op cit, page 52).
The Kerensky government intended to disperse the most revolutionary regiments of Petrograd, Moscow, Vladimir, Reval etc. to the front or to remote regions in order to behead the struggle. At the same time, the Liberal and Menshevik press launched a campaign of calumnies against the soldiers, accusing them of "smugness" of "not giving their lives for the Motherland" etc. The workers of the capital responded immediately: numerous factory assemblies supported the soldiers, called for "all power to the Soviets" and passed resolutions calling for the arming of the workers.
In this atmosphere, the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet on the 9th of October decided to create a Military Revolutionary Committee with the initial aim of controlling the government. However, it was soon transformed into the centre for the organisation of the insurrection. It regrouped representatives of the Petrograd Soviet, the Sailors' Soviet, the Finlandia region Soviet, the railway union, the congress of factory councils and the Red Guard.
The latter was a workers' body that was "formed for the first time during the 1905 revolution and was reborn during the March days of 1917, when there was a necessity for a force to maintain order in the city. In this period the Red Guard were armed and the Provisional Governments efforts to disarm them came to nothing. In each crisis that arose during the course of the revolution, detachments of the Red Guards appeared in the streets. They had no military training or organisation, but were overflowing with revolutionary enthusiasm" (J Reed, op cit).
On the foundations of this regroupment of class forces, the Military Revolutionary Committee (from now on referred to as the RMC) convoked a conference of regimental committees which on the 18th of October openly discussed the question of the insurrection. The majority of the committees, apart from 2 which were against and 2 that declared themselves neutral (there were another 5 regiments which did not agree with the Conference), pronounced in favour of the insurrection. Similarly the Conference passed a resolution in favour of the arming of the workers. This resolution was already being put into practice: en masse the workers went to the state arsenals and demand all the arms. When the government prohibited the handing over of arms, the workers and employees of the Peter and Paul Fortress (a reactionary bastion) decided to place themselves at the disposal of the RMC, and along with other arsenals organised the distribution of arms to the workers.
On the 21st of October the Conference of regimental committees adopted the following Resolution: "1) The garrison of Petrograd and its environs promises the RMC its full support in all its actions. 2) The garrison appeals to the Cossacks: we invite you to our meeting to-morrow. You are welcome, brother Cossacks! 3) The All-Russian Congress of Soviets must take power. The garrison promises to put all its forces at the disposal of the Congress. Rely upon us, authorised representatives of the power of the soldiers, workers and peasants, you can count on us. We are all at our posts to conquer or die" (Trotsky, op cit, vol. 3, page 108-109).
Here we have the characteristic features of a workers' insurrection: the creative initiative of the masses, straight forward and showing admirable organisation; discussions and debates which give rise to resolutions that synthesise the level of consciousness that the masses have reached; reliance on persuasion and conviction, as in the call to the Cossacks to abandon the government gang or the passionate and dramatic meeting of the soldiers of the Peter and Paul Fortress which took place on the 23rd of October, where it was decided to obey no one but the RMC. These characteristic features are, above all, expressions of a movement for the emancipation of humanity, of the direct, passionate, creative initiative and leadership of the exploited masses.
The "Soviet day" on the 22nd of October, which was called by the Petrograd Soviet, definitively sealed the insurrection: in all the districts and factories meetings and assemblies took place all day, which overwhelmingly agreed on the slogans "down with Kerensky" and "all power to the Soviets". This was a gigantic act where workers, employees, soldiers, many Cossacks, women, and children openly united in their commitment to the insurrection.
It is not possible within the outline of this article to recount all of the details (we recommend reading Trotsky's and Reed's books, which we have mentioned). What we want to make clear is the massive, open and collective nature of the insurrection "The insurrection was thus set for a fixed date, the 25th of October. And this was not agreed on in some secret session, but openly and publicly, and the revolution was victoriously carried out on the 25th of October precisely (6th of November), as had been established beforehand. World history has known a great many revolts and revolutions, but could one find another insurrection by the oppressed class that had been openly and publicly set for a precise date and which had been triumphantly carried out on the day nominated beforehand. For this reason and various others, the November Revolution is unique and without comparison" (Trotsky, The November Revolution, 1919).
The Bolsheviks had clearly posed the question of the insurrection in the workers' and soldiers' assemblies from September; they occupied the most combative and decisive positions in the RMC and the Red Guard; it was they who swung the barracks where there were doubts or which were for the Provisional Government. This was done through convincing the soldiers: Trotsky's speech was crucial in bringing over the soldiers of the Peter and Paul Fortress. They also untiringly denounced the manoeuvres, accusations and traps of the Mensheviks, and struggled for the calling of the 2nd Congress of Soviets against the sabotage of the social traitors.
Nevertheless, it was not the Bolsheviks, but the whole proletariat of Petrograd who decided on and carried out the insurrection. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries had repeatedly tried to delay the holding of the 2nd Congress of Soviets. It was through the pressure of the masses, the insistence of the Bolsheviks, the sending of thousands of telegrams from the local Soviets demanding its convocation, that finally obliged the CEC - the lair of the social traitors - to call it for the 25th.
"After the revolution of the 25th of October, the Mensheviks, and above all Martov, talked a lot about the seizure of power behind the Soviets' and workers' backs. It is hard to imagine a more shameless deformation of the facts. When the Soviets - in session - decided by a majority to call the 2nd Congress on the 25th of October, the Mensheviks said "you have decided the Revolution"; when in the Petrograd Soviet, by an overwhelming majority, we decided to refuse to allow the dispersal of the regiments away from the capital, the Mensheviks said: "This is the beginning of the revolution", when in the Petrograd Soviet we created the RMC the Mensheviks made it clear that "this is the organism of the armed insurrection". But when the insurrection, which had been planned, created and "discovered" beforehand by this organ, exploded on the decisive day, the same Mensheviks cried: "a plot by conspirators has provoked a revolution behind the workers' backs!"" (Trotsky, ibid).
The proletariat provided itself with the means of force - the general arming of the workers, the formation of the RMC, the insurrection - in order that the Congress of Soviets could effectively take power. If the Congress of Soviets had decided "to take power" without first carrying out these measures such a decision would have been an empty gesture easily ripped apart by the revolution's enemies. It is not possible to see the insurrection as an isolated formal act: it has to be seen within the overall dynamic of the class and, concretely, within a process on the international level where the conditions for the revolution were developing, and within Russia where innumerable local Soviets were calling for the effective taking of power: the Petrograd, Moscow, Tula, the Urals, Siberia, Jukov Soviets simultaneously carried out the triumphant insurrection.
The Congress of Soviets took the definitive decision, completely confirming the validity of the initiative of the proletariat in Petrograd: "Based upon the will of the great majority of workers, soldiers, and peasants, based upon the triumphant uprising of the Petrograd working men and soldiers, the congress assumes power ... The congress resolves: that all local power shall be transferred to the Soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' Deputies, which must enforce revolutionary order". (J Reed, op cit)
Adalen, 5/10/92.
[1] We have never denied the errors the Bolshevik Party committed, nor its degeneration and transformation into the spinal column of the odious Stalinist dictatorship (we will deal with this process in future articles of this series). The role of the Bolshevik Party, as well as an implacable critique of its errors and its degeneration, have been made in various articles in our International Review: ‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution' and ‘The Lessons of Kronstadt' (no. 3); ‘Defence Of The Proletarian Nature of The October Revolution' (nos. 12 and 13). The essential reason for the degeneration of proletarian political organisations and parties is due to the weight of bourgeois ideology in their ranks, a weight which constantly creates tendencies towards opportunism and centrism (see the ‘Resolution on Centrism and Opportunism' in International Review no 44).
As we saw in the last article, the Communist Manifesto was written in anticipation of an imminent revolutionary outbreak. In this expectation, it was not a voice crying in the wilderness:
" ... the consciousness of impending social revolution ... was, significantly enough, not confined to revolutionaries, who expressed it with the greatest elaboration, nor to the ruling classes, whose fear of the massed poor is never far below the surface in times of social change. The poor themselves felt it. The literate strata of the people expressed it. 'All well-informed people', wrote the American consul from Amsterdam during the hunger of 1847, reporting the sentiments of the German emigrants passing through Holland, 'express the belief that the present crisis is so deeply interwoven ill the events of the present period that "it" is but the commencement of that great Revolution, which they consider sooner or later is to dissolve the present constitution of things'" (E J Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-48).
Confident that huge social upheavals were about to take place, but aware that the nations of Europe were at various stages of historical development, the last section of the Communist Manifesto put forward certain tactical considerations for the intervention of the communist minority.
The general approach remained the same in all cases: "The communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but ill the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement ... the communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time."
More concretely, recognizing that the majority of countries in Europe had not yet even attained the stage of bourgeois democracy, that national independence and unification was still a central issue in countries such as Italy, Switzerland and Poland, the communists pledged to fight alongside the bourgeois democratic parties, and the parties of the radical petty bourgeoisie, against the vestiges of feudal stagnation and absolutism.
The tactic was spelled out in particular detail with regard to Germany:
"The communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization, and with a much more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth century, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution".
Thus: the tactic was support for the bourgeoisie in so far as it was carrying out the anti-feudal revolution, but always defending the autonomy of the proletariat, above all because the expectation was of "an immediately following proletarian revolution". How far did the events of 1848 vindicate these prognoses? And what lessons did Marx and his 'party' draw in the aftermath of the events?
As we have said, Europe was at a number of different social and political levels in 1848. Only in Britain was capitalism fully developed and the working class a majority of the population. In France, the working class had acquired a considerable fund of political experience through its participation in a series of revolutionary uprisings since 1789. But this relative political maturity was almost completely restricted to the Parisian proletariat, and even in Paris large-scale industrial production was still at its early stages, which meant that the political fractions of the working class (Blanquists, Proudhonists, etc) tended to reflect the weight of obsolete artisanal prejudices and conceptions. As for the rest of Europe - Spain, Italy, Germany, the central and eastern regions - social and political conditions were still extremely backward. These areas were for the most part divided up into a mosaic of petty kingdoms and did not exist as centralized nation states. Feudal vestiges of all kinds hung heavy on society and the
structures of the state.
Thus, in the majority of countries, the completion of the bourgeois revolution was the first item on the agenda - sweeping away the old feudal remnants, establishing unified nation states, installing the political regime of bourgeois democracy. And yet many things had changed since the days of the 'classical' bourgeois revolution of 1789, introducing a series of complications and contradictions into the situation. For a start, the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 were provoked not so much by a 'feudal' crisis but by one of the great cyclical crises of youthful capitalism - the great depression of 1847, which, coming in the wake of a series of disastrous harvests, reduced the living standards of the' masses to an intolerable level. Secondly, it was above all the urban, proletarian or semi-proletarianised masses of Paris, Berlin, Vienna and other cities who led the uprisings against the old order. And as the Manifesto had pointed out, the proletariat had already become a much more distinct force than it had been in 1789; not only on the social level, but on the political level as well. The rise of the Chartist movement in Britain had confirmed this. But it was first and foremost the great rising of June 1848 in Paris which verified the reality of the proletariat as defined in the Manifesto: as an independent political force irrevocably opposed to the rule of capital.
In February 1848, the Parisian working class had been the main, social force behind the barricades in the uprising that had toppled the monarchy of Louis Philippe and installed the Republic. But within months the social antagonism between the proletariat and the 'democratic' bourgeoisie had become overt and acute, as it became apparent that the latter was able to do almost nothing to relieve the economic distress of the former. The proletariat's resistance was couched in the confused demand of the 'right to work' when the government closed the national workshops, which had given the workers a minimum of relief in the face of unemployment. Nevertheless, as Marx argued in The Class Struggles in France, written in 1850, behind this wretched slogan lay the beginnings of a movement for the suppression of private property. Certainly the bourgeoisie itself was aware of the danger; when the Parisian workers took to the barricades to defend the national workshops, the uprising was put down with the utmost ferocity. "It is well known how the workers, with unheard-of bravery and ingenuity, without leaders, without a common plan, without supplies, and for the most part lacking weapons, held in check the army, {he Mobile Guard, the Paris national Guard and the National Guard which streamed in from the provinces. It is well known how the bourgeoisie sought compensation for the mortal terror it had suffered in outrageous brutality, massacring over 3,000 prisoners" (Marx, The Class Struggles in France, 1, 'The defeat of June 1848').
This uprising in fact confirmed the worst fears of the bourgeoisie throughout Europe and its outcome was to have a profound effect on the later development of the revolutionary movement. Traumatized by the specter of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie's nerve failed and it found itself unable to carry through its own revolution against the established order. This was amplified by material factors of course: in the countries dominated by absolutism, the bourgeoisie's political nervousness was also the result of its late economic and political development. In any case, the result was that, rather than calling on the energies of the masses in its battle against the feudal power, as it had done in 1789, the bourgeoisie more and more compromised with the reaction in order to contain the threat 'from below'. This compromise took various forms. In France it produced the strange anomaly of the second Bonaparte, who stepped into the breech of power because the bourgeoisie's 'democratic' mechanisms seemed only to open the door to the cold winds of social unrest and political instability. In Germany, it was incarnated in a particularly timid and spineless bourgeoisie, whose lack of resolve in the face of absolutist reaction was lambasted time and again by Marx, especially in the article published in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung of 15 December 1848, 'The bourgeoisie and the counter revolution': "The German bourgeoisie had developed so sluggishly, so pusillanimously and so slowly, that it saw itself threateningly confronted by the proletariat, and all those sections of the population related to the proletariat in interests and ideas, at the very moment of its own threatening confrontation with feudalism and absolutism." This made it "irresolute against each of its opponents, taken individually, because it always saw the other one in front of it or to the rear,' inclined from the outset to treachery against the people and compromise with the crowned representative of the old society ... without faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below ... an accursed old man, who found himself condemned to lead and mislead the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests - sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything - this was the nature of the Prussian bourgeoisie which found itself at the helm of the Prussian state after the March revolution. "
But though the bourgeoisie was in "mortal terror" of the proletariat, the latter was not mature enough, historically speaking, to assume political command of the revolutions. Already the powerful British working class was somewhat isolated from the events on the European mainland; and Chartism, despite the existence of a "physical force" tendency on its left wing, aimed above all at finding a place for the working class inside 'democratic', ie bourgeois, society. Above all, the British bourgeoisie was intelligent enough to find a way of gradually incorporating the demand for universal suffrage in such a way that, far from threatening the political reign of capital, as Marx himself had thought, it more and more became one of its mainstays. Besides, at the very time that continental Europe was in the midst of all its upheavals, British capitalism was already on the verge of a new phase of expansion. In France, although the working class had taken the greatest strides politically, it had been unable either to evade the traps of the bourgeoisie or, still less, put itself forward as the bearer of a new social project. The June 48 rising had to all intents and purposes been provoked by the bourgeoisie, and the communist aspirations contained within it were more implicit than explicit. As Marx put it in the Class Struggles in France ('The defeat of June 1848'): "The Paris proletariat was forced into the June insurrection by the bourgeoisie. This in itself sealed its fate. It was neither impelled by its immediate, avowed needs to fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by force, nor was it equal to this task. It had to be officially informed by the Moniteur that the time was past when the republic found itself obliged to show deference to its illusions; only its defeat convinced it of the truth that the smallest improvement in its position remains a utopia within the bourgeois republic, a utopia which becomes a crime as soon as it aspires to become reality ... ".
Thus, far from rapidly going over to a proletarian revolution, as the Manifesto had hoped, the movements of 1848 hardly even resulted in the bourgeoisie completing its own revolution.
The 1848 revolutions provided the Communist League with a very early ordeal by fire. Seldom has a communist organization, so soon after its birth, been granted the somewhat doubtful reward of being plunged into the deep end of a gigantic revolutionary movement. Marx and Engels, having opted for political exile away from the stultifying Junker regime, returned to Germany to play the part in events to which their convictions necessarily guided them. Given the Communist League's total lack of direct experience in events of such a scale, it would be surprising if the work that the organization carried out during that phase - including the work of its most theoretically advanced elements - were free from errors, sometimes quite serious ones. But the basic question is not whether the Communist League made mistakes, but whether its overall intervention was consistent with the fundamental tasks it had set itself in its statement of political principles and tactics, the Communist Manifesto.
One of the most striking features of the CL' s intervention in the German revolution of 1848 is its opposition to facile revolutionary extremism. In the eyes of the bourgeoisie - or at least in its propaganda organs - the communists were the nec plus ultra of fanaticism and terrorism, fell agents of destructiveness and forced social leveling. Marx himself during this period was referred to as the 'Red Terror Doctor' and was constantly being accused of hatching devious plots to assassinate the Crowned Heads of Europe. In actual practice: the activity of the 'Marx party' in this period is noteworthy for its sobriety.
In the first place, during the early, heady days of the revolution, Marx publicly opposed the revolutionary romanticism of the 'legions' set up in France by expatriate revolutionaries and aimed at taking the revolution back to Germany at the point of a bayonet. Against this, Marx pointed out that the revolution was not primarily a military question but a social and political one; he also dryly pointed out that the 'democratic' French bourgeoisie was only too pleased to see these troublesome German revolutionaries march off to fight the feudal tyrants of Germany - and that they had not neglected to give the German authorities due warning of their approach. In the same vein, Marx came out against an isolated and ill-timed uprising in Cologne in the declining phase of the revolution, since this would have once again led the masses into the waiting arms of the reaction, who had taken explicit measures to provoke the rising.
On a more general political level, Marx also had to combat those communists who believed that the workers' revolution and the advent of communism were on the short-term agenda; who scorned the struggle for bourgeois political democracy and considered that communists should talk only of the conditions of the working class and the necessity for communism. In Cologne, where Marx spent most of the revolutionary period as the editor of the radical democratic paper the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, the main proponent of this view was the good Dr Gotteschalk who considered himself a true man of the people and castigated Marx as no better than an armchair theorist, because he argued so stubbornly that Germany was not yet ripe for communism, that first the bourgeoisie would have to come to power and drag Germany out of its feudal backwardness; and that consequently the task of the communists was to support the bourgeoisie 'from the left' , participating in the popular movement to ensure that it continually pushed the bourgeoisie to go to the very limits of its opposition to the feudal order.
In practical organizational terms, this meant participating in the Democratic Unions that were set up to, as the name implies, bring together all those who were consistently and sincerely fighting against absolutism and for the establishment of bourgeois democratic political structures. But it can be said that, in reacting against the voluntarist excesses of those who wanted to skip the bourgeois democratic phase altogether, Marx went too far in the other direction and forgot some of the principles laid out in the Manifesto. In Cologne, Gotteschalk's tendency were in the majority of the League, and to counter their influence Marx at one point dissolved the League altogether. Politically: the NRZ went for a whole period without saying anything at all about the workers' conditions, and in particular about the need for the workers to guard their political autonomy in the face of all factions of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. This was hardly compatible with the notions of proletarian independence put forward in the Manifesto, and, as we shall see, Marx made a self-critique on this particular question in the first attempts to draw up a balance sheet of the Communist League's activity in the movement. But the basic point remains: what guided Marx in this period, as throughout his whole life, was the recognition that communism had to be more than a necessity in terms of fundamental human need: it also had to be a real possibility given the objective conditions reached by social and historical development. This debate was to reemerge in the League in the aftermath of the revolution as well.
In many ways, the most important political contributions of the Communist League, apart of course from the Manifesto itself, are the documents written in the aftermath of the 1848 movements; the 'balance sheet' that the organization drew up concerning its own participation m the revolts. This is true even though the debates that these documents expressed or provoked were to lead to a fundamental split and to the actual dissolution of the organization.
In the circular of the CL's executive committee, published in March 1850, there is a critique - in fact a self-critique, since Marx himself wrote the piece - of the activities of the League within the revolutionary events. While the document affirms without hesitation that the general political prognoses of the League had been amply confirmed by events, and while its members had always been the most determined fighters in the revolutionary cause, the organizational weakening of the League - in effect, its dissolution during the early stages of the revolution in Germany - had gravely exposed the working class to the political domination of the petty bourgeois democrats: " ... the formerly strong organization of the League has been considerably weakened. A large number of members who were directly involved in the movement thought that the time for secret societies was over and that public action alone was sufficient. The individual districts and communes (the basic units of the League's organization) allowed their connections with the Central Committee to weaken and gradually become dormant. So, while the Democratic Party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, has become more and more organized in Germany, the workers' party has lost its only firm foothold, remaining organized at best in individual localities for local purposes; within the general movement it has consequently come under the complete domination and leadership of the petty bourgeois democrats. This situation cannot be allowed to continue the independence of the workers must be restored". And there is no doubt that the most important element in this text is its clear defense of the necessity to fight for the fullest political and organizational independence of the working class, even during revolutions led by other social classes.
This was a necessity for two reasons.
First of all, if, as in Germany, the bourgeoisie proved itself incapable of accomplishing its own revolutionary tasks, the proletariat needed to act and organize independently in order to force the momentum of the revolution forward despite the reluctance and conservatism of the bourgeoisie: the model here was to some extent the first Paris Commune, the one in 1793 where the 'popular' masses had organized themselves in local assemblies or sections, centralized at the city level in the Commune, in order to push the Jacobin bourgeoisie to continue the impetus of the revolution.
At the same time, even if the most radical democratic elements came to power, they would be compelled by the logic of their position to turn on the workers and subject them to bourgeois order and discipline as soon as they became the new helmsmen of the state. This had been true in and after 1793, when the bourgeoisie began to discover more and more 'enemies on the left'; it had been demonstrated in blood by the June 1848 events in Paris; and in Marx's opinion it would happen again with the next round of the revolution in Germany. Marx predicted that following the failure of the liberal bourgeoisie, its inability to confront the absolutist power, the petty bourgeois democrats would be swept into the leadership of the next revolutionary government, but that they too would attempt forthwith to disarm and attack the working class. And for this very reason, the proletariat could only defend itself from such attacks by maintaining its class independence. This independence had three dimensions:
- The existence and action of a communist organization as the most advanced political fraction of the class:
"At the moment, while the democratic petty bourgeois are everywhere oppressed, they preach to the proletariat general unity and reconciliation; they extend the hand of friendship, and seek to found a great opposition party which will embrace all shades of democratic opinion; that is, they seek to ensnare workers in a party organization in which general social-democratic phrases prevail, while their particular interests are kept hidden behind, and in which, for the sake of preserving the peace, the specific demands of the proletariat may not be presented. Such unity would be to their advantage alone and to the complete disadvantage of the proletariat. The proletariat would lose all its hard-won independent position and be reduced once more to a mere appendage of official bourgeois democracy. This unity must therefore be resisted in the most decisive manner. Instead of lowering themselves to the level of an applauding chorus, the workers, and above all the League, must work for the creation of an independent organization of the workers' party, both secret and open, alongside the official democrats, and the League must aim to make every one of its communes a center and nucleus of workers' associations in which the position and interests of the proletariat can be discussed free from bourgeois influence":
- The maintenance of autonomous class demands, backed up by unitary organizations of the class, ie organs regrouping all workers as workers:
"During and after the struggle the workers must at every opportunity put forward their own demands against those of the bourgeois democrats. They must demand guarantees for the workers as soon as the democratic bourgeoisie sets about taking over the government. They must achieve these guarantees by force if necessary, and generally make sure that the new rulers commit themselves to all possible concessions and promises - the surest means of compromising them. They must check in every way and as far as it is possible the victory euphoria and enthusiasm for the new situation which follow every successful street battle, with a cool and cold-blooded analysis of the situation and with undisguised mistrust of the new government. Alongside the new official governments they must simultaneously establish their own revolutionary workers' government, either in the form of local executive committees and councils or through workers' clubs and committees, so that the bourgeois democratic governments not only immediately lose the support of the workers but find themselves from the very beginning supervised and threatened by authorities behind which stand the whole mass of the workers. In a word, from the very moment of victory, the workers' suspicion must be directed no longer against the defeated reactionary party but against their former ally, against the party which intends to exploit the common victory for itself".
- These organs must be armed; at no point must the proletariat be lured into surrendering its weapons to the official government:
"To be able forcefully and threateningly to oppose this party, whose betrayal of the workers will begin with the very first hour of victory, the workers must be armed and organized. The whole proletariat must be armed at once with muskets, rifles, cannon and ammunition, and the revival of the old-style citizens' militia, directed against the workers, must be opposed. Where the formation of this militia cannot be prevented, the workers must try to organize themselves independently as a proletarian guard, with elected leaders and with their own elected general staff; they must try to place themselves not under the orders of the state authority but of the revolutionary local councils set up by the workers. Where the workers are employed by the state, they must arm and organize themselves into special corps with elected leaders, or as a part of the proletarian guard. Under no pretext should arms and ammunition be surrendered, any attempt to disarm the workers must be frustrated, by force if necessary".
These conclusions as to what class independence in a revolutionary situation practically entails, are important not so much as an immediate prescription for a type of revolution which was not really on the agenda any more, but as easily recognizable historical anticipations of the future - of the momentous revolutionary conflicts of 1871, 1905 and 1917, when the working class was to form its own organs of political combat and to present itself as a viable candidate for power. Here in the League's circular is the whole notion of dual power, a social situation in which the working class begins to gain such a degree of political and organizational autonomy that it poses a direct threat to the bourgeoisie's management of society; and, beyond the inherently unstable dual power situation, the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the seizure and exercising of political power by the organized working class. In the text of the League, it is apparent that the embryonic forms of this proletarian power arise outside of, and in opposition to, the official organs of the bourgeois state. They are (Marx is specifically referring to the workers' clubs here) "a union of the whole working class against the whole bourgeois class - the formation of a workers' state against the bourgeois state" (Class Struggles in France). Consequently, these lines already contain the seeds of the position that the taking of power by the working class involves not the seizure of the existing state apparatus, but its violent destruction by the workers' own organs of power. Only the seeds, because this position had by no means been clarified by decisive historic experience: although the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte makes explicit, if passing, reference to the need to destroy the state rather than take control of it ("All political revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it"), during the same period Marx was still convinced that the workers could come to power in some countries (eg Britain) through universal suffrage. The matter was treated with regard to particular national conditions rather than as a general problem of principle.
This question was not finally cleared up until the real historical movement of the proletariat had intervened decisively in the discussion: it was the Paris Commune which settled it. But we can already see the continuity between the conclusions drawn about the Commune - that proletarian political power requires the appearance of a new network of class organs, a centralized revolutionary 'state' which cannot live alongside the existing state machine. Marx's 'prophetic' insight is apparent here; but these predictions are not mere speculations. They are solidly based on the reality of past experience: the experience of the first Paris Commune, of the revolutionary clubs and sections of 1789-95, and above all of the June days in France 48, when the proletariat armed itself and rose up as a distinctive social force, but was crushed in no small measure because it was insufficiently armed politically. Regardless of all the historical limitations within which these texts of the League were written, the lessons they contain about the necessity for independent working class action and organization remain as essential as ever; without it, the working class will never come to power and communism will indeed be no more than a dream.
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that these calls for proletarian autonomy were framed in a particular historical perspective - that of the 'permanent revolution'.
The Manifesto had envisaged a rapid transition from the bourgeois to the proletarian revolution in Germany. As we have said, the actual experience of 1848 had convinced Marx and his tendency that the German bourgeoisie was congenitally unfit to make its own revolution; that in the next revolutionary outbreak, which the March 1850 circular still considered to be a short-term prospect, the petty bourgeois democrats, the' social democrats' as they were sometimes referred to at the time, would come to power. But this social stratum would also prove Itself incapable of carrying through a complete destruction of feudal relations, and would in any case be forced to attack and disarm the proletariat as soon as it assumed governmental office. The task of really achieving the bourgeois revolution would thus fall to the proletariat, but in doing so the latter would be compelled to forge ahead towards its own, communist revolution.
That this schema was inapplicable to the very backward conditions of Germany was, as we shall see, recognized by Marx soon afterwards, when he realized that European capitalism was still very much in its ascendant phase. This can also be recognized by leftist commentators and historians. But according to the latter, "the tactic of permanent revolution, although inapplicable in the Germany of 1850, remained as a valuable political legacy for the workers' movement. It was proposed by Trotsky for Russia in 1905, though Lenin still considered it premature to attempt to convert the bourgeois democratic revolution into a proletarian one. In 1917, however, in the context of the all-European crisis brought about by the World War, Lenin and the Bolshevik party were able to apply successfully the tactic of permanent revolution, leading the Russian revolution of that year forward from the overthrow of Tsarism to the overthrow of capital itself" (David Fernbach, introduction to The Revolutions of 1848, Penguin Marx Library, 1973).
In reality, the whole notion of permanent revolution was based on an insoluble conundrum: the idea that while the proletarian revolution was possible in some countries, other parts of the world still had (or have) unfinished bourgeois tasks or stages ahead of them. This was a genuine problem for Marx, but it was transcended by historical evolution itself, which demonstrated that capitalism could only pose the conditions for proletarian revolution on a world-wide scale. It was as a single, international system that capitalism entered its decadent phase, its "epoch of wars and revolutions" with the outbreak of the First World War. The task facing the Russian proletariat in 1917 was not the completion of any bourgeois stage but the seizure of political power as a first step towards the world proletarian revolution. Contrary to appearance, February 1917 was not a 'bourgeois revolution', or the accession to power of some intermediate social stratum. February 1917 was a proletarian revolt which all the forces of the bourgeoisie did everything they could to derail and destroy; what it proved, very rapidly, was that all factions of the bourgeoisie, far from being 'revolutionary', were totally wedded to imperialist war and counter-revolution, and that the petty bourgeoisie and other intermediate strata had no autonomous social or political program of their own, but were doomed to fall in behind one or other of the two historic classes in society.
When Lenin wrote the April Theses in 1917, he liquidated all the outmoded notions of some half way stage between the bourgeois and the proletarian revolution, all the vestiges of purely national conceptions of revolutionary change. The Theses effectively dispensed with the ambiguous concept of the permanent revolution and affirmed that the revolution of the working class is communist and international, or it is nothing.
The most important clarifications about the perspective of communism came through the debate that broke out in the League not long after the publication of this first post-revolutionary circular. It soon became clear to Marx and those close to him politically that the counter-revolution had triumphed all over Europe and that there was in fact no prospect of an imminent revolutionary struggle. What convinced him of this more than anything was not simply the political and military victories of the reaction but his recognition, based on painstaking economic research in his new conditions of exile in Britain, that capitalism was entering a new period of growth. As he wrote in the Class Struggles in France:
"In view of this general prosperity, in which the productive forces of bourgeois society are flourishing as exuberantly as they possibly can under bourgeois conditions, there can be no talk of a real revolution. Such a revolution is only possible at periods when the two factors, modern forces of production and bourgeois forms of production, come into conflict. The incessant squabbles in which the representatives of the continental Party of Order are now indulging and compromising one another are remote from providing any opportunity for a new revolution. On the contrary, they are only possible because conditions for the time being are so secure and - what the reaction does not know - so bourgeois. All attempts of the reaction to put a stop to bourgeois development will recoil upon themselves as certainly as all the moral indignation and enthusiastic proclamations of the democrats. A new revolution is only possible as the result of a new crisis. But it will come, just as surely as the crisis itself" (IV, 'The abolition of universal suffrage in 1850').
Consequently, the task facing the Communist League was not the immediate preparation for revolution, but above all to grasp theoretically the objective historic situation, the real destiny of capital and thus the real bases for a communist revolution.
This perspective met with fierce opposition from the more immediatist elements in the party, the Willich-Schapper tendency who, in the fateful meeting of the CL's Central Committee in September 1850, claimed that the argument was between those "who organize in the proletariat" (ie, themselves, the real worker-communists) and "those whose influences derive from their pens" (ie Marx and his armchair theorists). The real issue was posed by Marx in his reply:
"During our last debate in particular, on the question of 'The position of the German proletariat in the next revolution', views were expressed by members of the minority of the Central Committee which directly contradict our second-to-last circular, and even the Manifesto. A national German approach has replaced the universal conception of the Manifesto, flattering the national sentiments of the German artisans. The will, rather than the actual conditions, was stressed as the chief factor in the revolution. We tell the workers: if you want to change conditions and make yourselves capable of government, you will have to undergo fifteen, twenty or fifty years of civil war. Now they are told: we must come to power immediately or we might as well go to sleep" (Minutes of the CC meeting, published in The Revolutions of 1848).
This debate resulted in the effective dissolution of the League. Marx proposed that its HQ be moved to Cologne and that the two tendencies work in separate local sections. The organization continued to exist until after the notorious Cologne Communist trial of 1852, but it was more and more a purely formal existence. The followers of Willich-Schapper got themselves increasingly involved in crack-brained plots and conspiracies aimed at unleashing the proletarian storm. Marx, Engels and a few others withdrew more and more from the activities of the organization (except when they came to the defense of their imprisoned comrades in Cologne) and devoted themselves to the main task of the hour - elaborating a more profound understanding of the workings and weaknesses of the capitalist mode of production.
This was the first clear demonstration of the fact that a proletarian party could not exist as such in a period of reaction and defeat; that in such periods revolutionaries can only work as a fraction. But the non-existence of an organized fraction around Marx and Engels in the ensuing period was not a strength; it expressed the immaturity of the proletariat's political movement, of the concept of the party itself (see the series 'The Fraction-Party relationship in the marxist tradition', IRs nos. 59, 61, 64, 65, in particular 'From Marx to the Second International', IR 64).
Nonetheless, the debate with the Willich-Schapper tendency has left us with an enduring legacy: the clear affirmation by the 'Marx tendency' that revolution could only come about when the "modern forces of production" had entered into conflict with "the bourgeois forms of production"; when capitalism had become a fetter on the development of the productive forces, a decadent social system. This was the essential reply to all those who, divorcing it from its objective historical conditions, reduced the communist revolution to a simple question of will. And it is a reply that has had to be repeated over and over again in the workers' movement - against the Bakuninists in the First International, who showed the same lack of interest in the question of material conditions, and made the revolution dependent on the flair and enthusiasm of the masses (and of their self-proclaimed secret vanguard); or against Bakunin's latter-day descendants in today's proletarian political milieu - groups like the Groupe Communiste Internationaliste and Wildcat, who, starting by rejecting the marxist conception of the decadence of capitalism, end up rejecting all notions of historical progress and claim that communism has been possible since capitalism began, or even since the very dawn of class society.
It is true that the debate in 1850 did not finally clarify this question of decadence; there is room in Marx's words about the "next revolution coming out of the next crisis" for concluding that Marx saw the revolutionary possibility emerging not so much out of a period in which-bourgeois relations have become a permanent fetter on the productive forces, but out of one of the cyclical and temporary crises which punctuated capitalism's life throughout the 19th century. Some currents within the proletarian movement - in particular the Bordigists - have tried to remain consistent with Marx's critique of voluntarism while rejecting the notion of a permanent crisis of the capitalist mode of production, the notion of decadence. But although the concept of decadence could not be fully clarified until capitalism really entered its decadent phase, it is our contention that those who defend this notion are the real heirs of Marx's method. This will be one of the elements we will examine in the next article in this series, when we consider Marx's theoretical work in the period following the dissolution of the League from the angle most relevant to this series: as a key to understanding the necessity and possibility of communism.
CDW
'Communism is dead! Capitalism has won because it is the only system that works! It is useless and even dangerous to dream of another society!' The bourgeoisie has unleashed an unprecedented campaign with the collapse of the eastern bloc and the so-called Communist regimes. At the same time, to drive in the nail, bourgeois propaganda is trying to demoralize the working class by persuading it that it's no longer a force in society, that it no longer counts, even that it no longer exists. The bourgeoisie has completely exaggerated the significance of the fall in class combativity that has resulted from the upheavals of the last few years. The recovery of class struggle, which has already begun, will expose these lies, but even during big workers' struggles the bourgeoisie will continue to hammer home the idea that these struggles cannot in any way lead to the overthrow of capitalism and the foundation of a society devoid of the scourges that this system imposes on humanity. Thus, against all the bourgeois lies, but also against the skepticism of certain would-be revolutionaries, the affirmation of the revolutionary character of the proletariat remains a responsibility of communists. This is the objective of the following article.
In the campaigns that we have suffered these past years, one of the major themes is the 'refutation' of marxism. The latter, according to the ideologues appointed by the bourgeoisie, is bankrupt. Its practical results and its collapse in the countries of the east illustrate this bankruptcy. In our Review we have shown that Stalinism has nothing to do with the communism that Marx and the whole of the workers' movement envisaged[1]. Concerning the revolutionary capacity of the working class, the task of communists is to reaffirm the marxist position on this question. In the first place this means recalling what marxisrn understands by a revolutionary class.
What is a revolutionary class for marxism?
"The history of all previous societies is the history of class struggles"[2]. This is the opening line of one of the most important texts of marxism and of the workers' movement: the Communist Manifesto. This thesis is not unique to marxism[3], but one of the fundamental bases of communist theory is that the class struggle in capitalist society has the ultimate perspective of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat and the installation of the power of the latter over the whole of society. This thesis has always been rejected, obviously, by the defenders of the capitalist system. However, while the bourgeoisie in the ascendant period of its system could discover (in an incomplete and mystified way of course) a certain number of social laws[4], it cannot do so today: the bourgeoisie of capitalist decadence has become totally incapable of giving rise to such thinkers. For the ideologues of the dominant class, the fundamental priority of all their theoretical efforts is to show that marxisrn is wrong (even if some defend this or that contribution of Marx). And the foundation stone of their 'theories' is that the working class has no historical role. That's when these experts are not denying the very existence of the class struggle, or worse, the existence of social classes themselves.
It's not only the avowed defenders of bourgeois society who make such assertions. Certain 'radical thinkers', who have made a career of contesting the established order, have echoed them for several decades. The guru of the group Socialisme ou Barbarie (and inspirer of the group Solidarity in Great Britain), Cornelius Castoriadis, at the same time that he envisaged the replacement of capitalism by a 'third system', the 'bureaucratic society', has been claiming for nearly 40 years that the antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, between exploiters and exploited, was destined to give way to a struggle between 'order-givers and order-takers'[5]. More recently, other 'thinkers' who have known their hour of glory, such as Professor Marcuse, affirmed that the working class had been 'integrated' into capitalist society and that the only challenge to the system would come from marginalized social categories such as blacks in the USA, students or even the peasants of the under-developed countries. Thus the theories about the 'end of the working class', which are flowering again today, do not even have novelty value: one of the characteristics of the 'thought' of the decadent bourgeoisie, and one which well expresses the senility of this class, is the incapacity to produce any new idea. The only thing that it can do is to ferret out old clichés from the rubbish bins of history and dress them up as the discovery of the century.
One of the favorite means used today by the bourgeoisie to evade the reality of class antagonisms, and even the reality of social classes, are sociological studies. With great supplies of statistics, it is demonstrated that real social cleavages have nothing to do with class differences but with criteria such as education, housing, age-group, ethnic origin, or religious persuasion[6]. According to this type of thinking the vote of a 'citizen' in favor of the right or of the left depends less on his economic situation than on other criteria. In the USA, in New England, the blacks and the Jews traditionally vote Democrat, in France, practicing Catholics, the people of Alsace or Lyon traditionally vote right. This forgets however that the majority of American workers never vote and that in strikes French workers who go to church are not necessarily less combative. In a more general way, sociological 'science' always forgets to give an historic dimension to its claims. Thus, there is a refusal to remember that the same Russian workers who launched the first proletarian revolution of the 20th Century, that of 1905, began it the 9th January (Red Sunday) with a demonstration led by a priest, and appealed to the kindness of the Czar to ease their poverty[7].
When the sociological 'experts' refer to history, it's only to say that things are radically different to the last century. At this time, according to them, marxism and the theory of the class struggle could mean something because the working and living conditions of the wage laborers of industry really were appalling. But since then the workers have been 'embourgeoisified' and integrated into the 'consumer society' to the extent of losing their identity. Moreover the bourgeois with a top hat and gold chain has given way to salaried 'managers'. All these considerations try to hide the fact that the fundamental structures of society have not basically changed. In reality the conditions which gave the working class its revolutionary nature in the last century are still present. The fact that the standard of living of the workers today may be better than that of their class brothers of past generations does not change in any way their place in the relations of production which dominate capitalist society. The social classes continue to exist and the struggles between them still constitute the fundamental motor of historical development.
It is a real irony of history that the official ideologies of the bourgeoisie pretend, on the one hand, that classes don't play any specific role (and thus don't exist), but recognize on the other hand that the world economic situation is the essential question which this same bourgeoisie is faced with.
In reality, the fundamental importance of classes in society is a necessary result of the preponderant place that the economic activity of men has within it. One of the basic affirmations of historical materialism is that, in the last analysis, the economy determines the other spheres of society: juridical relations, forms of government, ways of thinking. This materialist vision of history obviously demolishes the philosophies which see in historical events either pure chance, the expression of divine will, or the simple result of the passions or thoughts of men. But as Marx already said in his time "the crisis forces the dialectic into the heads of the bourgeoisie". The now obvious preponderance of the economy in the life of society is at the root of the importance of social classes, because the latter are precisely defined, contrary to other sociological categories, by the place they occupy vis-a-vis economic relationships. That has always been true since class society existed, but in capitalism this reality expresses itself more clearly.
In feudal society, for example, social differentiation was enshrined in laws. A fundamental juridical difference existed between the exploiters and the exploited: nobles were, by law, granted an official status of privileges (freedom from taxes, beneficiary of tributes from their serfs, for example) while the exploited peasants were attached to their land and obliged to give part of their revenue to the lord (or work for nothing on the land of the latter). In such a society, exploitation, if it was easily measurable (for example in the form of a tribute paid by the serf) seemed to derive from law. By contrast, in capitalist society, the abolition of privileges, the introduction of universal suffrage, the equality and liberty proclaimed by its constitutions, no longer allowed exploitation and class differentiation to hide behind differences in legal regulations. It is the possession or non-possession of the means of production[8], as well as their method of employment, which essentially determines the place in society occupied by its members and their access to its wealth; that is, their membership of a social class and the existence of common interests with the other members of the same class. In large measure, the fact of possessing the means of production and of putting them to work individually determines the membership of the petit-bourgeoisie (artisans, fanners, liberal professions, etc)[9]. The fact of being deprived of the means of production and of being constrained, in order to live, to sell its labor power to those who own them and who profit from this exchange to extract surplus value, determines the membership of the working class. Finally, the bourgeoisie are those who possess (in the strictly juridical sense or in global sense of their individual or collective control) the means of production which puts wage labor to work and who live from the exploitation of the latter through the appropriation of the surplus value that the workers produce. In essence, this differentiation into classes is as valid as it was last century. Moreover the interests of each of these different classes, and the conflicts between their interests, remains. That's why the antagonisms between the principal components of society, determined by the skeleton of the latter, the economy, continues to be at the center of social life.
That said, even if the antagonism between exploiters and exploited is one of the principal motors of the history of societies, it is not expressed identically in each society. In feudal society, the struggles, often ferocious and wide ranging, between serfs and lords, never led to a radical overthrow of the latter. The class antagonism which led to the overthrow of the ancien regime, the abolition of the privileges of the nobility, was not the one between the aristocracy and the class that it exploited, the serfs, but the conflict between this same nobility and another exploiting class, the bourgeoisie (English Revolution of the middle of the 17th century, French Revolution from the end of the 18th). Moreover, the slave society of Roman antiquity had not been abolished by the class of slaves (despite the sometimes formidable combats led by the latter, like the Spartacus revolt in 73 BC) but by the nobility
which was to dominate the Christian west for more than a millennium.
In reality, in the societies of the past, revolutionary classes have never been exploited classes, but were new exploiting classes. This was no accident. Marxism distinguishes revolutionary classes (also referred to as 'historic' classes) from other classes of society by reason of their capacity, contrary to the latter, to take on the leadership of society. In so far as the development of the productive forces was insufficient to assure an abundance of goods to the whole of society, it was inevitable that economic inequalities and thus relations of exploitation would remain. In these conditions, only an exploiting class was able to impose itself at the head of the social body. Its historic role was to facilitate the emergence and development of the new relations of production which it carried within itself; to supplant the old, obsolete relations of production, resolving contradictions made insurmountable as long as the old relations prevailed.
Thus, the decadence of Roman slave society came about because, on the one hand, the 'supplies' of slaves from the conquest of new territories came up against Rome's difficulty in controlling the increasingly far-flung frontiers of its empire, and on the other hand because of the system's inability to get the slaves to take the care required for the application of new agricultural techniques. In such a situation, feudal relations, in which the exploited no longer had a status equal to that of cattle[10], and in which they were closely interested in developing the productivity of the soil they worked on because they lived from it as well, were the most suitable for taking society out of the mess it was in. This is why the new relations were developed in particular by the increasing emancipation of the slaves (this was accelerated in certain places by the arrival of the 'barbarians', some of whom already lived in a form of feudal society).
Similarly, marxism (beginning with the Communist Manifesto) insists on the eminently revolutionary role played by the bourgeoisie at a certain stage of its history. This class, which appeared and developed within feudal society, saw its power grow vis-a-vis a nobility and a monarchy which was becoming more and more dependent on it, both for the supply of all kinds of goods (materials, furniture, spices, weapons) and for financing their expenses. As the possibilities of clearing and extending cultivated lands diminished, so one of the main sources of the dynamic of feudal relations dried up; and as great kingdoms were established, the role of protector of the populations, which had originally been the main vocation of the nobility, lost its raison d'etre. As a result the nobility's control over society became a barrier to social development. And this was amplified by the fact that this development, the real progress at the level of the productive forces, was more and more connected to the growth of trade, of the banks and of craftsmanship in the towns.
Thus, by putting itself at the head of the social body, at first in the economic sphere, then in the political sphere, the bourgeoisie freed society from the fetters that had plunged it into crisis; it created the conditions for the most formidable growth of wealth that human history had ever known. In doing so, it replaced one form of exploitation, serfdom, with another form of exploitation, wage labor. In order to achieve this, it was led, in the period that Marx called primitive accumulation, to take measures on a par with the way the slaves were treated, in order to compel the peasants to come and sell their labor power in the towns (on this subject, see the admirable pages in Book One of Capital). And this barbarism was only a foretaste of the way that capital would exploit the proletariat (child labor, night work for women and children, 18 hour days, the 'workhouse', etc) before the latter's struggles compelled the capitalists to attenuate the brutality of their methods.
As soon as it appeared, the working class waged revolts against exploitation. And these revolts were from the start accompanied by projects aimed at overturning society, abolishing inequalities, and holding social wealth in common. Here it was not fundamentally different from previous exploited classes, notably the serfs, who also, in certain of their revolts, rallied to the idea of a great social transformation. This was notably the case with the Peasants' War of the 16th century, in Germany, where the mouthpiece of the exploited was the monk Thomas Munzer, who advocated a form of communism[11]. However, contrary to the projects for social transformation put forward by other exploited classes, the one advanced by the proletariat is not an unrealisable utopia. The dream of an egalitarian society, without masters and exploitation, which was raised by the slaves and the serfs, could only be a mirage because the level of economic development reached by their societies did not permit the abolition of exploitation. By contrast, the communist project of the proletariat is perfectly realistic, not only because capitalism has created the premises of such a society, but also because it's the only project that can take humanity out of the swamp that it's now in.
Why the proletariat is the, revolutionary class of our time
As soon as the proletariat began to put its own project forward, the bourgeoisie could only express its disdain for what it saw as the ramblings of prophets crying in the wilderness. When it bothered to go beyond mere disdain, the only thing that it could imagine was that the workers could do no more than what the exploited of previous epochs had done: dream about impossible utopias. At first sight, history seems to have proved the bourgeoisie right. Its philosophy could be summed up in these terms: "there have always been rich and poor, and there always will be. The poor gain nothing by rebelling; the only thing that can work is that the rich don't abuse their wealth and concern themselves with relieving the suffering of the worst-off". Priests and charitable ladies have been the mouthpieces and practitioners of this 'philosophy'. What the bourgeoisie refuses to see is that its economic and social system, any more than the ones that preceded it, is not eternal; and that, like slavery and feudalism, it is destined to give way to another kind of society. And just as the characteristics of capitalism made it possible to resolve the contradictions that brought down feudal society (and as the latter had already done vis-a-vis slave society), the characteristics of the society that will resolve the mortal contradictions of capitalism flow from the same kind of necessity. Thus, by beginning with these contradictions, we can define the characteristics of the future society.
Obviously we can't go into these contradictions in any great depth in the context of this article. For more than a century, marxism has been doing this in a systematic manner, and our own organization has devoted a number of texts to the question[12]. However, we can give a resume of the general outlines of these contradictions. They reside in the essential characteristics of the capitalist system. This is a mode of production that has generalized commodity exchange to all the goods it produces, whereas, in the past, only a part of these goods, often a very small one at that, was transformed into commodities. This colonization of the economy by the commodity has even taken over the labor power that men set in motion in their productive activity. Divorced from the means of production, the producer, if he is to survive, has no choice but to sell his labor power to those who control the means of production - the capitalist class. This is in contrast to feudal society for example, where, while a commodity economy already existed to some degree, what the artisan or peasant sold was the fruit of his labor. It's this generalization of commodity relations which is at the basis of the contradictions of capitalism: the crisis of overproduction has its origins in the fact that the aim of this system is not to produce use values, but exchange values which have to find buyers. And it's the incapacity of society to buy all the commodities produced (even though actual needs are far from being satisfied) which gives rise to this apparently absurd calamity: capitalism collapses not because it produces too little, but because it produces too much[13].
The first characteristic of communism will therefore be the abolition of commodity production, the development of the production of use values, not exchange values.
Furthermore, marxism, and Rosa Luxemburg in particular, has shown that at the origin of this overproduction is the necessity for capital, considered as a totality; to realize, by selling outside its own sphere, that part of the surplus value extracted from the workers which is earmarked for accumulation. As this extra-capitalist sphere gets smaller, the convulsions of the economy can only get more and more catastrophic.
Thus, the only way to overcome the contradictions of capitalism is to abolish all form of commodity exchange, in particular the commodity character of labor power, in other words, wage labor.
The abolition of commodity exchange presupposes the abolition of what lies beneath it: private property. It's only when the wealth of society is appropriated in a collective manner that the buying and selling of this wealth can disappear (this already existed, in an embryonic form, in the primitive community). Society's collective appropriation of the wealth that it produces, and in the first place, of the means of production themselves, means that it's no longer possible for a part of society, a social class (including in the form of a state bureaucracy) to dispose of the means of production in order to exploit another part. Thus, the abolition of wage labor cannot be accomplished by introducing another form of exploitation, but only by abolishing exploitation in all its forms. And, in contrast to the past, not only must the transformation that alone can save society not lead to new relations of exploitation - capitalism really has created the material premises for an abundance that will make it possible to go beyond exploitation. These conditions of abundance can also be glimpsed in the very existence of the crises of overproduction (as the Communist Manifesto pointed out).
The question posed is therefore: what force in society is capable of carrying out this transformation, of abolishing private property and all forms of exploitation?
The first characteristic of this class is that it has to be exploited, because only such a class can have an interest in the abolition of exploitation. While in the revolutions of the past, the revolutionary class could not be an exploited class, given that the new relations of production were necessarily relations of exploitation, exactly the opposite is true today. In their day, the utopian socialists (such as Fourier, Saint-Simon, Owen)[14] harbored the illusion that the revolution could be taken in charge by elements of the bourgeoisie itself. They hoped that it would be possible to find, within the ranks of the ruling class, enlightened philanthropists who would understand the superiority of communism over capitalism, and would finance the building of ideal communities whose example would then catch on like wildfire. Since history is not made by individuals but by classes, these hopes were dashed within a few decades. Even if a few rare members of the bourgeoisie did adhere to the generous ideas of the utopians[15], the ruling class as such obviously turned its back on such efforts, or fought them openly, since they were aimed at making it disappear as a class.
Having said this, the fact of being an exploited class, as we have seen, is not enough to make that class revolutionary. For example, in the world today, and particularly in the underdeveloped countries, there exists a multitude of poor peasants suffering from exploitation through the appropriation of their fruit of their labor, enriching part of the ruling class either directly, or through taxes, or through the interest they pay to the banks and moneylenders to whom they are indebted, All the third-worldist, Maoist, Guevarist and similar mystifications are based on the fact that these strata are subjected to an often unbearable misery. When these peasants are led to take up arms it's only as the foot soldiers of this or that bourgeois clique, who, once in power, only strengthen exploitation all the more, often in particularly atrocious forms (as in the case of the Khmer Rouges in Cambodia in the second half of the 70s). The wearing out of these mystifications, which were put about both by the Stalinists and the Trotskyists, as well as certain 'radical thinkers' like Marcuse, simply demonstrates the patent failure of the 'revolutionary perspective' that supposedly lay with the poor peasants. In reality, the peasants, although they are exploited in all sorts of ways, and can sometimes wage very violent struggles to limit their exploitation, can never direct these struggles towards the abolition of private property because they themselves are small owners, or, living alongside the latter, aspire to become like them[16].
And, even when the peasants do set up collective structures to increase their income through an improvement in productivity or the sale of their products, it usually takes the form of cooperatives, which don't call into question private property or commodity exchange[17]. To sum up, the classes and strata which appear as vestiges of the past (peasants, artisans, liberal professions, etc)[18], and who only survive because capitalism, even if it totally dominates the world economy, is incapable of transforming all the producers into wage laborers - these classes cannot be the bearers of a revolutionary project. On the contrary, the only perspective they can dream about is the return to a mythical 'golden age' of the past: the dynamic of their specific struggles can only be reactionary.
The truth is that, since the abolition of exploitation is essentially bound up with the abolition of wage labor, only the class which is subjected to this specific form of exploitation, ie the proletariat, is capable of carrying out a revolutionary project. Only the class exploited within the bounds of capitalist relations of production, which is the product of these relations, is able to develop the perspective of going beyond them.
A product of the development of big industry, of a socialization of the productive process unprecedented in history, the modem proletariat cannot dream of a return to the past[19]. For example, while the demand for the redistribution or dividing up of the land might be a 'realistic' demand for the poor peasants, it would be absurd for the workers, who produce in an associated manner goods which incorporate parts, raw materials and technology which comes from all over the world, to start dividing up their enterprises into small pieces. Even illusions about self-management, ie the common ownership of an enterprise by those who work in it (which is a modem version ofthe workers ' cooperative) have really had their day. After numerous experiences, like the LIP factory in France at the beginning of the 70s, which often ended in conflicts between the workers as a whole and those they picked to be the managers, the majority of the workers are quite aware that, faced with the need to maintain the competitive position of the enterprise on the capitalist market, self-management means self-exploitation. When the proletariat develops its historic struggle, it can only look forwards: not towards the splitting up of capitalist property and production, but towards completing the process of socialization which capitalism has advanced considerably, but which it is incapable by its very nature of taking to its conclusion, even when the whole of the productive apparatus is concentrated in the hands of a nation state (as was the case in the Stalinist regimes).
In order to accomplish this task, the potential strength of the proletariat is enormous.
To begin with, in developed capitalist society, the essential wealth of society is produced by the labor of the working class even if it is still a minority of the world population. In the industrialized countries, the part of the national product that can be attributed to independent laborers (peasants, artisans, etc) is negligible. This is even the case in the backward countries, where the majority of the population lives (or just survives) from working the land.
Secondly, by necessity, capital has concentrated the working class in gigantic units of production, much bigger than anything that existed in Marx's day. Furthermore, these units of production are in general concentrated in the heart of, or close to, towns that are increasingly heavily populated. This regroupment of the working class, both where it lives and where it works, is an unrivalled source of strength when it knows how to make use of it, in particular through the development of solidarity and collective struggle.
Finally, one of the essential strengths of the proletariat is its capacity to develop its consciousness. All classes, and especially revolutionary classes, develop a form of consciousness. But hitherto, these forms could only be mystified, either because the project put forward could not be realized (as in the case of the Peasants' War in Germany, for example), or because the revolutionary class was obliged to lie" to hide reality from those it wanted to draw into its actions but which it was to continue to exploit (the case of the bourgeois revolution with its slogans 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity'). But since it is an exploited class whose revolutionary project is to abolish all exploitation, the proletariat does not have to mask, either from other classes, or from itself, the ultimate goals of its action. This is why, in the course of its historic struggle, the proletariat can develop a consciousness free from all mystifications. Because of this, its consciousness can go well beyond anything attained by its class enemy, the bourgeoisie. And it's precisely this capacity to become conscious which, along with its organization as a class, constitutes the decisive strength of the proletariat.
******
In the second part of this article, we will see how the proletariat today retains, despite all the campaigns which talk about its 'integration' or its 'disappearance', all the characteristics which make it the revolutionary class of our time. FM
[1] See in particular the article 'The Russian experience: private property and collective property' in International Review 61, as well as our series of articles' Communism isn't a nice idea, but a material necessity'.
[2] Marx and Engels later made the precision that this assertion only applied to the historical epochs that followed the dissolution of the primitive community, whose existence was confirmed by the ethnological works of the second half of the 19th century, such as those of Morgan on the American Indians.
[3] Certain bourgeois thinkers (such as the 19th century French politician Guizot, who was the head of government under the reign of Louis-Philippe) also reached this conclusion.
[4] This was also the case with the 'classical' economists such as Smith and Ricardo, whose work was particularly useful for the development of marxist theory.
[5] It's time to render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to Cornelius what belongs to him: all the latter's predictions have been invalidated by the facts. Did he not 'predict' that capitalism had overcome its economic crises (see in particular his articles on 'The dynamic of capitalism' in Socialisme ou Barbarie at the beginning of the 60s)? Did he not announce to the world in 1981 (see his book Devant la guerre, the second part of which, due to come out in the autumn of 81, we're still waiting for) that the USSR had definitively won the cold war ("a massive disequilibrium in favor of Russia"; "a situation practically impossible for the Americans to redress"? Such formulations were really welcome at a time when Reagan and the CIA were telling us all about the Evil Empire). This hasn't prevented the media from asking his 'expert' advice on all the big events of our time: despite all the gaffes he's made, the bourgeoisie will always be grateful to him for his tireless work against marxism - a work which is actually the root cause of all his chronic failures.
[6] It's true that, in many countries, these characteristics partially coincide with class membership. Thus, in many third world countries, the ruling class recruits most of its members from this or that ethnic group. This doesn't mean, however, that all members of that ethnic group are exploiters - far from it. Similarly, in the USA, the WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) are proportionally the highest represented in the bourgeoisie. This doesn't mean that there's no black bourgeoisie (Colin Powell, the armed forces chief, is black), or that there isn't a huge mass of 'poor whites'.
[7] "Sovereign ... we have come to you to ask for justice and protection ... Ensure that our needs are satisfied, and you will inscribe your name in our hearts, in the hearts of our children and grandchildren, forever." Such were the terms used by the workers' petition addressed to the Czar of all the Russians. But we should also point out that the petition added: "The limits of patience have been reached; for us, the terrible moment has arrived when death would be better than the prolongation of unbearable torments ... If you refuse to listen to our supplication, we will die here, on this square, in front of your palace."
[8] This possession does not necessarily take the form, as we have seen with the development of state capitalism, notably its Stalinist version, of an individual, personal ownership (one that can for example be passed on through inheritance). More and more it's in a collective manner that the capitalist class 'possesses' (in the sense of disposing of, controlling, benefitting from) the means of production, including when the latter have been statified.
[9] The petty bourgeoisie is not a homogeneous class. There are numerous variants of it which don't possess material means of production. Thus, cinema actors, writers, lawyers, for example, belong to this social category without disposing of specific tools. Their 'means of production' consist of a knowledge or a 'talent' which they put to use in their work.
[10] The serf was not a mere 'thing' belonging to the lord. Tied to the land, he was sold along with it (which was a trait he shared with the slave). However, there was initially a 'contract' between the serf and the lord: the latter, who possessed arms, offered him protection in return for the serf working on the lord's land (the corvee) or for a part of the serf's harvest.
[11] See 'Communism isn't a nice idea ...' I, 'From primitive communism to utopian socialism', IR 68.
[12] See in particular our pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism, soon to be reissued in English.
[13] On this point, see 'Communism isn't a nice idea ...', V, IR 72, for the way that the crisis of overproduction expresses the bankruptcy of capitalism
[14] See on this point 'Communism isn't a nice idea', I. IR 68.
[15] Owen was himself initially a big textile factory owner who made several attempts, both in Britain and America, to create ideal communities that ended up being broken on the laws of capital. Nevertheless he contributed to the development of the Trade Unions. The French utopians had less success in their enterprises. For years, Fourier waited in vain in his office for the benefactor who would finance his ideal city; and the attempts of his disciples to build 'phalansteries' (notably in the USA) ended in economic disaster. As for the doctrines of Saint-Simon, if they had some success, it was as the credo of a whole series of bourgeois, such as the Pereire brothers, founders of a bank, or Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal.
[16] There is an agricultural proletariat whose only means of existence is to sell its labor power to the owners of the land. This part of the peasantry belongs to the working class, and during the revolution constitutes its bridgehead into the countryside. However, since it undergoes its exploitation as the result of its 'bad luck' in being deprived of inheriting any land, or because it has been left too small a portion of land, the agricultural worker, who often works on a seasonal basis or is involved in a family farm, very often dreams of acquiring his own property and of a fairer division of the land. Only the advanced struggle of the urban proletariat will be able to turn him away from such chimaeras by offering the perspective of the socialization of the land along with the rest of the means of production.
[17] This doesn't mean that, during the period of transition from capitalism to communism, the regroupment of small landholders in cooperatives might not constitute a step towards the socialization of the land, in particular because it' would allow them to overcome the individualism that derives from the context of their labor.
[18] What is true for the peasants is even more true for the artisans whose place in society has been even more radically reduced than that of the former. As for the liberal professions (private doctors, lawyers, etc), their social status and their income (which is often the envy of the bourgeoisie) doesn't incite them to question the existing order in any way. As for the students, whose very definition indicates that they have no place in the economy, their destiny is to split up into the different classes they are heading towards on account of their qualifications or their family origins.
[19] At the dawn of the development of the working class, certain sectors, thrown into unemployment because of the introduction of new machinery, directed their revolt against the machines themselves, and went about destroying them. This attempt to return to the past was only an embryonic form of the workers' struggle and it was quickly superseded with the economic and political development of the proletariat.
"The new world disorder": this is what the English-speaking press is now calling the ‘new world order' that ex-president Bush bequeathed to his successor. The panorama is terrifying and catastrophic. The list of misfortunes hitting humanity is very long. The bourgeois press and television make this clear enough. They might like to hide the facts, but if they tried it would discredit them totally. But since they must still serve the ideology of the bourgeoisie, they separate the numerous tragic events taking place, they refuse to see the link between them, the common root: the historic impasse that capitalism has reached, the putrefaction of this social system, which explains the multiplication of imperialist wars and the brutal aggravation of the world economic crisis with all the ravages that it brings. To recognise the unity between all these characteristics of capitalism today, to recognise that they are all getting worse together and that they mutually influence each other, would be to expose the fact that capitalism is leading us into endless barbarism, that it is dragging the whole of humanity into a bottomless pit.
Recognising the link, the unity, the common cause behind all these elements of capitalism also serves to accelerate the development of consciousness about the historic alternative facing humanity today. For there is indeed a single alternative to this irreversible catastrophe: to destroy this society and build a radically different one. And there is one social force capable of taking on this task: the working class, which is both an exploited class and a revolutionary class. It alone can do away with capitalism, put an end to all these catastrophes and give birth to communism, a society in which men will no longer be led to kill each other but will be able to live in harmony.
No words are strong enough to denounce the barbarism and scale of the murderous local conflicts that are bloodying the whole planet. No continent is spared. These conflicts are not the inevitable result of ancestral hatreds; they are not the result of some natural law which determines that men are always evil, always looking for confrontation and war. This barbarous slide into imperialist war is not a natural fatality. It is the product of the historic impasse that capitalism has reached. The decomposition which is hitting capitalist society, the lack of any hope or perspective except individual survival, or membership of armed gangs in a war of each against all, is responsible for the explosion of local wars between populations who, for the most part, lived together harmoniously, or at least lived side by side, for decades or even centuries.
The putrefaction of capitalism is responsible for the thousands of deaths, killings, rapes and tortures, the famine and the deprivation decimating whole populations, men, women, and children. It is responsible for the millions of terrified refugees, forced to flee their houses, their villages, their regions, no doubt for good. It is responsible for the splitting up of families, for forcing parents to send their children away in the hope that they will escape the horrors, the massacres, the death, or the forced conscription, usually without any hope of seeing them again. It is responsible for the gulf of blood and revenge which is going to separate populations, ethnic groups, regions, villages, neighbours, parents. It is responsible for the daily nightmare in which millions of human beings are forced to live.
The decomposition of capitalism is also responsible for throwing out of capitalist production, or any productive activity at all, hundreds of millions of men and women, crammed together into the huge slums that now surround the mega-cities of the ‘third world'. The luckiest of them may from time to time find a super-exploited job which hardly manages to feed them. The others, under the whip of hunger, are compelled to beg, steal, to engage in all kinds of petty trafficking in order to get a pittance; they are pushed inexorably into the twilight of alcohol and drugs; they are forced to sell their own small children as virtual slaves to work in mines, in innumerable small workshops, or as prostitutes. Perhaps the worst of all this is the increasing number of abductions of street children, who are then killed because their livers or their eyes can be sold on the market. With all this material and moral degradation, which affects millions of humans beings, is it so astonishing that there are so many adults, adolescents, and even children of ten or less who are ready for any kind of horror or infamy, who are ‘free' of any morality, any values, any respect, for whom the lives of others are nothing because their own lives have been worth nothing since they were small children; that they are ready to become mercenaries in any guerilla group or street gang, led by any chief, general, colonel, sergeant, mafia boss; that they should stoop to torture, murder, systematic rape in the service of ‘ethnic cleansing' and other horrors?
There is a cause for this growing madness. There is something responsible for it: the historic impasse of capitalism.
The decomposition of capitalism is responsible for the frightful wars that are spreading throughout the territory of the ex-USSR, in Tadjikstan, Armenia, Georgia...it is responsible for the endless confrontations between militias that used to be allies in Afghanistan, and who now take turns flinging their missiles and shells across the streets of Kabul. It is responsible for the continuation of the war in Cambodia, for subjecting the country to blood and fire. It is responsible for the dramatic proliferation of wars and ethnic conflicts throughout the African continent. It is responsible for the renewal of ‘small' wars, if we can use the term, between armies, guerillas and mafias in Peru, Colombia, in Central America. While the populations of these areas have nothing, these armed gangs, whether formally part of the state or not, have considerable stocks of weapons, as often as not the fruits of the drugs trade, which is expanding all over the world, a trade that they control and practice themselves.
The decomposition of capitalism is responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia and for the chaos that has come out of it. Workers who used to work together in the same factories, who struggled and went on strike shoulder to shoulder against the Yugoslav capitalist state, peasants who cultivated land next to each other, children who went to the same school, the numerous families which are the fruit of ‘mixed' marriages, are now separated by an abyss of blood, of killings, of torture, of rape and plunder.
"The fighting between Serbs and Croats left some 10,000 dead. The fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina several tens of thousands (the Bosnian president has spoken of 200,000), 8,000 of them in Sarajevo...It is estimated that in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia there are two million refugees and victims of ‘ethnic cleansing'" (Le Monde des Débats, February 93).
Millions of men and women, of families, are seeing their hopes ruined, with no possible compensation, with no perspective ahead of them except despair, or even worse, blind revenge.
It is necessary to denounce with the utmost rigour the bourgeois lie that this period of chaos is purely temporary, that it is the price that has to be paid for the death of Stalinism in the eastern countries. We communists say that chaos and wars are going to develop and multiply. The phase of capitalist decomposition can offer neither peace nor prosperity. On the contrary, even more than in the past, it can only exacerbate the imperialist appetites of all capitalist states whether powerful or feeble. All of them are caught up in the war of each against all. There is not one conflict in which imperialist interests are absent. It is said that nature abhors a vacuum. It is the same with imperialism. Each one, no matter how strong or weak, is unable to leave a single region or country alone, for fear that a rival might grab it. The infernal logic of capitalism inevitably compels the various imperialisms to intervene.
No state, whether large or small, weak or powerful, can escape the implacable logic of imperialist rivalries and confrontations. It is just that the weakest powers, in order to defend their particular interests as best they can, have to line up according to the evolution of global imperialist antagonisms. They all participate in the rampaging development of local wars.
This period of chaos is not temporary. The evolution of global imperialist alignments around the main world imperialist powers, the USA of course, but also Germany, Japan, and, to a lesser degree, France, Britain, and Russia [1], China, throws oil on the fires of local wars. In fact, it is the old western imperialist powers at the very heart of world capitalism which are doing most to fan the flames of local wars and conflicts. This is the case in Afghanistan, in the Asiatic republics of the ex-USSR, in the Middle East, in Africa (Angola, Rwanda, Somalia) and of course in ex-Yugoslavia.
Ex-Yugoslavia has become the focal point in global imperialist rivalries, the place where, through the terrible war that has been going on, the imperialist stakes of the present period are being played for. If the historic impasse of decadent capitalism, its phase of decomposition, is responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia (as it was for the break-up of the USSR), and for the aggravation of tensions between the peoples who used to be part of it, it is the imperialist interests of the great powers which are responsible for the outbreak and dramatic intensification of the war. Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia provoked the war, as the Anglo-Saxon press repeats often enough in hindsight. The USA, of course, but also Britain and France, consciously pushed Serbia - which was only waiting for the chance - to dole out military punishment to Croatia. And from there on, the divergent interests of the imperialist powers we have mentioned determined the whole slide into military barbarism.
The atrocities committed on all sides, and especially the disgusting policy of ‘ethnic cleansing' undertaken by the Serbian militias in Bosnia, have been cynically used by the media propaganda of the western powers to justify their political, diplomatic and military interventions, and to hide their divergent imperialist interests. In fact, behind the humanitarian speeches, the great powers are confronting each other and have kept the fire going while pretending to be firemen.
Since the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the imperialist blocs that went with it, the allegiance owed to the USA by powers like Germany, France and Japan, to mention only the most important, has also disappeared. Inevitably, a country like Germany is destined to pose as an alternative pole of imperialist attraction to the US pole. Since the end of the Gulf war, these powers have more and more defended their own interests, putting the USA's leadership into question.
The break-up of Yugoslavia and the growing influence of Germany in the region, particularly in Croatia, and thus in the Mediterranean, represents a reverse for the American bourgeoisie in strategic terms [2], and it is also a bad example of its capacities for political, diplomatic and military intervention. It goes in the opposite direction to the lesson that it delivered via the Gulf war.
"We failed" said Eageleburger, Bush's Secretary of State. "From beginning to end, to right now, I am telling you I don't know any way to stop it (the war) except with the use of military force" (International Herald Tribune, 9.2.93). How is it that American imperialism, which was so prompt to use an incredible armada against Iraq two years ago, has not up till now resorted to massive military force?
Since last summer, each time the Americans were on the point of intervening militarily in Yugoslavia, when they wanted to bomb Serbian positions and airports, the rival European powers threw a spanner in the works. Last June, Mitterand's trip to Sarajevo, in the name of ‘humanitarian intervention', allowed the Serbs to lift the siege of the airport while at the same time saving face in front of the USA's threats to intervene; the sending of French and British soldiers within the UN force, then the reinforcement of the latter, then the Vance-Owen negotiations with all sides of the conflict - all this removed the justifications and, above all, considerably weakened the guarantee that a US military intervention would be successful. On the other hand, they aggravated the fighting and the massacres. as we have seen with the Vance-Owen Plan, which has been used by the Croats to reopen the war against Serbia in Krajina.
The hesitations of the new Clinton administration about supporting the Vance-Owen Plan, which has been devised in the name of the EC and the UN, reveal the USA's difficulties. Lee Hamilton, the Democrat president of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, summarised succinctly the problem facing US imperialist policy:
"The underlying fact here is that no leader is prepared to intervene massively in the former Yugoslavia with the kind of resources we used in the Gulf to throw back aggression, and if you are not prepared to intervene in that fashion then you have to deal with less forceful means and work within them" (International Herald Tribune, 5.2.93).
Following Hamilton's realistic advice, Clinton has seen reason and finally decided to support the Vance-Owen Plan. Like any good poker player, he has also decided to play the card of humanitarian intervention and to air-drop food supplies to the famished populations of Bosnia [3]. At the time of writing, the food containers dropped in the countryside still have not been found! Apparently, the ‘humanitarian' air-drops are as accurate as the ‘smart bombs' used against Iraq. Their actual result has been to intensify the war around the besieged cities. The number of victims has increased dramatically, with thousands of men, women and children fleeing desperately in the snow and the cold, under fire from artillery and snipers. But for the American bourgeoisie, the important thing is to begin imposing its military presence in the area. Moreover, its rivals are not fooled. "faced with the renewal of the fighting, and for humanitarian reasons", of course, the German and Russian bourgeoisies are openly talking about intervening themselves, about participating in the air-drops and even sending ground troops. The population's purgatory has a long way to go.
All the proposals of the American leaders confirm it: the US is more and more going to be compelled to use military force - and thus to exacerbate conflicts and wars. Humanitarian campaigns were the justifications for the displays of force that it carried out recently in Somalia and Iraq. These ‘humanitarian' displays were aimed at reasserting US military power in the eyes of the world, and, as a consequence, the impotence of the European powers in Yugoslavia. They also had the aim of preparing a military intervention in Yugoslavia viv-a-vis other rival imperialisms (as well as in front of the American population). As we have just seen, up till now the results have not measured up to their hopes. On the other hand, famine and military confrontations between rival factions continue in Somalia. Regional imperialist tensions in the Middle East are getting sharper, and the Kurds and the Shiites are still subjected to the terror of the various states in the region.
US imperialism's growing resort to the military card has the consequence of pushing its rivals to develop their own military strength. This is the case with Japan and Germany, who both want to change the Constitutions they inherited from the defeat of 1945, which restrict their capacities for armed intervention. It also has the consequence of stoking up the rivalries between the USA and Europe on the military level. The formation of the Franco-German army corps was a manifestation of this. In Yugoslavia, there is a real political battle going on to decide whether ‘humanitarian intervention' will be carried out under the command of the UN or NATO. In a more general sense, "a critical situation is shaping up between the Bonn government and NATO" (Die Welt, 8.2.93). This is confirmed by the former French president Giscard d'Estaing, who says that "defence is the sticking point in Euro-American relations" (Le Monde, 13.2.93).
The repulsive hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie has no limits. All the American military interventions, or those done under the cover of the UN - Somalia, Iraq, Cambodia, Yugoslavia - have been carried out in the name of humanitarian aid. All of them have served to rekindle and aggravate horror, war, massacres, the flight of refugees from fighting, misery and famine. They express and raise to a new level imperialist rivalries between small, medium, and above all the great powers. All of them are being pushed to increase their expenditure on arms, to reorganise their military forces in order to deal with new antagonisms. This is the real meaning of the ‘duty of humanitarian intervention' which the bourgeoisie goes on about. These are the results of the campaigns on humanitarian aid and the defence of human rights.
At the origin of the historic impasse of capitalism, which is provoking this horrifying spread of imperialist slaughters, is the system's inability to overcome and resolve the contradictions of its economy. The bourgeoisie is completely unable to solve the economic crisis. A bourgeois economist presents this contradiction while expressing his worries about the future of the inhabitants of Bangladesh (and the future of capitalism as well):
"Even if by some miracle of science enough food could be produced to feed them, how could they find the gainful employment needed to buy it?" (M F. Perutz from the University of Cambridge, cited in the International Herald Tribune, 20.2.93).
First of all - what an asshole! To claim today that it is impossible, except by some miracle, to feed the population of Bangladesh (and, we would say, of the whole world) is scandalous. Capital itself proves this, by paying farmers in the industrialised countries to limit their production and not to cultivate growing tracts of land. There is no underproduction, but an overproduction of goods. Not an overproduction of goods, of food, in relation to human needs, but, as underlined by our eminent university professor (who is both impotent, because he cannot resolve the contradiction, and hypocritical, because he argues as though there were not immense productive capacities around today), it is an overproduction resulting from the fact that the greater part of the world population can't buy the goods. From the fact that the markets are saturated.
Today, world capitalism means millions of human beings dying because they can't afford any food, and hundreds of millions not getting enough to eat when the main industrial powers, the same ones that are spending billions of dollars on their imperialist military interventions, compel their farmers to reduce their production. Not only is capitalism barbaric and murderous, it is also totally irrational and absurd. On the one hand, overproduction leads to the closure of factories, to throwing millions of workers out of work, and the abandonment of cultivatable lands; on the other hand there are hundreds of millions of individuals with no resources and tortured by hunger.
Capitalism can no longer resolve this contradiction as it did last century by conquering new markets. There are none left on the planet. Neither, for the moment, can it get on with realising the only ‘perspective' it can offer society, a third world war, as it has been able to do on two occasions since 1914, in the two world wars that left tens of millions dead. On the one hand, since the disappearance of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the imperialist blocs necessary for such a holocaust are not there; on the other hand, the population, and especially the proletariat, of the main western imperialist powers, is not ready to make such a sacrifice. Since capitalism is stuck in this situation, it is literally rotting on its feet.
In this situation of a historic impasse, economic rivalries sharpen as much as imperialist rivalries. The trade war is aggravating as are imperialist wars. And the disintegration of the USSR, which marked a very important step in the dramatic development of generalised chaos at the imperialist level, also marked an important step in the acceleration of competition between all capitalist nations, and especially between the great powers. "With the collapse of the Soviet threat, the economic disparities and disputes among the rich countries are getting harder to handle" (Washington Post, cited in the International Herald Tribune, 15.2.93). Hence the impossibility of so far closing the GATT talks, or the disputes and threats of protectionism between the USA, Europe and Japan.
Capitalism is bankrupt and the trade war has been unleashed. The recession is ravaging even the strongest economies, the USA, Germany, Japan, all the European states. No country is spared. It forces each one ruthlessly to defend its own interests. It is an added factor in the tensions between the big powers.
The economic bankruptcy of capitalism also has terrible consequences for the world proletariat. Here again, words or figures can't really convey the brutality of the attacks being mounted on the workers. The closure of enterprises, massive redundancies, are taking place all over the world. And especially in the main economic and imperialist powers, the USA, western Europe, even Japan; and in central sectors such as the automobile, aerospace construction, steel, and computer industries, as well as banks and insurance; in the public sector, etc. Just to give a slight indication of the redundancies being envisaged officially: 30,000 at Volkswagen; 28,000 at Boeing; 40,000 in the German steel industry; 25,000 at IBM, where there were already 42,900 in 1992...These massive cuts in the workers' ranks are being accompanied by wage reductions, drastic cuts in the ‘social wage' - social security, pensions, benefits of all kinds. For those ‘lucky' enough to keep their jobs, working conditions are getting worse and worse. Unemployment benefits are being considerably reduced, where they exist at all. The number of homeless, of families reduced to eating in soup kitchens, of beggars, has exploded in all the industrialised countries. The workers of North America and western Europe are experiencing absolute pauperisation, like their class brothers in the so-called ‘third world' and in eastern Europe did before them.
Just as imperialist conflicts are breaking out on all continents at the same time, with an incredible savagery, the attacks on the workers are falling harder than could have been thought possible not long ago, in all sectors, in all countries, and at the same time.
But unlike the wars and conflicts produced by the decomposition of capitalism, the economic catastrophe of capitalism and its consequences for the working class can give rise to a revival of hope, to the prospect of the communist alternative to this world of atrocity and misery.
Since the autumn of 1992, and the massive workers' reaction in Italy, the proletariat has started to fight again. Despite their weaknesses, the miners' demonstrations in then UK, the signs of anger in France, and the street demonstrations of steel workers in Germany, express the return of class combativity. Inevitably, the international proletariat is going to have to respond to the attacks against it. Inevitably, it will return to the path of the class struggle. But there is still a long way to go before it can present to suffering humanity the perspective of the proletarian revolution and of communism. Not only will it have to struggle of course, but it will also have to learn how to struggle. In the defence of its living conditions, in its economic struggles, in the search for an ever-widening unity, it is going to have to confront the manoeuvres and obstacles set up by the unions; it is going to have to uncover the divisive and corporatist traps laid by the ‘rank and file' unionists, and reject the phony radicalism of the leftists. It is going to have to develop its capacities for organisation, to regroup, to hold general assemblies open to all, workers and unemployed, to set up struggle committees, to demonstrate in the street and call for active solidarity. In short, it is going to have to wage a difficult and bitter political fight to develop its struggles and to affirm the revolutionary perspective. For the workers there is no choice but the political struggle. It comes directly from their conditions of life. It comes from their future, and the future of all humanity.
With the decomposition of capitalism, the chaos that goes with it, and particularly since the explosion of the USSR, imperialist wars have become more savage, more barbaric and at the same time more numerous. No continent has been spared. Similarly, the economic crisis is today taking on a deeper, more irreversible , more dramatic character than ever before, and it is hitting all the countries of the world. Combined together, they are dramatically aggravating the generalised catastrophe that the very survival of capitalism represents. Every day that passes is a another tragedy for hundreds of millions of human beings. Every day that passes is also another step towards capitalism's irreversible slide towards the destruction of humanity. The stakes are frightful: a definitive collapse into barbarism , with no hope of return, or the proletarian revolution and the creation of a world in which men can live in a harmonious community. Workers of all countries, take up the struggle against capitalism! RL, 4.3.93
[1] After the end of the USSR, will we now see the break-up of the Russian Federation? In any case, the situation there is deteriorating rapidly both economically and politically. Chaos is growing, violence and the rule of the mafia everywhere, corruption, brutal recession, poverty and despair. Yeltsin doesn't seem able to govern very much and his authority is more and more being called into question. The aggravation of the situation in Russia can only have grave consequences on the international level.
[2] Directly economic interests, the gaining of particular markets, is more and more secondary in the development of imperialist rivalries. For example, the control of the Middle East, and thus of its oil, by the USA, corresponds more to its strategic interests vis-a-vis the other great powers, Germany and Japan in particular, who are dependent on the oil supplies from this region, than to any financial benefits the USA might be able to draw from it.
[3] At the time of writing, it's still not clear who planted the bomb at the World Trade Center in New York. It is very probable that it is linked to the exacerbation of imperialist rivalries. Either it was carried out by a state which wanted to put pressure on the US bourgeoisie (as was the case with the terrorist attacks of September 86 in Paris), or it was a provocation of some kind. In any case, the crime has been used by the American bourgeoisie to create a sentiment of fear in the population, with the aim of making it rally round the state, and of justifying the military interventions to come.
The text below is an extract from a report on the situation in Germany written by Weltrevolution, the ICC's section in that country. Although the article deals with the situation in a single country, it actually reflects the general crisis of capitalism in all countries. Once feted in the bourgeoisie's propaganda as a virtuous example of capitalism's good health, the German economy has now become a symbol of the gravity of the system's downfall.
Now that it is sinking into the worst crisis it's been through since the 1930s, this central pole of world capitalism, which once seemed to be the most solid of all, is tottering. This situation is not only a significant pointer to the seriousness of the current world economic crisis; it is the harbinger of future storms that menace the entire edifice of global capitalism.
The bourgeoisie no longer has any ‘healthy' models to back up the illusion that, in order to get over the crisis, all that's needed is rigorous management. The situation in Germany shows that even the country that distinguished itself by having the most virtuous management of all, a country whose workers were always being praised for their sense of discipline, cannot escape the crisis This also shows the inanity of the bourgeoisie's constant appeals for more rigor. No bourgeois policy can offer a solution to the generalised bankruptcy of the capitalist system. The sacrifices that are everywhere being imposed on the proletariat will not bring a better tomorrow, but only growing misery with no improvement in sight, including in the most industrialised countries.
The recession in the USA at the end of the 80s, although eclipsed at the time by the collapse of the eastern bloc and the media celebration of the "victory of the market economy", was not merely of conjunctural but of historic importance. After the final and definitive collapse of the third world and of the eastern bloc, it meant the breakdown of one of the three main motors of the world economy, paralysed by a mountain of debts. 1992, at this level, was another truly historic year, marked by the public and spectacular humbling of the two remaining giants, Japan and Germany. The indebtedness of Germany in the aftermath of unification, while temporarily delivering a specific German boom, has not made it possible to avoid the recession. This means that, like for the US, for Germany this recession is of historic importance. Due to its soaring public debts, Germany no longer has the means to pay its way out of the present slump. Not only has Germany officially entered into recession, but it has failed as a powerhouse for the world economy and in its previous role as a relative pillar of economic stability in Europe. The German bourgeoisie is the latest and most spectacular victim of the explosion of economic chaos and the uncontrollability of the crisis.
In relation to the boom of the past three years, the conjuncture literally collapsed in the third quarter of 92. GNP growth, which at the end of 1990 reached a peak of almost 5%, dropped suddenly to around 1%, and is expected to actually fall below minus for the first six months of 1993, despite a predicted 7% growth in the ex-GDR. The orders for investment goods fell by 8% in the last six months. The production of the vital machine tools sectors dropped by 20% in 91 and 25% in 92. Total industrial production fell by 1% last year and is expected to be minus 2% this year. Textile production fell by 12%. The export sector, the traditional motor of the German economy, usually able to lead the way out of each slump, no longer delivers the goods in the face of world wide recession and increased imports. The balance of payments, still plus 57.4 billion dollars in 1989, has for 1992 reached a new record deficit of over 25 billion dollars. The devaluation of the currencies of Britain, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Norway in the autumn made German goods there around 15% more expensive overnight. The number of companies going bankrupt increased last year by almost 30%. The car industry is already planning production cuts of at least 7% for this year. The other industrial pillars such as steel, chemicals, electronics and engineering are planning similar reductions. One of the biggest steel and machine producers, Klöckner, is on the verge of bankruptcy. The result is an explosion of redundancies. Volkswagen, expecting a sales reduction of 20% this year, plans to sack every tenth employee: 12,500. Daimler-Benz (Mercedes, AEG, DASA Aerospace) will sack 11,800 this year and cut 40,000 jobs by 1996. Other major job killers: Post-Telecom: 13.500; Veba: 7000; MAN: 4500; Lufthansa: 6000; Siemens: 4000.Thus, the official unemployment figures at the end of 92 read: 3,126,000. That means 6.6% in the west and 13.5% (1.1 million) in the east. On short time work: in the west 649,000; in the east 233,000. In the east FOUR MILLION jobs have been eliminated in the past three years and almost half a million workers are in state employment schemes. And this is just the beginning. Even the official predictions expect 3.5 million unemployed by the end of this year for Germany as a whole. In the ex-GDR, production and services would have to increase by over 100% to even maintain employment at the present rate. Officially, three million homes are lacking just in the big cities, whereas 4.2 million people live from the lowest social benefits (460% more than in 1970). Even semi-official organisations admit that the real number of unemployed will reach 5.5 million this year. And this does not include the 1.7 million in the new eastern provinces in educational, labour creation, short time work and early retirement - an operation which has alone cost 50 billion DM.
When Kohl became chancellor in 82, the public debt of 615 billion DM amounted to 39% of GNP, or 10,000 DM per citizen. In the meantime this has reached 21,000 DM per head, over 42% of GNP. And soon it is expected to exceed 50% of GNP, so that each German would have to work six months without wages to pay it back. The state debt has reached 1700 billion, and is expected to exceed 2500 billion by the turn of the century. It took 40 years up until 1990 for the German state to reach the first thousand billion DM of debt. The second thousand billion is expected to be achieved by 1994 or at the latest 1995. Every minute of the year the state takes in 1.4 million DM in taxes and makes 217,000 DM in new debts. And over 100 billion DM have been loaned out by state controlled banks and funds (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, Berliner Industriebank) to East German companies alone between 89 and 91. Most of this money will never be seen again. 41 billion have gone to the ex-USSR in the same period and are expected to meet the same fate. Thus, overnight, vast financial resources accumulated over decades, and which made Germany not only the most solvent major power but also a principal and valuable money lender on the world markets, have melted away. Major instruments for manipulating the economy have been wasted definitively. And the recession makes all of this all the worse. Every missing growth % costs Bonn 10 billion DM, and the provinces and communes 20 billion DM in income losses through missing tax revenues. At the same time, taxes and social payments have reached record levels. Every second DM earned goes to the state or the social funds. And new taxes are planned: a drastic increase for mineral oil; or a special levy to finance a building boom for the east. And the share of interest payments in the federal budget, which rose from 18% in 1970 to 42% in 1990, is predicted to reach over 50% by 1995.The collapse of the German conjuncture, the shrinking of its markets, its demise as international financier, is a real catastrophe not only for the German but for the world and especially the European economy.
We could hardly find better examples of the growing uncontrollability of the world economic crisis than the way in which the economically most powerful bourgeoisie in Europe is more and more obliged to act in a way which only worsens the crisis or which is in contradiction to its own dearest principles. One example is the inflationist policy of public debt, not least to finance unproductive consumption, coupled with a constant increase of money in circulation - a policy which took on spectacular forms with the economic and monetary union with the GDR and which has been going on ever since. The yearly price index increase, traditionally one of the lowest of all the main industrial countries, is presently tending to be one of the highest. Hovering between 4 and 5%, the ceiling on this has only been maintained to date by the ruthless anti-inflationist interest rates policy of the Bundesbank. The headlong plunge into ever greater debts is itself a grave break with the previous policy of at least keeping debts within certain boundaries. The classical German anti-inflationist policies of the last forty years (both the goal of price stability and the relative autonomy of the Bundesbank are written into the constitution) reflect not only immediate economic interests but an entire political "philosophy", born not only of the experiences of the great inflation of 1923 and the economic disaster of 1929, but of the traditional leanings of the German "national character" towards order, stability and security. Whereas in Anglo-Saxon countries high interest rates are usually considered the main barrier to economic expansion, the "German school" declares that enterprises with good chances of profits will never be put off by interests rates, but rather by inflation. Equally, the fanatical pursuit of a policy of a "hard Deutsche Mark" is theoretically underlined by the idea that the advantages of devaluation (for exports) are always wiped out by the resulting inflation (through more expensive imports). It's thus far more significant of the loss of control when Germany of all countries today pursues such inflationary policies.The same goes for the eruptions in the EMS, which is a true catastrophe for German interests. Stable currency relations are crucial for German industry, since not only the big but even most of the smaller companies not only export mainly to other EC countries but conduct at least part of their production there. Without this stability, any price calculation becomes impossible, and life even more of a lottery than usual. At this level the EMS was really a success, not least in making Germany to quite a large extent independent of the fluctuations and manipulations of the Dollar. But even the Bundesbank with its still gigantic currency reserves was helpless in face of the speculative movement of 500 to 1000 billion dollars per day on the currency markets.As a world wide operating economic power, Germany has most to lose from the financial, monetary and commodity markets becoming ever-more fragile. And yet it finds itself obliged to conduct a national economic policy which daily hacks away at the foundations of these markets.
Whether in the US with Clinton, in Japan, or with the proposals of Delors in the EC, the policies of a more open and brutal state intervention through the financing of public works and infrastructure programmes, to some extent ignoring real market demands, is coming to the foreground in all industrial countries. This is coupled with an ideological shift away from the laissez-faire mystifications of the 80s, which were particularly developed in the Anglo-Saxon countries under Reagan and Thatcher. These policies are not a solution or even a medium-term palliative; they are merely a sign that the bourgeoisie is not planning to commit suicide and is prepared to postpone a greater catastrophe even if it means that when it comes it will be even worse. The level both of debts and of overproduction prohibit any real stimulation of the capitalist economy. Where these policies lead to is perfectly illustrated by the country which for political reasons was obliged to first initiate such schemes: Germany, with its reconstruction programmes for the east, transferring several hundred billion DM to its eastern provinces per year. The result today is: debt explosion, tendency to inflation, squandering of reserves, balance of payments deficit, and finally recession.But while Germany was the forerunner in all this, the goals and motivations of this policy is not identical to that in the US or Japan, where perhaps the main consideration is to stop the dive in economic activity. We should not lose sight of the fact that the main goal of this policy has been political (unification, stabilisation, the enlarging of the power of the German state etc). This gives such an economic policy a different dynamic from, say, that of the US under Clinton. On the one hand it implies that some investments can prove politically "profitable" even if giving immediate economic losses. But on the other hand it also means that the German bourgeoisie cannot simply stop and reverse policies if this operation proves too expensive, which is precisely the case. This is an operation where there is no turning back any more, even in face of the danger of bankruptcy. At the economic level the bourgeoisie badly miscalculated the costs of unification. It underestimated both the general costs and the degree of dilapidation of East German industry. And it didn't expect such a rapid collapse of the eastern export markets of the ex-GDR. Since then the strategy has changed. The territory of the ex-GDR must be made into a platform for conquering western markets. This of course is only possible if it acquires real competitive advantages over its rivals, in particular in the EC. The three pillars of this strategy are the following:
- A STATE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME: in an epoch in which production methods and technologies are becoming increasingly uniform, infrastructure (transport, communications etc) constitute a potentially decisive competitive advantage. There can be no doubt about the determination of the German bourgeoisie to equip its eastern provinces with the most modern infrastructure in Europe, that this programme is advancing in giant steps, and that it will be completed by the end of the century if German capital does not go bust beforehand;
- LOW WAGES: according to the wage agreements signed, eastern wages will soon reach western levels. However the unions have now reached an unofficial agreement according to which wages under the norm can be paid in enterprises struggling for survival (the case for 80% of them!)
- POLITICAL INVESTMENTS: the previous economic policy towards the east has been: the state creates the infrastructure and conditions, the employers make the investments. However the employers have not done so, for reasons to do with what is pleased to call itself "the market economy". The result: nobody wanted to buy the GDR's industry, which for the most part has completely disappeared in what has been the fastest and most spectacular deindustrialisation in history. In the end the state will have to pay directly for long term investments which private investors are shying away from.
Is the bourgeoisie capable of giving so much as the shadow of a solution to the problem of the world's division into nations, which has caused millions of deaths in the worldwide and local wars which have besmirched the planet since the turn of the century? This is at least the claim of several pro-European political tendencies.
Today's reality demonstrates that a united Europe incorporating the various EEC countries, and even others, was nothing but a utopia. We can see the proof in the disputes that divide them, and their inability to settle such tragic international events as those in Yugoslavia, despite their unfolding at the very gates of industrialised Europe. Nonetheless, it is not impossible that the bourgeoisie might, in different circumstances, and in particular to serve new imperialist alliances, be led to revamp the idea of European unity as "flavour of the month" once again. Once again, the bourgeoisie would be led to use campaigns on the European question to try to polarise the workers' attention on a problem which has nothing to do with their interests, and even more, to divide the class by making it take sides in a false debate.
This is why it is necessary to show that the whole project of building European unity is in fact just an element in the creation of alliances in a merciless economic war which is being waged between all the countries in the world, or in the formation of imperialist alliances with a view to open warfare to which the insoluble economic crisis is leading.
The different attempts at European unity are sometimes presented as so many steps towards the creation of a "new European nation", with a considerable economic and political standing in the world. Each step forward, and especially the latest, are, according to the euro-enthusiasts, factors of peace and justice in the world.
Such an idea has had all the more impact in that whole sectors of the bourgeoisie have fallen for it, and become its earnest advocates. They like to talk of the "United States of Europe", on the same lines as the United States of America.
In fact, such a proposal is a utopia, because it is lacking two essential factors.
The first is the fact that the formation of a new nation, in the full sense of the word, is a process that can only occur under certain historic circumstances. And the present period, unlike some in the past, is wholly unfavorable to such a formation.
The second is that, contrary to the claims of bourgeois propaganda "the political will of governments" and "popular aspirations" cannot act as substitutes for violence. Since the existence of the bourgeoisie is indissolubly linked to that of private property, whether individual or state-controlled, the unification of nations inevitably means the expropriation or violent subjection of some national fractions of the bourgeoisie by others.
This is illustrated by the history of the formation of new nations ever since the Middle Ages.
During the Middle Ages, the social, economic, and political situation can be summed up in these words of Rosa Luxemburg: "In the Middle Ages, when feudalism was dominant, the ties between different parts or regions of the same nation were in fact extremely loose. Every important city produced, with the surrounding countryside, the majority of products required to satisfy its day-to-day needs; it would also have its own administration, its own government, and its own army; in the West, the largest and most prosperous cities sometimes waged war and signed treaties with foreign powers. Similarly, the largest communities led their own isolated lives, and each part of a feudal lord's domain, or even each of his knights' manors, constituted in itself a quasi-independent state" [1].
Although at a slower pace and on a smaller scale than was to be the case under capitalist domination, the process of social transformation was already at work: "The revolution in production and commercial relations at the end of the Middle Ages, the increase in the means of production and the development of a money based economy with the development of international trade, and at the same time as the revolution in military techniques the decline of the nobility and the development of standing armies were all factors which in political terms encouraged the development of royal power and the rise of absolutism. Absolutism's main tendency was to create a centralised state apparatus. The 16th and 17th centuries were a period of constant struggle between the centralising tendency of absolutism and the remains of feudal separatism" [2].
Obviously, it was the bourgeoisie which gave the decisive impetus to this process of the formation of modern states, and brought it to a conclusion: "The abolition of tolls, and of the independence of both municipalities and the minor nobility in the matter of taxation and the administration of justice, were the first acts of the modern bourgeoisie. This went along with a large state machine which brought together all these functions: administration in the hands of central government, legislation by a parliament, the various armed forces gathered together in a centralised army under the command of the central government, customs duties levied uniformly on imports and exports, the imposition of a single currency throughout the state, etc. In the same way, the modern state has unified the cultural domain as far as possible, through a uniform régime in education, and with a church organised along the same lines as the state as a whole. In a word, capitalism's dominant tendency is towards the greatest possible centralisation" [3].
War has always played a vital role in the formation of modern nations, both internally in eliminating the resistance of reactionary sectors of society, and externally in asserting the nation's frontiers, and its right to exist, by force of arms. This is why the only viable states to have emerged from the Middle Ages are those which have a sufficient economic development to guarantee their own independence.
The example of Germany illustrates the role of violence in the formation of a strong state: after beating Austria, and subjecting the German princes, Prussia was able to impose a stable German unity thanks to the victory over France in 1871.
Similarly, the formation of the United States of America in 1776, although its foundations were not laid in the soil of feudal society since it had gained its independence in the war against Great Britain, also illustrates the same point: "The first nucleus of the Union between the various English colonies of North America, which until then had been independent of each other and which differed widely both socially and politically and indeed on many levels had widely diverging interests, was created by the revolution" [4]. But the formation of the cohesive modern USA of today was only assured by the North's victory over the South in the Civil War of 1861: "The Northern States acted as advocates of centralisation, thus representing the development of large-scale modern capital, machine industry, individual freedom and equality before the law, in other words the real corollary of wage labour, democracy, and bourgeois progress" [5].
The 19th century was characterised by the formation of new nations (Germany, Italy), or by the bitter struggle to do so (Poland, Hungary). This "is no accident, but corresponds to the impetus given by an expanding capitalist economy which finds the nation state the most appropriate framework for its development" [6].
Capitalism's entry into its decadent phase at the turn of the century prevented the emergence of any new nations capable of competing on an equal footing with the existing industrialised nations [7]. The six greatest industrialised nations of the 1980's (USA, Japan, Russia, Germany, France, Britain) were the same, though in a different order, as those of World War I. The saturation of solvent markets, which is at the root of capitalism's decadence, provokes a commercial war between nations and the development of imperialism, which is nothing other than the attempt to find a military solution to the insoluble problem of the economy. In this context, those nations which arrived late on the industrial scene have not been able to close the gap separating them from the most developed: on the contrary the gap tends to widen. Last century already, Marx underlined the permanent antagonism between the bourgeoisie's different national fractions: "The bourgeoisie finds itself engaged in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries" [8]. While the contradiction between capitalism and feudalism has been superseded, by contrast the antagonism between nations has only been exacerbated by decadence. This underlines how utopian, or hypocritical and deceitful, is the idea of a peaceful union of different states, European though they may be.
All the nations born in the present period were the result (like Yugoslavia on 28th October 1918) of the imposition of new frontiers or the dismemberment of vanquished nations or their empires in the world wars. In such conditions, they were necessarily deprived of the attributes of a major nation.
The present, and final, phase of decadence, that of social decomposition, not only discourages the emergence of new nations: it exerts an active pressure on the less cohesive existing ones. The breakup of the USSR is partly a result of this phenomenon, and in its turn it has been a destabilising factor both in the republics which it created and in the European sub-continent as a whole. Yugoslavia, amongst others, has not stood up to it.
Since the conditions for European unity as a nation did not exist before the beginning of the century, in a period which was much more favorable for new nations to emerge, it has been impossible ever since. However, given the region's importance - the greatest industrial concentration in the world - and its consequent status as a prime target for imperialist appetites, it was inevitable that Europe should become the theatre where the determining imperialist alliances in the international balance of power would be made and broken. From the end of World War II until the collapse of the Eastern bloc, it has been the bastion of the Western bloc, with a political and military cohesion to match that of the enemy bloc. Likewise, since the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the consequent dissolution of the Western bloc, it has been the theatre for the struggle for influence between the USA and Germany, which will be at the head of the two future imperialist blocs, should these ever come into being.
The economic agreements between European countries to face up to international competition have been superimposed on these imperialist rivalries and alliances, though not always in tune with them.
At the end of World War II, a Europe destabilised by economic crisis and social disorganisation looked an easy prey for Russian imperialism. The leader of the opposing bloc was thus obliged to do everything possible to reestablish a social and economic organisation which would make it less vulnerable to Russian ambitions: "Western Europe, although it had not suffered the appalling damage inflicted on the Eastern part of the continent, was still suffering, two years after the end of the war, from an economic exhaustion which it seemed unable to escape... overall, at the beginning of 1947 it seemed on the edge of an abyss... all these elements seemed likely to provoke, in the short term, a general economic collapse, while social tensions gathered on the horizon threatening to tip Western Europe into the rapidly forming camp of the USSR" [9].
The Marshall Plan was voted in 1948: $17 billion worth of aid was to be made available between 1948 and 1952. It was entirely at the service of this imperialist objective of the USA [10]. It was part of the dynamic of the strengthening of the two blocs and the increasing tensions between them. Other important events were part of the same pattern. On the Western side came, in the same year: Yugoslavia's break with Moscow, preventing the formation of a Balkan Federation including Bulgaria and Albania under Soviet influence; the creation of the Brussels Mutual Assistance pact (a military alliance between the Benelux countries, France and Great Britain), followed the year after by the Atlantic Pact which was to lead to the creation of NATO in 1950. This being said, the Eastern bloc did not remain passive: it initiated the "Cold War", marked in particular by the Berlin blockade and the pro-Russian coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948. In 1949, Comecon (Council for Economic Cooperation) was set up between the countries of the bloc. Moreover, the antagonism between the two blocs was not limited to Europe, but already was polarising imperialist tensions throughout the world. The years 1946-1954 saw the first phase of the war in Indochina, which was to end with the surrender of French troops at Dien Bien Phu.
The establishment of the Marshall Plan was a powerful factor drawing together the countries which benefited from it, and the body in charge of it, the "European Organisation for Economic Cooperation", was the precursor of all those "agreements" which were to follow. However, the motive force behind these agreements remained the demands of imperialism. This was especially true of the "European Coal and Steel Community". "The European Party led by Robert Schumann gained strength in 1949-50, when a Russian offensive was most feared, and it was desired to consolidate Europe's economic resistance while the political arena saw the reinforcement of the Council of Europe and NATO. And so the desire to give up particularities in favour of a pooling of the great European resources, in other words the foundations of economic power which at the time were coal and steel" [11]. 1952 thus saw the formation of the ECSC, a common market for coal and steel embracing France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. Although formally more autonomous of the USA than was the EOEC, this new community still served US interests through an economic and therefore a political strengthening of the Western bloc's frontier with the USSR. Great Britain did not enter the ECSC for reasons of its own, linked to its desire to preserve its "independence" from the other European countries, and to maintain the integrity of the "sterling zone", since the pound at the time was the world's second currency. However, this exception was perfectly acceptable for the Western bloc, given Britain's geographical position and the strength of its ties to the USA.
The EEC's creation in 1957, with the aim of "gradually doing away with customs duties, harmonising economic, monetary, financial and social policies, and establishing the free circulation of labour and free competition" [12] was a further stage in the reinforcement of European cohesion, and so of the Western bloc's cohesion likewise. Although the EEC was a potential economic rival for the United States, it began on the contrary as a factor in US development: "The geographical area most favored by direct US investments since 1950 is Europe: they have increased fifteen-fold. This tendency remained fairly modest until 1957, but accelerated afterwards.
The unification of the continental European market led the Americans to rethink their strategy in the light of several imperatives: the creation of a common economic tariff was likely to exclude them, if they were not already present on the spot. Existing investments were called into question, since within a unified market there could be advantages to be gained in terms of labour costs, taxation, or government subsidies, by relocating, for example, to Italy or Belgium. Moreover, there was no longer any reason to duplicate investment in more than one country. Finally, and above all, the new European market could compare in population, in industrial capacity, and in the medium term in living conditions, with the USA: its potential was therefore not to be neglected" [13].
In fact, Europe's development was such - during the 60s it became the world's greatest economic power - that its products began to compete directly with those from America. However, despite this economic success it was unable to overcome its own divisions, based on opposing economic interests and different political orientations within the Western club. An example of the opposition between different economic interests is the divergence between Germany on the one hand, which sought to encourage its exports by widening the EEC and developing closer relations with the USA, and France which on the contrary wanted a more closed EEC in order to protect its own industry from international competition. This political opposition between France and other countries came to a head over Britain's repeated applications to join the EEC. De Gaulle's government, which sought to reduce American domination, alleged that membership of the Community was incompatible with the "special relationship" between Britain and the USA.
Thus, "the EEC was only a very partial success, and was unable to impose a common policy. The failure of Euratom in 1969-70, the mitigated success of the Concorde aircraft, are illustrations of this"(13). This is hardly surprising, since a common and autonomous European strategy on the political, and thence on the economic level inevitably came up against the limits imposed by the discipline of the bloc dominated by the USA.
This bloc discipline disappeared with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and the dissolution of the Western bloc as a result, since as we have seen European unity was cemented essentially by imperialist considerations.
The only cohesive factor in Europe, as it appears today with the dissolution of the Western bloc, is at the economic level, in agreements designed to confront in the least unfavorable conditions possible the competition from Japan and America. By itself, this factor is very weak compared to the growing imperialist tensions which are pulling Europe apart.
The agreements which, on the economic level, define the present European Community are largely to do with freedom of trade in most commodities between member countries, with various safeguards allowing the temporary protection of national production in some countries, with the agreement of the other members. These agreements go hand in hand with other open or concealed protectionist measures against other countries which do not belong to the Community. Although these agreements obviously do not eliminate competition between the member countries (this is not their purpose anyway), they nonetheless have a certain effectiveness against competition from the US and Japan. One example is the hypocritical barriers imposed on imports of Japanese cars, to protect the European auto industry. Another, though in the opposite direction this time, is the USA's huge effort during the GATT negotiations to drive a wedge into European unity, and to have succeeded amongst other things over the question of agricultural produce. At the economic level, these measures are topped off by the adoption of various standards such as those concerning tax laws, designed to facilitate trade and economic cooperation amongst the countries involved.
Apart from the strictly economic measures, others have been adopted or proposed whose clear aim is to tighten the links between the various countries.
Thus, the Schengen agreement has been signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands (to be joined later by Spain and Portugal), with the aim of "providing protection against massive immigration", and at the same time "against internal destabilising factors".
Despite their vagueness, the Maastricht agreement is also an attempt to go further in tightening these links.
The implications of such agreements are wider than the mere common defense of certain economic interests, since the growing interdependence between the member countries opens the way to a greater political autonomy from the USA. The full importance of such a perspective can be seen when we consider that the most powerful European country involved is Germany, which is precisely the country most likely to take the lead of a future imperialist bloc opposed to the USA. This is the reason for the clear attempts on the part of Holland and Great Britain, which have remained the USA's faithful allies, to sabotage the construction of a more "political" Europe.
The imperialist question appears still more clearly if we look at the military agreements involving the "hard core" of the attempt to assert a clear autonomy against US hegemony. Germany and France have formed a common army corps, while a less important, but still significant agreement has been concluded between France, Spain, and Italy for the formation of a common air-sea force [14].
Britain's disapproval of the Franco-German force, and the Dutch reaction to it ("Europe must not be subjected to the Franco-German consensus") are clear indicators of the antagonism between the respective camps.
Similarly, the USA, despite some discreet and purely diplomatic noises in favour of Maastricht, are singularly unenthusiastic about the treaty, even though they can always rely on their British and Dutch allies to paralyse the European institution [15].
Obviously, the tendency will be for Germany and France to make more and more use of the EEC institutions to make Europe more autonomous relative to the USA. Conversely, Holland and Britain will be obliged to respond by paralysing European initiatives.
Nonetheless, such action by Britain or Holland would tend to "marginalise" them from the EEC structures if pushed beyond certain limits.
Such a perspective, which would mean the beginning of the breakup of the EEC, is obviously not without disadvantages at the economic level for all the countries involved. In Europe itself, it would accelerate the formation of a new bloc opposed to the US.
Since the "European project" is a pure myth, and moreover is preparing the integration of an imperialist bloc, the working class obviously has no sides to take in the quarrels going on between different bourgeois factions as to which imperialist camp to join. The workers must reject both the chauvinists who present themselves as the "guardians of national identity", or even the "defenders of the workers' interests against the bosses' Europe", and the no less nationalist partisans of "building Europe". The class has everything to lose on this terrain, which would do nothing but sow division and the worst illusions amongst it. And amongst the lies the bourgeoisie uses to deceive the workers, there are a few "classics" which they must be able to unmask.
"The union of the majority of European countries is a factor for peace in the world, or at least in Europe". This kind of idea relies on the assumption that if France and Germany are allied in such a structure, we will avoid a repetition of the last two world wars. It is true that this might avoid a conflict between the two countries - always assuming that France does not change sides at the last minute to join the US camp. But it provides no solution at all to the crucial problem of war. If the political ties between certain European countries were to develop further than they are today, this would inevitably be part of a dynamic towards the formation of a new imperialist bloc around Germany, and opposed to the USA [16]. And if the working class leaves the bourgeoisie's hands free, the end result of such a dynamic can only be imperialist war.
"This kind of union would allow its inhabitants to avoid such disasters as poverty, ethnic wars, or famines which are presently ravaging most other parts of the world". This idea is the complement to the one above. Apart from the lie which makes believe that a part of the planet could escape from the system's worldwide crisis, this idea is part of the propaganda whose aim is to persuade the working class in Europe to leave the fundamental problem of its own to survival in the hands of "its own" bourgeoisie, without regard to, and (though this is not admitted openly) to the detriment of the working class in the rest of the world. It therefore aims to harness the working class to the defense of bourgeois national interests. It is merely the equivalent, on the scale of the imperialist bloc in formation, of all the nationalist and chauvinistic campaigns that the bourgeoisie uses in every country. In this sense, it can be compared to the campaigns that the Western bloc used to employ against its Russian adversary, designated for the occasion as the "evil empire".
"The working class can, in fact, be identified with the most nationalist fractions of the bourgeoisie, since like them it is largely against European unity". It is true that under the barrage of bourgeois propaganda, large numbers of workers have in some cases (eg during the French referendum on the ratification of Maastricht in 1992) been led to take part in the "European debate". This is due to a weakness in the working class. It is also true that, in this context, some workers have been influenced by those arguments which seek at different levels to mix up the defense of class interests with nationalism, chauvinism, and xenophobia. Such a situation is a product of the fact that, overall, the working class is still subjected to the weight of the dominant ideology, of which nationalism in all its forms is a component. But the bourgeoisie also uses this situation to render the working class guilty of engendering within itself such "monstrosities", in order to divide the class into so-called "progressive" and "reactionary" fractions.
Faced with the lies of "overcoming national frontiers by building Europe", or of the "social Europe", as with the calls to nationalism in order to "protect themselves from the social evils of European Union", the workers have no choice to make. The only way forward for them is the intransigent struggle against all the fractions of the bourgeoisie, for the defense of their living conditions and the development of a revolutionary perspective, through the development of their international class solidarity and unity. Their only safeguard will be to put into practice the old but always up-to-date slogan of the workers' movement: "The workers have no fatherland. Workers of all countries, unite!".
M, 20th February, 1993
[1] Rosa Luxemburg, The Nation State and the Proletariat [212]
[2] idem.
[3] idem.
[4] idem.
[5] idem.
[6] "The proletarian struggle in the decadence of capitalism. The development of new capitalist units", International Review no.23
[7] See the article: "Still-born nations" in International Review no.69
[8] The Communist Manifesto.
[9] Pierre Léon, Histoire Economique et Sociale du Monde.
[10] Clearly, it is no accident that the plan was set up by Marshall, head of the US army's general staff during the war.
[11] idem.
[12] idem.
[13] idem.
[14] idem.
[15] Such an initiative is also significant of the need felt not only by France, but also by Spain and Italy, to avoid being completely defenseless against their powerful German neighbour and ally.
[16] The USA is also doing whatever it can, not just to block the French and German efforts, but also to create their own "common market", to prepare for an increasingly difficult world situation. The North American Free Trade Association formed with Mexico and Canada is not just an economic effort, but an attempt to reinforce the cohesion and stability of their immediate zone of influence, both against internal decomposition, and against the influence of other major powers from Europe or Japan.
test
The ICC has just held its 10th Congress. Our organization carried out an evaluation of its activity, its positions, and its analyses, during the last two years, and set out its perspectives for the years to come. The Congress' focal point was a recognition of the turning point reached in the class struggle. The massive struggles of the Italian proletariat during the autumn of 1992 are a sign that the period of reflux begun in 1989 with the collapse of stalinism and the Russian bloc, is coming to an end. This reflux affected the readiness which the workers had shown until then to fight back against the austerity measures imposed by the ruling class; it also had a significant effect on the development of its revolutionary consciousness. With this perspective of a recovery in the struggle, the Congress adopted the orientation of intervention in the struggles which are beginning so that the ICC should be ready to play its part, as a political organization of the proletariat, in this period of struggles, which will be decisive for the proletariat, and for humanity as a whole.
Obviously, if we are to set out such perspectives, then it is vital to know whether the analyses and positions that the organization has defended since the last Congress have in fact corresponded to the development of those events which have dominated the international scene. The Congress acquitted itself of this task, evaluating the development of chaos and military conflicts, the crisis, imperialist tensions, and of course the class struggle. In the same way, it conducted an evaluation of the organization's activities in order to adapt them to the new period.
In general, we can say that this 10th Congress has strengthened the organization, and given us more and better weapons to face the end of the century, with a historic course still set towards a confrontation between capital and labor, where the intervention of the proletarian vanguard will play a decisive part. In this sense, our evaluation of the 10th ICC Congress is a positive one. Let us briefly explain, for the working class and the proletarian political milieu, why we consider this to be the case.
The growth of chaos
The ICC's 9th Congress, held during the summer of 1991, showed how the phase of capitalist decomposition which began during the 1980s, lay at the foundations of the fall of the Eastern imperialist bloc, the break-up of the USSR, and the death of stalinism.
The 10th Congress noted that our analyses of the phase of decomposition and its consequences have been entirely correct. Not only has the explosion of the old Eastern bloc continued, the entire Western bloc has followed its example, breaking down the old "harmony" between its members, including the world's most industrialized countries. This break-up of the system of blocs that had existed since 1945 has unleashed a chaos which, far from diminishing, is spreading like gangrene all over the planet.
One element that has accelerated the development of chaos has been the sharpening imperialist antagonisms between the great powers. These make the most of every conflict between the bourgeoisies of different countries, or within the same country, to try to lay hold of strategic positions against their rivals, ravaging the rickety economies of the countries involved in the conflict, which once again highlights the irrationality of war in the period of decadence. In this sense, there is no conflict, big or small, armed or not, which is not entangled in the struggle between the most powerful imperialist gangsters.
The other element is the tendency towards the formation of a new system of imperialist blocs, and the USA's struggle to remain the sole "world policeman". Germany's strategic advance in the Balkan's war, through its open support for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, has positioned it as the one power capable of leading a bloc to rival the United States. However, the road to the formation of this new German bloc is becoming more and more difficult: on the one hand, is the determined opposition to German strategy from Great Britain and Holland, the USA's main allies in Europe; on the other, France and Germany's own specific imperialist appetites limit the reinforcement of the alliance between them, in which French military power would compensate German weakness in this domain.
Nor does the US have its hands free for military action. The rival powers' military and diplomatic activity in Yugoslavia has demonstrated the limitations of the 1991 "Desert Storm" operation, which was aimed at reasserting US leadership. Thanks to this, and to the opposition at home to the idea of a new Vietnam, the US has not had the same freedom of movement in Yugoslavia. However, the US has been anything but a passive spectator of events: its offensive, begun with the "humanitarian" intervention in Somalia and the "aid" to the muslim populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina being hunted down by the Serbian militia, has intensified with the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnian territory.
This whole situation only confirms the constant tendency towards the development of military conflict.
The crisis hits the heart of capitalism
At the economic level, the Congress observed that the crisis, expressed through the current economic recession, has become a major preoccupation for the bourgeoisie of the central capitalist countries. Since 1990 it has become clear that all the bourgeoisie's palliative to the crisis is wearing thin. The USA is not the only country to be hit by the recession (now in its third year in the US): "the open recession ... quote from int sit" (Point 9 of the Resolution on the international situation, published in this issue. World capital is suffering from a crisis which has reached a qualitatively higher degree than any experienced before.
Since the "neo-liberal" policies of the 1980s have proven incapable of providing the slightest solution, the bourgeoisie in the central countries has undertaken a strategic redirection, towards a still greater involvement by the state in the economy. This has been a constant feature of decadent capitalism, even under Reagan, since the only way out could survive was by constantly cheating with its own economic laws. With Clinton's election, the world's greatest power has concretized this strategy. Nonetheless, "int sit quote".
But the sharpening crisis is not only expressed in the economic recession. The disappearance of the imperialist blocs has also sharpened the crisis and economic chaos.
The accentuation of the crisis in the central countries has been immediately translated into a deterioration in the proletariat's living conditions. But the proletariat is not inclined to accept passively the decline into unemployment and poverty. In 1992, the Italian proletariat reminded us again that the crisis remains the ally of the working class.
The recovery in the workers' combativity
This was a focal point of the 10th Congress. After three years of reflux, the massive struggles of the Italian proletariat in the autumn of 1992 (see International Review no. 73), the huge demonstrations by miners and other workers in Britain against mine closures, and the mobilization of the workers in Germany this winter, along with other signs of workers' combativity in Europe and the rest of the world, have confirmed the ICC's position that the historic course is towards massive confrontations between bourgeoisie and proletariat.
But the most significant aspect of this recovery in the proletarian struggle in the central countries, is that they mark the start of an overcoming of the reflux in consciousness begun in 1989. Nonetheless, it would be naive of us to imagine that this recovery in the struggle will be linear and devoid of difficulty: the negative effects of 1989 - confusion, doubts as to the class' revolutionary capacities - are still far from being completely overcome.
These factors are joined by the damaging effects of capitalism's decomposition on the working class: atomization, the ideology of "look after number one", which undermines proletarian solidarity; the loss of perspective in the face of the reigning chaos; massive and long-term unemployment, which tends to separate the unemployed from the rest of the class, and to plunge many - especially the young - into delinquency; xenophobic and anti-racist campaigns, which tend to divide the workers; the rot in the ruling class and its political apparatus, which encourages all sorts of propaganda around "the struggle against corruption"; "humanitarian" campaigns over the barbarism unleashed on the "Third World", which the bourgeoisie uses to make the workers feel guilty, and to justify the decline in their living conditions. All these factors, like the wars where the participation of and confrontation between the great powers are not obvious (eg Yugoslavia), make the process of developing the proletariat's consciousness and renewing its combativity more difficult.
However, the gravity of the crisis, the brutality of the bourgeoisie's attacks, the inevitable development of wars where the central countries are openly involved, will all open the workers' eyes to the bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production. The perspective before us is thus a massive development in workers' struggles. This recovery in proletarian activity demands that revolutionaries intervene, that they take an active part in the combat in order to fulfill their potential, and to defend determinedly the communist perspective.
The ICC's activities
To live up to the challenge of the recovery in workers' struggles, the 10th Congress had to make an objective evaluation of the organization's activities since the previous Congress, verify that its orientations had been carried out, consider the difficulties that had appeared, in order to prepare as well as possible for the period to come. The Congress evaluated the organization's activities positively:
"The organization has proved itself capable of resisting the disorientation that has come in the wake of the bourgeoisie's renewed ideological campaigns "on the end of marxism and the class struggle". It has set out perspectives, which have consistently proved correct, on the acceleration of inter-imperialist tensions and of the crisis, and on the recovery of workers' combativity which would inevitably follow the avalanche of attacks launched against the working class; it has done so, while taking into account the specificities of the present historic phase of decomposition, and developing its activity with regard to present conditions and the state of its own militant strength" (Point 2 of the Resolution on Activities).
Theoretical and political strengthening of the organization
One positive aspect of our activities has been the theoretical and political deepening that the organization has carried out in the face of the need to confront the bourgeoisie's campaigns on the death of communism. This demanded that we explain clearly and carefully the counter-revolutionary nature of stalinism; however, one factor (the other being the acceleration of history to which we must always respond rapidly) made this task still more important: the development of revolutionary elements in contact with the ICC. These contacts, going against the surrounding social atmosphere, are the expression of a subterranean maturation in class consciousness expressed through this minority.
Moreover, these new events have shown us that it is not enough to master a general analytical framework. We must know how to "speak marxism", to apply it to the analysis of particular events and situations, and this is impossible without constant theoretical and political work.
"The continuation of our theoretical and political efforts, a vigilant attention to the evolution of the international and different national situations will determine the organization's ability to play an active part within the working class as it draws out a general perspective for the struggle, and in the end a communist perspective" (Point 3 of the Resolution on Activities).
Centralization
Right from the birth of the groups which formed the ICC, and of the ICC, the organization has always considered itself as an international one. But our ability to make this internationalist conception live is coming up against still greater difficulties today. The weight of decomposition on the whole of society increases the pressure of individualism, the spirit of "every man for himself", and localism, on today's revolutionary organizations still more than did the weight of post-68 petty-bourgeois ideology on the organizations of the 1970s. The 10th Congress debated the need to strengthen the ICC's political and organizational life with a determination to confront and overcome these new difficulties:
"In every aspect of our activities, at every moment, in our functioning and our political deepening, from day to day and in every task of the local sections, our tasks are 'international tasks', our discussions are 'international discussions', our contacts are 'international contacts'. Strengthening our international framework is the precondition for strengthening all our local activity" (point 4 of the Resolution on Activities).
The ICC's international centralization is a fundamental precondition for it to play its part as a proletarian political vanguard:
"Our conception of the organization is not one where the central organ dictates orientations which then need only be applied, but of a living tissue where all the components act constantly as parts of the whole (...) The substitution of a central organ for the life of the organization is completely foreign to our functioning. The organization's discipline is fundamentally based on a conviction in a constant, living international mode of functioning and it implies a common responsibility at every level in working out our positions and in the organization's activity as a whole" (Point 4 of the Resolution on Activities).
Intervention
"The international situation today opens perspectives for intervention in the struggle such as we have not seen in recent years" (Point 6 of the Resolution on Activities).
It is through our principal tool of intervention, the press that we must adapt to dynamic of the new period. We will have to intervene simultaneously at every level: decomposition, economic crisis, imperialism, class struggle.
"In this context, good reflexes and rapid action, rigor in following events, a profound assimilation of our orientations, will all be more decisive than ever (...) Firstly, the press must react to events, and to the first signs of recovery in the workers' struggle, with determination, while at the same time still dealing with the exacerbation of imperialist tensions, the questions of war and decomposition, responding constantly and correctly to what is going on under our eyes, taking account of the situation's full complexity, and denouncing untiringly the lies and maneuvers of the bourgeoisie and showing the proletariat's perspectives (...) we must take part in the development within the working class of the consciousness that it alone is the revolutionary class which bears within it the only alternative to decomposing capitalism - a dimension of its consciousness which has been especially hard hit by the ideological campaigns which accompanied the historical bankruptcy of stalinism" (Point 6 of the Resolution on Activities).
Our intervention towards sympathizers in contact with the ICC
The ICC has seen an important increase, in its different sections, in the number of contacts, which is a product of a minority within the working class approaching revolutionary positions. We have recognized that the number of contacts will increase with our intervention in the struggle. The organization's intervention towards them must be extremely determined, to permit their real incorporation into the proletarian revolutionary movement. The ICC, through its intervention towards these contacts must assert itself as the main pole of regroupment of revolutionary forces at the present time.
Intervention in the struggle
"The most important change for our intervention in the coming period is the perspective of a recovery in the workers' struggle" (idem). Our intervention in the struggle was a central element in the Congress' discussions. After three years of reflux in the class struggle, we insisted that the ICC must react rapidly, and be prepared to intervene without hesitating in the new situation:
"We will carry out our function as a revolutionary organization first and foremost in our ability to be active participants in the struggle, in our concern to try whenever possible to influence the course of the struggle and to make concrete proposals for action" (idem).
One of the main aspects of intervention in the workers' struggles is to avoid leaving the field free for the leftists and unions to act, especially through the rank-and-file unionists. As the struggles in Italy have shown us, these will play a major role, in trying to derail and control the struggle, by preventing them from developing on a class terrain, and by trying to confuse and demoralize the workers. Our intervention must aim to strengthen the greatest possible unity within the class:
"The organization must always intervene by putting forward, in every experience of working class struggle, what really defends the immediate interests of the class, the common interests of the whole class, what makes possible the extension and unity of the struggle, and its control by the workers themselves" (idem).
In the same way, "In the context of the working class' weakness on the level of consciousness, our intervention in the workers' struggles must, even more than in the past, highlight the historical bankruptcy of the capitalist system, its international and definitive crisis, the ineluctable plunge into misery, barbarism and wars if the bourgeoisie's rule continues, along with the perspective of communism" (idem).
Our intervention in the proletarian political movement
The tendency towards a reawakening of the struggle at levels unknown since the historic recovery at the end of the 1960s demands the strengthening, not just of the ICC but of the whole proletarian movement. This is why the 10th Congress paid special attention to our intervention within it. Although the response of the proletarian milieu to the Appeal of our 9th Congress has been very limited, we must not let this discourage us. We must improve our understanding of the different groups' positions, our mobilization, and our intervention in this respect.
A central element in strengthening our intervention in the political milieu, of which we are a part, is to reaffirm that it is itself an expression of the class' life, of the process of development of the class' consciousness. Strengthening our intervention towards the political milieu demands that debate within it be open, rigorous and fraternal, that its groups break with sectarianism and with the warped vision of some groups which consider that "any questioning, any debate, any disagreement is not a sign of a process of reflection within the working class but a 'betrayal of invariant principles'" (Point 2, Resolution on the proletarian political milieu).
These debates will in turn through a clearer light on new events, both for the ICC and for the rest of the milieu, which has experienced some confusion in understanding them.
"This was particularly true with the events in the East and the Gulf War. Even when these groups managed a minimum of clarity, it was accompanied by major confusions and came late in relation to the ICC. This observation is not to reassure us, or to let us sleep on our laurels, but to bring home the extent of our responsibilities towards the milieu as a whole. It should encourage in us a greater attention, mobilization, and rigour in following the proletarian political milieu, and intervening in it" (Point 4, idem).
The question of the defense of the proletarian political milieu taken as a whole required of the Congress a greater political clarity on the groups of the parasitic milieu which revolves around, and poisons the proletarian movement.
"Whatever their platform (which may formally be perfectly valid) the groups of the parasitic milieu do not express in the least any effort to developing consciousness within the class. In this sense, they are not part of the proletarian milieu, even if they should not be considered as belonging to the bourgeois camp (which is fundamentally determined by a bourgeois program: defense of the USSR, of democracy, etc). Fundamentally, what they express, and what determines their evolution (whether this be conscious or unconscious on the part of their members) is not the defense of revolutionary principles within the class, nor the clarification of political positions, but the spirit of the sect, or the 'group of friends', the affirmation of their own individuality against the organizations that they live off, all this being based on personal grievances, resentments, frustrations, and other wretched concerns derived from petty-bourgeois ideology" (Point 5, idem).
We can make no concessions to this parasitic milieu, which is a confusing and above all destructive factor in the proletarian political movement. Still less so today, when it is vital to defend and strengthen the proletarian political movement if it is to face up to the challenge of the new period, and confront all the attacks that it will have to undergo.
The ICC held its 10th Congress at a crucial moment in history: the proletariat is returning to the road of struggle against capital; the massive struggles of the Italian workers are an indication. Already the bourgeoisie's gigantic campaign on "the death of communism" is beginning to give way to the harsh reality of military barbarism and merciless attacks on the living conditions of the proletariat in the central countries, as a result of the increasing acceleration of the crisis of over-production.
Our 10th Congress has armed the ICC better to confront the challenge of the new period; the organization is united on the turning point reached in the situation, with the international recovery in the class struggle. Moreover, the Congress consolidated our analysis of inter-imperialist tensions and the crisis, whose acceleration is plunging decomposing capitalism into still greater chaos.
The Congress also insisted that this recovery in the struggle would not be easy, and that the collapse of stalinism and the Eastern bloc would continue to weigh on the development of proletarian consciousness, and would not be easily overcome. Moreover, the bourgeoisie will do everything in its power to prevent the proletariat raising its struggles to higher levels of combativity and consciousness. This is why the Congress adopted its perspectives to strengthen the ICC's international centralization, and to arm it better for intervention in the class struggle, but also in all the other expressions of class consciousness, such as the new contacts and the proletarian political movement.
With this 10th Congress, the ICC intends to live up to the demands of this historic period, and to take on its role as a vanguard of the proletariat. And in this way, we will help to overcome the reflux in the development of class consciousness, so that the class may reassert itself, and defend the only alternative to capitalist barbarism: communism.
Mercilessly, events are giving the lie to bourgeois propaganda. Never, perhaps, has reality laid bare so fast the massive doses of lies doled out by the hypertrophied media of the ruling classes. The "new era of peace and prosperity" lauded so extravagantly by political leaders throughout the world has shown itself to be a hollow dream, only a few months later. This new period has turned out to be, on the contrary, one of growing chaos, of a plunge into the worst economic crisis that capitalism has ever known, of a proliferation of conflicts where military barbarism has scaled heights rarely equaled, from the Gulf War to ex-Yugoslavia.
This abrupt increase in tension on the international scene is an expression of the catastrophic, and explosive, crisis that is undermining every level of capitalism's existence. Obviously, the ruling class cannot admit this since to do so would mean admitting its own impotence, and thus the bankruptcy of the system that it represents. All the reassuring declarations, all the determined pretence to control the situation, are inevitably contradicted by the unfolding of events themselves. More and more, all the ruling class' talk appears openly for what it is: lies. Whether they be conscious lies or merely the product of its own illusions makes no difference: never has there been so crying a contradiction between reality and the bourgeoisie's propaganda.
A few years ago, the Western bourgeois delighted in the almost total discredit of the stalinist ruling class in the Eastern bloc, since this discredit made them look better by contrast. Today, they are caught in the same dynamic of declining credibility. More and more, it is becoming evident that they use the same weapons: first, the lie; then when that is no longer enough, repression.
Bosnia: the lie of a peaceful and humanitarian capitalism
For the Western powers, the war in Bosnia has been an opportunity to wallow in a media orgy of defending "plucky little Bosnia" against the Serbian ogre. Politicians of every complexion have no words too harsh and no images to shocking, to denounce the barbarity of Serbian expansionism: the prison camps compared to the Nazi extermination camps, ethnic cleansing, the mass rape of Muslim women, the awful suffering of the hostage civilian population. They have shown a fine facade of unanimity, where humanitarian efforts are mingled with repeated threats of military intervention.
But behind the unity portrayed by the media, the reality is one of division. The contradictory interests of the great powers have not so much left them impotent to put an end to the conflict, but have rather been the essential factor which caused it. Through the intermediary of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, France, Britain, Germany and the United States have moved their imperialist pawns on the Balkan chessboard, while their crocodile tears served to hide their active role in the continuing war.
The recent Washington agreement, signed by the US, Britain, France, Spain and Russia has sanctioned the hypocrisy of the ideological campaigns which have succeeded each other during the last two years of war and massacre. It recognizes the Serbian territorial gains. Farewell to the oft-declared dogma of "the inviolability of internationally recognized frontiers". And now the press goes on and on about the impotence of post-Maastricht Europe, and of Clinton's USA, to make the Serbs give in, and to impose their demands for "peace" on the new Hitler Milosevic, who has replaced Saddam Hussein in the media chamber of horrors. Yet another lie, designed to perpetuate the idea that the great powers are peaceful, that they really want to put an end to the bloody conflicts ravaging the planet, and that the warmongers are only the petty despots of third-rate local powers.
Capitalism is war. This truth is written in letters of blood all through its history. Since World War II, not a day has passed without a war somewhere or other adding to the pile of horrific misery and massacre. And in every one, the great powers have been involved to a greater or lesser extent, fanning the flames in the name of the defense of the global strategic interests: the innumerable colonial wars in Indochina, Angola, Kenya, Malaysia; the Korean war, the Algerian war, the Vietnam war; the Arab-Israeli wars; the "civil" war in Cambodia, the Iran-Iraq war, the war in Afghanistan; and on, and on. In every one of these wars, bourgeois propaganda has wept over the martyred populations and the atrocities committed by one side or another, the better to justify its support for the opposing camp. And not one of these wars could have been fought without the weapons supplied in abundance by the great powers that make them. Every one of these conflicts has been concluded with hypocritical declarations of a return to eternal peace, while the ministries and military headquarters prepare their secret plans for the next war.
With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, Western propaganda has been pretending that the disappearance of the antagonism between East and West has removed the world's main source of conflict, and that we were on the verge of a "new era of peace" as a result. This lie has already been used after Germany's defeat brought World War II to a close, and it only lasted until the erstwhile allies - the Stalinist USSR and the Western democracies - were once again ready to rip each other apart for a new division of the world. On this level, the present situation is not fundamentally different. Even if the USSR has not been defeated militarily, its collapse has given free rein to the rivalries between yesterday's allies in a new world share-out. The Gulf War demonstrated how the great powers intend to keep the peace: with war. The massacre of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians was not aimed at overthrowing the local tyrant Saddam Hussein[1]. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the Western bloc likewise had lost its main factor of cohesion, and the Gulf War was the result of the USA's determination to warn its one-time allies of the risks they ran in trying to play their own hand.
The break-up of Yugoslavia is the result of Germany's desire to profit from the Yugoslav crisis to recover one of its old spheres of influence, and through Croatia to gain access to the Mediterranean. Germany's "good friends" had no intention of allowing it free access to the Croatian ports, and encouraged Serbia to attack Croatia. The USA then encouraged Bosnia to declare its independence in the hope of gaining a faithful ally in the region: the various European powers, for various contradictory reasons, has no desire to see this happen, and this was expressed in a two-faced attitude which on this occasion plumbed new depths of duplicity. While they all proclaimed their desire to protect Bosnia in public, in reality they encouraged the Serbian and Croatian advances and sabotaged the possibility of an American intervention. This complex reality was expressed in the propaganda. All the powers hypocritically agreed that little Bosnia should be protected from aggression; they all competed in "pacifist" and "humanitarian" declarations, but as soon as it came to concrete proposals, complete pandemonium reigned supreme. The USA on the one hand pushed for a tough intervention, while the French and the British, with delaying tactics and diplomatic ruses, did everything they could to prevent it.
Today's alliances may well change tomorrow, in which case Serbia will be presented as an acceptable ally. In the end, all these ardent humanitarian declarations appear for what they are: pure propaganda designed to hide the reality of deepening imperialist tensions between the great Western powers which once were allied against the USSR, but which since its collapse have engaged in a complex reorganization of their alliances. Germany aspires once again to play the role of bloc leader, which it lost with its defeat in World War II. Since there is no longer, or not yet, any bloc discipline, every country is "looking after number one" and playing its own imperialist card.
The situation in Bosnia is thus not the result of the great powers' impotence to restore peace, but on the contrary of the dynamic which is pushing yesterday's allies into confrontation on the imperialist terrain, even if for the moment it is still only indirectly.
If there is one power which has suffered a setback, and an avowal of impotence, in Bosnia, it is the USA. The US had used the Serbo-Croat conflict to show up the impotence and divisions of Europe. With the ceasefire signed between Serbia and Croatia, the US played the Bosnian card. Its inability to protect the latter has reduced its pretentions to the level of a third-rate actor's tirades. More than any other, the USA has upped the ante on the conflict, criticizing the timidity of the Vance-Owen agreement and the share it gives to the Serbs, and constantly menacing the latter with a massive military intervention. But they have not been able to carry this intervention out. The USA's inability to carry out its threats has dealt a sharp blow to their international credibility. What the US gained from the Gulf War has largely been lost by their setback in Bosnia. As a result, the centrifugal tendencies that encourage their ex-allies to escape from American tutelage and play their own imperialist card, have been reinforced and accelerated. As for those bourgeois factions which counted on US protection, they are now likely to think twice before doing so again: the fate of Bosnia is there to give them pause.
The Americans cannot ignore this situation. They are forced to react. The recent bombardments in Somalia and the dispatch of US troops to Macedonia herald a new sharpening of imperialist tensions.
Yesterday's allies still practice the same ideological faith which kept them together against the USSR. But behind the unity of propaganda, is a hotbed of mutual rivalry; after Bosnia, they herald new wars and new massacres. All the fine words, all the crocodile tears have only one aim: to hide the imperialist reality of the Yugoslav conflict, and to justify the war.
The economic crisis: the fake recovery
War is not an expression of the bourgeoisie's impotence, but of capitalism's inherently warlike nature. By contrast, the economic crisis is the clear expression of the ruling class' inability to overcome the contradictions of the capitalist economy itself. The pacifist proclamations of the ruling class are a pure lie: it has never been pacifist; war has always been a means for one bourgeois fraction to defend its own interests against the others, and one that it never hesitated to use. By contrast, all the fractions of the bourgeoisie dream sincerely of a capitalism without crises, without recessions, a capitalism of eternal prosperity producing ever more juicy profits. The ruling class cannot imagine that there is no solution to the crisis, since to do so would be to recognize its own historic limits. As a dominant exploiting class, it can neither accept nor even imagine its own negation in this way.
Between the dream of a capitalism without crises, and today's reality of a world economy incapable of escaping from recession, lies a gulf which grows wider every day, to the increasing disquiet of the ruling class. And yet it is not so long ago that the "liberal" Western bourgeoisie saw in the economic collapse of the USSR a proof of its own unshakeable health, and its ability to surmount every obstacle. At the time, the media indulged in an orgy of self-satisfaction, where capitalism was promised an eternal and radiant future. History did not wait long to take a brutal revenge on all these illusions, and to strip bare these lies.
The USSR's collapse was still incomplete when the crisis returned to the heart of the world's greatest economic power: the USA. Since then, it has spread like an epidemic to the whole world economy. Japan and Germany have in their turn been laid low. The ink was scarcely dry on the Maastricht treaty, promising a European renewal and economic prosperity, when the whole edifice collapsed with the crisis in the European Monetary System, followed by the recession.
The brutal acceleration of the world crisis is giving the lie to every country's propaganda about the recovery. The bourgeoisie is nonetheless still singing the same song - "we have the solution" - and proposing new economic plans to pull capitalism out of the mire. But none of these measures have any effect. Hardly has the ruling class had time to welcome a brief favorable tremor in the economic statistics, than reality lays bare its illusions again. The latest important example is US growth: hardly had he arrived in the White House than Clinton proudly announced a growth rate of 4.7% for the US economy (4th quarter 1992), and predicted the end of the recession. But these high hopes were soon dashed. Growth for the first quarter 1993 was forecast to be 2.4%: in reality, it was a mere 0.9%. The worldwide recession is there, and nothing the ruling class does can shift it. Panic is growing in the ruling circles, and nobody knows what to do.
Since none of the classical measures to encourage recovery have done any good, the bourgeoisie only has one argument left: "you must accept sacrifices today, so that things will get better tomorrow". This argument is used constantly to justify the austerity programs against the working class. Since the return of the historic crisis at the end of the 1960's, this kind of argument has of course come up against the discontent of the workers who have had to foot the bill, but it has still retained a certain credibility inasmuch as the alternation between periods of recession and recovery seemed to lend it some validity. But the poverty which has gone on getting worse everywhere, from one austerity plan to another, only to lead to the present catastrophic situation, show that all the sacrifices in the past have been in vain.
Despite all the plans "against unemployment" set up by governments in every industrialized country, unemployment has continued to grow. Today, it is reaching new heights. Every day, more redundancies are announced. With taxes rising, wages falling - or at least rising more slowly than inflation - nobody any longer has the nerve to pretend that living standards are improving. In the towns of the developed world, the poor are more and more numerous, reduced to homelessness because they cannot afford to pay rent, and to beggary to survive. They bear a dramatic witness to the social decay at the heart of the richest capitalist countries.
The bourgeoisie has made the most of the political, economic, and social bankruptcy of the stalinist "model" of state capitalism, falsely identified with communism, to repeat ad nauseam that only "liberal" capitalism can bring prosperity. The crisis is forcing it to eat its words.
The truth of the class struggle against the lies of the bourgeoisie
As the crisis degenerates, the bourgeoisie sees before it the terrifying specter of a social crisis. And only a little while ago, the bourgeoisie's ideologues thought that the bankruptcy of stalinism proved the inanity of marxism and the absurdity of any idea of class struggle. In its wake, the very existence of the working class was denied, and the historic perspective of socialism was presented as a "nice idea" but one which it would be impossible to carry out. All this propaganda has created a profound sense of doubt within the working class as to the possibility and necessity of another system, another kind of relation between human beings, to put an end to the barbarity of capitalism.
The working class remains profoundly confused by the rapid succession of events and intense media campaigns. Nonetheless, it will be pushed by events to take up the struggle again, against the constant and worsening attacks on its living conditions.
Since the autumn of 1992, and the mass demonstrations of angry Italian workers against the government's new austerity plan, signs are appearing in many countries of a slow renewal in proletarian combativity: in Germany, Belgium, Britain, Spain, etc. In a situation where the constant deepening of the crisis implies ever more draconian austerity plans, this dynamic can only accelerate and spread. With growing anxiety, the ruling class sees the inevitable perspective advance of a development of the class struggle. Its room for maneuver is shrinking. Not only is it unable to delay its attacks for tactical purposes, its ideological cover is wearing thin.
The impotence of all the bourgeois parties to resolve the crisis, to give the appearance of being good managers, only serves to discredit them further. Under today's conditions, no ruling party hope to profit from its popularity: we need only look at how, after a few months of deepening crisis, the popularity in the opinion polls of Mitterrand in France, Major in Britain, or even the newly elected Clinton in the USA, has fallen sharply. he situation is the same everywhere. The managers of capital, whether from the right or from the left, have revealed their impotence, and so laid bare the lies they have peddled for so many years. Internationally, the participation of the socialist parties in the management of the state in Italy, France, or Spain has shown that they are no different from the right-wing parties, from which they want so much to distinguish themselves. The stalinist parties are discredited by the collapse of their Russian model, and this too rubs off on the socialists. The proliferation of "scandals" showing up the generalized corruption within the ruling class is creating a rejection of the political apparatus verging on disgust. The whole "democratic" model of capitalist management is being shaken to the foundations. Every day, the gulf between reality and what the bourgeoisie says grows deeper. Consequently, the gulf between the state and civil society cannot but grow deeper also. The result today is that it has become a cliché‚ to say that politicians lie: the whole exploited class is deeply convinced of the fact.
But to see through one lie does not mean that one is immune to new mystifications, or that one has seen the truth. The proletariat is in this situation today. That the world is plunging towards catastrophe, that all the reassuring speeches are pure propaganda: the vast mass of workers understands this more and more. But if this is not accompanied by the search for an alternative, and a reappropriation by the proletariat of its revolutionary traditions, by the reassertion through struggle of its central role in society, and of its existence as a revolutionary class bearing a future for humanity, then disillusion can just as well lead to confusion and apathy. The present dynamic, in the light of the deepening economic crisis, pushes the working class to think, to search for a solution which can only, in accordance with the class' own being, be the new society that it bears within it: communism. Faced with the disaster that the ruling class can no longer hide, more and more is it necessary to put forward the revolutionary perspective.
The ruling class is not remaining passive in this situation. Even if its system is falling into chaos, it is not just going to give up the fight. It will hang on to social power with all its strength; it will do everything it can to hinder the development of proletarian consciousness, which it knows means its own demise. As its mystifications wear thin, it invents new ones or reuses the old with greater insistence. It even uses the decomposition gangrening its system as a new means to confuse the proletariat. Poverty in the "Third World and the barbarity of war are used to encourage the idea that wherever the catastrophe has not reached such a point, there is no reason to complain or protest. When scandals and political corruption are dragged into the light of day, as in Italy, they are used to give credit to the idea of a renewal of the political apparatus, and of a "clean state". Even the workers' own misery is used to deceive them. Fear of unemployment is used to justify reductions in wages, in the name of "solidarity". In every country, "protecting jobs" is the pretext for chauvinist campaigns, while "immigrant" workers are the perfect scapegoats to spread division within the working class. The bourgeoisie no longer has any historic future. It can only survive by the lie. It is the class of the lie. And when the lie is no longer enough, it still has the force of repression which does not mystify, but reveals openly the true face of capitalist barbarism.
Socialism or barbarism. This is the alternative posed by revolutionaries at the beginning of the century. It is more immediate than ever. Either the working class lets itself be taken in by the bourgeoisie's mystifications, and the whole of humanity is doomed along with capitalism to a process of decomposition which would mean its death. Or, the proletariat develops its ability to struggle, to lay bare the lies of the bourgeoisie, and to advance towards its own revolutionary goal. This is what is at stake in the present period. The winds of history are pushing the proletariat to assert its revolutionary being, but the future is certain. The bourgeoisie's masks are falling, but it makes new ones all the time. It is up to the proletariat to strip them away for good.
JJ
[1] Saddam, moreover, is still in power. For years, during the war with Iran, he was supported and armed to the teeth without any hesitation by the Western powers.
For ten years decomposition has spread its grip over the whole of society. Increasingly, world events can only be understood in this framework. However, the phase of decomposition belongs to capitalism's decadence and the tendencies proper to the whole of this period do not disappear, far from it. Thus in examining the world situation it is important to distinguish the phenomena which spring from the period of decadence in general, from those which specifically belong to its ultimate phase of decomposition, especially since their respective impacts on the working class are not identical and can even act in opposing senses. And this applies as much on the level of imperialist conflicts as on that of the economic crisis which both constitute the essential elements determining the development of working class struggles and its consciousness.
The evolution of imperialist rivalries
1) Rarely since the end of World War II has the world known such a proliferation and intensification of wars as we are seeing today. The Gulf War, at the beginning of 91, was supposed to install a "new world order" based on "Law". Since then the free for all which followed the end of the carving up of the world by the two imperialist colossi has not ceased to spread and worsen. Africa and South East Asia, traditional terrains for imperialist confrontation, have continued their plunge into convulsions and wars. Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan, Cambodia: these countries are today synonymous with armed confrontations and desolation despite all the "peace accords" and the intervention of the "international community" directly or indirectly patronized by the UNO. To these "storm zones" can be added the Caucasus and Central Asia which are paying a heavy price in inter-ethnic massacres for the disappearance of the USSR. Lastly, the haven of stability which Europe has constituted since the end of World War II is now plunged into one of the most bloody and barbaric conflicts. These confrontations tragically express the characteristics of the capitalist world in decomposition. They largely result from the newly created situation which constitutes, up to now, the most important manifestation of this new phase of capitalist decadence: the collapse of the Stalinist regimes and of the Eastern bloc. But, at the same time, these conflicts are again aggravated by one of the general and fundamental characteristics of this decadence: the antagonism between the different imperialist powers. Thus, the pretended "humanitarian aid" in Somalia is only a pretext and an instrument of the confrontation of the two imperialist powers which today oppose each other in Africa: the United States and France. Behind the offensive of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia lies China. Behind the different cliques battling for power in Kabul, stand the interests of the regional powers of Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, powers whose own interests and antagonisms are tied up with those of the "Great" powers, like the United States and Germany. Lastly, the convulsions which have put Yugoslavia to fire and sword, just some hundreds of miles away from "advanced" Europe, also reveal the principal antagonisms which today divide the planet.
2) Ex-Yugoslavia has become a major bone of contention in the rivalries between the world's main powers. If the confrontations and massacres which have unfolded here have found a favorable terrain with ancestral ethnic antagonisms smothered by the Stalinist regimes whose collapse has bought back to the surface, the sordid calculations of the major powers have constituted a factor of the first order in the exacerbation of these antagonisms. It is because Germany encouraged the secession of the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia, so as to make an opening towards the Mediterranean that has opened the Pandora's Box of Yugoslavia. It is because the other European states, as well as the United States, were opposed to this German offensive that they have directly, or indirectly by their inactivity, encouraged Serbia and its militias to unleash "ethnic cleansing" in the name of the "defense of minorities". In fact, ex-Yugoslavia constitutes a sort of resume, a striking and tragic illustration of the whole of the world situation in the domain of imperialist conflicts.
3) In the first place, the confrontations which today ravage this part of the world are a new confirmation of the total economic irrationality of imperialist war. For a long time, and following the "Gauche Communiste de France", the ICC has pointed out the fundamental difference opposing wars of the ascendant period of capitalism, which had a real rationality for the development of this system, and those of the period of decadence which can only express the total economic absurdity of a mode of production in agony. If the aggravation of imperialist antagonisms has as its ultimate cause the scramble of all the national bourgeoisies faced with the total dead end of the capitalist economy, the conflicts of war offer not the slightest "solution" to the crisis, for the world economy as a whole any more than for any country in particular. As "Internationalisme" already noted in 1945, war is no longer at the service of the economy, but rather the economy which is at the service of war and its preparation. And this phenomenon has only got worse since. In the case of Yugoslavia, none of the protagonists can hope for the least economic profit from their involvement in the conflict. This is evident for all the Republics who are making war at the present time: the massive destruction of the means of production and the forces of labor, the paralysis of transport and productive activity, the enormous waste that armaments represent to the detriment of the local economy will benefit none of the new states. Similarly, contrary to the idea which exists in the proletarian political milieu, this totally ravaged economy can in no way constitute a solvent market for the surplus production of the industrialized countries. It is not markets which the major powers are disputing on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, but strategic positions destined to prepare for what has become the principal activity of decadent capitalism: imperialist war on a still larger scale.
4) The situation in ex-Yugoslavia confirms another point that the ICC has underlined for a long time: the fragility of the European edifice. This, with its different institutions (European Organization of Economic Cooperation responsible for administering the Marshall Plan and which was ultimately transformed into the OECD, the Western European Union founded in 1949, the European Community of Coal and Steel which came into being in 1952, and which five years later became the European Economic Community) was essentially constituted as an instrument of the American bloc faced with the threat of a Russian bloc. The common interests of the different states of Western Europe faced with this threat (which did not prevent France's president de Gaulle from trying to limit US hegemony) constituted a powerful factor stimulating cooperation, notably economic, between these states. Such cooperation was unable to overcome the economic rivalries amongst them - a result which cannot be attained in capitalism - but it did permit a certain "solidarity" faced with the commercial competition of Japan and the United States. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the basis of the European edifice has been overturned. Henceforth, the European Union, that the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 wants to follow the EEC, will no longer be considered as an instrument of a Western bloc which itself has ceased to exist. On the contrary, this structure has become a battleground for imperialist antagonisms that the disappearance of the old configuration of the world has thrown up. This is what the confrontations in Yugoslavia have shown when we see the profound divisions displayed by the European states incapable of putting together the least common policy faced with a conflict developing on their own doorstep. Today, even if the "European Union" can still be used by all the participants as a bulwark against the commercial competition of Japan and the United States or as an instrument against immigration and against the combats of the working class, its diplomatic and military component is the object of a dispute which can only get worse between those (particularly France and Germany) who want to make it play a role as a structure capable of rivaling American power (preparing the formation of a future imperialist bloc) and the allies of the United States (essentially Britain and Holland) who see their presence there as a means of restraining such a tendency[1].
5) The evolution of the conflict in the Balkans equally illustrates one of the other characteristics of the world situation: the fetters on the reconstitution of a new system of imperialist blocs. As the ICC has underlined from the end of 89, the tendency towards such a system has been on the agenda ever since the old one disappeared with the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The emergence of a candidate to the leadership of a new imperialist bloc, rivaling that which would be led by the United States, is rapidly confirmed with the advance of Germany's positions in central Europe and in the Balkans whereas its freedom of military and diplomatic maneuver is still limited by the constraints inherited from its defeat in the World War II. The ascension of Germany is largely based on its economic and financial power, but it has also benefited from the support of its old accomplice in the EEC, France (concerted action in relation to the European Community, creation of common army corps, etc). However, Yugoslavia has shown the contradictions which divide this tandem: whereas Germany gave solid support to Slovenia and Croatia, for a long period France maintained a pro-Serbian policy aligning it, in the first instance, with the position of Britain and the United States, which permitted the latter to drive in a wedge within the privileged alliance between the two main European countries. Even if these two countries have made great efforts to see that the bloody imbroglio in Yugoslavia does not compromise their cooperation (for example Bundesbank support for the French Franc against speculative attacks), it is more and more clear that they do not put the same hopes in their alliance. Because of its economic power and its geographic position, Germany aspires to the leadership of a "Greater Europe" which itself would be the central axis of a new imperialist bloc. If it agrees to play such a role in the European structure, the French bourgeoisie, who since 1870 know the power of their neighbor to the east, would not be content with the role of second fiddle that is offered them with this alliance. For that reason France is not interested in too great a development of German military power (access to the Mediterranean, acquisition of nuclear arms notably) which would devalue the trumps it holds in order to maintain a certain parity with its neighbor over the leadership of Europe and at the head of contestation of American hegemony. The Paris meeting of March 11 between Vance, Owen and Milosevic under the presidency of Mitterrand, once again illustrates this reality. Thus, one of the conditions for a new sharing out of the world between two imperialist blocs, the very significant growth of the military capacities of Germany, carries with it the threat of serious difficulties between the two European candidates for the leadership of a new bloc. The conflict in ex-Yugoslavia confirms that the tendency towards the constitution of a new bloc, put on the agenda with the disappearance of that of the East in 1989, is by no means assured of reaching its end: to the geopolitical situation specific to the two bourgeoisies who make up the principal protagonists can be added the general difficulties proper to the period of decomposition which exacerbate the "each for themselves" between all the states.
6) The conflict in ex-Yugoslavia finally confirms one of the other major characteristics of the world situation: the limits of the efficacy of the 1991 operation "Desert Storm" designed to assert US leadership over the world. As the ICC said at the time, this large-scale operation was not mainly aimed at Saddam Hussein or even at the other countries of the periphery who might have tried to imitate Iraq. For the United States it was a question first of asserting and reminding others of its role as "world policeman" faced with the convulsions coming from the collapse of the Russian bloc, and particularly to obtain obedience from the other Western powers who, with the end of the threat from the east, were spreading their wings. Hardly some months after the Gulf War, the beginning of the confrontations in Yugoslavia illustrated the fact that these same powers, and particularly Germany, were quite determined to make their imperialist interests prevail to the detriment of those of the United States. Since then, the USA, while it has succeeded in demonstrating the impotence of the European Union by the lack of harmony reigning in the ranks of the latter, including here between the best allies of France and Germany, it ha not really contained the advance of other imperialisms, particularly those of the latter country which has, on the whole, achieved its aims in ex-Yugoslavia. Such a setback is clearly serious for the first world power since it can only encourage the tendency of numerous countries, on every continent, to use the new world givens in order to loosen the grip that's been imposed on them by the United States for decades. It is for this reason that the activism of the United States has not ceased around Bosnia after it made a display of military force with its massive and spectacular "humanitarian" deployment in Somalia and the prohibition of air space in South Iraq.
7) This latest military operation also confirms a certain number of realities previously put forward by the ICC. It has illustrated the fact that the real target aimed at by the United States in this part of the world is not Iraq, since it has strengthened Saddam Hussein's regime both inside and outside Iraq, but rather its "allies" that it tried, with less success than in 1991, to get behind it once more (the third thief of "the coalition", France, was content this time to send reconnaissance aircraft). In particular it constituted a message to Iran whose growing military power is accompanied by a re-forging of links with certain European, notably France. This operation equally confirms, since Kuwait is no longer concerned, that the Gulf War was not fought over the price of oil or for the United State's preservation of its "oil revenue" as the leftists, and even at one point certain groups in the political milieu have affirmed. If the US is keen to conserve and strengthen its grip on the Middle East and its oil fields, it is not fundamentally for commercial or strictly economic reasons. Above all it wants the power, should the need is felt, to deprive its Japanese and European rivals of their supplies of an essential raw material for a developed economy and still more for any military undertaking (a raw material moreover which the main ally of the US, Britain, has in abundance).
8) Thus, recent events have confirmed that, faced with an exacerbation of world chaos and of "look after number one" and the strong growth of its new imperialist rivals, the first world power will increasingly have to make use of its military force in order to preserve its supremacy. Potential areas of confrontation are not lacking and can only multiply. The Indian sub-continent, dominated by the antagonism between Pakistan and India, will find itself more and more concerned, as we can see, for example, with the confrontations in this latter country between religious communities which, if they are a testimony to decomposition, are stirred up by this antagonism. Similarly, the Far East today is the theatre of large-scale imperialist maneuvers such as, in particular, the rapprochement between China and Japan (sealed by the visit to Peking, for the first time in history, of the Emperor of Japan). It is more than likely that this configuration of imperialist forces will be confirmed since:
- there is no contentious issue remaining between China and Japan;
- each of these two countries has a dispute with Russia (the Russo-Chinese frontier, the Kurile Islands question);
- rivalry is growing between the United States and Japan around South East Asia and the Pacific;
- Russian is "condemned", even if that stirs up the "conservatives'" resistance to Yeltsin, to an American alliance from very fact of the importance of its atomic armaments (that the United States could not tolerate passing into the hands of another alliance).
Antagonisms between the first world power and its ex-allies do not even spare the American continent where repeated coup attempts against Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela as well as the constitution of the NAFTA, quite apart from their economic and social causes and implications, are moves aimed at increasing the influence of certain European states. Thus, the world perspective on the level of imperialist tensions is characterized by an ineluctable increase of the latter with a growing use of military force by the United States, and the recent election of the Democrat, Clinton, will not reverse this tendency, on the contrary. Up to now, these tensions have essentially developed from the fall-out of the collapse of the Eastern bloc. But, more and more, they will be further aggravated by the catastrophic plunge of the capitalist economy into its mortal crisis.
The evolution of the economic crisis
9) The year 1992 was characterized by a considerable aggravation of the situation of the world economy. In particular, the open recession generalized reaching countries that had been spared the first time round, such as France, and among the most solid as Germany and even Japan. If Clinton's election represented the continuance, and the strengthening, of the policy of the first world power on the imperialist arena, it symbolizes the end of a whole period in the evolution of the crisis and of the bourgeoisie's policies in order to face up to it. It takes note of the definitive weakness of "Reaganomics" which had aroused the most insane hopes in the ranks of the dominant class and numerous illusions among the proletariat. Today, in bourgeois language, there no longer remains the least reference to the mythical virtues of "deregulation" and "less state". Even politicians belonging to the forces who were made the apostles of "Reaganomics", such as Major in Great Britain, admit, faced with the accumulation of difficulties in the economy, the necessity for "more state" in it.
10) The "Reagan years", prolonged by the "Bush years", in no way represented an inversion of the historic tendency, specific to decadent capitalism, of the reinforcement of state capitalism. During this period, measures such as the massive increase of military spending, the rescue of the Savings and Loans by the Federal Reserve (which increased state spending by $1000 billion dollars) or the voluntary lowering of interest rates below the rate of inflation, have represented a significant growth in the intervention of the state in the economy of the first world power. In fact, whatever the ideological themes used, whatever the modalities, the bourgeoisie can never, in the period of decadence, renounce calling on the state to bring together something of an economy which is tending to break apart, in order to try to cheat its capitalist laws (and only the state can do this, notably by using the printing press. However, with:
- the new aggravation of the world crisis;
- the critical level reached by the dilapidation of certain crucial sectors of the American economy (health, education, infrastructure, equipment, research...) encouraged by the frantic "liberal" policy of Reagan and Co;
- the surrealist explosion of speculation to the detriment of productive investments encouraged by "Reaganomics".
The Federal State cannot escape a much more open intervention, an uncovered face, in this economy. In this sense, the significance of the arrival of the Democrat Clinton to the head of the American executive must not be reduced to merely ideological imperatives. These imperatives are not negligible, notably with a view to encouraging a greater adherence by the whole population of the United States to its imperialist policy. But, much more fundamental, the Clinton "New Deal" signals the necessity of a significant reorientation of this bourgeoisie's policy, a reorientation that Bush, too closely linked to the preceding policy, was badly placed to open up.
11) This political reorientation, contrary to the promises of Clinton the candidate, will not call into question the degradation of working class living conditions, that is qualified as "middle class" for the purposes of propaganda. Hundreds of billions of dollars of savings announced by Clinton at the end of February ‘93, represent a considerable growth of austerity designed to relieve the enormous Federal deficit and improve US competivity on the world market. However, this policy comes up against insuperable limits. The reduction of the budget deficit, if it is indeed carried out, will only accentuate the tendencies of the slowing down of the economy which has been doped by the same deficit for almost a decade. Such a slowing down, by reducing fiscal receipts (despite the increase seen in imports) will again lead to the aggravation of this deficit. Thus, whatever the measures applied, the American bourgeoisie will confront an impasse; instead of a recovery of the economy and a reduction of its debt (and particularly that of the state) it is condemned, to a deadline which cannot be deferred for long, to a new slowing down of the economy and to an irreversible increase in debt.
12) The impasse in which the American economy is placed only expresses that of the whole of the world economy. Every country is increasingly squeezed in a vice whose jaws are the fall of production and the explosion of debt (particularly that of the state). It's the striking manifestation of the irreversible crisis of overproduction into which the capitalist mode of production has sunk for more than two decades. Successively, the explosion of debt in the Third World, after the world recession of 73-74, then the explosion of American debt (as much internal as external), after that of 81-82, allowed the world economy to limit the direct expressions, and above all to mask the reality of this overproduction. Today, the draconian measures that the US proposes to apply, signal the definitive scrapping of the American "locomotive" which had pulled the world economy during the 1980's. The internal market of the United States is closing up more and more, and in an irreversible fashion. And if it is not thanks to a better competitivity of US-made goods, it will be through the unprecedented growth of protectionism, of which Clinton, since his arrival, has given a foretaste (increase in laws on agricultural products, steel, aircraft, closure of public markets...). Thus, the only perspective for the world market is that of an irreparable and growing contraction, all the more so as it is confronted with a catastrophic crisis of credit symbolized by ever more numerous bankruptcies in banking: constantly and deliriously abused by endebtment, the international financial system is near to explosion, an explosion which will lead to bringing about, in an apocalyptic fashion, the collapse of the markets and of production.
13) Another factor aggravating the state of the world economy is the growing chaos developing in international relations. When the world lived under the two imperialist giants, the necessary discipline that the allies had to respect within each of the blocs was expressed not only on the military and diplomatic, but also on the economic level. In the case of the Western bloc, it is through structures such as the OECD, the IMF, the G7 that the allies, who were at the same time the main advanced countries, established, under the aegis of their US chief, a coordination of their economic policies and a modus-vivendi in order to contain their commercial rivalries. Today, the disappearance of the Western bloc, following the collapse of that in the East, has dealt a decisive blow to this coordination (even if the old structures still survive) and leaves the field clear for the exacerbation of "every man for himself" in economic relations. Concretely, commercial wars can only be unleashed still more, aggravating the difficulties and instability of the world economy. This can be seen in the present paralysis in the GATT negotiations. Officially these have the aim of limiting protectionism between the "partners" so as to encourage world trade and thus the production of different national economies. The fact that these negotiations have become a free-for-all, where imperialist antagonisms are superimposed on simple commercial rivalries, can only provoke the inverse effect: a still greater disorganization of these exchanges, growing difficulties for the national economies.
14) Thus, coming into the last decade of the century, the gravity of the crisis has reached a qualitatively superior degree to anything capitalism has known up to now. The financial system moves closer to the edge of the precipice with the permanent and growing risk of being dashed against the rocks. The commercial war which will be unleashed will be at a level never seen. Capitalism cannot find any new "locomotive" to replace the American locomotive which is henceforth out of action. In particular, the colossal markets which the old countries run by the Stalinist regimes were supposed to represent only existed in the imagination of some sectors of the dominant class (and also in that of some groups of the proletarian milieu). The hopeless dilapidation of these economies, the bottomless pit that they represent for any investment, the political convulsions which excite the dominant class and which will even more deepen the economic catastrophe, all these elements indicate that they about to plunge into a situation like that of the Third World, that far from constituting a second wind for the economies of the most developed countries, they have become a growing millstone for them. Finally, if in the more developed economies, inflation has some chance of being contained, as is the case up to now, that does not at all mean any overcoming of the economic difficulties that underlie it. On the contrary, it is an expression of the dramatic reduction of the markets which exerts a powerful downward pressure on the price of goods. The perspective for the world economy is thus a growing fall of production with the wastage of a yet more important part of invested capital (bankruptcies, industrial desertification, etc) and a drastic reduction of variable capital, which signifies for the working class, outside of the growing attacks against wages, massive job losses, an unprecedented growth of unemployment.
The perspective of class combat
15) The capitalist attacks of every order which are unleashed today, and which can only worsen, hit a proletariat which has been palpably weakened during the course of the last three years, a weakening which has affected its consciousness as much as its combativity.
It is the collapse of the Stalinist regimes of Europe and the dislocation of the whole of the Eastern bloc at the end of 89, which has constituted the essential factor in the reflux of the proletariat's consciousness. The identification, by all sectors of the bourgeoisie for half a century, of these regimes with "socialism", the fact that these regimes did not fall under the blows of the class struggle but following an implosion of their economy, has allowed the bourgeoisie to use massive campaigns on "the death of communism", on the "definitive victory of liberal and democratic capitalism", on the perspective of a "new world order" made of peace, prosperity and the respect for Law. Although the vast majority of the proletariat in the great industrial concentrations have for a long time ceased to have any illusions in the so-called "socialist paradises", the inglorious disappearance of the Stalinist regimes has nevertheless dealt a blow to the idea that there could ever be anything else than the capitalist system, that the action of the proletariat could lead to an alternative to this system. Such a blow to consciousness was still more aggravated by the explosion of the USSR, following the failed coup of 1991, hitting the country which had been the theatre of the proletarian revolution at the beginning of the century.
On the other hand, the Gulf crisis, from Summer 90, operation "Desert Storm" at the beginning of 91, engendered a profound sentiment of impotence among workers who felt themselves totally incapable of acting, or of weighing on events whose gravity they were conscious of, but which remained the exclusive province of "those on high". This feeling powerfully contributed to a weakening of workers' combativity in a context where this combativity had already been altered, although to a lesser extent, by events in the East the previous year. And this weakening of combativity was yet further aggravated by the explosion of the USSR two years after the collapse of its bloc and by the contemporary development of confrontations in ex-Yugoslavia.
16) Events which rushed along after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, by raising a whole series of questions and contradictions to the bourgeoisie's campaigns of 1989, contributed to undermining a part of the mystifications in which the working class had been plunged. Thus, the crisis and the Gulf War began to deal some decisive blows to illusions on the installation of an "era of peace" that Bush had announced at the time of the collapse of the rival imperialism from the east. At the same time, the barbaric behavior of the "great democracy" of America and its acolytes, the massacres of Iraqi soldiers and the civilian population helped to unmask the lies on the "superiority" of democracy, on the victory of the "right of nations", and of the "rights of man". Lastly, the catastrophic aggravation of the crisis, the open recession, bankruptcies, losses registered by companies considered the most prosperous, massive job losses in every sector and particularly in these companies, the inexorable growth of unemployment, all these expressions of the capitalist economy's insurmountable contradictions are about to settle the hash of the lies about the "prosperity" of the capitalist system, its capacity to overcome the difficulties which had engulfed its so-called "socialist" rival. The working class has not yet digested all of the blows against its consciousness in the preceding period. In particular, the idea that there could be an alternative to capitalism does not automatically flow from the growing fact of the weakness of this system and can very well give rise to despair. But, within the class, conditions for a rejection of bourgeois lies, of a profound questioning, are about to develop.
17) This reflection in the working class takes place at a time where the accumulation of capitalist attacks and their growing brutality obliges it to shake off the torpor that has overcome it for several years. In turn:
- the explosion of workers' combativity in Italy during Autumn 92 (a combativity which has never been completely extinguished since);
- to a lesser degree but significant, the massive demonstrations of workers in Britain during the same period, after the announcement of many mine closures;
- the combativity expressed by the proletariat of Germany at the end of the winter following massive job cuts, notably in what constitutes one of the symbols of industrial capitalism, the Ruhr;
- other signs of workers' combativity, on a smaller scale, but which are multiplying in several countries of Europe faced with more and more draconian austerity plans.
All this shows that the proletariat is about to unclamp itself from the vice that has been gripping it since the beginning of the 90s, that it is freeing itself from the paralysis which had forced it to submit to the attacks of the bourgeoisie from this time without reaction. Thus, the present situation is fundamentally different from that at the preceding ICC Congress, which stated that "... the apparatus of the left of the bourgeoisie has already tried for several months to launch movements of premature struggle so as to hold back this reflection (within the proletariat) and to spread additional confusion in workers' ranks". In particular, the ambiance of impotence which predominated among the majority of workers, and which helped the bourgeoisie's maneuvers aiming to provoke minority struggles destined to drown in isolation, tends to give way more and more to a will to cross swords with the bourgeoisie, to reply with determination to its attacks.
18) The proletariat of the main industrialized countries is about to raise its head, confirming what the ICC has never ceased to affirm: "the fact that the working class still holds the key to the future within its hands" (Resolution to the 9th ICC Congress), and which it announced with confidence: "...it is because the historic course has not been overturned, because the bourgeoisie has not succeeded with its multiple campaigns and maneuvers in inflicting a decisive defeat on the class of the advanced countries and rallying them behind the national banner, that the reflux submitted to by the class, as much at the level of its consciousness as of its combativity, will necessarily be overcome". (Resolution of 29.3.92, International Review 70). However, this recovery of class combat will be difficult. The first attempts made by the proletariat since Autumn 92 show that it still suffers from the weight of the reflux. Largely, the experience, the lessons acquired during the struggles of the 80s, have not yet been reappropriated by the great majority of workers. On the other hand the bourgeoisie, from now, shows that it has drawn the lessons of preceding combats:
- by organizing, for some time, a whole series of campaigns designed to make the workers lose their class identity, particularly the anti-fascist and anti-racist campaigns, as well as others aimed at brain-washing them with nationalism;
- by using the unions to take the lead in any expressions of combativity;
- by radicalizing the language of these organs flanking the working class;
- by straightaway giving, wherever it's necessary as in Italy, a leading role to rank-and-file unionism;
- in some countries, by organizing or preparing the departure of "socialist" parties from government, the better to play the card of the left in opposition;
- by avoiding, thanks to international planning of its attacks, a simultaneous development of workers struggles in different countries;
- by organizing a systematic black-out on struggles.
Moreover, the bourgeoisie has shown itself capable of using the reflux in class consciousness to introduce false demands and objectives into the struggle (union rights, work sharing, defense of the company, etc).
19) More generally, it is still a long road that the proletariat must travel before it is capable of affirming its revolutionary perspective. It will have to spring all the usual traps that all the forces of the bourgeoisie will put under its feet. At the same time, it will confront all the poison of the decomposition of capitalism which penetrates the workers' ranks, and which the dominant class (whose political difficulties linked to decomposition do not affect its ability to maneuver against its mortal enemy) will cynically use:
- atomization, the "resourceful" individual, the "look after number one" spirit, which tends to undermine workers' solidarity and class identity and which, even in moments of combativity, will encourage corporatism;
- despair, the lack of perspective will continue to weigh, even if the bourgeoisie cannot again use an occasion like the collapse of Stalinism;
- the process of lumpenisation as a result of massive and long-term unemployment's tendency to cut many workers, especially the young, off from their class;
- the growth of xenophobia, including among important sectors, greatly facilitating, in exchange, the anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigns, which are aimed both at dividing the working class, and of drawing it into defense of the democratic state;
- urban riots, whether spontaneous or deliberately provoked (like those in Los Angeles in the spring of 1992), which the bourgeoisie will use to try to draw the proletariat off its class terrain;
- the different manifestations of the rotting of the dominant class, the corruption and gangsterism of its political apparatus, which if it undermines it credibility in the workers' eyes, at the same time favorizes campaigns of diversion in favor of a "clean" (or "green") state;
- the display of all the barbarity into which not only the Third World is plunging but also a part of Europe, like ex-Yugoslavia, which is a godsend for all the "humanitarian" campaigns aiming to make the workers feel guilty and accept the degradation of their own living conditions, but equally to justify the imperialist intrigues of the great powers.
20) This last aspect of the situation shows the complexity of the question of war as a factor in proletarian consciousness. This complexity has already been amply analyzed by communist organizations, and notably by the ICC, in the past. In the main, it consists of the fact that, while imperialist war constitutes one of the major manifestations of the decadence of capitalism, symbolizing in particular the absurdity of a system in agony and indicating the necessity of overthrowing it, its impact on the working class' consciousness depends strictly on the circumstances in which it breaks out. Thus the Gulf War, two years ago, brought to the workers of the advanced countries (which were all practically involved in this war, directly or indirectly) a serious contribution to overcoming the illusions spread by the bourgeoisie the year before, and thus helped to clarify consciousness. On the other hand, the war in ex-Yugoslavia has contributed not at all to the clarification of consciousness in the proletariat, which is confirmed by the fact that the bourgeoisie has not felt the need to organize pacifist demonstrations whereas several advanced countries (as France and Britain) already have thousands of men on the ground. And the same is true for the massive US police operation in Somalia. It seems that, when the sordid game of imperialism can conceal itself behind "humanitarian" screens, in other words it is able to present its military interventions as designed to relieve humanity from the calamities resulting from capitalist decomposition, it cannot, in the present period, be used by the great masses of workers in order to strengthen their consciousness and their class determination. However, the bourgeoisie will not always be able to hide the face of its imperialist war behind the mask of "fine sentiments". The ineluctable aggravation of the antagonisms between the great powers, by forcing them to make, even with the absence of the "humanitarian" pretext, more and more direct, massive and bloody interventions (which, in the final account, constitutes one of the major characteristics of the whole period of decadent capitalism) will tend to open the eyes of the workers to what is really at stake in our epoch. The same is true for war as for other expressions of the capitalist system's historic impasse: when they spring specifically from the decomposition of this system, they appear today as an obstacle to consciousness in the class; it is only as a general expression of the whole of decadence that they can constitute a positive element in this consciousness. And this potentiality will tend to become more and more of a reality inasmuch as the gravity of the crisis and the attacks of the bourgeoisie, as well as the development of workers' struggles, will permit the proletarian masses to identify the link between the economic impasse of capitalism and its plunge into barbaric warfare.
21) Thus, the evidence of the mortal crisis of the capitalist mode of production, the prime manifestation of its decadence, the terrible consequences that it will have for all sectors of the working class, the necessity for the latter to develop, against these consequences, the struggles in which it is once more engaging, will constitute a powerful factor in the development of consciousness. The aggravation of the crisis will more and more show that it is not the result of "bad management", that the "virtuous" bourgeoisie and the "clean" states are as incapable as the others of overcoming it, that they express the mortal impasse of the whole of capitalism. The massive deployment of workers' combats will constitute a powerful antidote against the noxious effects of decomposition, allowing the progressive surmounting, through the class solidarity that these combats imply, of atomization, "every man for himself" and all the divisions which weigh on the proletariat; between categories, branches of industry, between immigrants and indigenous workers, between the unemployed and workers with jobs. In particular, although the weight of decomposition has prevented the unemployed from entering the struggle (except in a punctual way) during the past decade, and contrary to the 30s, and while they will not be able to play a vanguard role comparable to that of the soldiers in Russia in 1917 as we had envisaged, the massive development of proletarian struggles will make it possible for them, notably in demonstrations on the street, to rejoin the general combat of their class, all the more so in that the numbers of unemployed who already have an experience of associated labor and of struggle at the workplace, can only grow. More generally, if unemployment is not a specific problem of those without work but rather a real question affecting and concerning all of the working class, notably as a clear and tragic expression of the historic weakness of capitalism, it is this same combat to come that will allow the proletariat to become fully conscious of it.
22) It is also, and fundamentally, through this combat against incessant attacks on its living conditions that the proletariat will have to overcome all the aftermath of the collapse of Stalinism, which has dealt such a blow to its perception of a perspective, its consciousness that there exists a revolutionary alternative to moribund capitalism. This combat "will give a new confidence to the working class, reminding it that it already constitutes a considerable force in society and will allow a growing mass of workers to turn once again towards the perspective of overthrowing capitalism" (Resolution of 29.3.92). And the more this perspective is present in workers' consciousness, the more the class will acquire the means to thwart the traps of the bourgeoisie, in order to develop its struggles fully, to take them effectively in hand, spread and generalize them. In order to develop this perspective, the class must not only recover from the disorientation it has suffered during the recent period, and reappropriate the lesson of the struggles fought during the 1980's; it must also rebuild the historic link with its communist traditions. The central importance of this development of consciousness can only emphasize the immense responsibility that rests on today's revolutionary minorities. It is the vital precondition for the definitive success of the class' combat.
[1] It seems that once again imperialist antagonisms do not automatically overlap with commercial rivalries, even if, with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the world imperialist map today is closer than the preceding one to the map of these rivalries, which allows a country like the United States to utilize, notably in the GATT negotiations, its economic and commercial power as an instrument of blackmail against its ex-allies. Likewise, the EEC could be both an instrument of the imperialist bloc dominated by the American power while favorizing commercial competition against the latter, countries as Britain and Holland can very well base themselves on European Union in order to validate their commercial interests faced with this power while representing its imperialist interests in Europe.
Major workers' struggles do not leave many visible traces once they are over. When "order" returns, when "social peace" once again imposes its ruthless daily discipline, soon not much more than a memory is left. Some would say that a memory is very nice, but it does not count for much. In fact, it is a formidable force in the mind of the revolutionary class.
The ruling ideology always tries to destroy the images of those moments when the exploited raise their heads. It does this by falsifying history. It manipulates memory by emptying it of its revolutionary content. It generates distorted clichés, devoid of everything that these struggles contained by way of example, instruction and encouragement for the struggles to come.
When the USSR collapsed, the high priests of the established order leapt in joyfully with the filthy lie that identifies the revolution of October 1917 with Stalinism. They have been doing the same thing to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the events of May 68, albeit on a smaller scale.
These events, both because of the number of participants and their length, constituted the greatest workers' strike in history. But they are presented today as a bit of student rebellion, the product of the childish and utopian dreams of a university intelligentsia imbued with the Rolling Stones and the Stalinist heroes of the "Third World". What is left of all this today? Nothing, except one more proof that the idea of going beyond capitalism is an idle fantasy. And the media reinforce this by regaling us with images showing that the once "revolutionary" student leaders - actually the apprentice bureaucrats of the day - have now become conscientious and respectable managers of the capitalism they protested so much about. Cohn-Bendit, "Danny the Red", a member of parliament for Frankfurt; the others, special advisers to the president of the Republic, ministers, high-ranking officials, enterprise administrators, etc. As for the workers' strike, no one talks about it except to say that it never went beyond immediate demands. That it landed up with a wage rise which was wiped out by inflation within six months. In short, the whole thing was just a lot of hot air.
***
What really remains of May 68 in the memory of the working class?
Certainly there are the images of burning barricades where, at night and in a fog of tear gas grenades, students and young workers confronted the police; images of the streets of the Latin Quarter in Paris, denuded of their cobblestones; of the mornings after, debris and upturned cars everywhere. And in fact the media showed plenty of images like this.
But the power of media manipulation has its limits. The working class possesses a collective memory, even if it is often "underground" and only expresses itself openly when the class once again manages to unite massively in the struggle. Apart from this more spectacular side, there remains in the workers' memory a diffuse but profound feeling about the enormous strength the proletariat has when it unites.
At the beginning of the events in May 68 there certainly was a student agitation, as there was in all the western industrial countries, fuelled to a large extent by opposition to the Vietnam war and by a new disquiet about the future. But this agitation was restricted to a very small part of society. It could often be summed up by the demonstrations in which masses of students intoned the syllables of one of the most murderous of the Stalinists: "Ho-Ho, Ho-Chi-Minh!". At the origin of the first disturbances in the student milieu in 68 in France, we find, among other things, the students' demand for access to the bedrooms of the female students in the university dormitories.... Before 68, on the campuses, student "revolt" was often asserted under the banner of the theories of Marcuse, one of whose essential theses was that the working class was no longer a revolutionary social force and had become definitively "bourgeoisiefied".
In France, the stupidity of General De Gaulle's government, which responded to the student ferment by a blind and completely disproportionate repression, brought the protest to the paroxysm of the first barricades. But this still remained circumscribed essentially to the ghetto of student youth. What changed everything, what transformed the "events of May 68" into a major social explosion, was the entry onto the scene of the proletariat. Things only began to get serious when virtually the entire working class entered the battle, paralyzing nearly all the basic mechanisms of the economic apparatus. Sweeping aside the resistance of the union machinery, breaking through corporatist barriers, nearly 10 million workers all stopped work at the same time. And by this alone they opened up a new period in history.
The workers, who a few days before had been a mass of scattered individuals, ignorant of each other and submitting to the weight of exploitation and of the Stalinist police in the workplaces; the same workers who were supposed to have become utterly bourgeois, suddenly found themselves reunited, with a tremendous power at their fingertips. A power which they were the first to be surprised by and which they did not always know what to do with.
The halting of the factories and the offices, the absence of public transport, the paralysis of the wheels of production, showed very clearly how, in capitalism, everything depends in the final analysis on the will and consciousness of the exploited class. The word "revolution" was on everyone's lips and the question of what was possible, of where it was all leading, of what had happened in the great workers' struggles of the past, became the central subject of discussion. "Everyone was talking and everyone was listening". This is one of the things one remembers the most. For a month, the silence which isolates individuals and keeps them atomized, this invisible wall which normally seems so impenetrable, so inevitable, so disheartening, had vanished. There was discussion everywhere: in the streets, in the occupied factories, in the universities and the high schools, in the youth centers, in the workers' neighborhoods, which had been turned into political meeting places by the local "action committees". The language of the workers' movement, which calls things by their real names - bourgeoisie, proletariat, exploitation, class struggle, revolution, etc - developed everywhere because it was naturally the only one that could get hold of reality.
The paralysis of bourgeois political power, the hesitations of the ruling class faced with a situation that had got out of control, confirmed the power of the impact of the workers' struggle. An anecdote illustrates very well what was felt in the corridors of power. Michel Jobert, the head of the cabinet under Prime Minister Pompidou during the events, in a TV program in 1978, devoted to the tenth anniversary of May 68, told how one day, looking through the window of his office, he saw a red flag flying on the roof of one of the ministerial buildings. He quickly phoned up to get this object removed because its presence made the official institutions look ridiculous. But after several calls, he had not managed to find anyone ready or able to carry out the job. It was then that he understood that something really new was taking place.
The real victory of the workers' struggles of May 68 was not in the wage rises obtained in the Grenelle agreement, but in the very resurgence of the power of the working class. It was the return of the proletariat onto the stage of history after several decades of triumphant Stalinist counter-revolution.
Today, when the workers of the whole world are suffering the effects of the ideological campaigns about the "end of communism and of the class struggle", the memory of what the mass strike in France 68 really was is a living reminder of the strength that the working class carries within itself. When the whole ideological machine tries to trap the working class in an ocean of doubt about itself, to convince each worker that he is desperately alone and can expect nothing from the rest of his class, this reminder is an indispensable antidote.
****
But, they tell us, what does it matter if the memory lives on, when the thing itself will not appear again? What proof is there that in the future we are going to see new, massive and powerful affirmations of the fighting unity of the working class?
In a slightly different form, this question was being posed just after the struggle of spring 68: was this just a flash in the pan, something specifically French, or did it open up, on an international level, a new historic period of proletarian militancy?
The following article, published in 1969 in no. 2 of Revolution Internationale, set itself to answer these questions. Through a critique of the analyses of the Situationist International[1], it insisted on the need to understand the profound roots of this explosion and to seek them not, as the SI did, in "the most obvious manifestations of social alienation", but in the "sources which gave birth to them and nourished them". "It is in these (economic) roots that a radical theoretical critique must find the possibility of a revolutionary upheaval ... The real significance of May 68 is that it was one of the first and one of the most important reactions of the mass of workers to a deteriorating world economic situation".
On this basis it was possible to see ahead. By grasping the link between the explosion of May 68 and the degradation of the world economic situation, by understanding that this degradation expressed a historic turning point in the world economy, by seeing that the working class had begun to free itself from the grip of the Stalinist counter-revolution, it was easy to predict that new workers' explosions would rapidly follow that of May 68, with or without radical students.
This analysis was quickly confirmed. In autumn 1969 Italy went through its most important wave of strikes since the war; the same situation appeared in Poland in 1970, in Britain in 1972, in Portugal and Spain in 1974-5. Then at the end of the 70s, a new international wave of workers' struggles developed, culminating in the mass strike in Poland in 1980-81, the most important struggle since the revolutionary wave of 1917-23. Finally, between 1983 and 89, another series of class movements which, in the main industrial countries, showed on several occasions a tendency for workers to challenge the union straitjacket, to take the struggle into their own hands and to extend it.
May 68 in France was "just the beginning", the beginning of a new historic period. It was no longer "midnight in the century". The working class had thrown off the weight of the dark years that had lasted since the triumph of the social democratic and Stalinist counter-revolution in the 20s. By affirming its strength through massive movements that were capable of opposing the union machines and the "workers' parties", the working class had initiated course towards class confrontations that barred the way to a third World War and opened the way to the development of the international proletarian struggle.
The period we are in today is the one opened up by May 68. Twenty-five years after, the contradictions of capitalist society which led to the May explosion have not lessened - on the contrary. Compared to what the world economy is going through today, the difficulties of the late sixties seem insignificant: half a million unemployed in France in 68, more than three million today, to give but one example of the true economic disaster which has devastated the entire planet over the last quarter-century. As for the proletariat, through all the advances and refluxes in its militancy and its consciousness, it has never signed an armistice with capital. The struggles of autumn 92 in Italy, in response to the austerity plan imposed by a bourgeoisie confronted with the most violent economic crisis since the war, and where the union apparatus encountered an unprecedented challenge from the workers, has once again confirmed this.
What remains of May 68? The opening of a new phase of history. A period in which the conditions have been ripening for new working class explosions which will go much further than the groping steps of twenty five years ago.
RV, June 93
[1] The SI was a group which had a definite influence in May 68, particularly among the most radical sectors of the student milieu. It had its origins on the one hand in the "Lettrist" movement which, following in the tradition of the surrealists, aimed to make a revolutionary critique of art; and on the other hand in the milieu around the review Socialisme ou Barbarie, founded by the Greek former Trotskyist Castoriadis at the beginning of the 50s in France. The IS also laid claim to Marx but not to marxism. It took up some of the most advanced positions of the revolutionary workers' movement, particularly those of the German and Dutch lefts (the capitalist nature of the USSR, rejection of the union and parliamentary forms, necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat via the workers' councils), but it presented them as its own discoveries, mixed in with its analysis of the phenomenon of totalitarianism: the theory of the "society of the spectacle". The SI certainly embodied one of the highest points that could be attained by sectors of the radicalized student petty bourgeoisie: the rejection of their condition (the "end of the university") and the attempt to integrate into the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. But they never quite got away from the characteristics of their origins, as can be seen in particular by their ideological view of history, their inability to see the importance of the economy and thus the reality of the class struggle. The review of the SI disappeared not long after 68 and the group broke up in a convulsive series of reciprocal expulsions.
(Reprinted from Revolution Internationale no. 2, 1969)
The events of May 1968 have produced an extraordinary abundance of literary activity. Books, pamphlets, and anthologies of every description have been published pell-mell, and in impressive quantities. The publishers - always on the lookout for fashionable "gadgets" - have been falling over each other to exploit the immense interest aroused among the masses for anything to do with these events. And they have had no difficulty in finding any number of journalists, photographers, PR experts, professors, intellectuals, artists, and men of letters. As everyone knows, this country is crawling with them, and they are always ready to pick up a good commercial subject.
All this frantic recuperation makes you want to vomit.
But amongst the mass of May's combatants, the interest awoken during the struggle has not come to an end with the street fighting. On the contrary, it has grown stronger than ever. Research, confrontations, discussions all continue. The masses were not mere spectators, or one-off rebels. They found themselves suddenly engaged in a struggle of historic dimensions, and once they had recovered from their own astonishment, they could not help but search for the fundamental roots of this social explosion which was their own work, and for the perspectives which this explosion has opened up both in the short term, and in the more distant future. The masses are trying to understand, to become conscious of their own activity.
This is why it is only rarely that we find in the mass of books written about May any reflection of the disquiet and the questioning amongst the people. These are to be found rather in small publications, in often short-lived reviews, in the duplicated sheets put out by all kinds of groups, or of district and factory struggle committees which have survived May, in their meetings, and through discussions which inevitably are often confused. And yet despite this confusion, serious work is nonetheless going on to clarify the problems raised by May.
After several months of silence, probably devoted to elaborating its work, the "Situationist International" group has just intervened in this debate, through a book entitled Enrages[1] and Situationists in the Occupation Movement.
From a group which did indeed take an active part in the struggle, we had every right to expect a profound contribution to the analysis of May's significance, especially with several months hindsight. We had a right to make demands of this book; but it does not live up to its promises. Quite apart from their own special vocabulary ("society of the spectacle", consumerism, "critique of daily life", etc), we can only regret that the situationists have given in to the fashion of the day, and stuffed their book with photos, pictures and comic strips.
You can think what you like of comic strips as a means of revolutionary propaganda and agitation. And we are aware that the Situationists have a special taste for comics and speech-bubbles as a means of expression. They even claim to have discovered in the technique of "detournement"[2] the modern weapon of subversive propaganda, and see this as a sign of their superiority to other groups which have stuck to the "outdated" methods of the "traditional" revolutionary press, to "boring" articles, and to duplicated leaflets.
There is certainly some truth in the observation that the articles in the press of many little groups are often repetitive, long, and boring. However, this should not become an argument in favor of trying to amuse. Capitalism is constantly discovering all kinds of "cultural" activities, organized leisure, and especially sports for the young. Here it is not just a matter of content, but also of an appropriate method to the aim of turning young workers away from reflection.
The working class does not need to be amused. It needs above all to understand, and to think. Comics, witticisms, and puns are of little use, especially when in reality, there is one philosophical language (full of obscure, convoluted and esoteric terms) reserved for the "intellectual thinkers", while for the great infantile mass of workers, a few pictures with simple headlines will do.
When you denounce the "spectacular" everywhere, you have to take care not to fall into the spectacle" yourself. Unfortunately, this is just what this book on May tends to do. Another characteristic of this book is its tendency to describe events day by day, when what was needed is an analysis that places them in their historic context, and brings out their fundamental meaning. Moreover, what is described is in fact less the events themselves and more the action of the enrages and situationists, as we can see from the title. The absurd exaggeration of the role played by this or that "personality" among the enrages, the self-praise gives the impression that it was not so much the situationists who took part in the occupations movement, but rather that the May movement was solely designed to throw into relief the great revolutionary qualities of the situationists and the enrages. Anyone who has not lived through May would get a very strange idea of what happened from this book. To listen to them, you would think that the situationists had played a dominant part in events right from the beginning. This shows great imagination, and a real ability to "take one's desires for reality". In fact, the situationists share in events was probably less, and certainly not greater, than that of many other groups. Instead of subjecting to criticism the behavior, ideas, and positions of other groups - which would have been interesting, but which they don't do - they simply minimize (how disdainfully and superficially they "criticize" the other "councilist" groups) or ignore them. This is a pretty dubious means of blowing your own trumpet, and doesn't get us very far.
The book (or what's left of it, without the comic strips, photos, songs, grafitti and other reproductions) begins with an observation which is generally correct: May surprised almost everybody, and in particular the revolutionary or supposedly revolutionary groups. Everybody, that is, except of course the situationists who "knew about and demonstrated the possibility and imminence of a new start for the revolution". For the situationist group, "thanks to the revolutionary theory which returns to the practical movement its own theory, deduced from it and raised to the coherence which it is pursuing, certainly nothing was more predictable, and more predicted, than the new epoch of the class struggle...".
There is no law against pretentiousness - indeed it is a widespread mania within the revolutionary movement, especially since the triumph of "Leninism", and the Bordigist current is a striking example of it. So we won't argue with the situationists' pretentions. We will simply ask: where and when, and on what basis, did the situationists foresee the events of May? When they say that "for years they have very accurately predicted the present explosion and its consequences", they are obviously confusing a general statement with a precise analysis. The "prediction" that one day the revolutionary explosion would arrive has existed for 120 years, since the beginning of the workers' movement. For a group which claims not only to have a coherent theory, but better still to "return its revolutionary critique to the practical movement", this is hardly enough. If it is to be anything other than a rhetorical turn of phrase, then "returning its revolutionary critique to the practical movement" must mean analyzing the concrete situation, with all its potential and its limitations. The situationists never made this analysis before May, and to judge by this book they have not done so since: when they talk about a new period of renewed revolutionary struggles, they never refer to anything more than abstract generalities. And even when they do refer to recent struggles, they never do more than observe an empirical fact. In itself, this observation never goes beyond witnessing the continuity of the class struggle, and says nothing about its direction, nor about its ability to open out into a historic period of revolutionary struggles, above all at the international level, as a socialist revolution must necessarily be. Even such a formidable and important revolutionary explosion as the Paris Commune did not open a revolutionary period in history, since it was followed on the contrary by a long period where capitalism stabilized and flourished, and where as a result the workers' movement turned to reformism.
Unless we want to follow the anarchists, who think that everything is always possible where there is a will, we are forced to understand that the workers' movement does not follow a continuously rising curve, but that it is made up of periods of rising and falling struggle, and is objectively determined in the first place by the capitalist system's degree of development and its inherent contradictions.
The SI defines the present period as "the present return of the revolution". What is this definition based on? Here is the explanation:
1) "The critical theory elaborated and spread by the SI showed easily (...) that the proletariat had not been abolished" (how strange that the SI shows "easily" something that all workers and revolutionaries have always known, without having to wait for the SI).
2) "... capitalism has continued to develop its alienations" (who would have thought it?).
3) "... wherever this antagonism exists (as if this antagonism didn't exist throughout capitalism) the social question still remains posed after more than a century" (well, there's a discovery!).
4) "...the antagonism exists throughout the surface of the planet" (another discovery!).
5) "The SI explains the deepening and concentration of these alienations by the delay of the revolution" (it's obvious).
6) "This delay clearly springs from the international defeat of the proletariat since the Russian counter-revolution" (another truth which revolutionaries have been proclaiming for 40 years at least).
7) Amongst other things, "the SI knew very well (...) that the emancipation of the workers would always and everywhere come up against the bureaucratic organizations".
8) The situationists note that the constant lie necessary for the survival of these bureaucratic machines is the cornerstone in the generalized falsification within modern society.
9) They "had also recognized and worked to join with the new forms (?) of subversion whose first signs were already gathering".
10) And this is why "the situationists recognised and demonstrated the possibility and imminence of a new start to the revolution".
We have reprinted these long extracts in order to demonstrate as exactly as possible, and in their own words, what the situationists "knew".
As we can see, this "knowledge" can be reduced to generalities which have been known for years to thousands of revolutionaries, and while these generalities may be enough to affirm the revolutionary project, they contain nothing which might be considered as a demonstration of the "imminence of a new start for the revolution". The situationists "theory" can thus be reduced to a mere profession of faith, and nothing more.
The fact is that the Socialist Revolution and its imminence or otherwise cannot be deduced from a few verbal "discoveries" like the consumer society, the spectacle, or daily life, which are just new words to describe well-known notions of this capitalist society based on the exploitation of the working masses, with all that that implies in the way of human deformation and alienation in every aspect of social life.
Even supposing that we are faced with a new start to the revolution, how does the SI explain that we have had to wait just this amount of time since the victory of the Russian Revolution - let's say, 50 years. Why not 30 years, or 70? You can't have it both ways: either this recovery is fundamentally determined by objective conditions, and in this case it has to be explained which one - something the SI never does - or, it is solely the result of an accumulating subjective will, which shows itself one fine day, in which case it could not be predicted because there would be no criteria to determine its degree of maturation.
Under these conditions, the prediction that the SI is so proud of would be more the work of a soothsayer than the result of any theory. When Trotsky wrote in 1936 that "The revolution is beginning in France", he was certainly mistaken, but this assertion was based on an altogether more serious analysis than that of the SI, since it referred to an economic crisis which was shaking the entire world. The SI's "correct" prediction is more like Molotov's inauguration of the famous "third period" of the Communist International at the beginning of 1929, announcing the great news that the world had just entered the revolutionary period. The similarity lies in the gratuitous nature of both assertions. Molotov thought that the economic crisis, whose study is indeed a vital starting point for any analysis of a given period, was sufficient to determine the its revolutionary nature or otherwise; so, on the basis of the 1929 crisis he thought he could announce the imminence of the revolution. The SI by contrast thinks it enough to ignore anything that smacks of an objective condition, whence its deep aversion for anything to do with an economic analysis of modern capitalist society.
All the SI's attention is thus devoted to the most obvious expressions of social alienation, and it neglects to look at the springs that feed them. We insist, again, that such a critique which deals essentially with superficial expressions, no matter how radical, is bound to be hemmed in, limited, both in theory and practice.
Capitalism necessarily produces its own alienations, and it is not in the expression of these alienations that we should look for the motor of its downfall. As long as capitalism, at its roots, remains a viable economic system, it cannot be destroyed by will-power alone.
"A society never expires before developing all the productive forces that it is capable of containing" (Marx, Preface to a Critique of Political Economy).
A radical critical theory must look at the roots of capitalist society to uncover the possibility of its revolutionary overthrow.
"At a certain stage of their development, society's material productive forces enter into collision with the relations of production... So begins an era of social revolution" (Marx, idem).
This collision that Marx talks about is expressed in economic upheavals, such as crises, imperialist wars, and social convulsions. Every marxist thinker has insisted on the fact that before we can talk of a revolutionary period, "it is not enough that the workers do not want to go on as before, the capitalists must also be unable to continue as before" (Lenin). And here is the SI, which claims to be virtually the sole organized expression of revolutionary practice today, going in exactly the opposite direction. On the rare occasions when this book overcomes its own distaste so far as to deal with economic questions, it is to show that the new start to the revolution is not just independent of society's economic bases, but is taking place in an economically flourishing capitalism. "No tendency towards economic crisis could be observed... The revolutionary eruption did not come from the economic crisis... what was attacked head-on in May, was a capitalist economy working well" (emphasis in the text).
What this is trying to demonstrate is that the revolutionary crisis and society's economic state are two different things, which can evolve each in its own way, without being related. The SI thinks that facts support this "great discovery", and so cries triumphally: "No tendency could be observed towards economic crisis"!!
No tendency at all? Really?
By the end of 1967, the economic situation in France began to show signs of deteriorating. The threat of unemployment caused more and more concern. By the beginning of 1968, the number of unemployed rose above 500,000. The phenomenon was no longer restricted to local pockets, but had reached every region. In Paris, the number of unemployed rose, slowly but surely. The press was full of articles dealing with the fear of unemployment in various milieux. Part-time working had come to stay in many factories, and had provoked reactions from many workers. Sporadic strikes were directly provoked by the question of preserving jobs, or full employment. The young were hardest hit, and began to have difficulty in entering the productive process. The drop in employment was all the more unwelcome, since the labor market was having to absorb generation of the demographic explosion after the war. A fear for the future became permanent amongst the workers, and especially amongst the young. This fear was all the sharper in that it had been virtually unknown since the war.
As unemployment rose, wages and living conditions fell, partly as a result. Naturally, government and bosses tried to make the most of the situation to attack workers' living standards (eg, the decrees on the Social Security).
More and more, the feeling is growing in the masses that the period of prosperity has come to an end. The workers' indifference and "don't give a damn" attitude, which the bourgeois have so lamented during the last 10-15 years, are giving way to a deep and growing anxiety.
Certainly, it more difficult to discern this rising anxiety and discontent amongst the workers than spectacular actions in a university faculty. But you can't go on ignoring it after the May explosion, unless you believe that 10 million workers were suddenly touched, one fine day, by the Holy Spirit of the Anti-spectacle. Such a massive explosion is founded on a long accumulation of real discontent among the masses at their economic situation and working conditions, even if a superficial observer saw nothing of it. Nor can we attribute the economic demands of the strike solely to the scoundrels of the trades unions and the stalinists.
It is obvious that the unions and the PCF (French "Communist" Party) came to the government's rescue by using economic demands to the hilt as a means of preventing the strike breaking out onto a global, social terrain. But we are not talking here about the role of these state organisms; they did their job, and they can hardly be reproached for doing it to the utmost. But the fact that they were so easily able to keep the vast mass of striking workers to the purely economic terrain proves that the masses main preoccupation in taking up the struggle was the increasingly threatening economic situation. While the task of revolutionaries is to uncover the radical possibilities contained in the struggle of the masses, and to take an active part in bringing them to fruition, it is necessary above all not to ignore the immediate concerns that have pushed the masses into struggle in the first place.
Despite the proclaimed self-confidence of government circles, the business world is increasingly alarmed by the economic situation, as we have seen in the financial press at the beginning of the year. What worries them most is not so much the situation in France, whose position is still relatively privileged, but the fact that the economy is slowing down in a context of worldwide economic gloom, which cannot help but have repercussions in France. In all the industrial countries, in both Europe and the USA, unemployment is rising and the economic outlook is getting darker. Despite a whole series of measures, Britain was forced at the end of 1967 to devalue the pound, dragging other countries in its wake. The Wilson government has announced an exceptional austerity program: reduction in public spending, including armaments; withdrawal of British troops from Asia; wage freeze; reduction of domestic consumption and imports; support for exports. On January 1st 1968, the Johnson government (in the USA) sounded the alarm, and announced harsh measures necessary to keep the economy in balance. In March, came the dollar crisis. The economic press became more pessimistic by the day, and began to speak more and more of the specter of 1929 crisis; many feared that this time, the consequences would be still worse. Everywhere, the price of credit rose, the stock exchanges fell. In every country, the same cry: reduce spending and consumption, increase exports at all costs, and reduce imports to the strict minimum. At the same time, the same deterioration appeared in the Eastern bloc, which explains the tendency of countries like Czechoslovakia and Romania to detach themselves from the Soviet grip, and look for markets elsewhere.
This is the economic backdrop to the situation prior to May.
Of course, this is not yet an open economic crisis, first because we are only at the beginning, and second because in today's capitalism the state possesses a whole arsenal of means to slow down, and temporarily to attenuate the crisis' most striking expressions. Nonetheless, it is necessary to put forward the following points:
a) For 20 years since World War II, the capitalism has lived on the basis of rebuilding an economy ravaged by war, of the shameless plundering of the under-developed countries which, through the swindle of national liberation and aid to the construction of independent states have been exploited to the point where they are reduced to desperate poverty and famine, and of a growing production of armaments: the war economy.
b) These three sources of prosperity and full employment during the last 20 years are close to exhaustion. The productive apparatus is faced with a world market more saturated than ever, and the capitalist economy finds itself in exactly the same situation as in 1929, only worse.
c) There is a closer inter-relation between national economies than in in 1929, with the result that any difficulties in one national economy has more immediate and greater repercussions on the economy of other countries.
d) The 1929 crisis broke out after a series of heavy defeats for the international proletariat: the victory of the counter-revolution in Russia completed with the mystification of "socialism in one country", and the myth of the anti-fascist struggle. Thanks to these particular historic conditions, the 1929 crisis - which was not merely conjunctural, but a violent expression of the chronic crisis of decaying capitalism - could develop for years and finally lead to world war and generalized destruction. This is not the case today.
Capitalism disposes of fewer and fewer themes of mystification capable of mobilizing the masses and sending them to the slaughter. The Russian myth is collapsing; the false choice between bourgeois democracy and totalitarianism is wearing very thin. In these conditions, the crisis can be seen immediately for what it is. Its first symptoms will provoke increasingly violent reactions from the masses in every country. Because, today, the economic crisis cannot run its full course, but is immediately transformed into a social crisis, the latter may seem to some to be independent, suspended in mid-air without any relation to the economic situation which is nonetheless its foundation.
Obviously, if we are to grasp this reality fully, it is no good looking at it naively. Above all, it is useless to look for a narrow relationship of cause and effect, limited locally to particular countries or particular branches of industry. This reality's foundations, and the causes that determine its evolution in the final instance, are only to be found globally, on the scale of the world economy. Looked at in this way, the movement of student struggles in every town in the world reveals its fundamental meaning, but also its limitations. If the student struggles in May were able to serve as a detonator for the vast movement of factory occupations, it is because, with all their specificities, they were no more than the forerunners of a deteriorating situation at society's core: in production, and the relations of production.
The full significance of May 68 is that it was one of the most important reactions by the mass of workers to a deteriorating world economic situation.
Consequently, it is wrong to say, as the author of this book does, that "The revolutionary upheaval did not spring from the economic crisis; on the contrary, it helped to create a situation of crisis in the economy" and that "once this economy has been disturbed by the negative forces of its historic overcoming, it must function less well".
This certainly turns reality upside down: economic crises are no longer the inevitable product of the capitalist system's inherent contradictions, as Marx tells us; on the contrary, it is the workers and their struggle who create crises in a systems which "works well". This is precisely what the bosses and capitalist apologists never stop telling us. This was De Gaulle's theme in November, baling the crisis of the franc on the activities of the May enrages[3].
This boils down to replacing marxist economic theory with the political economy of the bourgeoisie. Not surprisingly, with such an outlook, the author explains the immense movement that was May 68 as the work of a small, determined minority which he exalts: "The agitation unleashed in January 1968 by the four or five revolutionaries who were to constitute the enrages group was to lead, in five months, to the virtual liquidation of the state". Later, he writes: "never has an agitation undertaken by so small a number led in so short a time to such consequences".
For the situationists, the problem of the revolution is posed in terms of "leading", if only by exemplary acts. For us, it is posed in terms of a spontaneous movement of the masses of the proletariat, forced to rise up against a decaying economic system, which can no longer offer anything but growing misery and destruction, as well as exploitation.
It is on this granite rock that we base the class' revolutionary perspective, and our conviction in its achievement.
MC
[1] Enrages: in French, literally means "the angry ones". Since this sounds a little strange in English, we have left the original French expression.
[2] "Detournement" is a term dear to the situationists which it is difficult to render into English. Briefly put, it referred to a popular situationist technique of taking products of the capitalist media (advertisements, comic strips, etc) and "turning them against" ("detourner") what they described as the "society of the spectacle".
[3] We refer those who want to blame the November crisis of the franc on speculation by a few "bad Frenchmen" to these lines by Marx:
"The crisis breaks out first of all in the domain of speculation, and only moves later to that of production. To a superficial observer, the cause of the crisis seems to lie, not in over-production, but in over-speculation, which in fact is merely a symptom of over-production. The disorganization of production that comes afterwards seems to be, not the result of its own previous exuberance, but a consequence of the collapse in speculation" (Marx, Review from May to October 1850, published by M. Rubel in Etudes de Marxologie, no. 7, August 1963).
In the first part of this article, we explained why the proletariat is the revolutionary class within capitalist society. We have seen why it is the only force capable of resolving the insoluble contradictions which undermine the world today, by setting up a new society rid of exploitation and able to satisfy fully human needs. This capacity of the proletariat, which was demonstrated during the previous century by marxist theory in particular, does not spring merely from the degree of misery and exploitation to which it is subjected every day. Still less is it based, as some bourgeois ideologues try to pretend that marxism says, on some kind of "divine inspiration" transforming the proletariat into a "messiah for modern times". It is founded on thoroughly material conditions: the proletariat's specific place within capitalist relations of production, its status as the collective producer of the great majority of social wealth, and as a class exploited by these same relations of production. This place within capitalism does not allow it, unlike other social classes (such as the small peasantry, for example), to hope for a return to the past. On the contrary, it is forced to turn towards the future, to the abolition of wage labor and the construction of a communist society.
None of these elements are new: they are all part of the classical heritage of marxism. However, one of bourgeois ideology's most perfidious methods whereby it tries to turn the proletariat away from its communist project is to convince it that it is disappearing, or even that it has already disappeared. For this ideology, the revolutionary perspective is supposed to have had a meaning only as long as the vast majority of wage-earners were industrial workers; now that this category of the workforce is diminishing, such a perspective is supposed to disappear of itself. And we are forced to admit, that this kind of talk affects not only the less conscious workers, but even certain groups which call themselves communist. This is a further reason to fight firmly against such chatter.
The so-called "disappearance" of the working class
Bourgeois "theories" about the disappearance of the proletariat already have a long history behind them. For decades, they have been based on a certain improvement in workers' living conditions. The fact that workers can now acquire consumer goods which were once reserved to the bourgeois or the petty-bourgeois is supposed to illustrate the disappearance of the working class. But even when they appeared, these "theories" did not bear examination: when, thanks to the increase in the productivity of labour, such commodities as cars, televisions, or refrigerators became relatively cheap, and moreover when they became indispensable thanks to the evolution of the framework of working-class life[1], the fact of possessing them does not at all mean that one is no longer a worker, nor even that one is less exploited. In reality, the degree of exploitation of the working class has never been determined by the quantity or the nature of the consumer goods that it can dispose of at a given moment. Marx and marxism have long since answered this question: the wage-earners' ability to consume depends on the cost of their labour power, in other words on the quantity of labor necessary to renew it. When the capitalist pays the worker a wage, his object is to allow the latter to continue his participation in the productive process under the best possible conditions for the profitability of capital. This means that the worker must not only be able to house, feed, and clothe himself, but must also be able to rest, and to acquire the qualification necessary to operate the constantly evolving means of production.
This is why the creation and increase of paid holidays during the 20th century in the developed countries has nothing to do with any kind of bourgeois "philanthropy". They have been made necessary by the enormous increase in the productivity, and therefore the intensity of labor during the same period, as indeed of urban life as a whole. Similarly, the (relative) disappearance of child labor and the increase in time spent at school, which are presented as further proofs of bourgeois solicitude, are essentially due to capital's requirement for a more highly qualified labor force adapted to the demands of an ever more technically complex productive apparatus (though this has also become, today, a means of hiding unemployment). Moreover, in the "increase" in wages of which the bourgeoisie makes so much, especially since World War II, we must take account of the fact that workers must support their children for much longer than in the past. When children went to work at the age of twelve or even less, they brought extra money into a working-class family for ten years or more, before starting their own family. When children stay at school until eighteen, this effectively disappears. In other words, the "increase" in wages is also in large part one of capital's means of preparing the next generation of workers for new technological conditions.
Even if capitalism in the most developed countries gave the appearance, for a while, of reducing the workers' level of exploitation, this was only an illusion. In reality, the rate of exploitation, in other words the relation between the amount of surplus value that a worker produces and the wages he receives[2], has never ceased to grow. This is why, even at the time, Marx spoke of the "relative" pauperization of the working class as a constant tendency under capitalism. During the years of relative prosperity that corresponded to the reconstruction following World War II, the exploitation of the working class increased continuously, even though their living conditions did not fall as a result. This being said, we are not dealing with merely relative pauperization today. "Improvements" in wages are no longer a prospect in today's conditions, and the absolute pauperization which the bourgeoisie's apologists told us had disappeared for good is returning in earnest to the "wealthy" countries. Now that the policy of every national fraction of the bourgeoisie for dealing with the crisis, is to attack workers' living conditions through drastic attacks on the "social wage" and even on money wages, all the chatter about the "consumer society" or even the "bourgeoisification" of the working class has disappeared of itself. This is why the talk about the "disappearance of the proletariat" has changed its arguments, which now rely increasingly on the changes that affect different fractions of the class, in particular the reduction in the industrial labour force and in the proportion of "manual" workers in the labor force as a whole.
Such talk is based on a gross falsification of marxism, which has never identified the proletariat solely with industrial or manual ("blue-collar") workers. It is true that in Marx's day, the working class' biggest battalions were formed by the so-called "manual" workers. But there has always existed within the proletariat sectors which worked with sophisticated technology, or required a high degree of intellectual knowledge. Some traditional crafts, for example, required a long apprenticeship. Similarly, trades like the proof-readers in the printing industry required a high degree of study, which made their members "intellectual workers". This did not prevent this sector of the working class from being in the vanguard of the class struggle. In fact, the opposition between "blue-collar" and "white-collar" workers corresponds to the kind of categorization beloved of sociologists and their bourgeois employers, and is used to divide the workers' ranks. This is why this opposition is not new, since the ruling class understood a long time ago the advantage to be gained from making many employees think that they were not part of the working class. In reality, belonging to the working class has nothing to do with sociological, still less with ideological criteria (ie the idea that a proletarian, or a group of proletarians, has of his own condition). Fundamentally, it is determined by economic criteria.
Who belongs to the working class?
Fundamentally, the proletariat is the class exploited specifically by capitalist relations of production. As we saw in the first part of the article, the result is that "In general terms (...) belonging to the working class is determined by the fact of being deprived of the means of production, and of thus being obliged to sell one's labor power to those who do possess them, and who profit from this exchange to allot the surplus value to themselves". However, given all the falsification that surrounds the question, we need to give these criteria greater precision.
To begin with, although it is necessary to be a wage earner to be part of the working class, this is not a sufficient condition: otherwise the police, priests, the managers of large companies (especially in the state sector), and even government ministers would be exploited, and potential comrades in struggle of those that they repress, deceive, or set to work for a revenue ten or a hundred times less[3]. It is thus vital to understand that an essential characteristic of the working class is the production of surplus-value. This means two things in particular:
- a worker's income never exceeds a certain level[4]; beyond this, an income can only be derived from surplus-value extorted from other workers;
- a proletarian is a real producer of surplus-value, and not a paid agent of capital whose job is to impose capitalist order on the producers.
Amongst the personnel of a company, there may thus be technicians, or even engineers, whose salary is close to that of a qualified worker, and who belong to the same class as the latter, while those whose income is closer to the bosses' (even if they are not directly involved in labor management) do not. Similarly, the same company may include low-level managers or "security officers" whose wage may even be less than that of a technician or a qualified worker, but whose role is that of a "screw" in the industrial gaol and who therefore cannot be considered as part of the proletariat.
On the other hand, belonging to the working class does not necessarily imply a direct and immediate participation in the production of surplus-value. The teacher educating the future proletarian, the nurse - even the salaried doctor whose income these days may be less than that of a qualified worker - who "repairs" the workers' labor power (even if they also look after policemen, priests and union officials, or even ministers) undoubtedly belong to the working class in just the same way as the cook in the factory canteen. Obviously, the same is not true for the university mandarin, or for the private doctor. We should however be clear that the fact that teachers (whose economic situation is not usually brilliant) inculcate bourgeois values - consciously or unconsciously, willingly or not - does not exclude them from the exploited and revolutionary class, any more than workers in the armaments industry are excluded from it[5]. It is moreover the case that throughout the history of the workers' movement, there have been many teachers among the revolutionary militants. Similarly, the workers at the Kronstadt arsenal were among the vanguard of the Russian revolution in 1917.
We also need to make it clear that the vast majority of office workers and state employees also belong to the working class. If we take the case of a state enterprise such as the Post Office, nobody is going to claim that the mechanics, who maintain the Post Office trucks, or the sorting-office workers, do not belong to the proletariat. Nor, from this point of departure, is it difficult to understand that their comrades who deliver letters, or who work behind the Post Office counter are in the same situation. This is why office workers in banks, insurance companies, social security or income tax offices are also part of the working class. Nor can we even argue that their working conditions are any better than those of industrial workers. It is no less tiring to spend the day behind a desk or in front of a computer screen than operating a lathe, though it may be cleaner. And one of the objective factors behind the proletariat's ability to struggle as a class, and to overthrow capitalism - the associated, collective nature of its work - is not called into question by modern conditions of production, quite the reverse.
In the same way, the increasing technological level of production involves a growing number of what sociological statistics call "managers" (technicians, or even engineers), most of whose social status, and even income, is close to that of a qualified worker. This certainly does not imply any "disappearance" of the working class or its replacement by the "middle classes", but on the contrary the proletarianization of the latter[6] This is why the talk about the "disappearance of the proletariat" which is supposedly the result of the increase in the number of white-collar workers and technicians relative to manual workers has no other foundation than to try to demoralize and mystify both. Whether its authors believe what they say or not is irrelevant: they may serve the bourgeoisie efficiently while still being too stupid even to ask themselves who made the pen (or the word-processor) that they use to write their idiocies.
The so-called "crisis" of the working class
The bourgeoisie does not put all its eggs in one basket to demoralize the workers. So for those who are not taken in by the campaigns about the "disappearance of the working class", they reserve the idea that the latter is "in crisis". One of the supposedly decisive arguments in favor of this idea is the decline in union membership and influence during the last few decades. We will not, in this article, repeat our analysis of the bourgeois nature of trade unionism in all its forms. In fact, it is the working class' daily experience of the systematic sabotage of its struggle by the organizations which claim to "defend" it which is demonstrating this analysis, day after day[7]. And it is precisely this experience which is primarily responsible for the workers' rejection of the unions. In this sense, their rejection of the unions is not the sign of a "crisis" in their ranks, but on the contrary and above all a sign of a development in class consciousness. One illustration among many of this fact is the different attitude of workers in two great movements in France, thirty years apart. After the strikes of May-June 1936, right in the midst of the counter-revolution that followed the revolutionary wave after World War I, the unions enjoyed an unprecedented increase in membership. By contrast, after the general strike of May 1968, which marked the historic recovery of the class struggle and the end of the period of counter-revolution, union membership declined as workers tore up their union cards in disgust.
The argument that declining union membership proves the difficulties of the ruling class is a sure sign that anyone using it belongs to the ruling class. The same is true for the supposedly "socialist" nature of the stalinist regimes. History has shown, especially during World War II, the damage done to working-class consciousness by this lie peddled by every fraction of the bourgeoisie, whether right, left, or extreme left (stalinists and trotskyists). During the last few years, the lie of the "working class nature of the trades unions" has been used in much the same way: first, to enroll the workers behind the capitalist state; then, to confuse and demoralize them. However, the two lies have a different impact: because their collapse was not the result of the workers' struggle, the stalinist regimes' demise could be used effectively against the proletariat; by contrast, the discredit of the trades unions is essentially the result of this same workers' struggle, which considerably limits its impact as a factor of demoralization. This is why the bourgeoisie has encouraged the rise of "rank and file" unionism, to take the pressure off traditional unionism. And this is also why it is promoting more "radical" looking ideologues to put over the same message.
So we have seen the flourishing, and the promotion by the press[8], of analyses like those of Mr Alain Bihr, a doctor in sociology and the author, amongst other things, of a book titled: From the "great night"[9] to the "alternatives": the crisis of the European workers' movement. This gentleman's theses are not of much interest in themselves. However, the fact that he has recently been frequenting the milieux which claim to spring from the heritage of the communist left, some of which are ready to use his "analyses" themselves ("critically" of course) leads us to highlight the danger that they represent[10].
Mr Bihr presents himself as a "real" defender of working-class interests. This is why he does not claim that the working class is disappearing. On the contrary, he begins by asserting that: "... the frontiers of the proletariat extend today well beyond the traditional "world of the working class"". However, he only does so the better to put forward his central message: "During fifteen years of crisis, in France as in most other Western countries, we have seen a growing fragmentation of the proletariat which has called its unity into question and so has tended to paralyze it as a social force"[11].
Our author's main purpose is to demonstrate that the proletariat "is in crisis", and that it is the capitalist crisis itself which is responsible for this state of affairs, to which of course we have to add the sociological changes which affect the composition of the working class: "In fact, the current transformations of the wage relationship, with their overall effects of fragmentation and "reduction in mass" of the proletariat (...) tend to dissolve the two proletarian figures which made up the big battalions during the Fordist era: on the one hand, the skilled worker, whose condition is being profoundly modified by today's transformations which tend to replace the old skills with new categories of "professionals" linked to the new processes of automated labor; and on the other hand, the unskilled laborer, who was the spearhead of the proletarian offensive during the 60's and 70's, and is progressively being eliminated and replaced by part-time or fixed contract workers within the same automated production process"[12]. Apart from the pedantic language (which so delights the petty bourgeois who think themselves "marxist"), Bihr is just rehashing the same rubbish that generations of sociologists have already inflicted on us: automation is responsible for weakening the proletariat (since he thinks of himself as a "marxist" he doesn't talk about its "disappearance"), etc. He also follows them in maintaining that the decline in union membership is another sign of the "crisis of the working class" since: "All the studies that have been done on the development of unemployment and part-time working show that these tend to reactivate and reinforce the old divisions and inequalities within the proletariat (...). This dispersal into categories of such different status has had disastrous effects on the conditions of struggle. One sign of this is the failure of the various attempts, especially by the trades union movement, to organise part-time workers and the unemployed..."[13]. And so, behind all the radical talk and so-called "marxism", Bihr offers us the same old tripe served up by every sector of the ruling class: the trades unions are still "organizations of the workers' movement" (ibid).
This is the kind of "specialist" that inspires people like GS, and publications like Internationalist Perspective, which welcomes his writings with such sympathy. True, Bihr is no fool, and to smuggle his goods in he claims that the proletariat will be able, in spite of everything, to overcome its present difficulties by "recomposing" itself. But the way he says it tends to convince us of the reverse: "The transformations of the wage relationship have set a double challenge for the workers' movement: they force it simultaneously to adapt to a new social basis (a new "technical" and "political" composition of the class), and to make a synthesis between such apparently different categories as the "new professionals" and part-time workers, a synthesis which is much more difficult than that between the skilled and unskilled workers of the Fordist period"[14]. "The practical weakening of the proletariat and of the feeling of belonging to the working class can thus open the way to the recomposition of an imaginary collective identity on other bases"[15].
And so, after tons of - mostly specious - arguments designed to convince the reader that the working class is in serious trouble, and after having "demonstrated" that the cause of this "crisis" lies in the collapse of the capitalist economy and the rise of unemployment - neither of which will get anything but worse - the argument ends up simply asserting, without the slightest proof, that: "Things will get better... perhaps! But the challenge is a very difficult one". If you swallow Bihr's nonsense, and still believe that the proletariat and the class struggle have a future before them, you can only be a hopeless optimist. Well played Dr Bihr! Your rather obvious traps have caught the ignoramuses who publish IP and who present themselves as the true defenders of communist principles, which the ICC is supposed to have thrown to the winds.
It is true that the working class has encountered a number of difficulties in recent years, in the development of its struggles and its consciousness. For ourselves, and contrary to the reproaches directed at us by the professional sceptics (whether they be the EFICC - which is normal given their role as sowers of confusion - or Battaglia Comunista - which is less so, since this is an organization of the proletarian political milieu), we have never hesitated to point out these difficulties. But at the same time - and this is the least that one might expect of revolutionaries - we have analyzed the origins of these difficulties, and highlighted the conditions for overcoming them. And if we examine at all seriously the evolution of workers' struggles during the last decade, it is blindingly obvious that their present weakness has nothing to do with the falling numbers of "traditional" "blue-collar" workers. In most countries, for example, some of the most combative workers are to be found in the Post Office and the telecommunications industry. The same is true of health workers. In Italy in 1987, the biggest struggles were led by the school workers. And we could go on multiplying examples to show that neither the proletariat nor class combativity are limited to the "traditional" industrial workers. This is why our analyses are not obsessed with the kind of sociological criteria good only for academics or petty-bourgeois looking for an explanation not of the working class' problems, but of their own.
The real difficulties of the working class and how to overcome them
We do not have the space in this article to repeat all our analyses of the international situation during the last few years. The reader can find them in virtually every issue of the Review, and especially in the theses and resolutions adopted by our organization since 1989[16]. The proletariat's present difficulties, the reflux in its combativity and consciousness, on which basis some diagnose a "crisis" of the working class, have not gone unnoticed by the ICC. We have pointed out in particular that throughout the 1980's, the class has been confronted by the growing weight of capitalist society's generalized decomposition; by encouraging despair, atomization, the "look after number one" spirit, this has seriously damaged the general perspective of proletarian struggle and class solidarity, which - for example - has made it easier for the unions to shut the workers' struggles up in a corporatist framework. However - and this is an important sign of the class combat's vitality - the permanent weight of decomposition had not succeeded by 1989 in putting an end to the wave of struggles which had begun in 1983 with the strikes in the Belgian state sector. Quite the reverse: throughout this period we saw an increasing tendency for workers to go beyond the union framework, which obliged the unions to push a more radical rank-and-file unionism into the limelight, if they were to continue their work of sabotaging the struggle[17].
However, this wave of proletarian struggles was to be engulfed by the planetary upheaval which followed the second half of 1989. There were some - usually the same as those who had noticed nothing during the workers' struggles of the mid-80's - who thought that the collapse of the East European stalinist regimes in 1989 (the biggest expression to date of capitalist decomposition) would be favorable to the development of working class consciousness: we did not hesitate to assert that the opposite would be the case[18]. During 1990-91, with the Gulf crisis and War, then the Moscow putsch, we pointed out that these events would also affect the class struggle and the proletariat's ability to confront the increasing attacks of capital.
This is why the difficulties that the class has experienced these last few years have neither escaped our organization, nor surprised it. However, while we have analyzed their real causes (which have nothing to do with a mythical need for the working class to "recompose itself") we have also highlighted the reasons why the class has today the means to overcome its difficulties.
Here it is important to go back over one of Dr Bihr's arguments that there is a crisis in the working class: the economic crisis and unemployment have "fragmented the proletariat" by "reinforcing the old divisions and inequalities" within it. To show what he means, Bihr offers us a shopping list of all these "fragments": "workers with stable and guaranteed jobs", "those excluded from labor, or even from the labor market", "the floating mass of precarious workers". And he even takes delight in listing sub-categories of the latter: "workers for sub-contracting companies", "part-time workers", "temporary workers", "workers on training schemes", "workers in the black economy"[19]. In fact, what Dr Bihr presents as an argument is nothing other than a snapshot, which fits perfectly with his reformist vision[20]. It is true that at first the bourgeoisie's attacks on the working class were carried out selectively, in order to limit the extent of the latter's response. It is also true that unemployment, especially of young workers, has been used to blackmail some sectors of the proletariat, and so has reinforced their passivity by accentuating the influence of the general atmosphere of social decomposition and "every man for himself". However, the crisis itself, and its inexorable aggravation, will increasingly equalize, downwards, the living conditions of the working class' different sectors. In particular, the "high-tech" sectors (computers, telecommunications, etc) which had seemed to escape the effects of the crisis, are being hit head-on, throwing their workforce into the same situation as that faced by workers in the car or steel industries. Today, the biggest companies (such as IBM) are laying off en masse. At the same time, and contrary to the tendency of the previous decade, unemployment is rising faster among mature workers with existing work experience than amongst the young, which will tend to limit the atomization that unemployment created in the past.
Thus, even if decomposition is a handicap for the development of the class' struggle and consciousness, the increasingly obvious and brutal bankruptcy of the capitalist economy, with the string of attacks that this implies on working-class living conditions, is the determining element in the present situation for the recovery of the struggle, and the march of class consciousness. Obviously this is incomprehensible if one thinks, as reformist ideology (which cannot envisage the slightest revolutionary perspective) would have it, that the capitalist crisis provokes a "crisis in the working class". But once again, events themselves have taken care of the inane ramblings of the sociologists and demonstrated the validity of marxism: the Italian proletariat's formidable struggle in autumn 1992, against economic attacks of unprecedented violence, has once again shown that the proletariat has neither died nor disappeared, and that it has not given up the struggle, even if as one might expect it has not yet completely recovered from the blows it has suffered in the last few years. Nor will these struggles remain merely isolated events. Just like the workers' struggles of May 1968, they herald a general renewal of workers' combativity, a renewal of the proletariat's forward march towards the consciousness of the conditions and aims of its historic struggle for the abolition of capitalism. Whether those who lament, sincerely or otherwise, over the "crisis of the working class" and its "necessary recomposition" like it or not.
FM
[1] The car is indispensable for getting to work, or for shopping, when public transport is inadequate or distances are too great. A refrigerator becomes vital when the only means to buy cheap food is to go to the supermarket, which can't be done every day. As for the television, which has been presented as the symbol of access to the "consumer society", quite apart from the fact that it provides the bourgeoisie with a formidable means of propaganda and stultification (it has proved an excellent replacement for religion as "opium of the people"), it can be found today in many "Third World" slum dwellings, which speaks volumes as to its devaluation.
[2] Marx described the rate of surplus-value, or the rate of exploitation, as the ratio S/V, where S is the surplus value or labor-value (the number of hours in the working day that the capitalist appropriates for himself) and V the variable capital, ie the wage (the number of hours in which the worker produces an equivalent to the value that he receives). This ratio allows us to determine the real intensity of exploitation in objective economic terms, not in subjective ones.
[3] Obviously, this assertion contradicts the lies of all the so-called "defenders of the working class" like the social-democrats or the stalinists, who have a long experience both in repressing and mystifying the workers, and in government. When a worker "leaves the ranks" to become a full-time union official, a councilor, a town mayor, a member of parliament or even a minister, he loses all links with his class.
[4] Of course, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to determine this level, which varies over time and from one country to another. What is important is that in each country (or group of countries which are similar from the standpoint of their economic development and the productivity of labor), there is a threshold which separates a qualified worker's wages from a manager's salary.
[5] For a fuller analysis of productive and non-productive labor, see our pamphlet on The decadence of capitalism.
[6] Although we should note at the same time that some managers see their income rise to the point where they are integrated into the ruling class.
[7] For a more developed analysis of the nature of the trades unions, see our pamphlet Unions against the working class.
[8] For example, Le Monde Diplomatique, a French humanist monthly which specializes in the promotion of a capitalism "with a human face", often publishes articles by one Alain Bihr. In the March 91 edition, we find a text from this author entitled "Retreat of social rights, weakening of the trades unions, the proletariat is breaking up".
[9] In the French anarchist tradition, "le grand soir" designated the long-awaited general uprising which would overthrow the whole capitalist system.
[10] In no.22 of Internationalist Perspective, organ of the so-called "External Fraction of the ICC" we can read a contribution from GS (who is not a member of the EFICC, but who seems to have its agreement on all the essential points), entitled "The necessary recomposition of the proletariat", which quotes Bihr's book at length to support his assertions.
[11] Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1991.
[12] From the "great night"....
[13] Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1991.
[14] From the "great night"....
[15] Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1991.
[16] See the International Review nos. 60, 63, 67, 70 and this issue.
[17] Of course, if we follow Dr Bihr in considering the unions as working-class rather than bourgeois organizations, then the progress of the class struggle is converted into a retreat. But it is strange that people like the members of the EFICC, who officially recognize the bourgeois nature of the unions, follow him down this path.
[18] See the article on the difficulties confronting the proletariat in International Review no. 60.
[19] Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1991.
[20] One of Alain Bihr's favorite sayings is that "reformism is too serious to be left to the reformists". Just in case he takes himself for a revolutionary, let us undeceive him here and now.
The proletariat’s response to the first world war is fairly well known. However the episodes of class struggle which took place during the second world war in Italy in particular are not so clearly recognised. When bourgeois historians and propagandists make reference to them it is to try and demonstrate that the strikes of ’43 in Italy were the beginning of the “anti-fascist” resistance. As this year is the fiftieth anniversary of these events the unions in Italy have taken the opportunity to breath new life into this mystification with their nationalist and patriotic “commemorations”.
This article is dedicated to refuting this lie and to reaffirming the capacity of the class to respond to imperialist war on its own terrain.
As early as the second half of 1942 when the outcome of the war was as yet undecided and fascism seemed to be firmly in power there were sporadic strikes against rationing and for wage increases in the large factories in the north of Italy. These were just the initial warnings of the discontent within the ranks of the proletariat produced by the war and all the sacrifices demanded in its name.
On 5th March 1943 the strike at Mirafiori in Turin began. Within a few days it had spread to other factories and involved tens of thousands of workers. The demands were very clear and straightforward: increased food rations, salary increases and... an end to the war. In the next few months the unrest spread to the large factories in Milan, to the whole of Lombardy, to Liguria and other parts of Italy.
The response of the fascist government was that of stick and carrot: they arrested the workers most in prominence but they also made concessions on the more immediate demands. Mussolini suspected that the anti-fascist forces were behind the strikes, nevertheless he could not allow himself the luxury of allowing the workers’ protest to grow. In fact his suspicions were unfounded. The strikes were completely spontaneous, they came from the workers themselves and out of their discontent with the sacrifices demanded for the war to the extent that “fascist” workers also participated in the strikes.
“What was typical of this action was its class nature which at an historical level gave the strikes of 1943-44 their own typical, unitary character even when compared to the general movement that was conducted together with the national liberation committees” [1] [216].
“Availing myself only of my prestige as an old union organiser I confronted thousands of workers who resumed work immediately in spite of the fact that the fascists proved to be completely passive in the work-places and unfortunately in some cases actually fomented the strikes. This is something that impressed itself upon me enormously” (statement of under-secretary Tullio Cianetti, quoted in Turone’s book page 17).
It was not only the fascist hierarchy who were impressed by the action of the workers, it was the whole of the Italian bourgeoisie. They saw in the March strikes the rebirth of the proletarian spectre, a far more dangerous enemy than their adversaries within their own battle camp. These strikes made the bourgeoisie aware that the fascist regime was no longer adequate to contain the workers’ discontent and they made ready to replace it and reorganize their “democratic” forces.
On 25th July the King dismissed Mussolini, had him arrested and gave Marshal Badoglio the task of forming a new government. One of the first concerns of this government was to rebuild “democratic” unions in order to create new vehicles to channel the workers’ demands because in the meantime they had created their own organs to lead the movement and were therefore out of all control. The Minister for the Corporations (they were still called that!) Leopoldo Piccardi let the old socialist union leader Bruno Buozzi out of prison and offered him the post of commissioner of the union organisations. Buozzi asked for and got the Communist Roveda and the Christian-Democrat Quadrello as deputy commissioners. The bourgeoisie’s choice was well considered; Buozzi was well-known for his participation in the 1922 strikes (the occupation of the factories) in which he demonstrated his bourgeois loyalties by making every effort to counter the potential growth of the movement.
But the workers did not know what to make of bourgeois democracy and its promises. They distrusted the fascist regime above all because they were no longer able to bear the sacrifices demanded of them for the war. The Badoglio government asked them to go on bearing them.
In the middle of August ’43 the workers of Turin and Milan went on strike demanding once more an end to the war and even more forcefully than before. The local authorities again responded with repression but what proved to be more effective was the trip north made by Piccardi, Buozzi and Roveda to meet the workers’ representatives and convince them to go back to work. Even before they had rebuilt their organisations the unionists of the “democratic” regime began their anti-working class dirty work!
Caught between repression, concessions and promises the workers returned to work and waited on events. These changed rapidly. By July the allied forces had landed in Sicily, on 8th September Badoglio signed an armistice with them, fled south with the King and called on the population to continue the war against Nazi fascism. After a few demonstrations of enthusiasm a disorderly demobilization ensued. A lot of soldiers threw away their uniforms and went home or into hiding.
The workers were unable to rise up on their own class terrain but they were not talked into taking up arms against the Germans and returned to work, prepared to put forward their immediate demands against the new bosses in north Italy. In fact Italy was split into two: in the south there were the allied forces and a show of legal government, the north on the other hand was again under the command of the fascists, more precisely the German troops.
Even without the participation of the people the war in fact continued. The allied bombings of north Italy were intensified and with them the living conditions of the workers worsened. So in November-December the workers took up the struggle again. This time they met with even harsher repression; besides the threat of arrest there was the even more serious danger of deportation to Germany. The workers put forward their demands courageously. In November the workers of Turin went on strike, a large part of their demands were accepted. At the beginning of December the workers of Milan went on strike, they too received a combination of promises and threats from the German authorities. The following episode is significant. “At 11.30 general Zimmerman arrived and made the following threat: those who did not resume work were to leave the building; those who did so would be declared enemies of Germany. All the workers left the building” (from a clandestine paper of the Italian PC, quoted by Turone page 47). In Genoa on 16th December the workers went onto the streets but this time the German authorities used force: there were confrontations that resulted in deaths and injuries. Equally harsh confrontations continued throughout Liguria for the rest of December.
This was the turning-point; the movement had been weakened in this way and also because Italy was divided in two. The Germans were in trouble on the front and could not allow production to be interrupted any longer. They confronted the proletarian danger resolutely (also because the same danger was beginning to emerge within Germany itself in the form of strikes). Finally the character of the movement began to be distorted; it lost its spontaneous, class nature. This was also thanks to the efforts of the “anti-fascist” forces that tried to turn the workers’ protest into a struggle for “liberation”, a task that was made easier by the fact that many of the most advanced workers who fled to the mountains to escape the repression were there recruited by partisan bands. In fact strikes were still taking place in the Spring of ’44 and ’45 but by this time the working class had lost the initiative.
The propaganda of the bourgeoisie tries to present the whole strike movement from ’43 to ’45 as an anti-fascist struggle. The few elements that we have put forward show that this was not the case. The workers were struggling against the war and the sacrifices demanded from them in its name. In order to do so they fought against the fascists when they were officially in power (in March), against the government when it was no longer fascist - that of Badoglio (in August), against the Nazis when they were the real bosses in the north of Italy (in December).
What however is true is that right from the start the forces of “democracy” and the bourgeois left with the CP at its head tried to rob the workers’ struggle of its class character in order to divert it onto the bourgeois terrain of the patriotic, anti-fascist struggle. To this end they focused all their efforts. The spontaneous character of the movement caught them by surprise so the “anti-fascist” forces were obliged to run after it trying to mix their “anti-fascist” slogans into those of the strikers while the strikes were actually taking place. Their local militants were often unable to do so and were criticised by their party leaders because of it. The leaders of these parties were so caught up in their bourgeois logic that they were either unable or had difficulty understanding that for the workers the battle is always against capital regardless of what form it takes: “let’s recall what trouble we had in the early days of the liberation struggle getting workers and peasants to understand the situation when they had no communist background (sic!), when they understood that it was necessary to fight against the Germans as well but said ‘it doesn’t make a lot of difference to us whether the Italians or the Germans are our bosses’” (E. Sereni, head of the Italian CP at the time in “The government of the CL” quoted by Romolo Gobbi: Workers and the Resistance, page 34) [2] [217]. No, Signor Sereni, the workers understood quite clearly that their enemy was capitalism, that it was this they had to fight against in whatever form it took. Likewise you, as bourgeois as the fascists you were fighting, understood that this was the real danger that threatened!
We are certainly not among those who deny the necessity of a political struggle in the process of the proletariat’s self-emancipation. The problem is what politics, on what terrain, within what perspective. The “anti-fascist” struggle belongs wholly to the politics of patriotism and bourgeois nationalism. It in no way puts into question the power of capital. On the other hand the smallest demand for “bread and peace” if pursued to its conclusion (and this was what the Italian workers were unable to do) contains in embryo the perspective of the struggle against the capitalist system which is unable to give this peace or this bread.
In 1943 the working class again showed its anti-capitalist nature...
“Bread and peace” a simple and immediate slogan that made the bourgeoisie tremble and put its imperialist plans at risk. Bread and peace was the slogan that animated the Russian proletariat in 1917 and was the departure point for the revolutionary path which resulted in its taking power in October. In fact it is well-known that in the strikes of 1943 there were also groups of workers who called for the formation of soviets. It is also acknowledged, sometimes even in the historical reconstructions of the “anti-fascist” parties, that a significant proportion of workers saw participation in the resistance as anti-capitalist rather than patriotic.
Moreover the bourgeoisie’s fear was justified by the fact that there were also strike movements in Germany in the same year (1943) and later in Greece, Belgium, France and Britain [3] [218].
With these movements the working class returned to the social scene and threatened the power of the bourgeoisie. It had already done so - victoriously - in 1917 when the Russian revolution forced the combatants of the first world war to end the war prematurely in order to present a united front against the proletarian danger which was spreading from Russia to the whole of Europe.
As we have seen, the strikes in Italy accelerated both the fall of fascism and Italy’s withdrawal from the war. This action of the working class during the second world war reaffirmed the fact that it is the only social force able to oppose war. Unlike petit-bourgeois pacifism which holds demonstrations to “ask” capitalism to be less bellicose, when the working class acts on its own class terrain it puts in doubt the very power of capitalism and therefore its capacity to pursue its warlike ventures. In potential the strikes of ’43 contained the same threat as 1917: the perspective of the proletariat’s revolutionary development.
Revolutionary fractions of the time seized on this possibility (which they overestimated) and did all they could to encourage its development. The Italian fraction of the communist left (which published the review Bilan before the war) overcame the difficulties it had experienced at the beginning of the war and together with the newly formed French nucleus of the communist left it held a conference in August 1943 at Marseilles. The basis for the conference was the analysis that the events in Italy had opened up a pre-revolutionary phase, a corollary of this was that it was the moment to “transform the fraction into the party” and to return to Italy to oppose the attempts of the false workers’ parties to “gag the revolutionary consciousness” of the proletariat. In this way they began working around the defence of revolutionary defeatism and in June 1944 this led the Fraction to distribute a leaflet to the workers of Europe enroled in the various armies at war calling on them to fraternize and struggle against capitalism whether democratic or fascist.
The comrades who had stayed behind in Italy also reorganized themselves and on the basis of an analysis similar to that of Bilan founded the Internationalist Communist Party. This organisation also began a revolutionary defeatist activity; it opposed the patriotism of the partisan groupings and made propaganda for the proletarian revolution [4] [219].
Fifty years on it is impossible to remember the work and enthusiasm of these comrades (some of whom lost their lives in the process) without a sense of pride. Nevertheless we have to recognise that the analysis they defended was wrong.
...but war is not the best situation for the development of the revolutionary process
The struggles that we have mentioned, particularly those in Italy in 1943, are undeniably the proof of the proletariat’s return to its own class terrain and the beginnings of what was potentially a revolutionary process. However the result was not the same as in the movement against the war that took place in 1917. The movement in Italy in 1943 did not succeed in putting an end to the war as did the one in Russia followed by Germany at the beginning of the century. Nor did it manage to develop to a revolutionary outcome (which was the only thing that could also have put an end to the war).
The reasons for this defeat are many; some of them are general, others are specific to the situation in which events unfolded.
In the first place although it is true that war pushes the working class to respond in a revolutionary way this is more particularly the case in the defeated countries. The working class of the victorious countries usually remain more firmly under the control of the dominant class’ ideology; this works against international extension which is indispensable to the survival of proletarian power. Moreover if the struggle manages to force the bourgeoisie to make peace it robs itself at the same time of the exceptional conditions which gave rise to the struggle. In Germany for example the revolutionary movement which led to the armistice of 1918 suffered greatly in the period after it was signed because of the pressure exerted by a significant number of soldiers who returned from the front with only one desire: to return to their families and take advantage of the peace that had been so ardently desired and won at so high a price. In fact the German bourgeoisie had learnt the lesson of the Russian revolution. In the latter instance the continuation of the war by the provisional government which succeeded the Czarist regime after February ’17 was effective in nourishing the revolutionary insurrection in which the soldiers played a prominent part. For this reason the German government signed an armistice with the Entente powers on 11th November, two days after mutinies among the war fleet in Kiel had begun to take place.
Secondly these lessons from the past were put to good use by the bourgeoisie in the period preceding the second world war. The dominant class only went to war once it was sure that the working class had been completely subdued. The defeat of the revolutionary movement in the 20s had plunged the proletariat into deep confusion; mystifications about “socialism in one country” and the “defence of the socialist fatherland” were then heaped onto demoralization. This confusion enabled the bourgeoisie to engineer a dress rehearsal of the world war in the form of the war in Spain where the exceptional combativity of the Spanish workers was derailed onto the terrain of the anti-fascist struggle. In the meantime Stalinism also succeeded in dragging significant battalions of the rest of the European proletariat onto the bourgeois terrain.
Finally during the war itself, when the working class began to act on its own class terrain in spite of all the difficulties it had encountered, the bourgeoisie immediately took counter-measures.
In Italy where the danger was greatest the bourgeoisie as we have seen lost no time changing its regime and after that its alliance. In autumn ’43 Italy was divided in two; the south was in the hands of the allies, the rest was occupied by the Nazis. On the advice of Churchill (“Italy must be left to stew in its own juice”) the allies delayed their advance towards the north and so achieved two things: on the one hand they left the job of repressing the proletarian movement to the German army; on the other they gave the “anti-fascist” forces the task of diverting the movement from the terrain of the anti-capitalist struggle to that of the anti-fascist struggle. This operation succeeded in almost a year and from then on the activity of the proletariat was no longer autonomous although it continued to make economic demands. Moreover in the eyes of the proletariat the war was continuing because of the Nazi occupation; this was a substantial part of the propaganda of the anti-fascist forces. The idea that the partisan war was a popular struggle is largely a myth. This was a real war, organized for real by the allied and anti-fascist forces and the population was enroled in it by force (or by ideological pressure) as it is in any war. However it is also true that leaving the Nazis the job of repressing the proletarian movement and making them responsible for the continuation of the war encouraged a growing hatred of them and the consequent reinforcement of the propaganda of the partisan forces.
In Germany, armed with its experience of what can happen in the period immediately after a war, the international bourgeoisie acted systematically to avoid a repetition of events similar to those of 1918-19. In the first place shortly before the end of the war the allies carried out the mass extermination of the population of the workers’ quarters by means of the unprecedented bombardment of large cities such as Hamburg or Dresden. On 13th February 1945, 135,000 people (twice as many as at Hiroshima) perished in the bombing. As military objectives there were worthless (moreover the German army was already thoroughly routed): in reality their aim was to terrorize the working class and prevent it from organizing itself in any way. Secondly the allies rejected outright the possibility of an armistice on the grounds that they had not occupied the whole of German territory. They were anxious to administer this territory directly as they were aware of the danger that the defeated German bourgeoisie would be unable to control the situation on its own. Lastly once the latter had capitulated and in close collaboration with them the allies hung onto their war prisoners for many months in order to avoid the explosive mix that might have resulted if they had encountered the civilian population.
In Poland during the second half of 1944 the Red Army too left it to the Nazi forces to carry out the dirty work of massacring the insurgent workers in Warsaw: for months the Red Army waited a few kilometres away from the city while the German troops crushed the revolt. The same thing happened in Budapest at the beginning of 1945.
So having been warned by the experience of 1917 and on the alert after the initial strikes of the workers, the bourgeoisie throughout Europe did not wait for the movement to grow and strengthen. By means of systematic extermination and the work of the Stalinist and anti-fascist forces to derail the struggles they managed to block the proletarian threat and prevent it from growing.
The proletariat did not succeed in putting an end to the second world war or developing a revolutionary movement. But as is true for all proletarian battles the defeats can be transformed into weapons for future struggles if the working class draws the lessons correctly. And it is the role of revolutionaries to be the first to draw out these lessons and identify them clearly. Such a work means particularly that using a profound assimilation of the experience of the workers’ movement they must not remain imprisoned in past schemas as is still the case today for most of the groups of the proletarian milieu such as the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (Battaglia Comunista) and the various chapels of the Bordigist movement.
Very briefly these are the main lessons that it is important to draw from the experience of the proletariat over the last half century.
Contrary to what revolutionaries of the past thought, generalized war does not create the best conditions for the proletarian revolution. This is all the more true today when the existing means of destruction make a potential global conflict so devastating that it would make any proletarian reaction impossible as it would result in the destruction of humanity. The lesson that the working class must draw from its past experience is that to fight against war today it must act before there is a world war, afterwards it will be too late.
The conditions for the outbreak of another world war do not yet exist. On the one hand the working class is not mobilized in such a way as to allow the bourgeoisie to unleash a world war, the only outcome it can conceive to its economic crisis. Secondly although the collapse of the eastern bloc has set in motion a tendency towards the formation of two new imperialist blocs we are still a very long way from the actual constitution of such blocs and without them there can be no world war.
This does not mean that there is no tendency to war or that no real wars are taking place. From the Gulf war in ’91 to the one in Yugoslavia today and bearing in mind all the conflicts throughout the globe there is enough to show that the collapse of the eastern bloc has not opened a period of the “new world order” but rather a period of growing instability that could only lead to a new world war (unless society is submerged and destroyed beforehand by its own decomposition) if the proletariat does not take the lead with a revolutionary movement. The consciousness of this tendency towards war is an important factor that reinforces this revolutionary potential.
Today the most powerful factor that contributes to the growing consciousness of capitalism’s bankruptcy is the economic crisis, a catastrophic crisis which is insoluble within a capitalist framework. These two factors create the best conditions for the revolutionary development of the working class struggle. But this development is only possible if revolutionaries themselves are able to leave behind the old ideas that belong to the past and adapt their intervention to the new historic conditions.
Helios.
[1] [220] Sergio Turone, History of the Unions in Italy published by Laterza.
[2] [221] Romolo Gobbi, Workers and the Resistance. Although flawed by the councilist-apolitical approach of its author this book demonstrates well the anti-capitalist and spontaneous character of the movement in ’43. It also demonstrates well the nationalist and patriotic nature of the Italian PC in this movement by using abundant quotations from the archives of the PC.
[3] [222] For more details of this period see: Danilo Montaldi, "Essay on communist politics in Italy", Quaderni Piacentini edition.
[4] [223] For an account of the activity of the Communist Left during the war see our book, "The Italian Communist Left 1927-52", available from our address.
In the autumn of 1992, the class struggle reawaken with mass workers' demonstrations in Italy[1]. In the autumn of 1993, the workers' demonstrations in Germany have confirmed the recovery in the class struggle against the attacks raining down on the proletariat in the most industrialised countries.
In the Ruhr, in the industrialised heart of Germany, 80,000 workers have taken to the streets and blocked the main roads, to protest against the planned redundancies in the mines. On the 21st and 22nd September, without waiting for union instructions (which is significant in a country with a reputation for social "discipline"), miners in the Dortmund region downed tools, and demonstrated along with their families, the unemployed, and workers from other branches of industry who were called to show solidarity.
Whatever the result of these demonstrations, which are still going on as we go to press[2], one aspect of this movement gives a good example of how the working class can engage in struggle: the answer to massive attacks on working conditions is a massive and united counter-attack.
The recovery of the class struggle
Today more than ever, the working class is the only force capable of intervening against economic disaster. It is the only social class able to break down the capitalist order's national and sectional barriers. The division of the proletariat, reinforced by today's general social rot, maintains these barriers, and leaves the way open to the "social" measures being applied the world over. The interest of the working class, subjected everywhere to the same exploitation, the same attacks by the capitalist state, whether government, bosses, parties or unions, lies in the greatest possible unity of the greatest number, in both action and thought, to discover the methods of organisation and the direction for the combat against capitalism.
Last year, the workers in Germany were led by the nose for months, in a series of sterile trade union manoeuvres. The fact that today the workers are reacting by themselves is a sign of the international proletariat's reawakening combativity. This is the most significant event for the moment, but it is not an isolated one. There have been other demonstrations in Germany, including 70,000 workers against the redundancy plans at Mercedes-Benz and tens of thousands of workers in Duisburg against the 10,000 lay-offs announced in the engineering industry. The number of strikes is increasing in several countries: they are still channelled by the unions and their allies, but they show that this is not a time of passivity. Internationally, we can expect to see a slow and lengthy development of workers' demonstrations, of confrontations between bourgeoisie and proletariat.
In today's conditions, the international recovery of the class struggle will not be easy. There are many factors which tend to hold back the proletariat's consciousness and combativity:
- Social decomposition, corrupting social relationships and undermining the reflex of solidarity, encouraging the growth of despair and "every man for himself', generates a feeling that it is impossible to form a collectivity, to defend common class interests against capitalism.
- The avalanche of mass unemployment, which is running at a rate of 10,000 lay-offs a day in Western Europe alone, and which will go on growing, has at first a paralyzing effect on the workers.
- The systematic and repeated manoeuvres of the trades unions, whether official or "rank-and-file", which imprison the workers in sectionalism and division, have made it possible to control and contain the workers' discontent.
- The bourgeoisie's propaganda, whether based on the classic themes of the left fractions which claim to defend the "workers' interests" , or on the constant ideological campaigns since the fall of the Berlin Wall, on the "death of communism" and the "end of the class struggle", maintain a real confusion within the working class about the possibility of struggle. They reinforce the workers' doubts about the possibility of freeing themselves by the destruction of capitalism.
The proletariat will have to confront these problems in the struggle itself. More and more, capitalism will reveal the general and irreversible bankruptcy of its own system. It is true that the brutal acceleration of the crisis, and its catastrophic effects on the working class, tends at first to have a "knock-out effect". But it is also a favourable terrain for the proletariat to mobilize in defence of its class interests. This, coupled with the active intervention of revolutionaries in the class struggle, to defend the communist perspective, will help the class to find the means to organize and to carry this confrontation in the direction of its own interests, and those of humanity as a whole.
The end of "miracles"
It is a long time since anyone dared talk about an "economic miracle" in the "Third World". It is succumbing to universal poverty. The African continent has been almost entirely left to its fate. In most parts of Asia, a human life is worth less than an animal's. Famines spread year on year, affecting tens of millions of human beings. In Latin America, diseases that were thought to have been eradicated have returned, in epidemic proportions.
In the ex-Eastern bloc countries, the prosperity promised to follow the bloc's collapse has been remarkable for its absence. Stalinism on its death-bed was given a "shot in the arm" of liberal capitalism, but this has only added to the economic bankruptcy of this extreme form of state capitalism, which has hidden for sixty years behind the lie of "socialism" or "communism". Here too, poverty is growing fast, and living conditions are more and more catastrophic for the vast majority of the population.
In the "developed" countries too, the "economic miracles" have had their day. The tidal wave of unemployment and the attacks on every level of workers' living conditions have brought the economic crisis once again to the fore. The propaganda on the "triumph of capitalism" and the "bankruptcy of communism" hammers home the message that "nothing is better than capitalism". The economic crisis shows that under capitalism, on the contrary, the worst is still to come.
Massive attacks against the working class
The crisis lays bare the contradictions at the heart of a capitalism which is not only unable to ensure society's survival, but is destroying its productive forces, the proletariat foremost among them.
The capitalist ruling class bears the responsibility for the barbaric poverty inflicted on billions of human beings, but at least in the more developed countries they could maintain the illusion that the system functioned "normally". In the "democratic" states of the "First World", the ruling classes have tried to give the impression that the system offers a job and decent living and working conditions to every citizen. And although the growth in recent years of a so-called" new" poverty was beginning seriously to tarnish the tableau, its propaganda could still present the phenomenon as the inevitable price of "modernization".
Now that the crisis is more intense than ever, the "democratic" states are forced to drop their mask. Far from offering any perspective, however far off, of peace and prosperity, capitalism is lowering the living conditions of the working class and brewing war[3]. If the workers of the great West European, North American, and Japanese industrial concentrations still have any illusions about the "privileges" that they benefit from, they are in for a nasty shock.
The lie of economic “restructuring”, which was used to justify the previous waves of redundancies in the “traditional” industries and services, is beginning to wear thin. Today, there are plans for job reductions and lay-offs by the hundreds of thousands in industries which have already been “modernised” (automobile and aerospace), in high-tech industries (computing and electronics), or in the “profitable” service industries (banks and insurance), and in a civil service already “slimmed” during the 1980s (postal services, health and education).
Germany | Daimler/Benz | 43,900 |
| BASF/Hoechhst/Bayer | 25,000 |
| Ruhrkohle | 12,000 |
| Veba | 10,000 |
France | Bull | 6,500 |
| Thomson-CSF | 4,174 |
| Peugeot | 4,023 |
| Air France | 4,000 |
| Aerospatiable | 2,250 |
| Snecma | 775 |
Great Britain | British Gas | 20,000 |
| Inland Revenue | 5,000 |
| Rolls Royce | 3,100 |
| Prudential | 2,000 |
| T&N | 1,500 |
Spain | SEAT | 4,000 |
Europe | GM/Opel/Vauxhaul | 7,830 |
| Du Pont | 3,000 |
Some of the lay-offs announced in Europe during three weeks in September 1993. In total, more than 150,000 (Source: Financial Times)
Not one sector has escaped from the "demands" of the world economic crisis. Every capitalist unit has no choice but to cut costs, from the smallest to the largest, right up to the state whose responsibility is to defend the competitivity of the national capital. Even the richest states have been dragged into the crisis, and are witnessing a dizzy rise in unemployment. Not one island of economic health survives throughout the capitalist world. The "German model" is a model no longer, and everywhere social "plans", "pacts", and "shock therapy" are the order of the day. And the "shock" is first and foremost for the workers.
On average, almost one worker in every five is already unemployed in the developed countries. And one unemployed worker in five has been out of ajob for more than a year, with less and less chance of finding work again. Total exclusion from any normal means of subsistence is becoming a mass phenomenon: the "new poor" in the great cities are counted in their millions, the homeless in their tens of thousands.
The mass unemployment developing today is not a reservoir of manpower for a future economic recovery. There will be no recovery which would allow capitalism in the "developed" countries to reintegrate the tens of millions of unemployed into the productive process. The unemployed masses of today are no longer the capitalist "reserve army" that Marx described in the 19th century. They will swell the mass of those who are already completely excluded from normal living conditions in the "Third World" and the ex-Eastern bloc. They are the concrete expression of the tendency to absolute pauperisation created by the definitive bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production.
For those still at work, wage increases are either ridiculously low and eaten away by inflation, or blocked completely. Worse still, cash wage reductions are becoming more and more frequent. Added to the direct attacks on wages, are all the increases in both direct and indirect taxation, and the costs of housing, transport, health and education. Moreover, an increasing proportion of family income goes to the upkeep of children or relatives who are out of work. Benefits of all kinds - pensions, invalidity benefits, the dole - are either being reduced or simply abolished.
The working class must combat all this with vigour. The sacrifices that every state is asking of the workers today in the name of "national solidarity" will only be followed by more sacrifices tomorrow. Under capitalism, there will be no end to the crisis.
The crisis is irreversible
The class struggle is vital
Even those whose job it is to defend the lie of capitalism's economic health are looking down in the mouth. Even when the growth statistics show some tiny positive signs, they no longer dare talk of "economic recovery". At best, they speak of a "pause" in the recession, taking care to point out that "if there is a recovery, it is likely to be very slow and very weak"[4]. This cautious language shows that the ruling class is more at a loss today when faced with the crisis than it has been for twenty-five years.
Nobody dares any longer to talk about "the end of the tunnel". Those who don't see the irreversible nature of the crisis and believe in the immortality of the capitalist mode of production can only repeat like a litany: "there will necessarily be an economic recovery, because there has always been a recovery after the crisis". This sounds like the old fanner's saying "fine weather comes after the rain", and gives a good idea of just how far the capitalist class is incapable of mastering the laws of its own economy.
The most recent example is the disintegration of the European Monetary System throughout 1993, culminating in its collapse this summer[5]. The failure of the Western European states to adopt a common currency has put an abrupt halt to the construction of "European union", which its advocates argued would demonstrate capitalism's ability to cooperate economically, politically, and socially. Behind the summer's turbulence on the money markets, lie the unbreakable laws of capitalist exploitation and competition:
- it is impossible for capitalism to form a harmonious and
prosperous whole, at any level;
- the class which profits from the exploitation of labour power
is bound to be divided by competition.
While within each nation, the bourgeoisie is honing its weapons against the working class, internationally its quarrels and conflicts are proliferating. "Understanding amongst the peoples" which was supposed to have been modelled on the understanding between the great capitalist powers, is giving way to a merciless economic war, where "every man for himself' is the fundamental tendency. The world market has been saturated for years. It has become too narrow to allow the normal functioning of capitalist accumulation, and the expansion of production and consumption necessary for the realisation of profit - which is the motor that drives the whole system.
When a company goes bankrupt, its owners can simply put the key under the mat, sell up, and move on to more lucrative fields. But the capitalist class as a whole cannot declare itself bankrupt and liquidate the capitalist mode of production. This would be to declare its own disappearance, something which no exploiting class is capable of doing. The ruling class cannot just leave the stage on tiptoe when its time is up. It will defend its privileges tooth and nail, and to the hilt.
It is up to the working class to destroy capitalism. Its place within capitalist relations of production makes it the one class capable of putting a spanner in the works of the infernal capitalist machine. The working class has no economic power within society, and so has no particular interest to defend within it. Collectively, it has only its labour power to sell. The working class is the only force which bears within itself a perspective for new social relationships rid of the division into classes, scarcity, poverty, wars and frontiers.
This perspective is the international communist revolution, and it must begin with a mass response to the massive attacks of capitalism. This will be the first step in a historic combat against the systematic destruction of the productive forces, which is going on today all over the planet, and which has just speeded up abruptly in the developed countries.
OF, 23rd September 1993
[1] See International Review no 72, ‘A Turning Point’, ‘A Reawakening of Working Class Combativity’, from the 1st and 2nd Quarters of 1993.
[2] The immediate gains for the workers are likely to be meager, since the unions have quickly taken things in hand, profiting from the workers indecision as to how to continue their first initiative.
[3] See ‘Behind the Peace agreement, the imperialist war goes on’ in this issue.
[4] Liberation, 18th September 1993
[5] See the article on the economy in this issue.
The handshake between Yasser Arafat, President of the PLO, and Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister, was historic ... and thoroughly photogenic. After 45 years of war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, this was an important event, and US President Clinton, who organized the ceremony, intended that it should have a symbolic significance: that the only possible peace is the "Pax Americana". And after all the upsets he has suffered since his arrival in power, Clinton certainly needed a success like this. The party laid on in his own (white) house aimed not just to resuscitate his falling popularity at home, but to deliver a strong message to the whole world: the USA is the only "world cop" capable of guaranteeing the planet's stability. A striking coup like this was all the more necessary in that, ever since Bush's announcement in 1989 of a "new world order" under the aegis of US imperialism, the situation has gone from bad to worse in every domain. The downfall of the "Evil Empire" was supposed to bring with it prosperity, peace, order, the rule of law between peoples and for the individual. Instead, we have had economic convulsions, famine, war, chaos, massacres, torture: in a word, barbarism. Instead of the increased assertion of the authority of the "world's greatest democracy" as guarantor of world peace, we have seen a growing contestation of this same authority by more and more countries, including its closest allies. By publicizing the effusive reconciliation of these two "hereditary" enemies of the Middle East, under the paternal benediction of the US President (who is young enough to be their son, which only gives the image greater impact), Clinton claims to have inaugurated a new "new world order", now that Bush's one has been consigned to the dustbins of history. But neither the grand gestures nor the televised set-piece speeches can change the fact that in decadent capitalism, peace declarations and agreements are nothing but preparations for new wars and greater barbarism.
The Washington agreement of 13th September 1993 has eclipsed another "peace process" begun during the summer: the Geneva negotiations on the future of Bosnia. Nonetheless, these negotiations, with all the diplomatic manoeuvres and military posturing surrounding them, are crucial to the present situation.
Ex- Yugoslavia: a US set-back
As we go to press, there has not been any definitive agreement between the three sides (Muslims, Croats, and Serbs) squabbling over the carcass of the late Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The detailed frontiers of the proposed division of the country, presented to the negotiators on 20th August, are still under discussion. However, if we refuse to be taken in by the propaganda of the various parties to the conflict and the great powers behind them, what is really at stake in these negotiations, and in the continuing fighting, is plain enough.
In the first place, it is obvious that the war in Yugoslavia is not just an internal matter caused solely by inter-ethnic rivalries. The Balkans have for a long time been one of the main battlegrounds for the confrontations of the great imperialist powers. The name of Sarajevo did not acquire its lugubrious renown in 1992: for 80 years, it has been associated with the outbreak of World War I. This time too, as Yugoslavia began to fall apart in 1991, the great powers appeared as principal actors in the tragedy inflicted on the population of the region. Right from the start, Germany's firm support for Croatian and Slovenian independence fanned the flames of the conflict, as indeed did the support given to Serbia by France, Britain, Russia and the USA. Without repeating the analyses which have been expounded at length in this Review, it is important to highlight the antagonism between the interests of the greatest European power, which sees an independent and allied Croatia and Slovenia as a means to open a way to the Mediterranean, and those of the other powers which are utterly opposed to this extension of German imperialism.
When Bosnia itself declared independence, the USA hurried to support it. This difference in attitude compared with Croatia and Slovenia was indicative of the strategy of US imperialism: unable to make a reliable Balkan ally out of Serbia, given this country's ancient and solid links to Russia[1] and France, US imperialism aimed to make Bosnia its bridgehead in the region, over-shadowing a pro-German Croatia. Firm support for Croatia was a theme of Clinton's candidature. Once elected, he started out with the same policy, declaring in February 1993 that "The full weight of American diplomacy must be committed" to this objective. In May, Secretary of State Warren Christopher proposed to the Europeans two measures to halt the Serbian advance in Bosnia: lifting the arms embargo, and air strikes against Serbian positions. The US proposed in fact the same "solution" for the Balkans as they had already used in the Gulf: the big stick, and in particular the use of air power, which has the advantage of displaying the full extent of US superiority. France and Britain, in other words the two countries which had committed most of the ground troops to UNPROFOR, categorically refused. By the end of May, the Washington accords between the US and the European powers, despite Clinton's triumphalist declarations, effectively endorsed the Europeans' position on Bosnia: no counter-attack against the Serb offensive aimed at carving up Bosnia, limiting the UN forces, and eventually also those of NATO, to "humanitarian" missions.
It thus became clear that the world's greatest power was changing tack, and giving up the strategy conducted since 1992, with all the support of media campaigns on the defence of "human rights" and the denunciation of "ethnic cleansing". This was the recognition of a setback, which the United States blamed, not without reason, on the Europeans. Warren Christopher once again admitted the US' impotence on 21st July, when after describing the situation in Sarajevo as "tragic, tragic", he declared: "the United States is doing all it can, taking account of its own national interests".
And yet, ten days later, when the Geneva conference on Bosnia had begun, the Americans started banging the big stick again. Its leaders insisted, even more forcefully than in May, on the need for air strikes against the Serbs: "We think that the time for action has come ( ... ) the only realistic hope to bring about a reasonable political settlement is to put [NATO 's] air power at the service of diplomacy" (Warren Christopher in a letter to Boutros-Ghali, 1st August). "The United States will not stand by while Sarajevo is brought to its knees" (Christopher speaking in Cairo the following day). At the same time (2nd and 9th August), the US called two meetings of the NATO Council, to demand that its "allies" authorize and initiate air strikes. After hours of resistance, led mainly by France (but with British agreement), the principal of air strikes was agreed, but only on the condition (opposed by the Americans) that they be requested by the UN Secretary General. .. who has always opposed them. The new US offensive had run aground.
On the ground, Serbian forces loosened their grip on Sarajevo, and ceded control over the strategic heights overlooking the city, which they had seized from the Muslims a few days before, to UNPROFOR. But while the US attributed the Serb withdrawal to the NATO declaration, the Belgian general commanding UNPROFOR saw it as "an example of what can be done with negotiation", while his second-in-command, the British Brigadier Hayes asked: "What is President Clinton after? (. .. ) the Serbs will never be defeated with air power". This was a real affront to US diplomacy, and a sabotage of its diplomacy. Worst of all, for the US, their most faithful ally, Britain, acquiesced in or even encouraged it.
This being said, and despite their grandiloquent pronouncements, it is highly unlikely that the Americans seriously envisaged using air power against the Serbs during the summer. At all events, the die were cast: the perspective of a united, multi -ethnic Bosnia defended by both the Muslims and US diplomacy - had gone down the drain for good once the greater part of Bosnian territory had fallen into the hands of the Serbian and Croatian militia, with the Muslims only hanging on to a fifth, despite their representing almost half the pre-war population.
In fact, US objectives during the summer were already far removed from its diplomatic aims at the outset of the conflict. Its sole hope was to avoid the supreme humiliation of the fall of Sarajevo, and above all to introduce itself into a situation which had long since escaped from its control. As the last act of the Bosnian tragedy was played out in Geneva, the US had to make an appearance as "guest star", since the starring role had been denied it. And in the end, its contribution to the epilogue consisted of "convincing" its Muslim protégés to accept their capitulation as quickly as possible, in exchange for a few threats against the Serbs, since the longer the war continues in Bosnia, the more it shows up the impotence of the world's greatest power.
The American giant's pitiful efforts faced with the Bosnian war appear in a still cruder light if we compare them with its "management" of the Gulf crisis and war in 1990-91. Then, it kept all its promises to its Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti protégés. This time, it has been able to do nothing for its Bosnian client: its contribution to the conflict's "solution" has been to force the Bosnians to accept the unacceptable. In the context of the Gulf conflict, this would have been the equivalent of making gestures for several months, and then putting pressure on the Kuwaiti authorities to make them give up most of their territory to Saddam Hussein! Perhaps worse still, whereas in 1990-91 the Americans succeeded in dragging all the Western countries along with them (even if some, like the French and the Germans, dragged their feet), this time they have come up against opposition from other countries, even including the faithful Albion.
American diplomacy's obvious failure in the Bosnian conflict is a severe blow to the authority of a power which lays claim to the role of "world cop". How much confidence can other countries place in its "protection" now? How much fear can it inspire in those who might think of defying it? The full significance of the 13th September Washington agreement lies in its use as a means to restore this authority.
No 'Peace' for the Middle East
If proof were needed of the bourgeoisie's cynicism, the recent evolution of the Middle East situation would be largely sufficient. Today, the media are inviting us to shed a tear of joy over the historic handshake at the White House. They neglect to tell us how this handshake was prepared, less than two months ago.
In late July 1993, the Israeli state unleashed a massive bombardment on dozens of Lebanese villages. It was the biggest and bloodiest military operation since the "Peace in Galilee" operation of 1982. The dead were counted in the hundreds, if not the thousands, mostly civilian. Almost half a million refugees took to the roads. And this action, by a "democratic" state, led moreover by a "socialist" government, justified its action thus: the aim is to terrorize the civilian Lebanese population, in order to put pressure on the Lebanese government to crush Hezbollah. Once again, it is the civilian population which pays the price for imperialism's deeds. But the bourgeoisie's cynicism does not stop there: in reality, the question of Hezbollah was secondary - and as soon as the offensive was over, the latter renewed its attacks on Israeli troops in South Lebanon - and the Israeli military offensive was nothing other than a preparation for the touching ceremony in Washington, set up not just by Israel, but by its great American godfather.
On the Israeli side, it was important that the peace negotiations and its imminent truce proposals to the PLO should not be taken as a sign of weakness. The bombs and shells destroying the villages of southern Lebanon carried a message to the Arab states: "don't count on our weakness, we will only give up what suits us". This message was addressed especially to the Syrians, without whose permission Hezbollah could not operate, and who want to recover the Golan Heights annexed by Israel in the 1967 war.
On the US side, the intention was to demonstrate, through its henchman's military success, that it remains the boss of the Middle East, whatever difficulties it may encounter elsewhere. The message was addressed to any Arab state which might be tempted to play a different tune than the one ordered by the boss in Washington. It was useful, for example, to remind Jordan that it would be better not to repeat the infidelities of the Gulf war. Above all, it was time to remind Syria that its grip on Lebanon was due to America's good graces following the Gulf war, and that its historical links with France should remain just that: history. The same message was also addressed to Iran, the Hezbollah's godfather, and which is trying to renew diplomatic relations with France and Germany. In fact, the USA was addressing a warning to all the powers which might be tempted to come and poach in its own reserves.
Finally, the world's greatest power had to demonstrate clearly to all concerned that it still has the means to make itself respected, and that it could unleash the dogs of war as well as the doves of peace, as it likes. This was the message delivered by Warren Christopher during his Middle East tour, just after the Israeli offensive: "the present confrontations illustrate the urgent need for the conclusion of a peace agreement amongst the different states concerned". This is the classic method of the racketeer, who offers "protection" to the shopkeeper, after breaking up his shop.
As always in decadent capitalism, there is no fundamental difference between peace and war; the imperialist brigands prepare their peace agreements with war and massacres. And the peace agreements are never anything but a preparation for new and bloodier wars.
More war to come
After the negotiations and peace agreements in Washington and Geneva this summer, it is clear that there will be no more "new world order" under Clinton than there was under Bush.
In ex-Yugoslavia, even if the Geneva negotiations on Bosnia lead to agreement (for the moment the war is still going on, between Muslims and Croats, and within the different factions themselves), this will not mean an end to the conflict. The new battle-fields are already plain to see: Macedonia, almost openly claimed by Greece; Kosovo, whose largely Albanian population is tempted to merge in a "Greater Albania"; Krajina, a province of the Croatian Republic but now occupied by the Serbs and cutting the Croats' Dalmatian coastline in two. We also know that the great powers will not moderate these brewing conflicts: on the contrary, just as they have already done, they will be busy fanning the flames.
In the Middle East, peace is now in fashion. It won't last: fashions pass quickly, and there is no shortage of potential conflicts. The PLO, which will now be policing the territories that Israel has "granted" autonomy, must now confront the competition of the Hamas movement. Yasser Arafat's organisation is itself divided: its different factions, maintained by different Arab states, is bound to tear itself apart as the conflicts sharpen among these states themselves, now that the anti-Israeli "Palestinian cause" which once held them together has disappeared. Syria's grudging acceptance of the Washington agreement has not solved the problem of the Golan. Iraq is still ostracized. The Kurdish nationalists have not given up their demands in Irak and Turkey ... All these sources of conflict only sharpen the appetites of the great powers, which are always ready to discover a new "humanitarian" cause which just happens to correspond to their imperialist interest.
Nor are potential conflicts limited to the Middle East and the Balkans.
In the Caucasus and central Asia, Russia's imperialist appetites (though obviously more limited than in the past) are only adding to the chaos engulfing the old republics of the USSR, and sharpening the ethnic conflicts within them (Abkhazians against Georgians, Armenians against Azeris, etc). And this has not helped reduce the political chaos within Russia's own frontiers, as we can see from the confrontations between YeItsin and the parliament.
In Africa, war has been declared between the one-time allies of the Western bloc: "If we want to take the lead in the evolving world situation (. .. ) then we must be ready to invest in Africa as much as in other areas of the world" (Clinton, quoted in Jeune Afrigue);"Since the end of the cold war, we no longer have to align our positions in Africa with the French" (a US diplomat quoted in the same review). In other words: "If the French get in our way in the Balkans then we won't hesitate to go poaching in their African reserves". The Franco-US confrontation has already begun through their rival politicians or armies in Liberia, Ruanda, Togo, the Cameroons, the Congo and Angola. In Somalia, it is Italy which now finds itself in the anti-American front line (with France not far behind), and this in the framework of a "humanitarian" operation under the flag of that symbol of peace, the UN.
This list is neither exhaustive nor definitive. The collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989, and so the inevitable disappearance of the Western bloc, have eliminated - for now - the threat of a third world war. Instead, they have opened a real Pandora's box. Henceforth, the law of "every man for himself' will more and more hold sway, even if new alliances appear in the far-off and uncertain perspective of a new division of the world into two blocs. But these alliances are themselves shaky, since countries which are no longer under the threat of the "Evil Empire" have no interest in increasing the power of a stronger ally. When a friend's arms are too strong, an embrace may stifle me! France, for example, has no interest in seeing its German accomplice become a Mediterranean power by laying hands on Croatia and Slovenia. Still more significant, Britain, despite being the US' most long-standing ally, has no interest in encouraging the latter's game in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, which it still considers to some extent a "Mare Nostrum" thanks to its positions in Gibraltar, Cyprus, and Malta.
In fact, we are witnessing a complete overthrow of the dynamic of imperialist tensions. In the past, when the world was divided into two blocs, anything which strengthened the bloc leader was good for its henchmen. Today, anything that reinforces the strongest powers is likely to prove bad for its weaker allies.
This is why the US set-back in the Balkans, which owes a lot to its British "friend", cannot simply be interpreted as a policy error by the Clinton team. In fact, the US is faced with a kind of vicious circle: the more they try to assert their authority to draw their "allies" closer, the more these same allies will try to escape from this stifling tutelage. In particular, although the demonstration and use of its massive military superiority is a trump card for US imperialism, it is also a card which tends to turn against its own interests, by encouraging a still greater indiscipline amongst its "allies". But although brute force is no longer capable of imposing "world order", there is no alternative in a system which is plunging deeper and deeper into crisis, and it will be used increasingly.
This absurdity is a tragic symbol of what the capitalist mode of production has become: a rotting society, sinking into a barbarism of chaos, wars, and slaughter.
FM, 27 September 93
[1] The fact that Russia has now become one of the USA's best allies does not
eliminate the divergence of interests between the two countries. In particular, Russia has absolutely no interest in direct alliance between USA and Serbia, which would be bound to leave it out in the cold. The USA certainly tried to draw in Serbia by promoting the presidential campaign of the US citizen Panic.
In the summer of 1993, the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) highlighted the acceleration of some of the world economy's most important and deep-seated tendencies. These events have revealed the extent of artificial and destructive practices such as massive speculation; they have laid bare the power of the tendency to "look after number one" which is setting nations against each other. And in doing so, they have shown what will be the immediate future for capitalism: a future stamped with the mark of degeneration, decomposition and self-destruction.
These monetary upheavals are merely the superficial expressions of a far more dramatic underlying reality: capitalism's growing inability, as a system, to overcome its own contradictions. For the working class, and for the exploited classes all over the planet, this means the worst economic attack since the end of World War II, in terms of massive unemployment, the reduction of real wages, the fall in the "social wage", and so on.
"The speculators are burying Europe (...) The West is on the verge of disaster". These were the comments of Maurice Allais, a Nobel Prize winner in economics[1] on the events leading to the virtual disintegration of the EMS in July 1993. Such an eminent defender of the established order could hardly consider his system's economic difficulties as anything other than the result of the activity of elements "outside" the capitalist system: on this occasion, "the speculators". But the degree of economic disaster is at such a point that it has forced even the most obtuse bourgeois to a minimum of lucidity, if only to realise just how bad the
situation has become.
Three quarters of the planet (the "Third World", the ex -Soviet bloc) is not "on the verge of disaster", but right in the middle of it. The West, the last bastion, if not of prosperity then at least of non-collapse, is taking the plunge in its turn. For three years, powers like the United States, Canada, and Great Britain have been sinking into the longest and deepest recession since the war. The economic "recovery" greeted by the "experts" in the US on the grounds of renewed growth in GD P (3.2 % in the second half of 1992) has deflated since the beginning of 1993, with 0.7% growth during the first quarter, and 1.6% during the second, in other words virtual stagnation (the "experts" were expecting at least 2.3 % for the second quarter). The "American locomotive", which powered the Western recovery after the recessions of 1974-75 and 1980-82, is running out of steam even before it has begun to draw the train. As for Germany and Japan, the West's two other great economic poles, both are falling into recession in their turn. By May 1993, industrial production had fallen, year on year, by 3.6% in Japan, and by 8.3 % in Germany.
This was the backdrop for the crisis in the EMS, the second in less than a year[2]. Under the pressure of a worldwide tidal wave of speculation, the governments of the EEC were forced to abandon their commitment to keeping their currencies linked with stable exchange rates. By extending the "floor" and "ceiling" from 5 % to 30 % variation, they in effect reduced the agreement to mere verbiage.
Although these events take place within the special sphere of finance capital, they are nonetheless a product of the real crisis of capital. They are indicative, in at least three important ways, of the fundamental tendencies determining the world economy.
Unprecedented development of speculation, trafficking, and corruption
The size of the speculative forces that shook the EMS is a major characteristic of the present period. During the 1980's, speculative capital poured into everything from stocks and shares to property and art. As the 1990's began, many of these speculative values began to collapse, and capital has had to seek a refuge in speculation on the money markets. It has been estimated that on the eve of the EMS crisis, monetary speculation had reached $1,000 billion a day, the equivalent of one year's British GNP, and forty times greater than the flow of money corresponding to commercial payments! This is no longer an affair of a few rich and unscrupulous men ready to take risks in search of quick profits. The entire ruling class, led by its banks and states, is indulging in this artificial activity, which is totally sterile from the view-point of real wealth. They do so, not because this is the easiest way to make a profit, but because there is less and less possibility of investing capital profitably in the real world of trade and industry. The recourse to speculative profit is above all an expression of a difficulty in realising real profit.
This is also why capital's economic life is more and more infected with the most degenerate forms of illicit trade and generalized political corruption. The turnover of the world drugs trade has reached the same level as the trade in oil. The convulsions of the Italian political classes reveal the extent of the profits that can be made from corruption and all kinds of fraudulent deals.
Some radical bourgeois moralists deplore their ageing democracies' increasingly raddled image. They would like to rid capitalism of the "speculating vultures", the drug dealers and the corrupt politicians. Claude Julien, editor of the very serious Monde Diplomatique[3] has suggested, quite seriously that the democratic governments should" Sterilize the enormous financial profits produced by illegal trade, make it impossible to launder dirty money, by putting an end to banking secrecy, and eliminating tax havens".
Because they cannot imagine for a moment that there could exist a form of social organisation other than capitalism, these defenders of the system think that the worst aspects of present-day society could be eliminated with a few energetic laws. They think that they are dealing with curable ills, when in fact they are confronted with generalized cancer: the same kind of cancer that destroyed the decadent society of ancient Rome; a degeneration that will only disappear with the destruction of the society itself.
Capitalism forced to cheat its own laws
The inability of the EMS countries to maintain a real monetary stability expresses the system's growing inability to live in accordance by its own elementary rules. To understand the importance of the failure of the EMS, it is useful to remind ourselves why the EMS was created.
Money is one of the most important instruments of capitalist circulation. It provides a measure for exchange, of preserving and accumulating the value of previous sales in order to be able to buy in the future. It makes possible the exchange of the most varied commodities, whatever their nature and origin, by providing a universal equivalent value. International trade requires international money: sterling played this role until World War I, and has since been replaced by the dollar. But this is not enough. In order to buy and sell, and to make use of credit, different national currencies must trade "reliably", sufficiently constantly not to upset the entire exchange mechanism.
If there are not a minimum of rules respected in this domain, the results are felt throughout the economy. How is it possible to trade if nobody knows whether the price of a commodity will remain the same between the moment of placing the order and the moment of delivery? When currencies fluctuate widely, it is possible for a profitable sale to be transformed, in a matter of months, into a loss.
Today, international currency insecurity has reached such a point that we are seeing the resurgence of the most archaic form of exchange: barter, in other words the direct exchange of commodities without having recourse to money as an intermediary.
There are various ways of cheating with the monetary system in order to escape, at least temporarily, from the constraints of the law of capital. There is one today, which is gaining a special importance: what the economists like to embellish with the name "competitive devaluation". This is a way of "cheating" with the most elementary laws of capitalist competition: instead of improving productivity to win market share, a nation's capitalists devalue their currency. They therefore reduce the prices of their products on the world market. Instead of going through the difficult and complex business of reorganizing the productive apparatus, instead of investing in increasingly costly machinery to ensure an ever more effective exploitation of labour power, they need only let their exchange rate fall. Financial manipulation takes the place of real productivity. A successful devaluation can even allow a national capital to penetrate the markets of other more productive capitalists with their own commodities.
The EMS was an attempt to limit this kind of practice, which transformed all commercial "understanding" into a game for dupes. Its failure expresses capitalism's inability to ensure a minimum of rigour in a crucial domain.
But this lack of rigour, this inability to respect its own rules, is neither temporary, nor specific to the international money market. For 25 years, capitalism has been trying to "free" itself in every domain from its own constraints, its own stifling laws, often by using the apparatus in charge of its legality (state capitalism). During the first post-reconstruction recession, in 1967 it invented the "special drawing rights", which in fact were nothing but the ability of the great powers to print money on the international level, without any other backing than governments' promises. In 1972, the USA got rid of the constraint of the dollar's convertibility into gold, and of the monetary system established at Bretton Woods after the war. During the 1970s, monetary rigour gave way to inflationary policies, budgetary rigour to chronic budget deficits tight credit to unlimited, and unbacked, loans. The 1980s continued the same trend with the politics of so-called "Reaganomics , the explosion of credit and state budget deficits. Between 1974 and 1992, the overall public debt of OECD states rose from an average 35% of GDP to 65%. In countries such as Belgium and Italy, the state debt was greater than 100% of GDP. In Italy, the interest on this debt is greater than industry's entire wage bill. .
For 25 years, capitalism has survived its crisis by cheating with its own mechanism. But this has changed none of the fundamental reasons for the crisis. It has merely succeeded in undermining its very foundations, and piling up new difficulties, new sources of chaos and paralysis.
The growing tendency to "look after number one"
The EMS crisis has really highlighted the intensification of capital's centrifugal tendencies: "every man for himself, and devil take the hindmost". The economic crisis endlessly exacerbates the antagonisms between every fraction of capital, both nationally and internationally. The economic alliances between capitalists are merely temporary agreements between sharks to confront other sharks. They are constantly threatened by the allies' tendency to devour each other. Behind the EMS crisis looms the development of all-out trade war: a merciless, self-destructive war, but one which no capitalist can escape.
The complaints of those who, whether cynically or unconsciously, sow illusions as to the possibility of a harmonious capitalism, can do nothing about it: "We have to disarm the economy. It is urgent that we ask the businessmen to abandon their generals' and colonels' uniform (...) The G7would do itself a favour by setting up, at its next meeting in Naples, a "Committee for World economic disarmament?"[4]. He might as well ask the summit of the seven main Western capitalist nations to form a committee for the abolition of capitalism.
Competition is part of capitalism's very soul, and always has been. Today it is merely being exacerbated in the extreme. This does not mean that no counter-tendency exists. The war of all against all encourages the formation, willy-nilly, of indispensable alliances. The efforts of the 12 EEC countries to ensure a minimum of economic cooperation against their American and Japanese competitors were not just bluff. But the reassure of the economic crisis, and the resulting sharpening of trade conflicts, these efforts already, and will increasingly, come up against more and more insurmountable internal contradictions.
Neither businessmen nor governments can "abandon their generals' and colonels' uniform", any more than capitalism can be transformed into a system of economic harmony and cooperation. Only the revolutionary overcoming of this decomposing system can rid humanity of the absurd and self-destructive anarchy that it is suffering.
A future of unemployment, destruction, and poverty
War destroys material productive forces with fire and steel. The economic crisis destroys the productive forces by paralyzing them. In 25 years of crisis, whole regions like the north in Great Britain or France, or around Hamburg in Germany, have been abandoned, littered with closed-down factories and shipyards, devoured by rust and desolation. For the last two years, the governments of the EEC have been conducting a program to reduce Europe's cultivated land by 25%, because of a crisis of over-production.
War destroys men physically, both soldiers and civilians; the dead are mostly the exploited - workers or peasants. The economic crisis unleashes the scourge of mass unemployment. It reduces populations to misery, through unemployment or the threat of it. It spreads despair among today's generation, and blights the future of those to come. In the under-developed countries, it takes on the form of a veritable genocide by hunger and disease: the major part of the African continent has been abandoned to death by famine and epidemic, to desertification in the real sense of the term.
Ever since the late 60's, which marked the end of the prosperity due to post-war reconstruction, unemployment has gone on increasing all over the world. Its development has been uneven from one region or country to another. There have been periods of rapid increase (the open recessions) and periods of respite. But the general direction has never wavered. With the new recession that began at the end of the 1980's, it has reached unprecedented proportions.
The countries which were the first hit by the new recession (the USA, Canada, the UK) are still waiting for the recovery in employment, which was announced three years ago. In the EEC, unemployment is growing at the rate of 4 million a year (20 million unemployed are forecast for the end of 1993,24 million for the end of 1994). It is as if, in one year, every job in a country like Austria were to disappear. Between January and May 1993, there were 1200 more unemployed every day in France, 1400 more in Germany (and this is only according to official statistics, which systematically under-estimate the real unemployment figures).
In branches of industry which had supposedly been "slimmed" (to use the cynical term of the ruling class), new bloodlettings are announced: the EEC steel industry, which has already been reduced to 400,000 jobs, plans a further 70,000 redundancies. IBM, the model company of the last 30 years, has not stopped "slimming", and is planning 80,000 more job losses. The German car industry plans to lose 100,000 jobs.
The working class of the most industrialised countries, and especially in Europe, has never seen such violent or widespread attacks.
The European governments do not hide their alarm. Jacques Delors, president of the EEC, speaks for its governments when he warns of the danger of a forthcoming social explosion. Bruno Trentin, a leader of the main Italian union (the CGIL) who last autumn was hissed and booed by angry workers demonstrating against the austerity measures imposed by the government with the help of the unions, sums up the fears of the Italian bourgeoisie:
"The economic crisis is such, and the financial situation of the great industrial groups is so desperate, that we can only fear social unrest next autumn" (La Tribune, 28th July 1993).
The ruling class is right to fear the workers' struggles that the aggravation of the economic crisis will provoke. It is not often that objective reality has so clearly demonstrated that it is no longer possible to fight the effects of the capitalist crisis without destroying capitalism itself. The system's degree of decomposition, and the gravity of the consequences of its continued existence are such that its revolutionary overthrow will appear more and more as the only "realistic" way out for the exploited.
RV
[1] Liberation, 2nd August 1993
[2] In September 1992, Great Britain was forced to leave the EMS, "humiliated by Germany", and the weaker currencies were allowed to devalue. Their fluctuation bands within the EMS were widened.
[3] In August 1993.
[4] Ricardo Petrella, of Louvain Catholic University
In the previous article in this series (IR73) we saw that Marx and his tendency, having come to terms with the defeat of the 1848 revolutions and the onset of a new period of capitalist growth, embarked upon a project of deep theoretical research aimed at uncovering the real dynamic of the capitalist mode of production, and thus the real basis for its eventual replacement by a communist social order.
As early as 1844, Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and Engels in his Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, had begun to investigate - and to criticise from a proletarian standpoint - both the economic foundations of capitalist society, and the economic theories of the capitalist class, generally known as 'political economy'. The understanding that communist theory had to be built on the solid ground of an economic analysis of bourgeois society already constituted a decisive break with the utopian conceptions of communism which had been prevalent in the workers' movement hitherto, since it meant that the denunciation of the suffering and alienation brought about by the capitalist system of production was no longer restricted to a purely moral objection to its injustices; rather, the horrors of capitalism were analysed as the inevitable expressions of its economic and social structure, and could therefore only be done away with through the revolutionary struggle of a social class which had a material interest in reorganizing society.
In the years between 1844 and 1848, the 'marxist' fraction developed a clearer understanding of the inner workings of the capitalist system, a more historically dynamic conception which identified capitalism as the last in a long series of class-divided societies, and a system whose fundamental contradictions would eventually lead to its downfall and so pose the necessity and the possibility of the new communist society (see the article in IR72). However, the prime task facing revolutionaries during that phase was to construct a communist political organisation and intervene in the enormous social upheavals which shook Europe in the year 1848. In short, the need for an active political combat took precedence over the work of theoretical elaboration. By contrast, with the defeat of the 1848 revolutions, and the ensuing fight against the activist and immediatist illusions that led to the demise of the Communist League, it became essential to take a step back from pure immediacy and to develop a more profound, long-term view of the destiny of capitalist society.
For more than a decade, Marx therefore threw himself once again into the vast theoretical project he had set himself in the early 1840s. This was the period where he worked long hours in the British Museum, studying not only the classical political economists but a vast mass of information on the contemporary operations of capitalist society: the factory system, money, credit, international trade; not only the early history of capitalism, but the history of pre-capitalist civilisations and societies as well. The initial aim of this research was the one he had set himself a decade before: to produce a monumental work on 'Economics', which itself would only be part of a more global work dealing, among other things, with more directly political issues and the history of socialist thought. But as Marx wrote in a letter to Wedemeyer (MEW, XXVII, 486), "the stuff I am working on has so many ramifications", that the deadline for the work on Economics receded constantly, first by weeks, then by years; and in fact it was never to be completed: only the first volume of Capital was really finished by Marx. The bulk of the material deriving from this period either had to be completed by Engels and was not published till after Marx's death (the next three volumes of Capital), or, as in the case of the Grundrisse (the 'Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, rough draft'), never passed the stage of a collection of elaborate notebooks that were not available in the west until the 1950s, and were not fully translated into English until 1973. Nevertheless, though this was a period of great poverty and personal hardship for Marx and his family, it was also the most fruitful period in his life as far as the more theoretical side of his work is concerned. And it is no accident that so much of the gigantic output of those years was dedicated to the study of political economy, because this was the key to evolving a really scientific understanding of the structure and movement of the capitalist mode of production.
In its classical form, political economy was one of the most advanced expressions of the revolutionary bourgeoisie:
"Historically, it made its appearance as an integral part of the new science of humanity, created by the bourgeoisie in the course of its revolutionary struggle to install this new socio-economic formation. Political economy was thus the realistic complement to the great philosophical, moral, aesthetic, psychological, juridical and political commotion of the so-called 'Age of Enlightenment' during which the spokesmen of the ascendant class expressed for the first time the new bourgeois consciousness, which corresponded to the intervening changes in the real conditions of existence" (Karl Korsch, Karl Marx, Editions Champ Libre, p103).
As such, political economy had been capable, up to a certain point, of analysing the real movement of bourgeois society: of seeing it as a totality rather than a sum of fragments, and of grasping its underlying relations instead of being deceived by surface phenomena. In particular, the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo had come close to laying bare the secret at the very heart of the system: the origin and significance of value, the 'worth' of commodities. Championing the 'productive classes' of society against the increasingly parasitic and idle nobility, these economists of the English school were able to see that the value of a commodity was essentially determined by the amount of human labour embodied within it. But again, only up to a point. Since it expressed the viewpoint of the new exploiting class, bourgeois political economy inevitably had to mystify reality, to conceal the exploitative nature of the new mode of production. And this tendency to apologise for the new order came to the fore the more bourgeois society revealed its inbuilt contradictions, above all the social contradiction between capital and labour, and the economic contradictions that periodically plunged the system into crisis. Already during the 1820s and 30s, both the class struggle of the workers, and the crisis of overproduction, had made a definite appearance on the historical scene. Between Adam Smith and Ricardo there is already a "reduction in the theoretical vista and the beginnings of a final sclerosis" (Korsch, op cit, p 106), since the latter is less concerned with examining the system as a totality. But later economic 'theorists' of the bourgeoisie are less and less able to contribute anything useful to the understanding of their own economy. This degenerative process has, as with all aspects of bourgeois thought, reached its apogee in the decadent period of capitalism. For most schools of economists today, the idea that human labour has something to do with value is dismissed as a laughable anachronism; it goes without saying, however, that these same economists are utterly baffled by the increasingly evident breakdown of the modern world economy.
Marx took the same approach to classical political economy as he did to Hegel's philosophy: by treating it from the proletarian and revolutionary standpoint, he was able to assimilate its most important contributions while going beyond its limits. He was thus able to demonstrate:
- that although this primary fact is veiled in the capitalist production process, in contrast to previous class societies, capitalism is nonetheless a system of class exploitation and can be nothing else. This was the essential message of his conception of surplus value;
- that capitalism, despite its incredibly expansive character, its drive to submit the entire planet to its laws, was no less a historically transient mode of production than Roman slavery or mediaeval feudalism; that a society based on universal commodity production was inevitably condemned, by the very logic of its inner workings, to ultimate decline and collapse;
- that communism, therefore, was a material possibility brought about by the unprecedented development of the productive forces by capitalism itself; it was also a necessity if humanity was to escape the devastating consequences of capitalism's economic contradictions.
But if the core of Marx's work during this period is the study, sometimes in the most astonishing detail, of the laws of capital, the work as a whole was not restricted to this. Marx had inherited from Hegel the understanding that the particular and the concrete - in this case capitalism - could only be understood in its historical totality, that is, against the vast backdrop of all the forms of human society since the earliest days of the species. In the 1844 EPM Marx had said that communism was the "solution to the riddle of history". Communism is the immediate heir of capitalism; but just as the individual child is also a product of all the generations that have gone before him, so it can be said that "the entire movement of history is the act of genesis" of communist society (ibid). This is why a good deal of Marx's writings about capital also contain long excursions both into 'anthropological' questions - questions about the characteristics of man in general - and into the modes of production that preceded bourgeois society. This is particularly true of the Grundrisse; on one level a 'rough draft' of Capital, it is also a prologue to a more wide-ranging inquiry in which Marx deals at length not only with the critique of political economy as such, but also with some of the anthropological or 'philosophical' issues raised in the 1844 EPM, most notably the relationship between man and nature, and the problem of alienation. It also contains Marx's most elaborate presentation of the various pre-capitalist modes of production. But all these issues also find their way into Capital, particularly the first volume, if in a more distilled and concentrated form.
Before turning, therefore, to Marx's analysis of capitalist society in particular, we intend to look at the more general and historical themes that he deals with in the Grundrisse and Capital, since they are no less essential to Marx's understanding of the perspective and physiognomy of communism.
We have already (see IR 70) mentioned that there is a school of thought, and it sometimes includes genuine followers of Marx, according to which Marx's mature work demonstrates his loss of interest in, or even repudiation of, certain lines of inquiry which he had developed in his earlier work, particularly the 1844 or 'Paris' EPM: the question of man's "species being", the relationship between man and nature, and the problem of alienation. The argument is that such conceptions are tied to the 'Feuerbachian', humanistic, and even utopian view of communism which Marx held prior to the definitive development of the theory of historical materialism. While we don't deny that there are certain 'philosophical' hangovers in his Paris period, we have already argued (IR 69) that Marx's adherence to the communist movement was conditioned upon the adoption of a position that took him beyond the utopian socialists and onto a proletarian and materialist standpoint. The concept of man, of his "species being", in the EPM is not at all the same as Feuerbach's "dumb genus" criticised in the Theses on Feuerbach. It is not an abstract, individualized religion of humanity, but already a conception of social man, of man as the being who makes himself through collective labour. And when we turn to the Grundrisse and Capital, we find that this definition is deepened and clarified rather than rejected. Certainly, in the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx categorically rejects any idea of a static human essence and insists that "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations". But this does not mean that man 'as such' is a non-reality or that he is an empty page that is moulded entirely and absolutely by each particular form of social organisation. Such a view would make it impossible for historical materialism to approach human history as a totality; you would end up with a series of fragmented shots of each type of society, with nothing to connect them into an overall picture. The approach taken to this question in the Grundrisse and Capital is very far from this sociological reductionism; instead it is founded upon the vision of man as a species whose unique characteristic is its capacity to transform itself and its environment through the labour process and through history.
The 'anthropological' question, the question of generic man, of what distinguishes man from the other animal species, is taken up in the first volume of Capital. It begins with a definition of labour, because it is through labour that man makes himself. The labour process is "the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase" (part III, chap VII, p 179, 'The labour process'). "Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. He opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of the body, in order to appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal ... We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement" (ibid, p 174).
In the Grundrisse, the social character of this "exclusively human" form of activity is also stressed: "The fact that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of producing the object of the need of the other, and that each confronts the other as owner of the object of the other's need, this proves that each of them reaches beyond his own particular need etc as a human being, and that they relate to one another as human beings; that their common species-being is acknowledged by all. It does not happen elsewhere - that elephants produce for tigers, or animals for other animals..." (Grundrisse, Pelican Marx Library, 1973, p243). These definitions of man as the animal which alone possesses a self-conscious and purposive life-activity, who produces universally rather than one-sidedly, are strikingly similar to the formulations contained in the EPM [1].
Again, as in the EPM, these definitions assume that man is part of nature: in the above passage from Capital, man is "one of nature's own forces", while the Grundrisse uses exactly the same terminology as the Paris texts: nature is man's "real body" (p 542). But where the later works represent an advance over the earlier one is in their deeper insight into the historical evolution of the relationship between man and the rest of nature:
"It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital" (Grundrisse, p 489)
This process of separation between man and nature is viewed in a profoundly dialectical manner by Marx.
On the one hand, it is the awakening of man's "slumbering powers", the power to transform himself and the world around him. This is a general characteristic of the labour process: history as the gradual, if uneven, development of humanity's productive capacities. But this development was always held back in the social formations that preceded capital, where the limitations of a natural economy also kept man limited to the cycles of nature. Capitalism, by contrast, creates a wholly new potential for overcoming this subordination:
"Hence the great civilising influence of capital; its production of a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere local developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry. For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature-worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces " (Grundrisse, p 409-10).
On the other hand, capital's conquest of nature, its reduction of nature to a mere object, has the most contradictory consequences. As the last passage continues:
"But from the fact that capital posits every limit as a barrier and hence gets ideally beyond it, it does not by any means follow that it has really overcome it, and since every such barrier contradicts its character, its production moves in contradictions which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited. Furthermore. The universality towards which it irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain stage of its development, allow it to be recognised as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will drive towards its own suspension".
Having lived through 80 years of capitalist decadence, of an epoch in which capital has definitely become the greatest barrier to its own expansion, we can appreciate the full validity of Marx's prognosis here. The greater capitalism's development of the productive forces, the more universal its reign over the planet, the greater and more destructive are the crises and catastrophes that it brings in its wake: not only the directly economic, social and poetical crises, but also the 'ecological' crises which signify the threat of a complete break-down of man's "metabolic exchange with nature".
We can see plainly that, contrary to many would-be radical critics of marxism, Marx's recognition of capital's "civilising influence" was never an apologia for capital. The historical process in which man has separated himself from the rest of nature is also the chronicle of man's self-estrangement, and this has reached its apogee, or nadir, in bourgeois society, in the wage labour relation which the Grundrisse defines as "the most extreme form of alienation" (p 515). It's this which can indeed often make it seem as though capitalist 'progress', which ruthlessly subordinates all human needs to the ceaseless expansion of production, is more like a regression in comparison to previous epochs:
"Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production ... In bourgeois economics - and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds - this complete working out of the human content appears as a complete emptying out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end" (Grundrisse, p 487-8).
And yet this final triumph of alienation also means the advent of the conditions for the full realisation of humanity's creative powers, freed both from the inhumanity of capital and the restrictive limitations of pre-capitalist social relations:
"In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc....? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, ie the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming?" (ibid).
This dialectical view of history remains a puzzle and a scandal to all defenders of the bourgeois standpoint, which is forever stuck in an 'either-or' dilemma between a blanket apology for 'progress' and a nostalgic longing for an idealized past:
"In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to this original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as its legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end" (Grundrisse p 162).
In all these passages we can see that what applies to the problematic of 'generic man' and his relationship to nature also applies to his concept of alienation: far from abandoning the basic concepts formulated in his earlier work, the 'mature' Marx enriches them by situating them in their overall historical dynamic. And in the second part of this article we will see how, in the descriptions of the future society contained here and there throughout the Grundrisse and Capital, Marx still considers that the overcoming of alienation and the conquest of a really human life-activity remains at the core of the whole communist project.
This contradictory 'decline' from the apparently more developed individual of earlier times to the estranged ego of bourgeois society expresses another facet of Marx's historical dialectic: the dissolution of primordial communal forms by the evolution of commodity relations. This is a theme that runs through the whole of the Grundrisse, but it is also summarized in Capital. It is a crucial element in Marx's response to the view of mankind contained in bourgeois political economy, and thus in his adumbration of the communist perspective.
In effect, one of the Grundrisse's persistent criticisms of bourgeois political economy is the way it "mythologically identifies itself with the past" (p 106), turning its own particular categories into absolutes of human existence. This is what is sometimes called the Robinson Crusoe view of history: the isolated individual, not social man, as its starting point; private property as the original and essential form of property; trade, rather than collective labour, as the key to understanding the generation of wealth. Thus, on the very opening page of the Grundrisse, Marx opens fire on such "Robinsonades", and insists that "the more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clans. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity" (p 84).
Thus, the isolated individual is above all a historical product, and in particular a product of the bourgeois mode of production. The communal forms of property and production were not only the original social forms, in very primitive epochs; they also persist in all the class-divided modes of production which succeeded the dissolution of primitive classless society. This is most obvious in the 'Asiatic' mode of production, in which a central state apparatus appropriates the surplus of village communes who otherwise carry on the immemorial traditions of tribal life - a fact which Marx takes as "the key to the secret of the unchanging nature of Asiatic societies, an unchanging nature in such striking contrast with the constant dissolution and refounding of Asian states, and the never-ceasing changes of dynasty" (Capital, I, chapter XIV, section 4, p 338). In the Grundrisse, Marx insists on the way that the Asiatic form "hangs on most tenaciously and for the longest time" (p486), a point taken up by Rosa Luxemburg in her Accumulation of Capital, where she shows how difficult it was for capital and commodity relations to drag the base units of these societies away from the security of their communal relations.
In slave and feudal societies, the ancient community was far more thoroughly pulverized by the development of commodity relations and of private property - a fact which goes a long way towards explaining why slavery and feudalism contained the inner dynamic which could permit the emergence of capitalism, whereas capitalism had to be imposed on Asiatic society 'from the outside'. Nevertheless, important remnants of the communal form can be found at the origin of these formations: the Roman city, for example, arises as a community of kinship groups; feudalism arises not only out of the collapse of Roman slave society but also from the specific characteristics of the 'Germanic' tribal commune; and the tradition of common land was held onto by the peasant classes - very often as a motivating theme of their revolts and insurrections - throughout the mediaeval period. The common characteristic of all these social forms is that they were dominated by natural economy: the production of use value took precedence over the production of exchange value, and it is the development of the latter which is the dissolving agent of the old community:
"Monetary greed, or mania for wealth, necessarily brings with it the decline and fall of the ancient communities (Gemeinwesen). Hence it is the antithesis to them. It is itself the community (Gemeinwesen), and can tolerate none other standing above it. But this presupposes the full development of exchange values, hence a corresponding organisation of society" (Grundrisse, p223).
In all previous societies, "exchange value was not the nexus rerum" but existed at their "interstices" (ibid); and so it is only in capitalist society, where exchange value finally seizes hold of the very heart of the production process, that the ancient Gemeinwesen is finally and completely broken down, to the point where communal life is portrayed as the actual opposite of human nature! It is easy to see how this analysis parallels and reinforces Marx's theory of alienation.
The importance of this theme of the original community in Marx's work is reflected in the amount of time the founders of historical materialism devoted to it. It had already appeared in the German Ideology in the 1840s; Engels, leaning on the ethnographic studies of Morgan, was to take up the same issue in the 1870s, in his Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State. At the end of his life Marx was again delving deeply into this issue - the little-explored 'Ethnographic Notebooks' stem from this period. It was an essential component of the marxist response to political economy's assumptions about human nature. Far from being essential and unchanging features of human existence, categories such as private property and exchange value were shown to be transient expressions of particular historical epochs. And while the bourgeoisie tried to portray greed for monetary wealth as something fixed in the fundaments of man's being, Marx's historical researches uncovered the essentially social character of the human species. All these discoveries were obviously a powerful argument for the possibility of communism.
And yet Marx's approach to this question never slides into a romantic nostalgia for the past. The same dialectic is applied here as to the question of man's relationship to nature, since the two questions are really one: in primitive communist society, the individual is buried in the tribe, as the tribe is buried in nature. These social organisms "are founded on the immature development of man individually, who has not yet severed the umbilical cord that unites him with his fellowmen in a primitive tribal community ... They can arise and exist only when the development of the productive power of labour has not risen beyond a low stage, and when, therefore, the social relations within the sphere of material life, between man and man, and between man and nature, are correspondingly narrow. This narrowness is reflected in the ancient worship of nature, and in other elements of the popular religions" (Capital, Vol 1, chapter I, section 4, p 84).
Capitalist society, with its mass of atomised individuals separated and alienated from each other by the domination of the commodity, is thus the polar opposite of the primitive community, the result of a long and contradictory historical process leading from one to the other. But this severing of the umbilical cord that originally bound man to the tribe and to nature is a painful necessity if humanity is to at last live in a society which is at once truly communal and truly individual, a society where the conflict between social and individual needs has been overcome.
The study of previous social formations is only made possible by the emergence of capitalism:
"Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organisation of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along with it...." (Grundrisse, Introduction, p105). At the same time, this understanding of social formations becomes, in the hands of the proletariat, a weapon against capital. As Marx puts in Capital Vol 1, "The categories of bourgeois economy ... are forms of thought expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined mode of production, viz, the production of commodities. The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour as long as they take the form of commodities, vanishes therefore as soon as we come to other forms of production" (chapter I, section 4, p 81). In short, capitalism is only one of a series of social formations that have risen and fallen due to discernible economic and social contradictions. Seen in this historical framework, capitalism, the society of universal commodity production, is not the product of nature but is a "definite, historically determined mode of production", destined to disappear no less than Roman slavery or mediaeval feudalism.
The most succinct and well-known presentation of this overall vision of history appears in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, published in 1858 [2]. This short text was a summary not only of the work contained in the Grundrisse, but of the foundations of Marx's entire theory of historical materialism. The passage begins with the basic premises of this theory:
"In the social production of their existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations, which are independent of their will, namely, relations of production corresponding to a determinate stage of development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the real foundation on which there arises a legal and political superstructure and to which there correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life processes in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary it is their being that determines their consciousness".
This is the materialist conception of history in a nutshell: the movement of history cannot be understood, as it has done hitherto, through the ideas mean have had of themselves, but through studying what underlies these ideas - the processes and social relations through which men produce and reproduce their material life. Having summarized this essential point, Marx then goes on to say:
"At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - what is merely a legal expression of the same thing - with the property relations within the framework of which they have hitherto operated. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. At that point an era of social revolutions begins. With the change in the economic foundation the whole immense superstructure is more slowly or more rapidly transformed".
It is thus a basic axiom of historical materialism that economic formations (in the same text Marx mentions "the Asian, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production" as "progressive epochs of the socio-economic order") necessarily go through periods of ascent, when their social relations are "forms of development" of the productive forces, and periods of decline or decadence, the "era of social revolution", when these same relations turn into "fetters". Restating this point here may seem banal, but it is necessary to do so because there are many elements in the revolutionary movement who lay claim to the method of historical materialism, and yet argue vehemently against the notion of capitalist decadence as defended by the ICC and other proletarian organisations. Such attitudes can be found both among the Bordigist groups and the heirs of the councilist tradition. The Bordigists in particular may concede that capitalism goes through crises of ever increasing magnitude and destructiveness, but reject our insistence that capitalism definitively entered its own epoch of social revolution in 1914. For them this is an innovation not catered for by the 'invariance' of marxism.
These arguments against decadence are to some extent semantic quibbles. Marx did not generally use the phrase "the decadence of capitalism" because he did not consider that this period had yet begun. It is true that during his political career there were times when he and Engels succumbed to an over-optimism about the imminent possibility of revolution: this was particularly true in 1848 (see the articles in IR 72 and 73). And even after revising this prognosis after the defeat of the 1848 revolutions, the founders of marxism never quite gave up the hope that the new era would dawn while they were still around to see it. But their political practise throughout their lifetimes was fundamentally based on the recognition that the working class was still building up its forces, its identity, its political programme within a bourgeois society that had not yet completed its historical mission.
Nonetheless, Marx does talk about the periods of the decline, decay or dissolution of the modes of production that preceded capitalism, particularly in the Grundrisse [3]. And there is nothing in his work to suggest that capitalism would be different in any fundamental sense - that it would somehow avoid entering its own period of decline. On the contrary, the revolutionaries of the Second International were basing themselves entirely on Marx's method and anticipations when they proclaimed that the first world war had finally and incontestably opened up the "new epoch" of "capitalism's inner disintegration" as the first congress of the Communist International put it in 1919. As we argue in our introduction to the pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism, all the left communist groups who took up the notion of capitalist decadence, from the KAPD to Bilan and Internationalisme, were merely carrying on this 'classical' tradition. As consistent Marxists, they could do no more or less: historical materialism required them to come to a decision as to when capitalism had become a fetter on humanity's productive forces. The swallowing up of generations of accumulated labour in the holocaust of imperialist war settled the question once and for all.
Some of the arguments against the concept of decadence go a bit further than semantics. They may even base themselves on another passage from the Preface, where Marx says that "a social order never perishes before all the productive forces for which it is broadly sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the womb of the old society". According to the anti-decadentists - especially during the 60s and 70s when the total inability of capitalism to develop the so-called third world was not yet as clear as it is today - you could not say that capitalism was decadent until it had developed its capacities to the last drop of workers' sweat, and there were still areas of the world where it had a prospect of growing. Hence the "youthful capitalisms" of the Bordigists and the many impending "bourgeois revolutions" of the councilists.
Given the fact that the 'third world' countries today present us with a horrifying picture of war, famine, disease and disaster, such theories are now largely an embarrassing memory, but there is a basic misunderstanding, an error of method, behind them. To say that a society is in decline is not to say that the productive forces have simply ceased to grow, that they have come to a complete halt. And Marx certainly did not mean to imply that a social system can only give way to another when every single possibility of development has been exhausted. As we can see from the following passage in the Grundrisse, he shows that even in decay a society does not stop moving:
"Considered ideally, the dissolution of a given form of consciousness sufficed to kill a whole epoch. In reality, this barrier to consciousness corresponds to a definite degree of development of the forces of material production and hence of wealth. True, there was not only a development on the old basis, but also a development of this basis itself. The highest development of this basis itself (the flower into which it transforms itself; but it is always this basis, this plant as flower; hence wilting after the flowering and as a consequence of the flowering) is the point at which it is itself worked out, developed, into the form in which it is compatible with the highest development of the forces of production, hence also the richest development of individuals. As soon as this point is reached, the further development appears as decay, and the new development begins from a new basis" (p 541).
The wording is complicated, unpolished: this is very often the problem with reading the Grundrisse. But the conclusion seems limpid enough: the decay of a society is not the end of all movement. Decadence is a movement, but one characterised by a slide towards catastrophe and self-destruction. Can anyone seriously doubt that twentieth century capitalist society, which devotes more productive forces to war and destruction than any previous social formation, and whose continued reproduction is a threat to the continuation of life on Earth, has reached the stage where its "development appears as decay"?
In the second part of this article we will look more closely at the way the 'mature' Marx analysed capitalist social relations, the contradictions inherent in them, and the communist society that was the solution to these contradictions.
CDW
NOTES
[1] Compare the following passages with the ones cited above: "The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It is not distinct from that activity; it is that activity. Man makes his life activity an object of his will and his consciousness. He has conscious life activity; it is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity directly distinguishes man from animal life activity ..." And again:
"It is true that animals also produce . They build nests and dwellings, like the bee, the beaver, the ant, etc. But they produce only their own immediate needs or those of their young; they produce one-sidedly, while man produces universally; they produce only when immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom from such need; they produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature; their products belong immediately to their physical bodies, while man freely confronts his own product. Animals produce only according to the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man is capable of producing according to the standards of every species and of applying to each object its inherent standard; hence man also produces in accordance with the laws of beauty" (EPM, chapter on 'Estranged Labour').
We can add that if these distinctions between man and the rest of animal nature are no longer of any relevance to a marxist understanding of history; if the concept of man's species-being is to be discarded, we must also throw the entirety of Freudian psychoanalysis out of the window, since the latter can be summarized as an attempt to understand the ramifications of a contradiction which has, hitherto, characterised the whole of human history: the contradiction, the inner conflict, between man's instinctual life and his conscious activity.
[2] The Critique of Political Economy was published in 1858. Engels had been urging Marx to call a halt to his researches into political economy and start publishing his findings, but the book was still in many ways premature; it did not measure up to the scale of the project that Marx was undertaking, and in any case Marx changed the final structure of the work when he at last began producing Capital. Thus the Preface, with its brilliant summary of the theory of historical materialism, remains by far the most important part of the book.
[3] For example: in Grundrisse, p501, Marx says that "the master-servant relation ... forms a necessary ferment for the development and the decline and fall of all original relations of property and of production, just as it also expresses their limited nature. Still, it is reproduced - in mediated form - in capital, and thus likewise forms a ferment of its dissolution and is an emblem of its limitation". In short, the inner dynamic and the basic contradictions of any class society must be located at their core: the relations of exploitation. We will examine how this is the case for the wage labour relation in the second part of this chapter. Elsewhere, Marx stresses the role played by the development of commodity relations in accelerating the decline of previous social formations: "It goes without saying - and shows itself if we go more deeply into the historic epoch under discussion here - that in truth the period of dissolution of the earlier modes of production and modes of the worker's relation to the objective conditions of labour is at the same time a period in which monetary wealth on the one side has already developed to a certain extent, and on the other side grows and expands rapidly through the same circumstances as accelerate the above dissolution" (ibid, p 506).
In International Reviews no 71 [200] and no 72 [232] we published the first two articles in this series, in which we demonstrated how the proletarian revolution of October 1917 was the result of the conscious and massive action of the workers, of their political combat against the parties of the bourgeoisie (Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries...) who tried to sabotage their struggle and ensnare them in the First World War. We also laid out how in this formidable display of consciousness and combativity the Bolshevik Party had clearly played a vanguard role in the development of class consciousness and was the crucible of this immense revolutionary energy that led towards the destruction of the bourgeoisie state in the insurrection of 24-25 October. Stalinism was not the continuation of this torrent of emancipatory energy, but its brutal executioner, as we have said on numerous occasions[1].
Faced with the degeneration embodied by Stalinism, many workers believe, accepting the lies spread by the bourgeoisie, that the Russian Revolution "rotted from within", that the Bolsheviks just used the Russian workers in order to take power[2]. When the bourgeoisie portrays October, it does no more than apply to the Russian revolution the characteristics that have always made up its politics: swindling and deceiving the masses. However, the course of events leading up to the insurrection of October was driven by the "historic laws" of the proletarian revolution and not by the Machiavellian politics of the bourgeoisie.
"The Russian Revolution has but confirmed the basic lesson of any great revolution, the law of its being, which decrees: either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy and resolute tempo, breaking down all barriers with an iron hand and placing its goals ever farther ahead, or it is quite soon thrown backwards behind its feeble point of departure and suppressed by counter-revolution" (Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution).
If the formidable abundance of experience from February to October 1917 demonstrates to the workers that it is possible to overthrow the bourgeois state, the tragedy of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution teaches us another equally important lesson: the proletarian revolution can only survive by spreading over the whole planet.
"The fate of the revolution in Russia depended fully upon international events. That the Bolsheviks have based their policy entirely upon the world proletarian revolution is the clearest proof of their political farsightedness and firmness of principle and the bold scope of their policies" (Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution).
In fact, from 1914 when the First World War made it clear that the period of capitalism's decadence had begun, the Bolsheviks were in the vanguard of revolutionaries, when they demonstrated that the alternative to world war can only be the world revolution of the proletariat.
With this firmly internationalist orientation, Lenin and the Bolsheviks saw in the Russian Revolution "...only the first stage of the proletarian revolution which will inevitably arise as a consequence of the war."
But the Russian Revolution did not passively leave its destiny to the development of the proletarian revolution in other countries. Despite all the difficulties it confronted in Russia, it continually took the initiative to extend the revolution. In fact the state which arose from the revolution was seen as the first step towards the International Republic of Soviets, delineated not by the artificial frontiers of the capitalist nations, but by class frontiers. For example, systematic propaganda was carried out towards war prisoners, in order to incite them to join the international revolution, and those who wanted to could become Soviet citizens[3].
Out of this propaganda arose the "Social Democratic Organisation of Prisoners of War in Russia". This organisation called on the workers of Germany, Austria, Turkey etc to rise up in order to put an end to the war and to spread the revolution.
Germany was the pivotal point for the extension of the revolution and it was towards the German workers that all the energies of the Russian revolution were poured. As soon as an embassy was installed in Berlin (April 1918), it was transformed into a kind of general headquarters of the German revolution. The Russian Ambassador Joffe bought secret information from German functionaries and passed it on to German revolutionaries in order to expose the imperialist policies of the government; he also bought arms for the revolutionaries; tons of revolutionary propaganda were printed in the embassy and every night German revolutionaries surreptitiously went there in order to discuss the preparations for the insurrection.
The priorities of the world revolution led the Russian workers, even though they were suffering from hunger, to sacrifice three train loads of wheat, from their own rations, in order to help the German workers.
It is worth while knowing what it was like to live in Russia during the first moments of the revolution in Germany. When it first began, at an impressive demonstration of workers in front of the Kremlin,
"Tens of thousands of workers burst into a wild cheering. Never have I seen any thing like it again. Until late in the evening workers and Red Army soldiers were filing past. The world revolution had come. The mass of people heard its iron tramp. Our isolation was over" (Radek, quoted in E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 3, p104).
Another contribution to this world revolution, although unfortunately delayed, was the first Congress of the Communist International, which took place in Moscow in March 1919. The International understood that:
"Our task is to generalize the revolutionary experience of the working class, cleanse the movement of the corroding influence of opportunism and social patriotism, and rally the forces of all truly revolutionary parties of the world proletariat. Thus, we will facilitate and hasten the victory of the communist revolution in the entire world" (‘Manifesto of the Communist International to the Workers of the Whole World').
However, the proletariat was massacred in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and Munich, and the Communist International began to make concessions to parliamentarism, trade unionism and national liberation (encapsulated in the so-called "21 conditions"). Similarly the extension of the revolution was now entrusted to the "revolutionary war", which the Bolsheviks, as we will see further on, had rejected when they signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in 1918[4]. In December 1920, the Executive Committee of a CI already on the road to degeneration launched the nefarious slogan of the "United Front", based on a conviction that the European revolution was fading.
The fatalistic logic so common to bourgeois philosophy considers that "one thing leads ... to another". Thus, the Communist International, as well as all the other gigantic efforts of the working class and revolutionaries, is presented to us, from its beginnings, as a preconceived plan by the "Machiavellian" Bolsheviks, as a tool for the defence of the Russian capitalist state. But as we have said this is the logic of the bourgeoisie. For the proletariat by contrast, the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and the Communist International were the result of the defeat of the working class after a furious struggle against the bestial reaction of world capitalism. If it was "only a matter of time" before the revolution stewed in its own juice, as the bourgeoisie tell us today, why then did all the capitalists of the world join together in order to strangle the Russian revolution?
Between 1917 and 1923, i.e. until the failure of the revolutionary efforts of the world proletariat, all of the capitalists united in an international crusade under the slogan "down with Bolshevism". From German imperialism to the Czarist generals and the Western democracies of the Entente, who only a few months previously were entangled in the first world imperialist slaughter, they all signed up for this crusade. This is another essential lesson of October: when the workers' insurrection threatens the existence of capitalism, the exploiters put their differences aside in order to crush the revolution.
The first barrier the extension of the Russian Revolution faced was the siege by the Kaiser's armies. Therefore, it is certain that the Russian revolution, along with the revolutionary wave that arose as a response to the First World War, took place, as Rosa Luxemburg said, in "the most difficult and abnormal conditions" for the development and extension of the revolution, i.e. world war.
Peace was an imperious necessity and as such took first place in the priorities of the revolution. Peace talks began at Brest-Litovsk, on the 19th of November 1917. They were transmitted by radio nightly. Not only for the workers in Russia, but also the prisoners of war and the workers of the entire world. However, this does not mean that the Bolsheviks went to Brest-Litovsk with any confidence in the "peaceful" intentions of German imperialism:
"We conceal from nobody that we do not consider the present capitalist governments capable of a democratic peace. Only the revolutionary struggle of the working masses against their governments can bring Europe near to such a peace. Its full realisation will be assured only by a victorious proletarian revolution in all capitalist countries" (Trotsky, cited in E. H. Carr, op. cit. Vol. 3, page 41).
At the beginning of 1918 news began to arrive of strikes and mutinies in Germany, Austria, and Hungry[5], which encouraged the Bolsheviks to prolong the negotiations; but in the end these uprising were crushed. This led Lenin, again in a minority in the Bolshevik Party, to defend the necessity to sign the peace treaty as soon as possible. The extension of the revolution, for which they struggled dauntlessly, should not be confused with the "revolutionary war" that the Left Communists put forward[6]. It depended on the maturation of the revolution in Germany:
"It is fully admissible that with such premises not only would it be "convenient", but absolutely obligatory to accept the possibility of defeat and the loss of Soviet power. Nevertheless, it is clear that these premises do not exist. The German Revolution is maturing, but clearly it still has not broken out. It is obvious that we would not help but would block this process of maturation in Germany if "we accepted the possibility of the loss of Soviet power". This would help reaction in Germany, it would unleash difficulties for the socialist movement in Germany, we would divide the socialist movement of the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses of Germany who have still not incorporated socialism and who would be frightened by the defeat of Soviet Russia, in the same way that the defeat of the Paris Commune of 1871 scared the English workers" (Lenin, Selected Works).
This is the dilemma that exists in a bastion where the proletariat has taken power, but is momentarily isolated, since the revolution has not been spread by victorious insurrections in other countries. To cede the bastion or to negotiate, and therefore give way in front of superior military force, in order to try to obtain a respite and maintain the revolutionary bastion as a support for the world revolution?. Rosa Luxemburg, who certainly did not agree with the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, summed up with tremendous clarity how the struggle of the German proletariat was the only possible way of unblocking this contradiction, in a way which was favourable to the revolution:
"The whole assumption of the battle being carried out for peace by the Russians rests on the tactical hypothesis that the revolution in Russia will be the signal for the revolutionary uprising of the proletariat in the West ... In this case only and undoubtedly will the Russian Revolution have been the prelude to a generalized peace. Until now nothing like this has happened. The Russian Revolution, apart from a few valiant efforts by the Italian proletariat (the general strike of the 22nd August in Turin) has been abandoned by the proletarians of all countries ... however, the class politics of the international proletariat, by their nature and essence, can only be realised internationally ..."
(‘Historical Responsibility', Spartacus Letters no 18. Published in French in Rosa Luxemburg: Contre La Guerre Par La Revolution pages 128-129).
In the end, on the 19th of February, the German High Command suddenly renewed military operations ("The leap of this wild beast is very quick" Lenin said). Within a few weeks the German forces were at the gates of Petrograd and the Russian government finally had to accept peace on even worse conditions: the German armies occupied the former Baltic provinces in the Spring of 1918, the greater part of Byelorussia, all the Ukraine and the North of the Caucasus and later, in contradiction with its own agreement at Brest-Litovsk, the Crimea and the Trans-Caucasus (except Baku and Turkestan).
Along with the Italian Communist Left[7], we don't think that the peace of Brest-Litovsk represented a backward step for the revolution, but that it was imposed by the contradiction between the maintenance of the proletarian bastion and the extension of the revolution. The solution to this problem was not to be found at the negotiating table, nor at the military front, but in the response of the world proletariat. It was precisely when the capitalists managed to defeat the revolutionary wave that the Russian government accepted the conventional "foreign policy" of the capitalist states and signed the Rapallo agreement of April 1922, which neither in its form (a secret treaty), nor of course in its content (military aid from the Russian army for the German government) had anything to do with Brest-Litovsk or with the revolutionary politics of the proletariat. When the CI, in the full process of degeneration, called on the German workers to make a desperate action in October 1923, the arms used by the German state to massacre the workers had been sold to them by the Russian government.
The allies of the Entente, the "advanced democracies of the West" spared no effort in their aim of drowning the Russian revolution. In the Ukraine, in Finland, in the Baltic countries, in Bessarabia, Britain and France set up regimes which supported the counter-revolutionary White armies.
Not content with this, they also decided to directly intervene in Russia. Japanese troops disembarked at Vladivostok on the 3rd of April. French, British and American detachments arrived later:
"From the beginning of the November (1917) revolution the Entente powers took the side of the Russian counter-revolutionary parties and governments. With the help of the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, they have annexed Siberia, the Urals, the coasts of European Russia, the Caucasus, and part of Turkestan. They are stealing timber, petroleum, manganese, and other raw materials from these annexed territories. With the help of mercenary Czechoslovak bands they stole the gold reserves of the Russian empire. Directed by the British diplomat Lockhart, British and French spies organized the bombing of bridges and destruction of railways and tried to cut off food supplies. The Entente supplied money, weapons, and military aid to the reactionary generals Denikin, Kolchak, and Krasnov, who had hanged and shot thousands of workers and peasants in Rostov, Yuzovka (Donetsk), Novorossiak, Omsk and elsewhere" (‘The International Situation and the Policy of the Entente', First Congress of the Communist International, in Founding the Communist International page 218).
At the beginning of 1919, which is to say just as the German revolution broke out, Russia was completely isolated from the outside and confronted with one of the most intense periods of activity by the troops of the Western "democracies", as well as the White armies. To the troops sent by the capitalists to crush the revolution, the Bolsheviks again proclaimed the necessity for proletarian internationalism:
"You will be fighting not against enemies (ran a leaflet addressed to British and American troops in Archangel) but against working class people like yourselves. We ask you - are you going to crush us? ... Be loyal to your class and refuse to do the dirty work of your masters" (E.H.Carr, op. cit, page 99).
And again the calls of the Bolsheviks (this time in newspapers such as The Call in English or La Lanterne in French) had an effect on the troops sent to fight the revolution: "On the 1st March 1919 a mutiny occurred among French troops ordered to go up the line; several days earlier a British infantry company "refused to go to the Front" and shortly afterwards an American company "refused for a time to return to duty at the Front'" (E.H.Carr, op cit, page 134). In April 1919 French troops and the French fleet had to be withdrawn because of the indignation caused by the execution of Jeanne Labourbe, a Communist militant who had carried out propaganda in favour of fraternization between French and Russian troops. Likewise, British and Italian troops had to be withdrawn because in Britain and Italy workers were demonstrating against the sending of troops or arms to the counter-revolutionary armies. Therefore, the Western democracies were forced to change tactics and instead to use troops of the nations created by them out of the ruins of the old Russian empire as a cordon sanitaire against the spread of the revolution. In April 1919 Polish troops occupied part of Bylorussia and Lithuania. In April 1920 they occupied Kiev in the Ukraine and finally in May/June 1920, the Polish government supported by White general Denikin controlled almost all of the Ukraine. Enver Pasha, leader of the Young Turks "anti-feudal" revolution, ended up heading an anti- Soviet revolt in Turkestan in October 1921.
After the October insurrection and the workers' seizure of power throughout Russia, the remains of the bourgeoisie, of the army, the reactionary officer castes (Cossacks, Tekins ...) immediately began to regroup their forces behind the flag of the Provisional Government (curiously enough the same flag that Yeltsin flies in the Kremlin), forming the first White armies under the command of Kaledin, chief of the Don Cossacks.
However, the immense chaos and penury that ravaged isolated Russia, the "self-demobilization" of the remains of the Czarist army, the meagre armed forces of the revolutionaries, but above all the actions of German imperialism and the Western democracies in support of the White armies, progressively tipped the balance of class forces towards Civil War. In the middle of 1918, the territory under the Soviets was reduced to that of the feudal principality of Moscow, and the revolution was also confronted with the revolt by the "Czech Legion" and the anti-Bolshevik government in Samara[8], which cut off vital communications with Siberia. To this we have to add the Cossacks of Krasnov (the general defeated at Pulkvo in the first days of the insurrection and later freed by the Bolsheviks), Denikin's army in the South, Kaledin's in the Don, Kolchak in the East, Yudenitch in the North. All in all a bloody orgy of terror, of massacres, murder and atrocities, loudly applauded by the "democrats" and blessed by the "Socialists" who in Germany, Austria, Hungry and elsewhere were crushing the workers' insurrections.
Bourgeois historians present the bestiality of the Civil War "as something that happens in all wars", as the fruit of human "savagery". However, the cruel Civil War that raged for three years and caused, along with the disease and hunger resulting from the economic blockade up to seven million deaths, was imposed on the population of Russia by world capitalism.
Along with the Western armies and the White armies, there were the sabotage and counter-revolutionary conspiracies of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. In July 1918 Savinkov[9] organized, with funds supplied by the French ambassador, Noulens, a mutiny in Yaroslav, where for two weeks an authentic terror and revenge was waged against all that smacked of the proletariat and revolutionary Bolshevism. Also in July, only a few days after the disembarkation of the Franco-British force in Murmansk, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries organized an attempted coup, after the assassination of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach, with the aim of immediately relaunching hostilities with Germany. Lenin called this "another monstrous blow by the petty bourgeoisie". All the revolution needed at that time was an open war with Germany!
The revolution struggled between life and death. Survival, which depended on the revolution in Europe, demanded endless sacrifices, not only on the economic terrain as we have seen, but also on the political terrain. In this article we don't want to enter into an debate about such questions as the repressive apparatus or the regular army[10], about which the Russian revolution supplies endless lessons. Nonetheless it is important to point out that the movement from revolutionary violence to outright terror, as well as the subordination of the workers' militias to a hierarchical army or the increasing autonomy of the state from the workers' councils, were in great part the consequences of the isolation of the revolution, of the increasingly adverse relation of force between the bourgeoisie and proletariat internationally, which is what definitively decided the fate of a revolution that had triumphed in a single country.
There is no logical evolution from the Cheka, which, when it was formed in November 1917, accounted for hardly 120 men and did not have cars to make arrests with, and the monstrous political apparatus of the GPU - used by Stalin against the Bolsheviks. This evolution expressed a profound degeneration resulting from the defeat of the revolution. Likewise, there was no preconceived continuity between the Red Guards, which were the military units mandated and controlled by the Soviets, and the regular army where conscription was re-introduced in April 1919, along with barrack-room discipline and the military salute: in August 1920 the Red Army already had 315 thousand military "spetsys" (specialists from the Czarist army). The connection between the two was the crushing weight of the struggle between a proletarian bastion that needed the air of the international revolution and a furious world counter-revolution, which became ever more potent with each defeat inflicted on the international body of the proletariat.
In these conditions of isolation, of permanent blockade by the capitalists, of internal sabotage, and independently of any illusions the Bolsheviks had about the possibility of introducing a distinct logic to the economy, the reality was that between 1918 and 1921 the economy in Russia, as Lenin pointed out, was a "besieged fortress", a proletarian bastion, that tried in the worst possible conditions to hold out in the hope of the extension of the revolution.
In other issues of the International Review we have demonstrated that socialism never existed in Russia, since this necessitates, even in its first steps, the triumph of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie on an international scale. The economic policy that could be carried out in an isolated "revolutionary bastion" was necessarily dictated by capitalism's international domination. The idea of "socialism in one country" has always been denounced by revolutionaries as the ideological mask of the Stalinist counter-revolution.
What we want to point out in this article is that the terrible economic scarcity which ravaged the revolution in Russia was not brought about by socialism, but the impossibility of breaking out of this misery as long as the proletarian revolution remained isolated. The difference is without a doubt substantial: with the first thesis the capitalists hope that the workers will draw the lesson that "it is better not to make the revolution and destroy capitalism, because at least it allows you to survive", while the second draws out a fundamental lesson of the workers' struggle, valid for every movement from the strike in the smallest factory to a revolution which occupies a whole country: "if the struggles don't spread, if the revolution remains isolated, we cannot beat capitalism".
The workers' revolution in Russia arose from the First World War, and therefore inherited from this economic chaos, rationing, the subordination of production to the needs of war. Its isolation added further to this suffering due to the rigours of the Civil War and military intervention by the Western democracies. The same people who put on a humanitarian face at Versailles, under the slogan of "live and let live", did not hesitate to impose a draconian economic blockade which lasted from March 1918 to the beginning of 1919 (a few months before the definitive defeat of Wrangel's White army), and which even included the blocking of solidarity donations to the workers in Russia sent by their class brothers and sisters in other countries.
Thus, the population suffered all kinds of privations. Take the example of fuel. The cold sowed Russia with cadavers. Coal from the Ukraine was inaccessible until 1920 and the oil of Baku and the Caucasus was in the hands of the English from the Summer of 1918 until the end of 1919 as a result of the siege established by the capitalists. The total amount of fuel which reached the Russian cities in this period was no more than 10% of the normal supplies before the First World War.
There was bitter hunger in the cities. Bread and sugar had been rationed since the imperialist war. With the Civil War, this rationing reached inhuman levels due to the economic blockade and the sabotage of the peasants who hid part of their crops in order to sell them on the black market. When, in August 1918, the supplies to the shops in the cities had completely run out, it was decided to differentiate the rations:
In October 1919, with the White general Yudenitch at the gates of Petrograd, Trotsky described the population that had to take upon itself the breaking of the attacks by the White Guards, as a jumble of ghosts:
"The workers of Petrograd looked badly then; their faces were grey from under nourishment; their clothes were in tatters; their shoes, sometimes not even mates, were gaping with holes" (Trotsky, My Life, page 445).
In January 1921, although this was after the Civil War had finished, the black bread ration was 800 grams for workers in factories of continuous production and 600 grams for shock workers, and this was reduced to 200 grams for the carriers of "card B" (the unemployed). The same can be said of herrings, which had saved the day at other times, and which were now unavailable. Potatoes almost always arrived in the cities frozen, since the railways and locomotives were in a lamentable state (20% of their pre-war potential). At the beginning of Summer in 1921, a cruel famine developed in the Eastern provinces, such as the Volga region. During this period, according to the Congress of Soviets, between 22 and 27 million people were in need, threatened by starvation, cold and epidemics of typhus[11], diphtheria, flu ...
To these scarce supplies can be added speculation. In order to obtain something to supplement the official rations it was necessary to have recourse to the black market: the "sujarevka" (a name taken from Sujarevski Square in Moscow, where these types of transactions were carried out semi-clandestinely). Half of the grain that arrived in the cities came from the Commissariat of Supplies, the other half from the black market (at 10 times that of the official rate). There was another form of the black market: the illegal transport of manufactured goods to the countryside, in order to exchange them with the peasants for food. Soon the typography of the revolution produced a new person the "bag man", who on the ramshackle freight trains, took salt, matches, sometimes a pair of boots or a little oil in a bottle to the villages in order to exchange them for a few kilos of potatoes and some flour. In September 1918 the government tacitly recognised the black market, limiting it to only 1.5 punds (about 25 kilos) of wheat. From then on the bag man became known as the "pund and a half man", but still continued to profiteer. When factories began to buy goods with the products they produced, this practice spread likewise to workers, transforming them into "bag men", selling straps, tools etc to the villages.
As for working conditions, they were brutally aggravated by the tremendous misery, the isolation of the revolution and the Civil War. This laid ruin to the worker's demands, including the measures the government had adopted in order to satisfy them:
"Four days after the revolution a decree was issued establishing the principle of the 8-hour day and the 48-hour week, placing limitations on the work of women and juveniles and forbidding the employment of children under 14. One year later the Narkomtrud (the People's Commissariat of Labour) had to re-emphasis the obligatory nature of this decree. These prohibitions however had little effect in this period of extreme scarcity of labour due to the Civil War (E.H. Carr, op cit, Vol 2). The same Lenin who had denounced "Taylorism", that is to say the assembly line, identifying it as "the enslavement of man to the machine", finally gave into the demands to increase production, instituting "Communist Saturdays", for which the workers hardly received any food and were generally not paid, because they were seen as supporting the revolution. In the confidence that the revolution was still imminent in Europe, the most combative and conscious sectors of the Russian working class wanted to defend the proletarian bastion with this perspective. But deprived of their Soviets, their workers' assemblies and their class struggle against capitalist exploitation, they were progressively enchained to the most brutal forms of capitalist exploitation
Nevertheless, even despite this over-exploitation, the Russian factories still produced less, both because of the loss of productivity from a undernourished proletariat, and because of the chaos of the Russian economy. Even in 1923, three years after the end of the Civil War, the whole of Russian industry was functioning at 30% of its 1912 capacity. Only in small industry was workers' productivity 57% of that in 1913. This small industry developed above all from 1919, in great part it was rural (in fact its production was essentially of tools, rope, furniture ... for the local peasant market) and the workers in them worked in conditions similar to those in agriculture (particularly at the level of working hours).
Given the terrible living conditions in the cities, which we have seen, a large part of the workers emigrated to the countryside and were there integrated into small scale industry. And those still in the cities left the large factories to work in small workshops, where they could obtain bits to sell to the peasantry. In 1920, the total number of workers in industry was 2.2 million, of which only 1.4 million were employed in establishments of over 30 workers.
With the adoption of the NEP (the New Economic Policy) in 1921[12], state firms were confronted by competition from "private" Russian capitalists and the recently arrived foreign investors; therefore, as in any capitalist economy, the state-boss had to produce more and more cheaply. With demobilization after the Civil War and the application of NEP, a wave of unemployment ensued; for example, on the railways, up to half the work force was laid off. Unemployment grow rapidly from 1921. In 1923, there were 1 million officially registered unemployed in Russia.
The peasantry represented 80% of the population. During the insurrection the Congress of Soviets adopted the "Land Decree", which tried to deal with the need of tens of millions of peasants to get hold of a piece of land on which they could feed themselves, while at the same time eliminating the great landowners, which were not only the scourge of the peasants, but also a point of support for the counter-revolution. However, the measures taken did not contribute to the formation of large working units, in which the agricultural workers could exercise a minimum of workers' control. On the contrary, despite such initiatives as the "committees of agricultural workers", or the Kolkhozi ("collective farms"), or the Sovjozi ("Soviet granaries", also called "socialist grain factories", since their mission was to supply cereals to the proletariat of the cities), what spread was the small peasant unit, of ridiculous dimensions, and which could hardly supply the peasant family. In 1917 agricultural units of less than 5 hectares represented 58% of the total; by 1920 this reached 86% of cultivable land. Of course these units, given their meagre size, could in no way alleviate the hunger in the cities. The measures of "forced requisition" with which the Bolsheviks first tried to obtain the food necessary to cover the needs of the proletariat and Red Army not only led to a lamentable fiasco as regards the quantity collected, but more than that they pushed a great number of the peasants into the White armies, or into the armed gangs which very often fought the White armies and the Bolsheviks at the same time, such as was the case with the anarchist Makhno in the Ukraine.
From the summer of 1918 the state tried to help the middle peasants in order to achieve better results: in the first year of the revolution the Supply Commissariat had hardly collected 780 thousand tons of grain; between August 1918 and August 1919 it obtained two million tons. However, the peasant proprietor of a "medium" size holding was not disposed to collaborate:
"The middle peasant produces more food than he needs, and thus, having surpluses of grain, becomes an exploiter of the hungry worker. This is our fundamental task and the fundamental contradiction. The peasant as toiler, as a man who lives by his own toil, who has the oppression of capitalism, such a peasant is on the side of the worker. But the peasant as a proprietor, who has his surpluses of grain, is accustomed to look on them as his property which he can freely sell" (Lenin, cited in E.H. Carr, vol 2, page 164).
Here again the Bolsheviks could not carry out any other policy than the one imposed by the unfavourable balance of forces between the workers' revolution and the domination of capitalism. The solution to this pile of contradictions was not in the hands of the Russian state, nor did it reside in the relations between the proletariat and peasantry in Russia. The only solution could come from the international proletariat:
"At the IXth party congress of March 1919 which proclaimed the policy of conciliating the middle peasant Lenin touched on one of the sore points of collective agriculture. The middle peasant would be won over to the communist society "only... when we ease and improve the economic conditions of his life". But here was the rub:
"if we could tomorrow give 100,000 first-class tractors, supply them with benzene, supply them with mechanics (you know well that for the present this is a fantasy), the middle peasant would say: "I am for the commune (i.e. for communism)". But in order to do this, it is first necessary to conquer the international bourgeoisie, to compel it to give us these tractors".
Lenin did not pursue the syllogism. To build socialism in Russia was impossible without socialized agriculture; to socialize agriculture was impossible without tractors; to obtain tractors was impossible without an international proletarian revolution" (E.H.Carr, op. cit,. Vol 2, page 165). As one can see, neither during the period of "war communism" nor of the NEP was the Russian economy marked by socialism, but by the asphyxiating conditions imposed by the isolation of the revolution:
"We had even more reason to think that if the European working class had conquered power before, we could have remodelled our backward country - economically and culturally; we could have done this with technical and organizational support and that would have permitted us to correct and modify in part or totally our methods of war communism, leading us towards a truly socialist economy" (Lenin, "NEP and the revolution" in Economic Theory and Economic Policy in the construction of Socialism, page 40)
The defeat of the world proletariat revolutionary wave also led to the death of the Russian proletarian bastion. With the death of the revolution a new bourgeoisie could be reconstructed in Russia:
"The bourgeoisie was reconstituted as the revolution degenerated from within, not from the Czarist ruling class, which the proletariat had eliminated in 1917, but on the basis of the parasitic bureaucracy of the state apparatus which under Stalin's leadership was increasingly identified with the Bolshevik party. At the end of the 1920s, this party/state bureaucracy wiped out all those sectors capable of forming a private bourgeoisie, and with which it had been allied (speculators and NEP landowners). In doing so it took control of the economy" (from our supplement "Stalinism and democracy: two faces of capitalist terror').
The consequences of the isolation of the revolution were not only hunger and wars, but also the progressive loss of the principal capital of the revolution: the mass action and consciousness of the working class, which had expanded and deepened so much between February and October 1917 (see the article in International Review no 71).
At the end of 1918, the number of workers in Petrograd was 50% of those at the end of 1916, and in the Autumn of 1920, at the end of the Civil War, the birthplace of the revolution had lost 58% of its population. The new capital Moscow was depopulated by 45% and all of the provincial capitals by 33%. The majority of these workers emigrated to the countryside where life was less painful, but also a large number of these workers had gone into the Red Army and the service of the state:
"When it was hard at the front, we turned to the central committee of the Communist Party on the one hand and to the praesidium of the trade union central council on the other; and from these two sources outstanding proletarians were sent to the front and there created the Red Army in their own image and pattern" (Trotsky, cited in E.H.Carr, op cit, Vol 2 page 206).
Each time the Red Army, composed mainly of peasants, was routed or desertion was rife, brigades of the most determined and conscious workers were recruited, in order to be the vanguard of military operations or as a "containing wall" against peasant desertions. But also, every time they needed to suppress sabotage, organize the chaos in supplies, the Bolsheviks resorted to Lenin's famous slogan "proletarian energy is needed here!". Thus this energy of the revolutionary class was removed from the centres where it was born and where it had been refined, the workers' councils, the Soviets, and was increasingly integrated into the service of the state, which is to say, in the long run into the parasitic bureaucracy, into the organ that would become the organ of the counter-revolution[13]. A progressive devitalisation of the Soviets was the consequence of this:
"When the principal task of the government was the resistance to the enemy and we were obliged to push back all the attacks, control was exercised almost exclusively through orders and the dictatorship of the proletariat naturally took the form of a proletarian military dictatorship. Then, the open organs of Soviet power, the plenary assemblies of the Soviets almost disappeared and control passed directly to the Executive Committees, which is to say limited organs, committees of three or five persons, etc. Often, above all in the regions near to the front line, the "regular" organs of Soviet power, that is to say organs elected by the workers, were replaced local "revolutionary committees" which instead of submitting problems to the examination of the mass assemblies, resolved them on their own initiative" (Trotsky: The Theory Of Permanent Revolution page 126).
And this loss of collective reflection and discussion, took place not only in the assemblies, in the local soviets, but throughout the fabric of the workers' councils. From 1918, the sovereign Congress of Soviets, which was supposed to meet every three months, took place once a year. The Central Committee of Soviets is included in this; it was not able to carry out collective discussions and decisions. When at the VIIth Congress of Soviets (December 1919) the representative of the "Bund" (Jewish Communist Party) asked what the Central Executive Committee was doing, Trotsky replied "The CEC is at the battle front!".
In the end, all decisions and political life was concentrated in the hands of the Bolshevik Party. Kamenev at the IXth Congress of the Bolshevik Party made this clear:
"We administer Russia and we could not administer it any other way than through the communists" (our underlining). We agree with Rosa Luxemburg, who in The Russian Revolution makes the following critique:
""Thanks to the open and direct struggle for governmental power" (Trotsky writes) "the labouring masses accumulate in the shortest time a considerable amount of political experience and advance quickly from one stage to another of their development"
Here Trotsky refutes himself and his own friends. Just because this is so, they have blocked up the fountain of political experience and the sources of this rising development by their suppression of public life (...).
In reality, the opposite is true! It is the very giant tasks which the Bolsheviks have undertaken with courage and determination that demand the most intensive political training of the masses and the accumulation of experience".
The Italian Communist Left made the same point when it drew up a balance sheet of the causes of the defeat of the Russian Revolution:
"Although Marx, Engels, and above all Lenin pointed out many times the necessity to counter the state with its proletarian antidote, capable of impeding its degeneration, the Russian revolution, far from assuring the maintenance and the vitality of the proletariat's class organisations, incorporated them into the state apparatus, thus devouring its own substance" (Bilan no 28).
It was of little importance that the Soviet constitution tried to preserve the political weight of the working class so that the latter had first place in representation in the state (1 delegate for each 25,000 workers, while 125,000 peasants also elected 1 delegate), when already the problem was the absorption of these workers into the conservative machinery of the state.
And once the proletarian revolution was completely defeated in Europe, nothing, not even the iron control the Bolshevik party maintained over society, could prevent world and thus Russian capitalism from taking control of the state and leading it in a direction absolutely opposed to what the communists were trying to do:
"The machine refused to obey the hand that guided it. It was like a car that was not going in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired; as if it were being driven by some mysterious, lawless hand. God knows who, perhaps of a profiteer, or of a private capitalist, or of both. Be that as it may, the car is not going quite in the direction the man at the wheel imagines, and often it goes in an altogether different direction" (Lenin: "Political Report of the Central Committee of the RCP.', 27.3.22, Selected Works, Vol 3 page 620).
"The Bolsheviks feared the counter-revolution coming from the White Armies and other direct expressions of the bourgeoisie and defended the revolution against these dangers. They feared the return of private property through the persistence of small-scale production, particularly that of the peasantry ... But the danger of the counter-revolution did not come from the "kulaks" or from the horribly massacred workers of Kronstadt and the "White plots" the Bolsheviks thought they saw behind this uprising. The counter-revolution won over the corpses of the German proletariat defeated in 1919 and it took its hold in Russia through what was supposed to be the "semi-state" of the proletariat" (Introduction to the ICC's pamphlet The Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, page 8).
The solution to the situation created by the insurrection of October 1917 did not lie in Russia. As Rosa Luxemburg pointed out, "In Russia the problem can only be posed. But it cannot be resolved there". Meanwhile, the answer to this, the revolutionary wave which arose form the First World War, was defeated, as we will see in the next article in this series. This led to a course of events in Russia marked by the accumulation of contradictions, by a desperate search for solutions, none of which could cut the Gordian Knot because the revolution did not spread:
"In any case, the fatal situation in which the Bolsheviks today find themselves confronted with is, like the majority of their errors, a characteristic consequence, for the moment insoluble, of the problem the international proletariat, above all the German proletariat, confronts. To realise the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist revolution in only one country, besieged by a bestial reactionary imperialist domination and surrounded by the most bloody of the generalized wars that the history of humanity has known, is to square the circle. Any revolutionary party would be condemned to failure and to perish in this task, no matter how much it based its policies on a will to win and faith in international socialism or confidence in itself" (Rosa Luxemburg, "The Russian Tragedy" Spartacus Letters, no 11, September 1918).
The Russian revolution is the most important experience in the history of the workers' movement. The future revolutionary proletarian struggles cannot afford to spare any effort in re-appropriating its many lessons. But without doubt, the first of all these is the confirmation of the old marxist war-cry, "workers of the world unite!". This slogan is not just a "nice idea" but the vital precondition for the victory of the communist revolution. International isolation is the death of the revolution.
Etsoem, 27 July 1993
[1] See in particular our supplement "Communism is not dead, but its worst enemy, Stalinism".
[2] Unfortunately, as a consequence of the terrible disappointment that the failure of the Russian revolution assumed caused even amongst revolutionaries, theories such as the councilism have arisen, which present the Russian revolution as no more than a bourgeois revolution and the Bolshevik Party as a bourgeois party. Or there is the case of the Bordigists who define the Russian revolution as a double revolution (bourgeois and proletarian). We have dealt with these errors in articles in International Review no 12 [233] and 13 [234]: "October 1917: the Beginning of the Proletarian Revolution".
[3] The first Soviet Constitution of 1918 gave citizenship "to all foreigners who reside within the territory of the Federation of Soviets providing they belong to the working class or peasantry who do not exploit another's labour"
[4] The sessions of the 2nd Congress of the CI were carried out in front of a map where the advances of the Red Army in its counter-attack against Poland in the summer of 1920 were shown. As is well known, this military incursion served to push the Polish proletariat to close ranks with its bourgeoisie, and ended with the Red Army being defeated at the gates of Warsaw.
[5] In January 1918, a strike of half a million workers exploded in Berlin, which spread to Hamburg, Kiel, the Ruhr, and Leipzig, and in which the first workers' councils were formed. At the same time workers' uprisings took place in Vienna and Budapest, and even the majority of bourgeois journalists (cf. E. H. Carr, op. cit.) recognised that they were a reaction to the Russian revolution and, more concretely, the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.
[6] See International Reviews no 8 and 9 "The Communist Left in Russia".
[7] See International Review no 8, "The Communist Left in Russia', and International Reviews 12 [233] and 13 [234], "October 1917: The Beginning of the Proletarian Revolution". Also see our pamphlet The Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism [235] where through the Russian experience, we examine the problem of negotiations between a proletarian bastion and capitalist governments.
[8] This government ended up controlling all of the middle and lower Volga. In October 1918 400,000 "Volga Germans" rose up and formed a "workers' Commune". The so-called "Czech Legion" were Czechoslovakian prisoners of war authorized by the Russian government to leave Russia via Vladivostok. On the way 60,000 of the 200,000 who made up the expedition mutinied (it also has to be said that 1200 soldiers from this "legion" joined the Red Army) creating an armed gang dedicated to pillage and terror.
[9] This former Social Revolutionary in September 1917 served as the clandestine go-between for Kerensky and Kornilov. In January 1918 he organized an assassination attempt on Lenin and then was the named representative of the "Whites" in Paris, where of course he rubbed shoulders not only with the Allies' secret services, but also with ministers, generals, etc, who as a reward for his "democratic" labours put him in command of the teams of saboteurs, the so-called "Greens", amongst whom figured the famous character Sidney Reilly, Ace of Spies.
[10] See International Review no 3 "The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution'; nos 8 and 9 "The Communist Left In Russia", and 12 and 13, "October 1917: The Beginning of the Proletarian Revolution".
[11] The epidemics of typhus were so extensive and continuous that Lenin maintained that "either the revolution will destroy the lice or the lice will destroy the revolution."
[12] Despite what many members of the Communist Left in Russia thought, the NEP did not represent a return of capitalism, since Russia never had a socialist economy. We have taken a position on this question in International Review No 2, "Answer to Workers Voice" and nos 8 and 9 "The Communist Left in Russia".
[13] Our position on the role of the state in the period of transition, and the relationship between the workers' councils and this state, based on the lessons of the Russian experience, is developed in our pamphlet The Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism and in International Reviews nos 8, 11, 15, and 18. Likewise, for our critique of the idea that the party takes power in the name of the working class see International Reviews nos 23, 34 and 35.
The sudden collapse of the Eastern bloc automatically gave a new lease of life to its old Western rival's propaganda. For decades, the world has lived in the shadow of a double lie: the lie of the existence of communism in the East, identified with a merciless Stalinist dictatorship and opposed to the reign of democratic freedom in the West. This ideological combat was the expression, at the level of propaganda, of the imperialist rivalries between East and West, and it was the 'democratic' illusion which emerged the victor. Already, the camp of liberal democracy has proven victorious in the two world wars which have ravaged the planet since the beginning of the century, and in each case this has further strengthened the democratic ideology.
This is not mere coincidence. The countries which could lay the best claim to embody the democratic ideal were the first to carry out the bourgeois democratic revolution, and to set up purely capitalist states: in particular, Great Britain, France, and the United States of America. Because they came first, they were best served at the economic level. This economic superiority was concretized on both the military and the ideological level. During the conflicts which ravaged the planet since the beginning of the century, the strength of the liberal democracies has always been to convince the workers, who served as cannon fodder, that in fighting for 'democracy' they were defending, not the interests of one capitalist fraction against another, but an ideal of liberty against barbaric dictatorships. During World War I, the French, British and American workers were sent to the slaughter in the name of the struggle against Prussian militarism; during World War II, the brutality of the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships served to justify democratic militarism. After World War II, the ideological combat between the Eastern and Western blocs was assimilated to the struggle between 'democracy' and 'Communist dictatorship'. The Western democracies have always claimed to be fighting against a fundamentally different system: against 'dictatorship'.
Today, the Western democratic model is presented as an ideal of progress transcending economic systems and classes. Citizens are all 'equal' and 'free' to elect political representatives, and therefore the economic system that they want. In a 'democracy' everyone is 'free' to express his or her opinions. If the voters want socialism, or even communism, they need only vote for parties which claim to embody those aims. Parliament reflects 'the will of the people'. Every citizen can appeal to the law against the state. 'Human rights' are respected, etc.
This naive and idyllic vision of democracy is a myth, something that has never existed. Democracy is the ideology which masks the dictatorship of capital in its most developed regions. There is no fundamental difference between the various models that capitalist propaganda presents as opposing each other. All the supposedly different systems which democratic propaganda has presented as its opponents since the beginning of the century are expressions of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, of capital. They may differ in form, but not in kind. The naked totalitarianism of the Nazi or Stalinist regimes is not the expression of different economic systems, but the result of the development of the state totalitarianism characteristic of decadent capitalism, and of the universal development of state capitalism which marks the 20th century. In fact the superiority of the old Western democracies lies essentially in their greater ability to hide the signs of state totalitarianism.
Myths have a long life. But the economic crisis which is deepening daily in the most dramatic fashion is uncovering all the lies. Thus the illusion of Western prosperity, which was presented as being eternal at the point when the former Eastern bloc collapsed, died the death some time ago. The lie of democracy is of a different ilk, because it is not based on such immediate fluctuations. However, dozens of years of crisis have led to increasing tensions within the ruling class both internationally and internally within each national capital. As a result, the bourgeoisie has had to maneuver in all areas of its activity, to a far greater extent than ever before. There are more and more examples of how little the bourgeoisie adheres to its democratic ideals. All over the world, the 'responsible' political parties, from right to left, all of whom have followed the same policies of austerity against the working class when they have been in office, are suffering from a general loss of credibility. This loss of credibility, which affects the whole of the state apparatus, is the product of the growing divorce between the state which imposes all the misery and civil society which has to put up with it. But this state of affairs has been still further strengthened in recent years by the process of decomposition which affects the entire capitalist world. In all countries, the hidden rivalries between the various clans who inhabit the state apparatus have come to the surface in the form of endless scandals that expose how rotten the ruling class has become. Corruption and prevarication have become a gangrene throughout the state apparatus, politicians work hand in hand with all kinds of gangsters and swindlers, and all of this goes on in the secret corridors of power, unbeknownst to the public. Little by little the sordid reality of the totalitarian state of decadent capitalism is piercing the veil of democratic appearances. But this does not mean that the whole mystification has vanished. The ruling class knows how to use its own decay to reinforce its propaganda, using the scandals as a justification for a new struggle for democratic purity. Even though the crisis continually saps the bases of the bourgeoisie's domination and undermines its ideological grip on the exploited, the ruling class only becomes more determined to use all the means at its disposal to hold on to power. The democratic lie was born with capitalism; it will only disappear with it.
The 19th Century: bourgeois democracy, but just for the bourgeoisie
The dominant fractions of the world bourgeoisie can claim to be democratic because this corresponds to their own history. The bourgeoisie carried out its revolution and overthrew feudalism in the name of democracy and liberty. The bourgeoisie organized its political system in accord with its own economic needs. It abolished serfdom in the name of individual liberty, to allow the creation of a vast proletariat composed of wage laborers ready to sell their labor power individually. Parliament was the arena where the different parties representing the multiple interests existing within the bourgeoisie, and the different sectors of capital, could confront each other to decide the composition and orientations of the government in charge of the executive. For the ruling class, parliament was then a real place for debate and decision-taking. This is the historic model which our 'democracies' claim to represent today, the form of political organization adopted by the dictatorship of capital in its youthful period. This is the model that was adopted by the bourgeois revolution in Britain, France and the USA.
However, we should note that this classic model was never absolutely universal. Democratic rules were often seriously bent for the bourgeoisie to carry through its revolution, and to accelerate the social upheaval necessary to establish its system. We need only consider, amongst others, the French Revolution and the Jacobin terror, followed by the Napoleonic Empire, and the way the bourgeoisie brushed aside its democratic ideal when circumstances required. Moreover, bourgeois democracy was in some ways akin to Athenian democracy, within which all the citizens could take part in elections, except of course the slaves and foreigners who were not citizens.
In the democratic system first set up by the bourgeoisie, only property-holders could vote: for the workers, there was no right of free speech, nor freedom of organization. It took years of bitter struggle before the working class won the right to organize in trades unions, and to impose the principal of universal suffrage. The active participation of the workers in democratic institutions in order to win reforms, or to support the most progressive fractions of the bourgeoisie, was hardly part of the bourgeois revolution's program. Indeed, whenever the workers' struggle succeeded in winning new democratic rights, the bourgeoisie did its best to limit their effects. For example, when a new electoral law was adopted in Italy in 1882, a friend of Depretis, then head of the government, described his attitude as follows: "He feared that the participation of new social strata in public life would have as a logical consequence profound upheavals in the state institutions. From then on, he did everything he could to build solid dikes against the flood-tide he so feared" (F Martin, cited by Sergio Romano in Histoire de L'Italie du Risorgimento a nos jours, Le Seuil, Paris 1977). This sums up perfectly the ruling class' attitude, and its conception of democracy and parliament during the 19th century. Fundamentally, the workers were excluded from it. Democracy was not made for them, but so that capitalism could be well managed. Whenever the clearest fractions of the bourgeoisie supported certain reforms and proclaimed their approval for a greater participation of the workers in the functioning of 'democracy', through universal suffrage or the right of union organization, it was done the better to control the working class and to avoid social upheavals in production. It is no accident that the first bosses to organize themselves against the pressure of workers' struggles and at the same time the most in favor of reforms were those of big industry. In big industry the capitalists, confronted with the massive strength of the many proletarians that they employed, were fully conscious of the necessity both to control the explosive potential of the working class by allowing parliamentary and union activity, and to permit reforms (limitation of the working day, outlawing child labor) which would improve the health of the labor force and thus its productivity.
However, while the exploited were fundamentally excluded, the parliamentary democracy of the 19th Century was the way the bourgeoisie functioned. The legislative dominated the executive; the parliamentary system and democratic representation were social realities.
The 20th Century: 'Democracy' without content
By the beginning of the 20th century capitalism had conquered the world, and reached the limits of its geographic expansion. It had also reached the objective limit of the markets required for its production. The capitalist relations of production were transformed into fetters on the development of the productive forces. Capitalism as a whole entered into a period of world crises and world wars.
This decisive upheaval in the life of capital led to a profound modification in the political mode of life of the bourgeoisie and the functioning of its state apparatus.
The bourgeois state is in essence the representative of the global interests of the national capital. Everything to do with global economic difficulties, the threats of crisis and the means of overcoming them, and with the organization of imperialist war, is the business of the state. With the entrance of capitalism into its decadent period the role of the state thus becomes preponderant because it alone is capable of maintaining a minimum of order in a capitalist society torn apart by its own contradictions. "The state is the proof that society is caught in an insoluble contradiction with itself" said Engels. The development of an octopus-like state which controls all the aspects of economic, political and social life is the fundamental characteristic of the mode of organization of capitalism in its decadent phase. It is the totalitarian response of capitalist society in crisis. "State capitalism is the form capitalism tends to take in its phase of decline" (ICC Platform).
As a result power in bourgeois society is concentrated in the hands of the executive at the expense of the legislative. This phenomenon was particularly clear during the First World War when the needs of war and the interests of the national capital did not permit democratic debate in parliament and imposed an absolute discipline on all the fractions of the national bourgeoisie. But afterwards it was maintained and reinforced. The bourgeois parliament became an empty shell which no longer played any decisive role.
The Third International recognized this reality at its 2nd Congress when it proclaimed that "the center of gravity of political life today has completely and definitively left parliament", that "parliament cannot in any case, at the present time, be the theatre of a struggle for reforms and for the improvement of the situation of the working class, as it could at certain moments in the previous epoch". Not only could capitalism in crisis no longer grant durable reforms, but the bourgeoisie had definitively lost its economically and socially progressive historic role. All its fractions had become equally reactionary.
In this process the political parties of the bourgeoisie lost their primary function, that of representing different interest groups, different economic sectors of capital within the 'democratic' life of the bourgeoisie in parliament. They became instruments of the state responsible for making the different sectors of society accept the state's policy. From representatives of civil society in the state, the parties became instruments of the state to control civil society. The global interests of the national capital, which were represented by the state, tended to make the political parties of the bourgeoisie fractions of the state totalitarian party. This tendency toward the single party is expressed clearly in Fascist, Nazi or Stalinist regimes. But even when the fiction of pluralism was retained, in situations of sharp crisis such as imperialist war, the reality of a hegemonic party or the domination of a single party was imposed. This was the case at the end of the thirties and during the war which followed, with Roosevelt and the Democratic Party or, in Great Britain during the Second World War with the 'state of emergency', with Churchill and the war cabinet. "In the context of state capitalism, the differences which separate the bourgeois parties are nothing in comparison with what they have in common. All share a general premise according to which the interests of the national capital are superior to all the others. This premise means that different fractions of the national capital are capable of working very closely together, above all behind the closed doors of parliamentary commissions and in the highest echelons of the state apparatus." ('Notes on the consciousness of the decadent bourgeoisie', International Review 31). The leaders of the parties and members of parliament have in reality become state functionaries.
Thus all parliamentary activity loses any real connection with the decisions which the state takes in the name of the higher interest of the nation. Parliament only serves to mask the development of the totalitarian grip of the state on the whole of society. The 'democratic' functioning of the dominant class, even within the limits of the 19th century, no longer exists. It has become a pure mystification, a lie.
'Democratic' totalitarianism against the working class
Why then maintain such a costly and complicated 'democratic' apparatus if it no longer corresponded to the needs of capital? In fact, this whole organization retained an essential function at a moment when the permanent crisis was pushing the working class toward struggles for the defense of its living conditions and towards revolutionary consciousness. That function consisted of diverting the proletariat from its class terrain, of tangling it up in the 'democratic' game. In this task the state benefited from the support of the so-called Socialist parties after 1914 and the 'Communist' parties after the mid-thirties when they betrayed the class which gave birth to them. These parties are part of the bourgeois apparatus of control and mystification which tries to lend credit to the democratic lie in the eyes of the working class. In the 19th century the proletariat had to struggle to gain the right to vote. In the 20th century in the advanced metropoles, an intensive propaganda campaign is waged by the 'democratic' state to corral the working class onto the electoral terrain. In some countries, Belgium and Italy for example, the vote is even obligatory.
Moreover, when the struggle for reforms has lost any meaning, the unions, which corresponded to the need of the proletariat to better its situation in the framework of capitalist society, lost their utility for the working class. But they did not disappear - the state took hold of them in order to better control the exploited class. The unions complete the apparatus of 'democratic' coercion by the ruling class.
But then one may legitimately ask the following question: if the apparatus of democratic mystification is so useful to the dominant class, to its state, why isn't this mode of controlling society imposed everywhere, in all countries? It is interesting to note in this respect that the two regimes which most clearly symbolize state totalitarianism of the 20th century, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, were built on the crushing of the proletariat following the defeat of the revolutionary attempts which marked the entry of capitalism into decadence. Faced with a proletariat profoundly weakened by defeat, decimated by repression, the question of its control was posed differently for the bourgeoisie. In these conditions the democratic mystification is hardly useful and totalitarian state capitalism can appear without a mask. Moreover, precisely because, from the strict point of view of the functioning of the state machine, the 'democratic' apparatus inherited from the 19th century became superfluous at the beginning of the century, certain sectors of the bourgeoisie, recognizing this state of affairs, theorized its redundancy. Fascism is an expression of this tendency. The maintenance of a heavy 'democratic' machine is not only dispensable, but also demands an adequate economy to make it credible and a ruling class sufficiently experienced to manage it subtly. In the underdeveloped countries these factors are mostly unavailable and the weakness of the local proletariat doesn't encourage the bourgeoisie to put such a system in place. Consequently, military dictatorships are common in these countries. In these countries the weakness of the economy is expressed in the weakness of the local bourgeoisie, and here the army is the best fraction of the bourgeois state to represent the overall interest of the national capital and to provide the skeleton of the state apparatus. This role can also be played by militarized parties inspired by the Stalinist model, as in China.
Far from being the expression of a sort of perversion of the democratic purity of capitalism, the different dictatorships and openly totalitarian States which mark the whole history of the 20th century are on the contrary the manifestation of the general tendency towards state capitalism's totalitarian hold over all the economic, social and political aspects of life. They show the reality of state totalitarianism in decadent capitalism and show what is hidden behind the democratic veil of the ruling class in the developed countries. There is no qualitative difference in the functioning of those states which pretend to be democratic. The reality is simply better hidden.
In France in the thirties the same parliamentary assembly which had been elected with the Popular Front voted full powers to Marshall Petain. This was not an aberration, but, on the contrary, the clear expression of the inanity of democratic pretensions and the whole parliamentary game in capitalist decadence. Furthermore, after the war, the state which was installed by the Liberation was basically in continuity with the one which collaborated with Nazi Germany. The police, the judiciary, the economic and even political oligarchies who had been distinguished by their collaborationist zeal remained in place, except for some rare exceptions used as expiatory victims. It was the same in Italy where, like in France, some 90% of state functionaries retained their posts after the fall of the Fascist regime.
On top of this it is easy to show that our 'democracies' are never embarrassed to support or use this or that 'dictatorship' when it corresponds to their strategic needs, or even to install such 'dictatorships'. Examples aren't lacking: the USA in Latin America, or France in most of the its ex-African colonies.
The cleverness of the old Western 'democracies' consists in using the most caricatural forms of the barbarism and brutality of state capitalism to mask the fact that they themselves are no exception to this absolute rule of decadent capitalism - the development of state totalitarianism. In fact, only the most developed capitalist countries have the means to maintain the credibility of a sophisticated 'democratic' apparatus, to wield it for the purpose of mystifying and controlling the working class. In the underdeveloped capitalist world the regimes with a 'democratic' appearance are the exception and in general more the product of an effective support from a 'democratic' imperialist power than the expression of the local bourgeoisie. Their existence is more often provisional, subject to the fluctuations of the international situation. It takes all the power and experience of the oldest and most experienced fractions of the world bourgeoisie to maintain the credibility of the great lie about the democratic functioning of the bourgeois state.
In the most sophisticated form of capitalist dictatorship, that of 'democracy', the capitalist state must maintain the belief that the greatest liberty reigns. Brutal coercion, ferocious repression, must, whenever possible, be replaced by subtle manipulation to give the same result without the victim seeing it. It is not an easy task and only the most experienced fractions of the world bourgeoisie can do it effectively. To do so the state must control all the institutions of civil society. It must develop tentacles everywhere.
The democratic state has not only organized a whole visible and official system of control and surveillance of society but has woven a web of hidden threads which allow it to control and survey the parts of society which it pretends are outside of its competence. This is true for all sectors of society. A caricatural example is that of information. One of the great principles which the democratic state boasts of is the freedom of the press. It is true that in the 'democratic' countries there are many newspapers and often a multitude of different television channels. But close up things are not so idyllic. A whole administrative-juridical system allows the state to corrupt this 'liberty' and in fact the media are completely dependent on the good will of the state which has all the means to suppress a press headline. As for the main television companies, their authorization to broadcast is dependent on the agreement of the state. Nearly everywhere the essential means of information are in the hands of a few magnates who usually have a seat reserved for them in the ante-chambers of the ministries. One can imagine that if they benefit from this enviable position, it is because they have been mandated by the state to play this role. The big press agencies are very often the direct mouthpieces of the state's policies. The Gulf War illustrated this perfectly. The whole of the Western 'free press' was given the responsibility of relaying the great lies of war propaganda, filtering the news, and manipulating opinion to best serve the needs of imperialism. At this time there was hardly any difference between the 'democratic' conception of the media and the Stalinist one that is vilified so much, or Saddam Hussein's for that matter. They all churned out the most vile propaganda, and the loyal Western journalists, standing to attention, servilely checked their information with the army before publishing it - no doubt because of their concern for objectivity.
This gigantic democratic state apparatus finds its justification in the developed countries in the vital need for the ruling class to control the greatest proletarian concentrations of the planet. Although the democratic mystification is an essential aspect of imperialist propaganda for the great Western powers, it is on the social level, as an instrument for the control of the proletariat and of the population in general, that it finds its principle reason for existence. It is the need to lock society in a strait-jacket that compels the democratic state to carry out its large-scale maneuvers, using all the resources of propaganda and manipulation. One of the main occasions when the state maneuvers the heavy apparatus of democracy is the great electoral circus in which the citizens are periodically invited to participate. Elections, though they have lost any meaning as regards the actual operations of the totalitarian state, remain a powerful weapon to atomize the working class in an individualized vote, to divert its discontent onto a sterile terrain, and give credibility to the existence of democracy. It is no accident if the democratic states carry on a vigorous struggle against abstentionism and disaffection, because the participation of workers in the elections is essential to the perpetuation of the democratic illusion. However, even if parliamentary representation no longer has any importance for the functioning of the state, it is nonetheless essential that the results of the elections conform to the needs of the dominant class, so that it can make best use of the mystifying game of the parties and prevent them from being used up too quickly. Notably, the so-called 'left' parties have the specific role of controlling the working class; their position vis-a-vis governmental responsibilities determines their capacity to spread their mystifications and thus effectively control the working class. For example, it is clear that when austerity is on the agenda, as a result of the accelerating crisis, having the left in power threatens its credibility as a force claiming to defend the interest of the working class and leaves it badly placed to control the working class at the level of its struggles. It is thus extremely important for the state to manipulate the result of elections. To achieve this, the state puts in place a whole system for the selection of candidates, with rules designed to avoid surprises. But this is not the essential aspect. The servile press orients the choice through intense ideological campaigns. The subtle game of alliances between parties, with candidates manipulated for the needs of the cause, usually makes it possible to obtain the desired result and the intended governmental majority. It is a banality today that whatever the electoral results the same anti-working class policy remains. The democratic state conducts its policies independently of the elections, which are being organized at an accelerated pace. Elections are a pure charade.
Outside of elections, which are the touchstone of the state's 'democratic' self-justification, there are many other occasions where the latter maneuvers its apparatus to ensure its control. Against strikes for example. In each struggle carried out by the working class on its own terrain it comes up against all the forces of the state: press, unions, political parties, the forces of repression, provocations by the police or other less official organisms, etc.
What basically distinguishes the 'democratic' state from the 'dictatorships', is not in the end the means employed, which are all based on the totalitarian grip of the state on civil society, but the subtlety and efficiency with which they are employed. That is particularly true on the electoral level. Often the 'dictatorships' also look for legitimacy in elections or referenda, but the poverty of their means leads to a parody of what goes on in the rich industrialized countries. But there is no fundamental difference. The parody only shows the underlying general truth. Bourgeois democracy is only the 'democratic' dictatorship of capital.
Behind the decor of the 'democratic' state
While during the ascendant period of capitalism the bourgeoisie could base its class rule on the reality of the progress that its system brought to humanity, in the decadent period not only has this basis disappeared, but all capitalism can now offer is the misery of a permanent economic crisis and the murderous barbarism of endless imperialist conflicts. The ruling class can only maintain its rule and the survival of its system through terror and lies. This development has led to deep changes in the internal life of the ruling class, crystallized in the activity of the state apparatus.
What enables the state to cope with this new situation is its capacity to impose its repressive and military force, to make lies believable, and to preserve its secrets.
In these conditions, the sectors of the bourgeoisie most able to rise up in the state hierarchy are naturally those who specialize in the use of force, in lying propaganda, in secret activity and in all kinds of sordid maneuvers. That means the army, the police, the secret services, clans and secret societies, and mafia-type gangsters.
The first two sectors have always played an important, indeed indispensable role in the state. A number of generals made their mark on the political life of the bourgeoisie in the 19th century. But in this period, they usually reached the center of the state power only in exceptional situations, in particularly difficult moments for the national capital, as for example during the Civil War in the USA. This militaristic tendency was not the main one in bourgeois political life, as the example of Louis Napoleon showed. Today, however, it is highly characteristic that a considerable proportion of heads of state in the underdeveloped countries are military men, and even in the western 'democracies' we've had such figures as Eisenhower and Haig in the USA, or De Gaulle in France.
The accession to power of high-ranking members of the secret services, however, is a typical phenomenon of the period of decadence, one which clearly expresses the current concerns of the bourgeoisie and the internal functioning of the highest spheres of the state. Once again, this fact is particularly visible in the peripheries of capitalism, in the underdeveloped world. Most often the generals who take on the role of President were former heads of the army's secret services; and, very frequently, when a civilian figure becomes head of state, his previous career was in the 'civilian' secret services or in the political police.
But this state of affairs is not restricted to the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia or Latin America. In the USSR, Andropov was the boss of the KGB, Gorbachev was high up in it as well, and the current President of Georgia, Shevardnadze, is a former KGB general. Particularly significant is the example of Bush in the USA, 'the most democratic country in the world'. He was a former director of the CIA. And these are only the best-known examples. We do not have the means to make a complete list, nor is this our aim here, but it would be interesting to note the impressive number of politicians, ministers and parliamentarians who, before taking up these 'honorable' functions, gained their education in one or other branch of the secret services.
The multiplication of parallel police, of services each more secret than the other, of hidden agencies of all kinds, is a highly salient feature of social life in today's pseudo-democracies. This reveals the real nature of the needs and nature of the state's activities. It is obvious on the imperialist level: spying, provocation, threats, assassination, all kinds of manipulations - all this has become common coin in the defense of national imperialist interests on the world arena. But these are just the more 'patriotic' and 'admissible' aspects of the activities of the secret services. The occult activity of the state is even more developed on the internal level. Systematic filing of information on the population, surveillance of individuals, 'official' and secret phone-tapping, all kinds of provocations aimed at manipulating public opinion, infiltration of all sectors of civil society, hidden financing, etc - the list is a long one, and the state has recruited the manpower to do it all in secret, precisely in order to keep up the myth of the 'democratic' state. To carry out these tasks the state has recruited the dregs of society; the services of the mafia have been much appreciated and the distinction between gangster and secret agent has become increasingly vague, because these specialists in crime are quite capable of selling their skills to the highest bidder. For many years, the state has made use of the various networks of influence that existed in society - secret societies, mafia, sects - integrating them into its national and international policies, even raising them up to the higher spheres of the state. In fact the 'democratic' state does exactly what it denounces the 'dictatorships' for, but more discretely. Their secret services are not only at the heart of the state; they are also its antennae within civil society.
Parallel to this process, which has led to the ascent of fractions of the bourgeoisie whose way of life is based on secrecy, the entire functioning of the state has become more and more hidden. Behind the appearance of government, the real centers of decision have become invisible. Numerous ministers have no real power and are there to play to the gallery. This tendency reached its most cynical level with President Reagan, whose rather paltry acting talents allowed him to parade in front of the media, but who had no role at all in defining political orientations. For this there are other centers of decision, most of them unknown to the public. In a world where the ideological propaganda of the media has become increasingly important, the most essential quality for a politician is to know how to talk, to 'come across well' on the TV. Sometimes this is enough to make a career. But behind the political stage-sets erected to give the state a human face lurk a whole plethora of committees, agencies, lobbies animated by grey figures, most of them unknown to the general public, but ensuring the continuity of state policy, and thus the reality of power, without regard to the fluctuations of government.
This increasingly hidden operation of the state does not at all mean that disagreements and opposing interests have disappeared within the ruling class. On the contrary, with the deepening of the world economic crisis, divisions within each national bourgeoisie are sharpened. It's very clear that fractions crystallize around the choice of which imperialist alliances to make. But this isn't the only factor of division within the bourgeois class. Economic choices, the question of what attitude to adopt towards the working class, are other issues which give rise to debates and disagreements; also, the sordid scramble for power and influence as a means to amassing wealth is a permanent source of conflict between different clans of the ruling class, quite apart from real differences in orientation. These differences within the ruling class find their expression not so much through divisions into political parties, i.e. at the visible level, as through the formation of cliques which inhabit all echelons of the state and whose existence is hidden from ordinary mortals. The clan warfare to gain influence within the state is very severe, and yet it seldom sees the light of day. Here again, there is little to choose between the 'dictatorships' and the 'democracies'. Fundamentally, the war for power is waged outside the ken of the great majority.
The present situation of deep economic crisis, of the overturning of alliances following the collapse of the eastern bloc, has sharpened the rivalries and conflicts between the capitalist clans within the state. The various scandals, the 'suicides' of politicians and businessmen that we hear more and more about these days, are the visible manifestation of this shadowy war between the clans of the bourgeoisie. The proliferation of 'affairs' provides us with the opportunity to glimpse the real way the state operates behind the democratic smokescreen. In this respect the situation in Italy is particularly revealing. The P2 Lodge Affair, the Gladio Affair, the mafia scandals and all the scandals about corrupt politicians are an exemplary illustration of the totalitarian reality of the 'democratic' state which we have tried to deal with in this article. The concrete example of Italy will thus constitute the backbone of the second part of this article.
JJ
Reference articles: ICC pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism; International Review no 31: 'Machiavellianism, the consciousness and unity of the bourgeoisie; International Review no 66: 'The massacres and crimes of the 'great democracies').
The "peace" between Israel and the PLO in the Middle East shows itself to be just another prolongation of the unending war in this part of the world. Since the First World War the Middle East has been a major battle-ground for conflicting imperialist interests and it will remain so as long as capitalism exists. In this respect it is no different from all the other regions of the world where war has been continuous in open or latent form.
In Yugoslavia the war continues. Now battles are even taking place within the various camps; between Serbs, between Croats and between Muslims! These most recent conflicts give the lie in a very tragic way to the "ethnic" explanation for this war. And on this question the media has fallen silent! Under the cover of the "peoples'" "right to independence" ex-Yugoslavia has become a sinister experiment for the new confrontations between the great powers, produced by the disappearance of the old imperialist blocs. Here too there can be no turning back; capitalism has a free hand to carry out its war diplomacy in the name of "humanitarian" aid.
In Russia the situation just gets worse and worse. The shipwrecked economy has declined dramatically and the political instability that has already dragged whole areas of the ex-USSR into bloody war is more and more gnawing at the very heart of Russia. The danger that the kind of chaos existing in Yugoslavia will spread is a very real one. Here too capitalism has no perspective other than war.
Wars and crisis, social decomposition; this is the "future" that capitalism offers humanity for the last decade of the century.
In the "developed" countries which form the nerve center of this world capitalist system of terror, death and misery, workers' struggles have erupted over the last few months after four years of reflux and passivity. These struggles show that workers are beginning to mobilize against the austerity plans that are of a brutality unknown seen since the Second World War. They also contain in embryo the only possible response to the decadence and decomposition of the capitalist mode of production. In spite of all their limitations they already constitute a step towards the battle of class against class, a massive and international struggle of the proletariat. This is the only way to check the attacks against living conditions, the misery and wars that today stalk the planet.
The development of the class struggle
For several months now strikes and demonstrations have been on the increase in the main countries of Western Europe. The social calm that had reigned for nearly four years has been definitively broken.
The brutality of the redundancies and wage cuts and all the other austerity measures accompanying them, has provoked a growing discontent. On several occasions this has led to a renewed combativity, and a clear determination not to give up in the face of threatened attacks against all the living conditions of the working class.
The firm control of the movement everywhere by the trades unions does not reduce the importance of this development in the class struggle. In every country, the unions' calls for demonstrations and strikes are symptomatic of the growth in combativity within the ranks of the workers. Because of the place they occupy in the capitalist state as guardians of social order on behalf of the national capital, the unions see clearly that the working class isn't ready to passively accept the attacks against its living conditions. So they take the lead. The unions adopt a strategy that aims to prevent the development of the class struggle. They do so by misdirecting workers' demands and imprisoning them in corporatism and nationalism and by derailing the will to struggle into dead-ends. But the fact that they are adopting such a strategy is an indication that a real resurgence of class struggle is now taking place at an international level.
The resurgence of workers' combativity
The end of 1993 has been marked by strikes and demonstrations in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Britain, France and Spain.
The strikes and demonstrations in Germany[1] at the beginning of autumn set the tone. Every sector was affected by a strong wave of discontent. This forced the unions to orchestrate wide-spread maneuvers in the main industrial sectors. In particular a demonstration of building workers in Bonn on the 28th October in which 120,000 participated, and in the car industry, the "negotiation" of the 4 day working week accompanied by wage reductions at Volkswagen.
The first indications of the resurgence of international class struggle emerged in Italy in September 1992 when there was a large mobilization against the measures of the Amato government and against the official unions who had agreed to the measures. Since September 1993 strikes and demonstrations have increased there. As the large main unions have been severely discredited in the eyes of the workers, the rank-and-file union structures have taken up the baton. On 25th September 200,000 people demonstrated in response to an appeal from the "co-ordinations of the factory councils". On 28th October 700,000 people participated in demonstrations organized throughout the country and 14 million joined the 4 hour strike organized for the same day. On 16th November there was a demonstration of 500,000 workers in the building sector. On the 10th December demonstrations of metal workers at Fiat took place in Turin, Milan and Rome.
In Belgium on 29th October 60,000 demonstrators marched in Brussels in response to the appeal of the FGTB, the socialist union. On 15th November staggered strikes were organized in the public transport sector. On 26th November, which the bourgeois press named "Red Friday", a general strike against the prime minister's "global plan" was called by the two big unions, the FGTB and the Christian union, the CSC. This was the largest strike since 1936 and it paralyzed the whole country.
In France in October there was the strike of the Air France ground staff followed by a whole series of demonstrations and local strikes, including in particular the public transport strike on 26th November. In Britain 250,000 civil servants went on strike on 5th November. In Spain on 17th November 30,000 metalworkers assembled in Barcelona against planned redundancies at the SEAT car factory. On 25th November a big day of union demonstrations was organized throughout the country against the government's "social pact", which includes reductions in wages, pensions and unemployment benefits. Tens of thousands of people participated in Madrid, Barcelona and throughout the country.
The black-out
In every country the media propaganda; press, radio, television tries as much as possible to keep quiet about events concerning the working class.
In particular workers' movements in other countries are practically never "covered". And although some papers sometimes mention strikes and demonstrations very briefly, in the "popular" press and on the television there's almost a total black-out. For example, practically nothing of the strikes and demonstrations in Germany filtered through into the media in other countries. When the reality of "social unrest" cannot be kept hidden because the events are taking place within the country, or because it concerns maneuvers of the bourgeoisie which are useful for propaganda purposes, or because what is happening is sufficiently important to force its way into the news, the media systematically present only what is specific to each situation. It's the problem of this or that particular enterprise or it's the problem of this or that particular sector or it's the problem of this or that specific country. It's always the most corporatist and nationalist of the unions' demands that are presented. Or else it's spectacular and fruitless acts that are publicized such as minority confrontations with the agents of law enforcement (in France during the conflict at Air France, in Belgium during "Red Friday").
But behind the black-out and the misrepresentation of reality, the situation is basically the same in all of the developed countries and in Western Europe in particular; the class struggle has returned. The increase in strikes and demonstrations in itself already marks a resurgence of workers' combativity, a growing discontent with the lowering of the "standard of living" which is daily spreading to every strata of the working population, and with mass unemployment.
This development in the class struggle is only the beginning and it's coming up against difficulties produced by the conditions of the current historic period.
The difficulties of the working class in confronting the strategy of the union and the state's political apparatus
The working class is beginning to rediscover the path of struggle following an important period of reflux in workers' combats which has lasted almost four years.
The lie that Stalinism=communism still weighs heavy
Firstly the working class has been disoriented by the ideological campaigns on the "end of communism" and the "end of the class struggle" which has been hammered home since the Berlin wall went down in 1989. By presenting the death of Stalinism as the "end of communism", these campaigns have directly attacked the latent consciousness in the working class of the need and the possibility to fight for a different kind of society. By using and abusing the grossest lie of the century - the identification of the Stalinist form of state capitalism with "communism" - the propaganda of the bourgeoisie has greatly disoriented the working class. The majority have understood the collapse of Stalinism as a demonstration that it's impossible to create a system other than capitalism. Rather than making the consciousness of the class clearer about the capitalist nature of Stalinism, the end of the latter has made the lie about the "socialist" nature of the USSR and the eastern countries more credible. This has generated a deep reflux in the consciousness of the working class which was gradually escaping the clutches of this lie in the struggles that developed after the end of the 60s. This is mainly why the level of workers' demonstrations and strikes is the lowest known in Western Europe since the second world war.
The confusion about its own perspective - that of communism - which has been so nefariously identified with Stalinism's bloody, capitalist counter-revolution, has reigned in the working class for decades and persists today. It is still maintained by the propaganda of the bourgeoisie; those factions who denounce "communism" in order to laud the merits of liberal or socialist "democracy" as well as those factions who defend the "socialist gains" such as the communist parties and the Trotskyist organizations[2].
The bourgeois media take every opportunity to maintain this confusion. During the confrontation in Moscow in October 1993 between Yeltsin's government and the "parliamentary insurgents", their propaganda relentlessly presented the "conservative" deputies as the "real communists" (insisting that the "communists" could only come to an agreement with "fascists" of course). Thus they again increased the ideological smoke-screen about "communism" and once more used the corpse of Stalinism to drive home their message against the working class. As for the communist parties and Trotskyist organizations, disillusioned by the ravages made by the crisis in the USSR and the ex-"socialist" countries, they're gradually finding their voices again to defend the idea that the "socialist gains"[3] were a boon... before the "return of capitalism".
The bourgeoisie will go on maintaining the lie that Stalinism is identical to communism, a lie which hides the real communist perspective. The working class can only rid itself of this obstacle to the development of its consciousness by laying bare the counter-revolutionary role of the left organizations of capital - whether social-democracy, Stalinism and its "destalinised" variations, or trades unionism. This it can only do through practice, through its struggle.
The weight of trade unionism
The promise of a "new world order" which was to open up a "new era of peace and prosperity" under the banner of "democratic" capitalism has also contributed to a reflux in class struggle, in the capacity of the working class to respond to the attacks on its living conditions.
The Gulf war in 1991 gave the lie to the promises of "peace" and acted upon consciousness as a factor clarifying just what this "peace" resulting from the "triumph" of capitalism really means. But at the same time it produced a feeling of powerlessness that brought combativity to an end.
Today the economic crisis and the generalised attack on living conditions that comes in its wake, is pushing the proletariat to emerge slowly from its past passivity. The fact that combativity is returning is an indication that all the promises of "prosperity" have solved nothing. The facts are these. Capitalism can offer nothing but misery. Sacrifices made are the prelude to more sacrifices demanded. The capitalist economy is sick and the workers have to pay for it.
The present resurgence of class struggle is marked therefore by a confusion that continues to exist in the working class about the general perspective of its struggles historically - the real communist perspective of which it is the bearer. But at the same time it's also marked by an awakening consciousness of the need the fight against capitalism.
This is why what mainly characterizes this resurgence is the hold the unions have over the current struggles, the almost total absence of autonomous initiatives on the part of the workers, the fact that the rejection of unionism is very weak. If the consciousness, however vague, of the possibility of overthrowing capitalism is lacking, combativity is caught in a trap. Restricted to formulating demands within the capitalist framework, it finds itself on the home ground of unionism. This is why at present the unions manage to drag workers off their own class terrain:
- by formulating demands within a corporatist framework, within that of defending the national economy, to the detriment of demands that are common to all workers;
- by "organizing" "actions" aimed at dissipating the discontent, at making the working class believe that through such actions it is fighting for its own demands when it is really being dragged into dead-ends, diverted into isolated actions. That's when it's not simply being trotted out into inoffensive processions for the state.
The bourgeoisie is preparing for the confrontation...
With a few recent exceptions such as at the beginning of the movement of the miners in the Ruhr (Germany) in September, all the movements that have developed have been encapsulated and "organized" by the unions. All of them, including the more radical actions of base unionism, have taken place under the vigilant eye of the main unions and their leadership, when the latter haven't directly inspired them[4]. They are able to maneuver in this way because of the low level of consciousness in the working class of the real role the unions play in sabotaging their struggles. It's also because the bourgeoisie has prepared its strategy against the "social consequences of austerity", in other words against the danger of the class struggle.
The working class may have difficulty recognizing its class nature, becoming conscious of what it is but the bourgeoisie has no difficulty understanding that workers' struggles, strikes and demonstrations are dangerous. The ruling class knows that the class struggle is a danger for capitalism both from its general experience throughout its history and from the specific experience of the waves of struggles that it has had to contain, encapsulate and confront in the course of the last twenty five years[5]. With the particularly brutal measures required by the present economic mess, they are forced to plan the attacks and also the angry reactions that they are bound to provoke.
It is not therefore surprising that the bourgeoisie chose the timing of the explosion of workers' struggles in Italy in September 1992 to allow the anger of the proletariat in this country to erupt prematurely in order to prevent it contaminating other European countries[6]. Similarly most of today's movements more or less follow a timing decided by the unions. The "days of action" and also the publicity given to certain "examples" like Air France or "Red Friday" in Belgium is on the whole programmed by the political and union apparatus of the dominant class with the aim of allowing the working class to "let off steam". And they do so in unison with their "partners" in other countries.
Massive anti-working class measures, the ideological and political disorientation of the working class, illusions in the unions and a bourgeoisie that plans its strategy with great care: this is why the workers' combativity has not really checked the attacks against them. What's more the proletariat also suffers from the pressure of social decomposition. The general mood of "everyone for himself" is a drag on the need to develop solidarity and the collective struggle and facilitates the divisive maneuvers of unionism. Moreover the bourgeoisie uses the consequences of its own decomposition to hinder the working class in the development of its consciousness.
...and uses decomposition
Decomposition eats away at the flesh of bourgeois society. Lies and plots reign supreme in the battle for a slice of the cake getting visibly smaller, and this pushes the members of the bourgeois class into a corrupting attitude of looking out for number one.
The scandals and the various goings-on in the world of politics, finance, industry, sport or royalty, according to country, aren't just a masquerade. They correspond to the sharpening of rivalries within the dominant class. Nevertheless the one thing that anyone who is anyone is agreed upon is the need to publicize these goings-on to the hilt in order to occupy the media terrain.
In Italy, we have the example of the "clean hands" operation. The official explanation is that it aims to make politicians behave more morally and decently. In reality it's the settling of accounts between different factions of the bourgeoisie, between the different clans within the political apparatus. Basically this means between the pro-US tendencies (for 40 years the Christian Democratic Party were the US's zealous servants) and the tendencies that lean towards the Franco-German alliance[7]. In the same way in France the Tapie scandal and other media political soap operas are systematically given pride of place on the "news". To tell the truth no-one gives a damn but that's one of the results it's aiming for. They give as little information as possible and the message between the lines - "politics is dirty" - is very useful at a time when workers are trying to deal with political questions. In Britain it's the soap opera around the royal family that plays this role of monopolizing the "news".
The "humanitarian" campaigns to "take in a foreigner" in Germany or "get a child out of Sarejevo" in Britain, and the inflated coverage of murders committed by children in Britain and France also illustrate how decomposition is used by bourgeois ideology to maintain a feeling of powerlessness and fear. It is also used to turn attention from the real problems - economic, political and social.
To cap it all there's the systematic use of images of war, from the Middle East or Yugoslavia for example. The images are transmitted to hide the underlying imperialist interests and to create a sense of guilt amongst workers in the countries at "peace" to persuade them to accept their conditions of exploitation.
The perspectives for the class struggle
All these difficulties for the class struggle don't mean that the battle is already lost and that the workers can expect nothing. On the contrary. Although it obstructs the struggle, the very fact that the international bourgeoisie is mounting this concerted strategy against the working class shows that there is a real tendency towards mobilization, combativity and reflection on what is at stake in the present situation.
Workers have returned to the unions more "by default" than out of profound conviction. The situation is different to that in the thirties when the historic defeat of the working class was signified by tens of millions joining the unions. It's also more "by default" than out of a conviction in bourgeois politics that the proletariat still tends to follow the left wing parties of capitalism that pretend to be "workers' parties. This too is unlike the 30s when workers were enthusiastic about the "national fronts" (with their corollary of submission to "national socialism" and "Stalinism").
Social decomposition and the use the bourgeoisie makes of it combine with the maneuvers of the unions and their rank-and-file extensions to poison combativity and confuse the development of consciousness in the working class. However the economic crisis and the attacks on living conditions act as a powerful antidote. This is the terrain on which the proletariat has begun to respond. This is only the beginning of a long period of struggles. Repeated failures of economic demands are painful. But they also give rise to a deep reflection on the ends and means of the struggle. The mobilization of the workers is already leading to such a reflection. The bourgeoisie is not making a mistake when they publish a widely publicized "critique of capitalism" from... the pope. Suddenly intellectuals are publishing articles in "defense of Marxism". This kind of maneuver is designed to combat the danger of an early reflection that is taking place in the working class.
In spite of all the difficulties, present historic conditions trace a path towards class confrontations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Today's resurgence in combativity is only the first step towards them.
The job of revolutionary organizations is to actively participate in this reflection and in the development of working class actions. In the struggles we must relentlessly denounce the bourgeoisie's strategy of division and dispersion. We must reject corporatist, categorical, sectional and nationalist demands, oppose the unions' methods of "struggle" which are just maneuvers to damp down the fire. We must defend the perspective of the general struggle of the working class, the perspective of communism. We must call to mind the workers' past experiences in learning how to control the struggle through its general assemblies and with delegates elected and revocable by those assemblies. Where possible we must fight for the extension of struggles beyond sectoral divisions. We must encourage and animate discussion circles and struggle committees in which all workers can discuss and clarify the balance of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the nature of their combat that offers a perspective for the development of broader class confrontations in the years ahead.
OF, 12th December 1993
[1] See International Review no. 75.
[2] As for anarchism which sees Stalinism as the consequence of "Marxism", in spite of its "radicalism" it's condemned to rally to the side of the bourgeoisie. In its anarcho-syndicalist variation it attaches itself directly to the bourgeois state through its unionism. In its political variation it's the expression of the petite-bourgeoisie and makes its stand in the bourgeois camp as do the social strata that it represents. This is what it did in Spain in 1936.
[3] In France the Trotskyist group, Lutte Ouvriere, has mounted an enormous fly-posting campaign throughout France to denounce the "return of capitalism" in the USSR and calling for the defense of the famous "workers gains".
[4] This includes the demonstration in Italy called by the "co-ordinations..." and the brawls on the airport runways in Paris during the Air France strike.
[5] What's more, the generation of men who were twenty years old in 1968 now runs the capitalist state. This is a generation that is particularly experienced on the "social" question. Let's bear in mind that in France Mitterand is surrounded by old leftists from May 68. Also that the first great service that Chirac performed for his class was in May 68 when he organized secret meetings between the Pompidou government (of which Balladur was part...) and the Stalinist union, the CGT. These meetings prepared the agreements that were to bury the movement.
[6] On the struggles in Italy, 1992 see International Reviews no.72 and 71 (supplement).
[7] For more on Italy see International Review no.73.
Since the beginning of the decade, the world economy has been sunk into recession. The multiplication of lay-offs; the brutal growth of unemployment which has reached levels unknown since the 1930s; increasing insecurity for those lucky enough to keep their jobs; a generalized decline in living standards, which have been amputated by endless austerity plans; increasing pauperization, particularly through the marginalization of a whole sector of the population deprived of income and even of a roof over their heads. The working class of the big industrial cities is feeling the full force of such phenomena. Today, the exploited are facing the biggest ever attack on their living conditions. Behind all the abstruse statistics and abstract figures, this reality demonstrates in a terribly concrete way the truth of the economic crisis of the entire capitalist system. And yet, the flatterers of capital never tire of announcing that the recovery is coming ... next year. Up till now, these hopes have foundered every time. But at the end of 1993 this hasn't prevented the media from shouting more loudly than ever about the coming 'recovery'.
What is this new optimism based on? Essentially on the fact that in the USA, after several years of recession, there has been a return to positive national growth rates. Are these figures really significant? Do they herald a bright new capitalist tomorrow? If the workers were to believe that, they would be falling for the worst kind of illusions.
The deafening noise of the media barrage about the end of the recession actually expresses the need of the ruling class to counter-act the growing feeling within the proletariat, which is faced with a day-to-day reality which has been getting worse and worse for many years, that the managers of capital have no solution to the crisis of their system. Over the years, the ideological themes and discourse put forward by the ruling class have varied in form, from Reagan and Thatcher's 'less state' to the reconsideration of the social role of the state by Clinton; governments of left and right have come and gone, but reality has gone on moving in the same direction: the deepening of the world crisis and the generalized deterioration of living conditions for the exploited. All sorts of recipes and bitter medicines have been tried. New hopes have been raised again and again, but all in vain.
In the last few months, capitalist propaganda has found a new theme of mystification: the GATT negotiations. According to this, it's protectionism that has been holding back the development of the economic recovery. Consequently, the opening up of the market, respecting the rules of free competition will be the panacea which will make it possible to pull the world economy out of the doldrums. The USA is the main mouthpiece of this view. But all this is just ideological froth, a smokescreen which is less and less able to hide the ferocious free-for-all between the world's main economic powers in their effort to hold onto their part of an ever-shrinking world market. Under the cover of the GATT negotiations, each fraction of the bourgeoisie is trying to mobilize the proletariat behind the banners of defending the national economy. The GATT agreements are nothing but a moment in the sharpening trade war, and the working class has absolutely nothing to gain from them. The outcome of these negotiations make no difference at all to the trend towards frenzied competition which has been developing for years, and which has taken the form of massive lay-offs and draconian social plans aimed at restoring the competitive edge of enterprises - of attempts to balance the books by imposing drastic economies paid for by the working class. In the future, the capitalists will have yet another argument for justifying lay-offs, wage cuts, immiseration: "it's the GATT's fault", in the same way as we've already heard that it's all down to the EEC or NAFTA[1]. All these false arguments have only one function: to hide the reality that all this misery is the product of an economic system drowning in its own insoluble contradictions.
A recession without end
At the least flicker of the indices for growth, the leaders of capitalism are encouraged to see the signs of a recovery, and thus the justification of the austerity plans they have carried out. This has especially been the case in France and Germany recently. However, the growth figures in the main economic powers over the past few months show that there's very little for them to get happy about.
Thus, for the whole of the European Union (to give the new title of the former EEC), 'growth' was still a tiny +1% in 1992 before falling to -0.6% in 1993. In the last two years it has gone from +1.6% to -2.2% in Germany (not including the eastern part), from +1.4% to -0.9% in France, and from +0.9% to -0.3% in Italy. All the countries of the European Union have seen a fall in their Gross National Product with one exception: Britain, whose GNP has climbed from -0.5% to +1.9%[2].
Behind the required facade of optimism displayed by the politicians when they announce a recovery in 1994, the various specialized institutes, which address themselves to a more select audience, that of the economic 'decision-makers', are much more cautious. Thus, the Nomura Research Institute, having estimated that Japan's GNP would slip by 1.1% in the fiscal year from April 93 to April 94, envisages a further fall of 0.4% in the ensuing period, i.e. up till April 95. In its report it even says that "the present recession threatens to be the worst since the 1930s", and adds "it is important to note that Japan is about to go from a real recession to a full scale deflation"[3]. After a fall in GNP estimated at 0.5% in 1993[4], the planet's second economic power is not seeing any recovery on the horizon.
Apparently the climate is very different in the USA. With a growth in GNP estimated at 2.8% in 1993[5], the USA (along with Britain and Canada) seems to be an exception among the great powers. The country which has always claimed to symbolize liberal capitalism, which has been the latter's ideological champion, has another occasion to raise high the banner of triumphant capitalism. In the current atmosphere of pessimism, the USA presents itself as the spearhead of faith in the virtues of capitalism and in its ability to overcome all the crises it faces; in similar vein, it poses as the incarnation of 'democracy', an ideal which marks the crowning point of human achievement. Unfortunately for our apostles of eternal capitalism, this endlessly repeated ideological verbiage has very little to do with the nasty reality unfolding on the world scene, including in the USA. All this discourse is above all aimed at preventing the working class becoming conscious of the real situation by encouraging false hopes; it also serves as an ideological vector for America's imperialist interests in the face of its European and Japanese rivals. The highly publicized farce of the GATT shows this clearly.
The myth of the fall in unemployment in the USA
To back up its propaganda about the 'recovery', the USA bases itself on an indicator which has a much greater echo in the working class than the abstractions of GNP: the rate of unemployment. Here again, the USA and Canada seem to be an exception. Among the developed countries, they are the only ones who can claim that the number of unemployed has fallen, whereas everywhere else it has risen faster and faster:
Growth in unemployment (percentage rate)[6]
1992 |
1993 |
|
USA |
7.4 |
6.8 |
Canada |
11.3 |
11.2 |
Japan |
2.2 |
2.5 |
Germany |
7.7 |
9.9 |
France |
10.4 |
11.7 |
Italy |
10.4 |
11.7 |
Britain |
10.0 |
10.3 |
European Union |
10.3 |
11.3 |
OECD |
7.8 |
8.2 |
Is the situation of the workers different in the USA from that of other developed countries? Not a day passes without one of the great enterprises which occupy center stage on the world economy announcing a new train of redundancies. We won't repeat here the lugubrious list of lay-offs announced in recent months - that would take pages and pages. The situation is the same all over the world and the USA really is no exception. Thus, 550,000 jobs were eliminated in 1991, 400,000 in 1992 and 600,000 in 1993. From 1987 to 1992, enterprises of more than 500 employees 'slimmed down' their workforce by 2.3 million. It has not been the big enterprises that have created jobs in the USA, but the small ones. Thus, during the period under consideration, enterprises with less than 20 wage-earners saw a 12% growth in their workforce, those of between 20 and 100 a 4.6% growth[7]. What does this mean for the working class? Quite simply that millions of stable and well-paid jobs have been destroyed and that the new jobs are precarious, unstable, and usually badly paid. Behind the triumphalist employment figures of the US administration lurks all the savagery of a brutal attack on the living conditions of the working class. Such a situation has been made possible by the fact that in the USA, in the name of ‘liberalism' and the sacrosanct law of the market, the rules regulating the labor market is practically non-existent, contrary to the situation that prevails in Europe.
This is the model that the European and Japanese leaders are looking at with envy, in the hope of dismantling what they call the 'rigidity' of the labor market, i.e. the whole system of 'social protection' which has stood for decades and which, depending on the country, takes the form of a minimum wage, protection against redundancy in certain sectors (public service in Europe, large enterprises in Japan), precise rules about redundancy pay, unemployment benefit and so on. In fact, behind the slogans, now being voiced in all the industrial countries, about the need for a greater 'mobility' of the workforce, for a more 'flexible' labor market, lies one of the biggest ever attacks against the living conditions of the working class. This is the 'model' proposed by the USA. Behind the appearances contained in the figures, the diminution of unemployment in the USA does not mean good news for the workers. It corresponds to a huge degradation of proletarian living conditions.
What's true for the unemployment figures is also true for the growth figures. They only have a very distant connection to reality. The return to prosperity is no more than a dream for a capitalist economy that has been in open crisis for 25 years. One example that helps put the euphoric claims of American capitalism in perspective: during the 1980s, under President Reagan, we also had the same assertions about 'recovery' repeated over and over again, a recovery that was supposed to lay the specter of capitalist crisis once and for all. In the end, history took its revenge, and the open recession which followed consigned all this guff to oblivion. In fact the 1980s were years of crisis and the 'recovery' was no more than a hidden recession in which, in contrast to all the ideology, the living conditions of the working class got worse and worse. The present situation is worse still. The least that can be said is that the American 'recovery' is particularly wheezy and has very little significance. It has far more to do with reassuring propaganda than with reality.
A headlong flight into credit
As the GATT debates hotted up, an interesting figure was published in the press: the USA, the European Union, Japan and Canada account for 80% of world exports. This gives an idea of the preponderant weight of these countries on the world market. But it also shows that the economy of the planet is based on three poles: North America, Western Europe and Japan in Asia. And two of these poles, who represent nearly 60% of the total production of these countries, are still deep in recession. Despite all the speechifying of Clinton, who at this level is the continuator of his predecessors Reagan and Bush, the recovery of the world economy is not around the corner - far from it. In these conditions, what then is the significance of the American 'recovery'? Will the USA, Canada and Britain, who were the first to officially plunge into the recession, be the first to climb out of it? Are the positive figures they are boasting about the signs of an imminent revival of the world economy?
Let's take a closer look at this famous American 'recovery'. What's going on? Has Clinton made all the ills of the American economy disappear with the wave of a magic wand? Has he overcome its lack of competivity at the level of exports and thus the vast trade deficit, the colossal budget deficit which translated itself into such a level of debt that the problem of paying it back, and thus of the solvency of the American economy, poses a dire threat to the international financial edifice? None of this has disappeared; rather the opposite has happened. On all levels the situation is worse.
The annual deficit of the USA's trade balance, which in 1987 reached the record level of 159 billion dollars, was only partially reabsorbed, falling to a 'mere' 73.8 billion in 1991. But since then it has grown and grown; it was estimated at 131 billion in 1993[8]. As for the budget deficit, it was estimated at between 260 and 280 billion dollars in 1993. In brief, Clinton has done nothing new; he has continued along the same road as his predecessors, the road of massive indebtedness. Problems are put off till tomorrow and their real aggravation in the present is hidden. The fall in interest rates which has meant that today the Federal Bank lends at a rate of 3%, i.e. a rate equivalent to the official inflation level (and thus lower than the real inflation level) has no other goal than to allow enterprises, individuals, and the state to lighten the burden of debt and to provide a staggering economy with an internal market artificially maintained by 'free' credit. An example: after two years of quasi-stagnation, household consumption has started growing again in the last few months; in the third quarter of 1993 it went up by 4.4%. The essential reason for this is that individuals have been able to renegotiate their loans at a rate of 6.5% instead of 9.5%, 10% or more, thus increasing their disposable income and reviving their taste for living on credit. Thus, the amount of consumer credit jumped by 8% in August, 9.7% in September, and 12.7% in October[9]. The rediscovered confidence of the American economy is above all a new headlong flight into credit.
The USA certainly isn't alone in this massive resort to credit. It's a generalized situation.
Evolution of the net public debt (% age of nominal GNP)[10]
1991 |
1992 |
1993 |
|
USA |
34.7 |
38.0 |
39.9 |
Germany |
23.2 |
24.4 |
27.8 |
France |
27.1 |
30.1 |
35.2 |
Italy |
101.2 |
105.3 |
111.6 |
Britain |
30.2 |
35.8 |
42.6 |
Canada |
49.2 |
54.7 |
57.8 |
With the exception of Japan, which is using its well-lined pockets to keep its economy afloat and is already in its fifth recovery plan, with no great results, all the major countries are resorting to the drug of credit to avoid an even more dramatic recession. However, although according to the OECD's figures the American state's debt is not the biggest, it remains the case that the USA is the country which has resorted most massively to debt at all levels of its economic activity - state, enterprises, individuals. Thus, according to other sources, the gross deficit of the state represents 130% of GNP, that of enterprises and individuals 170%. The scale of the overall debt of the USA - more than 12,000 billion dollars, although other sources put it much higher - weighs heavily on the world economic situation. This situation means that while the idea of a dynamic towards recovery might sow illusions for a short time and find some provisional confirmation outside the US, basically it's destined to fizzle out.
America's counter-offensive
What for any other country would be seen as a catastrophic situation that would stir the IMF to anger is, in the USA's case, constantly being minimized by all the world leaders. The present 'recovery', like the one in the second half of the 80s, under Reagan, which was activated in a totally artificial manner by the drug of credit, is being claimed as proof of the dynamism of American capitalism, and by extension, of capitalism in general. The reason for this paradoxical situation is not only that all the economies of the world are closely dependent on the American market for their exports, and thus have an interest in sustaining it; it's also that the credibility of the USA is not only defined by the strength of its economy. The USA has other assets: above all, its status as the world's premier imperialist power for decades, its position as head of the western bloc from the end of the Second World War to the fall of the eastern bloc, enabled it to organize the world market in line with its needs. One example of this situation: the dollar is the reigning currency on the world market. Three quarters of international trade takes place in dollars. Even if the western bloc is now finished since the disappearance of the Russian ogre made it lose its cement, even if, as a result, the USA's main economic rivals - Europe and Japan, who used to obey the discipline of the bloc, including on the economic level - are now trying to spread their wings, it remains the case that the whole organization of the world market is inherited from the previous period. As a result, the USA will try to draw the maximum benefit from this in the present situation of exacerbated competition and trade war. The free-for-all around the GATT negotiations is a striking illustration of this situation.
The USA has stated its aims very clearly. The President has announced that the USA wants to raise its annual exports from 638 to 1,000 billion dollars. Which means that the US is seeking to redress its economic situation by restoring a favorable trade balance. An ambitious objective which can only be attained at the expense of other economic powers. The first plank of this policy is the revival of investment; Clinton sees a growing role for the state at this level. It is highly significant that in the USA the gross formation of fixed capital (investment) has risen from +6.2% in 1992 to +9.8% in 1993, whereas in 1993 it fell by 2.3% in Japan, 3.3% in Germany, 5.5% in France , and 7.7% in Italy; in Britain it has only gone up by +1.8%. The USA is armor-plating its economy in order to make it more competitive and to redouble its assault on the world market. But in the conditions of sharpening competition now prevailing, this purely economic policy is not enough. There is a second plank in the policy, consisting of using all the resources of American power to open up to US exports those markets guarded by protectionist barriers.
It's in this framework as well that we have to understand the NAFTA accords, the recent Seattle conference of Pacific seaboard nations, as well as the disputes which have dominated the GATT agreements. Imperialist motivations are clearly not absent from these economic negotiations. After the disappearance of their bloc, the USA must reconstitute and restructure its zones of influence. In the same way that they ensure that their economy benefits from their imperialist strength, they are also using their economic strength to further their imperialist interests. This is not new, but before, the USA's main economic rivals were tied by the discipline of the bloc and so used to grin and bear it. They paid the bill in the name of western solidarity. This is no longer the case.
France's defiant attitude towards the USA was not as isolated as media propaganda would have us believe. It had the support of the majority of European countries, notably Germany. Japan, meanwhile, has also been visibly defending its own interests. The negotiations were thus very hard and had all the appearance of a psycho-drama because, faced with American demands, Europe and Japan defended their own economic interests with a determination they have never shown before. But that's not the only reason. All the great powers, which are also the main exporting countries, have an interest in an agreement to limit protectionism. Even if France is the world's second biggest exporter of agricultural products, the French arguments about the Blair House pre-agreement, which only affected a very small part of its exports, were essentially a publicity-seeking pretext to draw attention away from the discrete and difficult negotiations about much more economically important issues. The dramatization of these negotiations was also based on the intensifying imperialist rivalries between the USA on the one hand, and the Franco-German alliance at the heart of Europe, and Japan, on the other.
France and most of the European countries have to mark their differences because behind these economic negotiations we are also seeing the development of the ideological themes that will serve the future imperialist alignments. It is thus particularly significant that there has been no agreement on audio-visual products. The famous "cultural exception", which France in particular has talked about so much, actually masks the need for those challenging US domination to block American control over the media, which are indispensable for any independent imperialist policy.
The argument that the GATT accord is going to help re-launch the world economy has been churned out in abundance. It has been based largely on a study done by a team of OECD researchers who predicted that the GATT accord would lead to a 213 billion dollar growth in annual world revenue, though they didn't lay too much emphasis on the fact that this prediction is for next century! By then of course, knowing how often the specialists of the day have been proved wrong, these handy predictions will have been forgotten. The real significance of these accords is the exacerbation of the trade war, the aggravation of competition, and thus, in the short term, the further decline of the world economy. They will not change the dynamic of the crisis. On the contrary they are a focus for the tensions and rivalries between the great powers of the world.
Beyond all the illusions that the ruling class is trying to sell today, the storm clouds are gathering over the world economy. Financial crisis, an even deeper slide into recession, the return of inflation is the specters looming on the horizon. For the working class they bring the threat of an increasingly tragic deterioration in its living conditions. But they also announce the fact that it is becoming more and more difficult for the ruling class to make people believe in its system. The crisis pushes the proletariat to struggle in defense of its living conditions, while at the same time opening its eyes to the lies of capitalism. Despite the suffering it brings, the crisis remains the main ally of the revolutionary class.
JJ, 16.12.93
[1] NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement, encompassing Canada, the USA and Mexico.
[2] Source: European Commission
[3] Deflation: reference to the crisis of 1929 during which the fall in production and employment was accompanied by a fall in prices.
[4] Source: OECD
[5] idem
[6] idem, except for Italy, which in the meantime has changed its methods of calculation; the source here is the European Commission
[7] idem
[8] idem
[9] Source: Federal Reserve
[10] Source: OECD
In the first part of this chapter (IR 75), we began to examine the historical context in which Marx dealt with capitalist society: as the last in a series of systems of exploitation and alienation, as a form of social organization no less transient than Roman slavery or mediaeval feudalism. We noted that, in this framework, the drama of human history could be considered in the light of the dialectic between the original social ties of humanity, and the growth of commodity relations which has both dissolved these ties and prepared the ground for a more advanced form of human community. In the section that follows we concentrate on the mature Marx's analysis of capital itself - of its inner nature, its insoluble contradictions, and of the communist society destined to supplant it.
It is surely impossible for anyone to approach Marx's Capital, its various drafts and annexes from the Grundrisse to Theories of Surplus Value, without a considerable degree of trepidation. This gigantic intellectual accomplishment, this work "for which I have sacrificed health, happiness and family" (Marx to Meyer, April 30, 1867), delves into the most extraordinary detail about the historic origins of bourgeois society, examines in all their concreteness the day-to-day operations of capital from the factory floor to the credit system, 'descends' to the most general and abstract questions about human history and the characteristics of the human species, only to 'ascend' again to the concrete, to the harsh and naked reality of capitalist exploitation. But although this is a work which demands considerable concentration and mental effort from its readers, it is never an academic work, never a mere description, or an exercise in scholarly learning for its own sake. As Marx so often insisted, it is both a description and a critique of bourgeois political economy. Its aim was not simply to classify, categorize or define the features of capital, but to point the way to its revolutionary destruction. As Marx put it in his usual colorful language, Capital is "assuredly the most frightening missile which has ever been launched at the heads of the bourgeoisie" (letter to Becker, April 17, 1867).
Our aim in this article is not, and could not be, to examine Capital and its surrounding works on political economy in any great detail. It is simply to draw out what seem to us to be its central themes, in order to emphasize their revolutionary and thus communist content. We begin as Marx began, with the commodity.
In the first part of this article we recalled that in Marx's view, man's history is not only the chronicle of the development of his productive capacities, but also the chronicle of his growing self-estrangement, of an alienation that has reached its peak in capitalism and the wage labor system. In Capital this alienation is dealt with from various angles, but perhaps its most significant application is contained in the concept of the fetishism of commodities; and to a very large extent, Capital itself is an attempt to see through, expose, and overturn this fetishism.
According to Marx in the opening chapter of Capital, the commodity appears to mankind as a "mysterious thing" (Vol One, chap 1) as soon as it is considered as more than an immediate article of consumption - i.e., when it is considered from the point of view, not of its mere use value, but of its exchange value. The more the production of material objects is subordinated to the needs of the market, to buying and selling, the more mankind has lost sight of the real aims and motives of production. The commodity has cast a spell on the producers, and never has this spell been so powerful, never has this "enchanted and perverted world" developed so much (see Vol Three, chap XLVIII), as in the society of universal commodity production, capitalism - the first society in history where market relations have penetrated to the very heart of the productive system, so that labor power itself has become a commodity. This is how Marx describes the process whereby commodity relations have come to bewitch the minds of the producers:
"... in the act of seeing, there is at all events an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value-relations between the products of labor which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. This I call the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labor, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities" (ibid).
For Marx, uncovering and overthrowing the commodity-fetish was crucial at two levels. First, because the confusion that commodity relations sowed in men's minds made it extremely difficult to grasp the real workings of bourgeois society, even for the most learned and acute theoreticians of the ruling class. And second, because a society which was ruled by the commodity was necessarily a society condemned to escape the control of the producers; not only in an abstract and static sense, but also in the sense that such a social order would eventually pull the whole of humanity towards catastrophe unless it was replaced by a society which had banished exchange value in favor of production for use.
Bourgeois political economists had of course recognized that capitalism was a society based on production for profit; some of them had recognized the existence of class antagonisms and social injustices within this society. But none of them had been able to discern the real origins of capitalist profit in the exploitation of the proletariat. The fetishism of commodities again: in contrast to oriental despotism, or classical slavery, or feudalism, there is no institutionalized exploitation in capitalism, no corvee, no legal ownership of one human being by another, no days fixed for working on the lord's estate. In the straightforward, commonsense view of bourgeois thought, the capitalist buys the workers' 'labor' and gives him, in return, a 'fair day's pay'. If a profit arises from this exchange, or from capitalist production in general, its function is simply to cover the cost and effort expended by the capitalist, which seems fair enough as well. This profit might be produced by the capitalist 'buying cheap and selling dear', i.e. on the marketplace, or through the 'abstinence' of the capitalist himself, or, as in Senior's theory, in the "last hour of labor".
What Marx demonstrated, however, through his analysis of the commodity, was that the origin of capitalist profit lies in a real form of slavery, in the unpaid labor-time extracted from the worker. This is why Marx begins Capital with an analysis of the origins of value, explaining that the value of a commodity is determined by the amount of labor-time embodied in its production. Thus far Marx was in continuity with classical bourgeois political economy (though modern economic 'experts' will tell us that the labor theory of value is no more than a charming antique - which is an expression of the utter degeneracy of bourgeois economic 'science' in this epoch). But Marx's achievement was his capacity to go deeper into the exploration of the peculiar commodity labor power (not labor in the abstract, as the bourgeoisie always approached it, but the worker's capacity to labor, which is what the capitalist actually purchases). This commodity, like any other, was 'worth' the amount of labor-time needed to reproduce it - in this case, to fulfill the worker's basic needs, such as food, clothing shelter, etc. But living labor power, in contrast to the machines that it set in motion, had the unique characteristic of being able to create more value in the working day than was required to reproduce it. The worker who works an 8-hour day may thus spend no more than 4 hours working for himself - the rest is given 'free' to the capitalist. This surplus value, when realized on the market, is the real source of capitalist profit. The fact that capitalist production is precisely the extraction, realization and accumulation of this stolen surplus labor makes it by definition, by nature, a system of class exploitation in full continuity with slavery and feudalism. It's not a question of whether the worker works for 8, 10 or 18 hours a day, whether his working environment is pleasant or hellish, whether his wages are high or low. These factors influence the rate of exploitation but not the fact of exploitation. Exploitation is not an accidental by-product of capitalist society, the product of individual greedy bosses. It is the fundamental mechanism of capitalist production and the latter could not be conceived without it.
The implications of this are immediately revolutionary. In the marxist framework, all the sufferings, material and spiritual, imposed on the working class, are the logical and inevitable product of this system of exploitation. Capital is without doubt a powerful moral indictment of the misery and degradation that bourgeois society heaps upon the vast majority of its members. Volume One in particular shows in great detail how capitalism was born "dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt" (Vol 1, XXXI); how, in its phase of primitive accumulation, nascent capital ruthlessly expropriated the peasants and punished the vagabonds that it had itself created with the whip and the axe; how, both in the early phase of manufacturing, the phase of capital's "formal domination", and in the industrial system proper, the phase of "real domination", the capitalists' "werewolf greed" for surplus value led with the objective force of a machine in motion to the horrors of child labor, the 18-hour day and all the rest. In the same work Marx also denounces the inner impoverishment, the alienation of the worker reduced to a cog in this vast machine, reduced by repetitive drudgery to a mere fragment of his real human potential. But he does all this not with the aim of appealing for a more humane form of capitalism, but of scientifically demonstrating that the very system of wage labor must lead to these 'excesses'; that the proletariat cannot mitigate its sufferings by relying on the good will and charitable impulses of its exploiters, but only by offering a dogged, organized resistance against the day-to-day effects of exploitation; that this inevitably increasing "mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation" can only be done away with through "the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production" (chap XXXII). In short, the theory of surplus value proves the necessity, the absolute unavoidability, of the struggle between capital and labor, classes with objectively irreconcilable interests. This is the granite foundation for every analysis of capitalist economics, politics and social life, which can only be understood clearly and lucidly from the point of view of the exploited class, since the latter alone has a material interest in piercing the veil of mystification with which capital covers itself.
As we showed in the first part of this article, historical materialism, the marxist analysis of history, is synonymous with the view that each class society has moved through an epoch of ascendance, in which its social relations provide a framework for the progressive development of the productive forces, and an epoch of decadence, in which the same relations have become of growing fetter on further development, necessitating the emergence of new relations of production. Capitalism, in Marx's view, was no exception to this - on the contrary, Capital, indeed Marx's entire work, can justly be described as the necrology of capital, a study of the processes leading to its demise and disappearance. This is why the crescendo to Volume One is the passage where Marx predicts a time when "the monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated" (Chap XXXII).
The first volume of Capital, however, is mainly a critical study of "The process of production of capital". Its principal aim is to lay bare the nature of capitalist exploitation, and thus largely restricts itself to analyzing the direct relationship between the proletariat and the capitalist class, keeping to an abstract model where other classes and forms of production are of no importance. It is in the subsequent volumes, particularly Volume Three and the Theories of Surplus Value (part two), as well as in the Grundrisse, that Marx embarks upon the next phase of his missile attack upon bourgeois society: demonstrating that the fall of capital will be the result of contradictions rooted in the very heart of the system, in the production of surplus value itself.
Already in the 1840s, and especially in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels had identified the periodic crises of overproduction as the harbingers of the eventual demise of capitalist society. In Capital and the Grundrisse, Marx devotes considerable space to polemicizing against the bourgeois political economists who tried to argue that capitalism was essentially a harmonious economic system in which every product could, all being well, find a purchaser - i.e. that the capitalist market could absorb all the commodities churned out in the capitalist production process. If crises of overproduction did take place, went the arguments of economists like Say, Mill and Ricardo, they were the result of a purely contingent imbalance between supply and demand, some unfortunate 'disproportionality' between one sector and another; or perhaps they were simply the result of wages being too low. Partial overproduction was possible, but not general overproduction. And any idea that the crises of overproduction sprang from insoluble contradictions built into the very system itself could not be admitted, because that meant admitting the limited and transient nature of the capitalist mode of production itself:
"The apologetic phrases used to deny crises are important are so far as they always prove the opposite of what they are meant to prove. In order to deny crises, they assert unity where there is conflict and contradiction. They are therefore important in so far as one can say they prove that there would be no crises if the contradictions which they have erased in their imagination, did not exist in fact. But in reality crises exist because these contradictions exist. Every reason which they put forward against crisis is an exorcised contradiction, and therefore, a real contradiction, which can cause crises. The desire to convince oneself of the non-existence of contradictions is at the same time the expression of a pious wish that the contradictions, which are really present should not exist" (Theories of Surplus Value, part two, chap XVII).
And in the ensuing paragraphs, Marx shows that the very existence of the wage labor system and of surplus value contains within itself the crises of overproduction:
"What the workers in fact produce is surplus value. So long as they produce it, they are able to consume. As soon as they cease to produce it, their consumption ceases, because their production ceases. But that they are able to consume is by no means due to their having produced an equivalent for their consumption ... By reducing these relations to those of consumer and producer, one leaves out of account that the wage-laborer who produces and the capitalist who produces are two producers of a completely different kind, quite apart from the fact that some consumers do not produce at all. Once again, a contradiction is denied, by abstracting from a contradiction which really exists in production. The mere relationship of wage laborer and capitalist implies:
1. that the majority of the producers (the workers) are non-consumers (non-buyers) of a very large part of their product, namely, of the means of production and the raw material;
2. that the majority of the producers, the workers, can consume an equivalent for their product only so long as they produce more than this equivalent, that is, so long as they produce surplus value or surplus product. They must always be overproducers, producers over and above their needs, in order to be consumers or buyers within the limits of their needs" (Theories of Surplus Value, part two, chap XVII).
In short, because the capitalist extracts surplus value from the worker, the worker always produces more than he can buy back. Of course, this is not a problem from the point of view of the individual capitalist, because he can always find a market with some other capitalist's workers; and the bourgeois political economist is likewise prevented by his class blinkers from seeing the problem from the point of view of the total social capital. But as soon as it is grasped from this standpoint (which only a proletarian theorist can do), then the problem indeed becomes a fundamental one. Marx explains this in the Grundrisse:
" ... the relation of one capitalist to the workers of another capitalist is none of our concern here. It only shows every capitalist's illusion, but alters nothing in the relation of capital in general to labor. Every capitalist knows this about his worker that he does not relate to him as producer to consumer and he therefore wishes to restrict his consumption, i.e. his ability to exchange, his wage, as much as possible. Of course he would like the workers of other capitalists to be the greatest consumers possible of his own commodity. But the relation of every capitalist to his own workers is the relation as such of capital and labor, the essential relation. But this is just how the illusion arises - true for the individual capitalist as distinct from all the others - that apart from his workers the whole remaining working class confronts him as consumer and participant in exchange, as money spender, and not as worker. It is forgotten that, as Malthus says, 'the very existence of a profit upon any commodity presupposes a demand exterior to that of the laborer who has produced it', and hence the demand of the laborer himself can never be an adequate demand. Since one production sets the other into motion and hence creates consumers for itself in the alien capital's workers, it seems to each individual capital that the demand of the working class posited by production itself is an 'adequate demand'. On one side, this demand which production itself posits drives it forward, and must drive it forward beyond the proportion in which it would have to produce with regard to the workers; on the other side, if the demand exterior to the demand of the laborer himself disappears or shrinks up, then the collapse occurs" (The Chapter on Capital, notebook IV).
If the working class, taken as a whole, cannot provide an adequate market for capitalist production, neither can the problem be solved by the capitalists selling each other their products: "If it is finally said that the capitalists have only to exchange and consume their commodities amongst themselves, then the entire nature of the capitalist mode of production is lost sight of; and also forgotten is the fact that it is a matter of expanding the value of the capital, not consuming it" (Capital, vol III, chap XV). Because the aim of capital is the expansion of value, reproduction of value on an ever-extending scale, it requires a constantly expanding market, an "expansion of the outlying fields of production" (ibid), which is why in its ascendant period capitalism was driven to conquer the globe and subject more and more of it to its laws. But Marx was quite aware that this process of expansion could not go on indefinitely: eventually capitalist production would encounter the limits of the market both in the geographic and the social sense, and then what Ricardo and the others refused to admit would become manifest: "that the bourgeois mode of production contains within itself a barrier to the free development of the productive forces, a barrier which comes to the surface in crises and, in particular, in overproduction - the basic phenomenon in crises" (Theories of Surplus Value, part two, chap XVII, section 14).
Just as the bourgeois economists were compelled to deny the reality of overproduction, they were no less troubled by another basic contradiction contained in capitalist production: the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Marx located the origins of this tendency in the imperious necessity for capitals to compete, to constantly revolutionize the means of production, i.e. to increase the organic composition of capital, the relation between the dead labour embodied in machines, which produce no new value, and the living labor of the proletariat. The contradictory consequences of such 'progress' are summarized as follows:
" ... proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, it is thereby proved a logical necessity that in its development the general average rate of surplus value must express itself in a falling general rate of profit. Since the mass of the employed living labor is continually on the decline as compared to the mass of materialized labor set in motion by it, i.e. to the productively consumed means of production, it follows that the portion of labor, unpaid and congealed in surplus value, must also be continually on the decrease compared to the amount of value represented by the invested total capital. Since the ratio of the mass of surplus value to the value of the invested total capital forms the rate of profit, this rate must constantly fall" (Capital, Vol Three, chap XIII). What worried the more serious bourgeois political economists like Ricardo about this phenomenon was again its inescapable nature, the fact that "the rate of profit, the stimulating principle of capitalist production, the fundamental premise and driving force of accumulation, should be endangered by the development of production itself", because this again implies that capitalist production "has its barrier, that it is relative, that it is not an absolute, but only a historical mode of production corresponding to a definite limited epoch in the development of the material requirements of production" (Vol Three, chap XV).
Capital is necessarily an unfinished work. Not only because Marx did not live long enough to complete it, but also because it was written in a historical period in which capitalist social relations had not yet become a definitive barrier to the development of the productive forces. And it is surely not unconnected to this that when Marx comes to define the basic element in the capitalist crisis, he sometimes emphasizes the problem of overproduction and sometimes the falling rate of profit, although there is never a mechanical and rigid separation made between the two: for example, the chapter in Volume Three devoted to the consequences of the falling rate of profit (Chap. XV, 'Internal contradictions of the law') also contain some of the most elucidating passages about the problem of the market. Nevertheless this apparent gap or inconsistency in Marx's theory of crisis has led, in the actual epoch of capitalism's decline, to the emergence within the revolutionary movement of different theories about the origins of this decline. Not surprisingly, they fall under two main headings: those based on Rosa Luxemburg's work, stressing the problem of realization, and those deriving from the work of Grossman and Mattick, emphasizing the falling rate of profit.
This is not the place for a detailed examination of these theories, a task we have at least initiated elsewhere (see in particular 'Marxism and crisis theory', IR 13). At this point we simply want to reiterate why for us Luxemburg's approach is the most coherent.
'Negatively', it's because the Grossman-Mattick theory, which denies the fundamental character of the realization problem, seems to regress to the bourgeois political economists denounced by Marx for claiming that capitalist production created a sufficient market for itself. At the same time, the adherents of the Grossman-Mattick theory often resort to the arguments of revisionist economists like Otto Bauer, whom Luxemburg ridiculed in her Anti-critique for arguing that the abstract mathematical schemas on expanded reproduction that Marx constructed in Capital Vol Two 'solved' the problem of realization and that Rosa Luxemburg's whole approach was a simple misunderstanding, the raising of a non-problem.
In a more positive sense, Rosa Luxemburg's approach provides an explanation for the historically concrete conditions determining the onset of the permanent crisis of the system: the more capitalism integrated the remaining non-capitalist areas of economy into itself, the more it created a world in its own image, the less it could constantly extend the market and find new outlets for the realization of that portion of surplus value which could be realized neither by the capitalists nor the proletariat. The inability of the system to go on expanding in the old way brought about the new epoch of imperialism and inter-imperialist wars, signaling the end of capitalism's progressive historical mission and threatening humanity with a relapse into barbarism. All this, as we have seen, was fully in line with the 'problem' of the market as posed by Marx in his critique of political economy.
At the same time, while the Grossman-Mattick approach, at least in its pure form, simply denies this whole question, Luxemburg's method allows us to see how the problem of the falling rate of profit becomes increasingly acute once the world market no longer has a field of expansion around it: if the market is glutted, there is no longer the possibility of compensating for the fall in the rate of profit, i.e. the decreasing amount of value contained in each commodity, by a rise in the mass of profit, i.e. by producing and selling more commodities; on the contrary, the attempt to do so only exacerbates the problem of overproduction. Here it becomes evident that the two essential contradictions uncovered by Marx act on each other and aggravate each other, deepening the crisis and making it ever more explosive.
"In the crises of the world market, the contradictions and antagonisms of bourgeois production are strikingly revealed" (Theories of Surplus Value, part two, chap XVII). This is certainly true of the economic disaster that has ravaged the capitalist world over the past quarter century. Despite all the mechanisms that capitalism has installed to delay the crisis, indeed to cheat the consequences of its own laws (mountains of debt, state intervention, the organization of world-wide fiscal and trade organisms, etc), this crisis has all the hallmarks of the crisis of overproduction, revealing as never before the true absurdity and irrationality of the bourgeoisie's economic system.
In this crisis we are faced, to a far greater degree than in the past, with the insane contrast between the vast potential for wealth and enjoyment promised by the development of the productive forces, and the actual misery and suffering induced by the social relations of production. Technically speaking, the whole world could be provided with adequate food and shelter: instead millions starve while food is dumped in the ocean, farmers are paid not to farm, and unimaginable scientific and financial resources are cast into the abyss of military production and war; millions go homeless while building workers are thrown onto the dole; millions are forced to work more and more intensively, for longer and longer hours, in order to meet the needs of capitalist competition, while millions more are ejected from work into the idleness and poverty of unemployment. And all because there is this crazy epidemic of overproduction. Not, as Marx pointed out, overproduction in relation to need, but overproduction in relation to the capacity to pay. "There are not too many necessities of life produced, in proportion to the existing population. Quite the reverse. Too little is produced to decently and humanely satisfy the wants of the great mass ... On the other hand, too many means of labor and necessities of life are produced at times to permit of their serving as means for the exploitation of laborers at a certain rate of profit. Too many commodities are produced to permit of a realization and conversion into new capital of the value and surplus value contained in them under the conditions of distribution and consumption peculiar to capitalist production ... Not too much wealth is produced. But at times too much wealth is produced in its capitalistic, self-contradictory forms" (Capital, Vol Three, chap XV).
In short, the crisis of overproduction, which can no longer be attenuated by a new expansion of the market, exposes the fact that the productive forces are no longer compatible with their "capitalist integument", and that this integument must be "burst asunder". The fetishism of commodities, the tyranny of the market, must be overthrown by the revolutionary working class, the only social force capable of taking hold of the existing productive forces and orienting them towards the satisfaction of human needs.
The definitions of communism in Marx's 'mature' theoretical work operate at two connected levels. The first derives logically from the critique of commodity fetishism, of a society ruled by mysterious, non-human forces, and caught up in the terrible consequences of its inner contradictions. It is, in fact, Marx's attempt to concretize a project already announced in The Jewish Question in 1843: that human emancipation requires man to recognize and organize his own social powers instead of being dominated by them. He thus outlines the solution to the insoluble contradictions of commodity production: an essentially simple form of social organization where the divisions based on private property have been superseded, where production is carried on for need, not profit, and where calculations of labor time, instead of being applied as a wrack for each individual worker and the working class as a whole, are directed solely towards working out how much social labor should be expended on the production of such and such necessities:
"The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip itself of its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan" (Capital, Vol One, Chap I).
"Let us now picture to ourselves, by way of a change, a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labor power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labor-power of the community. All the characteristics of Robinson's labor are here repeated, but with the difference, that they are social, instead of individual. Everything produced by him was exclusively the result of his own personal labor, and therefore simply an object of use for himself. The total product of our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But another portion is consumed by the members as a means of subsistence. A distribution of this portion amongst them is consequently necessary. The mode of this distribution will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers. We will assume, but merely for the sake of a parallel with the production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence is determined by his labor-time. Labor-time would, in that case, play a double part. Its apportionment in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the proper proportion between the different kinds of work to be done and the various wants of the community. On the other hand, it also serves as a measure of the portion of common labor borne by each individual, and of his share in the part of the total product destined for individual consumption. The social relations of the individual producers, with regard both to their labor and its products, are in this case perfectly simple and intelligible, and that with regard not only to production but to distribution" (ibid).[1]
For all that these features seem transparently simple, even obvious, it has time and again been necessary for marxists to insist on this minimal definition of a communist society against all the false 'socialisms' that have plagued the workers' movement for so long. In the Grundrisse, for example, there is a long polemic against Proudhonist fantasies about a socialism based on fair exchange, a system where the worker is paid in full for the value of his product, and money is replaced by a kind of non-money to measure this exchange. Against this, Marx insists both that "it is impossible to abolish money itself as long as exchange value remains the social form of products" (Chapter on Money), and that in a real communist society, "the labor of the individual is posited from the outset as social labor. Thus, whatever the particular material form of the product he creates or helps to create, what he has bought with his labor is not a specific and particular product, but rather a specific share of the communal production. He therefore has no particular product to exchange. His product is not an exchange value" (ibid).
In Marx's day, when he criticized "the idea held by some socialists that we need capital but not the capitalists" (Grundrisse, Chapter on capital, notebook V), he was referring to confused elements in the workers' movement. But in the period of capitalist decay such ideas are not simply wrong; they have become part of the arsenal of the counter-revolution. One of the distinguishing features of the entire left wing of capital from the Labor Party through the Stalinists to the most radical Trotskyists, is that all of them identify socialism as a capitalist society without private capitalists, a system where capital has been nationalized and wage labor statified, and where commodity production still reigns supreme, if not within each national unit then on world scale, as a relation between the various 'socialist nations'. Naturally, as we saw with the Stalinist system in the old eastern bloc, such a system in no way avoids the fundamental contradictions of capital and is just as doomed to collapse as the more classical variants of bourgeois society.
Thus far, Marx has described the material underpinnings of communist freedom, its basic prerequisites:
"Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis." (Capital, Volume Three, chap XLVIII).
The true goal of communism, therefore, is not merely a negative freedom from the domination of arbitrary economic laws, but the positive freedom to develop human potential to its utmost, and for its own sake. As we have noted before, this far-reaching project was announced by Marx in his early writings, particularly the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and he never deviated from it at any stage in his later work.
The passage just cited is preceded by the statement that "the realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production". This is true insofar as the enormous development of labor productivity under capitalism, the automation of production (which is clearly glimpsed by Marx in a number of passages in the Grundrisse), make it possible to reduce to a minimum the amount of time and energy spent on repetitive and unrewarding tasks. But when Marx actually begins to examine the content of the free activity characteristic of a communist humanity, he recognizes that such an activity will overcome any rigid separation between free time and working time:
"It goes without saying, by the way, that direct labor time itself cannot remain in the abstract antithesis to free time in which it appears from the perspective of bourgeois economy. Labor cannot become play, as Fourier would like, although it remains his great contribution to have expressed the suspension not of distribution, but of the mode of production itself, in a higher form, as the ultimate object. Free time - which is both idle time and time for higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject. This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming; and at the same time, practice, experimental science, materially creative and objectifying science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society. For both, in so far as labor requires practical use of hands and free bodily movement, as in agriculture, at the same time exercise" (Grundrisse, Chapter on Capital, notebook VII).
Thus, if Marx criticizes Fourier for thinking that labor can become "mere fun, mere amusement" (a misunderstanding kept alive by the successors of Fourier who abound on the margins of the revolutionary movement, such as the Situationists), he offers instead not a greyer, more mundane goal, but one far more epic in scope, pointing out that "the overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity - and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits - hence as self-realisation, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely labor" (Grundrisse, Chapter on Capital, notebook VI). And again: "Really free working, e.g. composing, is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion" (ibid).
The worldview of the first laboring class to be a revolutionary class, and thus one which recognizes labor to be the specifically human form of activity, marxism cannot envisage human beings finding real satisfaction in mere 'leisure' conceived in abstract opposition to work; it thus affirms that humanity will find its true fulfillment in a form of active creation, an inspired fusion of labor, science and art.
**********
In the next part of this series, we will follow Marx's 'return' from the abstract world of economic studies to the practical world of politics, in the period that culminated with the first proletarian revolution in history, the Paris Commune. In so doing, we will trace the development of the marxist understanding of the political problem par excellence: the problem of the state, and how to get rid of it.
CDW
[1] We will return in another article to the question of labor-time as a measure of individual consumption. But let's note that here labor-time no longer dominates the worker or society; society uses it consciously, as a means of planning the rational production and distribution of use-values. And, as Marx points out in the Grundrisse, it certainly no longer measures its real wealth in terms of labor-time, but in terms of disposable time.
IR76, 1st Qtr 1994
As a new recovery in proletarian combativity develops across the world, the need for greater unity within the revolutionary milieu is posed more sharply than ever. Consequently, it is important that revolutionary organisations should show themselves capable of drawing up a balance sheet of what has been achieved in this domain during the last few years, and of learning its lessons for the future.
This article aims to contribute to this effort. It is concerned in particular with a critique of the experience of the IBRP, in a spirit not of “competition”, but of a sincere and fraternal confrontation of positions. Our aim is not to criticise the IBRP’s practice for its own sake, but to illustrate the mistakes to be avoided, through this organisation’s experience.
During the last two years, something has begun to change within the international proletarian milieu: an awareness is beginning to emerge, fitfully and with many hesitations it is true, that revolutionaries must stand together if they are to live up to their responsibilities.
The ICC’s Appeal
In 1991, the ICC’s 9th International Congress published an “Appeal to the Proletarian Milieu”. It called upon the milieu to combat the sectarianism that weighs on it, and urged it to regard this combat as a vital matter for the working class. It expressed the first stirrings of a change in the atmosphere within the proletarian political movement.
“Instead of a total sectarian isolation, we find today in the different groups a greater will to air their reciprocal critiques in the press or in public meetings. Furthermore there is and explicit appeal from the comrades of Battaglia Comunista (BC) to overcome the present dispersion: an appeal whose arguments and aims we largely share. Finally there exists - and this must be encouraged to the full - a ‘push from below’ against sectarian isolation, which comes from a new generation of young elements that the earthquake of these last two years has pushed towards communist positions and who remain baffled by this politically unexplained dispersion (...)
“The threat today posed to the working class by capitalism in decomposition is the destruction of the proletariat’s class unity in a thousand fratricidal confrontations, from the sands of the Gulf to the frontiers of Yugoslavia. It is for this reason that the defence of its unity is a question of life or death for our class. But what hope can the proletariat have to maintain this unity, if even its conscious vanguard renounces the fight for its unification? Don’t anyone tell us that this is an appeal to “Kiss and make up”, an “opportunistic avoiding of divergences”. Remember that it was precisely their participation at Zimmerwald which allowed the Bolsheviks to unify the left at Zimmerwald, embryo of the Communist International, and make the definitive separation with Social Democracy” (International Review no 67).
The Appeal continued:
“It’s not a question of hiding divergences in order to rush into “marriages” between groups, but of beginning to discuss openly the divergences which are at the origins of the existence of different groups.”
The point of departure is to systematise the reciprocal critique of positions in the press.
“Another step which can be taken immediately is to systematise the presence and intervention at public meetings of other groups. A more important step is the confrontation of positions in jointly convoked public meetings...”.
Small Steps Forward
Our Appeal has not met with any explicitly favourable response from the other proletarian organisations. Nonetheless, some positive steps have continued to be taken:
- the Bordigist group which publishes Il Comunista and Le Prolétaire has engaged in open polemics with other Bordigist organisations and with BC;
- the Communist Workers’ Organisation (CWO, from GB) has opened its pages to other groups, has taken part with other groups in a discussion circle in the north of England, and recently took the unusual step of inviting the ICC to participate in a “readers’ meeting” in London;
- for the last two years, the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP: formed by the CWO and BC in 1984) has made space for the ICC’s publications on their stand at the annual “Fête de Lutte Ouvrière” in Paris [1] [241];
- BC has published BC Inform, a newsletter designed to circulate information among the proletarian groups internationally;
- several proletarian groups in Milan (including the ICC, BC, and Programa Comunista) took part in a joint demonstration against the visit by Ligachev (one-time member of the USSR’s Politburo) to that city at the invitation of the local stalinists. Although there are some serious criticisms to be levelled at this action, it nonetheless expressed a desire to break with isolation; a desire which was concretised again shortly afterwards by the same groups’ participation in a day of debates and sale of the internationalist press.
These initiatives are certainly a step in the right direction. But are they enough for us to say that the proletariat’s political organisations are really living up to their responsibilities, at the level demanded by the gravity of the present situation? We do not think so.
In fact, while we may welcome the newfound “openness” of the proletarian groups, we are forced to conclude that it is more an empirical response to the new situation than based on any deeply considered reappraisal.
The need for method
The regroupment of revolutionary militants cannot be left to chance. It demands a consistent method, based on openness to debate combined with a rigorous defence of principle.
Such a method must avoid two dangers: on the one hand, that of falling into “debate for debate’s sake”, mere academic chatter in which everyone says what they like without any concern to establish a dynamic towards common action; on the other hand, the illusion that it is possible to engage in “common work”, on a “technical” basis, without first being clear on principles - principles which can only be determined by open debate.
A lack of method may be excused in new groups who lack experience in revolutionary work: on the part of organisations which lay claim to the heritage of the Italian Left and the Communist International, it cannot. When we look at the history of the IBRP we can only conclude: first that no solid method exists for developing a work of revolutionary regroupment; second, that lack of any method has led to the complete sterility of their efforts.
oOoIf we criticise the IBRP’s failure, let it be said straight away that we take no satisfaction from it. We have had our own share of difficulties during the 1980’s. Moreover, we are only too well aware of the terrible fragility of the revolutionary movement as a whole today, especially if we compare this weakness with the enormous responsibilities confronting the working class and its political organisations in the present period. The object of studying the movement’s failings, past and present, is to overcome them and so better to prepare ourselves to confront the future. Revolutionaries study the history of their class, not slavishly in search of “recipes” or “formulae”, but in order to benefit from their class’ historical experience in confronting the problems of the present. They may sometimes forget, however, that they themselves are part of that history. After all, Battaglia Comunista has existed since 1952, while the ICC is the longest-lived fully international centralised political organisation in working class history. The International Conferences held at the turn of the 70’s have their place in the proletariat’s history, as much as those of Zimmerwald and Kienthal. The history of the proletarian milieu since the Conferences is not just a matter of “archaeological interest” as BC would have it (Workers’ Voice no.62): it has been the testing ground for the different conceptions of intervention and regroupment that were expressed by the different groups at the Conferences.
The proletariat has a historic task to accomplish: the overthrow of capitalism and the construction of communist society. In carrying out this task, it has only two weapons: its consciousness, and its unity. The revolutionary organisations therefore have a dual responsibility: to intervene in the working class, in order to defend the communist program, and to work for the regroupment of revolutionaries as an expression of the unity of the class.
We should be in no doubt about the eventual purpose of this regroupment: the formation of the world Communist Party, the last International, without which a successful communist revolution is an impossibility.
The work of regroupment has several facets, related but distinct:
- the integration of individual militants into communist organisations, since the very principle of proletarian activity is that of organised collective action on the basis of a common commitment to the communist cause;
- the organisations of the capitalist heartlands, where the proletariat’s historical experience is the greatest, have a special responsibility to the groups emerging in the capitalist periphery in the most difficult conditions of material deprivation and political isolation. These groups can only survive, and play their role in the worldwide unification of the working class, if they can break out of their isolation and become part of a wider movement;
- finally, all the communist organisations, and above all what we may term the “historic groups” (i.e. those with a direct historical affiliation to the working-class organisations of the past) have a responsibility to show their class that there is a fundamental difference, a class line, drawn between all those groups and organisations which stand firm on the defence of internationalist principles, and those “Socialist” or “Communist” parties whose sole purpose is to strengthen the bourgeois hold over the oppressed. In other words, the communists must clearly delimit and defend a proletarian political milieu.
In the basis of an abandonment of the lack of method, opportunistic attitudes, and sectarianism that the IBRP has demonstrated ever since its formation in 1984.
The International Conferences of the Communist Left
This article is not the place for a detailed history of the International Conferences [2] [242] but we do need to recall some aspects of them. The first Conference, called by BC [3] [243], met in Milan in 1977; the second in Paris, in November 1978; the third also met in Paris in 1980. Apart from BC, the CWO and the ICC, a number of other groups that stood on the terrain of the Communist Left took part [4] [244]. The criteria for participation in these Conferences, as defined and clarified during the first two Conferences, were as follows:
“ - Recognition of the October revolution as a proletarian revolution;
- Recognition of the break with Social-Democracy carried out by the First and Second Congresses of the Communist International;
- Rejection without reservations of state capitalism and self-management;
- Rejection of all communist and socialist parties as bourgeois parties;
- Orientation towards a revolutionary organisation that takes marxist doctrine and methodology as the science of the proletariat;
- Recognition of the refusal of the proletariat’s enrolment, in any form whatever, under the banners of the bourgeoisie” [5] [245]
The ICC stood foursquare behind the Conferences, as they were proposed in BC’s initial circular letter:
“In the kind of situation we are living today, where the dynamic of things progresses much more quickly than the dynamic of the world of men, it is the duty of the revolutionary forces to intervene in events with a will to achieve something on the terrain which gave birth to them, and is now in a state to receive them. But the Communist Left would fail in the task if it did not provide itself with effective weapons from the viewpoint of theory and political practice. This means:
a) above all, leaving the state of impotence and inferiority into which they have been led by a provincialism fostered by cultural factors marked with dilettantism, by an incoherent self-satisfaction which has taken the place of revolutionary modesty, and especially the weakening of the concept of militantism understood as a hard and disinterested self-sacrifice;
b) establishing a historically valid programmatic base; for our party, this is the theoretical and practical experience of the October Revolution, and on the international level the critical acceptance of the theses of the Communist International’s 2nd Congress;
c) recognising that it is impossible to arrive either at class positions, or at the creation of a world party of the revolution, still less at a revolutionary strategy, without first resolving the need to set in motion a permanent international centre of liaison and information, which will be the anticipation and the synthesis of what will be the future International, just as Zimmerwald, and above all Kienthal, were prefigurations of the IIIrd International” (Proceedings of the 1st International Conference).
“The Conference should also indicate how and when to open a debate on problems such as the trades unions, the party and so many others which today divide the international Communist Left, if we want the Conference to have a positive conclusion, and be a step towards a broader objective, towards the formation of an international front of groups of the Communist Left which will be as homogeneous as possible, so that we can finally leave the political and ideological tower of Babel and avoid a dismemberment of the existing groups” (2nd Letter from BC, ibid).
There was a further objective to the Conference: “the gravity of the situation (...) demands the taking up of precise and responsible positions, based on a unified vision of the various currents of the international communist left” (BC’s 1st Letter).
During the Conferences, however, it can hardly be said that BC shone by its coherence. Far from “taking up precise and responsible positions”, BC consistently refused the slightest common position: “We are opposed in principle to common declarations, for they do not express a political accord” (BC intervention at the 2nd Conference); “it is not the greater or lesser number of groups signing the resolution [on the international situation, proposed by the ICC] which will give it a greater or lesser weight in the class” (BC intervention at the 3rd Conference).
It is worth remembering that the 3rd Conference was held just after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and that all the groups present agreed on the imperialist nature of the USSR, the inevitability of war under capitalism, and the responsibility of the proletariat in holding back the march to war - which was certainly enough to set the Communist Left apart from the Trotskysists, Stalinists, Socialists, and democrats who were all urging the workers to support one side or another in the confrontation between the imperialist blocs of the USA and the USSR in Afghanistan [6] [246].
Following the Conferences’ demise, BC could write, in 1983: “The Conferences have accomplished their essential task which was to create a climate of confrontation and debate at an international level within the proletarian camp”; “we consider them as instruments of classification and political selection within the revolutionary camp” (BC’s reply to the address launched by the ICC’s 5th International Congress in 1983). Whatever happened to the “permanent international centre of liaison and information”? Where is “the international front of groups of the Communist Left”?
The International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party
Of course, anybody can change their minds, even a “serious leading force”, as BC likes to call itself. Having defined a “revolutionary camp” of serious groups (which in fact boiled down to... themselves!), within the “proletarian camp” (which includes the ICC amongst others, thank you very much!), BC and the CWO set about calling a 4th International Conference, and founding the IBRP.
As BC said in one of their last interventions at the 3rd and final Conference: “We want to undertake a 4th Conference which is a place for work and not merely for discussion... To work together requires common ground. For example, common work can only be undertaken with groups which recognise the need to create vanguard workers’ groups, organised on a revolutionary platform”. In Revolutionary Perspectives no.18, the CWO also announced their intention “to develop discussions and joint work with a view to the CWO regrouping with the PCInt. This does not mean that the process is near an end, nor does it mean that issues will be pushed aside or forgotten, but our recent cooperation at the Third Conference gives us the optimism that a positive conclusion can be realised”. A 4th International Conference was declared necessary which “does not reproduce the limitations of its predecessors but which is the preliminary condition for possible common political work on an international scale”.
By the time the IBRP was formed, the 4th “Conference” had been and gone: it was a complete fiasco [7] [247], and the experiment has not been repeated since. Nevertheless, the first issue of the IBRP’s Communist Review could still state, “In the Conferences groups and organisations belonging to the proletarian political camp meet, converge, and confront each other”. The Bureau’s platform, meanwhile, was supposed to represent “a moment in the synthesis of the groups’ platforms at the national level”.
Nine years later, what is the situation? The International Conferences have remained a dead letter. There has been no regroupment between BC and the CWO: indeed, as far as we can tell from their press there have not even been any discussions between them to resolve their differences, for example on the parliamentary or trades union questions. The French comrades, who in 1984 had “the intention of laying the foundations for an organisational recovery of the revolutionary movement on the organic positions now put forward by the IBRP” have disappeared without a trace. The only other group to join the IBRP - Lal Pataka in India - has foundered in a welter of sectarian anti-IBRP diatribe, and likewise disappeared.
The thirteen years since the 3rd Conference have sorely tried the proletarian milieu: militant forces that the working class can ill afford to lose have gone down with all hands. Just look at the fate of the groups which took part in the Conferences, even if only by correspondence: PIC (France), Forbundet Arbetarmakt (Sweden), Eveil Internationaliste (France), Organisation Communiste Révolutionnaire Internationaliste d’Algérie, have all disappeared. The GCI has moved towards leftism with its support for Sendero Luminoso; the NCI in its various permutations has gone over completely to the bourgeoisie by supporting Iraq during the Gulf War. The Fermento Obrero Revolucionario is foundering in complete stagnation.
Certainly, the disappearance of some of these groups was due to a necessary decantation. Nor is there any point in trying to remake history with “ifs”. Nonetheless, we can say that the failure of the Conferences as a place where the Communist Left could define itself and affirm its revolutionary nature against the 57 varieties of leftism, has deprived new groups searching for coherence, of any kind of solid anchorage in the ideological storms of decomposing capitalism. As it is, emerging groups which cannot identify completely with the positions of an existing organisation within the Communist Left are condemned to isolation, with all that that entails in terms of political stagnation, demoralisation and opening to the infiltration of bourgeois ideology.
And the IBRP has failed to provide any kind of substitute. Their alternatives have remained nothing but proposals. Thirteen years after the CWO announced the perspective of a regroupment with BC, none has taken place.
The IBRP in India
To understand why the IBRP has been unable to conduct any solid regroupment, it is useful to look at the attempt to integrate the Indian Lal Pataka group into the IBRP.
For one thing, the IBRP has constantly deluded itself as to the potential for regroupment of groups whose origins lie in the enemy camp, especially in leftism. These delusions are themselves tied to an ambiguous attitude to mass movements on a non-proletarian terrain, which Battaglia at least has never overcome. At the 2nd International Conference, BC could say that the task of communists is to “lead the movements of national liberation” and to “work in the direction of a class cleavage within the movement, not by judging it from outside”. These positions were repeated in the “Draft Theses on the Tasks of Communists in Capitalism’s Periphery”, which went on to conclude that “Capital’s domination in these countries [ie of the periphery] is not yet total over society, it has not subjected the entire collectivity to the laws of the ideology of capital as it has in the metropolitan countries. In the peripheral countries the political and ideological integration of individuals into capitalist society is not the mass phenomenon of the metropolitan countries because the exploited individual, poverty-stricken and oppressed, is not yet the citizen-individual of the original capitalist formations. This difference with the metropolitan countries makes mass communist organisations a possibility in the periphery (...) Such ‘better’ conditions imply the possibility of organising masses of proletarians around the proletarian party” (Communist Review no. 3).
We have said, over and over again, that it is a fatal mistake to think that communists can somehow “take over the leadership” of national liberation struggles, national revolutionary struggles, or whatever else one may want to call these struggles between “nations”. Such struggles are in fact a direct attack on proletarian consciousness, because they drown the only revoutionary class in the mass of “the people” - a danger which is especially great in the peripheral countries, where the proletariat is already heavily outnumbered by the peasantry and the masses of the landless poor.
We know this, not just from theory but from practice. The ICC’s oldest section, in Venezuela, was formed in direct opposition to all the Guevarist “national liberation” ideologies prevalent in the left at the time. More recently, our experience in forming our section in Mexico has confirmed - if that were necessary - that a solid communist presence can only be established by confronting all the varieties of leftism head-on, and by establishing a totally rigorous class line between bourgeois leftism, however radical, and proletarian positions.
The IBRP has consistently failed to establish this clear separation, from the “4th International Conference” held with Iranian CP supporters, to the fraternal correspondence with the “Marxist-Leninist” Revolutionary Proletarian Platform (RPP) group in India. Not surprisingly, the leftists themselves are often clearer about the real divisions between themselves and the communists than is the IBRP. Thus the Indian RPP: “... on the question of participation in reactionary trade unions and bourgeois parliaments it is difficult for us to be in agreement with you or any other trend who rejects such participation outright. Even though we recognise that your position on trade unions (...) is much saner in comparison with the ICC (who consider trade unions to have been integrated into the bourgeois state and hence need only to be smashed), we feel that in essence it remains a critique of the Bolshevik Leninist approach to the question from an extremely ‘left wing’ standpoint, since it starts from the same theoretical premise as that of the ICC and similar trends” (letter from RPP to the IBRP in Communist Review no. 3).
Ironically, the CWO now seems to have arrived at our own position as to the impossibility of groups (as opposed to individuals) moving from the bourgeois to the proletarian camp: “The politics of these [Trotskyist] organisations are without doubt within the left wing of capitalism and it would be a massive error to imagine that any such organisation could move back into the camp of Internationalist Communism” (Workers’ Voice no 65).
But neither the CWO, BC, or the IBRP, proved capable of understanding this in their attitude towards the supporters of the Iranian CP in exile (SUCM), or to the Indian Maoist organisation RPP (and it’s worth pointing out that, unlike Trotskyism, Maoism never belonged to the proletarian camp). On the contrary, just as the exclusion of the ICC from the 3rd International Conference was followed by the fiasco of the 4th, held with the former group as sole “visiting team”, so the IBRP was quite happy to team up with RPP in India in “the political battle against [the ICC’s] supporters” (Communist Review no 3), and to accept RPP’s Bengali section and newspaper moving bodily “into the camp of Internationalist Communism”.
In Communist Review no. 11, the “Statement on Lal Pataka” remarks that “Some cynical spirits might assume that we had too readily accepted this comrade into the Bureau”. We are not among such “cynical spirits”. The problem lies, not in the IBRP’s “haste” in “accepting” Lal Pataka, but in the congenital weaknesses of the IBRP itself. Given its own ambiguities on questions like trade unionism, and its own inability to draw a red line between communists and leftists, how can it help others to overcome their own confusions and to break completely with bourgeois ideology? Given the inability of BC and the CWO to carry their own discussions to the point of regroupment, how can the IBRP provide a solid international reference point for those coming towards communist politics?
The IBRP’s opportunist flirts with leftism are only matched by their sectarian attitude to groups not immediately within their “sphere of influence”. Communist Review no. 3 (1985), which deals to a large extent with groups in India, makes no mention of the Communist Internationalist group, nor of the group which was later to publish Kamunist Kranti, although both were known to the CWO at least. By 1991, Lal Pataka has disappeared from the pages of Workers’ Voice, to be replaced by Kamunist Kranti: “we hope that fruitful relations will be established between the International Bureau and Kamunist Kranti in the future”. Two years later, nothing much has come of this, since Communist Review no. 11 tells us that “it is a tragedy that, despite the existence of promising elements no solid nucleus of Indian communists yet exists”. There are only “sparks of consciousness in the midst of this turmoil”. In the meantime, the nucleus of the Communist Internationalist group has become an integral part of the ICC.... The IBRP would contribute more to the difficult process of revolutionary regroupment if it were prepared to recognise the existence of other groups in the movement.
The IBRP in the ex-Eastern bloc
After the failures with the Iranian SUCM, and the Indian RPP, one might have thought that the IBRP would have learnt something about the line dividing bourgeois organisations from the working class. The account of the IBRP’s intervention, with the Austrian Gruppe Internazionalistische Kommunisten (GIK), in the Eastern bloc leads us to doubt this.
While we salute the IBRP’s effort to defend communist positions within the turmoil of the ex-Eastern bloc (and wasn’t this a situation crying out for an "international front of the communist left” to use BC’s words?), it is nevertheless disturbing to see BC’s apparent illusions in the possibility of something positive emerging from the old CP’s. “Our comrades therefore decided to go and see the remnants of the Czechoslovak “Communist” Party. It might have been dangerous to go to communicate to the Stalinists all our hatred for their state capitalist régime of exploitation of our class, but it would be worth it if there were any residue of their working class base present, disorientated and witnessing the last breaths of the Party”. At another meeting, “there was no lack of discussion (including an exchange of ideas with foreign representatives of the IVth International)” (Workers’ Voice no 53, Sept 1990).
How can there be an “exchange of ideas” between those whose one aim is to prop up the putrid corpse of stalinism, and the Left Communists determined to bury it forever? The GIK’s report (in Workers’ Voice no 55) echoes this idea that there can somehow be a “mixture” of proletarian marxism and bourgeois ideology in the East: “There is a broader knowledge of Marxist ideas among the population, some elements of a Marxist materialist analysis are not unknown even if distorted in a bourgeois manner and mixed with a bourgeois content”. But is there anything to choose, in terms of working class consciousness, between a worker in Western Europe who has never heard of “proletarian internationalism”, and one in the East who thinks that it means the Russian invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan? Worse still, the GIK seems to prefer fishing amongst the defrocked Stalinists to intervening in the class itself:
“More important than our street interventions was our single intervention in the new KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) which was reformed in January 1990. It is not homogeneous and the common element of its founders is that they want to maintain “communist ideals” (...) Many of the KPD (...) defend the GDR as a “socialist system with mistakes”. Others are divided between pure Stalinism and those who support the anti-Stalinist left oppositions (both Trotskyist and Communist Left)” (Workers’ Voice no 55, our emphasis). Once again, the distinction is blurred between Trotskyism and Left Communism, as if both could belong to some kind of “anti-Stalinist” common front. This is hardly the kind of intervention which is likely to contribute to a clear-cut break with Stalinism and its Trotskyist defenders.
A New Beginning... or more of the same?
As far as we can tell, nothing has come of the IBRP’s attempts to extend its presence in the nine years of its existence, or of the regroupment between BC and the CWO announced in 1980. The “first serious selection of forces” that BC spoke of after the break-up of the International Conferences has remained... very selective. In summer 1991, the CWO announces: “The historical alternative in our time is either the present capitalist barbarism which will ultimately end in the extinction of human life, or the establishment of socialism by the proletariat (...) To assist in this process requires a greater concentration of forces than we ourselves (or indeed any other group of the proletarian political camp) presently possess. We are therefore trying to find a new and principled means to hold a political dialogue with all who consider themselves to be fighting for the same goals as ourselves”. Thirteen years after BC and the CWO “assumed the responsibility that one has a right to expect from a serious leading force” and broke up the International Conferences, we have come full circle. But as Marx said, history repeats itself the first time as tragedy, the second as farce, and the CWO’s “New Beginning” has not so far led to anything but a semi-regroupment with the CBG. But aren’t the CBG precisely the kind of people of whom BC wrote (in April 1992): “The political importance of a division which is sometimes necessary for precise theoretical interpretation and definition of strategy, has given way, in a certain political milieu and amongst certain personalities, to an exasperating practice of splitting for splitting’s sake, of the individual rejection of any centralisation, any organisational discipline, or any “inconvenient” responsibility in collective party work”?
How can the CWO, which never misses an opportunity to denounce the ICC’s “spontaneism” and “idealism” propose to fuse with the CBG, which insofar as it has any principles at all (i.e. not far) is supposed to defend the ICC’s platform? This unprincipled mish-mash is destined to go the same way as the rest of the IBRP’s efforts [8] [248].
Which way forward?
Twenty years of experience - with its successes and its setbacks - in building an international organisation present on three continents and in twelve countries has taught us one thing at least: there are no short cuts in the work of regroupment. The lack of mutual understanding, the ignorance of each others’ positions, the downright distrust that are the legacy of the thirteen years since the Conferences broke up - none of this will disappear overnight. If we are to rebuild any unity in the proletarian camp, then we must first have a return to “revolutionary modesty” as BC have termed it, and take the very limited steps outlined in the ICC’s “Appeal”: regular polemics, presence at each others’ meetings, common public meetings etc. And when a return to the spirit of the International Conferences does become possible, then it must be on the basis of the lessons of the past:
“There will be other Conferences. We will be there, and we hope to encounter, if their sectarianism hasn’t killed them by then, those groups which have not yet understood the Conferences’ importance, including your’s. And whether or not they be considered as continuators of the three Conferences we have just been through (...), they will profit from their gains:
- importance of these Conferences for the revolutionary milieu and the whole class;
- the necessity of criteria for selection;
- the necessity of taking position
- rejection of any haste;
- necessity of deeper discussion on the crucial questions confronting the proletariat.
To build a healthy body, the future World Party, demands a healthy method. These Conferences, in their strong as well as their weak poionts, will have taught those revolutionaries who “have not forgotten how to learn” as Rosa Luxemburg said, what such a method is” [9] [249].
Sven
[1] [250] “Lutte Ouvrière”, the main Trotskyist organisation in France, holds an annual jamboree outside Paris, more on the lines of a country fair than a political event. To give an image of “democratic tolerance”, a whole range of “left” organisations are given the opportunity to run a stand for the sale of their press, and to hold public meetings to defend their positions. The ICC has always gone to these events, to denounce the anti-working-class nature of the Trotskyists’ activity and to defend internationalist positions. Three years ago, the inevitable happened: an ICC militant unmasked LO’s wretched attempts to deny their support for Mitterand’s election in 1981 - and in a way which left no doubt about LO’s duplicity. Since then the ICC has been banned from holding either stand or forums.
[2] [251] The texts and proceedings of the International Conferences of the Communist Left (held between 1977 and 1980) can be obtained from the ICC’s addresses. We have also dealt with the main questions raised by the conferences in several issues of the International Review.
[3] [252] Formally,
these conferences were initiated by BC. But BC was not the only one to share
the concern for regroupment. Révolution Internationale, which was later to form
the ICC’s French section, had already called on BC, as one of the historic
currents within the proletariat, to begin regrouping the scattered proletarian
forces of the day. In 1972, at the initiative of Inter (later the ICC’s US
section), a series of conferences and correspondance began - which led
eventually to the creation of the Revolutionary Perspectives group on the one
hand and to the formation of the ICC in 1975, on the other.
[4] [253] If we count the groups which took part by correspondence, then we can also include: the FOR (Ferment Ouvrier Révolutionnaire); För Komunismen and Forbundet Arbetarmakt, from Sweden; the Nuclei Leninisti Internazionalisti and Il Leninista, from Italy; the Organisation Communiste Révolutionnaire Internationaliste d’Algérie; the Groupe Communiste Internationaliste, from Belgium; and the Groupe Communiste L’Eveil Internationaliste, from France.
[5] [254] Bulletin Préparatoire no 1 de la 3e Conférence des Groupes de la Gauche Communiste, November 1979. It’s worth pointing out that these criteria were proposed by the ICC as a starting point for the first Conferences, not by BC.
[6] [255] Following our “exclusion” from the Conferences, in an article “Sectarianism, a heritage of the counter-revolution to be overcome”, we wrote:
“For revolutionaries, to remain silent is to deny their very existence. Communists have nothing to hide from their class. Before the class, whose vanguard they aim to be, they take responsability for their acts and their convictions.
This is why the next Conferences will have to break with the habit of “silence” of the previous three.
They will have to be able to assert CLEARLY, and take responsibility for the result of their work, not in hundreds of pages of Conference proceedings, but in short resolutions, whether these results be the clarification of DISAGREEMENTS or COMMON positions, shared by all the groups.
The inability of the Conferences to put down the real content of the disagreements between the groups, in black and white, was an expression of their weakness.
The jealous silence of the 3rd Conference on the question of the war is shameful.
The next Conferences will have to be able to take their responsabilities, if they hope to be viable”.
(...)
““But watch out!”, the partisans of silence say to us. “We are not going to sign with just anyone! We are not opportunists!”. And we answer them: opportunism means betraying principles at the first opportunity. What we propose is not to betray a principle [internationalism], but to assert it with all our strength” (International Review no 22, 3rd quarter 1980).
[7] [256] We have not the space here to go into the sorry story of the 4th Conference. See International Review nos 40/41.
[8] [257] If it has not done so already. The last two issues of WV have borne no trace of the CBG’s “regular contributions”.
[9] [258] ICC Letter after the 3rd Conference, in the Proceedings of the 3rd Conference of Groups of the Communist Left, May 1980.
According to the popular misconception, which is systematically upheld and disseminated by all the mouthpieces of bourgeois ideology from the tabloid press to the professors of academe, communism means a society where everything is run by the state. The whole identification between communism and the Stalinist regimes in the East rested on this assumption.
And yet it is a total falsehood, reality turned on its head. For Marx, for Engels, for all the revolutionaries who followed in their footsteps, communism means a society without a state, a society where human beings run their affairs without a coercive power standing over them, without governments, armies, prisons or national frontiers.
Of course, the bourgeois world-view has its answer to this version of communism: yes. yes, but that's just a utopia, it could never happen; modern society is too big, too complex; human beings are too untrustworthy, too violent, too greedy for power and privilege. The very sophisticated (professors like J Talmon, author of The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, for instance) even inform us that the very attempt to create a stateless society must lead to the kind of monstrous Leviathan state that arose in Russia under Stalin.
But wait: if the vision of stateless communism is no more than a utopia, an idle dream, why do the present-day masters of the state spend so much time and energy repeating the lie that communism=state control over society? Could it be because the authentic version is actually a subversive challenge to the existing order, and because it corresponds to the needs of a real movement that is inevitably force to confront the state and the society that it protects?
If marxism is the theoretical standpoint and method of this movement, the movement of the international working class, then it becomes easy to see why bourgeois ideology in all its forms - not least those that label themselves 'marxist' - has always sought to bury the marxist theory of the state under a huge tip of intellectual refuse. When he wrote The State and Revolution in 1917, Lenin talked about the need to "excavate" the real marxist position on the state from underneath the rubble of reformism. Today, in the wake of all the bourgeois campaigns identifying Stalinist state capitalism with communism, this work of excavation still needs to go on. Hence this article, which focuses on a monumental event - the Paris Commune, first proletarian revolution in history - which bequeathed to the working class the most precious lessons on precisely this question.
In 1864 Marx emerged from more than a decade of submersion in profound theoretical investigation to return to the world of practical politics. In the decade that followed, his principal energies were to be directed towards two questions that were political through and through: the formation of an international workers' party, and the conquest of power by the working class.
After the long retreat in the class struggle initiated by the defeat of the great social upheavals of 1848, the proletariat in Europe began to show signs of reawakening consciousness and militancy. The development of strike movements around both economic and political demands, the formation of trade unions and workers' cooperatives, the mobilization of workers around questions of 'foreign policy' such as support for Polish independence or for the anti-slavery forces in the American Civil War, all this convinced Marx that the period of defeat was at an end. This is why he gave his active support to the initiative of English and French trade unionists to form the International Workingmen's Association[1] in September 1864. As Marx put it in the report of the General Council to the 1868 Brussels Congress of the International, "this Association has not been hatched by a sect or a theory. It is the spontaneous growth of the proletarian movement, which itself is the offspring of the natural and irrepressible tendencies of modern society". Thus, the fact that the motives of many of the elements who formed the International had little in common with Marx's views (the chief concern of the English trade unionists, for example, was to use it as a means to prevent the import of foreign strike-breakers) did not prevent him from taking a leading role within it, sitting on the General Council for most of its life and writing many of its most important documents. Since the International was a product of the movement of the proletariat at a certain stage in its historical development, a stage in which it was still forming itself as a force within bourgeois society, it was both possible and necessary for the marxist fraction to work alongside other working class tendencies within the International, to participate in its immediate activities around the day-to-day combat of the workers, while at the same time trying to free the organization from bourgeois and petty bourgeois prejudices and to imbue it as far as possible with the theoretical and political clarity it required if it was to act as the revolutionary vanguard of a revolutionary class.
This is not the place to go into a history of all the doctrinal and practical struggles which the marxist fraction fought within the International. Suffice it to say that they were based on certain principles that had already been laid out in the Communist Manifesto and reinforced by the experience of the 1848 revolutions, in particular:
- that "the emancipation of the working class must be conquered by the working classes themselves" (opening lines of the Provisional Rules of the IWMA). Hence the need for an organization "established by the working men themselves and for themselves" (speech on the 7th anniversary of the International, London, 1871) and to break free of the influence of bourgeois liberals and reformers - in short, to work out an independent class policy and action for the proletariat even in a period where alliances with progressive bourgeois fractions was still on the agenda. Within the International itself, the defense of this principle was to lead to a rupture with Mazzini and his bourgeois-nationalist followers;
- that, consequently, "the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all parties formed by the propertied classes" and that "this constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and its ultimate end - the abolition of classes" (resolution of the London Conference of the International on Working Class Political Action, September 1871). This defense of the class party - a centralized, international organization of the most advanced proletarians[2] - was waged against all the federalist, 'anti-authoritarian' anarchist elements, notably the followers of Proudhon and Bakunin, who believed that all forms of centralization were inherently despotic, and that in any case the International certainly should have nothing to do with politics, either in the defensive or the revolutionary phases of the proletarian movement. Marx's 'Inaugural Address' to the International in 1864 had already insisted that "To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes". The 1871 resolution was thus a reiteration of this founding principle against all those who believed that the social revolution could come to pass without workers taking the trouble to form a political party and to fight for political power as a class.
In the period between 1864 and 1871, the debate about involvement in 'politics' was largely related to the question of whether or not the working class should enter the sphere of bourgeois politics (the call for universal suffrage, participation of the workers' party in elections and parliament, struggle for democratic rights, etc) as a means to obtaining reforms and strengthening its position within capitalist society. The Bakuninists and the Blanquists[3], champions of the omnipotent revolutionary will, refused to analyses the objective material conditions within which the workers' movement was operating, and rejected such tactics as a diversion from the social revolution. Marx's materialist fraction, on the other hand, recognized that capitalism as a global system had not yet completed its historical mission, had not yet laid down all the conditions for the revolutionary transformation of society, and that consequently it was still necessary for the working class to fight for reforms both at the economic and political levels. In so doing, it would not only improve its immediate material situation, but would be preparing and organizing itself for the revolutionary showdown that would inevitably be produced by capitalism's historical trajectory towards crisis and collapse.
This debate was to continue in the workers' movement for decades to come, though in different contexts and with very different protagonists. But in 1871 momentous events in Continental Europe were to add a whole new dimension to the debate on working class political action. For this was the year of the first proletarian revolution in history, the actual conquest of political power by the working class - the year of the Paris Commune.
"Every step of a real movement is more important than a dozen programs" (Marx to Bracke, 1875)
The drama and tragedy of the Paris Commune are brilliantly described and analyzed in Marx's The Civil War in France, which was published in the summer of 1871 as an official address of the International. In this passionate diatribe, Marx shows how a war between nations, France and Prussia, was transformed into a war between the classes: following France's disastrous military collapse, the Thiers' government based in Versailles had concluded an unpopular peace and sought to impose its terms on Paris; this could only be done by disarming the workers regrouped in the National Guard. On 18 March 1871 troops sent by Versailles tried to seize cannons under the control of the Guard; this was to be the prelude to a massive repression against the working class and its revolutionary minorities. The workers of Paris responded by taking to the streets and fraternizing with the Versailles troops. In the days that followed they proclaimed the Commune.
The Commune of 1871, in name, was an echo of the revolutionary Commune of 1793, organ of the sans culottes during the most radical phases of the bourgeois revolution. But the second Commune had a very different meaning, looking not to the past, but to the future - to the communist revolution of the working class.
Although Marx had, during the siege of Paris, warned that an uprising in conditions of war would be "a desperate folly" ('Second Address of the General Council of the IWMA on the Franco-Prussian War'), when the uprising did come Marx committed himself and the International to expressing the most unwavering solidarity with the Communards - among whom the International's members in Paris played a leading role, even though hardly any were of a 'marxist' political persuasion. He could have no other reaction in the face of the vile slanders that the world bourgeoisie threw at the Commune, and of the horrifying revenge that the ruling class exacted from the Parisian proletariat for daring to challenge its 'civilization': after slaughtering thousands of fighters on the barricades, thousands more - men, women and children - were shot down in mass executions, incarcerated in the most abject conditions, deported to hard labor in the colonies. Not since the days of ancient Rome had such a slave-holders' blood orgy been enacted.
But beyond the elementary question of proletarian solidarity, there was another reason why Marx was driven to recognize the fundamental significance of the Commune. Even though the Commune was 'historically' premature in the sense that the material conditions for a world-wide proletarian revolution had not yet matured, the Commune was none the less an event of world-historical importance, a crucial step on the road to this revolution; it was a treasure-house of lessons for the future, for the clarification of the communist program. Before the Commune, the most advanced fraction of the class, the communists, had understood that the working class had to take political power as a first step towards building the classless human commonwealth. But the precise manner in which the proletariat would establish its dictatorship had not yet been clarified because such a theoretical advance could only be based on the living experience of the class. The Paris Commune was such an experience, perhaps the most vivid proof that the communist program is not a fixed and static dogma but something that evolves and grows in intimate connection to the practice of the working class; not a utopia, but a great scientific experiment whose laboratory is the actual movement of society. It is well known that Engels made a particular point, in his later introductions to the Communist Manifesto of 1848, of stating that the experience of the Commune had rendered obsolete those formulations in the text which conveyed the idea of capturing the existing state machine. The conclusions that Marx and Engels drew from the Commune, in other words, are a demonstration and a vindication of the historical materialist method. As Lenin put it in The State and Revolution:
"There is no trace of utopianism in Marx, in the sense that he made up or 'invented' a new society. No, he studied the birth of the new society out of the old, and the forms of transition from the latter to the former, as a natural-historical process. He examined the actual experience of a mass proletarian movement and tried to draw practical lessons from it. He 'learned' from the Commune, just as all the great revolutionary thinkers learned unhesitatingly from the experience of great movements of the oppressed classes ..."
Our aim here is not to retell the story of the Commune. The main events are already described in The Civil War in France, as well as in many other works, including those by revolutionaries like Lissagaray who fought on the barricades himself. What we shall try to do here is to examine exactly what it was that Marx learned from the Commune. In another article we will look at how he defended these lessons against all the prevailing confusions in the workers movement of his day.
"This was ... a revolution not against this or that Legitimist, Constitutional, Republican or Imperialist form of state power. It was a revolution against the state itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life" (Marx, first draft of The Civil War in France).
The conclusions that Marx drew from the Paris Commune were not, on the other hand, an automatic product of the workers' direct experience. They were a confirmation and an enrichment of an element in Marx's thought that had been a constant since he first broke from Hegelianism and moved towards the proletarian cause.
Even before he clearly became a communist, Marx had already begun to criticize the Hegelian idealization of the state. For Hegel, whose thought was a contradictory mélange of radicalism derived from the impetus of the bourgeois revolution, and of conservatism inherited from the stifling atmosphere of Prussian absolutism, the state - and the existing Prussian state at that - was defined as the incarnation of the Absolute Spirit, the perfected form of social existence. In his critique of Hegel, Marx by contrast shows that far from being man's highest and noblest product, the rational subject of social existence, the state, and above all the bureaucratic Prussian state, was an aspect of man's alienation, of his loss of control over his own social powers. Hegel's thought was upside down: "Hegel proceeds from the state and conceives of man as the subjectivised state; democracy proceeds from man and conceives of the state as objectified man" (Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State, 1843). At this point, Marx's standpoint is that of radical bourgeois democracy (though very radical, as he was already arguing that true democracy would lead to the disappearance of the state), a standpoint which saw human emancipation as something that lay first and foremost in the sphere of politics. But very rapidly, as he began to view things from the perspective of the working class, he was able to see that if the state alienated itself from society, it was because the state was the product of a society founded on private property and class privilege. In his writings on the Wood Theft Law, for example, he was beginning to adopt the view that the state was the guardian of social inequality, of narrow class interests; in The Jewish Question he was beginning to recognize that real human emancipation could not be restricted to the political dimension but demanded a different form of social life. Thus at its very inception Marx's communism was busy demystifying the state, and it never deviated from this path.
As we have seen in the articles on the Communist Manifesto and the revolutions of 1848 (International Reviews 72 and 73), as communism emerged as a current with a definite political program and organization, it carried on in the same vein. The Communist Manifesto, written before the great social upheavals of 1848, looked forward not only to the seizure of political power by the proletariat, but to the ultimate extinction of the state once its roots - a class-divided society - had been dug out and discarded. And the actual experiences of the movements of 1848 enabled the revolutionary minority organized in the Communist League to cast considerable light upon the proletariat's road to power, stressing the need, in any revolutionary upheaval, for the working class to maintain its own arms and class organs, and even (in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte) first suggesting that the task of the insurrectionary proletariat was not to perfect the bourgeois state machine but to smash it.
Thus the marxist fraction did not set about interpreting the experience of the Commune without any theoretical patrimony: the lessons of history are not 'spontaneous' in that the communist vanguard builds on an already-existing framework of ideas. But these ideas themselves must be constantly examined and tested in the light of working class experience, and it was to the glory of the Parisian workers that they offered convincing proof that the working class cannot make its revolution by taking charge of a machine whose very structure and mode of functioning is adapted to the perpetuation of exploitation and oppression. If the first step of the proletarian revolution is the conquest of political power, this can only come about through the violent destruction of the existing bourgeois state.
That the Commune arose out of the attempt by the Versailles government to disarm the workers is highly symbolic: it demonstrated that the bourgeoisie cannot tolerate an armed proletariat. Conversely, the proletariat can only come to power with arms in hand. The most violent and ruthless ruling class in history will never allow itself to be voted out of power - it can only be forced out, and the working class can only defend its revolution against all attempts to reverse it by maintaining its own armed force. Indeed, two of the most stringent criticisms that Marx made of the Commune were that it didn't make sufficient use of this force, standing "in superstitious awe" in front of the Bank of France instead of occupying it and using it as a bargaining counter, and failing to launch an offensive against Versailles when the latter still lacked the resources to launch its counter-revolutionary attack on the capital.
But despite its weaknesses in this respect, the Commune made a decisive historical advance when, with one of its first decrees, it dissolved the standing army and introduced the general arming of the population in the National Guard, which was effectively transformed into a popular militia. In so doing, the Commune took the first step towards the dismantling of the old state machine, which finds its expression par excellence in the army, in an armed force standing guard over the population, obeying only the highest echelons of the state machine and totally divorced from any control from below.
Alongside the army, indeed deeply interpenetrated with it, the institution which most clearly identifies the state as a "parasitic excrescence" that has alienated itself from society is the bureaucracy, that Byzantine network of permanent officials who regard the state almost as their own private property. Again, the Commune took immediate measures to free itself from this parasite. Engels summed these measures up very succinctly in his introduction to The Civil War in France:
"Against this transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society - an inevitable transformation in all previous states - the Commune made use of two infallible means. In the first place, it filled all posts - administrative, judicial and educational - by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials, high or low, were paid only the wages received by other workers. The highest salary paid by the Commune to anyone was 6,000 francs. In this way an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were added besides".
Marx also pointed out that by combining executive and legislative functions in itself, the Commune was a "working, not a parliamentary body". In other words, it was a higher form of democracy than bourgeois parliamentarism: even in the latter's hey-day, the division between legislative and executive meant that the latter tended to escape the control of the former and so spawn a growing bureaucracy. This tendency has, of course, been fully confirmed in the epoch of capitalist decadence, in which the executive organs of the state have turned the legislature into a mere facade.
But perhaps the most important proof that the proletarian democracy embodied in the Commune was more advanced than anything evolved under bourgeois democracy is this principle of revocable delegates.
"Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes" (The Civil War...). Bourgeois elections are founded on the principle of the atomized citizen in the polling booth, casting a vote which gives him no real control over his 'representatives'. The proletarian conception of elected and revocable delegates, by contrast, can only function on the basis of a permanent and collective mobilization of the workers and the oppressed. In the tradition of the revolutionary sections from which the Commune of 1793 had emanated (not to mention the radical 'agitators' elected from the ranks of Cromwell's New Model army in the English revolution), the delegates to the Commune's Council were elected by public assemblies held in each arrondissement of Paris. Formally speaking, these electoral assemblies had the power to formulate the mandates of their delegates and revoke them if necessary. In practice, it would appear that much of the work of supervising and pressurising the Communal delegates was carried out by the various 'Vigilance Committees' and revolutionary clubs which sprang up in the working class neighbourhoods and which were the focal points of an intense life of political debate, both about general, theoretical questions confronting the proletariat, and about immediate questions of survival, organisation and defence. The declaration of principles by the Club Communal, which met in the church of St-Nicholas-des-Champs in the Third Arrondissement, gives us a glimpse of the level of political consciousness attained by the proletarians of Paris during the heady two months of the Commune's existence:
"The aims of the Club Communal are as follows:
To fight the enemies of our communal rights, our liberties and the republic.
To defend the rights of the people, to educate them politically so that they may govern themselves.
To recall our mandatories to their principles if they should stray from them, and to support them in all their efforts to save the Republic.
Above all, however, to uphold the sovereignty of the people, who must never renounce their right to supervise the actions of their mandatories.
People, govern yourselves directly, through political meetings, through your press; bring pressure to bear on those who represent you - they cannot go too far in the revolutionary direction...
Long live the Commune!"
Based as it was on the permanent self-mobilization of the armed proletariat, the Commune, as Engels said, "was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word" (letter to Bebel, 1875). Lenin, in his State and Revolution, cites this line and expands on it:
"The Commune was ceasing to be a state since it had to suppress, not the majority of the population, but a minority (the exploiters). It had smashed the bourgeois state machine. In place of a special coercive force the population itself came onto the scene. All this was a departure from the state in the proper sense of the word. And had the Commune become firmly established, all traces of the state in it would have 'withered away' of themselves; it would not have had to 'abolish' the institutions of the state - they would have ceased to function as they ceased to have anything to do".
Thus the 'anti-statism' of the working class operates at two levels, or rather in two stages: first, the violent destruction of the bourgeois state; second, its replacement by a new kind of political power which as much as possible avoids the "worst sides" of all previous states and which ultimately makes it possible for the proletariat to do away with the state altogether, to consign it, in Engels evocative phrase, "to the Museum of Antiquities alongside the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe" (Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State)
The withering away of the state is predicated upon the transformation of the social and economic infrastructure - upon the elimination of capitalist relations of production and the movement towards a classless human community. As we have already remarked, the material conditions for such a transformation did not exist on a world scale in 1871. In addition to which, the Commune was in power only for two months, and only in one besieged city, even though it inspired revolutionary attempts in other cities in France (Marseilles, Lyons, Toulouse, Norbonne, etc).
When bourgeois historians try to debunk Marx's claims about the revolutionary nature of the Commune, they point to the fact that most of the social and economic measures it took were hardly socialist: the separation of Church and State, for example is entirely compatible with radical bourgeois republicanism. Even the measures which had a more specific impact on the proletariat - abolition of nightwork for bakers, assistance with the formation of trade unions, etc - were designed to defend workers against exploitation rather than do away with exploitation itself. All this has led some 'experts' on the Commune to argue that it was more the last gasp of the Jacobin tradition than the first salvo of the proletarian revolution. Others, as Marx noted, mistook the Commune "for a reproduction of the mediaeval Communes which first preceded, and afterwards became the substratum of ... the modern state power" (The Civil War...).
All these interpretations are based on a total failure to understand the nature of the proletarian revolution. The lessons of the Paris Commune are fundamentally political lessons, lessons about the forms and functions of proletarian power, for the simple reason that the proletarian revolution can only begin as a political act. Lacking any economic seat inside the old system, the proletariat cannot undertake a process of social transformation until it has taken over the reins of political power, and this on a world scale. The Russian revolution of 1917 took place in a historic epoch where world-wide communism was a possibility, and it was victorious on the scale of a vast country. And still the fundamental legacy of the Russian revolution relate to the problem of working class political power, as we shall see later on in this series. To have expected the Commune to have introduced communism in a single city would have been to expect miracles, and as Marx insisted "the working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-made utopias to introduce par decret du peuple. They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic circumstances, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society is pregnant" (The Civil War...).
Against all the false interpretations of the Commune, Marx insisted that it was "essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor" (ibid).
In these passages, Marx recognizes that the Commune was first and foremost a political form, and that there could be no question of any overnight utopias being established under its rule. And yet at the same time, there is a recognition that once the proletariat takes power into its hands, it can and must inaugurate, or rather "set free", a dynamic leading to the "economic transformation of labor", despite all the objective limitations placed on this dynamic. This is why the Commune, like the Russian revolution, does also contain valuable lessons about the future social transformation.
As an example of this dynamic, this logic towards social transformation, Marx pointed to the expropriation of the factories abandoned by capitalists who had fled the city, and their handing over to workers' cooperatives, who were to be organised in a single union. For him, this was an immediate expression of the Commune's ultimate aim, the general expropriation of the expropriators:
"It (the Commune) wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour. But this is communism, 'impossible' communism! Why, those members of the ruling classes who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system - and they are many - have become the obtrusive and full-mouthed apostles of co-operative production. If co-operative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the capitalist system; if united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production - what else, gentlemen, would it be but communism, 'possible' communism?" (ibid).
The Commune has also left us with important elements for understanding the relationship between the working class, once it has seized power, and the other non-exploiting strata of society, in this case the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. By acting as the determined vanguard of the entire oppressed population, the working class showed its capacity to win the confidence of these other strata, who are less capable of acting as a unified social force. And to keep these strata on the side of the revolution, the Commune introduced a series of economic measures that lightened their material burdens: abolition of all kinds of debts and taxes, transformation of the immediate embodiments of the peasant's oppression, "his present bloodsuckers - the notary, advocate, executor - into salaried communal agents, elected by, and responsible to, himself" (ibid). In the case of the peasants, these measures remained largely hypothetical, since the Commune's authority did not extend to the rural districts. But the workers of Paris did to a considerable extent win the support of the urban petty bourgeoisie, particularly through the postponement of debt obligations and the cancelling of interest.
The Commune's electoral structures also enabled the other non-exploiting strata to participate politically in the revolutionary process. This was inevitable and necessary, and was to be repeated during the Russian revolution. But at the same time, from the retrospective of the 20th century we can see that one of the main indications that the Commune was an 'immature' expression of the proletarian dictatorship, that it was the creation of a working class which had not yet reached its full development, was the fact that the workers did not have a specific and independent organization within it, or a preponderant weight in its electoral mechanisms. The Commune was elected exclusively from territorial units (the arrondissements) which, while being dominated by the proletariat, could not have allowed the working class to impose itself as a clearly autonomous force (especially if the Commune had spread to embrace the peasant majority outside Paris). This is why the workers' councils of 1905 and 1917-21, elected by workplace assemblies and grounded in the main industrial centers, were an advance upon the Commune as a form of the proletarian dictatorship. We would go so far as to say that the Commune-form corresponded more closely to the state composed of all the Soviets (workers', soldiers', peasants', town residents') which emerged out of the Russian revolution.
The Russian experience has made it possible to clarify the relationship between the specific organs of the class, the workers' councils, and the Soviet state as a whole. In particular, it showed that the working class cannot identify directly with the latter, but must exert a constant vigilance towards and control over it through its own class organizations, which participate in it without being engulfed by it. This is a question which will be examined later on in this series, though it has already been dealt with extensively in our publications (see in particular the ICC pamphlet The State in the Period of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism). But it is worth nothing that Marx himself had a glimpse of the problem. The first draft of The Civil War in France contains the following passage:
"...the Commune is not the social movement of the working class and therefore of a general regeneration of mankind, but the organized means of action. The Commune does not do away with the class struggles, through which the working classes strive to the abolition of all classes and therefore of all class rule ... but it affords the rational medium in which that class struggle can run through its different phases in the most rational and humane way".
Here is a clear insight into the fact that the real dynamic towards the communist transformation does not come from the post-revolutionary state, since the function of the latter is, like all states, to contain class antagonisms, to prevent them tearing society apart. Hence its conservative side in comparison to the actual social movement of the proletariat. Even in the brief life of the Commune, we can determine certain tendencies in this direction. Lissagaray's History of the Paris Commune, in particular, contains a good deal of criticism of the hesitations, confusions, and, in some cases, empty posturings of some of the Commune Council delegates, many of whom indeed embodied an obsolete petty bourgeois radicalism that was frequently outflanked by the more proletarian neighborhood assemblies. At least one of the local revolutionary clubs declared the Commune to be dissolved because it was not revolutionary enough!
Engels, in a more famous passage, is surely delving into this same problem when he says that the state - even the semi-state of the period of transition towards communism - "is at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious proletariat will have to lop off as speedily as possible, just as the Commune had to, until a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to discard the entire lumber of the state" (Introduction to The Civil War in France). Further proof that, as far as marxism is concerned, the strength of the state is the measure of man's unfreedom.
There is another vital lesson of the Commune which relates not to the problem of the proletarian dictatorship, but to a question which has been a particularly thorny one in the history of the workers' movement: the national question.
As we have already indicated, Marx and his tendency in the First International recognized that capitalism had not yet reached the apogee of its development. Indeed, it was still being held back by the vestiges of feudal society and other archaic remnants. For this reason, Marx supported certain national movements in so far as they stood for bourgeois democracy against absolutism, for national unification against feudal fragmentation. The support the International gave to Polish independence against Russian Tsarism, for Italian and German unification, for the American North against the slaveholding South in the Civil War, was based on this materialist logic. They were also causes which mobilized the sympathy and active solidarity of the working class: in Britain for example, there were mass meetings in support of Polish independence, and large demonstrations against British intervention on the side of the American South, even if the cotton famine resulting from the war led to real hardships amongst textile workers in Britain.
In this context, where the bourgeoisie had not yet exhausted its progressive historical tasks, the problem of wars of national defense was a very real one that had to be considered seriously by revolutionaries in each war between states; and it was posed with great acuity when the Franco-Prussian war broke out. The policy of the International towards this war was summarized in the 'First Address of the General Council of the IWMA on the Franco-Prussian War'. In essence, this was a statement of basic proletarian internationalism against the "dynastic" wars of the ruling class. It cited a manifesto produced by the French section of the International when war broke out: "Once more, on the pretext of the European equilibrium, of national honour, the peace of the world is menaced by political ambitions. French, German, Spanish workmen! let our voices unite in one cry of reprobation against war! ... war for a question of preponderance or a dynasty, can, in the eyes of workmen, be nothing but a criminal absurdity..." Such sentiments were not restricted to a socialist minority: Marx recounts, in the First Address, how internationalist French workers chased the pro-war chauvinists off the streets of Paris.
At the same time, the International held that "on the German side, the war is a war of self-defense". But this did not mean poisoning the German workers with chauvinism: in answer to the statement of the French section, the German affiliates to the International, while sorrowfully accepting that a defensive war was an unavoidable evil, also declared "the present war to be exclusively dynastic ... we are happy to grasp the fraternal hand stretched out to us by the workmen of France ... Mindful of the of the watchword of the International Workingmens' Association: proletarians of all countries unite, we shall never forget that the workmen of all countries are our friends and the despots of all countries our enemies" (resolution of a meeting at Chemnitz of a delegation representing 50,000 Saxon workers).
The First Address also warned that German workers should beware that the war did not turn into a war of aggression on the German side as well, and it already contained a recognition of Bismarck's complicity in the war, even though this was before the revelations about the Ems telegram, which proved the extent to which Bismarck actually lured Bonaparte and his 'Second Empire' into the war. In any case, with the collapse of the French army at Sedan, the war did become a war of conquest by Prussia. Paris was besieged and the Commune itself arose around the issue of national defense. The Bonaparte regime was replaced by a Republic in 1870 because the Empire had proved itself incapable of defending Paris; now the same Republic proved that it would rather deliver the capital to Prussia than allow it to fall into the hands of the armed workers.
But although in their initial actions the Paris workers were still thinking in terms of a defensive kind of patriotism, of preserving the national honor besmirched by the bourgeoisie itself, the rise of the Commune in fact marked a historic watershed. Faced with the prospect of a workers' revolution, the Prussian and French bourgeoisies closed ranks to crush it: the Prussian army released its prisoners of war to swell the counter-revolutionary French forces under Thiers, and allowed the latter through their lines in their final push against the Commune. From these events, Marx drew a conclusion of historic significance:
"That after the most tremendous war of modern times, the conquering and the conquered hosts should fraternize for the common massacre of the proletariat - this unparalleled event does indicate, not, as Bismarck thinks, the final repression of a new society upheaving, but the crumbling into dust of bourgeois society. The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer the struggle of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle bursts out into civil war. Class rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a national uniform; the national governments are one as against the proletariat!" (The Civil War...)
For its part, the revolutionary Parisian proletariat had already begun to take a number of steps beyond its initial patriotic stance: hence the decree enabling foreigners to serve on the Commune, "because the flag of the Commune is the flag of the Universal Republic"; the public destruction of the Vendome Column, symbol of France's martial glory ... the historic logic of the Paris Commune was to push towards the world-wide Commune, even if this was not possible at that time. This is why the uprising of the Paris workers during the Franco-Prussian war, for all the patriotic phrases that accompanied it, was in reality the harbinger of the explicitly anti-war insurrections of 1917-18 and the international revolutionary wave which followed them.
Marx's conclusions also pointed towards the future. He may have been premature to say that bourgeois society was crumbling to dust in 1871: this year may have marked the end of the national question in Europe, as Lenin noted in his Imperialism, Highest Stage of Capitalism, but it continued to be a question in the colonies as capitalism entered into its last phase of expansion. But in a deeper sense Marx's denunciation of the humbug of national war anticipated what would become a general reality once capitalism had entered its decadent phase: henceforth, all wars would become imperialist wars and there could no longer be any question of national defense as far as the proletariat was concerned. And the revolutionary upheavals of 1917-18 also confirmed what Marx had said about the capacity of the bourgeoisie to unite against the threat of the proletariat: faced with the possibility of a world-wide workers' revolution, the bourgeoisies of Europe, who had been tearing each other apart for four years, suddenly discovered that they had every reason to make peace in order to stifle the proletariat's challenge to their blood-soaked 'order'. Once again, the governments of the world were "one as against the proletariat".
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In the next article, we will look at the struggle that Marx and his tendency waged against those elements in the workers' movement who failed to understand, or even sought to undermine, the essential lessons of the Commune, in particular the German Social Democrats and Bakunin's anarchists. CDW
[1] The name International Workingmen's Association was of course a reflection of immaturity in the class movement, since the proletariat has no interest whatever in institutionalizing sexual divisions in its own ranks. As in most great social upheavals, the Paris Commune saw an extraordinary ferment amongst proletarian women, who not only vociferously challenged their 'traditional' roles but also were often the bravest and most radical defenders of the Commune, in the revolutionary clubs as well as on the barricades. This ferment also gave rise to the formation of women's sections of the International, which was an advance at the time even if such forms have no function in today's revolutionary movement.
[2] The term "constitution of the proletariat into a party" reflects certain ambiguities about the role of the party which were also a product of the historical limitations of the period. The International contained some of the features of a unitary organization of the class; and throughout the 19th century, the notion that the party either represented the class, or was the class in its organized form, was very deeply implanted in the workers' movement. It was not until the 20th century that such ideas were overcome, and then only after much painful experience. Nevertheless, there already existed a basic grasp of the fact that the party is the organization not of the whole class, but of its most advanced elements. Such a definition is already outlined in the Communist Manifesto, and the First International also saw itself in such terms when it said that the workers' party was "that section of the working class which has become conscious of the common class interest" ('The Prussian Military Question' and the German Workers' Party', written by Engels in 1865).
[3] The Blanquists shared the Bakuninists' voluntarism and impatience, but they were always clear that the proletariat had to establish its dictatorship in order to create a communist society. This is why Marx was, on certain crucial occasions, able to form an alliance with the Blanquists against the Bakuninists on the question of working class political action.
To listen to the bourgeoisie's propaganda, one would think that they only had the good of humanity at heart. The talk about the "defense of freedom and democracy", "human rights", or "humanitarian aid" are completely at odds with reality. All the noise that accompanies the speeches is proportional to the size of the lie it carries. As the master of Nazi propaganda, Goebbels, said: "The bigger the lie, the better its chance of being believed". The whole bourgeoisie applies this rule assiduously. The decadent capitalist state has developed a monstrous propaganda apparatus, rewriting history, drowning out events with media noise to mask capitalism's barbaric and criminal nature, which no longer brings any progress to humanity. This propaganda weighs heavily on the consciousness of the working class. That is what is designed for.
The two articles that follow - "The secret workings of the Italian state", and "The Mexican bourgeoisie in the history of imperialism" - show how, behind all the propaganda, the bourgeoisie of decadent capitalism is a class of gangsters, whose various fractions are ready for anything to defend their interests in their confrontations in the capitalist and imperialist arena, or united against the common danger of the proletariat.
To fight the enemy, you must first know him. This is especially true for the proletariat, whose main weapon is its consciousness and clarity in the struggle. The class' ability to lay bare the lies - especially "democratic" - of the ruling class, to discern, behind the propaganda mask - the reality of barbaric capitalism and the class that incarnates it, will determine its future ability to play its historic role: through communist revolution, putting an end to the most somber chapter in human history.
In February, the imperialist war in ex-Yugoslavia moved up a step. For the capitalist world, the stakes were raised, as the massacre in the market at Sarajevo was followed by direct military intervention by Russia and ther USA. The madness of war is spreading throughout the planet: to the old southern and eastern republics of the ex-USSR, to the Middle East, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Africa.
At the same time, the economic crisis is spreading, ravaging the lives of billions of human beings. Here too, disaster and the threat of a drastic fall into poverty is covering the planet, which cannot help but nourish still further conflict and war.
Capitalism is leading the world to desolation and destruction. The war in ex-Yugoslavia is neither a survival from the past, nor the mark of a transitional period, the price to pay for the end of Stalinism: it is a modern imperialist war, born of the situation created by the disappearance of the Eastern bloc and the USSR. It is a war of decadent capitalism's phase of decomposition, which heralds the only future that capitalism can offer humanity.
Nationalism and imperialist interests have exacted a toll of some 200,000 dead, and who knows how many wounded and crippled, from the population of Bosnia and the other Yugoslav republics. Lives torn apart, massive "ethnic cleansing", families chased from their homes and deported or broken up - maybe never to see each other again - this is the reality of capitalism. We denounce the terror imposed by each side, by militias and military drunk with blood, rape, and torture. We denounce the terror exercised by the Bosnian, Serb and Croat states, against refugees press-ganged into the contending armies under pain of death in the case of desertion. We denounce the misery and the hunger, the horror of old people reduced to beggary, picked out by snipers because they do not run fast enough to dodge the bullets, of mothers and fathers ripped to pieces by a mortar shell while looking for supplies, of children traumatized for life, both mentally and physically. We denounce the barbarity of capitalism. It alone is responsible for these tragedies.
We also denounce the new "values" and "principles" emerging from the "new world order" that the bourgeoisie promised us following the fall of the Berlin Wall: chaos and every man for himself. Shifting alliances and betrayals are the order of the day: cease-fires are violated when the ink on them is scarcely dry. Bosnians, Serbs, Croats have all been each other's allies, only to turn against their allies of yesterday. Croats and Bosnians slaughtered each other in Mostar under the benevolent eye of the Serb militia, while at the same time fighting together against the Serbs in Sarajevo. The "Muslims" of the Bihac enclave even turned against each other while encircled!
Once the present conflict comes to an end, if it ever does, there will be no return to the pre-war status quo. The surviving states will be devastated, and will never recover in a surrounding atmosphere of world economic crisis. The local bourgeoisie could not have escaped this even were it not blinded by its own nationalism its own local interests; the war in ex-Yugoslavia will not give birth to strengthened and viable states. At best a few war-lords or local chieftains will be able to set up their own rackets, until a rival comes to supplant them. This is what happened in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Cambodia; it is what is happening in Georgia, Palestine, Tadjikstan and elsewhere. Yugoslavia is now being "Lebanonised" in its turn.
Great powers' imperialist intervention is responsible for the worsening war
While the break-up of Yugoslavia was a direct result of decomposition, this same decomposition, there as elsewhere, has proved a fertile terrain for imperialism's sinister maneuvering. At the outset, it was Germany that encouraged the Croats and Slovenes to declare independence, while the USA and France supported the Serb reaction to teach both Croats and Germans a lesson.
"Nobody is disinterested. As soon as the Bosnian problem became a Balkan problem, it also became a problem of the political balance of power, and the interests of the great powers came to dominate the conflict" (Liberation, 22/2/94).
For two years, the great powers have intervened directly in the conflict, both diplomatically and militarily under cover of the UN and NATO. If anyone still doubted its imperialist nature, the events of February, with the threats of aerial bombardment, the dispatch of UN troops, NATO's F16 fighters shooting down Serbian aircraft have all shown the imperialist powers defending their interests against their rivals: "Effective international policy continues to be thwarted by the competing interests of major European powers. With Britain, France and Russia effectively shielding the Serbs, and the United States doing what it can on behalf of the Muslim-led government, the United States is now putting pressure on the third party to the struggle, the Croats, whose traditional protector, Germany, finds it impolitic to stand up to the other powers" (International Herald Tribune, 3/3/94)
The "humanitarian" mask feels a long time ago. The bourgeoisie's press no longer talks about it. And all of a sudden, the real aim of all the grand "humanist" and pacifist declarations for an end to the massacre, and the "salvation" of Bosnia, appear for what they are. For two years, they have been used to try to mobilize the population, and especially the working class, of the great industrialized nations behind the imperialism of their own national bourgeoisie. Once again, the great pacifists - "philosophers", writers, artists, vicars, ecologists - have shown themselves up as dangerous war-mongers in the service of imperialism.
The US counter-offensive
During the Gulf War, the US clearly demonstrated their world leadership. Since then, the American bourgeoisie has suffered a series of setbacks, if not defeats, in Yugoslavia. To begin with, they were unable to prevent the latter's disintegration, and so the independence of Croatia, which represented a step forward for Germany. Then, the US betted on Bosnia as a bridgehead in the region, but despite their power proved incapable of ensuring the new state's integrity and unity. The result was an independent Slovenia and Croatia under German influence, Serbia falling under first French then largely Russian influence, and the dismantling of Bosnia which is now hardly a firm anchorage point. The end result was negative for the world's greatest imperialist power. The United States could not allow such a defeat to damage their credibility and weaken their leadership in the eyes of the rest of the world. They could not allow it to encourage either their great European and Japanese imperialist rivals, or the "second-rate" imperialisms to assert themselves and call the American "new world order" into question.
Reduced to impotence in the Balkans, the US counter-offensive developed around two axes: the intervention in Somalia, and the opening of peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO - at the cost of a bloody Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 93.[1] The US thus demonstrated their military and diplomatic ability to "settle conflicts", which only served to highlight, by contrast, the Europeans' inability to put an end to the war in Bosnia. All the more so, since the US did everything they could to sabotage the European plans to put an end to the war in Bosnia by dividing it up in the Serbs' favor: in particular, by encouraging the Bosnian government to remain intransigent, and by re-equipping the Bosnian army so that it was able to go back on the offensive against both Serbs and Croats during the winter.
However, this was not enough to recover the ground lost, or to wipe out the impression of weakness given by the world's greatest power. It had succeeded in blocking the Europeans' plans, but without being able to regain the initiative itself. The more the bloody conflict continued, the more it damaged the "credibility" of the US themselves. The massacre in the market of Sarajevo could not have come at a better time to reshuffle the imperialist pack.
Although Clinton was still justifying the American air force's failure to intervene on the grounds of French and British refusal, more and more voices in the American state machine were pushing for action: "We will continue to have a problem of credibility if we do not act" said Tom Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Le Monde, 8/2/94). Clearly, Tom Foley is more concerned with US military credibility than with any of the "humanitarian" considerations that are put forward on the TV for the consumption of the working class.
The NATO ultimatum gives the initiative to the United States
Following the massacre of the market in Sarajevo, the NATO ultimatum was a punishment for the impotence of the Europeans, especially the British and the French who were forced to agree to air strikes which they had rejected and sabotaged ever since the conflict began. It demonstrated the greater weight of NATO, dominated by the Americans, over the UN where Britain and France played a greater role. The withdrawal of Serb canons under the threat of NATO air power was a success for the USA. Their ultimatum allowed them to regain the initiative, and to put a foot in the door both militarily and diplomatically, but nonetheless the success remained limited. It was only a first step, and could not efface the setbacks of the previous months, especially the partition of Bosnia.
"European governments have been playing a cynical game. (...) The Europeans were perfectly willing to use the shelling of Sarajevo and other cities to pressure the Bosnian government to accept a bad partition plan that denied them vital territory and transit routes. If they now agree to endorse NATO air strikes against the siege guns, they fully expect Washington, in return, to join in their diplomatic gang-up, at the very moment when the Bosnian government has begun to gain military strength, reversing some of its earlier losses" (New York Times, 9/2/94).
Moreover, the American display of strength was diminished by the reluctance of the Serb retreat, and its protection by the arrival of Russian blue berets. "The [NATO] alliance has not proven itself. Its will and capacity will continue to be doubted" (Courrier International, 24/2/94). The Americans tried to correct this bad impression somewhat, by shooting down four Serbian aircraft violating Bosnian air space (whereas almost 1000 violations had already taken place without provoking any reaction from NATO). US "credibility" demanded that they seize an appropriate occasion, and they did so.
The US ultimatum sidelines the Europeans
The USA's return to the game has been concretized by the signature of the Croat-Muslim agreement. US pressure has been applied to Croatia since February: "It is time now to make Croatia pay a price, economic and political" (International Herald Tribune, 26/2/94). Threats gave way to blackmail. The Croats understood this straight away, as can be seen from the removal of the ultra-nationalist Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, and his replacement by someone more "reasonable" and more easily controlled. After the threat came the "deal", the proposal: "The only way Croatia can get international support for reclaiming the Krajina (...) is to reforge its alliance with Bosnia" (International Herald Tribune, 26/2/94).
It goes without saying that this new alliance, under the American aegis, which promises the return of occupied Krajina to Croatia, is directly aimed at the Serbs. Here is a step towards "peace" which brings with it a still more terrible aggravation of the war, both on the quantitative level - spreading it to the whole of ex-Yugoslavia - and on the qualitative level by involving the regular armies of both Serbia and Croatia in total war.
As we write this, the confrontations between Croats and Muslims have not yet come to an end, especially around Mostar. But there is no doubt that this is a success for the USA, since the European countries have been forced to "welcome" the initiative, despite their lack of enthusiasm for it. The Muslim-Croat agreement has sidelined the Geneva negotiations, at least for the moment, and revealed the impotence of their European Union sponsor. Revenge was sweet for the Americans after two years of European insolence, when Warren Christopher the US Secretary of State was photographed on the White House Lawn between the two signatories to the accord. "Europe has had its day as the main arbiter of the Yugoslav crisis" (The Guardian).
Russia's aggressive imperialism
Another expression of the rearrangement of the imperialist game since the massacre at the Sarajevo market, is Russia's return in strength to the "concert of nations", with its firm opposition to the NATO ultimatum, its diplomatic success in saving the Serbs' face by "persuading" them to withdraw their artillery from Sarajevo, and the dispatch of its own blue berets. Russia's imperialist arrogance has reawaken, and Russia now clearly aspires to play a major role on the world stage.
Up till now, the United States has given unfailing support to Yeltsin, both internally against the conservative Stalinist fractions, and externally when Russia has intervened in its old empire.
The US bourgeoisie could not but be satisfied to see Russia oppose the imperialist aspirations of "Islamic" Iran, or of a Turkey inclining more and more towards Germany; or to see Russia imposing its conditions on Ukraine, which is still the world's third greatest nuclear power despite its economic collapse, and so forcing Ukraine to abandon its flirt with Germany.
But when Russia turned its attention to the ex-Warsaw Pact countries to oppose their integration into NATO, this alarmed the European bourgeoisies, Germany in particular, and even raised doubts amongst the Americans, although Clinton did accede to this demand by putting off the enlargement of NATO. But when Russia at last gains a military foothold, for the first time in its history, in the Balkans, and through them access to the centuries-old objective - the Mediterranean - then alarm bells rang in the White House. Enough is enough! The Russian aspiration to Mediterranean access, like that of Germany, is simply unacceptable to the French, British and US bourgeoisies, whether Yeltsin is in power or no. "We are not dealing with black and white, but with grey. Inevitably, there will be things that we don't like", said Clinton about Russia (Le Monde, 27/2/94).
Worse still as far as the Western powers are concerned, as the situation in Russia runs more and more out of control, while chaos and anarchy deepen, the pro-US "reformers" like Gaidar have been forced ut of the Yeltsin government to make way for the "conservative" fractions of the Russian ruling class, whose ultra-nationalist and revengeful spirit is most clearly expressed by the outrageous Zhirinovsky.
Clearly, whatever the fraction in power, Russia's return to the forefront of imperialist antagonisms does not mean a return to the situation of international "stability" which prevailed from Yalta to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and which fed the imperialist conflicts of the day. It does not mean the reappearance of two great powers able to impose limits on their respective vassals. There will not be a return to the situation where an imperialist Eastern bloc led by Russia opposed the US bloc in the West. The return of Russia, dangerously fuelled by the chaos overwhelming the country, and the Russian bourgeoisie's desperate search for a way out of its terrible situation, will increase imperialist tensions and antagonisms; it will encourage still more chaos and war at the international level.
The use of NATO (founded to contain the USSR in 1949) to impose an ultimatum on Serbia, is a real slap in the face for the Russians. It was designed as a warnming to Russia: to Yeltsin, of course, but also to the other fractions of the Russian state, especially the nostalgics for the past glory of the USSR. The Americans intended to send a clear message to their "partner" (the US press no longer talks about their "ally"): take care, there are lines which cannot be crossed. And in case the Russians missed the point, the destruction of Serbian planes by the American F16s was there to drive it home. This is the first time in its 45 year history that NATO has fired in anger.
The direct military interventions of both the USA and Russia in ex-Yugoslavia are new elements, of extreme importance, in the international situation. They mark a new step in the war, another step in the exacerbation of imperialist tensions, a new step into chaos and "every man for himself" both in the Balkans, whose wretched populations are not at the end of their suffering, and internationally.
European impotence
The new international situation is marked by the return in strength of Russian and American imperialism in ex-Yugoslavia. It is marked also by its corollary: the impotence of the European powers, in particular France and Britain. For two years, the latter have been able to sabotage the American efforts to intervene militarily and to play a major role on the military and diplomatic stage; today they have been forced to swallow their pride and support the NATO air strikes against the Serbs that before they had systematically refused. As for Germany, it has had to watch, impotently, the American counter-offensive, which although it was directed against the Serbs (which could only please the Germans), also put pressure on their Croatian allies.
The German advance is halted
Recent events have placed a whole series of barriers in the way of Germany's asserting itself as an alternative leading imperialist power to the United States. Russia, with American agreement, is contesting its influence over Central Europe and the Ukraine. Unthinkable only two months ago, America is now contesting German influence in Croatia, which is hoping the obtain from the Americans what Germany proved unable to offer: the Krajina. "Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia can no longer count on clear German leadership" (International Herald Tribune, 26/2/94). The US has even prevented Germany from playing any real role in the negotiations between Muslims and Croats. Absent from the terrain, because it does not have its own troops in the NATO contingent, and with Japan alone among the great powers in not having a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, Germany can only play an underhand game, and in the meantime watch impotently the American counter-offensive.
The new-found Russian arrogance is also alarming Germany. Even if Germany attempts sometimes to flirt with Russia, since both have in common the aim of reaching the Mediterranean, in the long term both powers' imperialist interests are contradictory, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Germany is thus caught between its aspiration to a place among the great imperialist powers, and so assert itself against the USA especially, and its fear of a chaotic Russia, against which only the Americans can offer military protection.
Unable to raise the American stakes, France has been forced out of the game
Although "Maintaining French-German political cooperation as the core of the European Community continues to be France's diplomatic priority" (idem), on a general and historic level, it has opposed the German advance towards the Mediterranean in Croatia. At the same time, it has opposed any American interference. It has thus tried to play its own game, with the British, and has found this beyond its capacity.
No longer listened to by the Serbs, threatened by the Bosnian offensive, the peace negotiations they sponsored paralysed, France and Britain found themselves in a dead-end. Uncomfortable situation. Having played all its trump cards, the French bourgeoisie could only ask the Americans and NATO to intervene. They had to accept defeat in this round, to be allowed to stay at the table of the imperialist game, just as they did during the Gulf War: this is what Mitterand calls "maintaining one's station in life".
Britain under American pressure
Britain's failure has been of much the same order. Britain is the US historic lieutenant, its most faithful ally in the imperialist game, and just as hostile to any German advance into the Balkans. Nonetheless, the British bourgeoisie has tried to defend its own specific interests in Yugoslavia, and has not wanted to "share" its own military and political influence in the region with the American bourgeoisie. The new situation created by the bombardment of the Sarajevo market, and the NATO ultimatum which had been opposed by the Major government, have been accompanied by a strong pressure before the Prime Minister's voyage to Washington.[2]
"The short-term approach to the Bosnian disaster orchestrated by Britain threatens to destabilize much of Europe (...) John Major should leave Washington in no doubt that his Bosnia policy is being closely scrutinized and that any more flights of expediency that exacerbate the Balkan crisis will not be lightly forgotten or forgiven" (International Herald Tribune, 26/2/94).
This American pressure, and the difficult situation confronted by Britain in Bosnia, has forced the British bourgeoisie back into line: they have had to give their approval to the NATO ultimatum (especially since the French had left them in the lurch). As the Guardian said: "In a speech to the Commons, Douglas Hurd betrayed the hidden motive behind this about-face. He emphasized three times the need to re-establish credibility and solidarity within NATO, and especially the US support for the Organization".
The US uses NATO to force the Europeans back into line
The USA has strikingly reasserted its world leadership. They have finally succeeded in bringing off the same coup as in the Gulf War: they have forced the main European powers back into their orbit - at least in Yugoslavia and for the moment. This is especially true for France, Germany, and second-rank countries like Italy, Spain and Belgium for example, which try to defend their own imperialist interests by playing the European, so anti-American, card. Moreover, the impotence of the Europeans, who have been forced to call in the Americans, has a wider meaning for all those imperialisms throughout the world which might have been tempted to oppose American interests. It is a victory for the American bourgeoisie, but a victory which bears within it the exacerbation of imperialist antagonisms and wars.
Towards the worsening of imperialist tensions and chaos
The US success in ex-Yugoslavia is not yet complete. They have to go further. If it is concluded, the Muslim-Croat alliance they have sponsored will take the confrontation with Serbia to a higher level. The European powers have taken a hiding, and will not hesitate to throw oil on the fire. Yeltsin, pushed by the conservative and nationalist elements, cannot but strengthen Russia's imperialist policies. But worse still, since all states are imperialist, the chain of conflicts will drag countries down into an irreversible and inextricable process of confrontations and antagonisms: in the Balkans there are Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey; in ex-Soviet Asia there are Turkey, Russia and Iran; in Afghanistan there are Turkey, Iran and Pakistan; in the Kashmir, Pakistan confronts India, both of them nuclear powers; India faces China in Tibet; China and Japan are lined up against Russia over frontier disputes and the Kurile islands, etc. The war is one of all against all, and this list is very far from being exhaustive.
This chain of conflicts, dragging countries down one after the other into chaos and disorder, is stretching more and more. It is pulling the capitalist world into the most terrible military barbarism. And so the situation confirms the marxist position: capitalism is imperialist war; "peace" is only a preparation for war. It confirms the marxist position that in decadence all nations, great or small, are imperialist. It confirms the marxist position that the international proletariat can give no support to nationalism, to its own ruling class, and that such a political surrender leads to the abandonment of its class interests, its struggles, and to sacrifice on the altar of nationalism. Decadent capitalism has nothing to offer humanity. It is dragging it to destruction. As communists have said since the beginning of this century, there is only one alternative: socialism, or barbarism.
At the price of immeasurable suffering, blood and tears, the decisive historic moment is approaching. Destroy capitalism, before it destroys the whole human race: this is the dramatic, gigantic mission of the proletariat!
RL
[1] The Hebron massacre perpetrated by a fanatical religious Jewish settler, whom the Israeli soldiers apparently allowed to act at will, expresses the reality of the "peace" that the United States are imposing on the Middle East. While the crime is useful to the Israeli state, which will use it to justify the disarming and gagging of its own extremists, it deepens the chaos into which the Occupied Territories and Israel itself are sinking. While the peace negotiations and the formation of a Palestinian state represent a success for the United States, which has thus eliminated all its imperialist rivals in the region, the situation of disorder, anarchy, and decomposition in both states and the region as a whole will continue to get worse.
[2] The visa granted by the US government to the Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, the publicity given to his visit to the USA, and his interview with the famous CNN journalist Larry King during prime time, were also the expression of American pressure on the Major government.
In numbers 90, 91, and 92 of the review Programme Communiste, published by the International Communist Party (which also publishes the papers Il Comunista in Italian and Le Proletaire in French) [1] [268], there is a long study on ‘Imperialist war in the bourgeois cycle and in marxist analysis', which conveys this organisation's conception of this vitally important issue for the workers' movement. The fundamental political positions that these articles affirm constitute a clear defence of proletarian principles faced with all the lies spread around by the various agents of the ruling class. However, some of the theoretical developments upon which these principles are based, and the predictions that follow from them, are not always equal to the statements of principle and run the risk of weakening rather than reinforcing them. This article proposes to criticise these erroneous theoretical conceptions in order to draw out the most solid possible basis for the defence of proletarian internationalism.
The ICP (Il Comunista) claims descent from the tradition of the Italian communist left, i.e. one of the international currents that held onto class positions in the face of the degeneration of the Communist International in the 1920s. In the article published in Programme Communiste (PC), we can see that, on a whole series of essential questions, this organisation has not lost sight of this current's. In particular, this article contains a clear reaffirmation of the foundations of the communist position on imperialist war:"Marxism is completely foreign to the empty and abstract formulae which hold that being ‘anti-war' is a suprahistorical principle and which see war, in metaphysical fashion, as an Absolute Evil. Our attitude is based on a historical and dialectical analysis of war crises in liaison with the birth, development and death of social formations.We therefore make a distinction between:a) wars of bourgeois progress (or development) in the European zone between 1792 and 1871;b) imperialist wars, characterised by the reciprocal clash of highly developed capitalist nations...c) revolutionary proletarian wars" (PC no. 90, p 19)."The fundamental orientation is to take a position for wars which push forward the general development of society, and against wars which obstruct and hold it back. Consequently, we are for the sabotage of imperialist wars, not because they are more cruel and more frightful than the previous ones, but because they run counter to the historic future of humanity; because the imperialist bourgeoisie and world capitalism can no longer play any ‘progressive ‘ role, but have become on the contrary an obstacle to the general development of society" (PC no. 90, p 22).The ICC could sign these passages with both hands. They concur with what we have written many times in our territorial press and in this Review [2] [269].Similarly, the ICP's denunciation of pacifism is particularly sharp and clear:"... capitalism is not the ‘victim' of war provoked by this or that tub-thumper, or by ‘malign spirits' left over from a previous barbaric epoch, against whom it is periodically necessary to defend itself ... bourgeois pacifism necessarily ends up in war-mongering. The idyllic dream of a peaceful capitalism is not in fact innocent. It's a dream soaked in blood. If you say that capitalism and peace can go together, not in a momentary and contingent manner, but permanently, you are compelled, when the war crisis mounts, to argue that something alien to civilisation is threatening the peaceful and humanitarian development of capitalism; and that the latter has to defend itself, including with weapons if other means are not sufficient, by gathering together all men of good will, all the ‘peace-loving' elements. Pacifism then accomplishes its final pirouette and turns into war-mongering, as an active factor, a direct agent for the war mobilisation. This is an obligatory process; it derives from the internal dynamic of pacifism, which naturally tends to transform itself into war-mongering..." (PC no. 90, p 22).From this analysis of pacifism, the ICP develops a correct orientation towards so-called the anti-war movements which from time to time flourish in the present period. Along with the ICP, we obviously consider that there can be a proletarian anti-militarism (like the one that developed during the First World War and which led to the revolution in Germany and Russia). But this anti-militarism cannot develop on the basis of the mobilisations orchestrated by all the good souls of the bourgeoisie:"With regard to the current ‘movements for peace', our ‘positive' policy is one of intervening from the outside, to propagandise and proselytise towards those proletarian elements captured by pacifism and caught up in petty bourgeois mobilisations, in order to draw them away from this kind of political action. In particular we say to these elements that the anti-militarism of tomorrow cannot be prepared by the pacifist parades of today, but only by the proletariat's intransigent struggle to defend its living and working conditions, against the interests of the company and the national economy. Just as the discipline of labour and the defence of the national economy prepare the discipline of the trenches and the defence of the fatherland, today's refusal to defend and respect the interests of the company and of the national economy prepare the anti-militarism and defeatism of tomorrow" (PCno. 92, p 61). As we will see later on, defeatism is no longer an adequate slogan for the present or future. However, we can only stress the validity of the ICP's general approach here. Finally, the article in PC is also very clear on the role of bourgeois democracy in preparing for and conducting imperialist war:"... in ‘our' civilised states, capitalism reigns thanks to democracy ... when capitalism puts its generals and cannons centre stage, it does so by relying on democracy, its mechanisms and its hypnotic rites" (PC no. 91, p 38)."The existence of a democratic regime gives the state greater military efficiency because it allows it to use its maximum potential both in preparing the war and in waging it" (ibid)."... fascism can only appeal politically to national sentiments, pushed to the level of racist hysteria, in order to cement ‘national unity'; whereas democracy possesses a more powerful resource for binding the whole population to imperialist war: the fact that the war emanates directly from the popular will freely expressed in elections; in other words, thanks to the mystification of electoral consultation, it appears to be a war for the defence of the interests and hopes of the popular masses and the working class in particular" (PC no. 91, p 41).We have reproduced these long quotes from PC (and we could have given others, notably those providing historical illustrations of the theses put forward) because they represent exactly our position on the questions concerned. Rather than reaffirming with our own words our principles about imperialist war, it seemed useful to show the profound unity of views that exists on this question within the communist left, a unity that constitutes our common patrimony.However, as important as it is to emphasise this unity of principles, it is equally the duty of revolutionaries to demonstrate the lack of theoretical consistency and coherence of the Bordigist current, which considerably weakens its capacity to provide the proletariat with an effective compass. And the first of these inconsistencies resides in the refusal of this current to recognise the decadence of the capitalist mode of production.
The recognition that, since the beginning of the century, and particularly since the First World War, capitalist society has entered its phase of decadence, constitutes one of the touchstones of the communist movement's perspective. During the first imperialist holocaust, revolutionaries like Lenin relied on this analysis in order to emphasise the necessity for the proletariat to reject any participation in the war, to "turn the imperialist war into a civil war"(see in particular Imperialism, highest stage of capitalism). Similarly, capitalism's entry into its period of decadence was at the heart of the positions of the Communist International at its foundation in 1919. It was precisely because capitalism had become a decadent system that it could no longer be a question of struggling to obtain reforms within it, as had the workers' parties of the Second International. From now on the proletariat's only historical task was to carry out the world revolution. And it was on this granite basis that the international communist left, and its Italian fraction in particular, was able to elaborate the totality of its political positions [3] [270].However, it was the ‘originality' of Bordiga and the current that he inspired to deny that capitalism had entered its decadent phase [4] [271]. And yet the Bordigist current, notably the ICP (Il Comunista) is in fact obliged to recognise that something changed at the beginning of the century, in the nature both of economic crises and of wars. On the nature of wars, the above quotations from PC speak for themselves: they show that there is an essential difference between the wars waged by capitalist states last century, and those of this century. For example, six decades separate the Napoleonic wars against Prussia from the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, while the latter was only four decades away from the 1914 war. However, the 1914 war between France and Germany was fundamentally different from all the previous ones between these two countries. That is why Marx could call on the German workers to participate in the war of 1870 (see the First Manifesto of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association on the Franco-Prussian war), and still remain quite clearly on a proletarian class terrain; and why in 1914 the call of the German Social Democrats for the workers to engage in ‘national defence' was definitely on a bourgeois terrain. This is exactly what revolutionaries like Lenin and Luxemburg defended tooth and nail at this time against the social-chauvinists who claimed to take their lead from Marx's position in 1870: this position was no longer valid because war had changed in nature, and this in turn was the result of a fundamental change in the life of the capitalist mode of production as a whole.Furthermore, PC says the same thing when it affirms that imperialist wars "run counter to the historic future of humanity; because the imperialist bourgeoisie and world capitalism no longer play any ‘progressive' role, but on the contrary have become an obstacle to the general development of society". Similarly, taking up a passage written by Bordiga, it considers that "world imperialist wars demonstrate that the crisis of capitalism's disintegration is inevitable because of the opening up of a period in which its expansion no longer represents the augmentation of the productive forces but the accumulation of greater and greater destruction" (PC, no. 90, p 25). However, imprisoned in old Bordigist dogmas, the ICP is incapable of drawing the logical consequences of this from the standpoint of historical materialism: the fact that world capitalism has become an obstacle to the general development of society means quite simply that this mode of production has entered its phase of decadence. When Lenin and Luxemburg affirmed this in 1914, they weren't pulling such an idea out of their hats: they were simply making a scrupulous application of marxist theory to an understanding of the historic facts in front of them. The ICP, like all the other ICPs belonging to the Bordigist current, claims adherence to marxism. This is a very good thing: today, only those organisations that base their programmatic positions on the teachings of marxism can hope to defend a revolutionary perspective. Unfortunately, the ICP provides us with the proof that it has a hard time understanding the marxist method. In particular, it may be very fond of using the term ‘dialectical', but it only reveals that, like someone trying to hide their ignorance by using complicated words, it doesn't know what it's talking about.For example, this is what we can read in PC about the nature of crises:"The ten-yearly crises of youthful capitalism were very minor incidents; they were more crises of international trade than of the industrial machine... They were crises of unemployment, i.e. of closures, the stopping of industries. Modern crises are crises of dis-aggregation of the whole system, which afterwards finds it difficult to reconstruct its different structures" (PC no. 90, p 28). There follows a whole series of statistics, which demonstrate the considerable breadth of 20th century crises, and the fact that they bear no comparison to those of last century. But the ICP doesn't see that the difference in scale between the two kinds of crisis reveals not only a fundamental difference between themselves, but also in the way of life of the system they affect. The ICP puts its regal foot on one of the basic elements of the marxist dialectic: the transformation of quantity into quality. In effect, for the ICP, the difference between the two types of crisis remains purely quantitative and doesn't concern the fundamental mechanisms of the system. It proves this by writing "last century there were 8 world crises: 1836, 1848, 1856, 1883, 1886 and 1894. The average length of the cycle according to Marx was ten years. This ‘juvenile' rhythm was followed, in the period between the beginning of the century to the outbreak of the Second World War, by a more rapid succession of crises: 1901, 1908, 1914, 1920, 1929. To the immeasurable growth of capitalism there corresponded an augmentation of organic composition ... which led to a growth in the rate of accumulation: this is why the average length of the cycle was reduced to 7 years" (PC no. 90, p 27). This arithmetic about the length of the cycles proves that the ICP puts the economic convulsions of last century on the same level as those of this century without understanding that the very nature of the notion of the cycle has fundamentally changed. Blinded by its faith in the divine words of Bordiga, the ICP fails to see that, in Trotsky's words, while the crises of the 19th century were the heartbeats of capitalism, those of the 20th are the rattles of its death-agony. The ICP shows the same blindness when it tries to point to the link between crisis and war. In a way that is argued systematically without being very rigorous (we will come back to this later on), PC tries to establish that, in the present period, the capitalist crisis necessarily leads to world war. This is a laudable concern since it aims to refute the illusory and criminal discourse of pacifism. However, it doesn't occur to the ICP to ask whether the fact that the crises of the 19th century didn't lead to world war, or even to local wars, means that there is a fundamental difference with those of the 20th century. Here again, the ICP's ‘marxism' is rather poverty-stricken: we have here not just a misunderstanding of what the word dialectical means, but a refusal, or at least an incapacity, to go beyond a fixation with apparent analogies between the economic cycles of the past and those of today, and to examine in depth the major, determining phenomena of the life of the capitalist mode of production. Thus, faced with a question as crucial as that of imperialist war, the ICP shows itself to be incapable of adequately applying marxist theory and grasping the difference between the ascendant phase of capitalism and its decadent phase. And the striking concretisation of this incapacity can be seen when the ICP tries to attribute to the wars of the present period an economic rationality similar to that of 19th century wars.
Our International Review has already published numerous articles on the question of the irrationality of war in the decadent period of capitalism [5] [272]. Our position is in no way an ‘original discovery' of our organisation. It is based on the fundamental acquisitions of marxism since the beginning of the 20th century, notably as expressed by Lenin and Luxemburg. These acquisitions were formulated with great clarity in 1945 by the Communist Left of France against the revisionist theory developed by Vercesi on the eve of the Second World War, a theory which led his organisation, the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left, into total paralysis when the imperialist conflict broke out:"In the epoch of ascendant capitalism, wars ... expressed the forward march of an enlarging and expanding capitalist economic system ... Each war justified and paid its costs by opening up a new field for greater expansion, ensuring the development of a greater capitalist production ... War was the indispensable means for capitalism to open up possibilities for its further development at a time when these possibilities existed and could only be opened up by violent means. By the same token, the collapse of a capitalist world that has historically exhausted all its possibilities of development finds its clearest expression in modern war, imperialist war, which, without opening up any possibility for the further development of production, simply hurls the productive forces into the abyss and accumulates ruins upon ruins at a rapidly growing rate" (Report on the international situation to the June 1945 conference of the Communist Left of France, republished in International Review59).As we have seen, PC also makes this distinction between the wars of last century and those of this century. However, it doesn't draw the consequences and after taking a step in the right direction, makes two in the wrong direction by looking for an economic rationality in the imperialist wars that dominate the 20th century.This rationality, "the demonstration of the fundamental economic reasons which push all states towards war" (PC no. 92, p 54), PC tries to find in quoting Marx: "a periodic destruction of capital has become a necessary condition for the existence of any current rate of interest ...Considered from this point of view, these horrible calamities which we are used to waiting for with so much disquiet and apprehension ... are probably only the natural and necessary corrective for an excessive and exaggerated opulence, the vis medicatrix thanks to which our social system as it is currently moulded is able from time to time to free itself from a constantly renascent plethora which threatens its existence, and return to a solid and healthy state " (Grundrisse). In reality, the destruction of capital, which Marx evokes here, is the type provoked by the cyclical crises of his time (and not by wars), at a moment when these crises constituted the heartbeats of the capitalist system (even if they already posed the perspective of the historical limitations of this system). In numerous parts of his work, Marx shows that the way capitalism surmounted these crises resided not only in a destruction (or rather a de-valorisation) of a momentarily excessive amount of capital but also, and above all, by the conquest of new markets, particularly those outside capitalist relations of production [6] [273]. And since the world market could not be indefinitely extended, since the extra-capitalist sectors could only get narrower and narrower to the point of disappearing completely as capital subjected the whole planet to its laws, capitalism was condemned to increasingly catastrophic convulsions.This was an idea developed much more systematically by Rosa Luxemburg in her book The Accumulation of Capital, but she didn't invent it, as some ignorant people think. What's more, the outline of such an idea appears in passages of PC's text, but when the latter makes reference to Rosa Luxemburg, it's not to base itself on her remarkable theoretical developments which explained with great clarity the mechanisms of the crises of capitalism and particularly why the laws of this system condemned it historically, but to take up the only really dubious position in The Accumulation of Capital - the thesis that militarism is a ‘field of accumulation' which can partially relieve capitalism from its economic contradictions (see PC no. 91, p 31-33). It was just such an idea that Vercesi unfortunately fell into in the 1930s, and which led him to think that the formidable development of arms production after 1933, by allowing capitalist production to get going again, made the prospect of world war more remote. At the same time, when PC tries to give a systematic explanation of the mechanism of the crisis, in order to show the link between the latter and imperialist war, it adopts a unilateral vision based mainly on the thesis of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall:"Since the bourgeois mode of production became dominant, war has been decisively linked to the law, established by Marx, of the fall in the average rate of profit, which is the key to capitalism's tendency towards final catastrophe" (PC no. 90, p 23). There follows a resume, which PC borrows from Bordiga (Dialogue with Stalin) of Marx's thesis according to which the constant elevation, within the value of commodities, of the part supplied by machines and raw materials (due to constant progress in productive techniques), in relation to that part supplied by the labour power of the workers, results in a historic tendency for the rate of profit to fall, since it is only the worker's labour power that can produce profit, i.e. produce more value than it costs.It should be pointed out that, in its analyses, PC (and Bordiga, whom it quotes abundantly), does not ignore the problem of markets and the fact that imperialist war is the consequence of the competition between capitalist states: "The geometrical progression of production requires each national capitalism to export, to conquer on its external markets outlets adequate to its production. And as each national pole of accumulation is subjected to the same rule, war between capitalist states is inevitable. From economic and trade wars, financial conflicts, disputes over raw materials, from the political and diplomatic confrontations that result, we finally arrive at open warfare. The latent conflict between states breaks out first in the form of military conflicts limited to certain geographic zones, of localised wars where the great powers don't confront each other directly, but through interposed agencies: but it leads in the end to generalised war, characterised by the direct clash between the great state monsters of imperialism, in which they are thrown against each other by the violence of their internal contradictions. And all the minor states are drawn into the conflict, whose theatre of operations extends to the entire planet. Accumulation-Crises-Local wars-World war". (PC no. 90, p 24).We can only subscribe to this analysis, which actually repeats what marxists have been saying since the First World War. However, the weak point here is that the search for external markets is seen by PC as simply a consequence of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, whereas it remains the case that capitalism has a permanent need for markets outside its own sphere of domination, as Luxemburg masterfully showed, in order to realise that part of value destined to be reinvested in the further cycle of capitalist accumulation. Starting from this unilateral vision, PC attributes to world war a precise economic function, thus giving it a real rationality in the functioning of capitalism:"The origin of the crisis lies in the impossibility of continuing accumulation, an impossibility which manifests itself when the growth of the mass of production can no longer compensate for the fall in the rate of profit. The mass of surplus labour is no longer sufficient to ensure a profit on the capital advanced, to reproduce the conditions for a return on investment. By destroying constant capital (dead labour) on a grand scale, war then plays a fundamental economic role: thanks to the dreadful destruction of the productive apparatus, it permits later on a gigantic expansion of production to replace what has been destroyed, and thus a parallel expansion of profit, of the total surplus value, i.e. the surplus labour which is the source of capital. The conditions for the revival of the accumulation process have been re-established. The economic cycle picks up again ... The world capitalist system enters aged into the war, but there receives a bath of blood which gives it a new lease of life and it comes out with the vitality of a robust new-born child" (PC no. 90, p 24).PC's thesis is not new. It was put forward and systematised by Grossmann in the 1920s and taken up afterwards by Mattick, one of the theoreticians of the council communist movement. It can be summarised simply in the following terms: by destroying constant capital, war reduces the organic composition of capital and thus allows for a rise in the rate of profit. The problem is that it's never been proved that during the recoveries that have followed world wars, the organic composition of capital is lower than what it was before the war. In fact the contrary is the case. If you look at the Second World War, for example, it is clear that, in the countries affected by the destructions of the war, the average productivity of labour and thus the relationship between constant and variable capital very quickly (i.e. by the beginning of the 50s), reached what it had been in 1939. Indeed, the productive potential that was reconstituted was much more modern than the one that had been destroyed. PC even notes this itself, and makes it one of the causes of the post war boom!: "The war economy transmits to capitalism both the technological and scientific progress realised by the military industries and the industrial implantations created for arms production. These were not all destroyed by bombing nor - in the case of Germany - by the dismantling carried out by the allies ... The large scale production of equipment, installations, buildings, means of transport etc, and the reallocation of means of production with a high technological composition coming from the war industry ... all this creates the miracle" (PC no. 92, p 38). As for the USA, in the absence of destruction on its own soil, the organic composition of its capital was much higher in 1945 than it had been 6 years earlier. However, the period of ‘prosperity' which accompanied the reconstruction went on long after that (in fact up to the mid-60s), i.e. well after the point where the pre-war productive potential had been reconstituted, taking the organic composition to its previous level[7] [274].Having already devoted numerous texts to criticising the conceptions of Grossmann/Mattick, which PC, following Bordiga, has taken up, we won't go over all this again here. On the other hand, it is important to show what theoretical aberrations (and aberrations pure and simple) result from Bordiga's conceptions, repeated by the ICP today.
The central preoccupation of the ICP is perfectly correct: to show the ineluctable character of war. In particular, it seeks to reject firmly the idea of a ‘superimperialism', as developed during the First World War by Kautsky, who sought to ‘demonstrate' that the great powers could agree amongst themselves in order to establish a shared, peaceful domination over the world. Such a conception was obviously one of the spearheads of the pacifist fraud, which aimed to make workers believe that you could put an end to wars without destroying capitalism. To respond to such a vision, PCcomes up with the following argument: "a superimperialism is impossible; if by some extraordinary means imperialism managed to suppress the conflicts between states, its internal contradictions could compel it to divide once again into competing national poles of accumulation and thus into conflicting blocs of states. The necessity to destroy enormous masses of dead labour could not be satisfied by natural catastrophes alone" (PC no. 90, p 26). In sum, the fundamental function of imperialist blocs, or of the tendency towards their constitution, is to create the conditions for large-scale destructions. With such a point of view, it becomes impossible to see why the capitalist states couldn't simply get together in order to carry out, when necessary, the destruction needed to restore production and the rate of profit. They certainly have the means to do this, while keeping control of the destruction in order to preserve their respective interests as much as possible. But what PCrefuses to take into consideration is that the division into imperialist blocs is the logical result of competition between national sectors of capitalism, a competition which is part of the very essence of this system, and which is exacerbated when the crisis hits with all its force. In this sense, the constitution of imperialist blocs is not at all the result of a sort of incomplete tendency towards the unification of capitalist states, but on the contrary of the necessity for them to form military alliances, since none of them is in a position to make war on all the rest. The most important thing about the existence of blocs is not the convergence of interests that can exist between the allied states (a convergence which can easily be put into question, as shown by all the turnabouts in alliances during the 20th century), but the fundamental antagonism between the blocs, which is the expression at the highest level of the insurmountable rivalries between all national sectors of capital. This is why ‘superimperialism' is a nonsensical term.Because it uses weak or debatable arguments, the ICP's rejection of the idea of a ‘superimperialism' loses a great deal of its force, which isn't the best way to combat the lies of the bourgeoisie. This is particularly evident when, after the above-cited passage, the ICP continues:"These are human wills, masses of human beings who have to do things, human masses arrayed against each other, energies and intelligences straining to destroy what is defended by other energies and other intelligences". Here we can see the whole weakness of thee ICP's thesis: frankly, with the means that capitalist states have at their disposal today, in what way are "human wills" and above all "human masses" indispensable to carrying out a sufficient level of destruction, if, as the ICP says, that is the economic function of imperialist war?In the final analysis, the ‘Bordigist' current pays a high price for the theoretical and political weaknesses of the analysis upon which it bases its positions on imperialist war and blocs. Thus, having chased the notion of superimperialism out of the door, it lets it back in through the window with its idea of a ‘Russo-American condominium' over the world:"The Second World War gave birth to an equilibrium correctly described by the formula of a ‘Russo-American condominium' ... If peace has reigned so long in the imperialist metropoles, it's precisely because of this domination by the USA and the USSR..." (PC no. 91, p 47)."In reality, the ‘cold war' of the 1950s expressed the insolent certainty of the victors of the conflict and the stability of the world equilibrium sanctioned at Yalta; it corresponded, within this framework, to the requirements of ideological mobilisation and control over social tensions within the blocs. The new ‘cold war' which took the place of detente in the second half of the 70s corresponded to a need to master the antagonisms no longer (or not yet) between classes but between states which were finding it more and more difficult to tolerate the old system of alliances. The Russian and American response to these growing pressures consisted in trying to direct the imperialist aggression of their allies in the direction of the opposing camp" (PC no. 92, p 47).In sum, the first ‘cold war' had no other ideological motivation than to ‘master the antagonisms between classes'. This is really the world turned upside down. It's true that at the end of the First World War we saw a real retreat in imperialist antagonisms, and that this was because the main concern of the bourgeoisie was to deal with the revolutionary wave which began in Russia in 1917, to establish a common front against the threat posed by the mortal enemy of all sectors of the bourgeoisie: the world proletariat. But the Second World War immediately led to the development of imperialist antagonisms between the two main victors, and the war economy was kept at a very high level; this was precisely because the danger from a proletariat already deeply affected by the counter-revolution had been completely eradicated during the war and in its aftermath by a bourgeoisie that had learned from its historical experience (cf our article ‘Workers' struggles in Italy 1943' in IR 75). In fact, with PC's vision, the Korean war, the war in Indochina, and later in Vietnam, not to mention all the ones in the Middle East between an Israeli state strongly supported by the USA and the Arab states receiving massive aid from the USSR (and we won't mention dozens of other up to the war in Afghanistan which went on until the end of the 80s) - all these wars were nothing to do with any fundamental antagonism between the two great imperialist monsters but were a sort of ‘bluff', either ideological campaigns against the proletariat or dictated by each super-power's need to keep order in its own stable. Furthermore, this last idea is contradicted by PC itself, which attributes to the ‘detente' between the two blocs, between the end of the 50s and the middle of the 70s, the same function as the cold war:"In reality, detente was simply the response of the two superpowers to the lines of fracture which appeared more and more clearly in their respective spheres of influence. What it meant was an increasing pressure from Moscow and Washington on their allies, aimed at containing their centrifugal tendencies" (PC no. 92, p 43).It is true that communists must never take what the bourgeoisie, its historians and journalists, say at its face value. But to claim that the hands of the superpowers were not behind most of the wars (more than a hundred) that ravaged the world from 1945 to the end of the 80s is to turn one's back on observable reality. It would also mean throwing away what PC itself says quite correctly: "The latent conflict between states breaks out firstly in the form of military conflicts limited to certain geographic zones, of localised wars in which the great powers do not confront each other directly, but through interposed agencies" (see above).In fact, the ICP can always explain, by referring to the ‘dialectic', the contradiction between reality and what it recounts, or between its various arguments: it thus shows us that rigour is not its strong point and that it can end up saying what it likes, which isn't a very good way to fight the lies of the bourgeoisie and strengthen the consciousness of the proletariat.All this turns into a caricature when, to combat the lies of pacifism, it turns to an article by Bordiga written in 1950, where the latter makes the indices of steel production one of the major factors in the evolution of capitalism itself: "War in the capitalist epoch, i.e. the most ferocious type of war, is the crisis inevitably produced by the necessity to consume the steel produced, and to struggle for the right to monopolise the supplementary production of steel" (‘His majesty steel', Battaglia Comunista no. 18, 1950).Always preoccupied by its desire to find a ‘rationality' in war, PC is led to the point of making it seem that imperialist war is not only a good thing for capitalism but for the whole of humanity, and thus for the proletariat, when it affirms that: "...the prolongation of bourgeois peace beyond the limits defined by an economic cycle which involves war, even if it were possible, would only result in situations worse than war". There then follows a quote from Bordiga which is worth its weight in peanuts (or in steel, if you like):"Let us suppose for a moment ...that instead of two (world) wars ... we had had bourgeois peace, industrial peace. In about 35 years, steel production would have increased by 20 times; it would have become 20 times bigger than the 70 millions in 1915, arriving today (i.e. in 1950, editor's note) at 1400 million. But all this steel would not be eaten or consumed and would not be destroyed if the peoples were not getting massacred. The two billion human beings in the world weigh about 140 million tons; thus in one year they would be producing ten times their own weight in steel. The gods punished Midas by turning him into a lump of gold; capital turns human beings into lumps of steel and turns the earth, the water and the air in which they live into a metal prison. Bourgeois peace is thus a more bestial prospect than war."This was, unfortunately, one of the deliriums that Bordiga was prone to. But instead of taking its distance from it, the ICP goes even further:"Above all if you consider that the earth, transformed into a steel coffin, would become nothing more than a place of putrefaction where men and commodities in excess would peacefully decompose. Here, our dear pacifists, is the fruit of the governments ‘coming to reason', of being converted to the ‘culture of peace'. But this is precisely why it's not Folly, but Reason - of course, the Reason of bourgeois society - which pushes all governments towards war, towards salutary and hygienic war" (PC no. 92, p 54).In writing these lines, which PC lays claim to, Bordiga was turning his back on one of the very bases of the marxist analysis: capitalism produces commodities, and if you are talking about commodities you are talking about the possibility of satisfying a need, however perverted it may be, like the ‘need' of capitalist states for instruments of death and destruction. If capital produces steel in great quantities, it is to a large extent to satisfy the demand of states for heavy industries used for making war. However, this production cannot go beyond the demand of the states: if the steel industrialists are no longer able to sell their steel to the military, because the latter have already consumed a sufficient quantity, they won't carry on producing for long or their enterprises will be in ruins. They are not mad. On the other hand, Bordiga was a bit mad when he imagined that the production of steel could go on indefinitely without any limit than that imposed by the destructions of imperialist war.It's lucky for the ICP that ridicule doesn't kill (and Bordiga himself didn't die from it either): the workers might well greet such meanderings with a loud outbreak of laughter. But in fact it's all very regrettable for the cause that the ICP wants to defend: by using stupid and ridiculous arguments against pacifism, it is unwittingly led into playing the game of this enemy of the proletariat.There's one good thing in all this however: through its delirious arguments justifying the ‘rationality' of war, the ICP demolishes the very idea. And this is no bad thing when this idea leads it to put forward a perspective that could demobilise the proletariat by making it underestimate the danger that capitalism represents for humanity. Such an idea is summarised in particular in the following passage:"It flows from this (war as a manifestation of economic rationality) that inter-imperialist struggle and the confrontation between rival powers could never lead to the destruction of the planet, because this struggle derives not from excessive greed but from the necessity to escape overproduction. When the excess has been destroyed, the war machine stops, whatever the destructive potential of the weapons used, because at that point the causes of the war have also disappeared" (PC no. 92, p 55).In the second part of this article we will come back to this dramatic underestimation of the threat of imperialist war that the ICP's analysis leads to, and more concretely to the way that the slogans of this organisation are a means of demobilising the working class. FM
[1] [275] It is necessary to make this precision because at present there are three organisations calling themselves the ‘International Communist Party': two of them come from the old organisation of the same name, which broke up in 1982 and which published Il Programma Comunista in Italian; today these two splits publish respectively under this same title and Il Comunista. The third ICP, which was formed on the basis of an older split, publishes Il Partito Comunista.
[2] [276] See in particular the articles published in IR nos. 52 and 53: ‘War and militarism in decadence'.
[3] [277] On this question, see in particular (among many texts devoted to the defence of the notion of the decadence of capitalism) our study ‘Understanding the decadence of capitalism' in International Review nos. 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 58. The question of the link between the analysis of decadence and political positions is dealt with in no. 49.
[4] [278] See ‘Understanding the decadence of capitalism'. The critique of Bordiga's conceptions is made in particular in IR nos. 48, 54 and 55.
[5] [279] See ‘War in capitalism' (no. 41) as well as ‘War and militarism In decadence' (nos. 52 and 53).
[6] [280] See on this point our pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism as well as numerous articles in this Review, notably no. 13 ‘Marxism and crisis theory' and no.76 (‘Communism is not a nice idea but a material necessity').
[7] [281] On the study of economic mechanisms of reconstruction see in particular part V and VI of our study ‘Understanding the decadence of capitalism' (IR nos. 55 and 56).
There are many factors that confer on Mexico a particular importance within imperialist relations: its role as a reserve of raw material (minerals and oil), and especially its geographic position - a large frontier with the United States - all of which means it is a "priority" for the world's first power. In our article on the NAFTA treaty[1], we have already pointed out that the treaty's fundamental aim is the preservation of stability in Mexico (and throughout Latin America via the "Initiative of the Americas"), since all situations of chaos or war will affect the United States. At the same time, there is also the necessity for the United States to stop some Latin American bourgeoisies flirting with other powers, such as Germany or Japan. But an even greater priority for the bourgeoisie of the United States is to guarantee a stable government on its southern border (and also its northern one, Canada), a government that will be an unconditional ally and not suffer from too much disorder.
It is clear that the capitalist class in Mexico is allied to that of the United States. Nevertheless, in the light of a situation where in other countries, including in Latin America, governments are questioning, to a lesser or greater extent, their loyalty to the United States, where bourgeoisies are inclined more towards Germany (or Japan), or where internal divisions are provoking political crises which shake the unity of the capitalist state, we have to ask ourselves whether Mexico could find itself in a situation of destabilization and even come to question its submission to the United States, as is occurring in other countries; or, on the contrary, is Mexico a territory that is 100% secure for the United States?
In the final decades of the last century, the United States ascended to complete economic and political domination over the countries of Latin America. This domination has not been free from disputes and difficulties. In fact, the application of the so-called "Monroe Doctrine", according to which "America is for the Americans" (which is to say, Latin America is for the bourgeoisie of the United States) primarily meant the liquidation, by the beginning of the century, of the influence of the old powers, who throughout the 19th century had predominated in Latin America, with Britain in first place. Later, in the first half of the 20th century, the struggle was against those trying to take a piece of American's cake. Finally, after the Second World War, the United States had to fight the destabilizing influence of the USSR. Throughout the 20th century, the political crises which have occurred in the countries of Latin America, violent changes of government, assassinations of rulers, coups and wars, have had as their backdrop - when they are not the fundamental cause - these squabbles. The attitude of Latin America bourgeoisies cannot be seen as being passive, but as seeking to take the best advantage; on more than one occasion, spurred on by the other great powers, they have more or less seriously questioned the supremacy of the United States, although of course without shaking it off. Mexico is a classic example.
The so-called "Mexican revolution", or, where does the loyalty of the Mexican bourgeoisie come from?
One of the most important results - if not the most important - of the war of 1910-1920, the so-called "Mexican revolution", was the definitive weakening of the national bourgeoisie which had grown up in the shadow of the old powers, and its substitution by a "new bourgeoisie" submissively and unconditionally allied to the United States. In fact, during the second half of the 19th century and especially during the 30 years of the presidency of Porfirio Diaz, an aggressive and vigorous national capital had arisen (in the mines, railways, oil, textiles, etc as well as finance and commerce) under the influence of such countries as France and Britain. At that time, the Mexican bourgeoisie was preoccupied by the advances and aspirations of the United States towards Latin America and Mexico in particular and tried to counteract it by opening its doors to the other powers, in the vain hope that by increasing the investments and political influence of Europe no power would be able to pre-dominate.
However, by the turn of the century, Diaz's iron dictatorship was beginning to break up. The form of military dictatorship was already too narrow for the advance of economic development and various factors were pushing for its modification. These were expressed by faction fights within the capitalist class in the struggle for the succession of the already old Diaz, especially by the vigorous faction of the landowner\capitalists in the north, who aspired to a predominant role in the government, in accordance with their economic power. At the same time a profound discontent was growing amongst the exploited classes of the countryside (peons on the haciendas throughout the country, rancheros in the north, communeros in the south) and amongst the young industrial proletariat who already could not bear its pitiless exploitation. These factors produced a social upheaval that lead to ten years of internal war, though, contrary to what the official histories say, this did not constitute a real social revolution.
In the first place, the war in Mexico between 1910 and 1920 was not a proletarian revolution. The young and dispersed industrial proletariat did not constitute a decisive class during it. In fact, its most important efforts at rebellion, the wave of strikes at the beginning of the century, had been completely crushed on its eve. To the extent that some sectors of the proletariat participated in the war, they trailed behind some of the bourgeois factions. As for the agricultural proletariat, without the lead of its industrial brothers and still chained to the land, it was integrated into the peasant war.
The peasant war, at the same time, didn't constitute a revolution. The war in Mexico demonstrated for the umpteenth time that the peasant movement is characterized by the lack of its own historical mission, and could only end up by being liquidated or integrated into the movement of the historic classes (the bourgeoisie or the proletariat). In Mexico, it was in the south where the peasant movement acquired its "classical" form, where the peasant masses, still living in the old traditional communities, destroyed the Porfiristas haciendas; however, once they had taken over the land they abandoned their arms. They could never form a regular army or a government capable of controlling for any time the cities they took. These masses end up being attacked as much by the new "revolutionary" regime as by the old one and were finally cruelly defeated. The northern rancheros' war suffered a similar fate. Their tactic was to take cities through assault by cavalry: this had been an effective tactic in the previous century against the Porfirista Federal army, but was a noisy failure against modern trench warfare, barbed wire and the machine guns of the new regime's army. The defeat of the peasants (communeros in the south and rancheros in the north) led to the recovery of their land by the old landlords and the formation of new latifundias in the first years of the new regime.
Finally, it is not possible to see this war as a bourgeois revolution. It did not lead to the formation of a capitalist state, because one already existed and all that happened was that one form of this state was replaced by another. Its only merit was to have put in place the basis for the adoption of capitalist relations in the countryside, with the elimination of the system of "tiendas de rayas" which tied the peons to the haciendas and therefore impeded the free movement of the labor force (although, in general, rapidly developing capitalist relations of production had already fully existed and were predominant even before the war).
The great powers in the Mexican war
The so-called "Mexican Revolution" was not only an internal social conflict, it was also fully inscribed in the imperialist conflicts which unfolded throughout the world at the beginning of the century and which led to the First World War. In fact, the succession of governments that followed the fall of Porfirio Diaz, the government (and assassination) of Madero, then the government and expulsion of Huerta, and then the government and assassination of Carranza, that the official histories call a succession of misfortunes caused by "good" and "bad" men, "traitors" and "patriots" - all this can be explained much more logically by the struggle between the great powers for economic and political predominance in Mexico via control of the government; the sometimes 180 degree turnabouts that took place were thus the result of inter-imperialist struggles. To be exact, behind the scenes, we find the United States trying to establish a government in Mexico that supported and was subordinated to it[2].
The United States actively pushed for the disintegration and fall of the Diaz government, through its support for the northern landowner/capitalist fractions (led by Madero), with the aim of gaining economic and commercial concessions and weakening the influence of the European powers. However, Madero did not seek to destroy in favor of the US the "balance" of forces between the different powers that had existed in the days of Diaz, nor did he really improve the situation of the exploited classes. Unable to deal with the peasant revolts, Madero became an obstacle to the US's plans, who then backed Huerta's conspiracy to assassinate him and to take power.
Then, Huerta tried to use the struggle between the great powers to his own ends. The only result of which was that he ended up being abandoned by them all. Concurrently, the peasant movement reached its peak and Huerta was also cast aside. At the same time, the First World War erupted in Europe and from then on the situation in Mexico began to be influenced by another power: Germany
Germany was struggling with the other powers in order to gain a place in the imperialist arena for the division of the world market, to which it had arrived late. As regards Mexico, though it did have some economic interests there, these were not their main concern. Germany understood Mexico's strategic importance and sought to make good use of it in order to obstruct the United States. Germany's secret and diplomatic services first of all tried to use Huerta and then with better judgment Carranza, as a means of provoking an armed conflict between the United States and Mexico. Through this Germany intended to divert the military efforts of the United States, which was already supplying arms to the "Allies" and was preparing to enter the war. At its peak, the German bourgeoisie dreamt of a Japanese-Mexican-German alliance which would confront the United States in America. However at this time Japan was more concerned about seizing power in China and was not strong enough to challenge the United States. In the end, the "Allies" were able to foil Germany's plans. After this, understanding how close it was to defeat, Germany changed its policy and, through economic treaties, it tried to maintain a certain influence in Mexico, in the hope of better times.
At the beginning of the 1920's, the First World War being over and the internal conflict having died down, a new bourgeoisie was to be found in power in Mexico, whose "original" capital was derived from war profits. The United States was in the ascendant throughout the continent, and the influence of the old powers, Britain and France was in full retreat, although not totally liquidated. For example, Britain would continue to contest the control of oil, with the US, for another two decades. While the governments "emanating from the revolution", after that of Carranza (who was certainly assassinated) did not again call into question the supremacy of their neighbor in the north.
Nevertheless, the old bourgeoisie of the Porfirista period, although profoundly weakened, was not totally defeated. And before accepting it had to adapt it to the new situation and that it had no other option than to live and fuse together with the "new" capitalists, some of its sectors still had enough strength to call into question the new government.
The war of the "Cristeros"
The war of 1910-1920 did not totally settle accounts between the two parts of the national capital: this meant that between 1926-1929 a new and bloody war broke out between them. The war embraced the republic's central and western states (Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacion) and once again the peasants served as cannon fodder. As for the influence that the great powers exercised over Mexico, it is very interesting to observe that the "old" faction once again received support from some sections of European Capital (France, Spain, Germany) via the Roman Catholic church. In fact, this faction had "religious freedom" as its slogan, because this was supposedly being infringed by the "revolutionary regime" (in reality, what it was doing was seizing the "old" faction's areas of economic power, including those inside the Catholic church). And behind this slogan was the ideology of "Synarchy". Behind the "old" faction's cry of "Viva Cristo Rey" (from which the name Cristeros is derived) was the idea of the search for the new "world kingdom" led by the old powers (France, Germany, Italy, Spain...) - the ideological antecedent of European fascism in the 30's. Hence, once again we find European capital (or at least sections of it) trying to use an internal conflict to destabilize the country: only a few years later the same countries would confront the US on the military terrain. The Cristeros were defeated and the "old" fraction had no option but to change colors, integrate themselves with the others and bury its pro-European aspirations. The governments of the 30's and 40's served at the United States table, turning Mexico into a supplier of raw materials during the Second World War. This was the case, not only with the government of Avila Camacho who "declared war" on the Axis powers, but also his predecessor and elector (in Mexico the president is decisive in the election of his successor): Lazaro Cardenas, a distinguished general in the war against the Cristeros, whose mythical "expropriation of oil" in 1938 fundamentally led to the definitive expulsion of the British oil companies and the conversion of Mexico into an exclusive energy reserve for the United States.
The interlude of the Stalinist imperialist bloc
The end of the Second World War opened up what could be called a historical "parenthesis" in the world struggle that the United States and Germany had sustained throughout the century. For more than 40 years Russian imperialism challenged the world supremacy of American imperialism[3]. The formation of a new alignment of imperialist blocs found the old enemies on the same side: Germany on the same side as the United States.
In Latin America, the United States strengthened its economic and political domination, despite the USSR's intensions and intervention in the region (via some guerrilla movements and flirtations with "Socialist" governments). However, given the relative weakness of the USSR, these were - with the exception of Cuba[4] - no more than attempts to destabilize the region, as Germany had tried to do in an earlier period.
Nevertheless, this digression finished at the turn of the present decade, when the eastern imperialist bloc collapsed, the western bloc dissolved and the USSR fell apart. And contrary to what the bourgeois media says, this did not mark the end of the conflicts between the great powers, the "end of history" or anything like it.
Today, imperialist relations are a morass of destabilization, chaos and wars, which covers the whole world. No country, no matter how great or small can escape the sinister logic of imperialist struggles, especially the one around the two great powers, rivals throughout the century: the United States and Germany. However, the "New World Disorder" blunts the tendencies towards the formation of a new pair of imperialist blocs with these two powers as their axes, around which all the other countries would polarize. The allies of yesterday have become today's enemies, in an endless whirlwind of chaos, which does not stop these tendencies but feeds them, while the latter, at the same time, further increase chaos. And there is no way that Mexico can escape this dynamic of international capitalist relations.
Mexico "always loyal"?
We will now try to answer the questions we asked at the beginning of this article about the Mexican capitalist class' "loyalty" to the United States.
The American bourgeoisie has been assured the loyalty of Mexican bourgeoisie throughout the last seven decades, and in general terms, it will continue to receive it.
There are still some sections of the Mexican bourgeoisie who have never adjusted to domination by the United States. However, we would not call them a fraction (that would imply a deep fissure in the ruling class and that is not the case). These sections, although a relative minority, were still able to get one of their men into the president's seat, which was the situation with President Diaz Ordaz in the 60's. This was clearly only possible in a period when the tensions between the "pro-Europeans" and the "pro-Americans" were secondary to the confrontation with the "main enemy", Russian imperialism, and an alliance existed between Western Europe and the United States.
Nothing like that will happen again in the future. The United States will seek a guarantee of absolute loyalty from the Mexican executive, in order to avoid any "mistakes" which could bring to power a representative of the sections more inclined to the powers of the old continent.
Despite this, we can expect to see these minority sectors, fired up by the Germans, showing their heads, getting worked up, "protesting" and "demanding", creating further problems for the pro-American government. Likewise, we can expect to see the United States' rivals using these sectors, not to dispute control over Mexico, but in order to create social instability in its backyard, on the principle that everything that hinders the US and causes it to divert resources (economic, political, military) is a move they can use to their advantage.
We can already see signs of this. For example: the reanimation in recent months of the heirs of Synarchy (the Partido Democrata Mexicano and other similar regroupments). In the split of the Partido Accion Nacional - never more than a secondary electoral force in the country - one part aligning itself with the Salinas government, while the other, which contains the "historic leaders", decided to remain and form another party, that is ideologically closer to the Synarchists. The struggle in the Catholic Church is also significant. It is between one part which is seeking to reconcile itself with the government and the other which constantly attacks it from the pulpit. And finally, there is the resurgence of the ceremonies of "Cristo Rey" and the "Cristeros"; it is no accident that these are being pushed by the Vatican (which, according to the evidence, is drawing closer to Germany). There has been a religious rally in Guanajuato on the hill which symbolizes the Cristeros movement, which was presided over by the governor (a member of PAN). In Mexico City a rally took place in order to celebrate the beatification by the Pope of some thirty martyrs of the War of the Cristeros ...
We want to underline that these minority sections of capital favorable to an "anti-American" and therefore "pro-European" attitude cannot put into question the supremacy of the United States. However, they will certainly be able to create problems, of more or less gravity. We will see this in time.
Should the proletariat support one side or other of the bourgeoisie?
It is vital that the working class understands that its interests have nothing in common with these imperialist struggles. That it has nothing to gain from supporting one faction of the bourgeoisie against another and everything to lose. Two world wars between the different imperialist gangsters for the redivision of the world market have left the working class with tens of millions dead. In Mexico, the wars of 1910-1920 and 1926-1929 have also left it with millions of dead and its chains of oppression strengthened.
The proletariat must be aware that behind the calls for the defense of the "homeland" or "region" lurks the aim of dragging workers into defending interests which are not their own, including killing each other for the benefit of their exploiters. These calls are certainly going to increase in vehemency, until they become deafening, as the bourgeoisie's search for cannon fodder for its struggles becomes increasingly urgent. The proletariat must reject these calls, and oppose the continuation of these imperialist struggles, through developing its own class struggle, which is the only way of definitively putting an end to the capitalist system, which has nothing to offer humanity other than wars and chaos.
Leonardo, July 1993
Some Spanish terms used:
Haciendas and Latifundias: large landed estates
Peon: landless peasants forced to work on these estates
Ranchero: small independent farmer found in north of Mexico
Communero: peasants still working on a communal basis
[1] Revolucion Mundial no 12, "TLC: El gendarme del mundo asegura su traspatio" (TLC are the Spanish initials for NAFTA)
[2] F Katz' book La Guerra secreta en Mexico is a very full study and reveals the level of the influence of the great powers in the "Mexican Revolucion". We have taken from it much of what we have presented here.
[3] We are not able here to develop on our analysis of Stalinism. Thus, we recommend reading our "Manifesto of the 9th Congress of the ICC" and the International Review.
[4] On Cuba read Revolucion Mundial issues 9 and 10
The first part of this article[1] dealt with the general framework for understanding that in decadent capitalism the state develops towards a totalitarian way of functioning even when it has a democratic form. The second part is an illustration of the fact using the example of Italy.
For the last few years recurrent scandals have tainted the political life of the ruling class in Italy. The affairs referred to as the P2 Lodge[2] and the Gladio network and the links with the Mafia in particular have lifted a corner of the virtuous veil that covers the bourgeois state and given a glimpse of the sordid and criminal reality of its workings. The bloody succession of terrorist and Mafia attacks, of "suicides" motivated by financial bankruptcy, traces its origins to the very heart of the state, to its tortuous maneuvers to safe-guard its hegemony. One "affair" follows hard on the heels of another and the ruling class knows exactly how to use the apparent uniqueness of each scandal to make us forget the previous ones. Today the other big western "democracies" point an accusing finger at the Italian bourgeoisie that is guilty of such crimes in an attempt to make us believe that the situation there is peculiar to that country. Aren't Machiavelli and the Mafia as typically Italian as Chianti and Parmesan cheese? In reality the whole scandalous history of the Italian bourgeoisie and all its ramifications demonstrates just the reverse. What is specific to Italy is that its democratic covering is more fragile historically than in the other democracies. A closer inspection shows that what the Italian scandals unveil is not at all peculiar to Italy. On the contrary it's an expression of decadent capitalism's general tendency towards state totalitarianism and of the imperialist antagonisms that have marked the twentieth century in every part of the world.
The history of Italy since the beginning of the century is an ample demonstration.
The Mafia at the heart of the state and of imperialist strategy
In the middle of the 1920s Mussolini declared war on the Mafia: "I'll drain them dry the way I drained the Pontin marshes", he stated. In Sicily this task was assigned to the chief of police Mori and his men. But the years passed and the Cosa Nostra held out. When the prospect of the Second World War loomed the Mafia became an important strategic weapon for the future belligerents as it was firmly implanted both in the south of Italy and in the USA. Mussolini was interested in increasing his influence among Italo-Americans and so forming a "fifth column" in enemy territory. For this reason in 1937 he welcomed with open arms Vito Genovese, nick-named Lucky Luciano, who was the boss of the American Mafia and had a somewhat delicate relationship with US law. Genovese became a protégé of the fascist regime and was invited on more than one occasion to eat a friendly plate of spaghetti at the table of Il Duce in the company of such celebrities as Count Ciano (Mussolini's son-in-law and minister for foreign affairs) and Hermann Goering. In 1943 he received the highest distinction of the fascist regime; Il Duce himself pinned the Ordine di Commendatore on his breast. Genovese carried out little services for the fascist regime. He eliminated members of the Mafia who hadn't understood the new rules of the game; in New York he arranged for the assassination of an Italo-American journalist, Carlo Tresca, who ran an influential anti-fascist newspaper, Il Martello. But more important still, the help he gave put Lucky Luciano in a privileged position which enabled him to set up a network for all kinds of trafficking and also to enlarge his sphere of influence. The chief of police in Naples, Albini, became his man and in 1943 Genovese managed to get him named deputy secretary of state for the Ministry of the Interior. Ciano too was under Genovese's control because, as a drug addict, he depended upon him for his supply of drugs.
During this period the USA, which had entered the war in 1941, was quite aware of the strategic importance of the Mafia. On its home ground the US had to prevent a front being created among immigrants of Italian origin within the US. This meant that it became indispensable for the American state to negotiate with the Mafia as among other things they controlled the dockers' and lorry drivers' unions, sectors that were vital for army transportation and supplies. To reinforce their credibility the Mafia organized the sabotage of the liner The Normandy; it was set alight in February 1942 in the port of New York while being refitted to transport troops. Shortly afterwards a general dock strike, instigated by the Mafia-controlled union, brought the port to a standstill. In the end the American Navy asked Washington for permission to negotiate with the Mafia and its boss, Luciano, although he was in prison at the time, and Roosevelt eagerly agreed. The American state has always denied this and the details of Operation Underworld (as it was called) have always been classified. Lucky Luciano too insisted right up to his death that all this was no more than "bullshit and tall stories made up for idiots"[3]. However after decades of silence on the question it's now generally recognized that the American state negotiated an alliance with the Mafia. In accordance with their promise Luciano was freed after the war and "exiled" to Italy. As public prosecutor Thomas Dewey had arranged for the arrest and sentencing of Luciano ten years earlier and by virtue of the ensuing publicity had become governor of the state of New York in the intervening period. In an interview with the New York Post, he justified Genovese's release in these words: "An exhaustive enquiry has established that the help given by Luciano to the Navy during the war was considerable and valuable".
In fact the Mafia did help the American state a great deal during the war. Initially it placed a foot in both camps but in the middle of 1942 when the balance of forces tipped more clearly in favor of the Allies, the Mafia put its forces at the disposal of the USA. Within the US it did so by committing its unions to the war effort but it was most clearly illustrated in Italy. When American troops disembarked in Sicily in 1943 the support they received from the Mafia there was efficient and of great assistance to them. The disembarkation on 10th July was more like a day's outing; the American soldiers encountered little opposition and only seven days later Palermo was under their control. At the same time the British 8th army, which probably didn't receive the same degree of support from the Mafia, was forced to fight for five weeks and sustained numerous losses just to attain part of its objectives. According to some historians this alliance with the Mafia saved the lives of 50,000 American soldiers. From that time onwards General Patton called the Sicilian godfather, Don Calogero Vizzini, who organized the rout of the Italian-German forces, the "Mafia General". As a reward the latter, who up to then had spent many a year in prison, was elected Mayor of his town Villalba under the benevolent eye of the Allies. On 25th July, a week after the fall of Palermo, the fascist Grand Council removed Mussolini and one month later Italy capitulated. The sphere of influence established by Genovese was to be very important in the events following the disembarkation in Sicily. Ciano helped Badoglio to remove Mussolini. The black market structure set up in the Naples region worked in complete harmony with the Allied forces to their mutual benefit. Vito Genovese became the right hand man of Charlie Poletti, the American military governor of the whole of occupied Italy. Afterwards when he returned to the US Genovese became the most important Mafia boss there in the post-war period.
The alliance between the American state and the Mafia that was born during the war was not to be dissolved when the war ended. The Honorata Societa had proved itself such an efficient and useful partner that the American state couldn't run the risk that its services might be exploited by other interests especially when a new rival imperialist bloc emerged at the end of the Second World War: the USSR.
The Gladio affair: a manipulative structure for the strategic interests of the US bloc
In October 1990 Prime minister Giulio Andreotti revealed the existence of a clandestine organization that was run in parallel with the official secret services, financed by the CIA and integrated into NATO; its function was to counter-attack in the event of a Russian invasion and by extension to fight against Communist influence. This was the Gladio network. The revelation provoked a huge outcry; not only in Italy but internationally as a similar structure had been constituted in every country of the western bloc under the control of the USA.
"Officially" the Gladio network was constituted in 1956 but its real origin goes back to the end of the war. Even before the Second World War was over, once the fate of the Axis forces was sealed, the new rivalry developing between the USA and the USSR was monopolizing the attention of the most important states and their secret services. War crimes and those responsible for them were forgotten in the face of the new war that was beginning against the influence of the new Russian adversary. Throughout Europe the allied services, especially the American ones, were recruiting old fascists and Nazis in abundance, executioners and adventurers of all kinds, all in the name of the holy struggle against "Communism". For the "losers" this was an excellent opportunity to renew their virginity at little cost.
In Italy the situation was particularly delicate as far as western interests were concerned. It had the strongest Stalinist party in Western Europe which came out of the war covered in glory because of the decisive role it had played in the resistance against fascism. During the run up to the 1948 election, held in accordance with the new constitution set up after the Liberation, concern grew among western strategists because they were not at all sure what the result would be, and a victory for the Italian Communist Party (PCI) would be catastrophic. Given that Greece was plunged in civil war and the CP was threatening to take power by force, and that Yugoslavia was still within the Russian orbit, if Italy fell under the influence of the USSR it would represent a strategic disaster of the highest order for western interests. The danger was of losing control over the Mediterranean and therefore over access to the Middle East.
In the face of this danger the Italian bourgeoisie quickly forgot their old wartime divisions. In March 1946 they dissolved the High Commission which had been given the task of purging the state of those who had been too committed to supporting Mussolini. They demobilized the partisans. They replaced those who had been given positions of responsibility by the Liberation Committees, especially at the head of the police, by those who had been chosen by Mussolini in the past. From 1944 to 1948 an estimated 90% of personnel who had formed part of the state apparatus under the fascist regime were reinstated.
The electoral campaign that was supposed to christen the new democratic republic was in full swing. Financial and industrial establishments, the army, the police, all of whom had formed the bulwark of the fascist regime, began trumpeting the virtues of their old enemy, western democracy, and warning of the danger of "Communism". The Vatican, which is an important fraction of the Italian bourgeoisie, had initially supported Mussolini's regime; during the war it played a double game (as it is wont to do). It now threw itself into the electoral campaign. In front of 300,000 believers gathered in Saint Paul's Square the Pope declared that, "whoever offered their assistance to a party that didn't accept the existence of God was a traitor and a deserter". In the south of Italy the Mafia was active in the electoral campaign, financing Christian Democracy and instructing their contacts to vote for them.
All this took place under the benevolent eye and active support of the USA. In fact the American state spared no effort. In the USA the "letter to Italy" campaign was mounted urging Italo-Americans to send letters to their family in Italy advising them to vote the "right" way. The Voice of America radio station, which had vilified the wrong-doings of the fascist regime during the war, now denounced, day after day, the dangers of Communism. Two weeks before the elections the Marshall Plan was approved but the USA had not waited until then to inundate the Italian government with dollars; a few weeks earlier an aid package of $227 million was voted by Congress. Parties and organizations hostile to the PCI and to the Democratic Front which it was part of received aid in hard cash; the American press estimates the sum spent in this way at $20 million.
But, in case all this failed to prevent the PCI's Democratic Front from winning, the USA set in motion a secret strategy that would go into action in the event of a government dominated by the Stalinists coming to power. The American secret services contacted and coordinated the activity of the various clans within the Italian bourgeoisie who were opposed to the PCI, those at the head of the state apparatus, the army, the police, the big industrialists and financiers, the Vatican, the Mafia godfathers. They set up a clandestine resistance network that was to go into action if the "Communists" seized power and which recruited its members from among the "old" fascists, the army, the police, the Mafia milieu and generally among committed "anti-communists". The re-emergence of fascist groups was encouraged in the name of the defense of "liberty". Weapons were distributed secretly. The feasibility of a military coup d'état was considered and it was no accident that a few days before the election 20,000 police carried out maneuvers with armored weapons and that Mario Scelba, minister for the Home Office, announced that he'd set up a structure able to deal with armed insurrection. The decision was made that, in the event of the PCI winning, Sicily would secede. The USA was able to count on the Cosa Nostra to see to this as they supported the "independence" struggle of Salvatore Giuliano for this reason. In the meantime the American general staff would make serious plans for the occupation of Sicily and Sardinia by its armed forces.
In the end, on 16th April 1948 Christian Democracy with 48% of the votes carried the majority with 40 seats. The PCI was relegated to the opposition and Western interests were safe. But the first elections of the new Italian democratic republic that came out of the liberation were not at all democratic. They were the result of enormous manipulation. Anyway even if the result had gone the wrong way the "democratic" forces of the west were ready to organize a coup d'état, to sow disorder, to stir up civil war in order to re-establish their control over Italy. It was under these auspices and in these conditions, which couldn't have been any less democratic, that the Italian republic was born. It carries the marks to this day.
In order to achieve this electoral result a clandestine structure (a far cry from the official framework of how "democracy" functions) was set up under the leadership of the USA. It regrouped those sectors of the bourgeoisie who were most favorable to western interests and who thus formed the dominant clan within the Italian state. This was later to be called the Gladio network. In secret it regrouped a political nerve center (the summit), an economic body, various interest groups who profited from financing it, an armed wing, a rank-and-file who were recruited by the secret services and were responsible for low level tasks. This structure proved effective. It was maintained because the development of imperialist antagonisms in what's called the "cold war" period and the fact that the PCI continued to be a powerful party in Italy means that what was useful for western strategic interests post war remains so today.
However manipulating the election results by means of a tight control over the political parties, the main state organs, the media and the heart of the economy wasn't enough; there remained the danger that the situation would turn to the advantage of the PCI. In order to deal with "Communist subversion" the Gladio organization (or its equivalent under another name) has been preparing a prospective military coup d'état since the end of the war in order to preserve the foundations of western bloc domination:
- in 1967, L'Expresso denounced in its columns the putchist preparations organized three years earlier by the police and secret services. In the subsequent enquiry legal representatives came up against state secrets, the secret services tampering with evidence, obstruction from ministers and influential political figures and a series of mysterious deaths among those involved in the affair.
- on the night of 7/8 December 1970 commandos of the extreme right occupied the Home Office in Rome. But the plot failed and the several hundred armed men who paraded around in the Roman night went home at dawn. An escapade on the part of a few fascist elements? The preliminary investigations that went on for seven years showed that the plot was organised by Prince Valerio Borghese, that the military were involved at the highest level, that politicians within Christian Democracy and the Social Democratic Party were involved, that the military attaché to the American Embassy was in close liaison with those who initiated the coup. From then on the enquiry was gradually stifled, although Admiral Miceli, head of the secret services, was dismissed in 1974 following the issue of a warrant for his arrest which accused him of "having promoted, formed and organized together with others a secret association of military and civil personnel with the aim of stirring up armed insurrection".
- in 1973 another plot to instigate a coup d'état was uncovered by the Italian police. This one was organized by Eduardo Sogno, formerly Italian Ambassador to Rangoon. Once again the enquiry was impeded in the name of preserving "state secrets".
However if you look closely these plots have more the appearance of political maneuvers to maintain a certain political atmosphere than real attempted coups that failed. In fact in 1969 Italy experienced a wave of strikes, the "hot autumn", which marked the re-awakening of the class struggle and which revived the fear in the minds of NATO strategists that the social situation in Italy would be destabilized. After 1969 a strategy was to be developed that was intended to re-establish order and strengthen the state: the strategy of social tension.
The strategy of social tension: provocation as a method of government
In 1974 Roberto Caballero, a bureaucrat in the fascist union Cisnal, stated in an interview with L'Europeo: "When trouble arises in the country (disturbances, union unrest, violence) the Organization goes into action to create the conditions to restore order. If such trouble doesn't arise it's created by the Organization itself through the intermediary of all those groups of the extreme right (if not the groups of the extreme left) who are now involved in black subversion". He also goes on to say that the group of people controlling this organization "who include representatives of the Italian and American secret services as well as influential multinational companies, have chosen a strategy of disorder and tensions which serve as a justification for restoring order".
In 1969, 145 attacks were carried out. The climax that year was reached on 12th December with the bloody explosions in Rome and Milan which left 16 dead and about a hundred injured. The inquiry into these bombings was to spend three years on a false trail in pursuit of anarchists before discovering, in spite of all the obstacles placed in its path, the black trail: that of the extreme right and the secret services. 1974 was marked by two bloody attacks at Brescia (7 dead, 90 injured) and in a train, The Italicus (12 dead, 48 wounded). Once again the trail led to black terrorism. However from 1974 the "black" terrorism of the extreme right gave place to the terrorism of the Red Brigades. This reached its height with the kidnapping and assassination of the Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Then in 1980 the extreme right made a violent come-back with the bloody attack at Bologna station (90 dead) which was finally attributed to them. Once more the preliminary investigations implicated the secret services and once more the general heads of these services escaped trial.
The "strategy of social tension" was set up cynically and efficiently to create a climate of terror in order to justify a strengthening of the state's means of repression and control over society. The link between the terrorism of the extreme right and the secret services emerged clearly from the inquiries conducted even if these were suppressed. On the other hand such links weren't clearly shown by the police inquiries in relation to the terrorism of the extreme left as carried out by groups such as the Red Brigades and Prima Linea. However here too, with the benefit of hindsight, the facts and evidence gathered tend to show that "red" terrorism was encouraged, manipulated, used, if not directly instigated by the state and its parallel services.
It is already evident that the Red Brigade attacks had the same result as those of the neo-fascists: they created a climate of insecurity that served the state's ideological campaigns to justify the strengthening of the forces of repression. In the second half of the 1970s they helped to make the public forget what the earlier enquiries had begun to show: that the bombs from 1969 to 1971 were not the work of anarchists but of fascist elements used by the secret services. Because the perpetrators justified the "red" bombings in terms of a revolutionary phraseology they were more effective in confusing the process of developing consciousness that was taking place within the working class, and they increased the weight of repression that fell upon the most advanced elements of the proletariat and the revolutionary milieu who were lumped together with terrorism. In short, from the point of view of the state it was much more useful than "black" terrorism. That's why the bourgeois media that serves the state's interests attributed the earlier bombings that were carried out by the extreme right to anarchists. That was the whole point of the maneuver, to act as a provocation.
"The situation could arise in which allied countries show themselves to be passive or indecisive when confronted with communist subversion. The military espionage of the United States must be furnished with the means to mount special operations able to convince the governments of allied countries and public opinion that the danger of insurrection is a real one. The military espionage of the United States must try to infiltrate the seats of insurrection by means of agents on special mission with the task of forming action groups within the most radical movements." This quotation is an extract from the US Intelligence Field Manual, the campaign manual for American spies, and the intelligence leaders in Washington claim that it's false. But it's been authenticated by Colonel Oswald Le Winter, an ex-CIA agent and liaison officer in Europe, in a television documentary about Gladio. He also gave a concrete demonstration of what it means when he stated during the interview, "The Red Brigades as well as Baader-Meinhof and Action Directe were also infiltrated. Several of these left-wing terrorist organisations were infiltrated and controlled". He goes on to say that "reports and documents from our bureau in Rome testified that the Red Brigades had been infiltrated and that their nucleus received its orders from Santovito". General Santovito was the head of the Italian secret services (SISMI) at the time. A more reliable source, Frederico Umberto d'Amato, ex-chief of the political police and minister of the Home Office from 1972 and 1974 proudly relates that "The Red Brigades were infiltrated. This was difficult because they had furnished themselves with a very rigid and efficient structure. Nevertheless they were infiltrated spectacularly and with optimum results".
More than any other act committed by the Red Brigades, kidnapping Aldo Moro, killing his escort, holding him in captivity and finally executing him in 1978 arouses suspicion of a maneuver of some clan within the state and the secret services. It's amazing that the Red Brigades who were composed of young elements in revolt, highly motivated and committed but with little experience of clandestine war, were able to carry out an operation of such scope and so well. The enquiry brought to light many disturbing elements: a member of the secret services was present at the place where he was snatched, the bullets found on the scene had been treated in a particular way used by the special services, etc. The scandal provoked by the discovery that the state had had a hand in the bombings from 1969 to 1974, which had been wrongly attributed to the anarchists, had been forgotten. Even so the suspicion reigned within public opinion in Italy that state manipulation had lain behind the Red Brigade attacks. In fact Aldo Moro was kidnapped just before he was due to sign the "historic compromise" which was to seal a governmental alliance between Christian Democracy and the PCI. It was Moro who had master-minded the idea. His widow said that "I learnt from my husband or someone else that around 1975 he had been warned that his attempts to bring together the various political forces to govern for the good of the country had displeased certain groups and individuals. He'd been told that if he persisted with this political project he was likely to pay very dearly for his stubbornness". The "historic compromise" might have opened the doors of government to the PCI. As Prime Minister Moro was aware of the existence of Gladio. He probably thought that the infiltration of the PCI that it had carried out over the years in order to lessen the east's influence, and the fact that the party was distancing itself increasingly from Russian political choices, made it acceptable in the eyes of his western allies. But the way that the state abandoned him when he'd been seized shows that this was not the case. In the end the "historic compromise" wasn't signed. So the death of Moro corresponds perfectly with the interests that Gladio defended, and when D'Amato speaks of the "optimum results" obtained from the infiltration of the Red Brigades one wonders whether he is thinking of Moro's assassination.
The various enquiries have always been obstructed by certain state sectors, administrative delaying tactics and the sacred "secret d'état" but the discovery of the P2 Lodge in 1981 confirmed the suspicions of the judiciary as to the existence of a secret government, a parallel structure that was pulling the strings from the shadows and organizing the "strategy of social tension".
The P2 Lodge: the real hidden power of the state
In 1981 customs officials discovered a list of 963 "brother" members of the P2 Lodge. This list contained the cream of the Italian bourgeoisie: 6 current ministers; 63 high ranking civil servants in government ministries; 60 politicians including Andreotti and Cossiga; 18 judges and prosecutors; 83 big industrialists including Agnelli, Pirelli, Falk, Crespi; bankers such as Calvi and Sindona; members of the Vatican such as Cardinal Caseroli; important figures from the communications sector such as Rizzoli, owner of Corriere de la Sera or Berlusconi, owner of numerous television channels; practically all the heads of the secret services over the years among whom the generals Allavena, the head of SIFAR from June 1965 to June 1966, Miceli, named as head of the secret services in 1970, Admiral Casardi who succeeded him, General Santovito then patron of SISMI; 14 army generals; 9 admirals; 9 police chiefs; 4 air force generals and 4 top customs officials. This is just to mention those in the most prominent positions although names could also be cited from the universities, among trade unionists, the leaders of extreme right wing groups. Apart from radicals, leftists and the PCI the whole Italian political spectrum is represented. This list is certainly not complete however. A number of other names were mentioned at the time of the scandal without any proof being given. Among the rumours that were never substantiated it was even suggested that influential members of the PCI belonged to the P2.
However you can say that there's nothing very unusual in all this. In fact it's quite usual to find within the Freemasons a number of well-known figures who practice rituals and find this a good way to cultivate contacts and fill their address books. Even so the personality of the Grand Master, Licio Gelli, is disturbing.
Gelli was the head of this Lodge and unknown to the general public. However the course of the enquiry and subsequent revelations were to show the determinant influence that he's had over Italian politics over the years. His personal history is edifying. Gelli began his career as a member of the fascist party; at 18 he joined the Black Shirts who were to fight in Spain; during the war he actively collaborated with the Nazis to whom he handed over dozens of partisans and deserters. It seems that from 1943 he started to play both sides. He contacted the Resistance and the American secret services. After the war he fled to Argentina and returned to Italy with no difficulty in 1948. At the beginning of the 60s he joined the Freemasons, was active in the Propaganda Two Lodge, of which he rapidly became Grand Master and where he was joined by the most important heads of the secret services. There are a number of proofs of his subsequent power. When one of his children got married such prominent personalities as Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani and apparently Pope Paul VI sent sumptuous gifts. According to the enquiries Agnelli offered him a telephone in solid gold as a token of friendship. At the beginning of the 1980s, Gelli telephoned almost every day to the prime minister, the minister of trade and industry, the minister for foreign affairs, to the leaders of the main Italian political parties (Christian-Democrat, Socialist, Social-Democrat, Republican, Liberal and neo-Fascist). The cream of the Italian establishment filed to his residence near Florence and his private rooms at the luxury hotel Excelsior. The most noteworthy of these is Andreotti who is in fact his official political representative, his tool.
The conclusion of the commission of enquiry on the P2 Lodge is interesting. It considers that Gelli "belongs to the secret services of which he's the head; the P2 Lodge and Gelli are the expression of an influence exerted by the American masons and the CIA over the Giustiniani Palace since it reopened after the war; an influence that is evidence of the economic dependence on the American masons and its head Frank Gigliotti". Gigliotti is himself a CIA agent. In 1990 an ex-CIA agent, Richard Brenneke, stated, in a television interview that caused a scandal, "The United States government financed P2 to the tune of 10 million dollars a month". Look how clear it is. P2 and Gladio are one and the same. The charge sheet of 14th June 1986 refers to "the existence in Italy of a secret structure composed of military and civil elements whose final goal is to govern the existing political balance by controlling the democratic evolution of the country and who have used various means to realize this objective, including the use of attacks committed by neo-fascist organizations". It also speaks of "a sort of invisible government in which P2, deviant sectors of the secret services, organized crime and terrorism are tightly bound together".
However this lucid opinion of the judiciary will not change the way the Italian state functions to any great extent. Suspected of complicity in the Bologna bombing, Gelli left the country, was arrested in a Swiss bank on 14th September 1982 while he was drawing out 120 million dollars from a numbered account. On 10th August 1983 the old man carried out an incredible escape from his Genevan prison and disappeared into thin air until four years later when he gave himself up to the Swiss authorities. The Swiss extradited him to Italy. But although in 1988 he'd been condemned in his absence to ten years imprisonment, he was re-tried in 1990 and finally acquitted. The P2 scandal was banalised and forgotten. The P2 Lodge has disappeared but no doubt another secret structure, equally efficient, has replaced it. In 1990 Cossiga, ex-member of P2 and then prime minister, could say with satisfaction of Gladio that, "he's proud that the secret was kept for 45 years". The dozens killed in attacks are forgotten; forgotten too the countless murders. New scandals arrive in the nick of time to make us forget the old ones.
Some lessons
All these events, in which Italian history and crime are fused together, have not had much echo outside the country. It's all been presented as an "Italian business", with no link to what happens in the other big western democracies. In Italy itself, the role of the Mafia has been portrayed as a regional product of the south of Italy; the "strategy of tension" as the work of bent sectors of the secret services, and political scandals as the simple product of the corruption of certain politicians. In short, the real lessons have been glossed over and, with all the scandals, revelations, televised trials and resignations of statesmen, the illusion that the state is fighting against these affronts to democratic order has been kept up. However, this brief history of the "affairs" that have shaken the Italian republic since the 1930s shows something quite different:
- these affairs are not a specifically Italian product, but the result of the international activity of the bourgeoisie, in a context of sharpening imperialist rivalries. In these conditions, this means that Italy, far from being an exception, is an example of what's going on everywhere;
- they are not the expression of a corrupt minority of the ruling class, but of the totalitarian operation of the state in decadent capitalism, even if it hides behind the democratic mask.
Both the history of the rise of the Cosa Nostra and the revelations about the Gladio and P2 networks show that these are international, not just Italian affairs.
This is particularly obvious with the Gladio affair. The Gladio network, by definition, was a secret structure of NATO, and so an international one. It was the secret transmission belt for the USA's control over the countries of its bloc, whose function was to oppose by all available means both the maneuvers of the other bloc and the dangers of social instability. This is why it was secret. In the same way as it existed and acted in Italy, it existed and acted in other countries of the western bloc. There is no reason for it to have been otherwise: from the same causes, the same effects.
With this clarification, we can understand more easily the forces at work behind the colonels' coup d'état in Greece in 1967, Pinochet's in 1973, and all the others that followed in Latin America in the 70s. Similarly, it is not only in Italy that, from the end of the 60s, we have seen a wave of terrorist attacks, allowing the state to wage intense ideological campaigns aimed at disorienting a working class that was returning to the path of struggle, and at justifying the reinforcement of its weapons of repression. In Germany, in France, in Britain, in Japan, in Spain, in Belgium, in the USA, we can in the light of Italian events reckon that, behind the actions of terrorist groups of the far right, the far left, or the nationalist ones, lies the hand of the state and the secret services, and an organized international strategy under the auspices of the bloc.
Again, the edifying example of the role of the Mafia in Italy is not something recent, nor a specifically local product. The integration of the Mafia into the heart of the Italian state is not a new phenomenon: it goes back more than 50 years. It is not the product of a slow gangrene affecting only the most corrupt politicians: it is the result of the overturning of alliances that took place during the Second World War. The Mafia, acting on behalf of the Allies, played a decisive role in the fall of Mussolini's regime and, as payment for these services, gained a central place in the state. The alliance formed during the war didn't end with the war. The Mafia remained, as a clique within the Italian bourgeoisie, the USA's main source of support within the Italian state. The weight and role of the Mafia within the Italian state is thus above all the result of American imperialist strategy.
Is this an unnatural alliance between the US champion of democracy and the symbol of crime, dictated by the imperatives of world strategy? Alliance yes, unnatural no. Italian reality simply highlights a worldwide phenomenon of decadent capitalism: in the name of the sacrosanct imperatives of the state and imperialist interests, the great powers which, in front of the media, trumpet their democratic convictions, are behind the scenes engaged in all kinds of alliances which show that their official discourse is nothing but lies. It's a banality to note that the numerous dictators who reign in the peripheries of capitalism do so thanks to the patronage of one great power or another. The same goes for the various mafia-type clans around the world: their activity can only develop with impunity because they render such important services to the dominant imperialisms who have carved up the planet.
These mafia are very often an integral part of the ruling fractions of the bourgeoisie. This is obvious for a whole series of countries where the production and export of drugs is the essential economic activity, thus facilitating the ascent, within the ruling class, of the gangs which control this increasingly important sector of the capitalist economy. But this reality is not limited to the underdeveloped countries and we can find examples in the upper echelons of world capitalism. Thus, the alliance between the American state and the Italian Mafia during the Second World War extended into the USA itself, where at the same time the American branch of the Cosa Nostra was invited to participate in the affairs of state. The situation in Japan is quite similar to that in Italy and the recent scandals that have broken there show the omnipresent links between the politicians and the local mafia. The Italian example is thus also valid for the two biggest economic powers in the world, where a mafia has conquered a choice place within the state. This is not only due to the latter's economic weight, thanks to its control over extremely lucrative economic sectors - drugs, gambling, prostitution, rackets of all kinds - but also to the 'specialized' services that these cliques of gangsters can provide, services that correspond perfectly to the needs of the state in decadent capitalism.
It is true that the most 'respectable' bourgeoisies have always used the services of special agents when this was necessary, or those of its shadier fractions for 'unofficial' (i.e. illegal, according to its laws) activities. There are plenty of examples in the 19th century: espionage of course, but also the resort to criminal strong-arm elements to break strikes or the use of local mafia in the penetration of the colonies. But at this time this aspect of the life of capitalism was limited and circumstantial. Since it entered its phase of decadence at the beginning of the century, capitalism has been in permanent crisis. In order to ensure its domination, it can no longer rely on the progress it used to bring about. Unable to do that anymore, it can only base its power on lies and manipulation. What's more, during the course of the 20th century, which has been marked by two world wars, the exacerbation of imperialist tensions has become a preponderant factor in the life of capitalism. In the free-for-all that reigns all over the planet, everything is permitted, even the lowest blows. In order to respond to such requirements, the functioning of the state has had to adapt. To the extent that lies and manipulation, whether for the needs of imperialist defense or of social control, have become essential to the survival of the system, secrecy has become a central part of the capitalist state; the kind of classical democratic functioning of the bourgeoisie and its state which we saw in the 19th century are no longer possible. It is only kept up as an illusion aimed at hiding the reality of state totalitarianism, which has nothing democratic about it. The realities of power have been hidden because they are so inadmissible. Not only has power been concentrated in the executive, at the expense of the legislative, whose representative, parliament, has become a screen feeding the campaigns of the media; even within the executive, power has become concentrated in the hands of specialists in secrecy and all kinds of manipulations. In these conditions, not only has the state had to recruit an abundance of specialized manpower, creating a multitude of special services, each one more secret than the next; within the state, the result has been the ascent of those cliques of the bourgeoisie most experienced in secrecy and 'illegal' activity. In this process, the totalitarian state has extended its grip to the whole of society, including the underworld, culminating in a symbiosis in which it has become difficult to distinguish a politician from a businessman, a secret agent or a gangster.
This is the basic reason for the growing role of mafia-type bodies in the life of capital. But the Mafia isn't the only example. The P2 Lodge affair shows that Freemasonry, because of its occult functioning and its international affiliations, is an ideal instrument for use as a network of influence by secret services for the needs of imperialist policy. The different Masonic groupings in the world have been used for a long time by the state and the various western imperialist powers. The same is probably true for all the other important secret societies.
But the P2 Lodge was not only a tool of American imperialist policy. It was first of all part of Italian capital and it shows the reality of state totalitarianism behind all the democratic blather. It regrouped within itself bourgeois clans which have been dominating the state in a hidden manner for years. This does not mean that it regrouped the whole Italian bourgeoisie. The PCI was excluded since it represented another fraction whose foreign orientation was directed towards the east. It is also probable that other cliques exist within the Italian bourgeoisie, which could explain why the scandal broke. Furthermore, within the P2 Lodge several clans cohabited, linked by convergent interests under the American aegis and faced with the common danger of Russian imperialism and 'Communist' subversion. The list found at Gelli's house makes it possible to identify certain of these clans: the big industrialists of the north, the Vatican, a very important sector of the state apparatus, notably the upper echelons of the army and secret services, and, in a more discrete manner, the Mafia. The links between the latter and the P2 Lodge appears with the bankers Sindona and Calvi: the first one died of poisoning in prison, the second was found hanging from a bridge in London. Both of them had been involved in financial scandals when they were managing the funds of the Vatican and the Mafia. Strange alliances perfectly typical of contemporary capitalism. The P2 Lodge is a sulphurous cocktail which shows us that reality often outdoes the most outlandish fiction: occult societies, secret services, the Vatican, political parties, the milieux of business, industry and finance, the Mafia, journalists, trade unionists, academics, etc.
In fact, the exposure of the P2 Lodge revealed the veritable center of hidden decision-making which has presided over the destinies of Italian capitalism since the war. Gelli called himself, with cynical humor, "the grand puppet-master", the one who pulled the strings from behind the scenes, and whose "puppets" were the politicians. The great democratic process of the Italian state was thus no more than a skillful bit of stage-management. The most important decisions were taken elsewhere than in the official structures (national assemblies, ministries, presidency, etc) of the Italian state. This secret structure of power was maintained no matter what the result of the numerous electoral consultations which took place over these years. What's more, the P2 Lodge had all the cards it needed to manipulate the elections and keep the PCI out of power, as in 1948. Virtually all the leaders of the Christian Democratic, Socialist and Republican parties were under its thumb and the democratic game of "alternatives" was just sleight of hand. The reality of power did not change. Behind the scenes, Gelli and his P2 Lodge continued to control the state.
Here again, there is no reason why this should be an Italian specificity, even if elsewhere the occult decision-making center may not take the rather romantic form of a Masonic Lodge. For a number of years, the brutal aggravation of the crisis and the overturning of imperialist alignments resulting from the disappearance of the eastern bloc has provoked a shift in alliances between the various cliques within each national capital. Far from being the expression of a sudden desire to restore a more democratic way of operating, the present campaigns developing in a number of countries, stressing the need to clean out the most rotten apples from the state, are no more than a settling of scores between different cliques vying for control over the state. The manipulation of the media, the use of compromising dossiers is the weapons in this struggle, which can also take bloodier forms.
In fact, all this shows, in hindsight, that Italy, far being an exception with its succession of political scandals, is an edifying example and harbinger of what is now happening everywhere.
JJ
Some references:
On the Mafia: Le Syndicat de Crime by J M Charlier and J Marcilly, Presse de la Cite, Paris 1980. On Gladio and the P2 Lodge: Intelligences secretes, by F Calvi and O Schmidt, Hachette, Paris 1988; Gladio, EPO, Bruxelles 1991; as well as the documentary televised in three parts, Gladio, BBC, 1992. On the strategy of tension in Italy: Il partito del golpe, G Flamini, Ferrara, Boloventa, 1981.
[1] See International Review no 76
[2] P2 means "Propaganda Due" - Propaganda Two
[3] Testimony of Lucky Luciano
The beginning of 1994 has been marked by a major reality: the worldwide explosion of unemployment. The governments of the seven biggest western economic powers organized for the occasion, greatly reinforced by media propaganda, a meeting exclusively devoted to this question, qualified as 'problem number one'. The American president personally presented 'a global plan against unemployment' based on the 'success' of American methods. At the heart of Europe, in the biggest power on the continent, unemployment beat records unknown since the 30s. The German economic minister, Gunter Rexold, recognized: 'The fact that more than 4 million citizens cannot find work is one of the greatest challenges for the state and society since the foundation of the Federal Republic.' A report of the International Labor Organization affirmed that today 30% of workers in the world are unemployed or under-employed. That means 820 million people: 120 million are officially 'registered' unemployed, 700 million are 'under-employed'. What is the significance of this new aggravation of unemployment? Are the methods of the American government an effective remedy against the sickness? What are the perspectives for the class struggle?
An unprecedented situation
The more the dominant ideology, following in the footsteps of the campaigns on the 'collapse of communism', presents capitalism as the only possible form of social organization for modern humanity, the more devastating are the ravages created by the continuation of this system. The plague of unemployment, source of poverty, isolation, despair, which incarnates to the highest degree the absurd and merciless dictatorship of capitalist profit over the conditions of existence of the immense majority of society, is without doubt the most significant of these calamities.
The present increase in unemployment, expressing the new open recession in which capitalism has been now stuck for four years, did not sweep down on a world of 'full employment'. Far from it. It is now more than a quarter of a century, since the recession of 1967, which marked the end of the prosperity of the post-war reconstruction, that the contagion of unemployment has systematically infected the whole planet. The sickness has extended according to the slower rhythm of economic 'growth', with moments of acceleration and periods of relative stagnation. But the periods of relief have never annulled the effects of the preceding aggravation and through various fluctuations the number of unemployed has continued to increase in every country[1]. Since the beginning of the 70s, even the term 'full employment' has disappeared from the vocabulary. The adolescents of the last two decades are known as the 'unemployed generation'.
The explosion of unemployment which marked the beginning of the 90s did not therefore create a new problem. It only worsened an already dramatic situation. And how.
Germany, the biggest economic power in Europe, has suffered a massive increase in unemployment since 1991. In January 1994 the official figure of job seekers passed the 4 million mark. If we add to this figure those unemployed on 'social security' we get 6 million. Its the highest level since the 30s depression. The official rate of unemployment has reached 17% in former East Germany, 8.8% in the West. The perspective for the immediate future is also catastrophic: 'experts' have forecast 450,000 more unemployed from now to the end of the year. Massive redundancies are expected in the most powerful and competitive sectors of the German economy: 51,000 at Daimler-Benz, 30,000 in the chemical industry, 16,000 in aeronautics, 20,000 at Volkswagen...
The expenses of German unification momentarily created a market which allowed Europe to delay a little its entry into the open recession after that of the United States and Great Britain. The decline of the German economy into recession was accompanied by an explosion of unemployment in the whole of Western Europe. So in little more than 3 years the rate of (official) unemployment has gone from 9% to more than 12% in France, from 1.5%% to more than 9% in Sweden, from 6.5% to more than 10% in Holland and Belgium, from 16% to 23.5% in Spain.
According to estimates a minimum growth of 2.5% per year in Europe would be necessary simply to prevent the growth of unemployment. We are far from it. Even the most optimistic don't expect unemployment to diminish in Europe until 1995, or even 1996. For 1994 alone the OECD expects another million unemployed on the old continent.
To this quantitative increase, one must add a rapid qualitative deterioration , marked by the development of 'long-term' unemployment and youth unemployment[2] accompanying the generalized decrease in unemployed benefit both in value and over time.
In Japan, which has suffered the worst recession since the Second World War, unemployment is also increasing. Even if the absolute level is still low by comparison with the other powers, the number of 'official' unemployed has passed from 1.3 to nearly 2 million in three years. These figures however only give a very partial idea of the reality. The Japanese government has followed a policy of keeping the unemployed in the factories, paying them less and reducing work time, rather than putting them in the street. But this policy, accompanying that of 'employment for life' in the great industrial conglomerations, is giving way to the increase in redundancies. Toyota has clearly announced the future by proclaiming the end of its policy of guaranteed employment[3].
Faced with this situation, the government of the United States and, those of Canada and the United Kingdom, claim to have succeeded over two years in creating new employment and stopping the growth of unemployment. It is true that in the 'Anglo-Saxon' powers the official statistics show a reduction in unemployment. But this affirmation hides two major realities:
On the purely quantitative level, the present 'recovery' in employment appears insignificant in relation to that which followed the recession of 1979-82.
Thus, in the manufacturing sector in the United States, the number of employed has, at best, only been broadly maintained for 3 years, while certain sectors have even seen substantial falls. The big industrial enterprises continue to announce massive redundancies: in the month of November 1993 alone Boeing, ATT, NCR, and Philip Morris announced 30,000 job losses for the years to come. In the course of the Reagan recovery of the 80s industrial employment increased by 9%, while today this increase hasn't gone beyond 0.3%. In the tertiary sector the Clinton Administration claims to have increased employment by 3.8%, but this figure was 8% after 1982. The budget presented by Clinton for 1995 is one of the most rigorous for years: 'we must distinguish between luxury and necessity'. It anticipates the elimination of 118,000 jobs in the public administrations, a stage toward the 250,000 announced for the five years to come.
As far as the United Kingdom and Canada are concerned, the recovery of employment is limited for the moment to marginal, insignificant changes.
The facts are simple: there are today in all these three countries 4 million more unemployed than there were three years ago.[4]
As for the quality of employment, the reality of the United States illustrates the scale of the economic disaster. Workers are more and more reduced to a situation of permanent instability and insecurity. You are unemployed for six months, then work for three. The famous 'mobility' of employment actually means a sort of sharing of employment. You are unemployed for less time than in Europe but more often. According to a recent poll among the people in work in the United States, 40% are afraid of losing their job in the coming year. The jobs created are, in the main, in the tertiary sector. A great part of them are in 'services' such as parking cars for the big restaurants, walking dogs, minding children, packing shopping at supermarket check-outs, etc. The unemployed have been transformed into (very) cheap servants...30 million people, 25% of the active American population, are outside the normal circuit of employment, that is, live directly under the pressure of unemployment.
Whatever the forms of the sickness, whether in the United States or in Europe, in the industrialized countries or in the under-developed countries, unemployment has become effectively 'problem number one' of our epoch.
What does this reality mean?
The significance of the massive and chronic development of unemployment.
For the working class the negative significance of unemployment is an everyday reality. The proletarian who cannot find work is expelled from the process of production: the basis of social relations. For some time, when he is able to receive benefit, he has the impression of being a 'parasite' on society, then isolation, total poverty. For those who work still more abuse from the dominant class: 'if you are not happy, there are thousands of unemployed who are ready to take your place'. For the proletariat unemployment, whether a threat or a reality, is one of the most effective forms of repression, one of the worst aggravations of what makes the capitalist machine an instrument of exploitation and oppression.
The negative significance of unemployment may appear however less evident for the capitalist class. On the one hand the latter suffers from the classic blindness of exploiting classes, incapable of really perceiving the social damage of their domination; on the other hand it needs to believe and make believe that the irresistible growth of unemployment for more than a quarter of a century is not a sickness belonging to the historic senility of its system, but a 'natural' phenomenon, a sort of fatality due to technical progress and to the necessary adaptation of the system. "We have to live with it friends, yesterday's jobs are not coming back", declared the US Secretary of Labor Robert Reich during the G7 meeting on unemployment.
In fact, the propaganda on the "new recovery" is trying to theorize a situation that is developing in several countries (United States, Great Britain, Canada), where production has begun to grow without producing any significant fall in unemployment.
But there is nothing either "natural" or "healthy" in the massive development of unemployment. Even from the viewpoint of the health of capitalism itself, chronic mass unemployment is an unequivocal sign of senility.
For the capitalist class, unemployment is a reality which, at least to begin with, increases its power over the exploited by providing a blackmail weapon which forces down wages. This is one reason why the ruling class always needs a reserve of unemployed as part of the labor force.
But this is only one aspect. From the standpoint of capital, once unemployment rises above a certain minimum, it becomes a negative, destructive factor for capital, and the sign of a sickness. Capital feeds on proletarian flesh. Profit is made from living labor. Profit comes neither from raw materials, nor from machines, but from the "surplus value" of the exploited. When capital makes part of the labor force redundant, it deprives itself of a part of the true source of its own accumulation. If it does so, then, it is not for pleasure but because market forces and the demands of profitability oblige it.
The chronic slide into mass unemployment gives an expression in real life to two fundamental contradictions pointed out by Marx, which condemn capitalism historically:
- capitalism's inability to create through its own mechanisms an adequate solvent market to absorb all that it produces;
- the need to "replace men with machines" to maintain competitivity, which leads to a permanent tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
Today's explosion in unemployment, added to the mass of unemployed that has built up since 1967, has nothing to do with a "healthy restructuring" due to "progress". On the contrary, it is the practical proof of the definitive impotence of the capitalist system.
Capitalist "solutions"
The G7 meeting devoted to the problem of unemployment was a media manipulation typical of the way that the ruling class governs. The operation's media message could be summed up as: "If you are wondering if you're going to lose your job, or find another one; if you're worried about your children growing up unemployed; then you should know that the governments of the West's seven greatest economic powers are concerned about it, and are taking care of the situation".
Of course, no concrete decisions came out of this, apart from a request to the OECD to keep better count of the unemployed, and a promise to hold a new meeting of the G7 in Naples, in July, to talk about the problem again.
Clinton's "world plan against unemployment" is in fact nothing but an assertion on the part of the Americans of their firm intention to intensify the aggressivity of their commercial war against the rest of the world. When Clinton asks Japanese capital to open its domestic markets, or demands that the Europeans lower their interest rates to relaunch production (and so their imports from the US), he merely confirmed the warning delivered by his trade representative Micky Kantor: "Nobody should have any doubt about our commitment to go forward, to open markets, and to develop trade, just as we have done since President Clinton took office".
The spectacle offered by the G7 has at least demonstrated that the different national capitals are indeed incapable of finding a worldwide solution to unemployment. The only thing they know how to and can do is to exacerbate the trade war of each against all.
The grand principles asserted at the meeting are nothing other than the demands of competitivity for each national capital. And from this point of view, American capital could certainly propose its recent economic policy as a model. It has certainly put into practice all the recipes designed to improve the profitability of an ailing economy and arm it against the competition:
Lay off "excess" labor
"If we are honest with ourselves, restoring industrial competitivity is inimical to employment". These were the words of a highly placed official of the European Union at the G7 summit, one of the authors of the White Book presented by Delors. We have seen how US capital has put this into practice by improving "labor mobility".
Improve the profitability and productivity of labor
To achieve this, the Clinton administration has simply applied the good old capitalist method: pay the exploited less, while making them work harder. Clinton has put it in these, very concrete terms: "A longer working week than 20 years ago, for the same salary". And this is really happening: US manufacturing industry's working week is indeed longer today than it was 20 years ago. As for wages, during his electoral campaign Clinton promised to revise the minimum wage, and even to index-link it to inflation. Nothing has come of it. And since the minimum has been effectively frozen since the beginning of the 1980s, in reality the minimum wage has been steadily falling during the last 10 years. As for the so-called "social protection", in other words that part of the wage which capital pays in the form of certain services and state benefits, the Democrat administration has presented its famous Health Reform plan as a progress. In reality, there will be no extra spending by American capital in favor of the exploited, merely an attempt to rationalize an absurd and anarchic reality, which has led to medical expenses per employee being amongst the highest in the world.
Intensify the exploitation of labor power by modernizing the productive apparatus
Industrial investment has increased markedly during the last two years in the United States (+15% in 1993, with a similar rate forecast for 1994). These investments, though considerable in some sectors, are not accompanied by any significant increase in employment. For example, AT&T is preparing to invest colossal sums to develop "communication highways", which has been put forward as the investment program of the decade, and yet at the same time has announced 14,000 redundancies.
American methods are in fact nothing other than the good old recipes for capitalist economic warfare against both the exploited and its competitors. The policies of other national capitals are not fundamentally different. The governments of old Europe, which claim to have an exemplary system of social protection, have for years been systematically reducing "social spending". "Some measures, such as the Social Chapter [an annex to the Maastricht Treaty] need to be relegated to the museum where they belong" declared recently Kenneth Clarke, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. The same attitude and the same practice have been developed by all governments, though they are not always presented in so provocative a manner.
At best, these policies make it possible to unload the effects of the crisis onto competing capitals[5]. In no way can they provide a general solution.
The growth in the profitability and productivity of labor may favor one capital at others' expense, for a time. But from the global point of view, once this increase in productivity has been generalized, it merely poses the problem of the inability of the market to absorb surplus production still more sharply. Reducing the wages and number of employees means reducing the available outlets. More productivity means that extra markets need to be fund.
Each national capital can only combat the problem at the local level by making it worse at the global level.
Finally, last but not least, the recovery in US investment has been financed, once again, by credit. The net national debt alone has risen from 30% to 39% of GDP. A similar movement has appeared in other countries to confront the recession. This can only aggravate the already fragile and explosive situation of world finance, which has been undermined by two decades of debt and speculation.
To encourage the use of credit, the US government has for three years imposed extremely low rates of short-term interest. The increase in these rates is both inevitable and dangerous for world financial stability. The low cost of short-term money has made possible the accumulation of enormous amounts of speculative capital. Wall Street in particular has been inundated with it[6]. The rise in the cost of credit runs the risk of causing a financial crash which would bring to nothing all the efforts at holding back the rise in unemployment.
The "solutions" that governments offer today to confront the problem of unemployment, apart from the fact that they represent direct attacks on the living conditions of the exploited, are build on the quicksands of colossal debt and unlimited speculation.
What perspectives for the class struggle?
Even if capitalism were to collapse completely, it would not disappear for all that. Without the revolutionary action of the proletariat, capitalism will continue to rot on its feet, dragging humanity down into endless barbarism.
What part will unemployment play in the course of the class struggle?
For the working class, the generalization of unemployment is worse than having police stationed in every home and workplace. It makes the struggle more difficult, because of the ignoble blackmail that it allows the ruling class exercise on the workers.
However, once it reaches a certain point the revolt against this repression itself becomes a powerful stimulant to the class struggle and its generalization. What percentage of unemployed is necessary for this to happen? The question cannot be answered, because it is not a matter of a mechanical relationship between the economy and the class struggle, but of a complex global process where the consciousness of the proletarians has a prime role to play.
Nonetheless, we know that the situation is totally different from the Great Depression during the 1930s.
From the economic viewpoint, the 1930s crisis was resolved by the development of the war economy and the application of Keynesian policies (in Germany on the eve of war, unemployment had almost entirely "disappeared"); today, the effectiveness of the war economy and Keynesianism lies behind us. They have been used to the hilt to bring us to the present situation, leaving a financial time-bomb ready to explode.
From the political viewpoint, the situation of the world proletariat today has nothing to do with that of the 1930s. Sixty years ago, the working class was weighed down by the bloody and dramatic defeats it had suffered during the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, especially in Germany and Russia. Ideologically and physically beaten, the proletariat let itself be atomized and enrolled under the banners of its national bourgeoisie, to march into a second world massacre.
Today's generations of proletarians have not suffered any heavy defeats. Starting with the struggles of 1968 - the first response to the beginning of the economic crisis - they have, with ups and downs, with advances and retreats in combativity, opened and maintained a new historic course.
The governments are right to tremble before what the experts call the "social unrest" which may result from the increase in unemployment.
They are still able to use those aspects of unemployment which make the proletarian struggle more difficult: its repressive, divisive, atomizing aspects, the fact that it is pushing more and more fractions of the revolutionary class - and especially the youth, who find it increasingly difficult to "enter active life" - into a decomposed and destructive marginalization.
But because it attacks the living conditions of the working class so violently, because it is universal and strikes without distinction in every sector and every country, unemployment demonstrates that for the exploited class the solution lies not in improved management, in reforming or restructuring capitalism, but in the destruction of the system itself.
The explosion of unemployment reveals the full extent of capitalism's failure, and the historic responsibility of the world working class.
RV
[1] In 1979, after the ‘recovery' which followed the recession of 1974-75 (known as the "First Oil Crisis"), there will still 2 million more unemployed than in 1973 in the United States, 750,000 more in West Germany. Between 1973 and 1990, on the eve of the present recession, the ‘official' number of unemployed in the OECD countries (the 24 industrialized Western countries, including Australia, New Zealand and Japan) increased by 20 million, from 11 to 31 million. And these are only the richest countries. In the "Third World" or the old "Socialist bloc" the extent of the disaster is incomparably worse. Many under-developed countries have never recovered from the recession of 1981-82, and have fallen without a break into the pit of poverty and under-employment.
[2] At the beginning of 1994, 50% of the unemployed in Europe had been without a job for more than a year. The "experts" predict that by the end of 1994, 25% of unemployed will be under 20 (International Herald Tribune, 14th March 1994).
[3] Japan has to confront a sharp drop in exports, which are the main motive force behind its growth. The effects are being felt throughout the economy, but they are especially significant in the consumer electronics sector where Japan is traditionally very strong. This sector's exports fell by almost 25% in 1993, and are now only 50% of their 1985 level. In 1993, Japan for the first time imported more color TVs than it exported. The paradox is that most of these imports came from Japanese subsidiaries set up in other South-East Asia countries to take advantage of lower labor costs. The exceptional economic "boom" of certain Asiatic economies springs in reality from the economic crisis, which forces the capitals of the major powers, subjected to the most merciless trade wars, to "delocalize" some of their production to countries where labor is cheap (and more disciplined) in order to lower their costs.
[4] 2.3 million more in the USA, 1.2 million in the UK, 600,000 in Canada.
[5] For example, the recent American "recovery" was achieved in part at the direct expense of Japanese capital, which lost market share to the US in some sectors.
[6] This is the case with so-called "derivative" stocks, which are based not on economic criteria linked to the health of the companies they are supposed to represent, but on mathematical equations built on purely speculative mechanisms (it is a sign of the times that a large part of recent US computer investments have been designed to modernize and increase the capacity of companies which speculate with these ultra-modern systems). These stocks represent a colossal sum of money: Salomon brothers holds $600 billion, the Chemical Bank $2,500 billion. These two alone come to $3,100 billion, which is the equivalent of the combined GDP of Germany, France and Denmark!
In France, both CP and SP leaders waved the fascist menace, after long years in power when they used the far right Le Pen as bogeyman. To complete the tableau of the resurgence of the “fascist menace”, a dozen Waffen SS veterans visiting the Normandy beaches was held up as an example of the rising tide of “enemies of democracy”.
The 50 million dead in World War II are invoked as the victims of “Nazi barbarism” alone, from CNN to the most insignificant local paper. In most European countries, the slightest actions of a few hooligans are blown up out of all proportion. Right on time, Hollywood turns out a film on the massacre of the Jews in Europe, and exalts the idealism of the brave GIs who died in their thousands on the Normandy beaches in the name of “freedom”.
These militarist festivities carefully avoid mentioning the crimes of the “victorious democracies”, which are certainly enough [1] [285] to put the democratic leaders in the same company as Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. But even this is a concession to the false personification of “war crimes”. The dictators are only subordinates. It is the bourgeoisie as a social class which is the principal war criminal. When the sinister Goebbels declared that a lie repeated often enough becomes a truth, his cynical opposite number Churchill could assert that “In times of war truth is so precious that it should always be safeguarded by a rampart of lies” [2] [286].
Most of those enrolled in the two opposing camps hardly went to war enthusiastically, being still traumatised by the deaths of their fathers’ generation 25 years previously. The massive exodus in France, the terror of the Nazi state exercised over the German population, the massive deportations of state capitalist Stalinism: none of this is revealed in the complacent news reports of the time which are being rehashed for us today. All the “objective” but nonetheless abject documentaries and articles are dominated by one name: Hitler! uring the Middle Ages, the Plague was seen as the scourge of God. In the midst of decadent capitalism the bourgeoisie has found an equivalent for Holy Democracy: the Brown Plague. Successive ruling classes throughout history have invoked a higher evil in order to fabricate a commonalty of interest between the oppressed and their exploiters. The personification of events around the dictators, or Allied generals, is very useful to cover the fact that they were nothing but the spokesmen for their respective bourgeoisies. The magic of names is used to make the classes disappear at the moment of war: in a new crusade against evil, everyone is bound to join in unity.
1933, the year of Hitler’s accession to power, is a key date, as the revolutionaries of the Bilan group showed, not because it marked the “defeat of the democracies”, but because it meant the decisive victory of the counter-revolution, above all in the country were the proletariat was traditionally the strongest component in the workers’ movement. Hitler’s arrival in power cannot be explained solely by the humiliating treaty of Versailles in 1918, whose demand for “reparations” drove Germany to its knees. It was due above all by the proletariat’s disappearance from the social scene, as a threat to the bourgeoisie.
In Russia, the state was beginning to massacre Bolsheviks and revolutionary workers on a grand scale, with the silent approval of the Western democracies which has done so much to arm the White armies. In the Germany, the Weimar Republic’s social-democratic régime had quite naturally given way to Hitler’s Nazis after their victory in the republican elections. The “socialist” leaders who had massacred the revolutionary German workers - Scheidemann, Noske and Co - democratically gave up their ministries. They were never troubled during the next five years of the Nazi régime.
The struggles in France and Spain during the 1930s were only the fag-ends of strikes compared with the size of the defeat suffered by the working class internationally. Fascism’s electoral victory in Italy and Germany was not the cause, but the product of the proletariat’s defeat on its social terrain. In secreting fascism, the bourgeoisie invented, not a new kind of régime, but a state capitalism along the same lines as the Roosevelt New Deal or Stalinist capitalism. In time of war, the bourgeoisie’s factions naturally unite at the national level, since they have eliminated the proletarian threat worldwide, and this unification may take the form of the Nazi or Stalinist parties.
The “rising danger” was organised in complicity with Stalin and the Russian bourgeoisie by the Communist Party vassals of the new Russian imperialism, under the cover of the Popular Front ideology, which kept the workers disoriented behind the programmes of national unity and the preparation for the imperialist war.
The French CP hoisted the patriotic tricolour in 1935, with the signature of the Laval-Stalin Pact, committing the workers to get themselves massacred: “If Hitler, despite everything, starts a war, he should know that he will have to face the united people of France, with the Communists in the front rank, to defend the country’s security, and the liberty and independence of the people”. It was the CP in Spain that broke the last strikes, and shot down the workers with the help of the GPU, before Franco came to finish off their dirty work. The Stalinist leaders then took refuge in France and Russia, as De Gaulle and Thorez were to do when they fled to London and Moscow respectively.
From 1918 to 1935, war had continued all over the planet, but these were limited wars far from Europe, or wars of “pacification”, such as those conducted by French imperialism in Syria, Morocco, and Indochina. For the revolutionaries of the Bilan group, the first serious warning came with the war in Abyssinia, involving British imperialism and Mussolini’s army. It served the interests of some of the Western allies to identify fascism and war. The blame for the next World War could thus be laid largely at fascism’s door. The fascist scarecrow was given greater credit with the victory of Franco’s army in 1939. Allied propaganda could prove its case by pointing to the hundreds of thousands of victims of Francoism. A period of status quo followed, in the name of a search for “peace”, while Germany carried out the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, then the Anschluss with Austria in 1938. The Munich Conference of 30th September 1938 was followed in October by Germany’s seizure of the Czech Sudetenland. The Czech’s had not even been invited to attend at Munich, and when the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia itself in March 1939, neither France nor Britain lifed a finger. Daladier and Chamberlain, on their return from Munich, were greeted enthusiastically by the crowds who believed that “peace” had been saved, but in fact both sides were playing for time. Official historians have since been content to explain events by the inadequate rearmament of the French and British states. In fact, the war-time alliances had not been finally settled: the German bourgeoisie still cherished the hope of an alliance with France and Britain against Russia. The German people were every bit as deceived as the French and British:
“(...) The Germans acclaimed Chamberlain wildly, seeing him as the man who would save them from war. More people cane to greet him than had come to greet Mussolini (...) Munich was festooned with Union Jacks, the crowds ecstatic. WHen Chamberlain returned to Heston aerodrome he was welcomed like the Messiah. In Paris, a public subscription was proposed to offer a gift to the British Prime Minister” [3] [287].
In 1937, the Japanese began their final invasion of China, seizing Peking and threatening US hegemony in the Pacific. On 24th August 1939, the Russo-German pact burst like a thunder-clap, leaving Hitler’s hands free to begin his assault on Western Europe. In the meantime, the German army invaded Poland on 1st September, joined by the Russians. Unwillingly, the French and British governments declared war on Germany two days later. The Italian army grabbed Albania. Without any formal declaration of war, Stalin’s army invaded Finland on 30th November. In the April of 1940, the Germans landed in Norway.
The French army began its offensive in the Saar, but was halted at the cost of a thousand men on either side. Stalin gave the lie to his supporters, who had pretended that the Russo-German treaty was a pact with the devil to prevent Hitler from attacking Wester Europe, by declaring:
“It is not Germany that has attacked France and Britain, but France and Britain that have attacked Germany (...) After the commencement of hostilities, German made peace proposals to France and Britain, and the Soviet Union openly supported Germany’s proposals. The leading circles of France and Britain brutally rebuffed both Germany’s peace proposals and the Soviet Union’s efforts to bring the war speedily to an end”.
Nobody wanted to take responsibility for starting the war, before the proletariat. After the war, indeed, governments no longer appointed “Ministers of War”, only “Ministers of Defence”. It is likewise striking to see the Nazi state’s desire to appear as the aggressed party in Germany itself. Albert Speer notes in his Memoirs this private declaration by Hitler: “We will not make the same mistake as in 1914. We now have to lay the blame on our enemy”. On the eve of the war with Japan, Roosevelt repeated the same thing: “The democracies must never appear as the aggressor”. The nine months of inactivity, known as the “phoney war”, confirm this hesitation of all the belligerants. The historian Pierre Miquel notes that Hitler put off the attack on the West no less than 14 times due to the German army’s lack of preparation and poor weather conditions.
On 22nd June 1941, Germany turned on the USSR, taking completely by surprise that “brilliant strategist” Stalin. On 8th December, after letting the Japanese massacre its own soldiers at Pearl Harbour (the attack was known well in advance by the secret service), the United States could pose as the “victims” of Japanese aggression and declare war on Japan. Germany and Italy finally declared war on the US on 11th December 1941.
This brief survey of the diplomatic road to world war, in a situation where the world proletariat had been reduced to silence, prompts a few remarks. Two local wars (Abyssinia and Spain) had finally stamped the fascists as war-mongers, after years of media excitement in Europe, denouncing Hitler’s and Mussolini’s demands, as well as their military parades: the latter were certainly better organised than the French 14th July, or the American or British nationalist festivities, but no less absurd. Two more local wars at the heart of Europe (Czechoslovakia and Poland) led to the rapid defeat of the “democratic” countries concerned. The “shameful” failure to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia (and Spain) made the “defence of democracy” and bourgeois freedom inevitable after Poland’s invasion by the two “totalitarian” powers. Politico-diplomatic manoeuvres can drag on for years. Armed conflict can settle matters on the ground in a few hours, at the price of a terrible slaughter. The war did not really become a World War until a year after Germany’s conquest of Europe. For more than four years, the US did not attempt any decisive operations against the invaders, leaving the German army to play the gendarme in Europe. The United States, far away from Europe, were initially more concerned by the Japanese threat in the Pacific. The World War lasted longer than the local wars had done, and this cannot be explained solely by the power of the German army or the ups and downs of imperialist diplomacy. It is well-known, for example, that a part of the American bourgeoisie would have preferred to ally itself with Germany rather than with Stalin’s “communist” régime, just as the German bourgeoisie had tried in vain to make an alliance with France and Britain against the “Reds”. Hitler’s government made peace overtures to Britain in 1940, in 1941 just before the beginning of the Operation Barbarossa onslaught on Russia, and after the defeat of Mussolini’s North African army. The British were all the more hesitant, in that they were tempted to leave the two great totalitarian powers destroy each other. But it would be wrong to rest here, and to argue as if the principal opposing class for every bourgeoisie, the proletariat, had simply disappeared from the concerns of the imperialist leaders thanks to the “unifying” - and “simplifying” - war!
Moreover, marxists cannot reason on war in itself, independently of historical periods. For youthful 19th century capitalism, war was essential in opening the possibility of further development, opening new markets at the point of the bayonet. This was shown in 1945 by the French Communist Left (GCF), one of the rare groups to have held high the standard of proletarian internationalism throughout World War II: “... in its decadent phase, capitalism has historically exhausted all possibilities of development, and finds in modern imperialist war the expression of this decadence which without opening the possibility of any further development of production, engulfs in the abyss the productive forces and heaps ruin on ruin, faster and faster (...) The more the market contracts, the more bitter becomes the struggle to possess sources of raw materials and to dominate the world market. The economic struggle between economic groups is increasingly concentrated, to its most complete form in the struggles between states. The exasperated economic struggle between states can only be resolved, in the end, by armed force. War becomes the only means for each national imperialism to try to extricate itself from its difficulties, at the expense of rival imperialist states” [4] [288].
Bourgeois historians tend to gloss over the rapid defeat of the once great French power. The German army’s attack was not delayed solely by the weather. The German state apparatus did not make a mistake in choosing Hitler, nor was it composed of imbeciles only able to march the goose-step. The main reason was once again the play of secret diplomatic consultations. Alliances can be overturned, even in the middle of war. Moreover, ever since the mutinies of German soldiers in 1918, the German bourgeoisie had taken care to see that their troops did not go hungry... The German bourgeoisie of 1938 was the heir of the Weimar Republic, which had bloodily crushed the attempt at proletarian revolution in 1919; the SS battallions were based on the old Frei Korps which a socialist government had used to crush the workers in revolt. Neither the eruption of the Paris Commune in 1870, nor the 1917 October Revolution, nor the Spartakist insurrection of 1919 had been forgotten. Even politically in defeat, the working class remained a danger in the face of a long imperialist war.
German imperialism’s rapid victory in Czechoslovakia was the result of a war of nerves, bluff, and careful manoeuvring, and above all of speculation on other governments’ fear of the consequences of a war generalised too quickly, and without the definite adherence of the proletariat. Whereas the French generals had stuck to the old conceptions of a “war of position” developed during the 1914-18 conflict, the German general staff had modernised its strategy in favour of the Blitzkrieg (“lightning war”). According to this conception (much in vogue today, as we can see from the Gulf War), a slow advance without a ferocious strike was doomed to defeat. Worse still, since the population’s readiness for war was fragile, letting the war drag on and giving the combattants the possibility to address each other from the trenches led to the risk of mutinies and social explosions. In the 20th century, the working class has inevitably become the first battalion against imperialist war. Hitler himself at one point confided to Albert Speer: “industry is a favorable factor in the development of communism”. As he also told Speer - who became his Minister for Munitions during the war - following the introduction in 1943 of the forced labour system in France, strikes and revolts which hold back production are a risk to be run in time of war. The German bourgeoisie had inherited its reflexes from Bismarck, whose invasion of France had been blocked by the Parisian workers’ insurrection against their own bourgeoisie. He had been concerned then at the risk of contagion amongst the German workers and soldiers, as in fact happened nearly 50 years later when the German proletariat reacted to the war on revolutionary Russia by an insurrection against their own ruling class.
And yet, after the sudden halt of their first offensive, the Germans conducted a “war of boredom” for almost a year. Germany wanted above all to open up Lebensraum (“living space”) in the East, and would still have preferred to ally itself with the two Western democracies rather than waste its military potential by invading them. Germany supported Laval and Doriot, one-time pacifists claiming to be socialists, and who wanted to help the German war effort. These pro-fascist tendencies, who called for a Franco-German alliance, remained a minority. The bourgeoisie as a whole had no confidence in the proletariat’s readiness to mobilise for war. The French working class had not been defeated head-on, with bayonets and flame-throwers, as it had in Germany in 1919 and 1923.
The German bourgeoisie therefore advanced cautiously in a country which it knew to be fragile, not so much militarily as socially. In fact, they needed only watch the slow decomposition of the French bourgeoisie, with its cowardly generals on the one side and the pacifists, soon to become collaborators on the other, the latter keeping the workers in impotence.
The Popular Front had helped in the effort of rearmament (while disarming the workers politically), but had not completely succeeded in achieving national unity. Certainly, the police had broken many strikes, and interned hundreds of militants, who were not themselves very clear as to how to oppose the war. The left of the French bourgeoisie had calmed the workers with all the claptrap of the Popular Front and the congés payés (paid holidays), during which the workers were mobilised. The extreme left pacifist fractions completed the task of undermining any class alternative. The anarchists, who were still very influential in the unions, finished off the Stalinists’ work of sabotage, publishing the 1939 leaflet “Peace Now” in September 1939, signed by a gaggle of intellectuals “(...) No flowers in the gun-barrels, no heroic songs, no cheers as the troops depart. And we are told that it is like this in all the belligerant countries. The war stands condemned from day one, by the majority of its participants both on the front, and in the rear. Let us then make peace quickly”.
“Peace” cannot be an alternative to war in decadent capitalism. Such resolutions onyl encouraged the “every man for himself”, individual solutions and the flight abroad for those who could afford it. The proletarians’ disarray was increased, their alarm and their impotence concentrated on the general rout of the left parties and groups which had claimed to defend their interests, and left them trapped in anti-fascist “common sense”.
The disintegration of French society was such that the “drôle de guerre” (“phoney war”) on one side, the “komischer Krieg” on the other, was only an interlude allowing the German army, after a bloody bombardment of Rotterdam (40,000 dead) to push through the fragile French Maginot Line on 10th May 1940, almost without resistance. The French officers were the first to flee, leaving their troops flat. The populations of Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the north of France including Paris and the French government, fled in a mass, uncontrolled and panic-stricken dash towards the centre and south of France. This was one of the most gigantic exodus of modern times. This lack of “resistance” by the population was to become a subject for reproach by the ideologues of the maquis (many of home, like Mitterand and the Belgian and Italian “socialists”, only turned their coats in 1942), and was used after the war to blackmail the working class into sacrificing itself for the reconstruction.
The Blitzkrieg nonetheless caused 90,000 deaths and 120,000 wounded on the French side, 27,000 dead on the German. The collapse left ten million people refugees in terrible conditions. One and a half million POWs were sent back to Germany. And this was nothing compared to the 50 million dead in the slaughter to come.
In Europe, the population suffered the worst civilian casualties humanity had ever seen in war-time. Never had so many women and children joined soldiers among the dead. For the first time in history, the civilian casualties were greater than the military.
With its “Bismarckian” reflexes, the German bourgeoisie took care to divide France in two: an occupied zone, the north with the capital, to guard the coast against the British; and a free zone, the south, given legitimacy by the puppet government of General Pétain, the “hero of Verdun”, and the ex-socialist Laval. This collaborationist state took the load off the Nazi war effort for a while, until the Allied advance led German imperialism to boot it out.
The constant fear of a workers’ uprising against the war, weakened as they were, appears even amongst the right. A collaborationist paper, L’Oeuvre, speaks crudely of the occupying forces’ need for trades unions - the so-called social victory of the Popular Front - and in similar terms to those of any Left Wing or Trotskyist party: “The occupiers have the greatest concern not to antagonise the working class, not to lose contact, and to integrate them into a well-organised social movement (...) The Germans hope that all workers will be integrated into corporatism, and for this it seems that cadres will be necessary who have the real confidence of the workers (...) They need men who have authority, and whom others will follow” [5] [289].
From 1941 onwards, some in the collaborationist French government began to worry about the termporary nature of the Occupation, and the guarantee of social order that came with it. The Pétainist bourgeoisie and De Gaulle’s exiled Free French kept up discreet contacts, their main concern being to maintain social and political order in the transition from one epoch to another. The ideology of the - very weak - Resistance movement, propagated by the liberal fraction exiled in Britain and by the Stalinists of the PCF in France, at first had great difficulty in attracting the workers into a National Union for the country’s “Liberation”. In 1943 the German bourgeoisie helped reinforce the ranks of the “terrorists” despite itself, by instituting “the relief” - one worker forced to labour in Germany in exchange for each POW allowed to return to France. But fundamentally, it was the left and far-left parties who succeeded in drawing the workers into the Resistance on the basis of the “victory of Stalingrad”.
Changes of imperialist alliance and the proletariat’s possible reaction are lines of orientation for the bourgeoisie in the midst of war. Formally, the turning-point in the war came in 1942, with the halt to Japanese expansion and the battle of El Alamein, which freed the oil fields. In the same year, began the battle of Stalingrad, where the Stalinist state gained a victory thanks to the help of US military supplies (tanks and weapons that were more sophisticated than Russia itself could produce to confront the modern German army). During secret negotiations, Stalin had used his promise to declare war on Japan as a bargaining counter. The war could then have been brought to a rapid conclusion, especially since a part of the German bourgeoisie was keen to get rid of Hitler, and made an attempt to assassinate him in 1944. The Allies left the plotters isolated, to be wiped out by the Nazi state (Admiral Canaris’ Valkyrie plan).
But this did not take account of the Italian proletariat. It was necessary to prolong the war for two years in order to massacre the proletariat’s best forces, and avoid as hasty a peace as in 1918, concluded with the revolution at its heels.
Following the eruption of the Italian proletariat, 1943 was a turning-point in the war. At a world level, the bourgeoisie used the isolation and defeat of the Italian workers to develop the strategy of the Resistance in the occupied countries, in order to gain the populations’ support for the future capitalist peace. Up till then, most of the Resistance groups had been made up essentially of tiny minorities of nationalist petty-bourgeois, using terrorist methods. The Anglo-American bourgeoisie was to glorify the Resistance ideology more pragmatically after the victory at Stalingrad and the pro-Western turn of the CPs. The workers did not see much difference between exploitation by a German or a French boss. They had shown no desire to die in the name of Anglo-French imperialism to support Poland, they had made no effort to involve themselves in a war which seemed to have nothing to do with their interests. To mobilise them with a view to defending “democracy”, they had to be given a perspective which seemed valid from the class point of view. Stalingrad as the war’s turning-point, and the possibility of putting an end to the demands of the occupying army, of regaining “freedom”, even with “their own” police, raised the workers’ hopes, along with the “liberating communism” represented by Stalin. Without this lie (and the further oppression of “the relief”), the workers would have remained hostile to the armed Resistance bands, whose exactions increased the violence of Nazi terror. Without the support on the ground of the Stalinists and Trotskyists, the bourgeoisie in London and Washington would have had no hoping of bringing the workers into the war. Contrary to 1914, it is was not a question of lining the workers up in ranks to send them to the slaughter, but of gaining their adherence on the civilian terrain, in the Resistance network, behind the cult of the glorious victory of Stalingrad!
In fact, in both Italy and France many workers joined the maquis encouraged by the illusion of returning to the class struggle, and the Stalinists and Trotskyists even offered them the fraudulent comparison with the Paris Commune (weren’t the workers rising against their own bourgeoisie led by the new Thiers - Pétain - while the Germans occupied France, as before?). In the midst of a population terrorised and impotent since the outbreak of war, many workers enrolled in the Resistance bands went to their deaths under the impression that they were fighting for the “socialist liberation” of France or Italy, in other words in a new “civil war against their own bourgeoisie”; just as in 1914, the German and French workers had been sent to the front under the pretence that Germany and France “exported” socialism. The Stalinist and Trotskyist resistance groups concentrated their blackmail on the workers to put them “in the front line of the struggle for the independence of peoples”, in a key sector for the paralysis of the economy: the railways.
At the same time, and unknown to the workers, the domination of pro-Allied right-wing factions in the Resistance, for the restoration of the old capitalist order after the peace, was the object of a bitter struggle. Teams of American secret agents from AMGOT (Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territories) were sent to France and Italy (this was the origin of the P2 Lodge and the US and Italian bourgeoisie’s complicity with the Mafia), to ensure that the Stalinists did not grab enough power to attach themselves to Russian imperialism. From start to finish, the Stalinists new the limits of the role assigned to them, especially where they were most skilled: sabotaging the workers’ struggles, disarming the more utopian Resistance groups, and beating down those workers who protested at the demands of reconstruction. Immediately after the “Liberation” - and as a proof of the complicity of all bourgeoisies against the proletariat - the Western ruling class - while condemning, for form’s sake, a few “war criminals” - recruited a number of ex-Nazi and Stalinist torturers as useful secret agents in most of the European capitals. These new recruits’ first task was of course to counter their opposite numbers on the Russian side, but above all to struggle “against communism”, in other words against the natural goal of any generalised autonomous struggle by the workers themselves, which was inevitably a threat after the horror of war and the shortages that followed it.
We will leave the bourgeois to debate amongst themselves the exact number of dead in each country [6] [290], but there is no doubt that the Russians suffered most: 20 million dead on the European front. These were conspicuous by their absence from the festivities marking the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landings. Today’s Russian historians continue to accuse the United States of delaying the landings in order to bleed the USSR further, with a view to the Cold War to come: “The landings came when Germany’s fate was already sealed by the Soviet counter-offensive on the Eastern front” [7] [291].
At the end of the fat years of reconstruction, the bourgeois liberals with their high priest Solzhenitsyn began to wax indignant over the millions dead in Stalin’s gulags, pretending to forget that the real crowning of the counter-revolution came with the utter complicity of the West... in the war. We know how merciless is the bourgeoisie after a proletarian defeat (tens of thousands of Communards, their wives and children, were slaughtered and deported after the defeat in 1871). The way that World War II was conducted allowed it to increase tenfold the massacre of the class which had so frightened it in 1917. The Russians bore the weight of 4 years of war in Europe alone. It was only at the beginning of 1945 that the Americans set foot in Germany, reducing the numbers of their own dead and preserving their social peace. The millions of Russian victims showed a tragic heroism indeed, since without American military assistance the backward Stalinist régime would have been defeated by an industrialised Germany.
After such a blood-letting, the Russian state had no need of democratic niceties to impose order. The Allies let the Russian soldiery take its revenge on millions of Germans, raising Russia to the status of “victorious power”, which experience since 1914 has shown helps to keep the social peace. The Russian government and its dictator let the German’s massacre the proletariat in Warsaw, just as they left hundreds of thousands of civilians die of cold and starvation in Stalingrad and Leningrad, and according to Souvarine attributed the millions of deaths in the gulag to the war.
To satisfy the victorious imperialisms’ appetites (the Stalinist régime dismantled all the factories in Eastern Europe, while the West profited from the reconstruction paid for by the US), it was necessary that the proletariat should not try to steal the bourgeoisie’s “Liberation”.
An intense propaganda campaign was conducted in both the West and the “totalitarian” USSR over the genocide of the Jews, which the Allies had known about since the beginning of the war. As some more serious historians have recognised, the explanation for this genocide is to be found not in the Middle Ages, but in the framework of world war. The massacre reached a fantastic intensity after the beginning of the war with Russia, to resolve more rapidly the problem of the huge masses of prisoners and refugees, especially in Poland. The Nazi state was concerned to feed its own troops, if this meant sending to an early grave a population that held back the war effort (bullets had to be saved for the Russian front, especially since wiping out such huge numbers individually had proved demoralising even for the killers). At Bermuda conference in 1943 the Allies had decided to do nothing for the Jews, preferring to let them be exterminated rather than try to handle the enormous exodus that would have come as a result of a Nazi expulsion of the Jewish population. A number of negotiations were conmducted via Romania and Hungary. All met with Roosevelt’s polite refusal. The best-known proposal, masked today behind the limited humanist action of a Schindler, was made by Eichmann to Allied representatives: 100,000 Jews against 10,000 trucks. The Allies refused the exchange, in the words of the British state: “transporting so many people would be likely to damage the war effort” [8] [292].
This genocide of the Jews, the Nazi “ethnic cleansing” was a perfect excuse for any barbarity in the Allied “victory”. The camps were opened to enormous publicity.
The rampart of lies designed to assign a diabolic status to the defeated camp has served to silence any questioning of the Allies’ terror bombing, designed above all to silence the world proletariat. Some figures are enough to unmask the horror:
- July 1943, Hamburg, 50,000 dead;
- 1944, Darmstadt, Königsberg, Heilbronn, 24,000 dead;
- Braunschweig, 23,000 dead;
- 13th-14th February 1945, Allied planes carried out an intensive bombardment of Dresden, a town full of evacuees, causing 250,000 deaths: it was one of the war’s most terrible crimes;
- in 18 months, 45 of Germany’s 60 main towns were virtually destroyed, and 650,000 people killed;
- in March 1945, the bombardment of Tokyo killed 80,000 people;
- in France, as elsehwere, the working class areas were the main targets: thousands were killed in Le Havre and Marseille, while during the landings the bombing of Caen and other towns caused thousands of deaths among the civilian population, to add to the 20,000 dead on either side among the troops;
- four months after the Reich’s surrender, with Japan practically on its knees, the most terrifying weapon of all time obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, under the pretext of saving American lives; it was necessary that the proletariat remember for years to come that the bourgeoisie is an all-powerful class...
In a future article, we will consider the working class reaction during the war, passed over in silence by official historians, as well as the positions and activity of the revolutionary minorities of the time.
Damien
[1] [293] See International Review 66: “The massacres and crimes of the great democracies”, 3rd Quarter 1991.
[2] [294] The Secret War, A.C. Brown.
[3] [295] 34-39: L’Avant-guerre, Michel Ragon, Ed Denoël, 1968.
[4] [296] Report on the International Situation, 14th July 1945.
[5] [297] L’Oeuvre, 29th August, 1940.
[6] [298] See the International Review, op. cit., as well as the Manifesto of the ICC’s 9th Congress: Communist Revolution or the Destruction of Humanity.
[7] [299] Le Figaro, 6 June 1994.
[8] [300] See L’Histoire de Joël Brand by Alex Weissberg. Half a century later, the refugee problem still encounters the same shameful capitalist restrictions: “For economic and political reasons (each refugees costs some $7,000), Washington does not want the number of Jewish refugees to increase to the detriment of other exiles - from Latin America, Asia, or Africa - who have no support and may be more “persecuted”” (Le Monde, 4th October 1989). Maastrichtian Europe is not to be outdone: “... for Europe, most asylum seekers are not “real” refugees, but ordinary economic migrants who cannot be tolerated on a saturated job market” (Libération, 9th October 1989). This is where decadent capitalism ends up. Unable to develop the productive forces, it prefers during times of war or peace, to leave a great part of humanity to die a lingering death. The hypocritical impotence displayed in the face of the “ethnic cleansing” in ex-Yugoslavia, or of the ungeard-of massacre of 500,000 human beings in Rwanda, shows what capitalism is capable of TODAY. By letting these massacres happen, just as they did with the genocide of the Jews, the Western democracies pretend they have nothing to do with the horror, when in fact they are its accomplices, and even play a more direct part than they did during the Nazi epoch.
IR78, 3rd quarter 1994
At the end of the first part of this article we cited a sentence of the PCI in PC nº92, which is particularly significant of this organisation’s dangerous vision:
“It flows from this [war as a manifestation of economic rationality] that inter-imperialist struggle and the confrontation between rival powers could never lead to the destruction of the planet, because this struggle derives not from excessive greed but from the necessity to escape overproduction. When the excess has been destroyed, the war machine stops, whatever the destructive potential of the weapons used, because at that point the causes of the war have also disappeared”
Such a vision, which puts on the same level the wars of the last century, which had, effectively, an economic rationality, and those of this century, which have lost such rationality, flows directly from the incapacity of part of the Bordigist current to understand the fact that capitalism, as the Communist International said, has entered into its period of decadence since World War I. However, it is important to come back to this vision because it not only turns its back on the real history of the World Wars, but completely demobilises the working class.
It is not true that the two World Wars ended when the economic causes which engendered them had disappeared. It is obviously necessary to agree on the real economic causes of the war. But, even from the point of view of the PCI that the objective of the war was to destroy enough constant capital to allow a sufficient rate of profit to recover, one can note that real history is in contradiction with the imaginary conception of this organisation.
If we take the case of World War I, to affirm such a thing is a shameful betrayal of the fight by Lenin and the internationalists throughout the war (less so when its a question of a crass ignorance of these historical facts). In fact, the resolution adopted at the 1907 congress of the 2nd International (Stuttgart Congress), with an amendment presented by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, and the Manifesto adopted by the Basle Congress in 1912, made it very clear that Lenin led the struggle, from August 1914, for revolutionaries “to use the economic and political crisis created by the war with all their strength to profoundly agitate the popular layers and precipitate the fall of capitalist domination” (Resolution of the Stuttgart Congress). He did not say to the workers: “the imperialist war will end in any case when the economic causes which engendered it are exhausted”. On the contrary, he showed that the only means of putting an end to the imperialist war, before it led to a catastrophic hecatomb for the proletariat and for the whole of civilisation, consisted in the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war. Obviously PC takes up this slogan, and approves the policy of the internationalists throughout this war. But at the same time, it is not capable of understanding that the scenario that it presents of the end of the generalised imperialist war was not realised in 1917-18. On the contrary, the 1st World War ended, very rapidly, in November 1918, because the strongest proletariat in the world, that of Germany, had risen against it and was taking the road of revolution as the Russian proletariat had done one year before. The facts are eloquent: on the 9th November 1918, after several months of workers’ strikes throughout Germany, navy sailors based at Kiel mutinied against their officers, while an insurrectional mood developed within the proletariat; on the 11th November the German authorities signed an armistice with the countries of the Entente. The bourgeoisie had learned very well the lesson of Russia a year before when the decision of the provisional government, emerging from the revolution of February 1917, to continue the war constituted the principal factor in mobilising the proletariat toward the October Revolution and soviet power. Thus, history has proved correct the vision defended by Lenin and the Bolsheviks: it is the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat that has put an end to the imperialist war and not some destruction of excess commodities.
The 2nd World War, contrary to the First (and to the expectations of many revolutionaries) did not open the way to a new revolutionary wave. And it was unfortunately not the action of the proletariat that put an end to it. However, that doesn’t mean that it fulfilled the abstract schema of PC. If one studies seriously the historical facts, and takes off the deforming spectacles of ‘invariant’ Bordigist dogma, one can easily see that the end of the war had nothing to do with some ‘sufficient destruction of surplus’. In reality the imperialist war ended with the complete destruction of the military potential of the vanquished and by the occupation of their territory by the victors. The most explicit case was Germany once again. If the Allies took the trouble to occupy every inch of German territory, dividing it into four military zones, this was not for economic but social reasons: the bourgeoisie remembered the 1st World War. It knew that it could not count on a defeated government to guarantee social order in the enormous proletarian concentrations in Germany. According to PC itself (we can once more note its incoherence):
“During the 3 years from 45-48 a serious economic crisis hit all the European countries affected by the war [well! this was where the most constant capital was destroyed] (...) One can see that the post-war stagnation affected victors and vanquished alike. But armed with the experience of the period after World War I, the world bourgeoisie knew that this stagnation could give rise to explosions of class struggle and revolution. That’s why the post-war economic depression was also the period of the massive military occupation of Europe. This occupation only began to be reduced, in the western sector, from 1949, when the spectre of ‘social disorder’ became remote” (PC Nº 91, p43).
In reality, in the name of ‘marxism’ and even of the ‘dialectic’, PC gives us a mechanistic, vulgar-materialist vision of the process of the beginning and the end of world imperialist war.
For marxism the economic infrastructures of society in the last analysis determine its superstructures. Moreover all historical facts that affect the political, military or social scene have economic roots. However, it is once more ‘in the last analysis’ that this economic determination plays its role, in a dialectical, not a mechanical, way. There is, particularly at the beginning of capitalism, an economic origin to war. But the link between economic factors and war has always been mediated by a series of historical, political, and diplomatic factors, which allow the bourgeoisie to mask the real nature of war from the proletariat. That is already valid for the last century, when war had a certain economic rationality for capital. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 was an example.
On the Prussian side this war had no immediate economic goal (even if, obviously, the victor allowed himself the luxury of imposing a price of 6 million gold francs in exchange for the departure of his occupation troops). Fundamentally the war of 1870 allowed Prussia to create German unity around itself (after it had beaten its Austrian rival for such a role at the battle of Sadowa in 1866). The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine had no decisive economic interest, but constituted the wedding present for the different German political entities. And it was through this political unity that the capitalist nation could develop impetuously to become, and remain, the first economic power of Europe.
On the French side the choice made by Napoleon III to go to war was still more remote from a direct economic determination. Fundamentally, as Marx showed, it was a question of the monarch launching a ‘dynastic’ war which would permit the Second Empire, if victorious, to root itself more firmly at the head of the French bourgeoisie (which in its great majority, whether royalist or republican, was not over-fond of ‘Badinguet’ as Napoleon was known) and to allow Napoleon’s son to succeed him. That is why Thiers, representing the most clear-sighted of the capitalist class, was ferociously opposed to this war.
When one examines the causes of the 1st World War, one can equally note how far the economic factor, which is obviously fundamental, acts indirectly. We cannot, in the context of this article, develop on all the imperialist ambitions of the different protagonists of this war (at the beginning of the century revolutionaries devoted many pamphlets to this question). Suffice it to say that for the two principal countries of the Entente, Great Britain and France, the fundamental stakes was the preservation of their colonial empires against the ambitions of Germany, whose growing power and industrial muscle had practically no colonial outlets. That is why in the final analysis, the war was for Germany (which played the role of aggressor in the conflict) a struggle for a re-division of markets at the time when the latter were already in the hands of the older powers. The economic crisis which began to develop in 1913 was obviously an important factor which worsened imperialist rivalries that broke out on the 4th August 1914, but it would be totally false to pretend (which no marxist did at the time) that the crisis had reached such a level that capital could do nothing else than unleash the World War with its immense destruction, in order to overcome it.
In reality, the war could very well have broken out in 1912, during the Balkan crisis. But at this very moment, the Socialist International had mobilised itself and the working masses against the threat of war, notably at the Basle Congress. The bourgeoisie had to halt its advance along the road to generalised confrontation. By contrast, in 1914, the principal reason why the bourgeoisie could begin the World War did not lie in the level reached by the crisis of overproduction, which was far from the level reached today for example. It lay in the fact that the proletariat pacified by the idea that war no longer threatened and more generally by reformist ideology (propagated by the right wing of the socialist parties which in most cases was the leadership) made no serious mobilisation against the threat which increased sharply after the assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 20th June 1914. For a month and a half, the bourgeoisie of the principal countries had plenty of time to verify that their hands were free to unleash the massacre. In particular, in Germany as much as in France, the governments directly contacted the leaders of the socialist parties who assured them of their loyalty and of their capacity to drag the workers toward the butchery. We are not inventing anything: these facts were put forward and denounced at the time by revolutionaries like Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin.
Concerning the 2nd World War, one can also show how, after the economic crisis of 1929, all the elements which would end up in the outbreak of war in September 1939 fell into place: the arrival of Hitler to power in 1933, the rise to power in 1936 of the ‘popular fronts’ in France and Spain, the civil war in the latter from July of the same year. The fact that the open crisis of the capitalist economy would finally end in imperialist war was moreover seen very clearly by the bourgeois leaders. Cordell Hull, close collaborator of the American president Roosevelt, declared: “When goods circulate, soldiers don’t advance”. Hitler on the eve of the war said clearly that Germany “must export or die”. However, one cannot account for the moment when war broke out uniquely according to PC:
“After 29, the attempt was made to overcome the crisis in the USA by a kind of ‘new model of development’. The state intervened in a massive way in the economy... and launched gigantic plans for public investment. We know today that all that only had secondary effects on the economy, which in 37-38 sank once again into crisis: only the rearmament credits in 38 could spark a ‘vigorous’ recovery and attain historic levels of production. But public indebtedness and the production of armaments could only provide a break, it could not eliminate the tendency to crisis. Let us note that in 39 the war broke out to avoid the descent into a still more ruinous crisis... The crisis before the war lasted 3 years and was followed after 33 by a recovery which led directly to the war” (PC Nº90, p29). This explanation is not false in itself, even though one must reject the idea that the war would be less ruinous than the crisis: one only has to look at the state of Europe after the 2nd World War to see that such an affirmation is not serious. By contrast, such an explanation becomes false if one attempts to understand from it alone why the war broke out in 1939 and not at the beginning of the 30s, when the world and particularly Germany and the United States sank into the deepest recession in history.
To show the incredible schematism of the PC’s analysis, it is enough to cite the following passage:
“The development of the imperialist economy at a certain moment ‘made’ the war. And while it is true that the military confrontation temporarily resolved the problems posed by the crisis, it is necessary to underline however that the military confrontation did not flow from the recession but from the artificial recovery that followed it. Drugged by the intervention of the state, financed by public debt (military industry for a good part), production recovered; but the immediate consequence was the saturation of an already water-logged world market, reproduction under a more acute form of inter-imperialist confrontation and thus war. At this moment the states threw themselves at each other, they made war because of the threat from bulldozers, combine-harvesters and any other pacific machines that one can imagine...The power to launch the war did not come from the barrel of a gun but from the mass of unsold commodities” (PC Nº91, p37)
Such a vision makes a complete abstraction of the concrete conditions through which the economic crisis ended up in war. For PC things are reduced to the mechanism: recession, ‘drugged’ recession, war. Nothing else. One can already note that this schema could not be applied at all to the 1st World War. But, concerning the second, PC doesn’t rely on the form taken by the drugged recovery in Germany after 1933: that of a colossal rearmament effort by the Nazi regime, nor on the significance of the coming to power of this regime itself. Moreover PC doesn’t examine in the least the significance of the coming to power of the Popular Front in France, for example. Finally the events on the international scene as important as the Italian expedition of 1935 against Abyssinia, the war in Spain in 1936, the war between Japan and China a year later are ignored. In reality, no war can be waged with combine-harvesters. Whatever the pressure exercised by the crisis, war can only break out if the military, diplomatic, political and social conditions have been prepared and are mature. The history of the 30s is precisely that of these preparations. Without going over in detail here what we have already developed in other issues of this Review we can only say that one of the functions of the Nazi regime was to drive the reconstitution of German military potential on a grand scale and “at a rhythm which surprised even the generals” [1] [301]. The clauses of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had previously kept this potential in check. In France too, the Popular Front had been responsible for re-launching the armament effort on a scale unknown since the 1st World War. Moreover, the wars mentioned above took place within the perspective of military and diplomatic preparations for the generalised confrontation. The war in Spain must be mentioned particularly. It was the terrain where the two Axis powers, Italy and Germany, not only tested their weapons for the war to come but also reinforced their alliance in view of the latter. But not only that: the war in Spain perfected the physical and political crushing of the world proletariat after the revolutionary wave which had begun in 1917 in Russia and finished in China in 1927. Between 1936 and 1939 it was not only the proletariat of Spain that was defeated, firstly by the Popular Front, then by Franco. The Spanish war had been one of the essential means by which the bourgeoisie of the democratic countries, particularly in Europe, glued the workers to anti-fascist ideology, which allowed them to be used once more as cannon fodder in the 2nd World War. Thus the acceptance of the imperialist war by the workers of the fascist and Nazi regimes as a result of terror was obtained in the other countries in the name of the ‘defence of democracy’ with the active participation, obviously, of the left parties of capital, the ‘socialists, and ‘communists’.
The mechanical schema that led to the outbreak of the 2nd World War, according to PC, coincides with reality. But one can only understand the latter by looking at the specific conditions of this period and not from this single schema. In particular, as far as both Germany, but also countries like France and Great Britain were concerned (with a certain delay for other countries however) the armament effort was one of the causes of the recovery after the depression of 1929. But that was only possible because the principle capitalist states had considerably reduced their military capacity following the 1st World War because the main preoccupation of the world bourgeoisie was to face up to the revolutionary wave of the proletariat. In addition, bolstered by the experience of the 1st World War the bourgeoisie knew very well that it could only launch the imperialist war with the precondition of a totally submissive proletariat in order to avoid a revolutionary resurgence of the latter during the war.
Thus PC method consists in establishing as a historical law a schema that can only be applied once in history (since we have already seen that did not even apply before the First World War). To be valid in the present period the historical conditions of today would have to be fundamentally the same as those of the 30s. This is far from the case: never have armaments been so developed and the proletariat has not suffered a profound defeat as it did during the 20s. On the contrary since the end of the 60s, it has emerged from the profound counter-revolution, which had weighed on it since the beginning of the 30s.
PC’s schematic vision ends up in a particularly dangerous analysis of the present period. It is true that from time to time, in its study, PC seems to discover a slightly more marxist conception of the process that leads to World War. For example:
“For such masses of human beings to be sent to the slaughter, the populations must be prepared in time for the war: and for them to stand up to the effects of all-out war, this work of preparation must be followed by a work of constant mobilisation of the energy and consciousness of the nation, of all the nation, in favour of war (...) Without the cohesion of the whole social body, without the solidarity of every class in a war for which their own existence and hopes must be sacrificed, even the troops of the best armies are condemned to disintegrate under the blow of the privations and daily horrors of the conflict” (PC Nº91, p41).
But such completely correct affirmations are in flagrant contradiction with the approach adopted by PC when it tries to predict the years to come. Resting on its schema, recession-drugged recovery-war, PC indulges in studious calculations (which we will spare the reader) to end up with the following conclusion:
“We can now refute the thesis of the imminence of the 3rd World War” (PC Nº90, p27). “We can then situate the date of the presumed economic maturity of the conflict around the middle of the first decade of the next millennium (or if one prefers the next century)” (Ibid. p29).
We can note that PC bases such a prediction on the fact that “the process of drugged recovery typical of the war economy, which followed the crisis, has not happened yet, in a situation where the economic situation, which, from one recession to another is still far from exhausting the tendency to depression inaugurated in 74-75” (Ibid).
Now we can obviously show (see all our analyses on the characteristics of the present crisis in this Review) how, for more than a decade, the ‘recoveries’ of the world economy have been perfectly ‘drugged’. But PC says so itself some lines before:
“We only want to underline that the world capitalist system has used the same means to prevent the crisis, which it used after the 1929 crash”.
Coherence is not really a strong point of PC and the Bordigists: it is perhaps their conception of the ‘dialectic’, since they flatter themselves with being “experienced in the handling of the dialectic” (PC Nº91, p56) [2] [302].
That being said, beyond the contradictions of PC, it is important to underline the perfectly demobilising character of the predictions with which they amuse themselves with on the date of the next world conflict. Since its foundation the ICC has insisted that once capitalism had exhausted the effects of the reconstruction of the 2nd World War, the historic crisis of the capitalist mode of production broke out once more in the form of open crisis (at the end of 60s, and not in 1974-75 as the Bordigists would like, in order to prove an old ‘prediction’ of Bordiga) the conditions for a new World War were given. It has also demonstrated that the military and diplomatic conditions for such a war were completely mature with the constitution of the two great imperialist blocs around NATO and the Warsaw Pact behind the two principle military powers of the world. The reason why the economic dead-end of world capitalism has not ended up in a new generalised butchery is to be found fundamentally in the fact that the bourgeoisie doesn’t have its hands free on the social terrain. Since the first bites of the crisis the world working class - in France in May 1968, in Italy in the autumn of 1969, and in all the developed countries afterward - raised its head and detached itself from the profound counter-revolution, which it had suffered for four decades. In explaining this, in basing its propaganda on this idea, the ICC (in a very modest way, obviously, corresponding to its actual strength) has helped to re-forge the self-confidence of the working class faced with the bourgeois campaigns, which permanently try to sap this confidence. By contrast, in continuing to propagate the idea that the proletariat was still totally absent from the historical scene (as if it were still ‘midnight in the century’) the Bordigist current made (involuntarily, certainly, but that doesn’t change anything) its small contribution to the bourgeoisie’s campaigns. Worse still, in letting it be thought that, in any case, the material conditions of a 3rd World War were not yet present, it has helped to demobilise the working class against this threat, playing, on a small scale, the role of the reformists on the eve of the 1st World War when they convinced the workers that the war was no longer a threat. Thus it is not only, as we have seen in the first part of this article, in affirming that a 3rd World War would not risk destroying humanity that PC has helped to mask the real stakes of the combat of the working class today, but also in giving credence to the idea that the class struggle has nothing to do with the fact the World War III has not broken out since the 70s.
The collapse of the Eastern Bloc, at the end of the 80s, has momentarily eclipsed the military and diplomatic conditions for a new World War. However, the mistaken vision of PC continues to weaken the political capacities of the proletariat. The disappearance of the blocs has not put an end to military conflicts, far from it. The large and medium powers continue to confront each other in the conflicts of small states and even through ethnic conflicts. The reason why these powers don’t engage more directly on the ground, or why when they do it effectively (like in the Gulf War in 1991) they only send professional soldiers or volunteers, is the fear that to send conscripts, that is workers in uniform, would provoke reactions and a mobilisation of the working class. Thus, at the present time, the fact that the bourgeoisie is not capable of dragging the proletariat behind its war objectives is a factor of first importance limiting the scale of imperialist massacres. And the more the working class develops its struggles, the more the bourgeoisie will be trapped in its disastrous projects. This is what revolutionaries must say to their class to help it become conscious of its real capacities and its responsibilities. Unfortunately, despite its completely valid denunciation of bourgeois lies on imperialist war, and notably of pacifism, this is not done by the Bordigist current, and not by PC in particular.
To conclude this critique of the analyses of PC on the question of imperialist war, we must return to some ‘arguments’ employed by this review when it tries to stigmatise the positions of the ICC. For PC we are “social-pacifists of the extreme left” on the same level as the Trotskyists (PC Nº92, p61). Our position is “emblematic of the impotent rage of the petit-bourgeoisie” (Ibid. p57). And why, may we ask? Because:
“If the outbreak of war definitively excludes the revolution, then peace, this bourgeois peace, becomes despite everything an advantage which the proletariat, while it doesn’t have the force to make the revolution, must protect like the apple of its eye. And here is, in the end, the old ‘struggle for peace’ ..in the name of the revolution. Wasn’t he fundamental axis of the propaganda of the ICC at the time of the Gulf War denunciation of the warmongers of all kinds, and the lamentations on the ‘chaos’, the ‘blood’ and the ‘horrors’ of the war? Certainly war is horrible, but bourgeois peace is too and the ‘peace-mongers’ must be denounced as severely as the ‘war-mongers’; as for the growing ‘chaos’ of the bourgeois world, it can only be welcomed by real communists because it only signifies the approach of the time when revolutionary violence must be opposed to bourgeois violence” (Ibid.).
Sincerely the ‘arguments’ of PC are a little poor, and above all, lies. When revolutionaries at the beginning of century, the Luxemburgs and Lenins, at each congress of International Socialism and in their daily propaganda, put workers on guard against the threat of imperialist war, when they denounced the preparations for the latter, they did not do the same thing as the pacifists and it seems to us that PC still identifies with these revolutionaries. Moreover, when, in the course of the war itself, they stigmatised with all their energy the imperialist bestiality of the ‘war-mongers’ and other ‘social chauvinists’ they didn’t add their voice to that of pacifists like Romain Rolland. It is exactly the same struggle of these revolutionaries that the ICC is demanding, and without the least concessions to pacifist propaganda, which they denounce with the same vigour as war propaganda contrary to what PC pretends (they should read our press a bit better). In reality the fact that PC is obliged to lie on what we really say only shows one thing: the lack of consistency of their own analysis.
To close, we would say to these comrades that it is no use to spend all their energy to predict the date of the future World War to end up in a ‘prediction’ for the period to come which comprises no less than four possible scenarios (see PC Nº 92, p57-60). The proletariat, to arm itself politically, expects clear perspectives from revolutionaries. To trace such a perspective it is not sufficient for the latter to content themselves with the “strict repetition of classical positions” as the PCI wants to do (PC Nº92 p31). While marxism can only rest on a strict respect of proletarian principles, notably in relation to imperialist war, as the ICC believes as much as the PCI, it is not a dead theory, incapable to taking account of different historical circumstances in which the working class develops its struggle, whether for the defence of its immediate interests or for communism (the two are part of the same whole). It must be able, as Lenin said, to “analyse concretely a concrete situation”. Any other analysis is no longer marxism, and is either useless or spreads still more confusion in the ranks of the working class. This is unfortunately the ‘marxism’ that the PCI gives us.
FM
[1] [303] History of international relations Book 6, page 142, by Pierre Renouvin (Paris 1972)
[2] [304] In the domain of the incoherence of the PCI, one could also cite the following: “if peace has reigned until now in the imperialist metropoles, it is precisely because of this domination by the USA and the USSR, and if war is inevitable … it is for the simple reason that forty years of ‘ peace’ have matured the forces that tend to put into question this equilibrium, which emerged from the last world conflict” (PC No. 91, page 47). The PCI should make up its mind once and for all. Why has the war not taken place yet? Because, exclusively, the economic conditions are not yet mature as PC tries to show through many pages, or from the fact that its diplomatic preparations are not yet ready? Understand who can.
Behind the banners of 'peace', 'civilization' and 'democracy', the greatest military powers of the world have just celebrated with all due pomp the anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy. The festivities organized for the occasion, the repulsive live shows enacted at the very scene of the butchery fifty years ago, the sonorous congratulations and hymns to their own glory exchanged by the most powerful heads of state on the planet - all this was the subject of a vast media operation on a world scale. The message was put across very clearly: "we, the great industrialized states and our democratic institutions are the heirs of the liberators who freed Europe from that incarnation of evil, the Nazi regime. Today as yesterday, we are the guardians of civilization, peace and humanity against oppression, terror, barbarism and chaos".
These people want us to believe that today, like yesterday, barbarism is the fault of ... someone else. The old lie that the 1939-45 butchery, its 50 million dead, its train of atrocities and suffering, was all the fault of the barbaric madness of Hitler and not of capitalism as a whole, not of the sordid imperialist interests of all the camps involved. We have been sold this lie for half a century, in the hope that a lie repeated a thousand times will become a truth. And if it's all served up to us again now, it's with the aim of once again excusing capitalism, and in particular the great 'democratic' powers, from the responsibility of the massacres, wars, genocides and growing chaos ravaging the planet today.
Half a million people involved in the operation, the most gigantic military expedition of all time, a frightful slaughter which, in the space of a few hours, left tens of thousands of corpses on the ground. This is what, in the name of 'peace', the crowned heads and presidents of the 'international community' celebrated this June 6 1994. Gathering hypocritically in front of the rows of white crosses, upon which are inscribed the ages of these children they call 'heroes' - 16, 18, 20 years old - the only true emotion this crowd felt was regret for the loss of the good old days of fifty years ago, when the working class was defeated and was ready to supply such abundant cannon-fodder (see the article '50 years of imperialist lies ' in this issue).
All of them, Clinton, Major, Mitterand and the rest, go on and on about peace. They did the same thing five years ago, when the Berlin wall fell. And it was in the name of peace that this same 'international community', a few months later, unleashed 'Desert Storm' on Iraq, with its tens of thousands of victims. They told us that out of this unspeakable butchery a 'new world order' would arise. Since then, it's again been in the name of peace and civilization that they've made their presence felt in Yugoslavia, in Africa, in the countries of the former USSR, in the Middle East and the Far East. The more these regions have been ravaged by war, the more the great powers set themselves up as defenders of peace, the more active they have become in all these conflicts, in order to defend the only 'just cause' that any capitalist state knows about: its own imperialist interests.
There can be no peace under capitalism. The end of the Second World War may have pushed war away from Europe and the most developed countries, but it only displaced it towards the periphery of the system. For 50 years, the imperialist powers large and small have not ceased confronting each other through local conflicts. For decades, these incessant local wars were moments in the rivalry between the two great imperialist blocs over the division of the world. The collapse of the eastern bloc and, as a result, the break-up of the western bloc as well, far from putting an end to the war-like and imperialist reality of capitalism, was the signal for it to intensify without limits.
In a world now ruled by the principle of every man for himself, yesterday's allies are fighting over spheres of influence all over the planet. The celebrations of D-Day, where the most powerful states got together to congratulate each other on having chased war away from Europe 50 years ago, took place at the very time that war has returned to this continent, to Yugoslavia - and it is a war that has been nourished actively by the rivalries between the great 'civilized' states.
No, the military chaos ravaging the planet today can't be explained away as the simple result of the return of 'ancestral hatreds' between backward populations - another version of the argument that barbarism is always someone else's fault. Everywhere it is being fed, sharpened, kept up, when it's not provoked outright, by the imperialist rivalries and ambitions of the very same states who give us such fine speeches about their humanitarian, peaceful and civilized intentions.
Rwanda: rivalries between France and America are responsible for the horror
A terrifying bloodbath. Entire populations coldly murdered with machetes and nailed clubs, children slaughtered in their cots, families hunted by hordes of killers to their last places of refuge and savagely massacred. The country transformed into a vast charnel-house and Lake Victoria polluted by thousands of rotting corpses. The number of victims? At least half a million, no doubt more. The scale of the genocide is not known. Never in history has there been such an exodus, in such a short time, of populations blindly fleeing from massacres.
The way the 'democratic' bourgeois media has portrayed this holocaust has been designed to get across this message: "look at the horrors that are the result of the ancestral racial hatreds that divide the backward populations of 'savage' Africa. In the face of all this the civilized states are powerless. But you should be glad to live in democratic countries which are shielded from such chaos. The day-to-day reality of poverty and unemployment that you have to put up with is a paradise compared to the massacres these populations are subjected to".
The lie is all the bigger, this time around, in that the so-called ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis was directly created by the imperialist powers in the period of colonization. At that time Hutus and Tutsis corresponded much less to 'ethnic' criteria than to social castes. The Tutsis were the reigning feudal caste who initially had the support of the colonial powers. Inheriting the Rwandan colony when the German empire was carved up by the victors of the First World War, it was Belgium who introduced the reference to people's ethnic group on their identity cards, sharpening the hatred between the two castes in order to gain support from the Tutsi monarchy.
In 1959, Belgium made an about-face and supported the Hutu majority which had taken power. The famous 'ethnic' identity card was maintained and so was discrimination between Tutsis and Hutus in the various spheres of social life.
Several hundred thousand Tutsis fled the country and wound up in Burundi or Uganda. In the latter country they were to be a recruiting base for the clique around the current President Museveni, who took power in Kampala with their support in 1986. In return, the new Ugandan regime gave arms and aid to the Tutsi guerillas, leading to the formation of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) which entered into Rwanda in October 1990.
In the meantime, Belgian imperialism's control over Kigali was replaced by France. The latter gave unstinting military and economic support to Habyarimana's Hutu regime, which imposed a reign of terror on the country and reinforced ethnic resentments against the Tutsis. It was thanks to the support of French imperialism which armed it and sent military reinforcements to help it that the regime was able to check the advances made by the RPF, which was discretely supported by the US, via Uganda which armed it and trained it.
From there the civil war took off, anti-Tutsi pogroms multiplied at the same time as those carried out by the RPF against all those suspected of 'collaborating' with the regime. In the name of 'protecting the innocent' Paris has sent in an expeditionary force. In reality the French state is simply defending its position against the offensive of the USA, which since the collapse of the eastern bloc has been trying to deprive France of its spheres of influence in Africa. The RPF guerillas are the spearhead of an American offensive aimed at bringing down the pro-French regime in Kigali.
In order to save the regime, France set out a 'peace' plan in August 93, comprising a more 'democratic' constitution, transferring some power to the Tutsi minority as well as the various opposition cliques.
This plan proved to be unrealizable. Not because 'ancestral hatreds' were too strong, but quite simply because the imperialist maneuvers and strategic calculations of the great powers could not accommodate it. On the very eve of the inauguration of the new constitution, the Rwandan and Burundi presidents were assassinated, burying the plan and unleashing the bloodbath.
The recent revelations in the Belgian press (Belgium has its own reasons for doing down its French rival in Africa) directly implicated French military elements in the 6 April assassination, suggesting that Paris could well have ordered the killings in the hope that, by pointing a finger at the RPF rebels, it would give the government army all the justifications it needed to put an end to the Tutsi rebellion. If that was the case, reality went beyond all its hopes. But it matters little which of the two cliques, the government or the RPF, and behind them France or the USA, had the greater interest in elevating the Rwanda conflict from simmering guerrilla war to all-out war. The very logic of capital pushes it in that direction: 'peace' is no more than a myth in capitalism, at best a pause during which new conflicts are being prepared. In the last instance war remains capitalism's only way of life, its only way of resolving its contradictions.
Today the sorcerers' apprentices are making a show of emotion about the scale of the conflagration they themselves have lit. However, for months all these good people allowed the massacre to go on while deploring the "impotence of the UN". The decision adopted by the UN Security Council in mid-May - more than a month after the war had begun and 500,000 were already dead! - to send 5,000 men in under the aegis of UNIMAR, wasn't even supposed to be carried through until July! Even if certain African states in the region have declared that they are ready to supply troops, among the great powers, who are charged with supplying equipment and finances, sloth and apathy have reigned, leading one UNIMAR official to protest: "it's as if we had become totally unfeeling, as though we were indifferent to all this". To which the diplomats of the Security Council replied: "in any case, most of the massacres are over, we have to wait and see what happens next". The other UN resolutions, which are supposed to stop war supplies through Uganda and Zaire, have had no more effect. And quite understandably so: we've see the same 'impotence' in Bosnia. It merely reflects the divergence of imperialist interests between those who present themselves as the 'forces of peace'.
The military-humanitarian pose was adopted most stridently by the French government in June, after a cease-fire was immediately violated. "We can't tolerate this anymore" claimed the French minister for Foreign Affairs, proposing an intervention "in the framework of the UN" but on condition that the operation should be under French command. The initiative immediately provoked the reaction of RPF representatives who said indignantly that "France can't stop the genocide that it has helped set in motion". As for the other big powers, they are doing all they can to hamstring the French, particularly the USA. First because if France aims to take charge of the operation, it's in order to conserve its role as the dominant power in the country, to put all its weight behind stopping the RPF's advance. Second because the USA, for their part, are not only supporting the RPF on the ground, but also want to make it clear that no one else except themselves can take on the job of gendarme. This is what really lies behind this new outbreak of 'humanitarian' posturing; it's got nothing at all to do with the fate of the massacred population.
Yemen: the strategic calculations of the great powers
Born out of the reunification of the two Yemens four years ago - in the euphoria created by the collapse of the eastern bloc, which suddenly left Aden and its one-party YSP regime without a backer - the newly unified Yemeni republic hasn't lasted long. The secession by the south and the renewed military conflict between the two parts of the country is yet another demonstration of what the 'new world order' really means: a world of instability and chaos, of states being torn to shreds by the pressure of social decomposition. But as in Rwanda or Bosnia, the chaos has been nourished and fed by the imperialist powers of the region and beyond, who are still trying to pull irons out of the fire for their own benefit.
Regionally the Yemen conflict has been fuelled on one side by Saudi Arabia, which reproaches the Islamic factions in the north for being too sympathetic to their menacing neighbor Iraq and to the regime in Sudan. It's Saudi, and behind it its powerful ally America, who has thus supported the secessionist clique in Aden with the aim of weakening the pro-Iraqi factions. On the other side, by supporting the northern offensive, Khartoum is defending its regional imperialist influence, in particular against its local rival Egypt, another American stronghold.
The stakes of this struggle are none other than control of the eminently strategic position of the port of Aden, which faces the French stronghold in Djibouti. And who is behind the military-Islamic Sudanese regime? As it happens, it's discretely backed by France which is seeking to counter the US offensive in Somalia which has threatened its position in Djibouti.
The hidden warfare between the great powers, particularly the US and France, in Africa and the Middle East, has led to this sordid reality which has seen France denouncing Islamic obscurantism in Algeria, where it is destabilizing its own sphere of influence with the blessing of the USA which is supporting the FIS more or less openly; at the same time we have seen the USA denouncing Islamic fundamentalism when it goes against its interests in Arabia, while France, forgetting its anti-clerical soul, finds militant Islam rather to its taste when it helps it to defend its imperialist interests at the entrance to the Red Sea. Yet another ideological justification which has collapsed in the face of the squalid reality of imperialism.
Bosnia: 'peaceful' missions fuel the war
The same cynicism, the same great power duplicity has been revealed in the war in Bosnia (see the article 'The great imperialist powers foment war' in International Review 77). The recent evolution of the diplomatic-military imbroglio between the great powers, as the massacres continue unabated, has given the lie to all their 'humanitarian' pretenses, which are just a cover for using the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim populations to advance their imperialist designs.
The Bosnian theatre, which for a long time has been a favorite hunting ground of the various European powers, has today become one of the cornerstones of the American offensive. With the NATO ultimatum and the threat of air attacks on Serb forces, Washington managed to regain the initiative in a very convincing manner, to slap down Russia's new pretensions in the region and to expose the total impotence of Britain and France, who have had to accept the American intervention that they have up till now rejected and sabotaged with all means at their disposal. And the USA has made further advances by overseeing the creation of the Croat-Muslim Federation. All of a sudden Germany's intention to use Croatia as a springboard to the Mediterranean has been kicked into touch. Here again, all these grand military-diplomatic maneuvers have nothing at all to do with 'the return to peace'.
As we said in our previous issue, "the Croatian-Muslim alliance which the USA is overseeing - if it does get realized - will take the confrontation with Serbia onto another level. The European powers which have just received a slap in the face won't hesitate to throw oil onto the fire". The vote of the American senate for lifting the embargo on arms supplies to the Bosnians - which received unexpected support from a handful of French armchair diehard intellectuals - can only encourage the Bosnian army, which has already been armed by the American bourgeoisie, to resume its military offensive. And the massacres won't be halted by the European plan for the partition of Bosnia, which is totally unacceptable to the Muslims, and to which the White House, in apparent disagreement with Congress, has pretended to support. Its predictable failure, and Washington's support for the new Croat-Muslim anti-Serb front, will make the widening of the war inevitable.
The butchery which has now been raging in ex-Yugoslavia for three years now is not about to end. It is potent proof of how the wars and chaos born out of the decomposition of capitalism are aggravated by the big imperialist powers. And also that, in the name of 'humanitarian intervention', the only alternative they can propose is either to bomb the Serb forces or arm the Bosnians. In other words, faced with the war and chaos provoked by the decomposition of the capitalist system, the most powerful and industrialized nations can only respond by adding more war.
Korea: towards new military clashes
While areas of conflict proliferate, another one is smoldering around North Korea, which is seeking to equip itself with a nuclear arsenal. The reaction of the USA, which has threatened Pyongyang with an escalating series of sanctions, has once again been presented to us as the attitude of a responsible and 'civilized' power concerned to stop the arms race and defend the peace. In fact this 'major crisis' is very similar to the USA's showdown with Iraq four years ago, which ended with the butchery of the Gulf war. And, as then, the pretensions of North Korea (which is already one of the most militarized countries in the world, with a million-strong army), its ambition to add nuclear weapons to an already huge arsenal, are basically just a pretext.
Behind the 'Korean crisis' and the media intoxication about Pyongyang's aggressive intentions towards its southern neighbor, we can see the USA reacting to the threats to its hegemony, to its status as world cop, posed by the alliance being formed between the two giants of the region: China and Japan. In threatening to go "as far as it takes", America's real targets are not Pyongyang but the former two countries. All this is part of the White House's pressure on China, which on the one hand is holding out the carrot of "Most Favored Nation" status, and on the other hand the stick, via its threats against its little North Korean protégé.
The aim behind deliberately raising the tension with North Korea is to force China and Japan to range themselves behind the USA, to oblige Beijing to break solidarity with Pyongyang, cut through the Sino-Japanese axis and stamp on any pretensions towards political independent these countries might have. Exactly the same as in the Gulf crisis, when the USA even provoked the crisis by encouraging Saddam Hussein's ambitions towards Kuwait, with the sole aim of forcing the European powers to line up behind the USA and, contrary to their own interests in the Middle East, to make an act of allegiance to America's military power. The operation was a great success then. The imperialist ambitions of the USA's European rivals were for a while smothered, at the cost of a revolting butchery.
Whether or not the USA goes all the way this time, repeating its bloody 'exploit', whether or not it unleashes its enormous military machine with the aim of bringing the Asian powers to heal, this new crisis shows the future that capitalism is preparing for us.
Capitalism is war
The ceremonies commemorating D-Day also had the aim of reminding everyone that it is the USA which lays down the law in 1994, just as it did in 1944. The slap in the face given to the Germans, who were visibly excluded from the festivities, was intended to remind it who lost the Second World War and to make it understand that it would not be a good idea to try to obtain a new status in the world imperialist balance of forces. The even more striking absence of Russia - which did not fail to protest against the fact that its participation in the victory of 1945 was being 'forgotten', as were the millions of proletarians it sacrificed on the altar of the world butchery - was also aimed at repudiating Moscow's ambition to regain a place among the leading powers of the world. As for the hypocritical speechifying of those who were invited, proclaiming their common concern to act 'for peace', all this cannot really hide the sordid reality of the confrontations between them all over the planet.
There will be no pause in the acceleration and spread of military conflicts. Since its birth, war has been part of capitalism's history. In the period of its decay, it has become the system's permanent way of life. The bourgeoisie wants us to believe that all this is inevitable, that there's nothing we can do except rely on the good intentions of the great powers and their efforts to limit the most devastating effects of all this. Nothing could be more false. As we have just seen, the great powers are the world's main warmongers. And for a very simple reason: this war-like chaos, this militarist folly has its roots in the accelerating downfall of the capitalist economy.
The answer is in the hands of the proletariat
Turn over this coin of the war and barbarism spreading all over the underdeveloped countries, and you will find the poverty and mass unemployment that are growing throughout the big industrialized countries. Permanent war and catastrophic economic crisis are both expressions of the same bankruptcy of the capitalist system. Capitalism is not only incapable of doing away with these scourges; as it rots on its feet, it can only offer more poverty, more unemployment, more wars.
There is an alternative to the frightful future that capitalism promises us. It is in the hands of the international working class and it alone. It is above all up to the workers in the great industrialized countries, who are being hit full tilt by the dramatic consequences of the crisis of the system, to develop this alternative by struggling on their class terrain in the most resolute, united, and conscious manner possible.
Against the feelings of powerlessness that the ruling class wants to inject it with, against its attempts to pull it behind its military adventures, the working class must respond by developing its class response to the attacks of capital. This is the only possible response to the barbarism of the system, because only the working class has the capacity to destroy capitalism before its murderous logic leads to the destruction of humanity. The future of the human species is in the hands of the proletariat.
PE, 19.6.94
The bourgeoisie knows that it is stuck in the crisis. The momentary weakness of the international working class is allowing it to get away with the cynical language of a historically moribund class which knows that it can only survive by intensifying oppression and exploitation.
The doctors have spoken. The economic 'experts' of the OECD Secretariat[1], after two years of intense reflection, declare that they have "carried out the mandate which the Ministers entrusted to them in May 1992". The object of their study? Unemployment, hypocritically called "the problem of employment". But what is the diagnosis? What remedies are being proposed?
The Study begins by attempting to measure the symptoms. "There are 35 million people unemployed in the OECD countries. Fifteen million workers, perhaps, have either given up looking for a job, or have accepted part-time work for want of anything better". The extent of the illness already poses a problem: the definition of unemployment is often different in different countries, and in all cases, it underestimates the reality for obvious political reasons. But even with these defects, the figures are unprecedented: 50 million people directly affected by the problem of unemployment: that's equivalent to the entire working population of Germany and France put together!
How do our medical experts explain why it's come to this - these people for whom capitalism is eternal and is supposed to have gone through a rejuvenation since the collapse of Stalinism?
"The emergence of large scale unemployment in Europe, Canada and Australia and the proliferation of mediocre jobs linked to the appearance of unemployment in the USA thus have one and the same underlying cause: the inability to adapt to the changes in a satisfactory manner".
What changes? "... new technologies, globalization, and the intense competition at national and international level. The existing policies and systems have made the economies rigid and paralyzed the capacity and even the will to adapt".
What does this "inability to adapt", this "rigidity" consist of? Naive types who still believe that economists are something other than charlatans whose job is to justify capitalism might have expected them to talk about the rigidity of the laws which, for example, oblige states to pay farmers not to cultivate the soil, or to close thousands of perfectly efficient factories while hunger and poverty spread all over the planet. But no. The rigidities our doctors are talking about are those which hold up the free and pitiless play of capitalist laws, the very laws that are plunging humanity into a growing chaos.
The Study cynically illustrates this point of view through the remedies, the "recommendations" that it puts forward:
"...Suppressing all negative connotations, in public opinion, relating to the failure of enterprises ...
Increasing the flexibility of the working day ...
Increasing the flexibility of wages, reducing the costs of non-salaried manpower ...
Re-evaluating the role of legal minimum wages ... by sufficiently modulating wage rates with regard to age and regions ...
Introducing "renegotiation clauses" which would make it possible to renegotiate onto a lower level collective accords drawn up at a higher level ...
Reducing the costs of non-salaried manpower ... by lightening deductions at enterprise level (ie, taxes payed by the bosses) and replacing them with other kinds of taxes, notably on consumption or income (ie taxes payed mainly by the workers).
"Fixing remunerations offered by job creation schemes at a lower level than the participant could obtain on the labor market in order to incite people to look for regular work ...
The systems of unemployment benefit have ended up constituting a semi-permanent guaranteed income in many countries, and this doesn't make people want to go out and work ...
Limiting the length of eligibility for unemployment benefit in countries where it is particularly long ..."
Rarely has the bourgeoisie allowed itself to come out with such brutal language at this level. The conclusions of the OECD are basically no different from those formulated by the 'experts' of the European Union or by the US president at the recent G7 meeting[2]. The Study will serve as a basis for the work of the next G7 meeting, which is again devoted to the problem of unemployment.
The ruling class is quite aware that the threat of unemployment can give it immense power over the exploited class. It knows that the workers are finding it hard to fight back at the moment. And this allows it to harden the tone. To speak without any flourishes.
In reality, in practice, all the governments of the world are already carrying out such policies to one degree or another. What this document announces is simply an aggravation of these policies.
But how effective can these 'remedies' be?
Capitalism cannot adapt in a healthy manner to the changes which it itself provokes at the level of the technical productivity of labor and the interdependence of the world economy.
The intensification of competition between capitalists, exacerbated by the crisis of overproduction and the scarcity of solvent markets, pushes the capitalists to continually modernize the process of production, replacing men by machines, in a frenzied search to 'reduce costs'. The same race obliges them to shift part of production to countries where labor power is cheaper (China and South East Asia today, for example).
But in doing so the capitalists don't solve the chronic problem of the lack of outlets which affects the whole world economy. All it can do is to allow some to survive at the expense of others, but at the global level the problem is merely aggravated.
The real inability to adapt does not lie somewhere between capitalism and the policies of the governments, who have for a long time now been attacking the living conditions of the exploited in the most industrialized countries. The real inability to adapt lies in the contrast between the actual technical capacities of society: the productivity of labor, the communications explosion, the internationalization of economic life on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the continuation of the laws of capitalism, the laws of exchange, wage labor, of statified or individual private property. It is capitalism itself which cannot adapt to the capacities and needs of humanity.
As the Communist Manifesto put it: "bourgeois institutions have become too narrow to contain the wealth they have created".
The only interesting thing about the 'new' language of the ruling class is that it recognizes that it is faced with an economic crisis that is destined to last. Even if the bourgeoisie always thinks that its system is eternal, even if it talks about the recovery of the world economy, it is admitting today that it is doomed, at least for the years ahead, to go through a situation of constantly growing unemployment; that the trend for the number of unemployed people to go on growing all over the planet for the past quarter-century is far from over.
The Study displays a certain lucidity when it looks into the social future: "Certain people will not be able to adapt to an economy that is progressing (they should say: an economy whose mortal illness is progressing). Their exclusion from the mainstream of economic activity threatens to provoke social tensions which could have heavy human and economic consequences".
What these experts don't and can't see is that these "social tensions" contain the only way out for humanity and that the "heavy human and economic consequences" could be the world communist revolution.
RV, 18 June 1994
[1] The OECD is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. It regroups the 24 most industrialized countries of the former US bloc (all the countries of Western Europe, the USA and Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). Mexico is in the process of being integrated.
[2] See the article 'The explosion of unemployment' in International Review 77.
Class consciousness is a living thing. The fact that a part of the proletarian movement has attained a certain level of clarity does not mean that the whole movement has attained it, and even the clearest fractions can, in certain circumstances, fail to see all the implications of what they have seen, and even lose their grip on a previously-reached level of understanding.
This is certainly true for the question of the state and the lessons that Marx and Engels drew about the Paris Commune, which we analysed in the last article in this series (IR 77). In the decades that followed the defeat of the Commune, the ascent of reformism and opportunism in the workers' movement led to the absurd situation, at the turn of the century, in which the 'orthodox' marxist position on the state, as preached by the likes of Karl Kautsky, was the one which asserted that the working class could come to power through parliamentary elections, ie through capturing the existing state. So that when Lenin in his State and Revolution, written during the revolutionary events of 1917, undertook the task of "excavating" the real heritage of Marx and Engels on this question, the 'orthodox' accused him of sliding back into Bakuninist anarchism!
In fact, the struggle to disseminate the real lessons of the Paris Commune, to keep the proletarian movement on the right track to the communist revolution, was already underway in the aftermath of the French workers' insurrection. In this combat against the mephitic influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology on the workers' movement, marxism faced a battle on two fronts: against the 'state socialists' and reformists, who were particularly strong in the German party, and against Bakunin's anarchist tendency, which had a powerful presence in the less developed capitalist countries.
In this three-sided conflict, many issues were in debate, or were the seeds of future debates. With the German party, there was already the problem of confusing the necessary fight for reforms with the ideology of reformism, in which the ultimate revolutionary goals of the movement are forgotten altogether. The question of reforms was also posed by the Bakuninists, but from the other way round: they had nothing but contempt for the immediate defensive struggles of the class, and wanted to leap over them, straight into the grand "social liquidation". With the latter, as well, the question of the role and the internal functioning of the International was to become one of extreme acuity, hastening the demise of the International itself.
In the next two articles, we shall be concerned mainly with the way these conflicts related to the conception of the revolution and of the future society, though there are inevitably numerous points of contact with the issues mentioned above.
In the 20th century, the identification between socialism and state capitalism has been one of the most persistent obstacles to the development of class consciousness. The Stalinist regimes, in which a brutal totalitarian state has violently assumed control of virtually the entire economic apparatus, arrogantly called themselves 'socialist', and the rest of the world bourgeoisie obligingly agreed. And of all Stalinism's more 'democratic' or 'revolutionary' cousins - from social democracy on its right to Trotskyism on its left - have devoted themselves to spreading the same basic falsehood.
No less pernicious than the Stalinist version of this lie is the social democratic idea that the working class can benefit from the activity and intervention of the state even in those regimes which are explicitly defined as 'capitalist': in this vision, local councils, central governments controlled by social democratic parties, the institutions of the welfare state, the nationalised industries, can all be used on behalf of the workers, and even as stepping stones towards a socialist society.
One of the reasons why these mystifications are so deeply ingrained is that the currents who advocate them were once part of the workers' movement. And many of the ideological tricks they peddle today have their origins in genuine confusions existing in an earlier phase of that movement. The marxist world outlook emerges out of a real combat against bourgeois ideology in the ranks of the proletarian movement, and for this very reason is inevitably faced with an unending struggle to free itself from the subtle influences of ruling class ideology. In the marxism of the ascendant period of capitalism, we can thus discern a recurring difficulty in separating itself from the illusion that the statification of capital amounts to its suppression.
To a large extent, such illusions resulted from the conditions of the day, in which capitalism was still mainly perceived through the personality of individual capitalists, and where the concentration and centralisation of capital were still at an early stage. Faced with the evident anarchy created by a plethora of competing individual enterprises, it was easy enough to fall for the idea that the centralisation of capital in the hands of the national state would constitute a step forward. Indeed, many of the measures of state control put forward in the Communist Manifesto (a state bank, nationalisation of the land, etc - see the article in this series in IR 72) are done so with the explicit aim of developing capitalist production in a period when it still had a progressive role to play. Despite this, the issue remained clouded, even in the more mature writings of Marx and Engels. In the previous article in this series, for example, we cited one of Marx's comments on the economic measures of the Paris Commune, in which he appears to say that if workers' co-operatives centralised and planned production on a national scale, this would be communism. Elsewhere, Marx seems to advocate, as a transitional measure towards communism, the state administration of typically capitalist operations such as credit (cf Capital, Vol 3, chap. XXXVI).
In pointing to these errors, we are not issuing any moral judgement on our political ancestors. The clarification of such questions has only been achieved by the 20th century revolutionary movement after many decades of painful experience: in particular the Stalinist counter-revolution in Russia and, more generally, the growing role of the state as the organising agent of economic life in the epoch of capitalist decadence. And the clarification that has been achieved today is entirely dependent on the method of analysis elaborated by the founders of marxism, and on certain prophetic insights into the role that the state would, or could, assume in the evolution of capital.
What allowed later generations of marxists to correct some of the 'state capitalist' errors of the earlier ones was, above all Marx's insistence that capital is a social relation, and cannot be defined in a purely juridical manner. The whole thrust of Marx's work is to define capitalism as a system of exploitation founded on wage labour, on the extraction and realisation of surplus value. From this standpoint, it is entirely irrelevant whether the agent that sucks surplus value from the workers, which realises that value on the market in order to accrue a profit and expand its capital, is an individual bourgeois, a corporation, or a nation state. As the economic role of the state gradually increased and consequently fed the illusory expectations of parts of the workers' movement, it was this theoretical rigour which enabled Engels to formulate that oft-quoted passage in which he emphasises that "the transformation, either into joint-stock companies and trusts, or into state ownership, does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces. In the joint-stock companies and trusts this is obvious. And the modern state, again, is only the organisation that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage-workers - proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head" (Anti-Duhring)[1].
Among the more sophisticated apologists for Stalinism have been those currents, usually Trotskyists or their offspring, who have argued that while the monstrous bureaucratic nightmare of the former USSR and similar regimes could not be called socialist, neither can it be called capitalist, because when you have the total nationalisation of the economy (although, in fact, none of the Stalinist regimes ever reached this point), production and labour power lose their commodity character. Marx, by contrast, was able to theoretically envisage the possibility of a country in which all social capital was in the hands of a single agency, without this country ceasing to be capitalist: "Capital can grow into powerful masses in a single hand because it has been withdrawn from many individual hands. In any given branch of industry centralisation would reach its extreme limit if all the individual capitals invested in it were fused into a single capital. In a given society the limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist company" (Capital, Vol 1, chap XXV, section 2).
From the point of view of the world market, 'nations' are in any case no more than particular capitalists or companies, and the social relations within them are entirely dictated by the global laws of capitalist accumulation. It makes little difference whether buying and selling has been done away with inside this or that national border: such countries are no more 'islands of non-capitalism' in the capitalist world economy than the kibbutzim are islands of socialism in Israel[2].
Thus, marxist theory contains all the necessary premises for rejecting the identification between state capitalism and socialism. Furthermore, Marx and Engels were already faced with the need to deal with this 'state socialist' deviation in their own day.
Germany had never passed through a phase of liberal capitalism: the weaknesses of the native German bourgeoisie meant that the development of capitalism in Germany was largely overseen by a powerful bureaucratic state dominated by semi-feudal elements. As a result what Engels referred to as "the superstitious belief in the state" (Introduction to the Civil War in France) was particularly marked in Germany, and it strongly infected the emergent workers' movement there. This tendency was typified by Ferdinand Lasalle, whose faith in the possibility of using the existing state on behalf of the workers reached the point of making an alliance with the Bismarck regime against the capitalists. But the problem wasn't restricted to the 'Bismarckian state socialism' of Lasalle. There was a marxist current in the German workers' movement, led by Liebknecht and Bebel. But this tendency often fell into the kind of marxism that led Marx to declare that he wasn't a marxist: mechanistic, schematic, and above all, lacking in revolutionary audacity. The very fact that this current described itself as "social democratic" was in itself a backward step: in the 1840s, social democracy had been synonymous with the reformist 'socialism' of the petty bourgeoisie, and Marx and Engels had deliberately defined themselves as communist to emphasise the proletarian and revolutionary character of the politics they espoused.
The weaknesses of the Liebknecht-Bebel current were starkly revealed in 1875 when it fused with the Lasalle group to form the Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP, later the SDP). The founding document of the new party, the 'Gotha Programme', made a number of totally unacceptable concessions to Lasalleanism. It was this that prompted Marx to write his Critique of the Gotha Programme in the same year.
This withering attack on the profound confusions contained in the new party's programme remained an 'internal' document until 1891: hitherto, Marx and Engels had feared that publishing it more widely would provoke a premature split in the SDP. In retrospect, one can debate the wisdom of this decision, but the logic behind it is clear enough: for all its faults, the SDP was a real expression of the proletarian movement - it had shown this in particular through the internationalist stand that Liebknecht and his current - and even many of the Lassaleans - had taken during the Franco-Prussian war and the Paris Commune. What's more, the German party's rapid development had already demonstrated the growing importance of the movement in Germany for the whole international working class. Marx and Engels recognised the need to wage a long and patient fight against the ideological mistakes of the SDP, and they did so in a number of other important documents written after the Critique. But this fight was motivated by the effort to build the party, not destroy it. This was always the method that informed the struggle of the marxist left against the rise of opportunism within the class party: the struggle was for the party as long as that party has any proletarian life within it.
In the criticisms that Marx and Engels made of the German party, we can see in outline many of the issues that were later taken up by their successors, and which were to become matters of life or death in the great historical events of the early twentieth century. And it is by no means accidental that all of them were centered around the marxist conception of the proletarian revolution, which was always the key question that distinguished the revolutionaries from the reformists and utopians in the workers' movement.
The second half of the 19th century was the period of capitalism's greatest acceleration and world-wide development. Within this context, the working class was able to wrest significant concessions from the bourgeoisie, considerably ameliorating the terrible conditions that had presided over the previous phases of capitalisms' life (limitations on the working day, on child labour, increase in real wages, etc). Combined with this were gains of a more political nature - the right to assemble, to form trade unions, to participate in elections, etc - which enabled the class to organise and express itself in the battle to improve its situation inside bourgeois society.
Marx and his tendency always insisted on the necessity for this fight for reforms, rejecting the sectarian arguments of elements such as Proudhon, and later Bakunin, who argued that such struggles were futile or a diversion from the revolutionary path. Against such ideas, Marx affirmed that a class which was unable to organise to defend its most immediate interests would never be capable of organising a new society.
But the very success of the struggle for reforms had its negative consequences - the growth of currents who turned this struggle into the ideology of reformism, openly rejecting the final communist goal in favour of concentrating on immediate gains, or mixing the two up into a confused and confusing medley. Marx and Engels may not have been able to see all the dangers involved in the growth of such currents - i.e. that they would end up dragging the majority of working class organisations into the service of the bourgeoisie and its state - but the combat against reformism as a species of bourgeois ideology inside the proletarian movement, a combat which was to occupy so much of the energies of later revolutionaries like Lenin and Luxemburg, certainly begins in earnest with them.
Thus, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx points out that not only are the immediate demands it contains (e.g. over education, child labour) formulated in a confused way; more importantly, the newly formed party completely fails to distinguish between such immediate demands and the ultimate revolutionary goal. This is particularly marked in the call for "producers' co-operatives with state aid and under the democratic control of the working people", which would supposedly pave the way towards "the socialist organisation of labour". Marx mercilessly criticises this Lassallean "prophet's remedy": "Instead of being the result of the revolutionary process of social transformation in society, the 'socialist organisation of the whole of labour' 'arises' from 'state aid' to producers' cooperatives which the state, not the workers, is to 'call into being'. The notion that state loans can be used for the construction of a new society as easily as they can for the construction of a new railway is worthy of Lassalle's imagination!". This is an explicit warning against listening to those who claim that the existing capitalist state can in some way be used as an instrument for creating socialism - even if they present it in more sophisticated terms than those of the Gotha Programme.
By the end of the 1870s, the advocates of reformism in the German party had become even more brazen, to the point of questioning whether the party should present itself as a working class organisation at all. In their 'Circular letter to Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke et al', written in September 1879, Marx and Engels made what is probably their most lucid attack on the opportunist elements who were more and more infiltrating the movement:
"The people who appeared as bourgeois democrats in 1848 can now just as well call themselves Social Democrats. Just as for the former the democratic republic was unattainably remote so, too, is the overthrow of the capitalist order for the latter, and it has therefore absolutely no significance for the political practise of the present day; one can mediate, compromise and philanthropise to one's heart's content. And it is just the same with the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. On paper it is acknowledged because its existence can no longer be denied; but in practise it is hushed up, watered down, attenuated. The Social Democratic Party is not to be a workers' party; it is not to incur the hatred of the bourgeoisie or of anyone; above all it should conduct energetic propaganda among the bourgeoisie; instead of stressing far-reaching goals which deter the bourgeoisie and are unattainable in our generation anyway, it should rather devote its whole strength and energy to those petty-bourgeois patchwork reforms which could provide the old social order with new supports and hence perhaps transform the final catastrophe into a gradual, piecemeal and, as far as possible, peaceful process of dissolution".
Here in outline is the marxist critique of all the later variants of reformism that were to have such a disastrous effect within the ranks of the international working class.
The Gotha Programme's inability to define the real connection between the defensive and offensive phases of the proletarian movement was also embodied in its utter confusion about the state. Marx lambasted its call for a "free people's state and a socialist society" as a nonsensical phrase, since the state and freedom are two opposed principles: "freedom consists in converting the state from an organ standing above society into one completely subordinated to it" (Critique). In a fully developed socialist society, there will be no state at all. But more important still is Marx's recognition that this call for a "people's state", to be realised by the granting of "democratic" reforms which a number of capitalist countries have already conceded, is a way of avoiding the crucial question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is in this context that Marx raises the question: "what transformation will the nature of the state undergo in communist society? In other words, what social functions will remain in existence that are analogous to present functions of the state? The question can only be answered scientifically, and one does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousand fold combination of the word people with the word state”.
Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.
“Now the programme does not deal with this nor with the nature of the future state of communist society" (ibid)[3].
As we saw in the last article in this series, this notion of a proletarian dictatorship was, in 1875, something very real for Marx and his tendency: the Paris Commune, only four years earlier, had been the first living episode of the working class in power, and it had shown that such a vast political and social turn-around can only take place when the workers smash the existing state machine and replace it with their own organs of power. The Gotha Programme demonstrated that this lesson had not been assimilated by the workers' movement as a whole, and as the reformist current grew within the movement, it was to be forgotten more and more.
In the interests of historical accuracy, however, it is necessary to point out that even Marx and Engels themselves had not fully assimilated this lesson. In a speech to the Hague congress of the International, in September 1872, Marx could still argue that "heed must be paid to the institutions, customs and traditions of the various countries, and we do not deny that there are countries, such a America and England, and if I was familiar with its institutions, Holland, where the workers may attain their goal by peaceful means. That being the case, we must recognise that in most continental countries the lever of the revolution will have to be force; a resort to force will be necessary one day in order to set up the rule of labour".
It has to be said that this idea was an illusion on Marx's part - a measure of the weight of democratic ideology on even the most advanced elements in the workers' movement. In the years that followed, all sorts of opportunists were to seize upon such illusions to give Marx's seal of approval to their efforts to abandon any idea of a violent revolution and to lull the working class into believing that it could get rid of capitalism by legally and peacefully using the organs of bourgeois democracy. But the authentic marxist tradition does not lie with them: it lies with the likes of Pannekoek, Bukharin and Lenin, who took the most daring and revolutionary elements in Marx's thinking on the question, those which led inexorably to the conclusion that in order to establish the rule of labour in any country, the working class would have to use the lever of force, and first and foremost against the existing state machine, no matter how democratic its forms. What's more, reality, the real evolution of the democratic state, had assisted them in reaching this conclusion, for as Lenin put it in State and Revolution:
"Today, in 1917, at the time of the first great imperialist war, this restriction made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and last representatives - in the whole world - of Anglo-Saxon 'liberty', in the sense that they had no militarist clique and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves. Today, in Britain and America, too, "the precondition for every people's revolution" is the smashing, the destruction of the "ready-made state machinery"".
The International Workingmen's Association had proclaimed that "the emancipation of the working class must be conquered by the working classes themselves". Although it was not possible, in the workers' movement of the 19th century, to clarify all aspects of the relationship between the proletariat and its revolutionary minority, this affirmation is a basic premise of all subsequent clarifications. And in the polemics within the movement after 1871, the marxist fraction had a number of occasions to take the issue further than the IWA's general assertion. Particularly in the combat against the out-and-out reformist elements infesting the German party, Marx and Engels were led to show that elitist and hierarchical views of the relationship between party and class were the result of the penetration into the movement of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology, which was carried in particular by middle class intellectuals who saw the workers' movement as a vehicle for their own schemes for improving society.
The marxist response to this danger was not to retreat into workerism, the idea that an organisation made up solely of industrial workers was the best guarantee against the penetration of alien class ideas. "It is an inevitable phenomenon which is rooted in the course of the development that people from the hitherto ruling class join the struggling proletariat and supply it with educative elements. We have already stated this clearly in the Manifesto. But two points must be noted here: firstly, in order to be of use to the proletarian movement, these people must bring real educative elements with them. But this is not the case with the great majority of the German bourgeois converts ... Secondly, when such people from other classes join the proletarian party the first requirement is that they do not bring any remnants of bourgeois, petty bourgeois etc prejudices with them, but that they adopt the proletarian outlook without prevarication. These gentlemen, however, as has been demonstrated, are chock full of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideas ... We cannot ally ourselves, therefore, with people who openly declare that the workers are too uneducated to free themselves and must first be liberated from above by philanthropic big bourgeois and petty bourgeois" ('Circular Letter to Bebel ... ').
The notion that the workers can only be emancipated by the benevolent actions of an all powerful state goes hand in hand with the idea of a party of 'benefactors' descending from the clouds to free the poor benighted workers from their ignorance and servitude. Both were part of the same reformist, state socialist package that Marx and his current fought with such energy. It should be said, however, that the delusion that a small elite could act on behalf of the class or in its place was not limited to these reformist elements: it could also be held by genuinely proletarian and revolutionary currents, and the Blanquists were the prime example of this. The Blanquist version of substitutionism was a vestige of an earlier phase of the revolutionary movement; in his Introduction to The Civil War in France, Engels shows how the living experience of the Paris Commune had practically refuted the Blanquist conception of revolution:
"Brought up in the school of conspiracy, and held together by the strict discipline which went with it, they started from the viewpoint that a relatively small number of resolute, well-organised men would be able, at a given moment, not only to seize the helm of state, but also by a display of great, ruthless energy, to maintain power until they succeeded in sweeping the mass of the people into the revolution and ranging them round the small band of leaders. This involved, above all, the strictest, dictatorial centralisation of all power in the hands of the new revolutionary government. And what did the Commune, with its majority of these same Blanquists, actually do? In all its proclamations to the French in the provinces, it appealed to them to form a free federation of all French Communes with Paris, a national organisation which for the first time was really to be created by the nation itself. It was precisely the oppressing power of the former centralised government, army, political police, bureaucracy, which Napoleon had created in 1798 and which then had been taken over by every new government as a welcome instrument used against its opponents - it was precisely this power which was to fall everywhere, just as it had already fallen in Paris".
That the best of the Blanquists were obliged to go beyond their own ideology was also confirmed in the debates within the Commune's central organ: when a significant element in the Commune Council wanted to suspend the Commune's democratic norms and set up a dictatorial "Committee of Public Safety" on the model of the French bourgeois revolution, a considerable number of those who openly opposed this move were Blanquists - proof that a genuinely proletarian current can be influenced by the development of the real movement of the class, something that rarely happened in the case of the reformists, who represented a very material tendency for the organisations of the class to fall into the hands of the class enemy.
Although the Gotha Programme talked about the "abolition of the wages system", its underlying vision of the future society was one of 'state socialism'. We have seen how it contains the absurd notion of a movement towards socialism through state-assisted workers' cooperatives. But even when it talks more directly about the future socialist society (in which a "free state" still exists...), it is unable to go beyond the perspective of an essentially capitalist society run by the state for everyone's benefit. Marx is able to detect this under the cover of the Programme's fine phrases, in particular the sections which talk about the need for "the co-operative regulation of the total labour with a fair distribution of the proceeds of labour", and "the abolition of the wage system together with the iron law of wages". These phrases reflect the Lassallean 'contribution' to economic theory, which was in fact a complete abandonment of Marx's scientific view of the origins of surplus value in the unpaid labour time extracted from the workers. The programme's empty words about "just distribution" conceal the fact that it actually makes no provision to do away with the basic mechanisms of value production, which is the infallible source of all "injustice" in distributing the proceeds of labour.
Against these confusions, Marx affirms that "within the co-operative society based on common ownership of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their products; just as little does the labour employed on the products appear here as the value of these products, as an objective quality possessed by them, since now, in contrast to capitalist society, individual labour no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component part of the total labour. The phrase "proceeds of labour", objectionable also today on account of its ambiguity, thus loses all meaning".
But rather than offering a utopian vision of the immediate abolition of all the categories of capitalist production, Marx points out the necessity to distinguish the lower from the higher phases of communism: "what we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges".
In this phase, there is still scarcity and still all the vestiges of capitalist 'normality'. On the economic level, the old wages system has been replaced by a system of labour-time vouchers: "the individual producer receives back from society ... exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour... He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such and such an amount of labour (after deducting his labour for the common funds). and with this certificate he draws from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs". As Marx points out in Capital, these certificates are no longer money in the sense that they cannot circulate or be accumulated; they can only 'buy' individual items of consumption. On the other hand, they are not entirely free of thee principles of commodity exchange:
"Here obviously the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his labour, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass into the ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption. But, as far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form. Hence equal right here is still - in principle - bourgeois right...", because, as Marx explains, workers have very different needs and capacities. It is only in the higher phase of communist society when "all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly" that "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right can be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"
What is the exact target of this polemic? Lying behind it is the classical conception of communism not as a 'state' to be imposed but as "the real movement which abolishes the present state of affairs" as The German Ideology had put it thirty years earlier. Marx thus elaborates the vision of the proletarian dictatorship initiating a movement towards communism, of a communist society emerging from the collapse of capitalism and from the proletarian revolution. Against the state socialist view that capitalist society somehow transforms itself into communism through the action of a state acting as society's unique and benevolent employer, Marx envisages a dynamic towards communism founded on a communist basis.
The idea of labour-time vouchers has to be considered in this light. In the first instance they are conceived as an attack on value production, as a means of getting rid of money as a universal commodity, of halting the dynamic of accumulation. They are seen not as a goal but as a means to an end, one which could be immediately introduced by the proletarian dictatorship as a first step towards a society of abundance which will have no further need to measure the individual's consumption according to his individual output.
Within the revolutionary movement, there has been and will continue to be a debate on whether this system is the most appropriate way of achieving these ends. For a number of reasons, we would argue that it is not. To begin with, the 'objective' socialisation of many aspects of consumption (electricity, gas, housing, transport etc) would in the future make it possible fairly rapidly to supply many such goods and services free of charge, subject only to the total reserves controlled by the workers; as for more individual items of consumption, a system of rationing controlled by the workers' councils would have the advantage of being more 'collective', less dominated by the conventions of value exchange. We will come back to these and other problems in a future article. Our main concern here is to uncover Marx's basic method: for him, the system of labour vouchers had its validity as a means of attacking the foundations of the wage labour system, and should be judged against this benchmark; at the same time, he clearly recognised its limitations, because integral communism cannot be introduced overnight but only after a "more or less long period of transition". In this sense, Marx is himself the severest critic of the system of labour time vouchers, insisting that they do not escape "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right" and embody the persistence of the law of value. And in fact whatever method of distribution the proletariat introduces in the aftermath of the revolution, it will still be marked by the vestiges of the law of value. Any false radicalism here is fatal (and, in fact, conservative in practise) because it would lead the proletariat to confuse a temporary and contingent means with the real goal. This, as we shall see, is a mistake that many revolutionaries fell into during the so-called War Communism period of the revolution in Russia. For Marx, the final communist aim always had to be kept in sight; otherwise the movement towards it would go astray and, in the end, be caught up once again in the orbit of the planet Capital.
The next article in this series will examine Marx's combat against the principal version of false radicalism in his day: the anarchist current around Bakunin.
CDW
[1] Engels goes on to say that "Whilst the capitalist mode of production ... forces on more and more the transformation of the vast means of production, already socialised, into state property, it shows itself the way to accomplishing this revolution. The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into state property", from which he concludes that "the first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society - the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society - this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state". Engels is doubtless referring here to the post-revolutionary state formed after the destruction of the old bourgeois state. The experience of the Russian revolution, however, has led the revolutionary movement to question even this formulation: ownership of the means of production even by the 'Commune state' does not lead to the disappearance of the state, and can even contribute to its reinforcement and perpetuation. But Engels could not have the benefit of such hindsight of course.
[2] Although Marx uses the term "society" here, he can only mean "country" and not capitalist society as a global whole: as he remarks elsewhere, a capital which does not confront other capitals is a "non-thing".
Capitalism cannot exist without competition between capitalist units. Moreover, history has shown that the nation-state is the highest level of effective unity that capitalism can attain. This has been confirmed recently by the disintegration of the imperialist blocs formed in 1945: once the dominant nation was no longer able to impose the unity of the bloc, it broke up into its component, and competitive, national units.
[3] In the last article in this series we referred to the experience of the Russian revolution, which for us has shown the need to make a distinction between the transitional state and the proletarian dictatorship, between the organ emanating out of the transitional society and charged with holding it together, and the actual instruments of proletarian power (workers' councils, factory committees, etc), which have the task of initiating and leading the process of communist transformation. On certain occasions, groups within the proletarian milieu have used this passage from the Critique of the Gotha Programme (ie. that the state can be nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat) to argue that this distinction is at odds with Marx and marxism. In reply we can only assert that the real movement of the class has clarified this question in practise as well as theoretically; but it is also important to understand the historical context of the passage, which was a polemic against those who wanted to leave the existing bourgeois state untouched and who shied away from the very idea of a proletarian revolution.
In the first part of this article we tried to bring out just how ignominious were the commemorations of the 1944 landings which in no way represented a “social” liberation for the working class. On the contrary they represented an unprecedented massacre in the final years of the war; misery and terror throughout the years of reconstruction. All the members of the different capitalist camps that fought one another were responsible for the war and it resulted in a redivision of the world between the great powers. As we’ve stressed many times in this Review, the working class didn’t make an appearance centre stage as it did during the First World War. In every country the workers were petrified by the capitalist terror. But although the proletariat was unable to rise to what it’s capable of historically by overthrowing the bourgeoisie this doesn’t mean that it had “disappeared” or that it had completely lost its combativity or that its revolutionary minorities remained completely inactive.
The working class is the only force able to oppose the unleashing of imperialist barbarism; the First World War was incontestable proof of this. The bourgeoisie went to war only after it had ensured that the international proletariat was enroled in the war and rendered impotent. Today’s democratic bourgeoisie can spout on about its liberation; its predecessors took very careful precautions before, during and after the war to stop the proletariat from shaking once more its barbarous edifice as it had done in Russia in 1917 and in Germany in 1918. The experience of the revolutionary wave that arose during and in opposition to that war confirmed the fact that the bourgeoisie is not an all-powerful class. The mass struggle of the proletariat leading to insurrection is a social bomb a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bomb built under the auspices of the “democratic” bourgeoisie. Once you refuse to be taken in by all the eulogising of chronological accounts of individual military battles against the evil of Hitler the whole process of the Second World War demonstrates that the proletariat remained one of the central preoccupations of the bourgeoisie in the various antagonistic camps. This doesn’t mean that the proletariat was in a condition to threaten the existing order as it had done two decades earlier but it remained a primary concern for the bourgeoisie. The latter couldn’t completely wipe out the class that produced the fundamental wealth in society so it had rather to destroy its consciousness. It had to obliterate from the minds of the workers the very idea that they exist as a social entity that is antagonistic to the interests of the “nation”, make them forget that once they unite massively they are able to change the course of history.
As we will briefly outline here, each time there was a risk of the proletariat rising up and attempting to affirm itself as a class a holy alliance of imperialisms was formed that crossed their own battle lines. The Nazi, democratic or Stalinist bourgeoisies reacted to preserve the capitalist social order, often without even having to co-ordinate their action. The immunological defences of the reactionary social order arise naturally. It’s only after half a century that the proletariat can draw the lessons of this long defeat, of the capacity of the decadent bourgeoisie to defend its order of terror.
The 1939-45 war was only possible because in the 1930s the proletariat didn’t have sufficient strength to prevent an international conflict; it had lost its consciousness of its class identity. The bourgeoisie succeeded in annihilating the proletarian threat in three stages:
- the crushing of the great revolutionary wave in the period after 1917 which ended in the triumph of Stalinism and the theory of “socialism in one country” being adopted by the Communist International;
- the dispersal of the social convulsions that took place in the centre of capitalism where the alternative between socialism or barbarism was decisively played out: in Germany this was mainly under the leadership of Social-Democracy with Nazism coming along to finish the job by imposing unprecedented terror on the workers;
- the total derailment of the workers’ movement in the democratic countries under the guise of “freedom against fascism” with the ideology of the “popular fronts” which managed to paralyse the workers of the industrialised countries more subtly than did “national unity” in 1914.
In Europe the “popular front” formula was no more than the forerunner of the National Front of the CP and other left parties during the war. Workers in the developed countries were manipulated into a situation in which they bowed either before anti-fascism or before fascism; symmetrical ideologies both of which entail submission to the defence of the “national interest”, to the imperialism of their respective bourgeoisies in other words. The German workers in the 1930s weren’t “victims of the Treaty of Versailles” as their rulers claimed but of the same crisis that affected their class brothers throughout the world. In the same way the workers of western Europe and of the United States weren’t the victims of Hitler, the unique “causative factor of the war” before the Almighty but of their own “democratic” bourgeoisies in their eagerness to defend their own sordid imperialist interests. In 1936 the mystification around anti-fascism and the “defence of democracy” was accompanied by propaganda aimed at pushing workers to take sides between the rival fractions of the bourgeoisie: fascism/anti-fascism, right/left, Franco/the Republic. In most of the European countries the “Popular Front” ideology which, as the name suggests, was an alliance between enemy classes recycled and aimed at convincing workers to accept unimaginable sacrifices, was created by left governments or left parties “in opposition” and had the ideological support of Stalinist Russia.
On the whole the war in Spain was a rehearsal for the World War with its confrontation between different imperialisms who stood behind the various Spanish fractions. And it served above all as a laboratory for the “popular fronts” and made it possible to concretise and designate “the enemy” (fascism) that the workers of western Europe would be called upon to fight against by mobilising behind their bourgeoisie. The hundreds of thousands of Spanish workers who were massacred were a better “proof” of the need for a “democratic war” than the assassination of an archduke in Sarajevo had been twenty years earlier.
The bourgeoisie could only go to war by defeating the workers, by convincing them that it was also their war:
“The bourgeoisie aims to put a stop to the class struggle or more precisely to destroy the proletariat’s power as a class, to destroy its consciousness, derail its struggles when it places its agents within the proletariat to empty the struggles of their revolutionary consciousness and draw them onto the path of reformism and nationalism which is the final and decisive condition for the outbreak of imperialist war” [1] [309].
In fact the bourgeoisie had learned from the experience of the revolutionary wave which began during the First World War; before unleashing the Second World War it made sure that it had completely crushed the proletariat, more effectively beaten it into submission than when it waged the “Great War”.
In relation to the political vanguard of the proletariat specifically we have to say that opportunism had triumphed within the workers’ parties several years before the beginning of the conflict and had transformed them into agents of the bourgeois state. In 1914 this had been less clear cut as in the majority of countries revolutionary currents continued to exist within the parties of the 2nd International. For example the Russian Bolsheviks or the German Spartakists were members of the Social-Democratic parties and they fought within these parties. When the war broke out the Social-Democratic parties were totally under the control of the bourgeoisie but within their ranks there were still signs of proletarian life which upheld the banner of proletarian internationalism notably at the conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal. On the other hand the parties belonging to the 3rd International ended up in the arms of the bourgeoisie during the 1930s, well before the beginning of the World War for which they were to act as zealous recruiting officers. And they were also reinforced by the Trotskyist organisations which at that moment passed over bag and baggage into the camp of the bourgeoisie by embracing the cause of one imperialist camp against the other (in the name of the defence of the USSR, of anti-fascism and other disgusting themes). Finally the breaking up, the extreme isolation of the revolutionary minorities who continued to defend principled positions against the war further attests to the extent of the defeat suffered by the proletariat.
Atomised, politically fragmented by the betrayal of the parties that spoke in their name and by the near non-existence of their communist vanguard, the workers’ response to the outbreak of war was one of general confusion.
As during the first global conflict it needed at least two or three years before the working class, stunned by the entry into war, could find the path of struggle once more. In spite of the terrible conditions existing in the World War and especially the terror that reigned because of it the working class showed that it was still able to struggle on its own terrain. However the terrible defeat it had suffered during the war meant that most of these struggles weren’t at a high enough level to lead in the medium term to revolution or to seriously unsettle the bourgeoisie. Most of the movements were dispersed, cut off from the lessons of previous struggles and above all they weren’t yet armed with a real reflection on why the international revolutionary wave begun in Russia in 1917 had been defeated.
So albeit in the worst of conditions the workers showed that in most of the belligerent countries they were able to raise their heads once more but censorship and media brain-washing predominated as long as the press was still in existence. In the bombed factories, in the prison camps, in the areas where they lived the workers tended naturally to rediscover their classic means of protesting. In France for example from the second half of 1941 there were dozens of strikes for improved wages and working hours. Workers tended to turn their backs on all participation in the war (although half the country was occupied): “class instinct was stronger than national duty” [2] [310]. The miners’ strike in the Pas-de-Calais is a significant demonstration of this. They laid the responsibility for the worsening of working conditions at the door of their French bosses, they weren’t yet following the Stalinist slogans for the “patriotic struggle”. The description of this strike is telling:
“The strike on the 7th at Douges broke out in the same way that strikes have always broken out in the pits. There was discontent. They’d had enough. The miners didn’t consider the question of legality any more in 1941 than in 1936 or 1902. They weren’t concerned that there were infantry companies at the front line or a popular front government in power or Hitler’s men waiting to deport them. Down the pits they consulted together and agreed. They cried “Long live the strike” and they sang at the top of their voices, tears in their eyes, tears of joy, tears of success” [3] [311]. The movement extended over several days, leaving the German military powerless and involving more than 70,000 miners. The movement was savagely repressed [4] [312].
1942 saw other workers’ strikes, some of them accompanied by street demonstrations. The introduction of the “relief” (forced labour in Germany) provoked strikes even when the country was occupied until the PCF and the Trotskyists derailed the combat into a nationalist struggle. We should note however that the strikes and demonstrations remained restricted to the economic level against food rationing and supplies going for military needs. In the Borinage in Belgium January was marked by a series of strikes and protest movements in the coal mines. In June a strike broke out in the Herstal factory and housewives demonstrated in front of the Hotel de Ville in Liège. When it was announced that thousands of workers would be forcibly deported in the winter of 1942, 10,000 workers once more went on strike in Liège and the movement involved 20,000 others. In the same period there was a strike of Italian workers in Germany in a big aircraft factory and at the beginning of 1943 in Essen, there was a strike of foreign workers, some of them French.
The proletariat was unable to develop a frontal struggle against the war, against its own bourgeoisie, in the way that the Russian workers had done in 1917. If the struggle remains at this level (a protest that doesn’t become general) then although it may be a reaction against the bosses and the unions who break strikes, once the bosses agree to salary increases (as they did in the USA and England for example) it enables the government to continue the war all the more effectively. The risk in this situation is that the nationalist ideology of the Liberation can be grafted onto it. Well before the introduction in France of “forced labour” (the bread and wine for the National Union in 1942-43), the British bourgeoisie possessed a fanatical advocate of forced labour in the form of the British CP and its hysterical reaction to the German attack on Russia in the middle of 1941. From then on and in concert with the Trotskyists through the unions there was no longer any question of strike action but rather of increasing production in order to help the war effort and support the Russian (imperialist) bastion [5] [313].
The continuation of the World War worked against the bourgeoisie in spite of the profound weakness of the proletariat as we can see from the increase in strike days in England. In the period when war was declared there was a drastic fall but from 1941 onwards the number of strikes increased until 1944, then it once more decreased after the “Victory”.
In the assessment it made of this period during the war the Communist Left in France recognised the importance of these strikes and supported them in their immediate objectives but it was “not lured into their vision which is still limited and contingent” [6] [314]. In the face of all these strikes that were relatively dispersed and did not link up most of the time owing to the predominance of military censorship the international bourgeoisie on both the German and the allied sides did all it could to prevent them radicalising, often by making minor economic concessions and always by using the unions which in their various forms were, and remain, an instrument of the bourgeois state. Social relations couldn’t remain peaceful for long during the war when inflation was increasing steadily.
The terrible seriousness of the situation makes it possible to understand why the revolutionary minorities of the period held out more hope for a revolution than was warranted by the real balance of class forces. The whole of Europe lived “on its uppers”, only workers who did fifteen to twenty hours overtime a week were able to afford food products, the price of which had increased tenfold in three years. In this situation of privation and hatred - a hatred that was redoubled by the sense of impotence in the face of internment and deportations - the outbreak of a mass struggle lasting several months by nearly two thousand Italian workers in March 1943, alerted the international bourgeoisie even more than the strikes breaking out in several countries, that it was time to prepare the lie of the Liberation as the only possible outcome of the war. We shouldn’t overestimate the scope of this movement but we must acknowledge that confronted with this autonomous action of the Italian proletariat on its own class terrain the Italian bourgeoisie took prompt and appropriate measures and in this it was assisted by the whole of the world bourgeoisie, which shows that it maintained the same vigilance that it had exhibited before the war.
At the end of March 50,000 workers went on strike in Turin for a “bombing” bonus and an increase in food rations without giving a thought to Mussolini’s views on the matter. Their rapid victory encouraged class action throughout the whole of north Italy against night work in the areas in danger of being bombed. This movement triumphed in its turn. The concessions didn’t placate the working class, new strikes arose accompanied by demonstrations against the war. This frightened the Italian bourgeoisie and in 24 hours it turned tail. But the Allied bourgeoisie was on the alert and occupied the south of Italy in the Autumn. This resurgence of the proletariat had to be countered by patching up the national Union on a royalist and democratic basis. With the complicity of the old fascist fogeys Grandi and Ciano who’d suddenly been converted to anti-fascism Vittorio Emanuele came out from the woodwork to stop Mussolini. In spite of everything mass demonstrations continued and spread throughout Turin, Milan, Bologna. Railway workers organised impressive strikes. In view of the breadth of the movement the caretaker government of Badoglio fled to Sicily in order to leave Mussolini - who’d been freed by Hitler - to return and carry out the repression with the Nazis and the tacit consent of Churchill. The German forces savagely bombarded working class towns. Churchill, who had said openly that it was necessary to “let the Italians stew in their own juice” declared that he did not want to negotiate with such a government. The working class certainly shows itself to be a liberator (as long as it’s able to go forward in accordance with its own dynamic) and to block it the Anglo-Saxon allies deemed it wise to change the puppets and pull the strings themselves. After the terrible repression and the consequent swelling of the ranks of the partisans whose resistance was completely within a capitalist framework the Allies were able to advance from the south to “liberate” the north and reinstate Badoglio [7] [315]. The bourgeoisie succeeded in dragging the Italian workers onto their own capitalist terrain with the ideology of the National Union just as it had done in France with the struggle against forced labour. It managed to do so up until the so-called Liberation, all strictly controlled by the Stalinist militias and the mafia.
This impressive movement that began in March 1943 was neither an accident nor a rarity in the midst of the general horror of the global holocaust. As we’ve just emphasised, during 1943 there was a timid international wave of resurgence in the struggle about which we obviously have little information. To give some examples: a strike at the Coqueril factory in Liège; 3,500 workers in struggle at an aircraft factory on the Clyde and a strike of miners near Doncaster, England (May 1943); strike of foreign workers in a Messerschmitt factory in Germany; strike at AEG, an important factory near Berlin where Dutch workers brought Belgian, French and even German workers into a protest against the low standard of the works canteen; strikes in Athens and demonstrations of housewives; 2,000 workers were on strike in Scotland in December 1943.
The mass strike of Italian workers remained encapsulated in Italy and the Resistance had robbed it of its class character. The ensuing massacre is the result of the failure sustained by the workers in the midst of the war: when the proletariat allows itself to be caught in the nationalist groove it is savagely decimated. To impose terror after proletarian actions of this kind is a constant tactic of the bourgeoisie. Moreover this terror was indispensable for the bourgeoisie because it hadn’t finished the war and it wanted its hands free until it had done so, particularly in theatres of operation outside Europe.
In eastern Europe wherever there was the danger of workers rising up, albeit without a revolutionary perspective, the bourgeoisie operated a burnt earth policy.
During the summer of 1944 the workers in Warsaw remained under the control of the Polish SP based in London. They participated in the insurrection launched by the Resistance when they learnt that the Red Army had entered the outskirts of the capital from the other side of the Vistula. And it was with the tacit consent of the Allies and the clear passivity of the Stalinist state that the German state was able to carry out its role of policeman and butcher by massacring tens of thousands of workers and razing the town to the ground. Eight days later Warsaw was a graveyard. Finally the “red” army let the massacre in Budapest take place and then made their entry as an army of grave diggers.
For its part the “liberating” western bourgeoisie did not want to risk social explosions against the war in the defeated countries. To avoid them it carried out monstrous bombings of German towns, bombings that for the most part had no military value but which were aimed at the workers’ districts (in Dresden in February 1945 the death toll was nearly 150,000, more than double that at Hiroshima). The aim was to exterminate as many workers as possible and terrorise the survivors so that they wouldn’t attempt to renew the revolutionary struggles of 1918 to 1923. Likewise the “democratic” bourgeoisie ensured it had the means to systematically occupy territory where the Nazis had had to withdraw. All offers of negotiation or armistice from Hitler’s opponents in Germany were rejected. If Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin had allowed the formation of a native German government in a vanquished country they would never have slept easy in their beds, it would have constituted a major threat. As in 1918 a vanquished German state would inevitably be weak in the face of a working class that was revolted by large scale slaughter and profound misery, and in the face of demobilised soldiers. The allied armies took it upon themselves to ensure order throughout Germany for an indefinite period (and they remained there until 1994 though for other reasons) and in doing so gave weight for a long time to one of century’s grossest lies: the “collective guilt” of the German people.
Throughout the last months of the war Germany experienced a series of riots, desertions and strikes. But a democratic figurehead such as Badoglio was superfluous amidst the hell of the bombings. The German working class had been terrorised, caught between the hammer and the anvil, between the allied armies and the Russian soldiers who were flooding in. Along the route taken by the disintegrating German army deserters were hung to act as a deterrent to others. The situation could have become disturbing if the bourgeoisie hadn’t continued to prepare the terrain in all its wretchedness for the period immediately after war. The ferocious repression was enough and social peace was preserved by the occupation and the shameless partition of Germany. Even though it was quite correct to welcome the reactions of the proletariat in Germany, our comrades at the time over-estimated the strength of the opposition that the bourgeoisie was confronting:
“When soldiers refuse to fight, coming close to civil war in some places, when sailors take up their revolvers against the war, when housewives, the Volkssturm, refugees increase the jitteriness of the German situation, the most formidable of military and police machines disintegrates and revolt is an immediate perspective. Von Rundstedt is repeating the policy of Ebert in 1918, he hopes to avoid civil war by treating for peace. The allies have understood the revolutionary threat contained in what began in Italy in 1943. The peace is now faced with the crisis that is raging savagely in Europe without the means to hide the contradictions which will be resolved by class war. The war effort, the brown plague, the barracks can no longer act as a pretext either to feed industries that have atrophied or to continue holding the working class in the present state of slavery and famine. But what’s more serious is the prospect of German soldiers returning to their ruined homes and the repetition of the 1918 revolution which is increasingly inevitable(...) For great ills there are heroic remedies: destroy, kill, starve, annihilate the German working class. We are a long way from punishing the brown plague, we are very far from the capitalists’ promise of peace. Democracy has demonstrated that it’s better able to defend bourgeois interests than the fascist dictatorship”[8] [316].
In fact the American and Russian armies were present in the streets in vanquished countries such as Germany, leaving no no-man’s land in the conquered towns and stifling any hint of proletarian resistance. In the victorious countries an incredible degree of chauvinism was generated that was much worse than in the First World War. As the revolutionary minority predicted, the democratic bourgeoisie feared contagion from the demobilised German soldiers, some of whom made no attempt to hide their joy: in old film they can be seen smiling and throwing their hats in the air. So the Western bourgeoisie decided to intern them in France and Britain. Part of the disintegrated German army was held abroad; 400,000 soldiers who were prisoners of war were dispatched to Britain and interned for several years after the end of the war to avoid them fomenting revolution, as their fathers had done before them, once they returned to their own country and the misery of Europe in the immediate post war period [9] [317].
Most revolutionary groups were enthusiastic about these events, grafting onto them the schema of the victorious revolution in Russia and the eruption of the proletariat against the war. The conditions of 1917 could not be repeated because the bourgeoisie had learnt its lessons.
It was nearly two years after the dramatic movement of the workers in Italy in 1943 before the clearest of the revolutionary minority were able to draw the lessons of the defeat the workers had sustained at an international level, and once more to profit from the drastic conditions of the World War to give an orientation for the revolution. The bourgeoisie knew how to keep the initiative and profit from the absence of revolutionary parties.
“Enriched by the experience of the first war and far better prepared for a possible revolutionary threat, international capitalism reacted solidly and with exceptional skill and prudence against a proletariat decapitated of its vanguard. From 1943 the war was transformed into a civil war. In saying this we don’t mean that the inter-imperialist antagonisms had disappeared or that they’d ceased to act in the pursuit of war. These antagonisms continued and increased but to a lesser extent and in a way that was secondary to the seriousness of the threat facing the capitalist world in the shape of a revolutionary explosion. The revolutionary threat will be the central concern and preoccupation of capitalism in both blocs: that’s what primarily determines the course of military operations, their strategy and the direction they take.(...)In the first imperialist war when once the proletariat took the path of revolution it kept the initiative and forced global capitalism to stop the war. By contrast in the present war capitalism seized the initiative at the first sign of the revolution in Italy in 1943 and implacably pursued a civil war against the proletariat. It forcibly prevented any concentration of proletarian forces, refused to stop the war even though Germany repeatedly demanded an armistice after the disappearance of the Hitler government, it resorted to monstrous carnage and a pitiless preventive massacre in order to nip in the bud any hint of a revolutionary threat from the German proletariat(...) The revolt of workers and soldiers who in certain towns got the better of the fascists, forced the allies to hasten their march and finish this war of extermination before they had planned to do so” [10] [318].
As we have said, the war was only possible because the 3rd International had degenerated and the communist parties had gone over into the bourgeois camp. The revolutionary minorities who fought against the rise of Stalinism and fascism from a class perspective were all defeated, expelled from the democratic countries and eliminated and deported from Russia and Germany. Of the international unity that the Internationals have represented in every epoch there remained only scraps, fractions, dispersed minorities often without any links between them. The Left Opposition of Trotsky, a current that had fought against the degeneration of the Russian revolution was gradually drawn towards opportunist positions on the Single Front (the possibility of an alliance with the left parties of the bourgeoisie) and its successor “anti-fascism”. Although Trotsky died, assassinated as was Jaurès (because in the eyes of the world bourgeoisie he symbolised the proletarian threat even more than the great tribune of the 2nd International) by the beginning of the second world holocaust his partisans were no better than the social chauvinists at the beginning of the century since they took the side of one of the imperialist camps; that of Russia and the Resistance.
Most of the minorities were no more than fragile vessels adrift amidst the disarray of the proletariat and they disintegrated when war broke out. In the 1930s only the Italian fraction regrouped around the review Bilan defended the position that the workers’ movement had entered into a period of defeat that would lead to war [11] [319].
The passage to clandestinity brought dispersal and the loss of precious contacts that had been built up over years. In Italy there was no organised group. In France it was only in 1942 in the depth of the imperialist war that the militants who had fought in the Italian fraction and had sought refuge there regrouped together and formulated political class positions against the opportunism of the Trotskyist organisations. They called themselves the French nucleus of the Communist Left. These courageous militants produced a declaration of principles which clearly rejected the “defence of the USSR”:
“The Soviet state is an instrument of the international bourgeoisie and has a counter-revolutionary function. The defence of the USSR in the name of what remains of the gains of October must therefore be rejected and replaced by an uncompromising struggle against the Stalinist agents of the bourgeoisie(...)Democracy and fascism are two aspects of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie which correspond to the economic and political needs of the bourgeoisie at given moments. Consequently as the working class has to establish its own dictatorship after destroying the capitalist state it must not take the side of one or other of these forms.”
Contact was re-established with elements of the revolutionary current in Belgium, Holland and with Austrian refugees in France. In the very dangerous conditions of clandestinity important debates emanated from Marseille around why the workers’ movement had undergone the recent defeat and re-establishing what were the class lines between proletariat and bourgeoisie. This revolutionary minority continued to intervene against the capitalist war and for the emancipation of the proletariat in complete continuity with the struggle of the 3rd International at its origins. Other groups who rejected the defence of the imperialist USSR and all forms of chauvinism emerged more or less clearly from the Trotskyist orbit: Munis’ group in Spain, the Revolutionäre Kommunisten Deutschlands of Austria and Dutch councilist groups. The leaflets put out by these groups against the war, distributed clandestinely, left on train seats were vilified by the bourgeoisie of the Resistance from Stalinists to democrats as “Hitler-Trotskyist”. Those who distributed them ran the risk of being shot on sight (see the documents published above and the presentation to them).
In Italy after the powerful struggles in 1943 the dispersed elements of the Left regrouped around Damen and later around Bordiga, a renowned figure of the left in the 2nd and 3rd Internationals. In July 1943 they constituted the Partito Comunista Internazionalista, but as they believed (as did most revolutionaries at the time) that there was to be an insurrectional push of the working class they succumbed to the capitalist Liberation and for all their courage had great difficulty defending clear positions to workers who were mobilised behind the sirens of the bourgeoisie [12] [320]. They were unable to promote the regroupment of revolutionaries at an international level and were reduced to a tiny minority after the war. In particular they refused to carry out any serious work with the French nucleus which from that time on called itself the Communist Left in France [13] [321].
In fact in spite of all their courage the revolutionary groups who defended international class positions during the 2nd World War were unable to influence the course of events because of the terrible defeat that the proletariat had suffered and the capacity of the bourgeoisie to systematically take the initiative and prevent the development of any class movement that could pose a real threat. But their contribution to the historic struggle of the proletariat is not at this level. It resides fundamentally in the process of reflection that it represented and which allowed them to draw the lessons of the important events that had taken place, a reflection that has continued up to the present day.
To continue with their critical method, to ourselves sieve through their errors is a mark of respect to the Marxist tradition that these groups upheld in the past, it is to remain faithful to the struggle that they waged. The Communist Left in France was able to correct the error it made in judging it possible that the process of defeat could be reversed during the Second World War even if they didn’t necessarily draw out all the implications of the fact that the course was not towards revolution. There were nevertheless other groups, in Italy in particular, who continued to apply a schematic view of revolutionary defeatism.
The Italian revolutionaries formed the party in Italy in a voluntarist and adventurist way around figures from the CI such as Bordiga and Damen and so didn’t really arm themselves with the means to re-establish class principles, much less to draw the real lessons from the experience of the past. Not only was this International Communist Party bound to fail - it rapidly found itself reduced to a sect - but it was also led to reject a Marxist analytic method in favour of a barren dogmatism which simply reiterated the schemas of the past on the question of war in particular. Even during the Liberation the PCI continued to believe that a revolutionary cycle would be initiated, parodying Lenin’s: “The transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war begins after the war has ended” [14] [322]. To repeat Lenin’s formula that every proletariat must desire “the defeat of its own bourgeoisie” as a spring board for the revolution - a position that was incorrect even at the time because it inferred that the workers of the conquering countries did not have this same spring board - makes the success of the revolution dependent on the failure of the home bourgeoisie and is no more than a mechanistic abstraction. In fact even during the first revolutionary wave, although the war acted initially as an important stimulus in mobilising the proletariat, it later gave rise to a division between the workers of the defeated countries who were the most clear and combative and those of the victorious countries against whom the bourgeoisie succeeded in using euphoria at the “victory” to paralyse their struggle and the development of their consciousness. Moreover the experience of 1917-18 also showed that if a revolutionary movement develops out of World War the bourgeoisie can play the card of ending the war, a card that it didn’t hesitate to play in November 1918 when the revolution in Germany was developing. This eliminates the main nourishment for the development of consciousness and action on the part of the proletariat.
Our comrades of the Communist Left were wrong when, on the basis of the unique example of the Russian revolution, they under-estimated the debilitating consequences of the world imperialist war on the proletariat. The Second World War was to bring elements towards a clearer analysis of this crucial question. As those groups who claim to be the sole inheritors of the Italian Communist Left unfortunately demonstrate, to repeat the errors of the past today is to block the real path towards class confrontation, it is to affirm the impossibility of enriching the Marxist method and to refuse to act as the guide that the proletariat needs [15] [323].
The question of war has always been of the greatest importance in the workers’ movement. Modern imperialist war, hand in hand with exploitation and the attacks of the economic crisis, remains a major factor in developing the consciousness that the revolution is indispensable. Clearly the permanent nature of war in capitalism’s decadent phase has to be a valuable factor towards reflection. This process of reflection must not stop now that the collapse of the eastern bloc, formerly presented as the devil incarnate, has momentarily postponed the possibility of another World War. The wars that are taking place on the borders of Europe serve as a reminder to the proletariat that “those who forget about war will one day have to endure it” [16] [324]. The great responsibility of the proletariat is still to rise up against this decomposing society. The perspective of a different society, achieved under the leadership of the proletariat, must of necessity entail the development of the class’ realisation that it must fight on its own social terrain and find its strength there. The growing struggle of the proletariat is a struggle that is antithetical to the military objectives of the bourgeoisie.
In spite of all the eulogistic refrains about the “new world order” set up in 1989 the working class of the industrialised countries should not be taken in by promises of a respite before the next round of human destruction. The fate that capitalism inescapably promises us is either a third World War if a new system of imperialist blocs is constituted, or else the total rotting away of society accompanied by famines, epidemics and a plethora of military conflicts in which the nuclear weapons that are produced all over the place will be called into service.
The alternative is still communist revolution or the destruction of humanity. United and determined workers can disarm the minority that pulls the strings and even make atomic bombs obsolete. So we must firmly reject the old argument of the bourgeoisie that claims that from now on modern technology will prevent any proletarian revolution. Technology is the product of men and it obeys a determined policy. Imperialist policy is always strongly determined, as the events of the Second World War demonstrate, by the state of submission of the working class. The historic resurgence of the proletariat at the end of the 1960s showed what is at stake, even if the international proletariat has not yet drawn all its lessons. In those places that have escaped the ravages of war the economic crisis hits, increases hardship and reveals the bankruptcy of capitalism.
The revolutionary minorities must sieve through the experience of the past. The “midnight of the century” experienced the greatest crime that humanity has ever known but it would be still more criminal to believe that the risk of the total destruction of humanity no longer exists. It isn’t enough to denounce the current wars, revolutionary minorities must be able to analyse the secrets of the imperialist policy of the world bourgeoisie, not in order to light the fuse in every place torn apart by war today and where militarism reigns supreme but rather to show the proletariat that the struggle doesn’t take place “at the front” but is conducted “behind the lines”.
In order to fight against imperialist war, which is always with us, and struggle against the attacks of the bourgeois economic crisis the working class must undergo a whole series of struggles and experiences which will lead towards the revolutionary civil war just when the bourgeoisie believes it’s at peace. A long period of class struggle is still necessary, nothing will be easy.
The proletariat has no choice. Capitalism will lead to the destruction of humanity if the proletariat proves to be powerless to destroy it.
Damien.
[1] [325] "Report On The International Situation To The July 1945 Conference Of The Communist Left In France", International Review 59.
[2] [326] Gregoire Madjarian, Conflits, pouvoirs et societé à la Libération. The work of Stéphane Courtois, Le PCF dans la guerre is also interesting.
[3] [327] From the memoirs of Auguste Lecoeur, ex-right hand man of the French Stalinist leader Thorez. He was excluded after the war and is therefore freer to express the truth about the struggle which he and others lied about at the time, claiming that it was primarily a nationalist struggle.
[4] [328] Because of the situation this movement was premature and isolated, and it was unable to have the resounding effect of the massive struggle of the Italian workers in 1943. It’s worth noting however the differences between the fearful occupation of the German military (the officers never dared go down the pits) and the dictatorship exercised by the PCF over the miners at the Liberation. A television report on France’s Channel 3 in August disclosed some amazing revelations from some of the miners who survived the "battle for production". Servants of the Gaullist government, Stalinist ministers demanded an enormous effort to the point that the mines became a graveyard - after the war. Thousand of their comrades who died of silicosis or because of mechanisation and excessive speed-ups were martyred not by the "Boche" or even by the struggle "against the Boche" but on the orders of the Stalinist minister Thorez. In order to "set the country on its feet again" Thorez didn’t hesitate to declare, "If the miners die at their post, their wives will replace them". Only in totalitarian Russia was life expectancy so short.
[5] [329] Anti-Parliamentary Communism. The movement for Workers’ Councils, 1917-45, Mark Shipway.
[6] [330] Report On The International Situation, July 1945.
[7] [331] We deal with this movement in Italy in 1943 in the International Review 75.
[8] [332] "La Paix", L’Etincelle no 5, organ of the Communist Left in France.
[9] [333] The re-education of German prisoners in England from 1945 to 1948, Henry Faulk, Chatto and Windus, London 1977.
[10] [334] Extract from the Report On The International Situation, Communist Left in France, July 1945, reprinted in the International Review 59, 1989.
[11] [335] We don’t have room here to go over in detail the debates in the Italian fraction or the divergences between the different groups but the history of the Communist Left in Italy is available to our readers.
[12] [336] See the articles: "The ambiguity of Battaglia Comunista on the question of the partisans", International Review 8, Dec 1976, "The origins of the PCI: what it claims to be, what it is", International Review 32, 1st quarter 1983 and "Concerning the origins of the PCI", International Review 34, 3rd quarter 1983.
[13] [337] On the history of these groups see the Italian Communist Left and the International Review nos. 34, 35, 38, 39, 64, 65, 66.
[14] [338] Quoted from Internationalisme 36, 1948, reprinted in International Review 36, 1st quarter 1984.
[15] [339] At the time of the Gulf war we showed what bad use the currents who claim descent from the Italian Left still make of revolutionary defeatism when they called for "fraternisation between Iraqi and western soldiers" (see the article "The political proletarian milieu faced with the Gulf war", International Review 64, 1st quarter 1991). In a zone and in conditions in which the proletariat is extremely weak, to toss into the air slogans of this type that stem from anarchist voluntarism can only at best give credence to individual desertions. These comrades must ask themselves why the bourgeoisie has the means to lead local wars without worrying about the proletariat and why it is unable to unleash them in the heart of the industrialised metropoles. Worse still, these slogans, broadly taken up by all the leftist sects, are often only a fig leaf to cover support for the imperialism of the little countries oppressed by the big ones. A recent issue (no 427) of Le Prolétaire offers a slogan in the form of the smarmy title: "French imperialism out of Africa and Rwanda!" We are the first to denounce French imperialism as a butcher in its resistance to the kick in the pants that American imperialism is giving it, and it bears an enormous responsibility for the massacre of more than 500,000 human beings in Rwanda. But we would be ashamed to share a slogan with American imperialism! Such a slogan for the PCI certainly has a very "defeatist" sound to it. So what? French imperialism has effectively been defeated in Rwanda, in what way has it advanced one iota the class consciousness of the workers in France?
[16] [340] Albert Camus.
In the last article in this series we looked at the combat waged by the marxist tendency in the International Workingmen's Association against the reformist and "state socialist" ideologies in the workers' movement, particularly in the German party. And yet according to the anarchist or "anti-authoritarian" current led by Mikhail Bakunin, Marx and Engels typified and even inspired the state socialist tendency, were the foremost proponents of that "German socialism" which wanted to replace capitalism not with a free stateless society but with a terrible bureaucratic tyranny of which they themselves would be the guardians. To this day, Bakunin's criticisms of Marx are presented by anarchists and liberals alike as a profound insight into the real nature of marxism, a prophetic explanation of why the theories of Marx led inevitably to the practises of Stalin.
But as we shall try to show in this article, Bakunin's "radical critique" of marxism, like all the subsequent ones, is radical in appearance only. The response that Marx and his current made to this pseudo-radicalism necessarily accompanied the fight against reformism, because both ideologies represented the penetration of alien class viewpoints into the ranks of the proletariat.
The growth of anarchism in the second half of the 19th century was the product of the resistance of the petty bourgeois strata - artisans, intellectuals, shopkeepers, small peasants - to the triumphant march of capital, a resistance to the process of proletarianisation which was depriving of them of their former social "independence". Strongest in those countries where industrial capital arrived late, in the eastern and southern peripheries of Europe, it expressed both the rebellion of these strata against capitalism, and their inability to look beyond it, to the communist future; instead it gave voice to their yearning for a semi-mythical past of free local communities and strictly independent producers, unencumbered by the oppressions of industrial capital and the centralising bourgeois state.
The "father" of anarchism, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, was the classical incarnation of this attitude, with his fierce hatred not only of the state and the big capitalists, but of collectivism in all forms, including trade unions, strikes, and similar expressions of working class collectivity. Against all the real trends developing within capitalist society, Proudhon's ideal was a "mutualist" society founded upon individual artisan production, linked together by free exchange and free credit.
Marx had already lambasted Proudhon's visions in his book The Poverty of Philosophy, published in 1847, and the evolution of capital itself in the second part of the century gave practical demonstration of the obsolescence of Proudhon's ideas. To the "mass worker" of capitalist industry, it was increasingly obvious that both for resisting capitalist exploitation and abolishing it altogether, only a collective struggle and a collective appropriation of the means of production could offer any hope.
On the face of it, the Bakuninist current, which from the 1860s onwards tried to combine Proudhon's "anti-authoritarianism" with a collectivist and even communist approach to social questions, looks like a clear advance over classical Proudhonism. Bakunin even wrote to Marx expressing his admiration for his scientific work, declaring himself to be his disciple and offering to translate Capital into Russian. And yet, despite its ideological backwardness, the Proudhonist current had, at certain moments, played a constructive role in the formation of the workers' movement: Proudhon had been a factor in Marx's movement towards communism in the 1840s, and the Proudhonists had helped to found the IWMA. The history of Bakuninism, by contrast, is almost entirely a chronicle of the negative and destructive work it carried out against the International. Even Bakunin's professed admiration for Marx was part of this syndrome: Bakunin himself confessed that he had "praised and honoured Marx for tactical reasons and on grounds of personal policy", the ultimate aim being to break up the marxist "phalanx" which dominated the International (cited in Nicolaevsky, Karl Marx: Man and Fighter, chap 18, p 308 of the Penguin edition).
The essential reason for this is that while Proudhonism predated marxism, and Proudhonist groups the First International, Bakuninism developed to a large extent in reaction against marxism and against the development of a centralised, international proletarian organisation. Marx and Engels explain this evolution in relation to the general problem of "sects", but the target is above all the Bakuninists, since the passage is from "The Alleged Splits in the International" (1872), which was the response of the General Council to Bakuninist intrigues against the IWMA:
"The first phase in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is marked by sectarianism. This is because the proletariat has not reached the stage of being sufficiently developed to act as a class. Individual thinkers provide a critique of social antagonisms, and put forward fantastic solutions which the mass of workers can only accept, pass on, and put into practise. By their very nature, the sects established by these initiators are abstentionist, strangers to all genuine action, to politics, to strikes, to coalitions, in brief, to any unified movement ... All these sects, though at first they provide an impetus to the movement, become an obstacle to it once it has moved further forward".
The main stake in the struggle between the marxists and the Bakuninists was the International itself: nothing more clearly demonstrated the petty bourgeois essence of anarchism than its approach to the organisational question, and it is no accident that the issue which led to the open split between these two currents was not an abstract debate about the future society, but about the functioning of the proletarian organisation, its internal mode of operation. But, as we shall see, these organisational differences were also connected to different visions of the future society and the means to create it.
From the time that they joined the International at the end of the 1860s, but above all in the period following the defeat of the Commune, the Bakuninists raised a hue and cry about the role of the General Council, the central organ of the International which was based in London and thus strongly influenced by Marx and Engels. For Bakunin, the General Council was a mere cover for the dictatorship of Marx and his "coterie"; he thus put himself forward as the champion of the freedom and autonomy of the local sections against the tyrannical pretensions of the "German socialists". This campaign was deliberately linked to the question of the future society, since the Bakuninists argued that the International itself was to be the embryo of the new world, the precursor of a decentralised federation of autonomous communes. By the same token, the authoritarian rule of the marxists within the International betrayed their vision of the future: a new state bureaucracy lording it over the workers in the name of socialism.
It is perfectly true that the proletarian organisation, in both its internal structure and its external function, is determined by the nature of the communist society it is aiming for, and of the class which bears that society within itself. But contrary to the anarchist conception, the proletariat has nothing to fear from centralisation in itself: communism is indeed the centralisation of the world's productive capacities to replace the competitive anarchy of capitalism. And in order to reach this stage, the proletariat has to centralise its own fighting forces to take on an enemy which has frequently demonstrated its capacity to unite against it. This is why the marxists replied to Bakunin's taunts by pointing out that his programme of complete local autonomy for the sections meant the end of the International as a unified body. As the organisation of the proletarian vanguard, the "militant organisation of the proletarian class in every country, linked together in common struggle against the capitalists, the landowners, and their class power organised by the state" ("The Alleged Splits ..."), the International could not speak with hundreds of conflicting voices: it had to be able to formulate the goals of the working class in a clear and unambiguous manner. And for this to be the case, the International needed effective central organs - not facades concealing the ambitions of dictators and careerists, but elected and accountable bodies charged with maintaining the unity of the organisation between its congresses.
The Bakuninists on the other hand sought to reduce the General Council to "no more than an office for correspondence and providing statistics. Its administrative functions being abandoned, its correspondence would obviously be reduced simply to reproducing information already published in the Association's various journals. The correspondence office would therefore barely exist. As for providing statistics, that is a job that can be done without a powerful organisation, and even more, as expressly stated in the original Rules, without a common objective. Now since these things smack strongly of 'authoritarianism', while there should perhaps be an office, it should not be a statistical office. In brief, the General Council should go. The same logic would also disband Federal Councils, local committees and all other centres of "authority". All that would remain would be autonomous sections" (ibid).
Later on in the same text, Marx and Engels argued that if anarchy meant only the ultimate aim of the class movement - the abolition of social classes and thus of the state which guards class divisions - then all socialists were for it. But the Bakuninist current meant something different in its actual practise, since it "designates anarchy in the ranks of the proletariat as the infallible means of destroying the powerful concentration of social and political forces in the hands of the exploiters. It is therefore demanding that the International replace its organisation with anarchy - just at a time when the old world is trying to destroy it. The international police could ask no better means to prolong the Thiers republic forever, while covering it with the mantle of empire".
But there was far more to Bakunin's project than some abstract opposition to all forms of authority and centralisation. In fact, what Bakunin was against was above all the "authority" of Marx and his current; and his tirades against its alleged propensity for secret manoeuvering and plotting was fundamentally the projection of his own deeply hierarchical and elitist conception of organisation. His guerilla war against the Central Council was really motivated by a determination to set up an alternative, if hidden, centre of power.
When Marx and Engels evoked the history of "sectarian" organisations, they were referring not just to the wooly-minded utopian ideas that often characterised such groups, but also to their political practises and functioning, inherited from bourgeois and petty bourgeois secret societies with their cloak and dagger traditions, occult oaths and rituals, sometimes combined with a propensity for terrorism and assassination. As we have seen in a previous article in this series (see International Review 72), the formation of the Communist League in 1847 already marked a definitive break with such traditions. Bakunin, however, was steeped in these practises and never abandoned them. Throughout his political career, his policy was always one of forming secret groups under his direct control, groups based more on personal "affinity" than on any political criteria, and using these hidden channels of influence to gain hegemony over wider organisations.
Having failed to turn the liberal League of Peace and Freedom into his version of a revolutionary socialist organisation, Bakunin formed the Alliance of Socialist Democracy in 1868. It had branches in Barcelona, Madrid, Lyons, Marseilles, Naples and Sicily; the main section was in Geneva with a Central Bureau under Bakunin's personal control. The "Socialist" part of the Alliance was very vague and confused, defining its goal as "the social and economic equalisation of classes" (rather than their abolition), and fixating obsessively on the "abolition of the right of inheritance" as the key to the overcoming of private property.
Shortly after its formation, the Alliance applied for membership of the International. The General Council criticised the confusions in its programme, and insisted that it could not be admitted into the International as a parallel international organisation; it would have to dissolve itself and convert its individual sections into sections of the International.
Bakunin was quite happy to agree to these terms for the simple reason that the Alliance was, for him, only a front for an increasingly esoteric maze of secret societies, some fictional, some real; for a Byzantine hierarchy ultimately answerable to none other than "citizen B" himself. The full story of Bakunin's secret societies has yet to be uncovered, but certainly behind the Alliance (which in any case was not really dissolved upon entering the IWMA) the "International Brotherhood" was an inner circle that had already been operating inside the League for Peace and Freedom. There was also a shadowy "National Brotherhood" midway between the Alliance and the International Brotherhood. There may have been others. The point is that such formations betray a mode of functioning entirely alien to the proletariat. Where proletarian organisations function through elected and accountable central organs, Bakunin's convoluted hierarchy could be accountable to no one but himself. Where proletarian organisations, even when they have to operate in clandestinity, are fundamentally open to their own comrades, Bakunin treats the "average" members of his organisation as mere footsoldiers to be manipulated at will, unaware of the purposes they are really serving.
It is therefore no surprise to find that this elitist conception of relations within the proletarian organisation is reproduced in the Bakuninist view of the function of the revolutionary organisation within the class as a whole. The General council's polemic against the Bakuninists, "The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the IWMA", written in 1873, picks out the following gems from Bakunin's writings:
"It is necessary that in the midst of popular anarchy, which will make up the very life and all the energy of the revolution, the unity of revolutionary thought and action should be embodied in a certain organ. That organ must be the secret and world-wide association of the international brothers". Admitting that revolutions can't be made by individuals or secret societies, the latter has the task of organising "not the army of the revolution - the army must always be the people - but a revolutionary general staff composed of devoted, energetic and intelligent individuals who are above all sincere - not vain or ambitious - friends of the people, capable of serving as intermediaries between the revolutionary idea and the popular instincts. The number of these individuals should not, therefore, be too large. For the international organisation throughout Europe one hundred serious and firmly united revolutionaries would be sufficient ...".
Marx and Engels, who wrote the text in collaboration with Paul Lafargue, then comment:
"So everything changes. Anarchy, the 'unleashing of popular life', of 'evil passions' and all the rest is no longer enough. To assure the success of the revolution one must have 'unity of thought and action'. The members of the International are trying to create this unity by propaganda, by discussion and the public organisation of the proletariat. But all Bakunin needs is a secret organisation of one hundred people, the privileged representatives of the revolutionary idea, the general staff in the background, self-appointed and commanded by the permanent 'citizen B'. Unity of thought and action means nothing but orthodoxy and blind obedience ... we are indeed confronted with a veritable Society of Jesus".
Bakunin's real hatred of capitalist exploitation and oppression is not in question. But the activities he engaged in were profoundly dangerous for the workers' movement. Unable to wrest control of the International, he was reduced to a work of sabotage and disorganisation, to the provocation of endless internal squabbles which could only weaken the International. His penchant for conspiracy and bloodthirsty phraseology made him a willing dupe of an openly pathological element like Nechayev, whose criminal actions threatened to bring discredit upon the entire International.
These dangers were magnified in the period after the Commune, when the proletarian movement was in disarray and the bourgeoisie, which was convinced that the International had "created" the uprising of the Paris workers, was everywhere persecuting its members and seeking to destroy its organisation. The International, led by the General Council, had to react very firmly to Bakunin's intrigues, affirming the principle of open organisation against that of secrecy and conspiracy: "There is only one means of combatting all these intrigues, but it will prove astonishingly effective; this means is complete publicity. Exposure of all these schemings in their entirety will render them utterly powerless" (ibid). The Council also called for, and obtained at the 1872 Hague Congress, the expulsion of Bakunin and his associate Guillaume - not because of the many ideological differences they undoubtedly had, but because their political practises had endangered the very existence of the International.
In fact, the struggle for the preservation of the International had at this moment more of a historical than an immediate significance. The forces of counter-revolution were gathering pace, and the Bakuninist intrigues were only accelerating a process of fragmentation that was being imposed by the general conditions facing the class. To the extent that they were aware of these unfavourable conditions, the marxists considered it better that the International should be (at least temporarily) dismantled than fall into the hands of political currents who would undermine its essential purpose and bring its very name into disrepute. This was why - again at the Hague Congress - Marx and Engels called for the General Council to be transferred to New York. It was the effective end of the First International, but when the revival in the class struggle permitted the formation of the Second nearly two decades later, it was to be on a much clearer political basis.
The organisational question was the immediate focus for the split in the International. But intimately connected to the differences on organisation between the marxists and the anarchists was a whole series of more general theoretical issues which again revealed the different class origins of the two standpoints.
At the most "abstract" level, Bakunin, despite claiming to stand for materialism against idealism, openly rejected Marx's historical materialist method. The point of departure here was the question of the state. In a text written in 1872, Bakunin states the differences quite openly:
"The marxist sociologists, men like Engels and Lasalle, in objecting to our views contend that the state is not at all the cause of the poverty, degradation and servitude of the masses; that both the miserable condition of the masses and the despotic power of the state are, on the contrary, the effect of a more general underlying cause. In particular, we are told that they are both the products of an inevitable stage in the economic evolution of society; a stage which, historically viewed, constitutes an immense step forward to what they call the 'Social Revolution'" (cited in Bakunin on Anarchy, edited by Sam Dolgoff, New York, 1971).
Bakunin, on the other hand, not only defends the view that the state is the "cause" of the suffering of the masses, and its immediate abolition the precondition for their deliverance: he also takes the logical step of rejecting the materialist view of history, which considers that communism is only possible as the result of a whole series of developments in man's social organisation and productive capacities - developments which include the dissolution of the original human communities and the rise and fall of a succession of class societies. Against this scientific approach, Bakunin substitutes a moral one:
"We who, like Mr Marx himself, are materialists and determinists, also recognise the inevitable linking of economic and political facts in history. We recognise, indeed the necessity and inevitable character of all events that occur but we no longer bow before them indifferently, and above all we are very careful about praising them when, by their nature, they show themselves in flagrant contradiction to the supreme end of history. This is a thoroughly human ideal which is found in more or less recognisable form in the instincts and aspirations of the people and in all the religious symbols of all epochs, because it is inherent in the human race, the most social of all the species of animals on earth. This ideal, today better understood than ever, is the triumph of humanity, the most complete conquest and establishment of personal freedom and development - material, intellectual and moral - for every individual, through the absolutely unrestricted and spontaneous organisation of economic and social solidarity.
Everything in history that shows itself conformable to that end from the human point of view - and we can have no other - is good; all that is contrary to it is bad" (ibid).
It is true, as indeed we have shown in this series, that the "ideal" of communism has appeared in the strivings of the oppressed and the exploited throughout history, and this striving corresponds to the most fundamental human needs. But marxism has demonstrated why, up until the capitalist epoch, such aspirations were doomed to remain an ideal - why, for example, not only the communist dreams of the Spartacus slave revolt, but also the new feudal form of exploitation which extricated society from the impasse of slavery, were necessary moments in the evolution of the conditions which make communism a real possibility today. For Bakunin, however, while the first might be considered "good", the second could only be considered "bad", just as in the text cited above, he goes on to argue that while the "comparatively higher standard of human liberty" in ancient Greece was good, the later conquest of Greece by the more barbaric Romans was bad, and so on down through the centuries.
From this starting point, it becomes impossible to judge whether a social formation or social class is playing a progressive or regressive role in the historical process; instead all things are measured by an abstract ideal, a moral absolute which remains unchanging throughout history.
Around the margins of the revolutionary movement today there are a number of "modernist" currents who specialise in rejecting the notion of the decadence of capitalism: the most logically consistent of these (eg the Groupe Communiste Internationaliste, or the Wildcat group in the UK) have gone on to dismiss the marxist conception of progress altogether, since to argue that a social system is in decline obviously involves accepting that it was once in the ascendant. They conclude that progress is a completely bourgeois notion and that communism has been possible at any time in history.
As it turns out, these modernists are not so modern after all: they are faithful epigones of Bakunin, who also came to reject any idea of progress and insisted that the social revolution was possible at any time. In his "seminal" work, Statism and Anarchy (1873), he argues that the two essential conditions of a social revolution are: extremes of suffering, almost to the point of despair, and the inspiration of a "universal ideal". This is why, in the same passage, he argues that the place most ripe for a social revolution is Italy, as opposed to the more industrially developed countries, where the workers are "relatively affluent" and "so impregnated by a variety of bourgeois prejudices that, excepting income, they differ in no way from the bourgeoisie".
But Bakunin's revolutionary Italian "proletariat" consists of "two or three million urban workers, mainly in factories and small workshops, and approximately twenty million totally deprived peasants". In other words, Bakunin's proletariat is really a new name for the bourgeois notion of "the people" - all those who suffer, regardless of their actual place in the relations of production, their capacity to organise, to become conscious of themselves as a social force. Elsewhere, indeed, Bakunin lauds the revolutionary potential of the Slavic or Latin peoples (as opposed to the Germans, towards whom Bakunin maintained a chauvinistic dislike throughout his life); he even, as the General Council notes in "The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the IWMA" argues that, in Russia, "the brigand is the true and only revolutionary".
All this is entirely consistent with Bakunin's rejection of materialism: if the social revolution is possible at any time, then any oppressed force can create it, be they peasants or brigands. Indeed, not only does the working class in the marxist sense have no particular role to play in this process, Bakunin positively rails against the marxists for insisting that the working class has to exercise its dictatorship over society:
"Let us ask, if the proletariat is to be the ruling class, over whom is it to rule? In short, there will remain another proletariat which will be subdued to this new rule, to this new state. For instance, the peasant 'rabble', who, as it is known, does not enjoy the sympathy of the marxists who consider it to represent a lower level of culture, will probably be ruled by the factory proletariat of the cities" (Statism and Anarchy).
This is not the place to go into the relationship between the working class and the peasantry in the communist revolution. Suffice it to say that the working class has no interest whatever in setting up a new system of exploitation once it has overthrown the bourgeoisie. But what is revealing in Bakunin's fears is precisely the fact that he does not view this problem from the point of view of the working class, but of the "oppressed in general" - to be precise, from the point of view of the petty bourgeoisie.
Unable to grasp that the proletariat is the revolutionary class in capitalist society not merely because it suffers but because it contains within itself the seeds of a new and more advanced social organisation, Bakunin is also unable to envisage the revolution as anything more than "a vast bonfire", an outpouring of "evil passions", an act of destruction rather than of creation: "A popular insurrection, by its very nature, is instinctive, chaotic and destructive ... the masses are always ready to sacrifice themselves, and this is what turns them into a brutal and savage horde, capable of performing heroic and apparently impossible exploits ... This negative passion, it is true, is far from being sufficient to attain the heights of the revolutionary cause; but without it, revolution would be impossible. Revolution requires extensive and widespread destruction, a fecund and renovating destruction, since in this way and only this way are new worlds born" (Statism and Anarchy).
Such passages not only confirm Bakunin's non-proletarian outlook in general; they also enable us to understand why he never broke with an elitist view of the role of the revolutionary organisation. Whereas for marxism the revolutionary vanguard is the product of a class becoming conscious of itself, for Bakunin the popular masses can never go beyond the level of instinctive and chaotic rebellion: consequently, if anything more than this is to be achieved, it requires the work of a "general staff" acting behind the scenes. In short, it's the old idealist notion of a Holy Spirit descending into unconscious matter. The anarchists who never fail to attack Lenin's mistaken formulation about revolutionary consciousness being introduced into the proletariat from the outside are curiously silent about Bakunin's version of the same notion.
Intimately connected to the organisational question, the other great point of contention between the marxists and the anarchists was the question of "politics". The Hague Congress was a battleground over this issue: the victory of the marxist current (supported in this instance by the Blanquists) was embodied in a resolution insisting that "the proletariat can act as a class only by constituting itself into a distinct political party, opposed to all the old parties formed by the possessing classes", and that "the conquest of political power becomes the great duty of the proletariat" in its fight for emancipation.
This dispute had two dimensions. The first was an echo of the argument about material necessity. Since for Bakunin, the revolution was possible at any time, any struggle for reforms was essentially a diversion from this great end; and if that struggle went beyond the strictly economic sphere (which the Bakuninists grudgingly accepted, without ever really understanding its significance) onto the terrain of bourgeois politics - of parliament, elections, campaigns for changes in the law - it could only mean capitulating to the bourgeoisie. Thus, in Bakunin's words, "the Alliance, true to the programme of the International, disdainfully rejected all collaboration with bourgeois politics, in however radical and socialist a disguise. They advised the proletariat that the only real emancipation, the only policy truly beneficial for them, is the exclusively negative policy of demolishing political institutions, political power, government in general, and the state" (Bakunin on Anarchy, p 289).
Behind these highly radical phrases lay the anarchists' incapacity to grasp that proletarian revolution, the direct struggle for communism, was not yet on the agenda because the capitalist system had not yet exhausted its progressive mission, and that the proletariat was faced with the necessity to consolidate itself as a class, to wrest whatever reforms it could from the bourgeoisie in order, above all, to strengthen itself for the future revolutionary struggle. In a period in which parliament was a real arena of struggle between fractions of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat could afford to enter this arena without subordinating itself to the ruling class; this strategy only became impossible once capitalism had entered its decadent, totalitarian phase. Of course, the precondition for this was that the working class had its own political party, distinct and opposed to all the parties of the ruling class, as the resolution of the International put it, otherwise it would merely act as an appendage of the more progressive bourgeois parties rather than tactically supporting them at certain moments. None of this made any sense to the anarchists, but their "purist" opposition to any intervention in the bourgeois political game did not equip them to defend the autonomy of the proletariat in real and concrete situations: a prime example of this is given in Engels article "The Bakuninists at Work," written in 1873. Analysing the uprisings in Spain, which could certainly not be of a proletarian, socialist character given the backwardness of the country, Engels shows how the anarchists' opposition to the demand for a republic, their resounding phrases about immediately establishing the revolutionary Commune, did not prevent them, in practise, from tailending the bourgeoisie. Engels acerbic comments are indeed almost a prediction of what the anarchists were to do in Spain in 1936, albeit in a different historical context:
"As soon as they were faced with a serious revolutionary situation, the Bakuninists had to throw the whole of their old programme overboard. First they sacrificed their doctrine of absolute abstention from political and especially electoral activities. Then anarchy, the abolition of the state, shared the same fate. Instead of abolishing the state they tried, on the contrary, to set up a number of new, small states. They then dropped the principle that the workers must not take part in any revolution that did not have as its aim the immediate and complete emancipation of the proletariat, and they themselves took part in a movement that was notoriously bourgeois. Finally they went against the dogma they had only just proclaimed - that the establishment of a revolutionary government is but another fraud, another betrayal of the working class - for they sat quite comfortably in the juntas of the various towns, and moreover almost everywhere as an impotent minority outvoted and politically exploited by the bourgeoisie".
The second dimension of this dispute over political action was the question of power. We have already seen that for marxists, the state was the product of exploitation, not its cause. It was the inevitable emanation of a class-divided society and could only be done away with for good once classes had ceased to exist. But, contrary to the anarchists, this could not be the result of a grand, overnight "social liquidation". It required a more or less long period of transition in which the proletariat would first have to take political power in its own hands, and use this power to initiate the social and economic transformation.
By arguing, in the name of freedom and opposition to all forms of authority, that the working class should refrain from conquering political power, the anarchists were thus preventing the working class from getting to first base. In order to reorganise social life, the working class had first to defeat the bourgeoisie, to overthrow it. This was of necessity an "authoritarian" act. In Engels' famous words:
"Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon - authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough? Therefore, either one of two things: either the anti-authoritarians don't know what they are talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion; or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the movement of the proletariat. In either case they serve the reaction" ("On authority", 1873).
Elsewhere, Engels pointed out that Bakunin's demand for the immediate abolition of the state had shown its true value in the farce of Lyons in 1870 (i.e shortly before the real workers' uprising in Paris). Bakunin and a handful of his supporters had stood on the steps of Lyons Town Hall and declared the abolition of the state and its replacement by a federation of communes; unfortunately, "two companies of the bourgeois National Guard proved quite sufficient, on the other hand, to shatter this splendid dream and send Bakunin hurrying back to Geneva with the miraculous decree in his pocket" ("Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the IWMA").
But because the marxists denied that the state could be decreed out of existence, this didn't mean that they aimed to set up a new dictatorship over the masses: the authority they stood for was that of the armed proletariat, not that of a particular faction or clique. And, following Marx's writings about the Commune, it was simply a slander to claim, as Bakunin repeatedly did, that the marxists were in favour of taking hold of the existing state, that along with the Lassalleans they were for a "people's state" - a notion savaged by Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Programme (see the article in this series in International Review 78). The Commune had made it clear that the first act of the revolutionary working class was the destruction of the bourgeois state and the creation of new organs of power whose form corresponded to the needs and aims of the revolution. It is of course an anarchist legend to claim that, in the immediate aftermath of the Commune, Marx opportunistically dropped his authoritarian views and came round to the positions of Bakunin: that the experience of the Commune vindicated anarchist principles and refuted the marxist ones. In fact, reading Bakunin on the Commune (particularly in his The Knouto-Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution), one can only be struck by how abstract his reflections are, how little they attempt to assimilate and relay the essential lessons of this momentous event, how they trail off into some rather vague ramblings about God and religion. They cannot be compared at all to the concrete lessons Marx drew from the Commune, lessons about the real form of the proletarian dictatorship (arming of the workers, revocable delegates, centralisation "from below" - see the article in this series in International Review 77). As a matter of fact, even after the Commune, Bakunin was quite incapable of seeing how the proletariat could organise itself as a unified political force. In Statism and Anarchy, Bakunin argues against the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat with naive questions like "Will perhaps the proletariat as a whole head the government?", to which Marx replies, in the notes he wrote about Bakunin's book (known as the "Conspectus of Bakunin's Book Statism and Anarchy", written in 1874-5 but not published until 1926): "Does in a trade union, for instance, the whole union constitute the executive committee?". Or, when Bakunin writes "The Germans number nearly 40 million. Will, for example, all 40 millions be members of the government?", Marx replies "Certainly, for the thing begins with the self-government of the Commune". In other words, Bakunin had utterly failed to see the significance of the Commune as a new form of political power which was not based on a divorce between a minority of rulers and majority of ruled, but permitted the exploited majority to exercise real power over the minority of exploiters, to participate in the revolutionary process and ensure that the new organs of power did not escape their control. This immense practical discovery of the working class provided a realistic answer to the oft-posed question about revolutions: how do you prevent a new privileged group usurping power in the name of the revolution?. The marxists were able to draw this lesson even if it required correcting their previous position on the possibility of seizing the existing state. The anarchists, on the other hand, were only able to see the Commune as a confirmation of their eternal principle, indistinguishable from the prejudices of bourgeois liberalism: that all power corrupts, and it is best to have nothing to do with it - a conception unworthy of a class which aims to make the most radical revolution of all time.
It would be a mistake simply to ridicule the anarchists or deny that they ever had any insights. If one plunges into the writings of Bakunin or a close associate like James Guillaume, one can certainly find images of great power together with snatches of wisdom about the nature of the revolutionary process, in particular their constant insistance that "the revolution must be made not for the people but by the people and can never succeed if it does not enthusiastically involve all tthe masses of the people ..." ("National Catechism", 1866). We may even surmise that the ideas of the Bakuninists - who were talking about revolutionary communes based on "imperative, responsible and revocable mandates" at least as early as 1869 (in the "Programme of the International Brotherhood" which Marx and Engels quote from extensively in their "The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the IWMA") - had a direct impact upon the Paris Commune itself, especially since some of its leading members were followers of Bakunin (Varlin for example).
But as has been said on several occasions, the insights of anarchism are comparable to the stopped clock which tells the right time twice a day. Its eternal principles are a stopped clock indeed; what it lacks, however, is a consistent method that would enable it to grasp a moving reality from the class standpoint of the proletariat.
We have already seen this to be the case when anarchism deals with questions of organisation and political power. It is no less the case when it comes to its prescriptions for the future society, which, in certain texts (Bakunin's "Revolutionary Catechism", 1866, or Guillaume's "On building the new social order", 1876, published in Bakunin on Anarchy), amount to real "cookbooks for the recipes of the future" of the kind that Marx always declined to write. Nonetheless these texts are useful in demonstrating that the "fathers" of anarchism never grasped the root problems of communism - above all, the necessity to abolish the chaos of commodity relations and place the productive forces of the world in the hands of a unified human community. In the anarchists' description of the future, for all their references to collectivism and communism, the artisan's standpoint is never transcended. In Guillaume's text, for example, it may be a good thing for the land to be tilled in common, but the crucial thing is that the agricultural producers win their independence; whether this is obtained through collective or individual ownership "is of secondary importance"; by the same token, the workers will become owners of the means of production through separate trade corporations, and society as a whole will be organisaed through a federation of autonomous communes. In other words, this is a world still divided into a multitude of independent owners (individual or corporate) who can only be linked together through the medium of exchange, through commodity relations. In Guillaume's text this is perfectly explicit: the various producers associations' and communes are to be connected through the good offices of a "Bank of Exchange" which will organise the business of buying and selling on society's behalf.
Eventually, Guillaume argues, society will be able to produce an abundance of goods and exchange will be replaced by simple distribution. But having no real theory of capital and its laws of motion, the anarchists are unable to see that a society of abundance can only come about through a relentless struggle against commodity production and the law of value, since the latter are precisely what is holding the productive capacities of mankind in thrall. A return to a system of simple commodity production certainly cannot result in a society of abundance. In fact such a system cannot exist on a stable basis, since simple commodity production inevitably gives rise to expanded commodity production - to the whole dynamic of capitalist accumulation. Thus, while marxism, expressing the standpoint of the only class in capitalist society that has a real future, looks forward to the freeing of the productive forces as the foundation for an unlimited development of human potential, anarchism, with its artisan's standpoint, is caught up in the vision of a static order of free and equal exchange. This is not a real anticipation of the future, but nostalgia for a past that never was.
CDW
In the ensuing part of this series we will begin to look at the way the marxist movement of the 19th century addressed the "social questions" posed by the communist revolution - questions such as the family, religion, and the relationship between town and country.
On Thursday 8th September 1994, a week after the definitive withdrawal of Russian troops from the whole territory of the former German Democratic Republic, it was the turn of the three allies of yesteryear, the Americans, British and French, to evacuate Berlin. What a symbol! If there was one city that summarized the 45 years of confrontation between East and West, this half century of Cold War - a cynical historian's euphemism because you couldn't get hotter or bloodier than the wars in Korea and Vietnam - that city was Berlin. A sinister page has thus been turned in the history of imperialist rivalries which started to be written at the end of the Second World War - the rivalries between America and the now defunct USSR which to a large extent had Germany as their prize. However, it has to be said that the end of this epoch, which was really marked by the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, has not at all given us the "New World Order" promised by all the leaders of the great capitalist states. We are still waiting for the dividends of peace. In fact, we've never been further away from a world based on harmony between states and on economic prosperity. What's more, with the exception perhaps of the first two world conflicts, humanity has never been through so much barbarism, The decadence of the capitalist mode of production is expressing itself through a litany of massacres, epidemics, exoduses and destructions.
Bombardments in Bosnia, assassinations in the Maghreb, massacres in Rwanda, slaughter in Yemen, ambushes in Afghanistan, exodus from Cuba, famine in Somalia...there are fewer and fewer countries in the world spared from chaos. Every day now, on all the inhabited continents, the list of countries falling into disorder gets longer. What's more everybody knows this. Day after day the bourgeois media and their zealous journalists provide us with plenty of evidence, including the goriest details, to show us how millions of human beings are suffering all over the world. After all, the citizens of the democratic countries can and above all should know. This is the age of the triumph of objective information. In fact, while the bourgeois media are always there to throw at us pictures of the agony endured by hundreds of thousands of people in countries like Rwanda, they never tell us the real causes of all this. They constantly pass off false explanations as the real ones.
The unleashing of chaos bears the stamp of the great powers
With regard to the latest massacre, in Rwanda where 500,000 have perished, the fallacious interpretations of the bourgeoisie have not been missing. Virtually everything possible has been said about the bottomless hatred between Hutus and Tutsis, divisions that apparently go back to the depths of time. This is totally false. The real barbarians are, among others, the French officials, top civil servants and diplomats with their unctuous speeches, ardent defenders of French imperialist interests in the region. Because for years it has been none other than the French bourgeoisie which has provided military equipment to the mainly Hutu troops under President Habyarimana, the sinister FAR who were responsible for the first killings and the massive exodus of mainly Tutsi populations. This murderous orgy had been planned by the local authorities. All the famous journalists and respected experts kept this well hidden before and during the massacres. Similarly, very little leaked out about the massive support given by the USA and Britain to the other, equally murderous faction, the mainly Tutsi RPF. It's not astonishing that France refrained from openly denouncing the Americans' support for the RPF, otherwise it would have been hard for it to pose as the virtuous defender of the Rights of Man, which it claims to have invented in the first place. In fact, Operation Turquoise was just the humanitarian alibi for the criminal French state. Its real motive was the defense of sordid imperialist interests. However, this intervention has not stopped the slaughter (that was not its goal in any case), but neither has it stopped the pro-American RPF from seizing Kigali. This is much more annoying for Paris. But in any case, the FAR, based in Zaire and manipulated by France, will be used to harass the RPF and even take back power from it. Thus, every power shows that it is ready to unleash chaos in its rivals' sphere of influence. The USA and Britain, in order to destabilize a French position, deliberately used the card of disorder by aiding the RPF. The French bourgeoisie is now trying to get its own back. The Calvary being suffered by the Rwandan population is far from over. War, cholera, dysentery and famine continue to claim their victims.
In the light of this example we can better understand the situation in Algeria. The actors, the weapons used, the objectives are the same. Here, the Americans trying to dislodge French imperialism from one of its traditional spheres of influence, the Maghreb. The US, via Saudi Arabia which finances the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), is deliberately trying to chase France from the region. Thus, what with the bomb attacks and executions carried out by the FIS under Washington's sponsorship and the repression and imprisonment meted out by the military government supported by Paris, Algeria is going through the worst kind of convulsions. Here again we can see that the population, caught between the FIS and the military, is walking a Via Dolorosa. And the rest of North Africa is going the same way. The stakes are the same, as recognized by the geo-historian Y. Lacoste in an interview in number 180 of the review L'Histoire: "In the wake of Algeria, Tunisia and even Morocco will also tip over... Thus we are heading for a very difficult period for France".
Even closer to the big industrialized metropoles of Europe than Algeria, there is ex-Yugoslavia where for three years now war and anarchy have reigned supreme. Despite this, we are regularly told that peace is imminent. Reality systematically tears the bourgeoisie's pacifist pipedreams to pieces. Let us recall: last year, we were told that Sarajevo was returning to a bit of calm. Concerts and church services transmitted on TV, collections for the children of this martyred city, nothing was missing in the solemn celebration of the end of the fighting, all thanks to the foreign offices of the great democracies. What do we find now? The shelling and the sniper fire has resumed to the point that Pope John Paul II himself did not want to take the risk of testing whether his popemobile would resist high caliber ammo. He preferred to go to Zagreb, in Croatia. It is less dangerous, for the moment. Only for the moment because all the activities of the great powers are serving to aggravate the conflict. For example, the recent American initiative to constitute a Croatian-Bosnian Federation aimed at detaching Croatia from its alliance with Germany threatens to take the confrontation onto an even higher level. In fact, the policy of the White House, which is ready to support the Croats in their efforts to annex Krajina, the Serb enclave in their territory, will intensify and widen the opposition between the Bosnian-Croat alliance and the Serbs. Here, more surely than in Somalia, Afghanistan or Yemen, given the strategic importance of the Balkans, the exacerbation of tensions between the great powers leads to desolation. The former are under-developed countries where the proletariat is too weak to stop the barbarism. But while, in the past, capitalism was able to displace this chaos onto the periphery of its system, today it is unable to prevent it approaching the big industrialized centers. The convulsions hitting Algeria and Yugoslavia are proof of this. Striking also is the sheer number of geographical zones totally ravaged by war and all its scourges. Speaking very generally, up to the seventies, one conflict broke out when a previous one had finished. Today, as in Afghanistan, they just carry on, but in different forms. This phenomenon is no accident. Like a cancer reaching its terminal stages, capitalism at this end of the century is being devoured by the insane cancer cells of war.
Capitalism is decomposing. Only the proletariat can offer a perspective
Some people will object that there are some regions of the planet where peace is possible. This would seem to be the case in Northern Ireland, where the IRA says it is laying down its arms. Nothing could be more deceptive. By forcing the Catholic extremists of the North to negotiate, the USA is trying to put pressure on Britain so that the latter no longer has any pretext for maintaining its grip on Ulster. Why? Because Britain is no longer the docile ally it once was. Since the collapse of the USSR divergent imperialist interests have grown on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly with regard to ex-Yugoslavia. 'Capitalist peace' is never anything but a particular moment in the combat between states.
In fact, capitalist decomposition is more and more affecting the industrialized countries. Of course, the level of its manifestations is far less catastrophic than in the countries cited above. But it is certainly the case in Italy, precisely because of the inter-imperialist rivalries cutting through this state. While the Italian democratic state has never been noted for its stability (see International Reviews 76 and 77 on this point), this fragility is now being aggravated by the rivalries between different factions opting for opposing imperialist alignments. Here the Berlusconi clique has more or less chosen the American alliance, while the other clique, which controls the judiciary, leans more towards an alliance with France and Germany. This confrontation, which has seen the latter faction revealing scandal after scandal, has led the country to a state of near paralysis. Not that the time has come for a Rwandan-type solution in which the Italian bourgeoisie settles its differences with machetes. No, for the moment car bombs and plastic explosives suffice. The level of development in the country is not the same, their histories are different, but above all, the Italian working class is not prepared to line up behind this or that bourgeois clan. The same goes for the whole proletariat of the industrialized countries. However, the fact that the only class that can offer humanity a perspective is not mobilized behind the bourgeoisie does not stop capitalism from literally rotting on its feet. On the contrary, it is precisely this situation of historical stalemate, where the proletariat is unable in the immediate to impose it historic perspective, ie the overthrow of the system, and where the bourgeoisie is unable to unleash a world war, which is at the origin of the phase of decomposition. However, it is certain that if the working class doesn't manage to carry out its historic mission, the most frightful scenarios are plausible. Through wars and all sorts of abominations, humanity will be wiped out.
The bourgeoisie has absolutely nothing to offer against the bankruptcy of its social organization. It simply proposes that we should resign ourselves to all this barbarism - ie, accept suicide. It doesn't even believe in the 'recovery' of the world economy. And quite rightly it knows that, even if it manages to get production going by launching itself into debt (especially public debt), it can't really absorb unemployment or prevent violent and destructive financial explosions. The saturation of the world market and its consequence, the desperate search for outlets, the trade war, oblige all states and enterprises to sever the branch they are sitting on. Finally, as portrayed in the recent novel by the Frenchman J. Attali, that "brilliant thinker" of the bourgeoisie, the ex-adviser to Mitterand and probably the person with the most honors and diplomas in France, the only future is an abominable world in which human organs are for sale and fathers kill their children. This work is called It's Coming, but it's already here; the book is just a sad summary of today's world and of the void that awaits us if the proletariat doesn't overthrow it.
Arkady 17.9.94
IR79, 4th quarter 1994
The Conception of Decadence in Capitalism
Polemic with IBRP
Is imperialist war solution to the capitalist cycles of accumulation
The future world Communist Party, the new International, will be built on political positions, which will supersede the mistakes, inadequacies, or unresolved questions of the old party, the Communist International. This is why it is vital that the organisations that claim their origins in the Communist Left continue to debate together. We consider that the decadence of capitalism is fundamental among these positions. In previous issues of the International Review, we have shown how their ignorance of this notion led the Bordigist current into theoretical aberrations on the question of the imperialist war, and led to a political disarmament of the working class [1] [345].
In this article, we will look at the positions of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista and the Communist Workers’ Organisation, which together form the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP) [2] [346]. Both these organisations clearly base the necessity for the communist revolution on the analysis that capitalism has entered its decadent phase since World War I. However, while in this they are different from the Bordigist groups, both the PCInt and the CWO defend a series of analyses, which in our opinion imply a weakening, or even a rejection, of the notion of capitalist decadence.
In this article, we will examine the arguments that these organisations defend on the role of world wars and the nature of imperialism, which we believe prevent them from defending the communist position on capitalism’s decadence to the hilt, and in all its ramifications.
The Nature of Imperialist War
The IBRP explains world imperialist war, which is a fundamental characteristic of decadent capitalism, as follows: “And just as in the 19th century, the crises of capitalism led to the devaluation of existing capital (through bankruptcies), thus opening the way to a new cycle of accumulation based on the concentration and fusion of capital, in the 20th century the crises of world imperialism can no longer be resolved other than by a still greater devaluation of the existing capital, through the economic collapse of whole countries. This is precisely the economic function of world wars. As in 1914 and 1939, this is imperialism’s inexorable “solution” to the crisis of the world economy” [3] [347].
This vision of the “economic function of world wars”, via “the economic collapse of whole countries”, by analogy with the bankruptcies of the previous century, in fact boils down to regarding world war as a means for world capitalism to launch “a new cycle of accumulation”, in other words according an economic rationality to the phenomenon of world war.
This rationality existed in the wars of the previous century: in the case of national wars (e.g. in Italy, or between France and Prussia), they allowed the formation of great national units, which meant a real advance in the development of capitalism; the colonial wars extended capitalist relations of production to far-flung corners of the globe, and so contributed to the formation of the world market.
The same is no longer true in the 20th century, in the period of capitalist decadence. Imperialist war has no economic rationality. World war’s “economic function” in destroying capital may seem analogous to what happened in the previous century, but this is only in appearance. In the 20th century, war’s function is radically different, and the IBRP must feel this, confusedly, since they put the word “solution” in quotes. Far from being a solution to a cyclical crisis, “thus opening the way to a new cycle of accumulation”, war is the clearest expression of capitalism’s permanent crisis. It expresses the tendency to chaos and disintegration that grips world capitalism, and moreover it accelerates this tendency.
The last eighty years have fully confirmed this analysis. Imperialist wars are the fullest expression of the infernal spiral of disintegration that capitalism has been caught in since entering its period of decadence. The cycle is no longer a phase of expansion followed by a phase of crisis, national and colonial wars, leading to a new phase of expansion and expressing the overall development of the capitalist mode of production; this cycle passes from generalised imperialist war for the re-division of the world market, through post-war reconstruction, to a new, far worse crisis, as has already happened twice in this century.
The nature of reconstruction after World War II
For the IBRP “Of course, the two previous crises [i.e. the two World Wars] had dramatic consequences for capitalism, but they still left enough room for manoeuvre for further development, including in the framework of decadence” [4] [348].
The IBRP realises the seriousness of the destruction and suffering caused by imperialist war; these it calls the “dramatic consequences” of war. But the wars of the ascendant period were also “dramatic” in this sense: they caused terrible destruction, hunger, and suffering. Capitalism was born “in blood and filth” as Marx put it.
Nonetheless, there is a vast difference between the wars of the ascendant and decadent periods: in the former, capitalism still had “enough room for manoeuvre for further development” as the IBRP puts it, while in the latter this room for manoeuvre was drastically reduced, and no longer allowed the further accumulation of capital.
This is the essential difference between wars in the two periods. To think that the two World Wars “left [capitalism] enough room for manoeuvre for further development” is to throw overboard precisely what distinguishes the period of capitalist decadence.
Obviously, this analysis of “room for manoeuvre” in capitalist decadence is closely linked to the IBRP’s explanations of the crisis, based solely on the theory of the tendential fall in the rate of profit, without taking account of the theory developed by Rosa Luxemburg on the saturation of the world market. Without entering into detail, a rapid overview of the reconstruction that followed World War II is enough to do away with the idea that capitalism still had “room for manoeuvre for further development”.
After the cataclysmic 1939-45 war, the world economy seemed not only to “return to normal”, but to have exceeded all previous growth rates. However, we should not let ourselves be blinded by dazzling statistics. If we ignore the problem of statistical massaging by governments and economic institutions - which exists, but is entirely secondary in the case that concerns us here - then we have to analyse the nature and composition of this growth.
If we do so, then we can see that a large part of this growth is made up of arms production and defence spending on the one hand, and of expenditure (state bureaucracy, marketing, publicity, “communication” media), which is totally unproductive from the standpoint of global capital.
Let us begin with the question of armaments. Contrary to the period following World War I, after 1945 the armies were not completely demobilised, and arms spending went on rising almost without interruption until the end of the 80s.
Before the collapse of the USSR, US military spending swallowed 10% of GNP. In the USSR, the figure stood at 20-25%; in the EEC it is currently 3-4%, while in many Third World countries it stands as high as 25%.
Arms production does at first increase the volume of production. However, because the value created does not “return” to the production process, but ends up either being destroyed or rusting in barracks and nuclear silos, armaments in fact represent a sterilisation, a destruction of a part of global production: with military spending, “an ever-growing share of production goes into products which do not reappear in the following cycle. The product leaves the sphere of production, and does not return to it. A tractor returns to the sphere of production in the form of harvested wheat. A tank does not” [5] [349].
In the same way, the post-war period witnessed a huge increase in non-productive spending. The state developed a huge bureaucracy, companies followed the same principle in disproportionately increasing the mechanisms of control and administration of production; faced with ferocious competition, the cost of marketing has grown constantly, to the point where it absorbs as much as 50% of a product’s cost. Capitalist statistics put this huge mass of expenditure on the positive side of the balance-sheet, under the heading of “services”. However, this growing mass of unproductive spending in fact constitutes a drain on global capital. “When capitalist relations of production cease to be the instrument for the development of the productive forces and become fetters, all the “artificial” costs that they entail become simple waste. It is important to note that this inflation of artificial costs is an inevitable phenomenon, which imposes itself on capitalism with as much violence as its contradictions. For half a century the history of capitalist nations has been filled with “austerity programs”, attempts to turn back the clock, struggles against the uncontrollable expansion of government costs and unproductive expenses in general. (...) All these efforts, however, systematically end in failure. (...) The more difficulties capitalism faces, the more it must develop its artificial costs. This vicious circle, this gangrene rotting the core of the wage labour system, is only one of the symptoms of the real disease: the decadence of capitalism” [6] [350].
Having seen the nature of capitalist growth since the second imperialist massacre, let us see how it is shared out among the different zones of world capital.
Starting with the ex-Eastern bloc, a substantial part of the USSR’s post-war “reconstruction” was in fact the wholesale dismantling and transfer of entire factories from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Manchuria, etc to the USSR itself. This was not a real growth, but merely a change in the geographical location of production.
On the other hand, as we have said for years [7] [351], the Stalinist economies produced goods of more than dubious quality, such that a substantial proportion of them were unusable. On paper, the growth in production reached “tremendous” levels, and the IBRP falls headlong for these figures [8] [352], but in reality this growth was largely fictitious.
As far as the ex-colonies are concerned, we have laid bare the lie of their “growth rates in excess of those of the industrialised world” in our article on “Still-born nations” in the International Review [9] [353]. Today, we can see that many of these countries have entered an accelerating process of chaos and decomposition, hunger, epidemics, destruction and wars. These countries have become the terrain for a permanent confrontation between the great powers, with the active complicity of the local bourgeoisies, subjecting them to the devastating plague of imperialist war as the permanent way of life of decadent capitalism.
From the strictly economic standpoint, most of these countries have been trapped for decades in a permanent depression. Nor should we be deceived by the “fantastic” growth rates of the “four Asian dragons”. The latter have carved themselves a niche on the world market by selling some consumer products and electronic components at ridiculously low prices. These prices are possible on the one hand by the massive exploitation of cheap labour [10] [354], and above all by the systematic use of state export credits and dumping (sales at prices below the cost of production).
These countries cannot, any more than the others, escape the implacable law for any country arriving late on the world market: “The law of supply and demand works against any development of new countries. In a world where markets are saturated, supply exceeds demand and prices are determined by the lowest production costs. Because of this, the countries with the highest production costs are forced to sell their commodities at reduced profits or even at a loss. This ensures that they have an extremely low rate of accumulation and, even with a very cheap labour force, they are unable to realise the investments needed for the massive acquisition of modern technology. The result of this is that the gulf which separates them from the great industrial powers can only get wider” [11] [355].
As for the industrial powers, it is true that between 1945 and 1967 they underwent real economic growth (from which we should deduct the enormous volume of military and unproductive spending).
However, there are at least two points that need making here. Firstly, “Some growth rates reached since World War II come close to, or even exceed, those reached during capitalism’s ascendant phase prior to 1913. This is the case for countries like France and Japan. However, it is far from being the case with the greatest industrial power, the USA (50% of world production at the end of the 50s, 4.6% average annual growth rate between 1957-65, as opposed to 6.9% between 1850 and 1880)” [12] [356]. Moreover, world production between 1913 and 1959 (including arms production) grew by 250%, whereas if it had increased at the same rhythm as between 1880 and 1890, the period of capitalism’s apogee, it would have grown by 450% [13] [357].
Secondly, these countries’ growth was achieved at the expense of an increasing impoverishment in the rest of the world. During the 70s, the system of massive loans from industrialised countries to the Third World, to allow the latter to absorb the former’s vast stocks of unsaleable commodities, gave the whole world economy an appearance of “rapid growth”. The 1982 debt crisis burst this enormous bubble, revealing a very serious problem for capital: “for years, a large part of world production has not been sold, but given away. This production may correspond to really manufactured commodities, but it has not produced value, which is the only thing that interests capitalism. It has not allowed a real accumulation of capital. Global capitalism has been reproducing itself on ever-narrower foundations. Taken as a whole, capitalism has not got richer. On the contrary, it has become poorer” [14] [358].
It is significant that the “solution” to the Third World debt crisis of 1982-85 was the massive indebtedness of the USA, which between 1982 and 1988 went from the being a creditor nation to being the world’s biggest debtor.
This demonstrates the dead-end that capitalism has reached, even in its strongholds - the great Western industrial metropoles.
Seen in this light, BC’s explanation of the American debt crisis is wrong and seriously under-estimates the situation: “but the real lever which has been used to drain the wealth of every corner of the world towards the United States has been the policy of rising interest rates”. BC describes this policy as “the appropriation of surplus-value through the control of finance revenue”, emphasizing that “we have gone from the increase in profit through industrial development to the increase in profit thanks to the development of finance revenue” [15] [359].
BC should ask itself why it is that we go “from the increase in profit through industrial development to the increase in profit thanks to the development of finance revenue”. The answer is obvious: whereas during the 1960s, industrial development was still a possibility for the major capitalist countries, and during the 1970s “development” was kept afloat by massive loans to the “Third World” and the Eastern bloc, these outlets were closed in the 1980s, and the only way out was provided by the gigantic arms spending of the United States.
This is why BC is wrong in viewing the massive indebtedness of the USA as part of a “struggle for finance revenue”, and is consequently incapable of understanding the situation in the 1990s, where the possibility of the US taking on more debt as it did in the 1980s simply no longer exists. The world’s “most developed capitalism” has closed another illusory way out of the crisis [16] [360].
The relation between imperialist war and capitalist crisis
For BC, war “is on the historical agenda from the moment that the contradictions of the capitalist accumulation process have developed to the point where they determine an over-production of capital and a fall in the rate of profit” [17] [361]. Historically, and historically only, this position is correct. The era of generalised imperialist war springs from the dead-end that capitalism has entered with its phase of decadence, when it is unable to continue accumulating because of the scarcity of new markets, which had previously allowed it to extend its relations of production.
BC tries to use a series of elements on unemployment before World War I, and on unemployment and the use of productive capacity before World War II, to show that “the data (...) shows unequivocally the close link between the course of the economic crisis and the two World Wars” [18] [362]. Apart from the fact that the data is exclusively limited to the United States, we will repeat here, without developing it, the argument put forward in International Review 77/78 in response to the same idea defended by Programme Communiste. Apart from the economic conditions, the outbreak of war requires one vital condition: that the proletariat of the major industrialised countries should be enrolled for imperialist war. If this condition is not fulfilled, war cannot begin, even if all the “objective” conditions are present. We will not go back over this fundamental position, which BC also rejects [19] [363]. Suffice it to say that the mechanical link that BC claims to establish between economic crisis and war (and in which BC joins with the Bordigists, who reject the notion of decadence altogether), leads them to under-estimate the problem of war in decadent capitalism.
In The Accumulation of Capital Rosa Luxemburg shows that “the greater the violence with which capitalism annihilates both external and internal non-capitalist strata, and debases the living conditions of the working class, the more the day-to-day history of capitalist accumulation worldwide becomes a series of catastrophes and convulsions, which, combined with the periodic economic crises will eventually make continued accumulation impossible, and will raise the international working class against the rule of capital, even before the latter has reached the objective economic limits to its development” [20] [364].
In general, war and economic crisis are not mechanically linked. In ascendant capitalism, war is at the service of the economy. In decadent capitalism, the reverse is true: imperialist war arises from capitalism’s historic crisis, but it then acquires its own dynamic, and becomes progressively capitalism’s very way of life. War, militarism, armaments production, tend to subject all economic activity to their own demands, so creating monstrous deformations in capitalism’s own laws of accumulation, and generating further convulsions in the economic sphere.
This was put forward clearly by the Communist International’s 2nd Congress: “The war has subjected capitalism to a change (...) War has accustomed it, as if this were the most ordinary thing in the world, to reduce whole countries to famine by blockade, to bomb and torch peaceful towns and villages, to infect springs and rivers with cholera, to carry dynamite in diplomatic bags, to print counterfeit currency of the enemy country, to make use of corruption, espionage and contraband on an unheard-of scale. Once peace has been concluded, the methods used in the war continue to be used in the world of commerce. Commercial operations of any importance are conducted under the aegis of the state. The latter has become more like a criminal gang, armed to the teeth” [21] [365].
The nature of “cycles of accumulation” in capitalist decadence
According to BC, “each time that the system can no longer counter, by an opposing impulse, the causes that provoke the fall in the rate of profit, then two kinds of problems are posed: a) the destruction of excess capital; b) the extension of imperialist domination over the world market” [22] [366].
First of all, we should point out that BC is a century late: the question of “the extension of imperialist domination over the world market” began to be posed more and more acutely in the last decade of the 19th century. The question has not been posed since 1914, for the simple reason that the entire planet has been inextricably bound in the bloody nets of imperialism. The question, which has been repeated, more and more sharply, since 1914 is not the extension of imperialism but the division of the world among the various imperialist vultures.
BC’s other “mission” for imperialist war - “the destruction of excess capital” - tends to compare the destruction of productive forces as a result of the system’s cyclical crises during the 19th century, with the destruction caused by this century’s imperialist wars. Nonetheless, BC recognises that there is a qualitative difference between them: “whereas then it was part of the painful cost of a “necessary” development of the productive forces, today we are faced with a systematic devastation spread over the entire planet, in the economic sense today, in the physical sense tomorrow, plunging the whole of humanity into the abyss of war” [23] [367]. But this is not enough, and BC has always insisted on under-stating this difference, by insisting much more strongly on the identity between capitalism’s functioning in its ascendant and decadent phases: “the whole history of capitalism is an endless race towards an impossible equilibrium; only crises, in other words famine, unemployment, war and death for the workers, are the moments whereby the relations of production recreate the conditions for a further cycle of accumulation which will end in a still deeper and vaster crisis” [24] [368].
It is true that the system is unable to escape the periodic crises, which lead it to blockage and paralysis, in both ascendant and decadent capitalism. But if we stop here, then we remain on the same terrain as the bourgeois economists, who comfort us by repeating that “recovery always follows recession”.
Of course, BC does not follow such chimera, and clearly defends the need to destroy capitalism and make the revolution. It still remains a prisoner of its schematic “cycles of accumulation”.
In fact:
- the cyclical crises of the ascendant period are different from the crises of decadence;
- the root of the imperialist war does not lie in the crisis of each cycle of accumulation; it is not a sort of dilemma reproduced each time the cycle of accumulation enters a crisis: it lies in a permanent historic situation which dominates the whole of capitalist decadence.
During capitalism’s ascendant period, crises were short-lived and occurred fairly regularly every 7-10 years. In the eighty years since 1914, and considering only the great industrialised countries, we have had:
- ten years of imperialist war (1914-18, 1939-45) which left more than 80 million dead;
- 46 years of open crisis: 1918-22, 1929-39, 1945-50, 1967-94 (we are not taking account of the brief “drugged recoveries” during the periods 1929-39 and 1967-94);
- only 24 years (scarcely a quarter of the period) of economic recovery: 1922-29 and 1950-67.
All this shows that the simple schema of accumulation is not enough to explain the reality of decadent capitalism, and prevents us from understanding its accompanying phenomena.
Although BC recognises the phenomenon of state capitalism, which is an essential component of decadence, it fails to follow all its consequences [25] [369]. A vital characteristic of decadence, which decisively affects the expression of “cyclical crises”, is the state’s massive intervention in the economy (closely tied to the formation of the war economy), through a whole series of mechanisms, which the economists call “economic policy”. This intervention profoundly alters the law of value, provoking monstrous deformations throughout the world economy, which systematically exacerbate the system’s contradictions, leading to brutal convulsions not only in the economic apparatus, but in every sphere of society.
State capitalism, and the permanent weight of the war economy, transform radically both the substance and the dynamic of the economic cycle: “Particular conjunctures in the economy are no longer determined by the relationship between productive capacity and the shape of the market at a given moment, but by essentially political causes. (...) In this context, it is no longer the problems of the amortisation of capital that determine the length of phases of economic development but, to a great extent, the level of destruction in the previous war. (...) In contrast to the 19th century, which was characterised by “laisser-faire”, the scale of recessions in the 20th century has been limited by artificial measures carried out by the state and its research institutes aimed at delaying the general crisis (...) [with a] whole gamut of political measures which tend to break with the strictly economic functioning of capitalism” [26] [370].
The problem of war cannot be placed in the dynamic of “accumulation cycles”, which BC moreover stretches out for the decadent period, to make them fit the cycles of “crisis-war-reconstruction”, when in fact, as we have seen, the latter are not purely economic in nature.
“It is however very important to note first of all that this periodic succession of conjunctures and the crisis, while they are essential elements of reproduction, do not constitute the real problem of capitalist reproduction. Successive periods of conjunctures and crisis are the specific form of movement towards capitalist production, but they are not the movement itself” (Rosa Luxemburg) [27] [371].
The problem of war in decadent capitalism must be situated outside the strict oscillations of the economic cycle, outside the ebb and flow of the conjunctures of the rate of profit.
“In this region, not only is the bourgeoisie no longer able to develop the productive forces, it can only survive on condition that it destroys them, and annihilates the accumulated wealth of centuries of social labour. Generalised imperialist war is the main expression of this process of decomposition and destruction, into which the whole of capitalist society has entered” (“Notre réponse à Vercesi”, in Bulletin Interne International de Discussion no 5, published by the Fraction Italienne de la Gauche Communiste in May 1944).
The IBRP’s hands are tied by its theories on the cycles of accumulation, determined by the fall in the rate of profit, and it explains war through an “economic determinism” of crises in the cycles of accumulation.
As marxists, it is clear that we know very well that “the economic infrastructure determines the whole of society’s superstructure”. However, we do not understand this as a stencil, to be applied mechanically to every situation, but as a world-historic viewpoint. This is why we understand that while the chaos of decadent capitalism has an economic origin, it has been exacerbated to such a point that it cannot be understood in the limits of a strict economism.
“The other aspect of capitalist accumulation concerns the relations between capital and non-capitalist modes of production, where it has the whole world for its theatre. The methods used here are colonial policy, the system of international loans, the politics of spheres of interest, war. Violence, swindling, oppression, pillage, show themselves in the open, unmasked, and it is difficult to recognise the rigorous laws of the economic process in the inter-meshing of violence and political brutality.
Bourgeois liberal theory only considers the one aspect of “peaceful competition”, the marvels of technology and the pure exchange of commodities; it separates the economic domain of capital from the other, violent aspect, whose acts are considered as more or less fortuitous incidents of outside politics” [28] [372].
The IBRP rigorously denounces the barbarity of capitalism, the catastrophic effects of its policies and wars. And yet, it is unable to arrive at a unitary and global vision of war and economic evolution, which is necessary for a coherent theory of decadence.
The blindness and irresponsibility implied by this weakness are manifest in this formulation: “From the first signs of the world economic crisis, our party maintained that there was only one way out. The alternative before us is clear: either a bourgeois overcoming of the crisis in a world war leading to a monopolist capitalism further concentrated in the hands of a small group of powers, or the proletarian revolution” [29] [373].
The IBRP is not sufficiently aware of what a third World War would mean: nothing other than the complete annihilation of the planet. Even today, when the collapse of the USSR and the consequent disappearance of the Western bloc make the formation of new blocs difficult, the risk that humanity will be destroyed through a chaotic succession of local wars remains very serious.
The degree of capitalism’s putrefaction, the gravity of its contradictions, have reached a level such that a third World War would lead to the destruction of humanity.
It is an absurd game, played with schemas and “theories” which do not correspond to historical reality, to suppose that a third World War could be followed by “a monopolist capitalism further concentrated in the hands of a small group of powers”. This is science fiction... but unfortunately anchored in the phenomena of the end of the previous century.
The debate among revolutionaries should start from the highest level reached by the old party, the Communist International, which stated very clearly at the end of World War I: “The contradictions of the capitalist régime revealed themselves to humanity after the war, in the form of physical suffering: hunger, cold, epidemics and a resurgence of barbarism. Judgment was passed, without appeal, on the old academic quarrel among socialists on the theory of pauperisation and the gradual passage from capitalism to socialism. (...) Today we are faced, not just with social pauperisation, but with a physiological and biological impoverishment, which appears before us in all its hideous reality” [30] [374].
The end of World War II went still further in confirming this crucial analysis by the CI. Since then, the life of capitalism, in “peace” as in war, has aggravated the tendencies that revolutionaries predicted, but to levels that they could not imagine at the time. What is the point of playing with ridiculous hypotheses of a “monopolist capitalism” after a third World War? The alternative is not “proletarian revolution or war leading to the birth of a monopolist capitalism”, but proletarian revolution or the destruction of humanity.
Adalen, 1/9/94
[1] [375] See International Review 77/78, on “The Rejection of the Notion of Decadence”, polemic with Programma Comunista.
[2] [376] The Partito Comunista Internazionalista publishes the paper Battaglia Comunista (BC) and the theoretical review Prometeo. The Communist Workers’ Organisation publishes the paper Workers’ Voice. The Communist Review is published jointly by the two organisations and contains articles by the IBRP as such, as well as translations from Prometeo.
[3] [377] “Crisis of Capitalism and the Perspectives of the IBRP”, in Communist Review no. 4, autumn 1985.
[4] [378] Communist Review no. 1, “Crisis and Imperialism”.
[5] [379] Internationalisme no. 46, summer 1952 (publication of the Gauche Communiste de France).
[6] [380] ICC pamphlet: The Decadence of Capitalism.
[7] [381] See “The Crisis in the GDR”, International Review no. 22, and “The Crisis in the Eastern bloc”, International Review no. 23.
[8] [382] In 1988, when the chaos and collapse of the Soviet economy had become obvious, the IBRP said that “during the 1970s, Russia’s growth rates were still the double of those in the West, and the equal of Japan’s. Even in the crisis of the early 1980s, the Russian growth rate was 2-3% higher than that of any Western power. During these years, Russia had largely equalled the USA’s military capability, overtaken its space technology, and was able to undertake the biggest construction projects since 1945” (Communist Review no. 6).
[9] [383] International Review no. 69, 3rd quarter 1992, 3rd part in the series “Balance sheet of 70 years of ‘national liberation’”.
[10] [384] Suffice it to recall the importance, in China, of the virtually free forced labour provided by prisoners. A study by Asia Watch (an American “human rights” organisation) has revealed the existence of these Chinese gulags employing 20 million workers. In these “re-education camps”, work is carried out under contract for Western firms (French, American, etc). Quality defects discovered by Western contractors are immediately visited on the prisoner responsible for the “mistake” by brutal punishments inflicted in front of his comrades.
[11] [385] International Review no. 23, “The Struggle of the Proletariat in Decadent Capitalism”.
[12] [386] ICC pamphlet: The Decadence of Capitalism.
[13] [387] Ibid.
[14] [388] International Review no. 59, 4th quarter 1989, “The International Situation”.
[15] [389] Prometeo no. 6, December 1993, “The United States and World Domination”.
[16] [390] BC, launching into speculation on its theory of the “struggle to share out finance revenue”, moves onto a dangerous terrain in affirming that this “is a parasitic form of appropriation, the control of this revenue excludes the possibility of redistributing wealth among the different categories and social classes through the growth in production and the circulation of commodities”. Since when has growth in the production and distribution of commodities tended to redistribute social wealth? As marxists, we understand that the growth in capitalist production tends to “redistribute” wealth to the benefit of the capitalists and at the expense of the workers. But BC discovers the contrary, by falling into the arguments of the left of capital and the unions, who demand investment “to provide work and well-being”. Faced with this kind of “theory”, we should remember how Marx answered citizen Weston in Wages, Prices, and Profit: “Thus citizen Weston forgets that this soupbowl, from which the eat, is filled with the whole product of national labour; what prevents them from getting more out of it is neither the smallness of the soupbowl, nor its being insufficiently filled, but solely the smallness of their spoons”. (Chapter 1, “Wages, Prices, and Money”).
[17] [391] Prometeo no. 6, “The United States and World Domination”.
[18] [392] “Crisis and Imperialism” in Communist Review no. 1.
[19] [393] See International Review no. 36, “Battaglia Comunista’s vision of the course of history”.
[20] [394] Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Chapter 32.
[21] [395] Manifesto of the 2nd Congress of the Communist International.
[22] [396] Prometeo no. 6, “The United States and World Domination”.
[23] [397] Battaglia Comunista no. 10 (October 1993).
[24] [398] 2nd Conference of Groups of the Communist Left, Vol. I, Preparatory Texts, “On the theory of crisis in general”, Contribution from PCInt/BC.
[25] [399] The comrades explicitly identify decadent capitalism with “monopoly capitalism”: “It is precisely in this historic phase that capitalism enters its decadent phase. Free competition, sharpened by the fall in the rate of profit, creates its opposite, monopoly, which is the form of organisation that capitalism adopts in order to stave off the threat of a further fall in the rate of profit” (2nd Conference of Groups of the Communist Left, text quoted). Monopolies survive in decadence but are far from constituting its essential characteristic. This vision is closely linked to the theory of imperialism, and to BC’s insistence on the “sharing out of financial revenue”. It should be clear that this theory makes it difficult to understand in depth the universal tendency (i.e. not limited to the Stalinist countries) to state capitalism.
[26] [400] International Review no. 23, “The Struggle of the Proletariat in Decadent Capitalism”.
[27] [401] Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Chapter 1.
[28] [402] Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Chapter 31.
[29] [403] “Crisis and Imperialism” in Communist Review no. 1.
[30] [404] Manifesto of the Communist International, 1st Congress of the CI, March 1919.
Around the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left (see our book The Italian Communist Left), reconstituted in Marseille in 1942, there formed a nucleus of about ten French elements: some of them had just broken with Trotskyism and others, still young, had only just moved towards revolutionary positions.
The Italian Communist Left is well known to our readers. However, we should take a few lines to recall that the Italian Left had a long political and theoretical tradition, a tradition of struggle in the Italian and international workers’ movement. Its origins go back to a few years before the First World War, to the fight of the younger elements of the Italian Socialist Party against the colonial war in Tripolitania, now Libya, between 1910 and 1912. The Italian Left was the main element in the creation of the Italian Communist Party at Livorno in 1921. In the mid-twenties, it held on to revolutionary positions against the degeneration of the Communist International, fighting within the latter until its definitive expulsion in 1928, along with other currents of the left, including the Russian left opposition under Trotsky. When fascism came to power in Italy, a number of its members were put in prison or exiled to the islands of the Tyrrenian sea. After that, the Italian Left carried on its internationalist political combat in emigration in France and Belgium, first in the International Left Opposition, which was not yet Trotskyist, and then virtually alone, after its exclusion from the latter.
By the 1930s, the revolutionary wave was definitely over. The Russian revolution had been isolated and defeated. The working class had been beaten, and with each year that passed, revolutionaries found themselves on their own, more and more distant from their class. As Victor Serge put it, it was “midnight in the century”, but the communist will of the Italian Left did not weaken. Throughout this period it held onto communist and internationalist principles. It was the only revolutionary organisation which understood that the historic course was no longer favourable to the working class and that the way was open to world imperialist war. This understanding of the political situation enabled it to grasp the fact that the war in Spain in 1936, like the wars in Abyssinia or Manchuria, were simply the preludes to the coming generalised imperialist war. It thus defended the idea that the proletariat was beaten and that the period was not favourable to the formation of new revolutionary parties. Its role, as a fraction of the future communist party, was to hold onto communist principles and to prepare the “revolutionary cadres” of the future party, which would be born when the proletariat re-emerged onto the historic scene.
The beginning of the Second World War got the better of the Italian Left and dispersed its members. It disappeared in August 1939 when war was declared; the International Bureau in Brussels dissolved itself.
However, some elements of the Italian Left managed to regroup in Marseille and decided to carry on the struggle for proletarian internationalism. Alone and against the tide they denounced the imperialist war and called on the workers of all the countries of Europe to fight against all the capitalist states, democratic, fascist or Stalinist (see the Manifesto of the Communist Left to the Proletarians of Europe, published in the book cited above).
When powerful strike movements broke out in Italy in 1943 (see International Review 75 [405]), a new perspective at last seemed to be opening up for revolutionaries. They considered that the historic course that had led the working class from defeat to defeat had changed. “After three years of war, Germany, and thus Europe present the first signs of weakness...we can say that the objective conditions are opening up a period of revolution” (“Draft resolution on the perspectives and tasks of the transitional period”, Conference of July 1943, published in Internationalisme no. 5, 1945).
The insurrectionary events which had just taken place in Italy were very important, but the bourgeoisie was on its guard; it was not to make the same errors that it had made at the end of the First World War and which led to the revolutions in Russia and Germany.
The revolutionaries themselves made a double mistake:
- they underestimated the bourgeoisie (see the article below), thinking that the proletarian revolution would come out of imperialist war, as it had done in 1871, 1905, and above all 1917;
- they underestimated the defeat suffered by the working class which had been ideologically defeated at the end of the 30s, then physically defeated, then crushed and murdered during the imperialist war.
The documents which we reproduce here express this overestimation: the slogans called on the workers not to march behind the Resistance, but to organise their own “action committees” and to follow the example of the Italian workers.
After the treason of the Communist Parties and the Trotskyist groups which had passed wholesale into the imperialist camp of the democrats and Stalinists, the immense merit of these comrades was to have raised aloft the only revolutionary and internationalist torch during the nationalist, chauvinist and revengeful hysteria of the “Liberation”. Against the tide, against the national unity that extended from the Gaullist right to the Stalinists and Trotskyists, the workers and revolutionaries-with-no-fatherland of the Communist Left of France distributed their leaflets and their papers.
It needed a mad courage to stand up against everyone, to call on the workers to desert the partisans, and in doing so to run the gauntlet between the Gestapo, the Vichy police, the Gaullists and the Stalinist killers.
Rx
WORKERS!
The Anglo-American troops have replaced the GERMAN GENDARME in the work of repressing the working class and reintegrating it into the imperialist war.
The RESISTANCE is pushing you into an insurrection, but under its leadership and for capitalist aims.
The COMMUNIST PARTY has abandoned the cause of the proletariat and has sunk into patriotism, which is so inimical to the working class.
More than ever your weapon remains THE CLASS STRUGGLE without any regard for frontiers or nations.
More than ever your place is not on the side either of fascism or of bourgeois democracy.
More than ever, ANGLO-AMERICAN, RUSSIAN AND GERMAN CAPITALISMS ARE THE EXPLOITERS OF THE WORKING CLASS.
The strike now underway has been provoked by THE BOURGEOISIE and for ITS INTERESTS.
Tomorrow, to fight against the unemployment which it cannot solve, YOU WILL BE MOBILISED AND SENT TO THE IMPERIALIST FRONT.
WORKERS!
- Don’t respond to the insurrection which will be made with your blood for the greater good of international capitalism.
- Act as proletarians, not as revanchist Frenchmen.
- Refuse to be reintegrated into the imperialist war.
WORKERS!
- Organise your action committees, and when the conditions allow it, follow the example of the Italian workers.
INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM CAN ONLY LIVE THROUGH WAR
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ARMIES WILL PROVE THIS TO YOU JUST LIKE THE GERMAN ARMY!
YOU WILL ONLY GET OUT OF THE IMPERIALIST WAR THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR!
PROLETARIAT AGAINST CAPITALISM!
French Communist Left, August 1944
Lead article from L'Enticelle, August 1944
Organ of the French Communist Left
Workers,
After five years of war, with all its misery, death and carnage, the bourgeoisie is weakening under the blows of a crisis that is opening the doors to civil war. Tomorrow’s Europe will be a vast powder-keg in which the counter-revolutionary British, American and Russian armies will implacably attempt to smother the revolutionary movements of the working class.
The tasks of repression have already been shared out amongst the belligerents. Italy has been a vast field of experience which has shown capitalism the danger, in times of war, of leaving intact workers’ concentrations that could give rise to independent class movements. The Italian workers have proved this.
This is why for two years Germany has been dragging you off to huge factories where, side by side, European workers have been slaved to death producing arms for the imperialist war. This is why for two years patriots in the service of capitalism have been pushing you into the maquis so that you lose your class consciousness and become revanchists. All the important industrial centres of France have been emptied more and more in order to reduce the risk of civil war and eliminate possible sources of revolutionary ferment provoked by the war.
The draining of all the workers’ energies is being done with the political intention of weakening your consciousness and lining you up like animals to be whipped and cut down the moment you whisper any protest.
The war today is no longer being fought between the belligerent imperialisms, but between a capitalism conscious of its will to remain in power despite its historical impossibility, and a proletariat blinded by the demagogy which pours spontaneously from the flanks of the bourgeois system.
The demagogic and repressive weapons of capitalism are already at work.
In addition to the concentration camps, the maquis, the ferocious exploitation of all the workers in Germany, we now have the bombing of the cities, especially where strikes are breaking out, as in Milan, Naples, Marseille. Through the radio, bourgeois propaganda has taken on the language of the October revolution, even though since its death in 1933 the Communist International has led you through defeat after defeat into the imperialist war.
The Red Army, which has usurped a name that is covered in glory because it was once a workers’ army fighting for the dictatorship of the proletariat, is now carrying on the deadly work of fascism, using the word ‘Soviet’ to disguise the imposition of capitalist exploitation.
De Gaulle, this “blackguard” as the Stalinists called him before 1941, has the backing of the Anglo-Americans and the Russians to mobilise and smother you in khaki once again.
Europe is ripe for civil war; capitalism is preparing to react by leading you towards the imperialist war.
Workers, each weapon of capitalism contains its own danger for capitalism.
To the reduction of revolutionary flashpoints, the situation responds by concentrating the working class even more densely in a nerve-center of capitalism.
Against the politics of patriotism, a proletarian solidarity is created in the German factories and will be fortified by the ineluctable necessity for the workers to defend themselves as workers in a Europe that tomorrow will be abandoned to famine and unemployment.
The crisis that leads to the transformation of imperialist war into civil war will not spare the imperialist armies, who will be affected by social convulsions in the rear, by the revolutionary contamination of insurrections by the European proletariat. The cause of the French proletariat is totally bound up with the cause of the European proletariat after four years of economic centralisation and concentration. The most dangerous enemies of the European and world working class are Anglo-American and Russian capitalisms, which do not intend to be dispossessed.
Workers, whatever the name you give your unitary organs, the example of the Russian Soviets of the 1917 October revolution must show you the way to power without compromise or opportunism.
Neither democracy nor Stalinism with their demagogy about “Bread, Peace and Liberty” can free you from the oppression and famine looming up, in a world where capitalism can bring only war.
Society is at a complete dead-end; the proletarian revolution is the only way out.
The first step to take is to break with the imperialist war through a clear class consciousness which proclaims above all the class struggle always and everywhere. The crisis of the world bourgeoisie, which has opened up in Italy and Germany, is forging the conditions and weapons favourable to the civil war, the spontaneous beginning of the revolution.
Workers!
Break with Anglo-mania, Americano-mania, Russo-mania.
Reject all patriotism, which can only serve capitalism.
Proclaim your class solidarity and organise for the victory of the revolution.
Break now with the parties that have betrayed the working class and led you into this imperialist war and want to keep you in it. Gaullism, social democracy, Stalinism, Trotskyism, these are the screens behind which the enemy class is trying to penetrate into your ranks in order to crush you.
Workers!
Salvation can only come from you, because history has given you all the possibilities of understanding your historic mission and the weapons to accomplish it.
Forward to the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war!
The Italian workers have shown you the way, it’s up to you to respond to the counter-revolution that is camouflaged in your own ranks!
The French Fraction of the Communist Left
The text published below was written in 1995, 20 years after the founding congress of the International Communist Current in 1975.
We reprint this text in order to give our readers an introduction to the history of our organisation, and an insight into the method which inspired its creation as an international regroupment of local organisations. This remains our method to this day.
Twenty years ago, in January 1975, the International Communist Current was formed. This is a considerable lifespan for a proletarian organisation, when we consider that the IWA only survived 12 years (1864-76), the Socialist International 25 years (1889-1914), and the Communist International 9 years (1919-28). Obviously, we do not pretend that our organisation has played a part comparable to that of the workers' Internationals. Nonetheless, the ICC's 20 years of experience belongs entirely to the proletariat, whence our organisation springs just as did the Internationals of the past, and as do the other organisations which defend communist principles today. In this sense it is our duty, and this anniversary provides us with an opportunity, to pass on to our class some of the lessons which we draw from these two decades of combat.
The comparison between the ICC and the organisations which have marked the history of the workers' movement, especially the Internationals, is disconcerting: whereas the latter organisations included or influenced millions, even tens of millions of workers, the ICC is only known, throughout the world, to a tiny minority of the working class. This situation, which is also the lot of all the other revolutionary organisations, should encourage us to modesty. It should not, however, lead us to underestimate the work we do accomplish, and still less should it discourage us. Ever since the proletariat first appeared as an actor on the social scene a century and a half ago, its historic experience has shown that the periods when revolutionary positions exerted a real influence over the working masses have been relatively limited. And moreover, it is on the basis of this reality that the bourgeoisie's ideologues have claimed that the proletarian revolution is a pure utopia, since most workers do not think it either necessary or possible. This phenomenon, which was already apparent when mass workers' parties existed, at the end of the 20th century, has been further amplified by the defeat of the revolutionary wave which followed World War I.
The working class made the world bourgeoisie tremble, and the latter took its revenge by subjecting its enemy to the longest counter-revolution in its history. And the spearhead of the counter-revolution was precisely those organisations - the socialist and communist parties, and the trades unions - which the working class had founded for its own combat, but which had gone over to the bourgeois camp. The vast majority of the socialist parties were already in the service of the bourgeoisie during the War, calling the on workers for "National Unity", and in some countries even joining the governments which had unleashed the imperialist slaughter. Then, when the revolutionary wave unfurled following the October 1917 revolution in Russia, these same parties played the part of executioners for the bourgeoisie, either by deliberately sabotaging the movement, as in Italy in 1920, or by ordering and organising the murder of workers and revolutionaries in their thousands, as in Germany in 1919. Later on, the communist parties, which had been formed around those socialist party fractions that refused to join the imperialist war effort, and which had taken the lead in the revolutionary wave by rallying around the Communist International (founded in March 1919), went down the same path as their socialist predecessors. Dragged down by the defeat of the world revolution, and by the degeneration of the revolution in Russia, they joined the capitalist camp during the 1930's, to become the most faithful recruiting sergeants for World War II in the name of anti-fascism and "defence of the socialist fatherland". Having been the main architects of the "resistance" movements against the German and Japanese occupying armies, they continued their dirty work by exercising a ferocious control over the workers during the reconstruction of the ruined capitalist economies.
Throughout this period the massive influence that the socialist or "communist" parties were able to have of the working class stifled the consciousness of workers, steeped them in chauvinism and either turned them away from any perspective for the overthrow of capitalism or confused this perspective with the strengthening of the democratic bourgeoisie or subjected them to the lie that the capitalist states of the Eastern bloc were "socialism" incarnate. During this "midnight in the century" the real communist forces who were chased out of the degenerating Communist International were in a situation of extreme isolation when they weren't actually exterminated by Stalinist or fascist agents of the counter-revolution. In the worst conditions in the history of the workers' movement the handful of militants who managed to escape the wreckage of the Communist International worked to defend communist principles in order to prepare the future historic resurgence of the proletariat. Many lost their lives or were worn out to the point that their organisations - the fractions and groups of the communist left - disappeared or else were crippled by sclerosis.
The terrible counter-revolution which crushed the working class following its glorious battles after World War I lasted for nearly forty years. But once the last fires of the reconstruction following the second world war had gone out and capitalism was again faced with the open crisis of its economy at the end of the 60s, the proletariat raised its head once more. May 1968 in France, the "rampant May" in Italy in 1969, workers' struggles in the winter of 1970 in Poland and a whole series of workers' struggles in Europe and on other continents: the counter-revolution was over. The best proof of this fundamental change in the course of history was the appearance and development in various parts of the world of groups who based themselves, often in a confused way, on the traditions and positions of the Communist Left. The ICC was formed in 1975 as a regroupment of some of these formations that the historic resurgence of the proletariat had produced. That fact that since then the ICC has not only continued to exist but has grown, doubling the number of sections is excellent proof of this historic resurgence of the proletariat, an excellent indication that the latter has not been defeated and that the historic course is still towards class confrontations. This is the first lesson to be drawn from the 20 years existence of the ICC against the idea shared by many other groups of the Communist Left who think that the proletariat hasn't yet emerged from the counter-revolution.
In International Review n°40, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the ICC, we drew a number of lessons from our experience in this earlier period. We recall them briefly here to underline some of the points we made about the period that followed. However before making such an assessment we must quickly go back to the history of the ICC. And for readers who are unacquainted with the article of 10 years ago we reprint large extracts from it here which deal with this history.
"The first organised expression of our Current appeared in Venezuela in 1964. It consisted of very young elements who had begun to evolve towards class positions through discussions with an older comrade who had behind him the experience of being a militant in the Communist International, in the left fractions which were excluded from it at the end of the 1920s - notable the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy - and who was part of the Gauche Communiste de France until its dissolution in 1952. Straight away this small group in Venezuela - which, between 1964 and 1968 published ten issues of its review Internacionalismo - saw itself as being in political continuity with the positions of the Communist Left, especially those of the GCF. This was expressed in particular through a very clear rejection of any policy of supporting so-called "national liberation struggles", a myth that was very prevalent in Latin American countries and that weighed heavily on elements trying to move towards class positions. It was also expressed in an attitude of openness towards, and making contact with, other communist groups - an attitude which had previously characterised the International Communist Left before the war and the GCF after it. Thus the group Internacionalismo established or tried to establish contacts and discussions with the American group News and Letters (...) and in Europe with a whole series of groups who were situated on class positions (...) With the departure of several of its elements for France in '67 and '68, this group interrupted its publication for several years, before Internacionalismo (new series) began in 1974 and the group became a constituent part of the ICC in 1975.
"The second organised expression of our Current appeared in France in the wake of the general strike of May '68 which marked the historic resurgence of the world proletariat after more than 40 years of counter-revolution. A small nucleus was formed in Toulouse around a militant of Internacionalismo. This nucleus participated actively in the animated discussions of Spring '68, adopted a 'declaration of principles' in June and published the first issue of Révolution Internationale (RI) at the end of that year. Straight away, this group continued Internacionalismo's policy of looking for contact and discussion with other groups of the proletarian milieu both nationally and internationally. (...) From 1970 onwards, it established closer links with two groups who managed to swim out of the general decomposition of the councilist milieu after May '68: the 'Organisation Conseilliste de Clermont Ferrand" and "Cahiers du Communisme di Conseils (Marseille)", following an attempted discussion with the GLAT which showed that this group was moving further and further away from marxism. Discussion with the former two groups, however, proved much more fruitful and after a whole series of meetings in which the basic positions of the Communist Left were examined in a systematic manner, RI, the OC of Clermont and CCC came together in 1972 around a platform which was a more detailed and precise version of RI's declaration of principles of 1968. This new group published the Revue Internationale as well as a Bulletin d'Etude at de Discussion and was to be at the centre of a whole work of international contact and discussion in Europe up until the foundation of the ICC two and a half years later.
"On the American continent, the discussions that Internacionalismo had with News and Letters left some traces in the USA and, in 1970, a group was formed in New York (part of which was made up of former members of News and Letters) around an orientation text with the same basic positions as Internacionalismo and RI (...) The new group began to publish Internationalism and like its predecessors set about establishing discussions with other communist groups. Thus it maintained contacts and discussions with Root and Branch in Boston, which was inspired by the councilist ideas of Paul Mattick, but these proved not to be fruitful since the Boston group was more and more turning into a club or marxology. In 1972, Internationalism sent a proposal for international correspondence to twenty groups, in the following terms:
"(...) 'Together with the heightened activity of the working class there has been a dramatic growth in the number of revolutionary groups having an internationalist communist perspective. Unfortunately, contact and correspondence between these groups has largely been haphazard and episodic. Internationalism makes the following proposal with a view towards regularising and expanding contact and correspondence between groups having an internationalist communist perspective (...)
"In its positive response, RI said:
"'Like you we feel the necessity for the like and activities of our groups to have as international a character as the present struggles of the working class. This is why we have maintained contact through letters or directly with a certain number of European groups to whom your proposal was sent. (...) We think that you initiative will make it possible to broaden the scope of these contacts and at the very least, to make our respective positions better known. We also think that the perspective of a future international conference is the logical follow-on from the establishment of this political correspondence (...)
"In its response, RI thus underlined the necessity to work towards international conferences of groups of the Communist Left, without any idea of haste: such a conference should be held after a period of correspondence. This proposal was in continuity with the repeated proposals it had made (in '68, '69 and '71) to the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (Battaglia Comunista - BC) to call such conferences, since at the time this organisation was the most important and serious group in the camp of the Communist Left in Europe (alongside the PCI - Programma Comunista, which was basking in the comfort of its splendid isolation). But despite Battaglia's open and fraternal attitude, these proposals had each time been rejected (...).
"In the end, Internationalism's initiative and RI's proposal did lead, in '73 and '74, to the holding of a series of conferences and meetings in England and France during the course of which a process of clarification and decantation got under way, notably with the evolution of the British group World Revolution (which came out of a split in Solidarity) towards the positions of RI and Internationalism. WR published the first issue of its magazine in May 1974. Above all, this process of clarification and decantation created the bases for the constitution of the ICC in January '75. During this period, RI had continued its work of contact and discussion at an international level, not only with organised groups but also with isolated elements who read its press and sympathised with its positions. This work led to the formation of small nuclei in Spain and Italy around the same positions and who in '74 commences publication of Accion Proletaria and Rivoluzione Internazionale.
"Thus, at the January '75 conference were present Internacionalismo, Révolution Internationale, Internationalism, World Revolution, Accion Proletaria and Rivoluzione Internazionale, who shared the political orientations which had been developed since 1964 with Internacionalismo. Also present were Revolutionary Perspectives (who had participated in the conferences of '73-'74), the Revolutionary Workers' Group of Chicago (with whom RI and Internationalism had begun discussions in '74) and Pour Une Intervention Communiste (which published the review Jeune Taupe and had been formed around comrades who had left RI in '73 (...). As for the group Workers' Voice, which had participated actively in the conferences of the previous years, it had rejected the invitation to this conference because it now considered that RI, WR, etc were bourgeois groups (!) because of the position of the majority of their militants on the question of the state in the period of transition from capitalism to communism (...).
"This question was on the agenda of the January 1975 conference... However it wasn't discussed at the conference which saw the need to devote the maximum of its time and attention to questions that were much more crucial at that point:
that analysis of the international situation;
the tasks of revolutionaries within it;
the organisation of the international current.
"Finally the six groups whose platforms were based on the same orientations decided to unify themselves into a single organisation with an international central organ and publishing a quarterly review in three languages - English, French and Spanish (...) - which took over from RI's Bulletin d'Etude et de Discussion. The ICC had been founded. As the presentation to number 1 of the International Review said, "a great step forward has just been taken". The foundation of the ICC was the culmination of a whole work of contacts, discussions and confrontations between the different groups which had been engendered by the historic awakening of the class struggle. (...) But above all it lay the bases for even more considerable work to come.
"This work can be seen by the readers of the International Review and of our territorial press and confirms what we wrote in the presentation to International Review n°1:
'Some people will consider that the publication of the Review is a precipitous action. It is nothing of the kind. We have nothing in common with those noisy activists whose activity is based on a voluntarism as frenzied as it is ephemeral' (1) (...)
"Throughout the ten years of its existence, the ICC has obviously encountered numerous difficulties, has had to overcome various weaknesses, most of which are linked to the break in organic continuity with the communist organisations of the past, to the disappearance of sclerosis of the left fractions who detached themselves from the degenerating Communist International. It has also had to combat the deleterious influence of the decomposition and revolt of the intellectual petty bourgeoisie, an influence that was particularly strong after '68 and the period of the student movements. These difficulties and weaknesses have for example expressed themselves in various splits - which we have written about in our press - and especially by the major convulsions which took place in 1981, in the ICC as well as the revolutionary milieu as a whole, and which led to the loss of half our section in Britain. In the face on the difficulties in '81, the ICC was even led to organise an extraordinary conference in January '82 in order to reaffirm and make more precise its programmatic bases, in particular concerning the function and structure of the revolutionary organisation. Also, some of the objectives the ICC set itself have not been attained. For example, the distribution of our press has fallen short of what we had hoped for. (...)
"However, if we draw up an overall balance sheet of the last ten years, it can clearly be seen to be a positive one. This is particularly true if you compare it to that of other communist organisations who existed after 1968. Thus, the groups of the councilist current, even those who tried to open themselves up to international work like ICO, have either disappeared or sunk into lethargy: the GLAT, ICO, the Situationist International, Spartacusbond, Root and Branch, PIC, the councilist groups of the Scandinavian milieu... the list is long and this one is by no means exhaustive. As for the organisations coming from the Italian Left and who all proclaim themselves to be THE PARTY, either they haven't broken out of their provincialism, or have dislocated and degenerated towards leftism like Programma (2), or are today imitating, in a confused and artificial way, what the ICC did ten years ago, as is the case with Battaglia and the CWO. Today, after the so-called International Communist Party has collapsed like a pack of cards, after the failure of the FOR in the USA (the FOCUS group), the ICC remains the only communist organisation that is really implanted on an international scale.
"Since its formation in 1975, the ICC has not only strengthened its original territorial sections but has implanted itself in other countries. The work of contact, discussion and regroupment on an international scale has led to the establishment of new sections of the ICC:
- 1975: the constitution of the section in Belgium which published the review, now a newspaper, Internationalisme, in two languages (French and Dutch), and which fills the gap left by the disappearance in the period after World War II of the Belgian Fraction of the International Communist Left.
- 1977: constitution of the nucleus in Holland, which began publication of the magazine Wereld Revolutie. This was particularly important in a country which has been the stamping ground of councilism.
- 1978: constitution of the section in Germany which began publication of the IR in German and, the following year, of the territorial magazine Weltrevolution. The presence of a communist organisation in Germany is obviously of the highest importance given the place occupied by the German proletariat in the past and the role it is going to play in the future.
- 1980: constitution of the section in Sweden which publishes the magazine Internationell Revolution. (...)
"If we underline the contrast between the relative success of our Current and the failure of other organisations, it's because this demonstrates the validity of the orientations we have put forward in twenty years of work for the regroupment of revolutionaries, for the construction of a communist organisation. It is our responsibility to draw out these orientations for the whole communist milieu.
"The bases on which our Current has carried out this work of regroupment even before its formal constitution are not new. In the past they have always been the pillars of this kind of work. We can summarise them as follows:
- the necessity to base revolutionary activity on the past acquisitions of the class, on the experience of previous communist organisations; to see the present organisation as a link in a chain of past and future organs of the class;
- the necessity to see communist positions and analyses not as a dead dogma but as a living programme which is constatly being enriched and deepened;
- the necessity to be armed with a clear and solid conception of the revolutionary organisation, of its structure and its function within the class."
These lessons that we drew 10 years ago (and which are more developed in International Review n°40 which we recommend our readers to refer to) obviously remain valid today and our organisation has striven constantly to put them into practice. However while during the first 10 years of its existence its central task was to build an international pole of regroupment for revolutionary forces, its main responsibility in the subsequent period has been to confront a series of trials ("trials by fire" in a way) that have come out of the convulsions taking place in the international situation in particular.
At the 6th Congress of the ICC which was held in November 1985, a few months after the 10 year anniversary of the ICC we said:
"At the beginning of the 80s the ICC characterised them as 'the years of truth'; years in which the main stakes for the whole of society would be revealed in all their terrible breadth. Half way through the decade the evolution of the international situation has fully confirmed this analysis:
- by a further aggravation of the convulsions of the world economy which has been manifested since the beginning of the 80s by the most serious recession since the 30s;
- by an intensification of tensions between the imperialist blocs which occurred in teh same period and was expressed in a considerable increase in military expenditure and through the development of clamorous war campaigns with Reagan as chantre , head of the most powerful bloc;
- by the resurgence of class struggle during the second half of 1983 after its momentary reflux from 1981 to 1983 just before and after the repression of the workers in Poland. This resurgence is characterised by a hitherto unprecedented simultaneity of the struggles especially in the important centres of capitalism and of the working class in western Europe" (Resolution on the international situation, International Review n°44).
This framework proved valid until the end of the 80s even though the bourgeoisie did what it could to present the "recovery" of 1983 to 1990, that was on the basis of the number 1 world power going into huge debt, as the "definitive end" of the crisis. As Lenin said, facts are stubborn and since the beginning of the 90s capitalism's tricks have led to an open recession even more long and brutal than the previous ones; this has been transformed the euphoria of the average bourgeois into a profound moroseness.
Likewise the wave of workers' strikes that began in 1983 continues with moments of reflux and moments of greater intensity up to 1989 which forced the bourgeoisie to bring forward various forms of base unionism (such as coordinations) in order to counteract the growing discredit of the official union structures.
However one aspect of this framework was dramatically put into question in 1989; that of imperialist conflicts. It's not that the marxist theory had been suddenly proved wrong by the "overcoming" of such conflicts but rather that one of the two main protagonists of such conflicts, the eastern bloc, collapsed dramatically. What we called the "years of truth" had proved fatal for an aberrant regime that had been built on the ruins of the 1917 revolution and for the bloc it dominated. An historic event of such breadth that overturned the map of the world created a new situation unprecedented in history in the sphere of imperialist conflicts. The latter took on forms hitherto unknown that revolutionaries have a responsibility to understand and analyse.
At the same time these upheavals that affected those countries that presented themselves as "socialist" dealt a very heavy blow to the consciousness and combativeness of the working class which had to face the most serious reflux since the historic resurgence at the end of the 60s.
So the international situation in the last ten years has compelled the ICC to confront the following challenges:
- to be an active factor in the class combats that took place between 1983 and 1989;
- to understand the significance of the 1989 events and the consequences they would have in the sphere of imperialist conflicts as well as the class struggle;
- more generally to develop a framework to understand the period in the life of capitalism of which the colllapse of the eastern bloc was the first great manifestation.
After the 6th Congress of the section in France (the largest in the ICC) held in 1984 the 6th ICC Congress placed this concern at the heart of its agenda. However the effort made by our international organisation over several months to rise to its responsibilities towards the class at the beginning of 11984 came up against the persistence within its ranks of conceptions that underestimated the function of the revolutionary organisation as an active factor in the proletarian struggle. The ICC identified these conceptions as a result of centrist slidings towards councilism. This was mainly a product of the historic conditions in which it was constituted as among the groups and elements who participated in its formation there existed a strong distrust of anything resembling Stalinism. In line with councilism these elements tended to put on the same level Stalinism, the conceptions of Lenin on the organisational question and the very idea of the proletarian party. During the 70s the ICC had made a critique of Stalinist conceptions but it hadn't gone far enough and so these continued to weigh on certain parts of the organisation. When the struggle against the vestiges of councilism began at the end of 1983 a number of comrades refused to see the reality of their councilist weaknesses, fantasising that the ICC was conducting a "witch hunt". To avoid the problem posed; centrism towards councilism, they "discovered" that centrism can no longer exist in the decadent period of capitalism (3). Added to such political incomprehensions these comrades, most of whom were intellectuals unwilling to accept criticism, felt a sense of wounded pride as well as "solidarity" towards their friends whom they deemed to be unfairly "attacked". As we pointed out in the International Review n°45 it was a sort of "remake" of the 2nd Congress of the POSDR in which centrism on the organisational question and the weight of the circle spirit, which meant that links of affinity took priority over political relationships, led the Mensheviks to split. The "tendency" that was formed at the beginning of 1985 was to follow the same pathe and split at the time of the 6th Congress of the ICC to constitute a new organisation, the "External Fraction of the ICC" (FECCI). However there is a big difference between the fraction of the Mensheviks and that of the FECCI. The former was to prosper by gathering together the most opportunist currents of Russian Social Democracy and ended up in the bourgeois camp whereas the FECCI has collapsed, keeping more and more of a low profile and producing its publication, International Perspectives at greater and greater intervals. n the end the FECCI rejected the platform of the ICC although at their formation they gave as their main task the defence of this same platform that the ICC which according to them was "degenerating", was in the process of betraying.
At the same time as the ICC was fighting against the vestiges of councilism within it, it participated actively in the struggle of the working class as our territorial press throughout this period shows. Despite the smallness of its forces our organisation was present in the various struggles. Not only did it distribute its press and leaflets, it also participated directly whenever possible in workers' assemblies to defend the need for the extension of the struggles and workers' control over them outside the various union forms; "official" unionism or "rank-and-file" unionism. So in Italy during the schools' strike in 1987 our comrades' intervention had a not negligible impact within the COBAS (rank and file committees) where they were present before these organisms were recuperated by rank-and-file unionism with the reflux in the movement. During this period one of the best indication that our positions were beginning to have an impact among the workers was the fact that the ICC became a particular object of hatred for some of the leftist groups. This was especially so in France where at the time of the strike on the railways at the end of 86 and of the strike in the hospitals in Autumn 88 the Trotskyist group "Lutte Ouvrière" mobilised its "strong arm men" to prevent our militants from intervening in the assemblies called by the "co-ordinations". At the same time ICC militants actively participated in - and were often the animators of - several struggle groups that drew together workers who felt the need to regroup outside the unions to push the struggle forward.
Obviously we mustn't "exaggerate" the impact that revolutionaries, and our organisation in particular, were able to have on the workers' struggles between 1983 and 1989. Generally the movement remained imprisoned by unionism, its "rank-and-file" variations taking the baton from the official unions where the latter had been too discredited. Our impact was very immediate and was anyway limited by the fact that our forces are still very small. But the lesson that we must learn from this experience is that when struggles develop revolutionaries find an echo when they're present because the positions they defend and the perspectives they put forward answer the questions that workers are asking. And for this to be true there's no need whatever for them to "hide their flag" or make the slightest concession to the illusions that may still weigh on the consciousness of the workers, particularly on the question of unionism. This is a valid lesson for all revolutionary groups which are often paralysed when confronted with struggles because the latter don't yet raise the question of capitalism's overthrow so they feel obliged to work with rank-and-file structures "to be heard" and thus give credibility to these capitalist organs.
Just as it is the responsibility of revolutionaries to be present "on the ground" when there are workers' struggles they must also be able at any moment to give the working class as a whole a clear framework of analysis for what's happening in the world.
An important aspect of this task is the understanding of the economic contradiction that affect the capitalist system. Those revolutionary groups who are unable to demonstrate the insoluble nature of the crisis that the system's drowning in show that they haven't understood the marxist tradition they lay claim to and are of no use to the working class. This is so with a group like "Ferment Ouvrier Révolutionnaire" for example who refused even too acknowledge that there was a crisis. Their eyes were so glued to the specific characteristics of the 1929 crisis that they denied all the evidence over the years... until they disappeared.
It's also up to revolutionaries to be able to evaluate the steps that the movement of the class has accomplished; to recognise the moments when it's going forward and also those when it is in retreat. This task firmly conditions the kind of intervention to make among the workers because then the movement is going forward their responsibility is to push it to its limits and in particular to call for its extension. When it's in retreat to call the workers to struggle is to push them to fight in isolation and to call for extension is to contribute to the extension... of the defeat. It's often precisely at such moments that the unions call for extension.
Finally following and understanding the various imperialist conflicts also constitutes a responsibility of the greatest importance for communists. A mistake in this sphere can have dramatic consequences. For example at the end of the 30s the majority of the Italian Communist Fraction with Vercesi, its main animator, at its head, beleived that the different wars of the period, notably the war in Spain, in no way augured a generalised conflict. The outbreak of world war in September 1939 left the Fraction completely crippled and it was several years before they were able to reconstitute themselves in the south of France and take up militant work again.
As for the present period it was extremely important to be clear on the events taking place during the summer and autumn of 1989 in the eastern bloc countries. For its part the ICC mobilised itself to understand what was happening from the time that Solidarnosc came to power in Poland in the middle of the summer when usually "current affairs" are on holiday." (4) It adopted the position that what was happening in Poland was a sign that all the European Stalinist regimes were entering a crisis of unprecedented depth: "The perspective for all the Stalinist regimes is...by no means a "peaceful democratisation" or a "recovery" of the economy. With the intensification of the world crisis of capitalism these countries entered a period of convulsions of a breadth unknown even in their past that is "rich" in violent upheavals" (International Review n°59, "Capitalist convulsions and workers' struggles"). This idea is developed further in the "Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and in the eastern countries" drafted on 15 September (almost two months before the fall of the Berlin wall) and adopted by the ICC at the beginning of October. In these theses we read (see International Review n°60):
"...since virtually the only cohesive factor in the Russian bloc is that of armed force, any policy which tends to push this into the background threatens to break up the bloc. Already, the Eastern bloc is in a state of growing dislocation. For example, the invective traded between East Germany and Hungary, between "reformist" and "conservative" governments, is not just a sham. It reveals real splits which are building up between different national bourgeoisies. In this zone, the centrifugal tendencies are so strong that they go out of control as soon as they have the opportunity (...)
We find a similar phenomenon in the peripheral republics of the USSR. These regions are more or less colonies of Tsarist or even Stalinist Russia (eg the Baltic countries annexed under the 1939 Germano-Soviet pact). However, unlike the other great powers Russia has never been able to decolonise, since this would have meant losing all control over these regions, some of which are vital economically. The nationalist moevements which today are profiting from a loosening of central control by the Russian party, are developing more than half a century late relative to the movements which hit the British and French empires; their dynamic is towards separation from Russia" (Point 18).
"...however the situation in the Eastern bloc evolves, the events that are shaking it today mean the historic crisis, the definitive collapse of Stalinism (...) In these countries, an unprecedented period of instability, convulsions and chaos has begun, whose implications go far beyond their frontiers. In particular, the weakening, which will continue, of the Russian bloc, opens the gates to a destabilisation of the whole system of international relations and imperialist constellations which emerged from World War II with the Yalta Agreements" (Point 20).
A few months later (January 1990), this last idea was given greater precision:
"The world's geopolitical configuration as it has lasted since World War II has been completely overturned by the events of the second half of 1989. There are no longer two imperialist blocs sharing the world between them. It is obvious (...) that the Eastern bloc has ceased to exist (...).
Does this disappearance of the Eastern bloc mean that capitalism will no longer be subjected to imperialist confrontations? Such a hypothesis would be entirely foreign to marxism (...) Today, the collapse of this bloc can absolutely not given renewed credence to such analyses: this collapse will eventually bring with it the collapse of the Western bloc (...) The disappearance of the Russian imperialist gendarme, and that to come of the American gendarme as far as its one-time "partners" are concerned, opens the door to the unleashing of a whole series of more local rivalries. For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (...) However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent and more violent, especially of course in those areas where the proletariat is weakest (...)
The disappearance of the two major imperialist constellations which emerged from World War II brings with it the tendency towards the recomposition of two new blocs. Such a situation, however, is not yet on the agenda..." (International Review n°61, "After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, destabilisation and chaos").
Events since then, especially the crisis and war in the Gulf in 1990-91, have only confirmed our analyses (5). Today, the whole world situation, and notably what is happening in ex-Yugoslavia, is a blinding proof of the complete disappearance of all the imperialist blocs, just as some European countries, France and Germany in particular, are trying with great difficulty to encourage the formation of a new bloc based on the EEC, which would be capable of standing up to the power of the United States.
As far as the evolution of the class struggle is concerned, the Theses of the summer of 1989 also took position:
"Even in its death throes, Stalinism is rendering a last service to the domination of capital: in decomposing, its cadaver continues to pollute the atmosphere that the proletariat breathes (...) We thus have to expect a momentary retreat in the consciousness of the proletariat (...) In particular, reformist ideology will weigh very heavily on the struggle in the period ahead, greatly facilitating the action of the unions.
Given the historic importance of the facts that are determining it, the present retreat of the proletariat - although it doesn't call into question the historic course, the general perspective of class confrontations - is going to be much deeper than the one which accompanied the defeat of 1981 in Poland" (Point 22).
Once again, the last five years have amply confirmed this forecast. Since 1989, we have witnessed the most serious retreat by the working class since historic re-emergence at the end of the 60s. Revolutionaries had to be prepared for this situation in order to adapt their intervention accordingly, and above all, not to "throw the baby out with the bathwater" by mistaking the long reflux for a definitive incapacity of the proletariat to conduct and develop combats against capitalism. In particular, the signs of renewed workers' combativity, especially autumn 92 in Italy and autumn 93 in Germany (see International Review nos 72 and 75), should neither be overestimated (given the extent of the proletarian retreat), not underestimated, since they are the forerunners of an inevitable recovery in the combat and development of class consciousness throughout the industrialised countries.
Marxism is a scientific method. However, unlike the natural sciences it cannot verify its theories in laboratory conditions, or by improving its recording technology. Marxism's "laboratory" is social reality, and it demonstrates its validity through its ability to forecast that reality's evolution. The fact that the ICC was thus able to forecast, from the first symptoms of the Eastern bloc's collapse, the main events which were to shake the world in the five years that followed should not be put down to an aptitude for reading tea-leaves or astrological charts. It is simply the proof of the ICC's attachment to the marxist method, which is responsible for the success of our forecasts.
This being said, it is not enough to call yourself marxist to be able to use the method successfully. In fact, our ability to understand rapidly what was at stake in the world situation flows from the application of the method which we have taken from Bilan, and which we described ten years ago as one of the main lessons of our own experience: the necessity of attaching oneself firmly to the gains of the past, the necessity of regarding communist positions and analyses as a living programme, not a dead dogma.
The 1989 Theses thus began by recalling, in the first ten points, the framework that our organisation had adopted at the beginning of the 80s, following the events in Poland, for understanding the characteristics of the Eastern bloc countries. It was this analysis that allowed us to demonstrate that the Stalinist régimes of the Eastern bloc were finished. And it was a much older gain of the workers' movement (pointed out in particular by Lenin against Kautsky) - the understanding that there cannot exist only one imperialist bloc - that allowed us to declare that the end of the Eastern bloc opened the way to the disappearance of the Western bloc also.
Similarly, to understand what was happening, we had to call into question a schema which had remained valid for more than forty years: the world's division between a Western bloc led by the USA, and an Eastern bloc led by the USSR. We also had to be capable of understanding that the Russia which had been built little by little since the time of Peter the Great, would not survive the loss of its empire. Once again, there is no special merit in being able to call into question the schemas of the past. We did not invent this approach. It has been taught us by the experience of the workers' movement, and especially by its main fighters: Marx, Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin...
Finally, understanding the upheavals at the end of the 80s meant placing it within a general analysis of the present stage of capitalism's decadence.
This is the work that we began in 1986, with the idea that we had entered a new phase in capitalist decadence: the system's decomposition. This analysis was laid out at the beginning of 1989 in the following terms:
"Up to now, the class combats which have developed in the four corners of the planet have been able to prevent decadent capitalism from providing its own answer to the dead end of its economy: the ultimate form of its barbarity, a new world war. However, the working class is not yet capable of affirming its own perspective through its own revolutionary struggles, nor even of setting before the rest of society the future that it holds within itself.
It is precisely this temporary stalemate, where for the moment neither the bourgeois nor the proletarian alternative can emerge openly, that lies at the origin of capitalism's putrefaction, and which explains the extreme degree of decadent capitalism's barbarity. And this rottenness will get still worse with the inexorable aggravation of the economic crisis" (International Review n°57, "The decomposition of capitalism").
Obviously, as soon as the Eastern bloc's collapse became clear, we placed this event within the framework of decomposition:
"In reality, the present collapse of the Eastern bloc is another sign of the general decomposition of capitalist society, whose origins lie precisely in the bourgeoisie's own inability to give its own answer - imperialist war - to the open crisis of the world economy" (International Review n°60, "Theses...", Point 20).
Similarly, in January 1990, we brought out the implications for the proletariat of the phase of decomposition, and of the new configuration of the imperialist arena:
"Given the world bourgeoisie's loss of control over the situation, it is not certain that its dominant sectors will today be capable of enforcing the discipline and coordination necessary for the reconstitution of military blocs (...) This is why in our analyses, we must clearly highlight the fact that while the proletarian solution - the communist revolution - is alone able to oppose the destruction of humanity (the only answer that the bourgeoisie is capable of giving to the crisis), this destruction need not necessarily be the result of a third World War. It could also come about as a logical and extreme conclusion of the process of decomposition.
(...) the continuing and worsening rot of capitalist society will have still worse effects on class consciousness than during the 1980s. It weighs down the whole of society with a general feeling of despair; the putrid stink of rotting bourgeois ideology poisons the very air that the proletariat breathes. Right up to the pre-revolutionary period, this will sow further difficulties in the way of the development of class consciousness" (International Review n°61, "After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, destabilisation and chaos").
Our analysis of decomposition thus allows us to highlight the extreme gravity of what is at stake in the present historic situation. In particular, it leads us to underline that the proletariat's road towards the communist revolution will be much more difficult that revolutionaries thought in the past. This is another lesson that we must draw from the ICC's experience during the last ten years, and one which recalls Marx's concern last century: that revolutionaries do not have the vocation of consoling the working class, but on the contrary of emphasizing both the absolute necessity and the difficulty of its historic combat. Only with a clear consciousness of this difficulty will the proletariat (and the revolutionaries with it) be able to avoid discouragement in adversity, and find the strength and lucidity to overcome the barriers on the road to the overthrow of this society of exploitation (6).
In this evaluation of the ICC's last ten years, we cannot overlook two important elements of our organisational life.
The first is very positive: it is the extension of the ICC's territorial presence, with the formation in 1989 of a nucleus in India, which publishes Communist Internationalist in Hindi, and of a new section, with its publication Revolucion Mundial, in Mexico, a country of the greatest importance in Latin America.
The second fact is much sadder: it is the death of our comrade Marc, on 20th December 1990. We will not here go back over the vital part he played in the formation of the ICC, and before that in the combat of the left communist fractions during the darkest hours of the counter-revolution. A long article (International Review n°65-66) has already dealt with this. Let us say simply that, while the convulsions of world capitalism since 1989 have been a "test of fire" for the ICC, as for the milieu as a whole, the loss of our comrade has been for us another "test of fire". Many groups of the communist life did not survive the death of their main inspirer. This was the case for the FOR, for example. Some "friends" have also predicted, with deep "concern", that the ICC would not survive without Marc. And yet, the ICC is still there, and it has held its course for four years despite the storms it has encountered.
Here again, we do not ascribe any particular merit to ourselves: the revolutionary organisation does not exist thanks to any one of its militants, however valorous. It is the historic product of the proletariat, and if it fails to survive one of its militants then this is because it has failed to take up correctly the responsibility that the class has given it, and because the militant has himself, in a certain sense, failed. If the ICC has been successful in surmounting the tests it has encountered, this is above all because it has always had the concern to attach itself to the experience of the communist organisations that preceded it, and to see its role as a long term combat rather than one in view of any immediate "success". Since the last century, this has been the approach of the clearest and most solid revolutionary militants: we look back to them, and in large part is our comrade Marc who taught us to do so. He also taught us, by his example, the meaning of militant devotion, without which a revolutionary organisation cannot survive, however clear it may be:
"His greatest pride lay not in the exceptional contribution he made, but in the fact that he had remained faithful in all his being to the combat of the proletariat. This too, is a precious lesson to the new generations of militants who have never had the opportunity to experience the immense devotion to the revolutionary cause of past generations. It is on this level, above all, that we hope to rise to the combat. Though now without his presence, vigilant and clear-sighted, warm and passionate, we are determined to continue" (International Review n°66, "Marc").
Twenty years after the formation of the ICC, we continue the combat.
FM
1) The fact that today we are publishing Interntional Review no 80 shows that it has maintained an unbroken regularity.
2) In the early 80s, the PCI-Programma renamed its publication to Combat. Combat slid rapidly towards leftism. Since then, some elements of the group have renewed the publication of Programma Comunista, which defends classic Bordigist positions.
3) On this subject, see the articles published in International Review n°41 and 45.
4) It should be said that almost all the groups of the proletarian milieu completely failed to understand the events of 1989, as we showed in the articles "The wind from the East and the response of revolutionaries", and "Faced with the upheavals in the East, a vanguard that came late", in International Review n°61-62. The prize goes without any doubt to the EFICC (which had left the ICC on the grounds that the latter was degenerating and incapable of carrying out any theoretical work): the EFICC took TWO YEARS to realise that the Eastern bloc had disappeared (see the article "What use is the EFICC?", in International Review n°70).
5) We have given an account of these events in International Review n°64-65. In particular, even before "Desert Storm", we wrote: "In the new historical period which we have entered, and which the Gulf events have confirmed, the world appears as a vast free-for-all, where the tendency of "every man for himself" will operate to the full, and where the alliances between states will be far from having the stability that characterised the imperialist blocs, but will be dominated by the immediate needs of the moment. A world of bloody chaos, where the American policeman will try to maintain a minimum of order by the increasingly massive and brutal use of military force" ("Militarism and Decomposition", International Review n°64). Similarly, we rejected the idea put about by the leftists, but shared by most of the groups of the proletarian milieu, that the war in the Gulf was a "war for oil" (see "The proletarian political milieu faced with the Gulf war).
6) It is not necessary here to go back over our analysis of decomposition at greater length. It appears in all our texts dealing with the international situation. Let us just add that, through a debate in depth throughout the organisation, this analysis has been made progressively more precise (on this subject, see our texts "Decomposition, the ultimate phase of capitalist decadence", "Militarism and Decomposition", and "Towards the greatest chaos in history", published in International Review n°62, 64, and 68 respectively).
For a quarter of a century, since the end of the 1960s, the scourge of unemployment has continued to extend and intensify throughout the world. This development has been more or less regular, going through more or less violent accelerations and refluxes. But the general upward tendency has been confirmed in recession after recession.
Apparently all the economic statistics are clear: the world economy is finally coming out of the worst recession since the war. Production is increasing, profits are returning. The medicine seems to have worked. And yet no government dares cry victory, all of them are calling for still further sacrifices, all remain extremely prudent, and above all, every one of them says that as far as unemployment is concerned - ie the main issue - there's not a great deal to look forward to[1].
But what kind of recovery is it that doesn't create jobs or only creates precarious ones?
During the last two years, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, which are supposed to be the first to have come out of the open recession which began at the end of the 80s, the 'recovery' has essentially taken the form of an extreme modernization of the productive apparatus in enterprises which survived the disaster. Those who did survive did so at the price of violent restructurations, resulting in massive lay-offs and no less massive expenditure on replacing living labor with dead labor, with machines. The increase in production noted by the statistics in recent months is essentially the result not of an increase in the number of workers reintegrated into employment but of a greater productivity on the part of those who have kept their jobs. This increase in productivity, which for example accounts for 80 % of the rise in production in Canada, one of the countries who have advanced the furthest into the 'recovery', is mainly due to very high investment into the modernization of machinery and communications, into the development of automation - not into the opening of new factories. In the USA it's this investment into equipment, principally computers, which explains the growth of investment in recent years. Investment in non-residential building is virtually stagnant. Which means that existing factories are being modernized but new ones aren't being built.
A Mickey Mouse recovery
In Britain today, while the govermnent never stops singing about the continual fall in unemployment, nearly 6 million people are working an average 14.8 hours a week. It's these kind of precarious and poorly paid jobs which are swelling the employment statistics. The British workers call them "Micky Mouse jobs".
Meanwhile the program of restructuring the big enterprises continues: 1,000 jobs cut in one of Britain's main electricity companies; 2,500 in the second largest telephone company.
In France, the Society Nationale des Chemins de Fer (railways) have announced 4,800 job-cuts for 1995; Renault 1,735, Citroen 1,180. In Germany, the giant Siemens company has announced that it will cut "at least" 12,000 jobs in 1994-5, after the 21,000 already gone in 1993.
The lack of markets
For each enterprise, increasing productivity is a precondition for survival. Globally speaking, this ruthless competition leads to important gains in productivity. But this poses the problem of the existence of sufficient markets to absorb the growing amount of production that the enterprises can ensure with the same number of workers. If the markets are insufficient, job-cuts are inevitable.
"We have to raise productivity by 5 or 6% per year, and as long as the market doesn't progress more quickly, jobs will go". This is how the French car bosses summed up their situation at the end of 1994[2].
Public Debt
How can the market be made to "progress"? In International Review 78 we showed how, in the face of the open recession since the end of the 80s, governments have resorted massively to public debt.
This debt has made it possible to finance the expenditure which helps create 'solvent' markets for an economy which is cruelly lacking in such things because it can't create them spontaneously. The spiraling growth in the debts of the main industrial countries is part of the basis for the re-establishment of profits[3].
Public debt allows 'idle' capital, which finds it harder and harder to find profitable emplacements, to function as state bonds, assured of convenient and reliable returns. The capitalist can extract his surplus value not from his own management of capital, but from the work of the state which levies taxes[4].
The mechanism of the public debt takes the form of a transfer of values from part of the capitalists and workers to the holders of state bonds, a transfer which follows the path of taxes then of interest drawn from the debt. This is what Marx called "fictitious capital" .
The stimulating effects of public debt are risky, but the dangers it accumulates for the future are guaranteed (see 'New financial storms ahead' in International Review no 78). The present 'recovery' will be very expensive tomorrow on the financial level.
For the proletarians, this means that on top of the intensification of exploitation at the workplace, taxation will get heavier and heavier. The state has to levy a growing mass of taxes to reimburse capital and the interests on the debt.
Destroying capital to maintain its profitability
When the capitalist economy is functioning in a healthy manner, the increase or maintenance of profits is the result of the growth in the number of workers exploited and the capacity to extract a greater mass of surplus value from them. When it is suffering from a chronic illness, despite the reinforcement of exploitation and productivity, the lack of markets prevents it from maintaining its profits without reducing the number of workers to exploit, without destroying capital.
Although capitalism draws its profits from the exploitation of labor, it finds itself in the 'absurd' situation of having to pay the unemployed, workers who are not working, as well as having to pay peasants not to produce, to leave their fields lying fallow.
The social costs of ‘maintaining incomes' have reached up to 10% of the annual production of certain industrial countries. From capital's point of this is a mortal sin, an aberration, pure waste, the destruction of capital. With all the sincerity of a convinced capitalist, the new Republican spokesman of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, went on the warpath against all "the government aid to the poor".
But capital's point of view is that of a senile system, which is destroying itself in convulsions that are dragging the world into endless barbarism and despair. The aberration is not that the bourgeois state throws a few crumbs to people who aren't working, but the fact that there are people who can't play a part in the productive process at a time when the cancer of material poverty is spreading all over the planet.
It's capitalism that has become a historical aberration. The current 'recovery' without jobs is further confirmation of this. The only real 'medicine' for the economic organization of society is the destruction of capitalism itself, the inauguration of a society where the objective of production is no longer profit, the return on capital, but the pure and simple satisfaction of human needs.
**********
"It goes without saying that political economy only considers the proletarian as a worker: he is the one who having neither capital nor ground rent, lives solely by his labor, by an abstract and monotonous labor. It can thus affirm that, just like a beast of burden; the proletarian deserves to earn enough to be able to work. When he is no longer working, political economy no longer considers him to lie a human being; it abandons this consideration to criminal justice, to the doctors, to religion, to statistics, to politics, to public charity" (Marx, Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy).
[1] The official predictions of the OECD announce a diminution in the rate of unemployment in 1995 and 1996. But the level of these reductions is miniscule: 0.3% in Italy (unemployment officially stands at 11.3% in 1994; by 1996 it is supposed to go down to 11 %); 0.5% in the USA (from 6.1 % in 94 to 5.6 % in
96); 0.7% in Western Europe generally (from 11.6% to 10.9%). In Japan no reduction is in sight.
[2] Liberation, 16.12.94
[3] Between 1989 and 1994, the public debt, measured as a percentage of gross national production, went from 53 to 65 % in the USA, from 57 to 73 % in Europe; in 1994, this percentage reached 123 in Italy, 142 in Belgium.
[4] This evolution of the ruling class into a parasitic body that lives off its state is typical of decadent societies. In the late Roman Empire as in decadent feudalism this phenomenon was one of the main factors in the massive development of corruption.
The anarchy and chaos which today characterizes the relations between fractions of the bourgeoisie, in particular at the international level, is not only the product of the earthquake represented by the collapse of the eastern bloc. This collapse, which is still taking its course as can be seen by the present events in the Caucasus, is itself the manifestation of a deeper reality, the same reality that explains the war in ex-Yugoslavia, or the fact that 900,000 Rwandans are rotting in refugee camps in Zaire: the advanced decadence of capitalism, its decomposition as a social system.
When a social system enters into its phase of decadence, that is to say when the social relations of production which characterize it become obsolete, no longer adapted to the possibilities and necessities of society, the very basis for the profits and privileges of the ruling class is reduced, made more fragile. The cohesion of the ruling class then tends to disintegrate into an infinite number of conflicting interests. Like hungry beasts who can only survive at the expense of others, more and more fractions of the class in power start tearing each other apart, devastating the civilization they once helped to build. Just as the numerous armies of decadent Rome ruined what was left of a decomposing Empire with their incessant conflicts, just as the feudal lords of the late Middle Ages destroyed whole harvests with their permanent local conflicts, so the imperialist powers of our century have made humanity go through the worst destructions in its history. The means and dimensions of the drama have changed. Catapults made of wood and animal skins have given way to guided missiles, and the battlefield has assumed the dimensions of the entire planet. But the nature of the phenomenon is the same. Society is destroying itself in an indescribable chaos, the prisoner of economic and social relations that have become too narrow ... Today, however, the very survival of humanity is at stake.
The forces of disintegration at work
To measure the reality of the chaos that now dominates international relations, we can distinguish two points of departure. On the one hand there is the general, 'ordinary', omnipresent chaos which is spreading everywhere; on the other hand, within all this, there are more important antagonisms, expressing the tendency towards the reconstitution of blocs or alliances and indicating the most decisive lines of force: this is the case with the antagonism between the former bloc leader, the USA, and a reunified Germany which is the candidate for the role of leader of a new bloc.
Ordinary chaos
The more the governments organize international meetings and summits between the statesmen of the big powers, the more the divisions between them break out into the open. The international organizations, whether it's the UN, NATO, the Western European Union or others, appear more and more as grotesque and impotent masquerades where the only thing that outdoes hypocrisy is cynicism. The media lament the 'misunderstandings' between the member countries, the 'differences in method' which are paralyzing these temples to the 'concert of nations'. But the reality of international relations is the reign of each against all. Each country is constantly caught between the necessity to defend its interests against those of others, which implies a proliferation of antagonisms with other countries, and, at the same time, the necessity for alliances that will enable it to survive in an ever more irrational and ruthless war. The fact that millions of victims pay for these antagonisms every year, all over the planet, does not halt this game of massacre between national capitals, and above all between the great powers.
The last months of 1994 have been rich in new manifestations of this frenetic chaos in which alliances are made and unmade against a background of ever-increasing instability.
The most tangible sign of the depth and importance of this instability today is the current evolution of the relations between the USA and Britain. What was once an unchanging point of reference in international relations is now going through its most difficult moments since the Suez crisis of 1956. The Economist, in its annual supplement, has talked of a "fading friendship". A report by the Pentagon goes along the same lines, accusing France of fuelling the war in Yugoslavia in order to poison relations between the USA and Britain.
During an ordinary summit at Chartres, in October 1994, Britain and France decided to set up a "group of combined aerial forces" and to work together towards an inter-African intervention force that would serve to "keep the peace" in English and French speaking Africa. The British no longer see the Western European Union as a "French submarine within NATO", and the journalists insist on the strength represented by this alliance between the only two nuclear powers in Europe.
Thus, Britain is moving further and further away from the USA; in order to defend its own interests, it is tending to adopt policies that are openly opposed to the USA, as we can see in Africa and above all in the Balkans.
The American-Russian alliance, that other pillar of the construction of the "new world order" has also been put to a
severe test. The question of the enlarging of NATO towards countries that were once part of the USSR's bloc (what Russia calls its "nearby abroad"), in particular Poland and the Czech republic, has more and more become a major bone of contention between the two powers. "No third country can dictate the conditions for enlarging NATO", as an American official dryly declared in the face of Russian protests.
The Franco-German axis, the spinal column of the European Union, has also been put into question: "We are light years from the German position" declared a French official, summarizing France's opposition to any "communitarianisation" of the foreign and security policies of the European Union. France fears that Europe will become a "German super-state". At the same time, Germany is nervous about a Franco-British alliance in 1995 against the prospect of a German-dominated federal Europe, an alliance that would have the sole purpose of countering Bonn's hegemonic ambitions.
Today the cohesion of the great blocs of the cold war seems like a distant memory of unity and order; the 'concert of nations' has become a barbaric cacophony. A cacophony whose face is that of the 500,000 victims of genocide in Rwanda, of the millions of corpses bloodying the planet from Cambodia to Angola, from Mexico to Afghanistan.
In this same process of disintegration, the break-up of the ex-USSR has not yet run its course. The Russian Federation, which sought to be the last bulwark against the centrifugal forces that had carried off the old empire, finds itself confronted with these same forces within itself, as well as in Moldova, Tadjikstan, Georgia, Abkhazia, Tatarstan ... the massive intervention of the Russian army in Chechnya[1] expresses the will of a part of the Russian ruling class to put an end to these tendencies which are continuing to dislocate what was, five years ago, the most
extensive imperialist power on the planet.
But decomposition has reached such a level in the ex-USSR that this operation aimed at 'restoring order' is turning into a new source of internal chaos.
On the ground, the resistance to Russian intervention has been more violent and 'popular' than was foreseen. In an atmosphere of nationalist and anti-Russian hysteria within the population, the president of Chechnya, Dudayev, launched an appeal in the face of the Russian army advance, declaring that "the earth under their feet must bum! It's a war to the death!". The president of the Russian republic of Ingushia, another Caucasian
republic close to Chechnya, announced the threat of the extension of the conflict, proclaiming that "the war for the Caucasus has begun!"
From the start, the Russians met with fierce resistance which cost them dear in men and materials.
But this operation has also led to new fractures within the Russian ruling class itself, which is already well-rotted. At the battle front, right at the beginning, one of the Russian generals (Ivan Babichev) refused to advance on the capital Grozny and fraternized with the Chechen population: "It is not our fault that we are here. This operation contradicts the Constitution. It is forbidden to use the army against the people". At the time of writing, several other generals on the ground have rallied to this protest.
In Moscow the divisions are also dramatic. "In Russia today there are two Chechen conflicts, one in the Caucasus, and another, more dangerous one in Moscow" declared Emile Paine, one of Yeltsin's advisers. A number of 'celebrated' military figures have stood against the intervention, as well as Yeltsin's former prime minister, Egor Gaidar, and Gorbachev ...
For President Clinton the crisis in Chechnya is an "internal problem" and for Willy Claes, the general secretary of NATO, it's an "inside business". "It's not in the interest of the USA and certainly not of the Russians to have a Russia that is going towards disintegration" declared Warren Christopher on TV, on 14 December, showing the profound disquiet of the American bourgeoisie towards the problems of its ally.
But the problem is not so "internal" as one might be led to believe. On the one hand because Chechnya has a certain sympathy from foreign forces, in particular neighboring Turkey and, probably, from Germany. On the other hand because this situation is only a spectacular expression of a world-wide process.
This dramatic putrefaction of the situation in Russia is not simply, as liberal speechmakers would have it, the consequence of the damage done by Stalinism (fraudulently identified with communism); it is not a specificity of Eastern Europe. Russia is just one of the places where the generalized decomposition of world capitalism is most advanced.
The tendencies towards the reconstitution of blocs
A universe of imperialist brigands cannot exist without there being a tendency towards the constitution of gangs and gang leaders. The multiple conflicts between capitalist nations inevitably tend to structure themselves in line with the antagonisms between the most powerful ones. And, among these, the one between the two main bosses stamps its imprint on all the others: the opposition between the USA and a reunified Germany, between the former chief of the western bloc and the only serious pretender to the leadership of a new bloc. This conflict runs
through the political life of numerous countries.
For example: the summit of the Islamic Conference held in Casablanca in December 1994 could not avoid becoming a clash between the Islamic countries allied to the USA and those allied to Europe. From the beginning, the camp led by Hassan II of Morocco (the recognized spearhead of American diplomacy) and Egypt's Mubarak (the country in the world which, next to Israel, receives the most aid from America) made an attack on " certain Islamic states" which support terrorists and which have "sold their souls to the Devil" , ie to Iran and Sudan, whose links with European powers are well-known.
In Turkey, at the end of November 94, the minister of foreign affairs, the social-democrat Soysal, who is somewhat pro-European and anti-American, resigned from the government.
In Mexico, in the state of Chiapas where the Zapatistas are to be found, there are two governors: one from the PRI, the government party since 1929 which has always worked as a solid ally of the 'Yankee' big brother despite using an 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric; the other, Avendano, the governor allied to the Zapatistas, who refuses to recognize the election of the PRI candidate due to frauds, and who controls a third of the province's municipalities. The latter has declared that only Europe can give him the necessary support for him to triumph.
In Europe itself, the question of the choice between the American option and the Germano-European one has rent the ruling classes. In Britain, within the party in power, there's been a set-to illustrated recently by the fact that the 'Euro-skeptics' practically put Major in a minority in the House of Commons on the question of contributions to the European Union. Major even envisaged the possibility of a referendum on the question.
In Italy, a country that was long considered to be "America's aircraft carrier in Europe", but also as one of the pillars of the European Union, the war between the two camps has torn the political class apart, even if what's really at stake is usually kept hidden. However, Carlo de Benedetti, one of the main figures amongst the national bosses, did not hesitate to attack the pro-American Berlusconi government in explicit terms: "Italy is distancing itself from Europe and entering into a spiral of destruction". It's this basic antagonism which is at the root of the
country's current governmental instability.
In France's political class, now in the midst of a presidential election campaign, there are also profound divisions over this question, particularly in the parties of the governmental majority.
Because they are not faced with a choice of this kind, only the German and American bourgeoisies seem to be somewhat coherent at the level of their international policy, even if this is not without its difficulties.
*****
Since the collapse of the USSR, Germany has made many advances on the international level: apart from its reunification, it has developed with some assurance its spheres of influence among the countries of central Europe, former members of the eastern bloc; it has intensified its links with countries as strategically important as Turkey, Iran or Malaysia; it has carried on building and enlarging the European Union, integrating new countries that are particularly close to it, such as Austria; in ex-Yugoslavia, it has imposed the international recognition of
its allies Slovenia and Croatia, which has opened up its access to the Mediterranean. The new reunified Germany has thus unequivocally affirmed that it is the only credible candidate for forming a new bloc opposed to that of the USA.
America's international policy has consisted of an offensive which has two main objectives: on the one hand, to preserve the dominant position of American capital; on the other hand, to systematically destroy the positions of its new European rivals.
The USA has been reaffirming its position as number one power by resorting to spectacular military operations, which often compel its former allies to line up behind it (Gulf war of 91, intervention in Somalia, invasion of Haiti, new operation in the Gulf in 94, etc); by keeping alive the international organisms formed at the end of the second world war to ensure its control over its allies, such as NATO, although the main targets of this tactic have not been taken in ("More than ever, the USA wants to make NATO an appendage of the State department and of Washington ". as a French diplomat declared recently[2]; by consolidating and fortifying its closest spheres of influence by creating 'free trade areas' such as NAFTA, which regroups the USA, Canada and Mexico, or the plan for areas regrouping the whole Pacific zone or the entire American continent (during December 94 Clinton convened two spectacular summits, first in Malaysia then in Miami, to get these projects off the ground).
Parallel to this the USA has been methodically attacking the spheres of influence of its former European 'allies', in particular the former colonial powers and principal military forces on the continent: France, but also Britain. The USA has thus chased France out of Lebanon, Iraq, and Rwanda, while severely threatening its positions in other black or North African countries (especially in Algeria where it has been supporting fractions of the Islamist movement); it has weakened the position of Britain in some of its former hunting grounds, such as South Africa and Kuwait.
If the blocs formed in the heat of the Second World War were for decades factors of relative stability, at least within their own ranks, today the fight for the constitution of new blocs is showing itself to be one of the main factors of instability and chaos.
The decomposition of international relations in decadent capitalism at the end of the 20th century is taking the form of the triumph of 'each against all' and the exacerbation of the law of the strongest.
The war in ex-Yugoslavia is the most significant focus of conflict in this period. 250,000 people killed, a million wounded a few hundred kilometers from the big industrial centers of Europe; fourteen countries militarily present under the flags of the United Nations[3]; five great powers (USA, Russia, Germany, France, Britain) using the multiple divisions within the local ruling class, exacerbated by the collapse of the USSR, to turn the country into a battlefield where the cannon-fodder is drawn essentially from the local inhabitants. From the grand hights of their 'Contact Group', these powers are pulling the strings that determine the evolution or the balance of forces on
the ground.
Who is behind who in ex-Yugoslavia?
"I know that the work of UNPROFOR was debatable. But the idea of the UN as an organization for peace above the nations pleased me a lot. J was rather naive. Now, J have the impression that, for five months, I have been helping the Serbs. I have the strong conviction that France is on the side of the Serbs, that France thinks that the mess in the Balkans will be lessened by a Serb-imposed stability"[4].
These words by a French bluehelmet aged 25[5] are a good summary of the contrast between the illusions of those who believed in the speeches of their governments about Yugoslavia and the sordid reality they discovered on the ground.
Since classes have existed, in order to mobilize the exploited into the butchery of war, the ruling classes have always had recourse to lies and mystifications. Religions and priests have always been the indispensable complement to the soldiers and the politicians. In our day, it is the totalitarianism of the media, the indoctrination of the masses, scientifically organized whether in the 'dictatorial' manner or in the more sophisticated forms used by 'democracy', which plays the role of recruiting cannon fodder and justifying massacres. The war in ex-Yugoslavia is no exception to this rule. But rarely has a war been covered up by such a quantity of lies and hypocrisy.
The powers involved all declare that they want peace and UNPROFOR claims to be "an organization for peace above the nations". But all of them are supporting and arming the parties involved in the conflict, without saying openly, even publicly declaring their hostility to a camp that they are secretly supporting.
In reality, behind the humanitarian and pacifist speeches each power is fuelling the war, if only to block alliances and advances made by its rivals. Thus, for example, the Pentagon has published a report which says that France is trying to keep up the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia in order to exacerbate antagonisms between the USA and Britain, which is certainly true; the USA and Britain also have an interest in the war carrying on in order to sharpen the opposition between France and Germany; Russia wants its status as a great power to be recognized and to this end
is playing on the rivalries between the western powers; as for Germany, which by supporting the independence of Slovenia and Croatia set a match to the powder, it only wants peace once the positions of its local allies have been favorably consolidated.
The veil of humanitarian and pacifist lies has been somewhat tom recently by the big confrontations over the Bihac enclave. This enclave, in the north of Bosnia, has a strategically crucial place in the heart of Krajina, that part of Croatia which is controlled by the Serbs. It is important for the Bosnians and the Serbs, but above all for the Croatians[6]. The importance of the stakes made it clearer than usual how the international powers
are participating in the war.
The USA overtly encouraged the Bosnian army to march on Bihac by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo to this country. This gave rise to a clamor of protest from the other powers, even though they have known for a long time that Washington has been secretly arming the Bosnians and even supplying it with "military advisers". The French minister of foreign affairs summarized the general reaction of the members of NATO to the gross liberties taken by the number one boss: "We regret that a permanent member of the Security Council has unilaterally exonerated itself from the application of a resolution which it had voted for and from decisions taken by common agreement within the Alliance "[7].
But the attitude of the French, just like that of their allies for now, the British, is no more in line with the decisions taken at diplomatic conferences. The impression of the French bluehelmet, that he was "helping the Serbs" when he was supposed to have been protecting the civil population against the latter, is not wrong. Two months ago the French government withdrew its bluehelmets from the Bihac enclave (they were replaced by inexperienced Bangladeshi troops), thus opening the door to the confrontations to come. Throughout the Serbian assault, the
troops of UNPROFOR, led by the French and the British, gave proof of a complicit impotence. On 5 December Izbegovic, the president of Bosnia, openly denounced the French and the British as "protectors of the Serbs". The American senator Robert Dole, future chief of the Republican majority in the Senate, declared that since the beginning of the conflict, the UN had done nothing but "help the Serb aggressors". The Croatian government has denounced Yashushi Akashi, the Japanese who is the special representative of the UN general secretary in ex-
Yugoslavia, as being "pro-Serb"[8].
In the face of these accusations, the French and British governments have once again been feigning outrage and threatening to withdraw their troops. The USA, which has always repeated that it could not allow itself to send a single one of its "boys" to Yugoslavia, seemed to do a backflip and declared that if this was the case it would be ready to send in 25,000 troops in order to assist an UNPROFOR retreat. "This is what allies are for", declared an American official[9]. It should be noted that Germany also rushed forward to offer its services, notably in the form of Tornado bombers, to help the French and British depart.
The events around Bihac have once again shown how the Americans are supporting Bosnia and the French and British are behind Serbia. What's more, the USA's declaration, as soon as the Serbs entered the town of Bihac, that" the Serbs have won the war in Bosnia", shows that it has not forgotten Croatia and its German ally. The position of the USA is clear: the Croats must accept the balance of forces imposed by the Serbs, they must make peace with the Serbs of Krajina, ie accept that the Bihac enclave, just like the third of Croatian territory which the Serbs conquered in the first part of the war, stay in Serbian hands. Thus the USA is using the Serbs against Germany. The recent 'private' voyage by Carter to discuss directly with the Serbs in Bosnia is an illustration of this.
There is nothing 'humanitarian' about the intervention of the great powers in ex-Yugoslavia. This is just a war for the most sordid imperialist interests. A war which, contrary to the litanies of the last three years, is far from moving towards a peaceful conclusion: the American offensive has met with strong resistance, and this can only lead to the intensification of conflicts. Furthermore, while Croatia has not carried out its threats to intervene, if it does do so, the conflagration will be even more general.
******
Capitalism in decomposition cannot live without wars, and wars like the one in ex-Yugoslavia cannot be eliminated without destroying capitalism.
It is vital that the proletariat understands the real nature of this new Balkans war. Not so much so that it is initiated into the analysis of imperialist strategies, but so that it is able to fight the feelings of powerlessness which the bourgeoisie tries to instill in the face of this conflict. To understand the decisive role played by the great powers in this war is to understand that the proletariat of the central countries has the possibility of stopping such madness. That it alone can offer a way out of the barbaric dead-end into which the decadence of capitalism has led humanity, and of which the war in ex-Yugoslavia is merely one of the more spectacular expressions.
RV, 27.12.94
[1] This little republic of the Russian Federation (a million and a half inhabitants, 13,000 square kilometers), situated in the Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, with a Muslim majority, rich in oil, a traditional route for all kinds of traffic (especially in arms and drugs), to a large extent still organized through family clans which have their extensions into the mafia of Russia's big cities ... declared its independence in 1991. This independence was never recognized either by Russia or any other country. Since the summer of 1994, Russia has been fuelling a civil war, arming and piloting a movement of revolt by the Russian minority against Dudayev's regime.
[2] Liberation, 1.12.94
[3] The UNPROFOR forces in Yugoslavia amount to 23,000 men in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with nearly 8,000 vehicles. The participating countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the USA, Spain, Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Norway and Turkey, who are members of NATO, plus Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ukraine.
[4] Liberation, 13.12.94
[5] This is the testimony of a young man doing his military service, but one who accepted to go "voluntarily into external action", ie he became a mercenary. The bourgeoisie of the main industrial powers cannot yet allow itself to send conscript troops into a military operation. It is not yet ready to make the exploited class, in countries with an old proletarian tradition pay the "blood tax".
[6] The Croatian authorities declared from the beginning of the confrontations over Bihac that they could not accept the fall of the enclave: "We have said that if there is no negotiated solution in Bihac, given its strategic importance, given the number of refugees who would be entering our country, we would be obliged to intervene ... the west has forced us to not intervene up till now ... " (declaration of a high Croatian official, LeMonde, 29.11.94). "The Croatian army is ready for war, but this will take place at the most propitious moment, both internally and internationally" (declaration by the commander in chief of the Croatian army, Liberation, 30.11.94).
[7] Le Monde, 16.11. 94
[8] Akashi already showed this to be the case when the Serbs took Gorazde in April 94, in his refusal to call for air strikes to stop the Serbian offensive.
[9] International Herald Tribune, 9.12.94
It is 80 years since the First World War inaugurated the epoch of capitalism's decadence, "the era of war or revolution" as the Communist International called it. However, while the imperialist war demonstrated the future that decadent capitalism had to offer humanity, the revolutionary wave, that put an end to the war and made the bourgeois order tremble from South Africa to Germany, from Russia to Canada, made clear that there is only one alternative to capitalist barbarity: the workers' world revolution.
This proletarian wave, whose high point was the Russian Revolution (see International Review nos 72, 73 and 75), constitutes an extraordinary fount of lessons for the workers' movement. The 1917-23 wave definitively confirmed, at the level of the world wide class struggle in the decadent period of capitalism, the majority of the positions that revolutionaries defend today (against the unions and "Socialist" Parties, against "national liberation" struggles, the necessity of the generalized organization of the class in Workers' Councils). In the present article we are going to concentrate on four questions:
* How the revolutionary wave turned imperialist war into a civil war between classes
* How it demonstrated Communist historical theses on the international character of the proletarian revolution
* How, despite being the factor that unleashed the revolutionary wave, war does not pose the most favorable conditions for the revolution
* The dominant character of the struggle of the proletariat in the most developed countries of capitalism.
It was the revolutionary wave that put an end to World War I
In International Review no 78 ("Polemic with Programme Comunista, Il") we show how the explosion of the war in 1914 was not directly due to economic causes, but because the bourgeoisie had brought about, due to the domination of reformist ideology in the "Social Democratic" parties, the ideological defeat of the proletariat. At the same time neither did the end of the war depend on, as they say, the bourgeoisie's "balancing the books" and concluding that the butchery had been "sufficient", to swap the "business" of destruction for that of reconstruction. Nor in November 1918 was there a clear military defeat of the central powers by the Entente powers[1]. In reality what forced the Kaiser to ask for an armistice was the necessity to form a front against the revolution which was spreading throughout Germany. If for their part the Entente powers did not take advantage of their enemy's weakness, it was due to the need to close ranks against the common threat, represented by the workers' revolution. In the countries of the Entente the revolution was still maturing. How did the proletarian response to the
war develop?
With the unfolding of the slaughter the proletariat began to shake off the weight of its defeat in August 1914[2]. Already in February 1915, the workers of the Clyde Valley (Great Britain had carried out a wildcat strike (against the advice of the union); this example was followed by workers in the arms industry and by Liverpool engineering workers. In France a strike by textile workers in Vienne and Lagors broke out. A general strike by the workers of Petrograd in 1916 stopped an attempt by the government to militarize workers. In Germany, the Spartacus League called a demonstration of workers and soldiers, under the slogans of "Down 'with the war!", "Down with the government!". "Hunger mutinies" took place in Silesia, Dresden ... It was in this climate of accumulating signs of discontent that news of the February Revolution in Russia arrived.
In April 1917 a wave of strikes broke out in Germany (Halle, Kiel, Berlin, ... ). Near insurrection took place in Leipzig and as in Russia, the first Workers' Councils were formed. On the 1st of May, in the trenches of the Eastern Front, Red Flags were flown in the German trenches and in the Russian. German soldiers passed a leaflet from hand to hand that said:
"Our heroic Russian brothers have thrown off the damned yoke of the butchers of their country ( ... ) Your happiness, your progress, depends on your ability to follow and take further the example of your Russian brothers ... A victorious revolution will not demand as many sacrifices as this savage war ... "
In France, in a climate of workers strikes (that of the Paris engineering workers spread to 100,000 workers in other industries), on the same 1st Maya meeting in solidarity with the Russian workers, proclaimed "The Russian Revolution is the signal for the world revolution". At the front illegal Soldiers' Councils circulated revolutionary propaganda and collected a levy from the soldiers' meager wages in order to help sustain the strikes in the rear.
At the same time in Italy massive rallies took place against the war. In Turin during one of these, a slogan arose that was constantly repeated throughout the country: "we should do as in Russia". In October 1917 soldiers and workers throughout the world looked towards Petrograd and "We should do as in Russia" was turned into a powerful stimulus to mobilize for the definitive end to the imperialist massacre.
Likewise, in Finland (where there had already been an attempted insurrection a few days after that in Petrograd) in January 1918 armed workers occupied public buildings in Helsinki and the South of the country. In Rumania at the same time, the Russian Revolution found an immediate echo. The Black Sea Fleet rebelled forcing an armistice with the Central Powers. In Russia the October revolution put an end to participation in the war, even submitting to the occupation of large areas of Russia by the Central Powers, under the so-called Peace of Brest-Litovsk, in the hope of the explosion of the world revolution.
In January 1918, the workers of Vienna learnt of the draconian "peace" conditions that the Austro- Hungarian government wanted to impose on the Russian Revolution. Confronted with the perspective of the continuation of the war Daimler workers unleashed a strike that within a few days had spread to 700,000 workers throughout the Empire, forming the first Workers' Councils. In Budapest, the strike spread under the slogan of "down with the war!", "Long live the Russian workers!", It was only the insistent calls for calm by the "Socialists", that calmed the strike wave, though not without resistance, and defeated the revolt of the fleet in Cattaro[3]. In Germany at the end of January there were also one million strikers. However, the workers left the running of the struggle in the hands of the "socialists" who agreed with the unions and the Military High Command to put an end to the strikes, sending more than 30,000 of the most prominent workers in the strike to the front. In this same period in the mines of Dombrowa and Lublin the first Workers' Councils in Poland were formed.
The movement against the war and in solidarity with the Russian Revolution was also growing in Britain. The visit of the Soviet Delegate Litvinov coincided in January 1918 with a wave of strikes and provoked such demonstrations in London that the bourgeois newspaper (The Herald) called them the "Workers' ultimatum to the government demanding peace". In France a strike broke out at Renault in May 1918, which rapidly spread to 250,000 workers in Paris. In solidarity the workers of the Loire region went back on strike and controlled the region for ten days.
Nevertheless, the last military offensives caused a momentary paralysis of these struggles. After the fiasco of these offensives the workers were convinced that the only way to stop the war was the class struggle. October saw a struggle by day laborers and a revolt against the dispatch of the most" Red" regiments from Budapest to the front, as well as massive strikes and demonstrations in Austria. On the 4th of November the bourgeoisie of the "double crown" retired from the war.
In Germany, the Kaiser attempted to "democratize" the regime (freeing Liebknecht, incorporating the "Socialists" into the government) in order to demand the "last drop of blood of the German people". However on the 3rd of November the sailors at Kiel refused to obey the officers who wanted to make one last suicidal attempt by the fleet to break out of the port. The Red Flag was hoisted throughout the fleet, and along with the workers of the city, they organized a Workers' Council. Within a few days the insurrection had spread to the main German cities[4]. On the 9th of November when the insurrection reached Berlin the German bourgeois, not wanting to make the same mistake committed by the Provisional government in Russia (prolonging participation in the war, which only served to ferment and radicalize the revolution) called for an armistice. On the 11th of November, the bourgeoisie put an end to the imperialist war in order to confront the class struggle.
The international nature of the working class and its' revolution
Unlike the revolutions of the bourgeoisie that were limited to implementing capitalism in their nation, the proletarian revolution is by necessity worldwide. While the bourgeois revolutions could be spread out over more than a century, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat tends, by its very nature, to take the form of a gigantic wave which spread throughout the planet. This has always been the historical thesis of revolutionaries. Engels already demonstrated this in the Principles of Communism:
"Question 19 - Will this revolution be made in one country? Answer - No. Major industry in creating the world market has drawn the people of the world so closely together, particularly the most advanced nations, that each nation is dependent on what happens in every other. It has furthermore regimented social development in the advanced countries to the point that, in all countries, the bourgeois and the proletariat have become the two decisive classes in society, and the struggle between these classes has become the major struggle in our epoch. The communist revolution, therefore, will not be a purely national one, it will erupt simultaneously, ie in England, America, France and Germany (...) It is a universal revolution and therefore, it will also develop on a universal terrain".
The revolutionary wave of 1917-23 fully confirmed this. In 1919, the British Prime Minister wrote: "The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep sense not only of discontent but anger and revolt amongst the workmen against pre-war conditions. The whole existing order in its' political, social and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other" (Quoted in E H Carr's The Bolshevik Revolution. Vo13).
However, the proletariat was unable to transform this formidable wave of struggles into a unified struggle. We will first look at the facts in order to be better able to analyze the obstacles the proletariat ran up against in the generalization of the revolution.
1. From November 1918 to August 1919. The attempted revolutions in the defeated countries ...
When the revolution began in Germany, three important detachments of the central European proletariat (Holland, Switzerland and Austria) had in practice already been neutralized.
In Holland, in October 1918, mutinies broke out in the army (the High Command scuttled its own Fleet before the sailors could seize control of it), while workers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam formed Workers' Councils. However, the "Socialists" "joined" the revolt in order to neutralize it. Their leader, Troelstra recalled much later "If I had not made a revolutionary intervention, the most energetic workers would have taken the road of Bolshevism" (P.J. Troelstra De Revolutie en de SDAP)
Thus, disorganized by their "leaders", separated from the help of the soldiers, the struggle ended with the machine gunning of workers, who on the 13th of November had united in a meeting near Amsterdam. The "Red Week" ended with 5 dead and dozens wounded.
In Switzerland on the same 13th of November, there was a general strike of 400,000 workers in protest against the use of troops against a demonstration celebrating the 1st anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The workers' newspaper "Volksrecht" proclaimed "Resist until the last. We are strengthened by the revolution in Austria and Germany, the workers' action in France, the movement of the proletariat in Holland and, above all, through the revolution in Russia".
But here also the "Socialists" and the unions called for an end to the struggle in order "not to place the unarmed masses under the guns of the enemy". It was precisely the disorientation and division that they created in the proletariat, that opened the doors to the terrible repression that defeated the "great strike". The "pacifist" Swiss government militarized the railways, organized counter-revolutionary guards, flattened workers' centers without any scruples. Hundreds of workers were arrested, and the
death penalty introduced for "Subversives".
In Austria, the Republic was proclaimed on the 12th of November. When the national red and white flag was hoisted, groups of workers tore off the white boarder. Men climbed onto the statue of Pallas Athena in the center of Vienna, and before an assembly of tens of thousands of workers, various speakers called for moving directly to the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the "Socialists" who had been called into government as the only party with any influence on the workers, declared that "The proletariat already has power. The workers' party governs the Republic" and systematically moved to neutralize the revolutionary organs, transforming the Workers' Councils into Councils of Production and the Soldiers' Councils into Army Committees (massively infiltrated by officers). The bourgeoisie's counter-offensive not only paralyzed the Austrian proletariat, but served as an instruction manual for the German bourgeoisie's counter -offensive.
In Germany, the Armistice and the proclamation of the Republic created a naive feeling of "triumph" for which the proletariat paid dearly. While the workers could not unify the different centers of struggle and vacillated about launching into the destruction of the state[5] the counter-offensive was organized and coordinated by the unions, the "Socialist" Party and the military High Command. From December the bourgeoisie went onto the offensive constantly provoking the proletariat of Berlin, in order to isolate their struggle from the rest of the workers in Germany. On the 4th of January 1919, the government sacked the Chief-of-Police Eichhorn, challenging the workers' opinion. On the 6th of January, half a million Berlin workers took to the streets. The following day the "socialist" Noske, commanding the Freicorps (demobilised officers and lower ranks, paid by the government) crushed the Berlin workers. Days later they murdered Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Although the events in Berlin alerted workers in other cities (above all in Bremen where workers assaulted the union headquarters and distributed their funds to the unemployed), the government was able to fragment this response, in a way which allowed them to begin by concentrating on Bremen, then against the workers of the Rhineland and the Ruhr in order to return once again in March to the revolutionary embers in Berlin in the so-called "Bloody Week" (1,200 workers killed). After this they fell upon the workers of Mansfeld and Leipzig and the Republic of Councils in Magdeburg.
In March the workers in Munich proclaimed the Republic of Bavarian Councils, which along with the October Revolution in Russia and the Hungarian Revolution, constituted the only experiences of the workers taking power. The armed Bavarian workers were able to defeat the counter-revolutionary army sent against them by the deputy president Hoffmann. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the workers in the rest of Germany had suffered severe defeats and could not come to the aid of their brothers, while the bourgeoisie organized an army which from the beginning of May put down the insurrection. Amongst the troops who spread terror in Munich were Himmler, Rudolf Hess, Von Epp ... future Nazi leaders. All them were encouraged in their anti-proletarian fury by a government that called itself "Socialist".
On the 21st of March 1919, after a formidable wave of workers' strikes and mutinies, the workers councils took power in Hungary. In a tragic error, the Communist unified, at this very moment, with the "Socialists" who sabotaged the revolution from within. At the same time the western "democracies" (especially England and France) immediately ordered an economic blockade to which was added military intervention by Rumanian and Czech troops. In May when the Bavarian Workers' Councils fell, the situation for the Hungarian Revolution was also terrible. However, a formidable workers' reaction, in which Hungarian, Austrian, Polish, Russian, but also Czech and Rumanian workers participated, broke the military blockade. In the long run however, the sabotage of the "Socialists" and the revolutions isolation got the better of the workers' resistance and on the 1st of August Rumanian troops took Budapest, installing a union government that liquidated the Workers' Councils. When the unions had finished their work they handed over command to Admiral Horty (another future collaborator with the Nazis) who unleashed a reign of terror against the workers (8,000 executed, 100,000 deportations). In the glow of the Hungarian revolution the miners of Dombrowa (Poland) took control of the region and formed a "Workers' Guard" in order to defend themselves from the bloody repression of that other "Socialist" Pilsudski. When the Hungarian councils fell, the "Red Republic of Dombrowa" crumbled.
The Hungarian Revolution also provoked the last workers' convulsions in Austria and Switzerland in June 1919, the Viennese police drawing the lessons of their German buddies, plotted a provocation (an assault on the headquarters of the Communist Party) in order to precipitate an insurrection when the whole of the proletariat was still weak and disorganized. The workers fell into the trap leaving 30 dead on the streets of Vienne. This also happened in Switzerland after a general strike in Zurich and Basle.
... and among the "victors"
In Great Britain, again in the Clyde region, at the beginning of 1919 more than 100,000 workers were on strike. On the 31st of January ("Red Friday") during a workers' rally in Glasgow, workers confronted troops and artillery sent by the government. Miners were ready to begin a strike, but the unions managed to stop it "Giving a margin of confidence to the government in order that it could study the nationalization of the mines" (Hinton and Hyman: Trade Unions and Revolution).
In Seattle (United States) at the same time a strike of shipyard workers broke out which within a few days had spread to all the workers in the city. Through mass assemblies and an elected and revocable strike committee, the workers controlled the city's food supply and organized self-defense against the troops sent by the government. However, the "Seattle Commune" remained isolated and a month later (after hundreds of arrests) the shipyard workers returned to work. Other strikes broke out, such as that of the miners in Butte (Montana) where a Workers' and Soldiers' Council was formed, and the strike by 400,000 steel workers. Here again, the struggles failed to unify.
In Canada during the Winnipeg General Strike in May 1919, the local Government organized a patriotic meeting in order to try and counteract the pressure from the workers with the chauvinism of victory. But the soldiers "threw away the script" and after recounting the horrors of the war proclaimed the necessity to "transform the imperialist war into class war" which radicalized the movement even more, leading to its spreading to Toronto. Nevertheless, the workers left the direction of the struggle to the unions who lead them to isolation and defeat and the terror of the city's thugs, whom the government called "special commissioners".
But the wave did not remain just in the countries directly effected by the imperialist slaughter. In Spain in 1919, a strike broke out at La Canadiense, and spread rapidly through the industrial belt of Barcelona. While on the walls of the haciendas (the houses of the great landowners) in Andulucia, the semi-literate day labors wrote "Viva los Soviets! Viva Lenin!". The mobilization of the day laborers during 1918-19 has gone down in history as the "Bolshevik two years".
Concentrations of workers outside Europe and North America also took part in the wave.
In Argentina, at the beginning of 1919, in the so-called "Bloody Week" in Buenos Aires a general strike took place in response to the repression inflicted on the workers at the Talleras Vasena factory. After 5 days of street fighting and artillery bombardments of workers' areas, 3,000 were left dead. In Brazil, the strike of200,000 workers in Sao Paulo saw the troops sent by the government fraternizing with the workers. At the end of 1918 a "Workers' Republic" was proclaimed in the favelas (shanty towns) of Rio de Janeiro, which, however, remained isolated and collapsed faced with the state of siege imposed by
the government.
In South Africa, the land of "racial hatred", the workers' struggles made clear the necessity and possibility of the workers struggling together "The working class of South Africa cannot gain its liberation until it overcomes the racial prejudices and hostility towards the workers of other colors within its ranks" (The International, newspaper of the Industrial Workers of Africa). In March 1919 a tram strike spread to all of Johannesburg, with assemblies and meetings in solidarity with the Russian Revolution. While in Japan, in 1918, the so-called "Rice Mutinies" developed against the sending of rice to Japanese troops who were participating in the counter-revolution in Russia.
2. 1919-1921: The late re-awakening of the proletariat in the "victorious" countries and the weight of the defeat in Germany
In this first phase of the revolutionary wave the proletariat played for high stakes. First, the suffocating isolation of the revolutionary bastion in Russia[6] had to be ended. But the very fate of the revolution was being decided. The strongest proletarian detachments - Germany, Austria, Hungary - had entered the combat, and their strength and experience would determine the future of the world revolution. Nonetheless, the first phase of the revolutionary wave ended, as we have seen, with profound defeats for the proletariat, from which it was unable to recover.
In Germany, the workers supported in March 1919 the general strike called by the unions against the "Kapp Putsch", in order to reinstate the "democratic" Scheidemann government. The workers of the Ruhr however, were not willing to return to power those who had already murdered 30,000 workers, and they armed themselves forming the "Red Army of the Ruhr". In some cities (Duisberg) they went as far as arresting the union and socialist leaders. But once again the struggle remained isolated. At the beginning of April the reconstituted German Army smashed the Ruhr revolt.
In 1921, the German bourgeoisie devoted itself to "cleansing" the revolutionary remnants who remained in Central Germany, plotting new provocations (the assault on the Leuna factories in Mansfeld). The Communists of the KPD, completely disorientated, fell into the trap and ordered the "March Actions" in which the workers of Mansfeld, Halle, etc, despite their heroic resistance could not overcome the bourgeoisie, who made good use of the dispersion of the movement, to massacre first the workers of Central Germany and then the workers of Hamburg, Berlin and the Ruhr who showed solidarity with them.
Given that the struggle of the working class is by essence international, what happens in one country has repercussions on what happens in others. Therefore, when after the euphoria caused by "victory" in the war, the proletariats of Britain, France and Italy joined the struggle en masse, the successive defeats suffered by their class brothers in Germany deepened the weight of the most nefarious mystifications: nationalization, "workers' control" of production, trust in the unions, lack of trust in the proletariat.
In Britain a hard-fought rail strike broke out in September 1919. Despite intimidation by the bourgeoisie (warships in the Thames estuary, soldiers patrolling the streets of London) the workers did not give in. What is more the transport workers and workers in electric businesses wanted to call a strike, but the unions stopped them. The same would happen later when the miners called on the solidarity of the rail workers. The kind-hearted union proclaimed: "Why the dangerous adventure of a general strike? Seeing we have within our grasp a much simpler, less costly and undoubtedly less dangerous means. We must show the workers that a much better way forwards is to intelligently use, the power that the most democratic constitution in the world offers them and that will allow them to gain all they desire" (Quoted by EdouardDolleans, Historia del Moviemento Obrero) To immediately prove this to the workers, "the most democratic bourgeoisie in the world" hired thugs, strikebreakers and provocateurs ... and made one million workers unemployed.
Nonetheless, the workers still had confidence in the unions. And they paid a very dear price for this: In April 1921 the miners called for a general strike, but were confronted with the refusal of the unions to back them (April the 15th, will always remain in workers memory as "Black Friday") which left the miners isolated, confused and open to the government's attacks. Once the main workers' detachments were defeated, the bourgeoisie "allowed the workers to gain all they desire" - wage cuts for over
7 million workers.
In France the worsening of the workers' living conditions (above all due to the scarcity of fuel and food) let loose a train of workers' struggles from the beginning of 1920. From February the epicenter of the movement was the rail strike that, despite opposition from the union, spread to and generated workers' solidarity in other sectors. Faced with this the CGT union decided to place itself at the head of the strike and to "support" it through the tactic of "waves of assault", or rather on one day the miners would strike, on another engineering workers ... and in this way workers solidarity did not tend to draw together, but to disperse and die. By the 22nd of May the rail workers were isolated and defeated (18,000 disciplinary sackings). It is true that the unions were "discredited" in front of the workers (membership fell by 60%) but their work of sabotaging the workers struggles had born fruit for the bourgeoisie: the French proletariat was defeated and left open to the punitive expeditions of the "Civic Leagues".
In Italy, where throughout 1917-19 formidable workers' struggles had broken out against the imperialist war and the sending of supplies to the troops fighting against the Russian Revolution[7], the proletariat was, however, unable to launch an assault against the bourgeois state. In the summer of 1920, due to the collapse of numerous businesses, a fever of "factory occupations" broke out, which were supported by the unions since, in reality, they diverted the proletariat away from the confrontation with the bourgeois state, and channeled them into the "control of production" instead. Suffice it to say that the government of Giolitti told businessmen that "we are not going to use military force to dislodge the workers, since this would move the struggle from the factory to the street" (Quoted in M Ferrare, Conversando con Togliatti). The workers' combativity was wasted in these factory occupations. The defeat of this movement, although in 1921 there were new and isolated strikes in Lombardy and Venice, opened the door to the counter-revolution, which in this case took the form of Fascism.
In the United States, the working class also suffered important defeats (the strikes in the coal mines and in the lignite mines of Alabama, and on the railways) in 1920. The capitalist counter-offensive imposed "open contracts" (the impossibility of collective bargaining), which brought about a 30 % reduction in wages.
3. The last death rattles of the revolutionary wave
From 1921, although there were still heroic expressions of workers' combativity, the revolutionary wave had already entered into its terminal phase. Even more so when the weight of the workers' defeats led the revolutionaries of the Communist International into increasingly serious errors (the application of the policy of the "United Front", support for "national liberation" movements, expulsion of the fractions of the revolutionary left from the International...) that at the same time led to more confusions and important failures which, in a dramatic spiral, led to new defeats.
In Germany the workers' combativity was diverted increasingly towards "anti-fascism" (for example when the ultra-right killed Erzberger, or when a warmonger wanted to "raze" Kiel in November 1918) or towards the nationalist terrain. Faced with the invasion of the Ruhr by French and Belgian troops in 1923, the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) raised the abject flag of "National-Bolshevism", claiming that the proletariat should defend the "German Fatherland", as something progressive, faced with the imperialist aggression represented by the powers of the Entente. In October of the same year, the Communist Party that had joined the governments of Saxony and Thuringia, decided to provoke insurrections beginning on the 20th of October in Hamburg. When the workers of this city rose up in revolt the Communist Party decided to retreat, which left them to face a cruel repression on their own. The exhausted, demoralized, crushed German proletariat had sealed its own defeat. Days later, Hitler led his famous "bierkeller putsch" an attempted Nazi uprising in a beerhall in Munich, which failed for the time being (Hitler came to power by the "parliamentary road" ten years later).
In Poland, the proletariat that in 1920 had closed ranks with its bourgeoisie against the invasion of the Red Army, returned to its class terrain in 1923 with a new wave of strikes. But the international isolation that this struggle suffered allowed the bourgeoisie to keep the initiative in its hands and to mount all kinds of provocations (the burning of the Warsaw Arsenal for which the Communists were accused) in order to confront the workers when they were dispersed. On the 6th of November an insurrection broke out in Krakow against the killing of two workers, but the lies of the "Socialists" (who got the workers to hand in their arms) lead to the disorientation and demoralization of the workers. Despite the wave of solidarity strikes with Krakow that took place in Domdrowa, Gornicza, Tarnow ... within a few days the bourgeoisie had extinguished this workers' uprising. In 1926 the Polish proletariat would be the cannon fodder of the inter-bourgeois struggles between the "Philo-fascist" government and Pilsudski who the "left" supported as the "defender of Liberty".
In Spain the successive waves of struggle were systematically held in check by the "Socialist" Party and the UGT, which allowed General Primo de Rivera to impose his dictatorship in 1923[8].
In Great Britain, after some partial and very isolated struggles (the marches of the unemployed on London in 1921 and 1923 or the all-out strike of construction workers in 1924) the bourgeoisie imposed a final defeat in 1926. After another wave of miners' strikes, the unions organized the "General Strike" which they called off 10 days later, leaving the miners alone to return to work in December having suffered thousands of sackings, After the defeat of this struggle the counter-revolution reigned in Europe.
Also in this phase of the definitive decline of the revolutionary wave, there were defeats of the proletarian movements in the countries of the periphery of capitalism:
In South Africa, the "Red revolt of the Transvaal" in 1922 against the replacing of white workers by black workers on lower wages, spread to workers of both races and other sectors (coalmines, railways ... ) until it took insurrectional forms.
In 1923 Dutch troops and thugs hired by the planters were used against a rail strike that spread from Java to Surabaj and Jemang (Indonesia).
In China, the proletariat had been dragged (following the infamous thesis of the CI which supported "national liberation" movements) into supporting the actions of the nationalist bourgeoisie grouped around the Kuomintang, which however had no hesitation in savagely repressing the workers when they struggled on their class terrain (for example the general strike in Canton in 1925). In February and March 1927 the workers of Shanghai launched insurrections in order to prepare the entry into the city of the nationalist general Chang-Kai-Shek. This "progressive" leader (according to the CI) did not hesitate to take hold of the city, in alliance with the shopkeepers, peasants, intellectuals and especially the lumpen elements, in order to crush with fire and blood the general strike directed by the Shanghai Workers' Council in protest at the prohibition of strikes by the "liberator". Even after two months of terror in the workers' areas of Shanghai the Cl still supported the "Left wing" of the Kuomintang, based in Wuhan. This nationalist "left" did not vacillate in shooting down workers whose strikes "were irritating the foreigners ( .. .) impeding the progress of their commercial interests" (M. N. Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China). When the proletariat was already completely crushed, the CP decided to "pass over to the insurrection", which did no more than make this defeat even worse: 2,000 workers were killed in the "Canton Commune" of December 1927.
This struggle of the Chinese proletariat marked the dramatic epilogue of the world revolutionary wave, and as the revolutionaries of the Communist Left analyzed, a decisive landmark in the passage of the "Communist" Parties into the camp of the counter-revolution. A counter-revolution that spread over the proletariat of the world, like an immense black night, for 40 years until the resurgence of the struggles of the working class in the middle of the 1960s.
War does not offer the most favorable conditions for revolution
Why did the revolutionary wave fail? Without a doubt the incomprehensions that the proletariat and revolutionaries had about the conditions of the new historical period of decadence, had a decisive weight; but we cannot forget how the objective conditions created by the imperialist war prevented this vast ocean of struggles from being channeled towards a unified combat. In "the historic conditions for the generalization of the struggle of the working class" (International Review no 26) we analyzed: "War is certainty a peak in the crisis of capitalism, but we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that it is also a 'response' by capitalism to the crisis. It is an advanced moment of barbarism which as such does not greatly favor the conditions for the generalization of the revolution".
We can see this from the facts of this revolutionary wave.
i) The war was a blood-letting for the proletariat. As Rosa Luxemburg explained:
"For the advance and victory of Socialism we need a strong, educated, ready proletariat, masses whose strength lies in knowledge as well as in numbers. And these very masses are being decimated all over the world. The flower of our youthful strength, hundreds of thousands whose Socialist education in England, in France, in Belgium, in Germany and in Russia was the product of decades of education and propaganda, other hundreds of thousands who were ready to receive the lessons of Socialism, have fallen, and are rotting upon the battlefields. The fruit of the sacrifices and the toil of generations is destroyed in a few short weeks, the choicest troops of the international proletariat are torn out by the roots" (The Junius Pamphlet).
A high percentage of the 70 million soldiers were proletarians who were replaced in the factories by women, or by workers recently brought from the colonies, with much less experience of struggle. Furthermore in the army the workers were diluted in an interclassist mass along with peasants, lumpens .... Thus the actions of the soldiers (desertions, insubordination...) though not benefiting the bourgeoisie, did not represent a terrain for genuinely proletarian struggle. For example, the desertions in the Austro-Hungarian army were in great part motivated by the refusal of Czechs, Hungarians.... to struggle for the Emperor in Vienna. The mutinies in the French army in 1917 did not question the war but "how to carry out the war" (the "inefficiency" of certain military actions ... ). The radical nature and, consciousness of some of the soldiers actions (fraternizing with the soldiers on the "other side", refusal to repress workers' struggles...) were in reality the consequence of the mobilization in the rear... And when after the armistice, the question was posed of destroying capitalism to put an end to war, the soldiers represented the most vacillating and backward sector. This is why the German bourgeoisie, for example, deliberately overstated the weight of the Soldiers' Councils compared to that of the Workers' Councils.
ii) The proletariat did not "control" the war. The unleashing of war requires the defeat of the proletariat. This included the impact of the reformist ideology that was part of this defeat, also the cessation of struggles in 1914: for example in Russia a growing wave of struggles that had developed during 1912-13 came to an abrupt end.
But besides, during the course of the war, the class struggle was pushed into the background by the din of military operations. While military reverses accentuated discontent (for example, the failure of the Russian Army's offensive in June 1917 brought about the "July days"), it is also certain that the offensives of the rival imperialisms and the success of their own, pushed the proletariat into the arms of the "interests of the fatherland". Thus the spring of 1918, at a significant moment for the world revolution (only months after the October insurrection in Russia), produced the last German military offensives that:
- paralyzed the wave of strikes which from January had broken out in Germany and Austria, with the "success" of the conquests in Russia and the Ukraine, which military propaganda called "the peace of bread".
- lead to French soldiers, who had been fraternizing with the workers of the Loire, closing ranks with their bourgeoisie. In the summer these same soldiers put down the strikes.
And what is more important, when the bourgeoisie saw that its domination was really threatened by the proletariat, it could put an end to the war, separating the revolution from its main stimulus. This question was not understood by the Russian bourgeoisie, but it was by the more prepared German bourgeoisie (and with them the rest of the world bourgeoisie). No matter how strong the imperialist antagonisms are between the different national capitals, the class solidarity of the different sections of the bourgeoisie is much stronger faced with the necessity to confront the proletariat.
In fact, the feeling of relief that the armistice generated in the workers weakened their struggle (as we saw in Germany) while, on the other hand, it reinforced the weight of bourgeois mystification. The bourgeoisie presented the imperialist war as an "anomaly" in the functioning of capitalism (the "Great War" was going to be "the war to end war ) trying to convince the working class that the revolution was not necessary because "everything would be as it was before". The sensation of a "return to normality" strengthened the tools of the counter-revolution: the "Socialist" parties and their" gradual passage to Socialism", the unions and their mystifications ("workers control of production", nationalizations, ... ).
iii) Finally the imperialist war broke the generalization of the revolution by fragmenting the workers' response between those of the victorious and defeated countries. Though the governments were weakened by military defeat, the crumbling of the regime did not necessarily mean the strengthening of the proletariat. Thus after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the proletariat of the "oppressed nationalities" was dragged into the struggle for the "independence" of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Yugoslavia[9]. The Hungarian workers who in October took Budapest, and the general strike in Slovakia in November 1920 ... were diverted onto the rotten terrain of "national liberation". In Galicia (then in Austria) what for years had been a movement against the war, was allowed to become demonstrations "for Polish independence and military victory over Germany!". In its insurrectional attempt of November 1918, the proletariat in Vienna was to struggle practically alone.
In the defeated countries, the revolt was more rapid but also more desperate and therefore dispersed and disorganized. The anger of the workers of the defeated countries, when it remained isolated from the struggle of the workers of the victorious ones, could finally be diverted towards "revanchism", as was seen in Germany in 1923, after the invasion of the Ruhr by Franco-Belgian troops.
In the victorious countries, on the other hand, the workers' combativity was delayed by the chauvinist euphoria of victory[10]. The workers' struggle recovered slowly, as if the workers had been waiting for the "dividends of Victory"[11]. Only once these illusions had been shattered by the brutality of post-war conditions (especially after 1920, when capitalism entered into a phase of economic crisis) did the workers of France, Britain, and Italy enter massively into struggle. However, by then the workers of the defeated countries had suffered decisive defeats. The fragmentation of the workers' response between the victorious and defeated countries, moreover, allowed the world bourgeoisie to jointly coordinate their forces, in support of those fractions that at different times found themselves in the front line of the war against the proletariat. After the defeat of the Paris Commune, Marx had already denounced "The unprecedented fact that in the most terrible war of modern times, the victorious and defeated armies united faced with the common threat of the proletariat (...) Class domination cannot hid the fact that under the national uniform, all national governments are as one only against the proletariat" (Marx, The Civil War in France):
* Even before the end of the war, the Entente powers had turned a blind eye when German troops in March 1918 crushed the workers' revolution in Finland or the revolt of the Hungarian Army at Vladai in September 1918.
* Faced with the German revolution, it was President Wilson (of the USA) who demanded that the Kaiser integrate the "socialists" into the government as the only force capable of confronting the revolution. A little later, the Entente gave the German government 5,000 machine guns with which to massacre the workers' revolt. And in March 1919, Noske's army would move, with the full consent of Clemenceau, into the Ruhr "demilitarized zone", in order to smash one revolutionary focus after another...
* From the end of 1918, Vienna served as the coordination center of the counter-revolution, commanded by the sinister English colonel Cuningham who coordinated, for example, the counter-revolutionary actions of Czech and Rumanian troops in Hungary. When the army of the Hungarian Workers' Councils attempted in July 1919 to carry out a military action on the Rumanian front, the troops of this country were waiting for them, since the Hungarian "socialists" had already informed the
Vienna "anti-Bolshevik center" about this operation.
* Along with military collaboration, came the blackmail of "humanitarian aid" which arrived from the Entente (especially from the USA), a condition of which was that the proletariat had to accept without protest exploitation and misery. When in March 1919, the Hungarian Councils called on the Austrian workers to enter into a common struggle with them, the "revolutionary" Frederik Adler answered them "You call on us to follow your example. We want to do this with all our hearts and will, but sadly we cannot. In our country there is no more food. We have been turned into complete slaves of the Entente" (Arbeiter-Zeitung, 23/3/1919)
In conclusion we can affirm that, contrary to what many other revolutionaries think[12], war does not create favorable conditions for the generalization of the revolution. This in no way means we are "pacifists" as some Bordigist groups claim. On the contrary, we defend as Lenin did that "the struggle for
peace without revolutionary action is an empty and lying phrase". It is precisely our responsibility as the vanguard in this revolutionary struggle, that demands that we draw the lessons of the workers' experience, and affirm[13] that the movement against the economic crisis of capitalism that began at the end of the 60's, although apparently less "radical", more tortuous and contradictory, will establish a much firmer material base for the proletarian world revolution:
* The economic crisis affects all countries without exception. Independently of the level of devastation that the crisis can cause in the different countries, it is certain that there are neither "victors", "vanquished", nor "neutrals".
* Unlike imperialist war, which the bourgeoisie could bring to an end faced with the threat of the workers' revolution, world capitalism cannot stop the economic crisis, nor can it avoid the increasingly brutal attacks on the workers.
It is significant that the very groups that accuse us of being "pacifists" tend to under-estimate the workers struggles against the economic crisis.
The decisive role of the main proletarian concentrations
When the proletariat took power in Russia, the Mensheviks along with all the "socialists" and centrists, denounced the "adventurism" of the Bolsheviks, because the "backwardness" of Russia meant that it was not mature enough for the Socialist revolution. It was precisely the justified defense of the proletarian nature of the October revolution that led the Bolsheviks to explain the "paradox" of the world revolution arising from the struggle of a "backward" proletariat as in Russia[14], by means of the erroneous thesis which sees the chain of world imperialism being broken at its weakest link[15]. Nevertheless, an analysis of the revolutionary wave permits the refutation from a Marxist viewpoint, both of the idea that the workers of the Third World will not be prepared for the socialist revolution, and of this idea's apparent "antithesis", that it will be easier for them.
1. The First World War represented the historic landmark of capitalism's entry into its decadent phase. Which is to say that the preconditions for revolution (sufficient development of the productive forces and also of a revolutionary class. Within a moribund society) had been established at a worldwide level.
The fact that the revolutionary wave spread to every comer of the planet and that, in all countries, the workers' struggles were confronted by the counter-revolutionary action of all the fractions of the bourgeoisie, made it clear that the proletariat (independently of the level of development the different countries had achieved) does not have different tasks in Europe or the so-called Third World. Thus, there is not a proletariat that is "prepared" for socialism (in the advanced countries) and a proletariat that is "too immature for revolution" that has to go through the "democratic-bourgeois phase".
The revolutionary wave that we have been analyzing, demonstrated how the workers of backward Norway could discover that "The workers' demands cannot be satisfied by parliamentary means, but only by the revolutionary actions of all workers" (Manifesto of the Cristiania Workers' Council March 1918); how the Indonesia plantation workers or those of the Rio favelas formed Workers' Councils, how Berber workers united with workers of European origin against the "nationalists" during the general strike in the Algerian ports in 1923...
To proclaim today, as some in the revolutionary milieu do, that the proletariat of these backward countries, unlike those of the advanced countries, must form unions, or support the "national" revolution of the "progressive" fractions of the bourgeoisie, is equivalent to throwing overboard the lessons of the bloody defeats suffered by these proletariats at the hands of the alliance of all the bourgeois fractions ("progressive" and reactionary) or of the unions (including the most radical ones, such as the anarchist ones in Argentina) who in the center and on the peripheries of capitalism demonstrated how they had been converted into agents of the capitalist state.
2. However, although the whole of capitalism and therefore the world proletariat, is "mature" for revolution, this does not mean that the world revolution could begin in any country or that the struggle of the workers of the most backward countries has the same responsibilities, the same determinant character, as the struggles of the proletariat of the most advanced countries. The revolutionary wave of 1917 -23 constantly demonstrated that the revolution can only start from the proletariats of the most developed capitalisms, that is to say those detachments of the working class which by the weight they have in society, by their accumulated historical experience gained through years of combat against the capitalist state and its mystifications, play a central and decisive role in the worldwide confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie:
The example of the struggle of the workers of the most developed countries, encouraged workers to form Workers' Councils from Turkey (where in 1920 there existed a Spartacist group) and Greece to Indonesia and Brazil. In Ireland (a, proletariat that Lenin erroneously believed should struggle for "national liberation"), the influence of the revolutionary wave opened up an interval, when the workers instead of struggling alongside the Irish bourgeoisie for their "independence" from Great Britain, struggled on the terrain of the international proletariat. In the summer of 1920 the Limerick Workers Council was formed and in the West of the country a revolt of farm laborers broke out which was put down, as much by the IRA (when the workers occupied fauns owned by Irish landlords) as by the British troops.
When the bourgeoisie had defeated the decisive workers battalions in Germany, France, Britain, Italy ... the world working class was decisively weakened, and the struggles of the workers in the countries on the periphery of capitalism could not change the course of the defeat of the world proletariat. The enormous demonstrations of courage and combativity given by the workers of America, Asia... separated from the contribution of the central battalions of the working class, were lost in serious confusions (as for example the revolution in China) which inevitably led them to defeat. In the countries were the proletariat is weakest, due to its scarce forces and experience, they were confronted, however, by the combined action of the bourgeoisies who have more experience in their class struggle against the proletariat[16].
Therefore the central link where the future of the revolutionary wave was decided was Germany, whose proletariat was a real beacon for the proletariat of the world. However, in Germany the most developed and conscious proletariat was confronted by a bourgeoisie that had accumulated a vast experience of confronting the proletariat. It is enough to see the "power" of the specific anti-worker apparatus of the German capitalist state: a "socialist" party and unions which maintained their organization and coordination at all moments in order to sabotage the revolution.
Therefore, in order to make the worldwide unification of the proletariat possible, it is necessary to overcome the most refined mystifications of the class enemy, the most powerful anti-worker apparatus... It is essential to defeat the strongest fraction of the world bourgeoisie and this can only be done by the world's most developed and experienced working class.
Hence, the thesis that the revolution must necessarily follow from war, as with the "weakest link", was an error of the revolutionaries of that period due to their desire to defend the proletarian world revolution. These errors, were however, converted into dogma by the triumphant counter-revolution after the defeat of the revolutionary wave, and today unfortunately form part of the Bordigist groups "doctrine".
The defeat of the revolutionary wave of the proletariat of 1917 -23 does not mean that the proletarian revolution is impossible. On the contrary, almost 80 years later capitalism demonstrates, in war after war, barbarity after barbarity that it cannot escape from the historic morass of its decadence. And despite its limitations, the world proletariat has emerged from the night of counter-revolution to set a new course towards decisive class confrontations, towards a new revolutionary attempt. To triumph in this new world assault on capitalism, the working class will have to draw the on lessons of what constitutes its main historical experience. It is the responsibility of revolutionaries to abandon dogmatism and sectarianism, in order to be able to discuss and clarify the necessary balance sheet of this experience.
Etsoem
[1] The German retreat from its French and Belgian position, between August and November, cost Britain 378,000 men and France 750,000.
[2] The defeat of the proletariat in 1914 was only ideological and not physical, hence the immediate return of strikes, assemblies, solidarity"" Whereas in 1939, the defeat was complete, both physical (after the crushing of the revolutionary wave) and ideological (anti-fascism).
[3] See "From Austro-marxism to Austro-fascisrn" in International Review no 10.
[4] See "70 years since the Revolution in Germany" in International Review No 55 & 56.
[5] Vacillations which were also shared by revolutionaries. See the book The German-Dutch Communist Left.
[6] See "Isolation is the death of Revolution" in International Review no 75.
[7] See "Revolution and Counter-revolution in Italy" in International Review no 2 & 3.
[8] The Spanish proletariat was not however defeated: hence its formidable struggles in the 30's. See our pamphlet Franco y La Republica masacran al proletariado (available only in Spanish).
[9] See "Balance of 70 years of 'national1iberation'" in International Review no 66.
[10] Only in the "defeated" part of France (Alsace-Lorraine), were there important strikes (rail, mines) and Soldiers' Councils in November 1918.
[11] The weakest capitalism that lost the war was also the one that initiated it, which permitted the bourgeois to reinforce chauvinism with campaigns about "war reparations".
[12] Including groups that laid out very serious and lucid balance sheets of the revolutionary wave, as was the case with our predecessors of the French Communist Left, who were wrong on this question, which lead them to hope for a new revolutionary wave after World War II.
[13] See the article quoted from International Review no 26.
[14] In our pamphlet The Russian Revolution, beginning of the World Revolution, we demonstrated that Russia was not backward (it was the world's 5th industrial power). Its advance in respect to the rest of the proletariat cannot be attributed to the supposed "backwardness" of Russian capitalism, but to the fact that the revolution arose from the war and that the world bourgeoisie was unable to come to the aid of the Russian bourgeoisie (as it was also unable to do during the "civil war" of 191 8-1 920) as well as to the absence of social shock absorbers (unions, democracy...) under Tsarism.
[15] We have expressed our critique of this "theory of the weak link" in "The proletariat of Western Europe at the center of the class struggle" and in "On the critique of the theory of the weak link" (International Review no 31 & 37 respectively).
[16] As we have already seen in the Russian Revolution (see the article in International Review no 75), when the French, British and North American bourgeoisies undertook coordinated counter-revolutionary action. Also in China the Western "democracies" at first supported the "warlords" financially and militarily and then the leaders of the Kuomintang.
On the eve of World War I, when revolutionaries like Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg declared the internationalist position characteristic of capitalism's new historic phase - "There is no longer any such thing as defensive or offensive wars" (Congress of Basel, 1912) - they did so with reference to the Balkan War. In capitalism's "decadent", "imperialist" phase, all wars between powers are equally reactionary. Contrary to what happened in the 19th century, when the bourgeoisie could still lead wars against feudalism, the proletarians could no longer choose between either camp in these wars. The only possible response to capitalism's militaristic barbarism is the destruction for capitalism itself. These positions, ultra-minority ones in 1914 when the First World War broke out, where nonetheless to form the basis for the great revolutionary movements of this century: the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the German Revolution of 1919, which put an end to the bloodbath begun in 1914.
For the first time since World War II, war has broken out again in Europe, and again it has broken out in the Balkans. It is vital that we reappropriate the experience of revolutionaries' struggle against war. This is why we are publishing this article which sums up a crucial aspect of revolutionaries' action against one of capitalism's most terrible scourges.
Bilan no 21, July August 1936
It would be falsifying history to say that the 1st and 2nd Internationals never considered the problem of war, and that they did not try to resolve it in the interests of the working class. We could even say that the problem of war was on the agenda right from the birth of the 1st International (the war that opposed
Austria to France and the Piedmont in 1859, the 1864 conflict between Denmark and the Austro-Prussian alliance, the war between Prussia and Italy on one side and Austria and South Germany on the other in 1866, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, not to mention American Civil War of 1861-65, and the insurrection of Bosnia-Herzegovina against Austrian annexation in 1878, all of which provoked the liveliest interest among internationalists at the time).
If we consider the number of wars that arose during this period, we can say that the problem was more a "burning" one in the time of the 1st International than of the 2nd, which was marked above all by the colonial wars for the division of Africa. With the exception of the brief conflict between Turkey and Greece in 1897, wars did not break out in Europe until the Balkan wars, and that between Italy and Turkey for the possession of Libya, which prefigured the world conflagration of 1914.
All this explains - and we are speaking from experience - that we, the generation which entered the struggle before 1914, perhaps considered the problem of war as an ideological struggle rather than a real and imminent danger: the termination, without recourse to arms, of serious crises such as the Fashoda or Agadir incidents tended to make us believe, wrongly, that economic "interdependence", in other words the increasing number of close ties between countries, constituted a secure defense against the outbreak of war among the European powers, and that their increasing military preparations rather than leading inevitably to war, only confirmed the principle "si vis pacem para bellum" ("if you want peace, prepare for war").
When the 1st International was founded, the universal panacea for preventing war was the suppression of standing armies, and their replacement by militia on the Swiss model. This position was put forward by the International's 2nd Congress at Lausanne in 1867, aimed in particular at a bourgeois pacifist movement which had formed a League for Peace that held congresses from time to time. The International decided to take part (in the Congress held in Geneva, where Garibaldi made his pathetically theatrical intervention with the famous declaration that "only the slave has die right to make war on tyrants"), and its delegates insisted that "it is not enough to do away with standing armies to put an end to war, but that a transformation of the entire social order is also necessary").
At the International's 3rd Congress, held in Brussels in 1868, a resolution was voted on the workers' attitude in the case of a conflict between the great European powers, where they were called to prevent a war of one people against another, and to cease work in the event of war. Two years later, in July 1870, the International found itself faced with the outbreak of war between France and Prussia.
The International's first manifesto was innocuous enough: "on the ruins that will be left by the two armies, socialism will remain the only real power. Then will be the moment for the International to decide what to do. Until then, let us remain calm and vigilant" (!!!).
The fact that the war was conducted by Napoleon "the Small" (ie Napoleon III) determined the somewhat defeatist attitude of large sections of the French population, amongst whom the internationalists opposition to the war found an echo.
Moreover, the fact that Germany was generally considered as having been "unjustly" attacked by "Bonaparte", provided a certain justification (since this was a "defensive" war) to the German workers' position of national defense.
The fall of the French Empire, after the catastrophic defeat at Sedan, overturned these positions.
"We repeat what we declared in 1793 to the European coalition" wrote the French internationalists in their manifesto to the German people: "the French people will not make peace with an enemy occupying our territory. Only on the banks of the contested river [the Rhine] will the workers reach out their hands to create the United States of Europe, the Universal Republic".
The patriotic fever intensified, and indeed presided over the birth of the glorious Paris Commune itself.
On the other side, for the German proletariat it was now a war conducted by the monarchy and Prussian militarism against the "French Republic" and the "French people". Hence the slogan of "an honorable peace without annexations", which motivated Liebknecht's and Bebel's protest in the Reichstag against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and their consequent condemnation for "high treason".
Another point remains to be clarified on the subject of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and the attitude of the workers' movement to it.
In fact, at the time, Marx envisaged the possibility of "progressive wars" - above all the war against Tsarist Russia - in an epoch where the cycle of bourgeois revolutions was not yet closed, just as he envisaged a possible conjunction of the bourgeois revolutionary movement with the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, where the latter would intervene, even in time of war, to hasten its final triumph.
"The war of 1870", wrote Lenin in his pamphlet on Zimmerwald, "was a "progressive war" like those of the French revolution, which while they undoubtedly brought with them all the elements of pillage and conquest, had the historic function of destroying or shaking feudalism and absolutism throughout the old Europe still founded on serfdom".
But while such a perspective was still admissible in Marx's day, even though it had already been overtaken by events, in capitalism's final, imperialist phase, to talk about "progressive", "national", or "just" wars is nothing but a deception and a betrayal. In effect, as Lenin wrote, unity with the national bourgeoisie of one's own country is unity against the unity of the revolutionary international proletariat, in a word it is unity with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat, the betrayal of the revolution and of socialism.
Moreover, we should not forget other problems which influenced Marx in 1870, and which he emphasized in a letter to Engels (20th July 1870). The concentration of state power following the Prussian victory could only be useful to the concentration of the German working class, favorable to its class struggle, and, Marx wrote "the German preponderance will transport the center of gravity of the European workers' movement from France to Germany, and consequently ensure the definitive triumph of scientific socialism over Proudhonism and utopian socialism".
To finish with the 1st International, we will point out that, curiously, the 1871 London Conference did not deal with these problems despite their topicality, any more than did the Hague Congress in September 1872 where Marx gave a presentation in German of the events since 1869, the date of the International's previous Congress. In fact, the events of the time were treated very superficially, and the Congress limited itself to expressing its admiration for the heroic champions who had fallen in the Commune, and its fraternal greetings to the victims of bourgeois reaction.
The first Congress of the reconstituted International, held in Paris in 1889, restated the old slogan of the "replacement of standing armies by popular militias", and the next Congress, held in Brussels in 1891, adopted a resolution calling on workers to protest, by constant agitation, against all attempts at war, adding by way of consolation that the responsibility for war would in all events fall on the shoulders of the ruling classes ...
The 1869 London Congress - which saw the definitive split with the anarchists - declared in a general programmatic resolution on the question of war, that "the working class in all countries must oppose the violence provoked by war".
In 1900, in Paris, following the growth in political strength of the socialist parties, a principle was set forward which was to become axiomatic for all agitation against war: "the socialist deputies to Parliament in all countries are required to vote against all military and naval expenditure, and against colonial expeditions".
But the fullest debates on the question of war took place at Stuttgart in 1907.
Alongside the grandiloquent phrase mongering of the histrionic Herve on the duty of "answering war by the general strike and insurrection", Bebel presented a resolution essentially in agreement with Guesde, which although theoretically correct was inadequate with regard to the role and tasks of the proletariat.
At this Congress, in order to "prevent Bebel's orthodox deductions being read through opportunist spectacles" (Lenin) Rosa Luxemburg, in agreement with the Russian Bolsheviks, added to the resolution amendments which emphasized that the problem consisted not only in the struggle against the eventuality of war, but also and above all in using the crisis caused by the war to accelerate the fall of the bourgeoisie: "to profit in every way from the economic and political crisis to raise the people and so
to precipitate the fall of capitalist rule" .
In Copenhagen in 1910, the previous resolution was confirmed, especially with regard to the strict duty of socialist deputies to refuse all war credits.
Finally, as we know, during the Balkan war, and faced with the imminent danger of a world conflagration exploding in the powder-keg of Europe - today the powder-kegs have been multiplied to infinity - a special Congress was held in Basel in November 1912, to draw up the famous manifesto, which repeated all the declarations of Stuttgart and Copenhagen, denounced the future European war as "criminal" and "reactionary" for all governments, and declared that it could only "hasten the fall of capitalism by unfailingly provoking the proletarian revolution".
But while the manifesto declared that the looming war would be a war of pillage, an imperialist war for all the belligerents, and that it could only lead to a proletarian revolution, it tried above all to demonstrate that this imminent war could not be justified by a shadow of national interest. This implied an admission that, under a capitalist regime, and in the midst of imperialist expansion, cases could exist where participation by the exploited class in a war of "national defense" could be justified.
Two years later, the imperialist war broke out, and with it the IInd International collapsed. This debacle was the direct result of the insurmountable contradictions and ambiguities contained in all these resolutions. In particular, the ban on voting war credits did not resolve the problem of the "defense of the country" against the attack of an "aggressor nation". This is the breach through which the pack of social-chavinists and opportunists poured. The "Sacred Union" was sealed with the collapse of the international class solidarity of the workers.
As we have seen, if we look superficially at the language of its resolutions the IInd International not only adopted a principled class position against war, it also provided itself with the practical means to oppose it, to the point of formulating more or less explicitly the principle of transforming the imperialist war into a proletarian revolution. But if we go to the bottom of things, we can see that while the IInd International posed the problem of war, it resolved it in a formal and simplistic manner. It denounced war above all for its horrors and atrocities, because the proletariat provided the cannon fodder for the ruling class. The Ilnd International's anti-militarism was purely negative, and left almost exclusively to the socialist youth, in some countries against the clear hostility of the party itself.
With the exception of the Bolsheviks during the 1904-05 Russian Revolution, no party envisaged so much as the possibility of systematic illegal work in the army. The parties limited themselves to manifestoes or papers against war, which were posted on the walls or distributed at schools, calling on workers to remember that under the soldier's uniform they remained proletarians. Faced with the inadequacy and sterility of this work, Herve had an easy time of it, especially in Latin countries with his wordy demagoguery of "burying the flag in the dung-heap", and his encouragement of desertion, the rejection of armies, and his famous slogan "shoot your officers".
In Italy - where in October 1912 the socialist patty gave the only example in the Ilnd International of calling a 24-hour strike against the Tripolitanian colonial expedition - a young worker in Bologna, Masetti, followed Herve's suggestions and shot his colonel during a military exercise. This was the only positive event to come out of the entire Herve comedy.
Less than a month later, on the 4th August, temporarily ignored by the mass of workers engulfed in the carnage of World War I, the manifesto of the Bolshevik Central Committee raised the flag of the continuity of the workers' struggle with its historic call for the transformation of the present imperialist war into a civil war.
The October Revolution was on the march.
Gatto Mamone
Guy Debord committed suicide on 30th November, 1994. All the press in France, where he lived, has written about his death, for despite his limited public appearances, Debord was a well-known personality. His fame was due, not to the "works" produced in what the media called his profession - film producer - whose audience was always a small one, but to his writing (The Society of the Spectacle, 1967), and above all to his activity as founding member and one of the main inspirations behind the Situationist International. As a revolutionary organization, it is this last aspect of Debord's life that interests us, for although it dissolved more than 20 years ago, in its time the Situationist International had a certain influence on the groups and elements that were moving towards class positions.
We do not propose here to produce a history of the SI, nor an exegesis of the 12 issues of its review published between 1958 and 1969. Suffice it to say that the SI was born, not as a political movement properly speaking, but as a cultural movement that brought together a number of artists (painters, architects, etc) from various tendencies (the Lettrist International, the Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus, the London Psycho geographical Committee, etc) , which proposed to make a "revolutionary" critique of art as it exists in society today. Thus the first issue of the SI's review (June 1958) published an address distributed to a meeting of international art critics, which said: "Scatter, pieces of art criticism, criticism of artistic fragments. Today, the unitary artistic activity of the future is being organized in the Situationist International. You have nothing more to say. The Situationist International will leave you no room. We will reduce you to famine".
It should be noted that although the SI called for a radical revolution, it still considered that it was possible to organize "the unitary artistic activity of the future" within capitalist society. Moreover, this activity was seen as a sort of stepping-stone to revolution, since "The elements of a new life must already be forming among us - in the field of culture - and it is up to us to bring passion to the debate" (SI no 1, page 23, "Les situationnistes et I'automation", by Asger Jorn). The author of these lines was a fairly well-known Danish painter.
The kind of concerns that interested the SI's founders showed that this was not an organization expressing an effort by the working class to develop its consciousness, but an expression of the radicalized intellectual petty bourgeoisie. This is why the SI's political positions, while they claimed to be based on Marxism, against stalinism and trotskyism, were extremely confused. An appendix to the first issue of the review took position on the coup d'état of 13th May 1958, when the army based in Algeria rebelled against the power of the French government: it speaks of the "French people", and of the trades unions and left-wing parties as "workers' organizations", etc. Two years later, we can still find "Third-Worldist" overtones in the fourth issue: "In the emancipation of the colonized and under-developed peoples, carried out by themselves, we salute the possibility of skipping the intermediate stages that others passed through, both in industrialization and in culture and the use of a life liberated from all constraint" ("La chute de Paris", SI no 4, page 9). A few months later, Debord was one of the 121 signatories (mostly artists and intellectuals) of the "Declaration on the right to desertion in the Algerian war", which includes the following: "The cause of the Algerian people, which is contributing decisively to the ruin of the colonial system, is the cause of all free men". SI no 5 takes up this gesture collectively, without the slightest criticism of the concessions to democratic ideology contained in the "Declaration".
Our aim here is not to heap denunciations on the SI. But it is important, especially for those who may have been influenced by this organization's positions, that the reputation for "radicalism" that surrounded it, its intransigence and its refusal to compromise, has been much exaggerated. The SI had great difficulty in disengaging itself from the political aberrations of its origins, especially its concessions to leftist or anarchist ideas. Only gradually did the SI approach the positions of the left communists - in fact of the councilisrs - just as the pages of its review gave an increasing space to political questions rather than artistic vagaries. For a while, Debord was closely linked with the group that published Socialisme ou Barbarie, and it was he who instigated the SI's evolution. In July 1960, he published a document titled "Preliminaries for a definition of a united revolutionary program" with P. Canjuers, a member of SouB. However, although for a time Socialisme ou Barbarie inspired the SI's political evolution, it was itself an extremely confused group. It came from a late split (1949) within the trotskyist "4th International", but was never able to break the umbilical cord tying it to trotskyism in order to join the positions of the communist left. After a number of splits, which produced the GLAT (Groupe de Liaison pour l' Action des Travailleurs), ICO (Information et Correspondance Ouvrieres) and the Pouvoir Ouvrier group, SouB ended its career under the aegis of Cornelius Castoriadis (who was to give his support, at the beginning of the 1980s, to Reagan's campaigns on the supposed military superiority of the USSR) as a coterie of intellectuals who explicitly rejected marxism.
We find another example of the extreme confusion of the SI's positions in 1966, when it tried to take position on Boumedienne's military coup d'état in Algeria, and could find nothing better than to make a "radical" defense of self-management (in other words, the old anarchist recipe, derived from Proudhon, which leads workers to take part in their own exploitation):
"The only program of Algerian socialist elements is the defense of the self-managed sector, not only as it is, but as it must become ... Only a maintained and radicalized self-management can be the starting-point for a revolutionary assault on the existing regime ... Self-management must become the sole solution to the mysteries of power in Algeria, and must know that it is this solution" (SI no 10, page 21, March 1966). Even in 1967, the issue no 11 of the SI's review, which contains its clearest political positions, continues to cultivate a certain ambiguity on a number of points, especially on the so-called "national liberation struggles". Alongside a vigorous denunciation of the "Third-Worldism" promoted by the leftist groups, the SI ends up making concessions to "Third-Worldism" itself:
"It is obviously impossible, today, to hope for a revolutionary solution to the Vietnamese war. Above all, we must put an end to American aggression, to allow the real social struggle develop naturally in Vietnam, on other words to allow the Vietnamese workers to rediscover their internal enemies: the Northern bureaucracy and all the possessing and ruling strata in the South (...) Only a resolutely anti-state and internationalist revolutionary Arab movement can both dissolve the Israeli state and gain the support of the mass of the exploited. By the same process, it alone will be able to dissolve all the Arab states and create Arab unification by the power of the Workers' Councils" (SI no 11, "Deux Guerres Locales", pp21-22).
In fact these ambiguities, which the SI never got rid of, explain in part its success at a time when "Third-Worldist" illusions were particularly strong within the working class, and above all in the student and intellectual milieu. This is not to say that the SI recruited on the basis of its concessions to "Third- Worldism", but rather that had the SI been perfectly clear on the question of the so-called "national liberation struggles", it is likely that many of its supporters at the time would have turned away from it[1].
Another reason for the SI's success in the student and intellectual milieu obviously lies in the priority it gave to its critique of capitalism's ideological and cultural aspects. For the SI, we are living today in the "society of the spectacle" (which was a new term for state capitalism), in other words within a phenomenon already analyzed by revolutionaries as specific to capitalism's decadent phase: the omnipresence of the capitalist state throughout society, including in the cultural sphere. Similarly, while the SI was very clear in declaring that the proletariat is the only revolutionary force in this society, its definition of the proletariat allowed the intellectual petty bourgeoisie to include itself within the working class, and so to consider itself as a "subversive force":
"Given the reality which is emerging today, we may consider as proletarians people who have no possibility of modifying the social space-time which society allocates for their consumption ... " (SI no 8, ‘Domination de la nature, ideologie et classes'). And the SI's typically petty-bourgeois vision of this question is confirmed by its analysis, similar to Bakunin's, of the lumpen-proletariat, which would be called to constitute a revolutionary force since "... the new proletariat tends to be defined negatively as a "Front against forced labor" which unites all those who resist recuperation by the state" ("Banalites de Base" in SI no 8, page 42).
The elements in revolt of the intelligentsia particularly liked the SI's propaganda methods: the spectacular sabotage of cultural and artistic events or the "subversion" of comic strips and photo-novels (for example, the nude pin-up shown speaking the famous slogan of the workers' movement: "The emancipation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves "). Similarly, situationist slogans encountered a great success in this social stratum: "Live without dead time. Pleasure unrestrained", "Demand the impossible", "Take your desires for reality". The idea of immediately putting into practice the situationist ideas of the "critique of daily life", in fact only expresses the immediatism of the petty bourgeoisie, a social class without any future. Finally, a pamphlet written by a situationist in 1967 (De la misere en milieu etudiant) presenting students as the most contemptible creatures in the world, alongside priests and the military, contributed to the SI's notoriety within a stratum of the population whose masochism is a measure of its lack of any role on the social and historical scene.
France was the country where the SI encountered the greatest echo, and the events of May 68 marked its apogee. Situationist slogans were on every wall, for the media the word" situationist" was synonymous with" radical revolutionary". The first Sorbonne Occupation Committee was composed largely of SI members and sympathizers. There is nothing surprising about this. The events of 68 marked at one and the same time the last gasp of the student revolts which began in California in 1964, and the historic recovery of the proletariat after four decades of counter-revolution. The simultaneity of these two phenomena, and the fact that state repression of the student revolt was the trigger for the massive strike movement which had been ripening with the first effects of the economic crisis, allowed the situationists to express the most radical aspects of this revolt, while still having a certain impact on certain sectors of the working class which were beginning to reject the bourgeois structures of control
constituted by the unions and the left parties.
However, the recovery in the class struggle, which caused the appearance and flourishing of a whole series of revolutionary groups including our own organization, was the death knell for the Situationist International. It proved incapable of understanding the real significance of the struggles of 1968. In particular, because it was convinced that the workers had risen against the "spectacle", not against the first effects of an insurmountable economic crisis the SI wrote idiotically: "The revolutionary eruption did not come from an economic crisis ... the frontal attack of May was on a capitalist economy working well" (Enrages et Situationnistes dans Ie mouvement des occupations, a book written by the Situationist Rene Viennet, page 209)[2]. With this view of things as their point of departure, it is hardly surprising that the SI succumbed to complete megalomania: "The agitation begun in January 68 at Nanterre by the four or five revolutionaries who were to form the "enrages" group [influenced by the Situationists' ideas] was to lead, only five months later, to the quasi-liquidation of the state" (ibid, page 25). From then on, the SI entered into a crisis which was to end in its dissolution in 1972.
In fact, it was only "by default" that the SI had an impact, before and during the events of 1968, on elements coming towards class positions, as a result of the disappearance or sclerosis in the period of counter-revolution of the communist currents of the past. Once the student revolt died, and organizations were formed in the wake of the 68 events that took up the experience of those currents, there was no longer any room for the SI. Its self-dissolution was the logical conclusion of its bankruptcy, of the trajectory of a movement which could have no future, because it refused to attach itself firmly to the communist fractions of the past. Guy Debord's suicide[3] probably followed the same logic.
Fabienne
[1] The best proof of the Sl's lack of rigor (to say the least) on this question is its designation of Mustapha Khayati to set out its theses on the subject (see "Contributions servant a rectifier I'opinion du public sur la revolution dans les pays sous-developpes", in SI no 11, pp38-40). Shortly afterwards, Khayati joined the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, without this causing his immediate exclusion from the SI; in the end, it was Khayati who resigned. At its Venice conference in 1969, the SI simply accepted the resignation with the argument that it did not accept "dual memberships". In short, whether Khayati joined a group like ICO, or enrolled in a bourgeois army (why not the police, it all comes to the same thing?) made no difference to the SI.
[2] In a polemic against our French press, the SI wrote: "As for the debris of the old non-trotskyist ultra-leftism, they needed at least a major economic crisis. They subordinated any revolutionary movement to its return, and so saw nothing coming. Now that they have recognized a revolutionary crisis in May, they have to prove that this "invisible" economic crisis was there in the spring of 68. Without any fear of being ridiculed, they are working at it now, producing schemas on the rise in unemployment and inflation. So for them, the economic crisis is no longer that terribly visible objective reality that was lived so hardly in 1929, but a son of eucharistic presence that supports their religion" (SI no 12, page 6). This crisis may have been "invisible" for the SI, but not for our current since our press in Venezuela (the only one in existence at the time) devoted an article to it in January 1968.
[3] Always assuming that he did commit suicide ... Another hypothesis is always possible: Debord's friend Gerard Lebovici was murdered in 1984.
It's not for fun that the capitalists refuse to exploit a growing number of workers or to carryon exploiting the old ones. They get their profit from living labor as it is devoured by the machinery of the wages system. The work of others is, for capital, the goose that lays the golden eggs. As such, capital doesn't have an interest in killing it. But capital's only religion is profit. A capitalist who doesn't make a profit is doomed to disappear. Capital doesn't give out jobs out of humanism, but because that's the way it works. And if profits are insufficient, it lays off, it cuts jobs. Profit is the alpha and omega of the capitalist bible.
According to official history, in 1949 a “popular revolution” triumphed in China. This idea, defended as much by the democratic West as by the Maoists, forms part of a monstrous mystification produced by the Stalinist counter-revolution about the supposed creation of “Socialist states”. It is certain that in the period between 1919 and 1927 China lived through an important working class movement, which was fully integrated into the international revolutionary wave that shook the capitalist world in that epoch, but this movement was ended by a massacre of the working class. What the bourgeoisie’s ideologues present on the other hand, as the “triumph of the Chinese Revolution”, was only the installation of a state capitalist régime in its Maoist variant, the culmination of a period of imperialist struggles on the terrain of China that began in 1928, after the defeat of the proletarian revolution.
In the first part of this article we will lay out the conditions in which the proletarian revolution arose in China, drawing out some of the principle lessons. The second part is dedicated to the period of the imperialist struggles, which gave rise to Maoism, while at the same time denouncing the fundamental aspects of this form of bourgeois ideology.
The evolution of the Communist International (CI) and its activity in China was crucial for the course of the revolution in that country. The CI represents the most important effort made by the working class up until now to give itself a world party with which to guide its revolutionary struggle. However, its late formation, during the world revolutionary wave, without having previously had sufficient time to consolidate itself politically and organically, led it, despite the resistance of the Left fractions[1] [411] into opportunist deviation when - faced with the defeat of the revolution and the isolation of Soviet Russia - the Bolshevik Party, the most influential in the International, began to vacillate between the necessity of maintaining the basis for a future renewal of the revolution, even at the cost of sacrificing the triumph in Russia, or the defence of the Russian state that had arisen from the revolution but at the cost of making treaties and alliances with the national bourgeoisies, treaties and alliances that represented an enormous fount of confusion for the international proletariat and lead to the acceleration of its defeat in many countries. The abandonment of the historic interests of the working class in exchange for promises of collaboration between classes, led the International to a progressive degeneration that culminated in 1928, with the abandonment of proletarian internationalism on the altar of so-called “defense of Socialism in one country”.[2] [412]
Lack of confidence in the working class progressively led the International, increasingly converted into a tool of the Russian government, to search for the creation of a barrier against the penetration of the great imperialist powers, through the support of the bourgeoisies of the “oppressed countries” of Eastern Europe, the Middle and Far East. This policy had disastrous results for the international working class, since through the political and material support of the CI and the Russian government for these supposedly “nationalist” and “revolutionary” bourgeoisies of Turkey, Persia, Palestine, Afghanistan... and finally China, these same bourgeoisies, who hypocritically accepted Soviet support without breaking their links either with the imperialist powers or with the landed aristocracy who they were supposedly fighting, crushed the workers’ struggles and annihilated the communist organisations with the arms supplied to them by the Russians. Ideologically, this abandonment of proletarian positions was justified by invoking the “Theses on the Colonial and National question” from the Second Congress of the IIIrd International (in whose writing Lenin and Roy had played a central role). These Theses certainly contain an important theoretical ambiguity, that distinguished wrongly between the “imperialist” and “anti-imperialist” bourgeoisies, which opened the doors to major political errors, since in this epoch the bourgeoisie, even in the oppressed countries, had finished being revolutionary and everywhere had acquired an “imperialist” character. Not only because the latter were tied to one or other of the great imperialist powers, but also because, after the working class had taken power in Russia, the international bourgeois formed a common front against all the revolutionary movements of the masses. Capitalism had entered into its decadent phase, and the opening of the epoch of the proletarian revolution had definitively closed the epoch of bourgeois revolutions.
Despite this error, these Theses were still capable of warding off some opportunist slidings, which unfortunately became generalised a little while later. The report of the discussion presented by Lenin recognised that in this epoch “A certain understanding has emerged between the bourgeois of the exploiting countries and that of the colonies, so that very often, even perhaps in most cases, the bourgeois of the oppressed countries, although they also support national movements, nevertheless fight against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes with a certain degree of agreement with the imperialist bourgeoisie, that is to say together with it”.[3] [413] Therefore, the Theses appeal for support principally amongst the peasants and, above all, they insist on the necessity of the Communist organisations maintaining their organic and principled independence faced with the bourgeoisie. “The Communist International has the duty to support the revolutionary movement in the colonies only for the purpose of gathering the components of the future proletarian parties - communist in fact and not just in word - in all the backward countries and training them to be conscious of their special tasks, the special tasks, that is to say, of fighting against the bourgeois-democratic tendencies... must unconditionally maintain the independent character of the proletarian movement, be it only in embryo”. But the International’s unconditional, shameful support for the Kuomintang in China forgot all of this: that the national bourgeoisie was already not revolutionary and was establishing close links with the imperialist powers, the necessity of forging a Communist Party capable of struggling against the democratic bourgeois and the indispensable independence of the working class movement.
The development of the Chinese bourgeoisie and its political movement during the first decades of the twentieth century, rather than demonstrating its supposedly “revolutionary” aspects, illustrates the extinction of the bourgeoisie’s revolutionary character and the transformation of the national and democratic ideal, into a mere mystification, when capitalism entered its decadent phase. A survey of events shows us not a revolutionary class, but a conservative, accomodationist, class, whose political movement neither looked to totally displacing the nobility nor expelling the “imperialists”, but rather to place itself between them.
The historians usually underline the different interests that existed between the fractions of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Thus, it is common to identify the speculator/merchant fraction as being allied with the nobility and the “imperialists”, while the industrial bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia formed the “nationalist”, “modern”, “revolutionary” fraction. In reality, these differences were not so marked. Not only because both fractions were intimately linked by business and family ties but above all, because the attitudes of the merchant fraction and those of the industrial and intelligentsia were not so greatly different given that they both constantly looked for the support from the “Warlords” linked to the landed nobility, as well as the governments of the great powers.
By 1911 the Manchu Dynasty was already completely putrid and on the point of collapse. This was not some product of the action of a revolutionary national bourgeoisie, but the consequence of the division of China at the hands of the great imperialist powers, who had torn the old Empire apart. China had increasingly become divided into regions controlled by warlords, owners of greater or smaller mercenary armies, always fighting amongst themselves in order to sell themselves to the highest bidder and behind whom usually stood one or other of the great powers. The Chinese bourgeoisie felt that it had to replace the dynasty, as country’s unifying element, although without the aim of breaking up the régime of production in which the interests of the landlords and the “imperialists” were mixed with their own, but rather, in order to maintain it. It is in this framework that the events that took place between the so-called “1911 Revolution” and the “May 4th Movement of 1919” have to be placed.
The “1911 Revolution” began as a plot by conservative warlords supported by Sun Yat-sen’s bourgeois nationalist organisation, the T’ung Meng Hui. The Emperor did not know of the warlords’ plans. They set up a new régime in Wuhan. Sun Yat-sen, who was in the United States looking for financial support for his organisation, was called on to become president of the new government. Both governments entered into negotiations and within a few weeks it was agreed that both the Emperor and Sun Yat-sen should retire, and a unified government would take their place headed by Yuan Shih-K’ai who was head of the imperial troops and the true strong man of the Dynasty. The significance of all of this is that the bourgeoisie put aside its “revolutionary” and “anti-imperialist” pretensions, in order to maintain the unity of the country.
At the end of 1912 the Kuomintang (KMT) was formed; Sun Yat-sen’s new organisation represented this bourgeoisie. In 1913 the Kuomintang participated in presidential elections, restricted to the propertied social classes, which they won. However, the new president Sun Chiao-yen was killed. After this Sun Yat-sen allied himself with some military sucessionists from the central South of the country intending to form a new government, but was defeated by forces from Peking.
As we can see the feckless “nationalists” of the Chinese bourgeoisie were constrained by the games of the “warlords” and consequently by the great powers. The explosion of the First World War subordinated the political movement of the Chinese bourgeoisie still further to the play of the imperialists’ interests. In 1915 various provinces “declared independence”, the country was divided between the “warlords”, backed by one or other power. In the North, the Anfu government - supported by Japan - disputed predominance with Chili - backed by Great Britain and the United States. Czarist Russia, for its part wanted to turn Mongolia into its protectorate. The South was also disputed, Sun Yat-sen made new alliances with some warlords. The death of the Peking’s strong man aggravated even more the struggles between the warlords.
It was in this context, at the end of the war in Europe, that the “May 4th Movement of 1919” occurred, extolled by the ideologues as a “real anti-imperialist movement”. In reality this petty-bourgeois movement was not directed against imperialism in general, but specifically against Japan, which had taken the Chinese province of Shangtun as its prize at the Versailles Conference (the conference where the “democratic” victors redivided up the world), which the Chinese students opposed. However, it is necessary to note that the aim of not ceding Chinese territory to Japan was in the interests of the other rival power: the United States, which was finally to “liberate” the Shantung province from exclusive Japanese domination in 1922. That is to say, that despite the “radical” ideology of the May 4th Movement, it remained encased in imperialist struggles. And it could have done nothing else.
On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that during the May 4th Movement the working class expressed its own aspirations for the first time in its demonstrations, which not only raised the nationalist demands of the movement, but also their own demands. The end of the war in Europe could not put an end either to the conflicts between the warlords or to the struggle between the great powers for the redivision of the country. Little by little two, more or less unstable, governments emerged: one in the North with its seat in Peking, commanded by the warlord Wu P’ei-fu, the other in the South, with its seat in Canton, at whose head was found Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. Official history presents the Northern government as representing the forces of noble “reaction” and the imperialists, while that in the South represented the “revolutionary” and “nationalist” forces, of the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie and the workers. This is a scandalous mystification.
The reality is that Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang were always backed by the southern warlords. In 1920 the warlord Ch’en Ch’iung-ming, who had occupied Canton, invited Sun to form another government. In 1922 following the defeat of first attempts by the southern warlords to advance towards the North, he was thrown out of government, but in 1923 the warlords supported his return to Canton. On the other hand, there is the much talked of alliance of the Kuomintang with the USSR. In reality, the USSR made treaties and alliances with all the governments in China, including with those in the North. It was the North’s definitive inclination towards Japan that obliged the USSR to prioritise its relationship with the government of Sun Yat-sen, which for its part never abandoned its efforts to gain support from the different imperialist powers. Thus in 1925, just before his death when travelling to negotiations with the North, Sun passed through Japan soliciting support for his government.
It was this party, the Kuomintang representative of a national bourgeoisie (commercial, industrial and intellectual) integrated into the game of the great imperialist powers and the “warlords”, that was declared a “sympathizer party” by the Communist International. It is to this party that at one time or another the communists in China had to submit themselves, on the altar of so-called “national revolution”, for whom they served as “coolies”.[4] [414]
According to the official history the development of the Communist Party in China was a by-product of the movement of the bourgeois intelligentsia at the beginning of the century. Marxism had been imported from Europe along with other Western “philosophies”, and the formation of the Communist Party formed part of the growth of many other literary, philosophical and political organisations in this period. With ideas of this kind the historians have invented a bridge between the political movement of the bourgeoisie and that of the working class, making it appear as if they had been one and the same, and giving the formation of the Communist Party a specifically national significance. The truth is that the development of the Communist Party in China was fundamentally linked, not to the growth of the Chinese intelligentsia, but to the march of the international revolutionary movement of the working class.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) was created between 1920 and 1921 from small Marxist, Anarchist and Socialist groups who sympathised with Soviet Russia. As with many other Communist Parties, the CPC was born as an integral part of the CI and its rise was linked with the development of the workers’ struggles that were also following the example of the insurrectional movements in Russia and Western Europe. In 1921 there were a few dozen militants, but within a few years there were thousands; during the strike wave in 1925 membership reached 4,000, and by the insurrectional period of 1927 it had risen to 60,000. This rapid numerical expansion expressed, on the one hand, the revolutionary will that animated the working class in China in the period from 1919 to 1927 (the majority of militants in this period were workers from the great industrial cities). Nevertheless, it is necessary to say that the numerical growth of the Party did not express an equivalent strengthening of the Party. The overhasty admission of militants contradicted the traditions of the Bolshevik Party of forming a solid, tested, vanguard organisation of the working class, rather than a mass organisation. But worst of all was the adoption at its 2nd Congress of an opportunist policy, from which it was unable to detach itself.
In mid 1922, on instructions from the Executive of the International, the CPC launched the wretched slogan of the “anti-imperialist United Front with the Kuomintang” and the individual adhesion of communists to the latter. This policy of class collaboration, (which began to spread through Asia after the “Conference of the Toilers of the East” in January 1922) was the result of the negotiations secretly entered into beforehand between the USSR and the Kuomintang. By June 1923, the CPC’s 3rd Congress voted for all Party members to join the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was itself admitted to the CI in 1926 as a sympathiser organisation, and took part in the CI’s 7th Plenary Session, in which the United Opposition (Trotsky, Zinoviev...) were not eve allowed to attend. In 1926, while the KMT was preparing its final blow against the working class, in Moscow the infamous “theory” was elaborated that the Kuomintang was an “anti-imperialist bloc of four classes (the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie).
This policy had disastrous consequences for the working class movement in China. While strike movements and demonstrations arose spontaneously and impetuously, the Communist Party, merged with the Kuomintang, was incapable of orientating the working class, of putting forward independent class politics, despite the incontestable heroism of the communist militants who were frequently found in the front ranks of the workers’ struggles. Equally bereft of unitary organisations of political struggle, such as the workers’ councils, at the demand of the CPC itself the working class put its confidence in the Kuomintang, in other words of the bourgeoisie.
However, it is equally certain that the policy of subordination to the Kuomintang encountered frequent resistance inside the CPC (as was the case with the current represented by Chen Tu-hsiu). From the 2nd Congress there had already been an opposition to the Theses defended by the delegate of the International (Sneevliet) according to which the KMT was no longer a bourgeois party, but a class front to which the CPC had to subordinate itself. Throughout the whole period of the union with the Kuomintang voices arose inside the Communist Party to denounce the anti-proletarian preparations of Chiang Kai-Shek; asking, for example, that the arms supplied by the USSR should go to arm the workers and peasants and not to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek’s army as happened, and eventually posing, the need to leave the trap that the KMT constituted for the working class: “The Chinese revolution has two roads: one is the one that the proletariat can mark out and by which we can advance our revolutionary objectives; the other is that of the bourgeoisie and this will ultimatly betray the revolution in the course of its development”.[5] [415]
Nevertheless, it was impossible for a young and inexperienced party to overcome the erroneous and opportunist directives of the Executive of the International and it fell into them itself. As a result, the working class was unable to stop the Kuomintang stabbing it in the back, because while the Kuomintang was preparing to do so, the proletariat was being pulled into a struggle against the landlords opposed to the Kuomintang. And therefore the revolution in China had few opportunities to triumph, because on the international level the backbone of the world revolution - the German proletariat - had been broken since 1919, the opportunism of the IIIrd International only precipitated the defeat.
Maoism has used the weakness of the working class in China as an argument to justify the movement of the CPC towards the countryside from 1927. The working class in China at the beginning of the century was certainly miniscule in relation to the peasantry (a proportion of 2 to 100), but its political weight was not limited in the same proportions. There were around 2 million urban workers (without counting the 10 million more or less proletarianised artisans populating the cities) highly concentrated on the banks of the Yangtze, in the costal city of Shanghai and in the industrial zone of Wuhan (the triple city Hankow-Wuchang-Hanyang); in the Canton-Hong Kong complex and the mines of Hunan province. This concentration gave the working class extraordinary potential for paralysing and taking under its control the vital centres of capitalist production. Also in the Southern provinces there existed a peasantry that was closely linked to the workers, since they provided the work force of the industrial cities, which could constitute a force of support for the urban proletariat.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to judge the strength of the working class in China from its numbers in relation to the other classes in the country. The proletariat is a historic class, that draws its strength from its international existence, and the example of the revolution in China clearly demonstrates this. The strike movement, did not have it’s epicentre in China, but in Europe; it was an expression of the expanding wave of the world revolution. The workers in China, as in all parts of the world, launched themselves into struggle faced with the example of the triumphant revolution in Russia and the attempted insurrections in Germany and other European countries.
At the beginning, since the majority of the factories in China were foreign owned, the strikes had an “anti-foreigner” tinge and the national bourgeoisie thought they could use this to apply pressure on the foreign powers. However, the strike movement took on an increasingly class character, against the bourgeoisie in general, without making a distinction between “national” and “foreign” bosses. Strikes for workers’ demands developed from 1919 onwards, despite repression (it was not uncommon for workers to be beheaded or burnt in the fireboxes of locomotives). In the middle of 1921, a textile strike broke out in Hunan. At the beginning of 1922, there was a 3 month sailors’ strike in Hong Kong, which finished when they won their demands. In the first months of 1923 a wave of about 100 strikes broke out, in which more than 300,000 workers participated; in February the warlord Wu P’ei Fu ordered the repression of the railway strike leading to the killing of 35 workers while, the wounded were mutilated. In June 1924 there was a three month general strike in Canton/Hong Kong. In February the cotton workers of Shanghai launched a strike. This was the prelude to the gigantic strike movement that swept all of China in the Summer of 1925.
In 1925 Russia fully supported the Kuomintang government in Canton. Already from 1923 an alliance between the USSR and the Kuomintang had been openly declared, a military delegation from the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek had visited Moscow, while at the same time a delegation from the International provided the Kuomintang with its statutes and organisational and military structure. In 1924, the first official Congress of the Kuomintang sanctioned the Alliance and in May the Whampoa Military Academy was set up with Soviet arms and military advisors, directed by Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, what Russia did was to form a modern army, in the service of the bourgeois fraction regrouped in the Kuomintang, which had been without one until then. In March 1925 Sun Yat-sen visited Peking (with whose government the USSR still maintained relations) in order to try and form an alliance that would unify the country, but he died of an illness before he could put forward his aim.
It was into this framework of an idyllic alliance that the full force of the working class movement burst, reminding the bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang and the opportunists of the International about the international class struggle.
A wave of agitation and strikes arose from the beginning of 1925. On the 30th of May English police in Shanghai fired on a workers’ and students’ demonstration, killing twelve demonstrators. This was the detonator for a general strike in Shanghai, which rapidly spread to the main commercial ports of the country. On the 19th of June a general strike also broke out in Canton. Four days later the British troops of the British concession of Shameen (bordering Canton) opened fire on another demonstration. The workers in Hong Kong launched a strike in response. The movement spread, reaching as far as Peking where on the 30th of July a demonstration of 200,000 workers took place while peasant agitation deepened in the province of Kwangtung.
In Shanghai, the strike lasted three months, in Canton/Hong Kong a strike/boycott was declared that lasted until October of the following year. Here, workers’ militias began to be formed. The working class in China demonstrated for the first time that it was a force really capable of threatening the whole capitalist régime. Despite this, one consequence of the “30th May Movement” was that the Canton government consolidated and extended its powers towards the South, this movement also shook the class instincts of the “nationalist” bourgeoisie regrouped in the Kuomintang, which until then had left the strikes “to get on with it”, since the strikes were mainly focused against the foreign factories and concessions. The strikes in the summer of 1925 generally assumed an anti-bourgeois character, without “respect” for the national capitalists either. Thus, the “revolutionary” and “nationalist” bourgeoisie, with the Kuomintang at its head (backed by the great powers and with the blind support of Moscow), furiously launched itself into a confrontation with its mortal class enemy: the proletariat.
In the last months of 1925 and the first months of 1926 there occurred what the historians call the “polarisation of the Left and the Right wings of the Kuomintang”, which according to them includes the fragmentation of the bourgeoisie into two, one part remaining loyal to “nationalism” and the other moving towards an alliance with “imperialism”. However, we have already seen that the most “anti-imperialist” fractions of the bourgeoisie never stopped trying to deal with the “imperialists”. What happened in reality, was not the fractionalisation of the bourgeoisie, but its prepartion to confront the working class, throwing out unnecessary elements inside the Kuomintang (the communist militants, a part of the petty-bourgeoisie and some generals loyal to the USSR). Then, the Kuomintang feeling that it had sufficient political and military force, tore off the mask of “the block of four classes” and appeared as what it always had been: the party of the bourgeoisie.
At the end of 1925, the boss of the “left wing” Liao Chung-K’ai was killed and the harassment of communists began. This was the prelude to Chiang Kai-shek’s coup, which made him the Kuomintang’s strong man, the man to initiate the bourgeois reaction against the proletariat. On 20th March, Chiang, in front of the cadets of the Whampao Military Academy proclaimed martial law in Canton; he then closed down the workers’ organisations, disarmed the strike pickets and arrested many communist militants. In the months that followed, communists were removed from any posts of responsibility in the KMT.
The Executive of the International, completely under the control of Stalin and Bukharin, showed itself to be blind to the reaction of the Kuomintang and despite the resistance from inside the CPC, ordered that the alliance be kept up, hiding these events from the members of the International and the CPs.[6] [416] Chiang Kai-shek brazenly demanded that the USSR support him militarily in order that he could carry out his Northern expedition, which began in July 1926.
As with many other actions of the bourgeoisie, the Northern expedition is falsely presented as a “revolutionary” event, as having the intention of spreading the “revolutionary” régime and unifying China. But the pretensions of the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek were not so altruistic. His cherished dream (as with the other warlords) was to possess the port of Shanghai and to obtain from the great powers the administration of its rich customs duties. To this end he relied on a very important element of blackmail: his capacity to contain and crush the workers’ movement.
When the Kuomingtang’s military expedition began, it declared martial law in the regions which it already controlled. Thus, at a time when the deluded workers in the North were preparing to support the forces of the KMT, it was totally banning workers’ strikes in the South. In September the “left wing” took Hankow, but Chiang Kai-shek refused to support it and set himself up in Hanchang. In October he ordered the communists to stop the peasant movement in the South and the army put an end to the strike/boycott in Canton/Hong Kong. This was a clear signal to the great powers (especially Britain) that the Kuomintang’s advance towards the North did not have “anti-imperialist” pretensions and a little time later secret negotiations began with Chaing.
From the end of 1926 the industrial areas along the Yangtze river boiled with agitation. In October the warlord Sia-Chao (who had just gone over to the Kuomintang) advanced on Shanghai, but stopped some kilometers from the city, allowing the “enemy” troops of the North (under the command of Sun Ch’uan-fang) to enter the city first in order to suffocate the imminent uprising. In January 1927, the workers spontaneously occupied the British concessions in Hankow (in the triple city of Wuhan) and Jiujiang. Then, the Kuomintang army halted its advance in order, in the best tradition of reactionary armies, to permit the local warlords to repress the workers’ and peasants’ movements. At the same time, Chaing Kai-shek publicly attacked the communists and crushed the peasant movement in Kwangtung (in the South). Such is the scenario in which it is necessary to place the Shanghai insurrectionary movement.
The Shanghai insurrectionary movement marked the culminating point of a decade of constant struggles and rise of the working class. This is the highest point the Revolution in China reached. However, conditions were extremely unfavourable for the working class. The Communist Party found itself disjointed, struck down, subordinated and tied hand and foot by the Kuomintang. The working class deceived by its illusions in the “block of four classes” was unable to give itself the council type unitary organisms necessary for the centralisation of its struggle.[7] [417] Meanwhile, the guns of the imperialist powers were pointed towards the city and the Kuomintang as it was drawing closer to Shanghai supposedly unfurled the flag of the “anti-imperialist revolution”, whose real objective was to crush the workers. Only the revolutionary will and heroism of the working class can explain its capacity to have taken, in these conditions, the city that represented the heart of Chinese capitalism, although it was only for a few days.
The Kuomintang resumed its advance in February 1927. By the 18th, the Nationalist army was in Jiaxing, 60 kilometers from Shanghai. Then, with the prospect of the imminent defeat of Sun Ch’uan fang, a general strike broke out in Shanghai: “the movement of the proletariat in Shanghai, from the 19th to the 24th of February was objectively an attempt by the proletariat of Shanghai to consolidate its hegemony. With the first news of the defeat of Sun Ch’uan fang in Zhejiang, the atmosphere in Shanghai became red hot and in the space of two days, there exploded with the potential of a elemental force a strike of 300,000 workers who transformed it irresistibly into an armed insurrection which ended up achieving nothing, due to a lack of leadership...”.[8] [418]
Taken by surprise, the Communist Party vacillated about launching the slogan of insurrection, while it was taking place on the streets. On the 20th, Chiang Kai-shek once again ordered the suspension of the attack on Shanghai. This was the signal for Sun Ch’uan fang’s forces to unleash repression, in which dozens of workers were killed, momentarily containing the movement.
In the following weeks Chiang Kai-shek, skillfully manoeuvered in order to avoid being relieved of the command of the army and to silence rumours about his alliance with the “right wing”, the great powers and his preparations against the working class.
At last, on the 21st of March, the definitive insurrectional attempt took place. A general strike was proclaimed on this day, in which practically all the 800,000 workers of Shanghai took part. “The whole proletariat was on strike, as was the greater part of the petty-bourgeoisie (shopkeepers, artisans,etc...) (...) within a few dozen minutes the whole police force was disarmed. By 2 o’clock the insurgents already possessed about 1500 rifles. Immediately afterwards the insurgent forces moved against government buildings and disarmed the troops. Serious fighting tool place in the Chapi neigbourhood (...) Finally, at four in the afternoon, on the second day of the insurrection, the enemy (approximately 3,000 soldiers) were definitively defeated. This wall broken, all of Shanghai (with the exception of the concessions and the international neighbourhood) was in the hands of the insurgents”.[9] [419] This action, after the revolution in Russia and the insurrectional attempts in Germany and other European countries was another blow to the capitalist world order. It showed all the revolutionary potential of the working class. Nevertheless, the bourgeoisie’s repressive apparatus was already working and the proletariat did not find itself in conditions to confront it.
The workers took Shanghai, only to open the gates to the national “revolutionary” army of the Kuomintang, which finally entered the city. No sooner had he installed himself in Shanghai, than Chiang Kai-shek began to prepare the repression of the workers, reaching an agreement with the speculator bourgeoisie and the city’s underworld gangs. Likewise, he started to approach the representatives of the great powers and the Northern warlords openly. On the 6th April Chang Tso-lin (with Chiang’s agreement) raided the Russian embassy in Peking and arrested militants of the Communist Party who were later murdered.
On the 12th of April a massive and bloody repression organised by Chiang was unleashed in Shanghai. Gangs of lumpenproletarians from the secret societies who had always played the role of strikebreakers were let loose against the workers. The troops of the Kuomintang - the supposed “allies” of the workers - were directly employed to disarm and arrest the proletarian militias. The proletariat tried to respond on the following day by declaring a general strike, but contingents of demonstrators were intercepted by troops, leading to numerous victims. Martial law was immediately imposed and all workers’ organisations were banned. In a few days five thousand workers were killed, amongst them many militants of the Communist Party. Raids and killings continued for months.
Simultaneously, in a coordinated action, the forces of the Kuomintang that had remained in Canton unleashed another massacre, exterminating thousands more workers.
With the proletarian revolution drowned in the blood of the workers of Shanghai and Canton, there was still resistance particularly in Wuhan. However, here again the Kuomintang, and more specifically its “left wing”, cast off the “revolutionary” mask and in July passed to Chaing’s side unleashing repression here also. Likewise, the military hordes were let loose to destroy and massacre in the countryside of the Central and Southern provinces. The murdered workers throughout China were counted in their tens of thousands.
The Executive of the International tried to cover up its nefarious and criminal policy of class collaboration, by putting the whole responsibility on to the CPC and its central organs, and more specifically on the current which had rightly opposed this policy (that of Chen Tu-hsiu). In order to finish off this work, it ordered the already weak and demoralised Communist Party of China to embark on an adventurist policy which ended in the so-called “Canton insurrection”. This absurd atempted “planned” coup was not supported by the proletariat of Canton and all it achieved was to unleash yet more repression. This practically marked the end of the workers movement in China, from which it would not recover to carry out a significant expression in the following 40 years.
The policy of the International towards China a focus of the Left Opposition’s denouncation of the rise of Stalinism (Trotsky’s current also ended up by incorporating Chen Tu-hsiu). This was a late and confused current of opposition to the degeneration of the 3rd International, and although it maintained itself on the proletariat’s class terrain in respect to China, when it denounced the subordination of the CPC to the Kuomintang as the cause of the defeat of the revolution, it could never overcome the false framework of the Second Congress of the International’s Theses on the national question which, in turn, was one of the factors which would lead it into opportunism (ironically Trotsky supported the new class front in China during the inter-imperialist confrontation of the 30’s), until it passed into the camp of the counter-revolution during the course of the Second World War.[10] [420] In any case, all the revolutionary internationalists who remained in China were henceforth called “Trotskyist” (for years Mao Tse-tung would persecute the few internationalists who still opposed his counter-revolutionary policy as “Trotskyist agents of Japanese imperialism”)
The Communist Party was literally annihilated, with around 25,000 Communists killed at the hands of the Kuomintang while the rest were imprisoned or persecuted. The remnants of the Communist Party, along with some detachments of the Kuomintang fled to the countryside. But this geographical displacement corresponded to a still more profound political displacement. In the following years the Party adopted a bourgeois ideology, its social base - led by the petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeosie - was predominantly peasant and took part in inter-bourgeois military campaigns. The Chinese Communist Party, despite having conserved the name, had stopped being a Party of the working class and was converted into a bourgeois organisation. But this is a historical question that will be dealt with in the second part of this article
***
By way of a conclusion, we want to draw out some lessons highlighted by the revolutionary movement in China:
* The Chinese bourgeoisie did not stop being revolutionary only when it launched itself against the proletariat in 1927. Already from the “1911 Revolution” on, the “nationalist” bourgeoisie had demonstrated its readiness to share power with the nobility, to ally itself with the warlords and to subordinate itself to the imperialist powers. Its “democratic”, “anti-imperialist” and even “revolutionary” aspirations were nothing but the cover to hide its reactionary interests, which were exposed when the proletariat began to represent a threat. In the epoch of capitalism’s decadence the bourgeoisie of the weak countries are as reactionary and imperialist as the other powers.
* The class struggle of the proletariat in China from 1919 to 1927 cannot be explained in the purely national context. It constituted a link in the wave of the world revolution that shook capitalism at the beginning of the century. The elemental power with which the workers’ movement arose in China, a section of the world proletariat at that time considered as “weak”, enabled them spontaneously to take into their hands great cities, and demonstrates the potential that the working class has to overthrow the bourgeoisie, although for this to happen it requires revolutionary consciousness and organisation.
* The proletariat can have nothing more to do with making an alliance with any fraction of the bourgeoisie. However, its revolutionary movement can draw behind it sections of the urban and rural petty-bourgeoisie (as the Shanghai insurrection and the Kwangtung peasant movement demonstrated). Nevertheless, the proletariat must not merge its organisations with those of other strata, in some kind of “Front”. On the contrary, it has to maintain its class autonomy at all times.
* To be victorious, the proletariat requires a political party which orientates it in the decisive moments, as much as the council type organisations that cement its unity. In particular, the working class has to provide itself with its World Communist Party, firm in principle and tempered in struggle, in sufficient time, before the explosion of the next international revolutionary wave. Opportunism, which sacrifices the future of the revolution on the altar of immediate “results” and leads to class collaboration must be permanently fought in the ranks of revolutionary organisation.
Leonardo.
[1] [421] In the context of this article we cannot deal with the struggle carried out by the left fractions in the International against its opportunism and degeneration, a struggle that took place at the same time as the events in China which we are relating here. As far as we are aware, the latter were alone to have produced a Manifesto signed jointly by the whole Opposition, including the Italian Left. This was the Manifesto “To the Communists of China and the whole world!”, published in La Vérité, 12th September 1930. In this respect, we recommend our book The Italian Communist Left, and the series of articles published in the International Review on the Dutch Left.
[2] [422] The degeneration ran parallel to the degeneration of the state that had arisen from the revolution, which lead to the reconstitution of state capitalism in its Stalinist form. See the “Manifesto of the 9th Congress of the ICC”.
[3] [423] Lenin - Report of the National and Colonial Commission of the Second Congress of the Communist International - July 26th 1920 and the Theses on the National and Colonial Question from the Second Congress. Taken from The Second Congress of the Communist International Vol 1, published by Pathfinder books, 1977.
[4] [424] The expression is Borodin’s; he was the International’s delegate in China in 1926. E.H. Carr Socialism in One Country vol 3.
[5] [425] Chen Tu-hsiu. Quoted by the same in his “Letter to all members of the CPC” December 1929. Taken from the already cited work La Question Chinoise..., p. 446
[6] [426] Only some weeks before Chaing Kai-shek had been named as an “honorary member” and the Kuomintang a “sympathiser party” of the International. Even after the coup, the Russian advisers refused to supply 5,000 rifles to the workers and peasants of the South and reserved them for Chaing’s army.
[7] [427] Much has been said about the role played by the unions in the revolutionary movement in China. It is certain that in that period the unions grew in the same proportion as the strike movements. However, in so far as these did not try to contain the movement in the framework of germinal economic demands, it policy was still subordinated to the Kuomintang (also, they were also obviously influenced by the CPC. Thus, the movement in Shanghai took as its declared aim the opening of the gates to the “Nationalist” army. In December 1927 the Kuomintang unions participated in the repression of the workers. In that the workers only had one means of massive organisation, the unions, this did not represent an advantage, but a weakness.
[8] [428] Letter from Shanghai by 3 members of the CI’s mission in China, dated the 17th of March 1927.
[9] [429] A Neuberg, The Armed Insurrection. This book was written around 1929 (after the 6th Congress of the International). It contains some valuable information on the events of this period, however, it tends to see the insurrection as a coup; furthermore it makes a crude apologia for Stalinism. On the other hand, it ought not to be surprising that the insurrection attempt in Shanghai, despite its size and its bloody repression, is hardly mentioned (if it is not completely hidden), both in the history books - be they “pro-Western” or “pro- Maoist”- and in the Maoist manuals. It is on this basis that it is possible to maintain the myth according to which the events of the 20’s were a “bourgeois revolution”
[10] [430] For a complete understanding of our position on Trotsky and Trotskyism read our pamphlet El Trotskismo contra la clase obrera.
In August 1914, the First World War broke out. It was to claim 20 million victims. The determining responsibility of the trades unions, and above all the social-democracy, in the slaughter was clear to all.
In the German Reichstag, in SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) voted unanimously in favour of war credits. At the same time, the unions called for the “sacred union”, banning all strikes and declaring themselves for the mobilisation of all the nation’s forces for war.
This is how the social-democracy justified the vote in favour of war credits by its parliamentary group: “In the time of danger, we will not abandon our fatherland. In this, we feel we are in accord with the International, which has always recognised the right of every people to national independence and self-defence, just as we are in agreement with it in condemning all wars of conquest. Inspired by these principles, we vote the war credits that are demanded”. The fatherland in danger, national defence, a people’s war for civilisation and liberty, were the “principles” on which social-democracy’s parliamentary representatives took their stand.
This was the first great betrayal by a proletarian party in the history of the workers’ movement. As an exploited class, the working class is an international class. This is why internationalism is the most fundamental principle for any proletarian revolutionary organisation; for any organisation to betray this principle leads it inevitably into the enemy camp: the camp of Capital.
German capital could never had started the war had it not been certain of the support of the unions and the leadership of the SPD. While their treachery was thus hardly a surprise for the bourgeoisie, it provoked a terrible shock in the workers’ movement. Even Lenin could not at first believe that the SPD had really voted for war credits. On first hearing the news, he thought that this was black propaganda aimed at dividing the workers’ movement[1] .
Indeed, given the years of increasing imperialist tensions, the IInd International had intervened very early against the preparations for imperialist war. At the Congress of Stuttgart in 1907and of Basle in 1912 – and even right up to the last days of July 1914 – it had taken position against the ruling class’ war-mongering, against the bitter resistance of an already powerful right-wing.
The SPD MPs voted for war as representatives of Europe’s greatest workers’ party, the product of decades of labour (often in the most unfavourable conditions, for example in the period of the anti-socialist laws, when the party was banned). The party owned dozens of both daily and weekly publications. In 1899, the SPD possessed 73 papers, whose overall circulation had reached 400,000 copies; 49 of them came out six times a week. In 1900, the party had more than 100,000 members.
The treachery of the SPD leadership thus confronted the revolutionary movement with a fundamental question: could this mass working class organisation be allowed to pass, bags and baggage, into the enemy camp?
The leadership of the German SPD was not alone in its treachery. In Belgium, Vandervelde, the International’s president, became a minister in a bourgeois government, as did socialist Jules Guesde in France. The French Socialist Party declared unanimously in favour of war. In Britain, where there was no conscription, the Labour Party took on the organisation of recruiting. In Austria, although the Socialist Party did not formally vote for war, it conducted a frantic campaign in its favour. In Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Holland, the socialist leaders all voted for war credits. In Poland, the Socialist Party took the position for the war in Galicia and Silesia, but against it in Russian Poland. In Russia, the picture was uneven: the old leaders of the workers’ movement like Plekhanov or the anarchist Kropotkin, but also a handful of Bolsheviks in exile in France, called for defence against German militarism. In Russia itself, the social-democrat fraction in the Duma made a declaration against the war. This was the first official declaration against the war by a parliamentary group in one of the main warring countries. The Italian Socialist Party took position against the war from the outset. In December 1914, the party excluded a group of renegades who, under the leadership of Benito Mussolini, aligned themselves with the pro-Entente bourgeoisie, and made propaganda in favour of the war. The Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Tesniaks) also adopted a firm internationalist position.
The International, the pride of the working class, disintegrated in the flames of the World War, to be transformed, in Rosa Luxemburg’s words, into a “heap of wild beasts in the grip of nationalist fury, tearing each other apart for the greater glory of bourgeois order and morality”. The SPD became a “stinking corpse”. Only a few groups in Germany – Die Internationale, Lichtstrahlen, the Bremen Left – the group around Trotsky and Martov, some of the French syndicalists, the Dutch De Tribune group around Gorter and Pannekoek, and the Bolsheviks, resolutely defended the internationalist standpoint.
Alongside this decisive betrayal by most of the II International’s parties, the working class was subjected to an ideological battering which succeeded in injecting it with a fatal dose of nationalist poison. In 1914, it was not just the petty-bourgeoisie which was enrolled behind Germany’s expansionist aims: whole sectors of the working class were also galvanised by nationalism. Moreover, bourgeois propaganda maintained the illusion that the war would be finished “in a few weeks, by Christmas at the latest”, and everybody would be able to go home.
On the eve of war, despite the extremely unfavourable conditions, the minority of revolutionaries who stood firm on the principle of proletarian internationalism did not give up the struggle.
With the vast majority of the working class still intoxicated with nationalism, on the eve of 4th August 1914, the main representatives of the social-democratic left organised a meeting in Rosa Luxemburg’s flat; present were Käthe and Herman Duncker, Hugo Eberlein, Julian Marchlewski, Franz Mehring, Ernst Meyer, Wilhelm Pieck. They were few, but their activity during the next four years was to have an immense influence.
Several vital questions were on the meeting’s agenda:
The general situation was obviously very unfavourable. That was no reason for resignation for these revolutionaries. Their attitude was not to reject the organisation, but on the contrary to continue and develop the struggle within it; and to fight determinedly to preserve its proletarian principles.
Within the social-democratic parliamentary group in the Reichstag, the vote in favour of the war credits was preceded by an internal debate where 78 MPs declared themselves for the vote, and 14 against. The 14, including Liebknecht, followed party discipline and voted for the credits. This was kept secret by the SPD leadership.
There was a lot less apparent unity in the party at the local level. Many local sections (Orstvereine) immediately sent protests to the leadership. On 6th August, a crushing majority in the Stuttgart local section defied the parliamentary fraction. The left even managed to exclude the right from the party, and to take control of the local paper. In Hamburg, Laufenberg and Wolfheim rallied the opposition; in Bremen, the Bremerbürger Zeitung intervened determinedly against the war; protests also came from the Braunschweiger Volksfreund, the Gothaer Volksblatt, the Duisburg Der Kampf and from papers in Nuremberg, Halle, Leipzig and Berlin, reflecting the opposition of large sections of the party rank and file. During a meeting at Stuttgart on 21st September 1914, Liebknecht’s attitude was criticised. He himself was to say later that to have acted as he did, under fraction discipline, had been a disastrous mistake. Since every paper was subject to censure from the outbreak of the war, the expressions of protest were immediately reduced to silence. The SPD opposition thus relied on making itself heard abroad. The Swiss Berner Tagwacht became the voice of the SPD left wing; the internationalists also found expression in the review Lichtstrahlen, edited by Borchardt from September 1913 to April 1916.
An examination of the situation inside the SPD shows that although the leadership had betrayed, the organisation as a whole had not been enrolled in the war. This is why the perspective appeared clearly: to defend the organisation, we cannot abandon it to the traitors; we have to exclude them and break clearly with them.
During the meeting at Luxemburg’s flat, the question was posed of leaving the party, either as a mark of protest or out of disgust at its treachery. This idea was unanimously rejected on the grounds that the organisation should not be abandoned, since this would mean offering it on a plate to the ruling class. It was impossible to leave the party, built at the cost of such immense efforts, like rats leaving a sinking ship. This was why fighting for the organisation did not mean leaving it but fighting to reconquer it.
At that moment, nobody thought of leaving the organisation. The balance of forces did not oblige the minority to do so .Nor for the time being was it a matter of building a new, independent organisation. This attitude of Rosa Luxemburg and her comrades set them among the most committed defenders of the need for organisation.
The fact is that the internationalists had begun the combat long before the working class recovered from its intoxication. As a vanguard, they did not wait for the reactions of the working class as a whole, but took the lead in the class’ combat. While the nationalist poison continued its work on the class, which was under the ideological and physical fire of imperialist war, the revolutionaries – in the most difficult conditions of illegality – had already unmasked the conflict’s imperialist nature. Here again, in their work against the war, the revolutionaries did not simply wait for wider fractions of the proletariat to come to consciousness by themselves. The internationalists assumed their responsibilities as revolutionaries, as members of a proletarian political organisation. Not a day passed during the war when the future Spartakists were not working to defend the organisation and lay the foundations for the break with the traitors. This was a far cry from the so-called spontaneism of Rosa Luxemburg and the Spartakists.
The revolutionaries immediately entered into contact with internationalists in other countries. As their best-known representative, Liebknecht was sent abroad and made contact with the Socialist Parties in Belgium and Holland.
The struggle against the war was fought at two levels: first, in Parliament, which the Spartakists could still use as a tribune; and second, more importantly, through the development of a network of resistance at local level in the party and in direct contact with the working class.
It was thus that in Germany, Liebnecht was to become the standard-bearer of the struggle.
Within Parliament, he succeeded in drawing more and more deputies to him. Clearly at first, fear and hesitation dominated. But on 22nd October 1914, five SPD deputies left the chamber in protest; on 2nd December, Liebknecht was alone in voting against war credits, but in March 1915 about 30 deputies left the chamber, and a year later in August 1916, 36 deputies voted against the credits.
Of course the real centre of gravity lay in the activity of the working class itself, on the one hand at the roots of the workers’ parties and on the other in the workers’ mass actions, both in the streets and in the factories.
Immediately after the outbreak of war, the revolutionaries had clearly and energetically taken a position on its imperialist nature [2]. In April 1915, the first and only issue of Die Internationale was published; 9,000 copies were printed and 5,000 were sold on the first evening (hence the name of the group “Die Internationale”).
The first illegal anti-war leaflets were distributed during the winter of 1914-15, including the most famous of them: “The main enemy is in our own country”.
Propaganda material against the war circulated in many local meetings of militants. Liebknecht’s refusal to vote for war credits was well-known and quickly made him the most famous adversary of the war, first in Germany and then in the neighbouring countries. All the positions taken up by the revolutionaries were considered as “highly dangerous” by the bourgeois security services. In the local meetings of militants, representatives of the traitorous party leaders denounced militants who distributed propaganda material against the war. Often the latter would be arrested following the meeting. The SPD was split to the core. Hugo Eberlein was to report, during the KPD’s founding Congress on 31st December 1918, that links existed with more than 300 towns. To put an end to the growing anti-war resistance in party ranks, the leadership decided in January 1915, in agreement with the military High Command, to silence Liebknecht definitively by drafting him into the army. This meant he could no longer speak freely or take part in meetings of militants. On 18th February, Rosa Luxemburg was imprisoned until February 1916; in July she was arrested again and remained in prison until October 1918. In September 1915, Ernst Meyer, Hugo Eberlein and the 70-year-old Franz Mehring, were all imprisoned, with many others.
Even in these extremely difficult conditions they continued to work against the war and did everything they could to continue their organisational work.
Meanwhile, the reality of war was beginning to sober more and more workers from their nationalist intoxication. The offensive in France had broken down and had been replaced by a long trench war. By the end of 1914, 800,000 soldiers had already died. In the spring of 1915, the war in the trenches of France and Belgium cost hundreds of thousands of lives. On the Somme, 60,000 soldiers died in one day. Disillusionment spread rapidly at the front, but above all the working class on the home front was plunged into dire misery. Women were mobilised into armaments factories while food prices rose terribly, to be followed by rationing. March 18 1915 saw the first women’s demonstration against the war. On 15th and 18th October there were bloody confrontations between police and demonstrators against the war in Chemnitz. In November 1915, some 15,000 demonstrators marched in Berlin against the war. The working class was stirring in other countries too. In Austria, numerous wildcat strikes broke out, against the orders of the unions. In Britain, 250,000 miners from the South Wales coalfields went on strike; in Scotland, strikes broke out among the engineers of the Clyde Valley. In France, there were strikes in the textile industry.
Slowly, the working class began to emerge from the fog of nationalism and to show its readiness to defend its interests as an exploited class. Everywhere, the “sacred union” began to tremble.
An epoch ended with the outbreak of World War I and the treason of the parties of the IInd International. The International died because several of its member parties no longer represented an internationalist orientation. They had ranged themselves alongside their respective national bourgeoisies. An International made up of different national member parties does not betray as such; it dies and no longer has any part to play for the working class. It can no longer be corrected as such.
But the war had clarified things within the international workers’ movement: on the one hand were the traitor parties; on the other the revolutionary left which continued to defend class positions coherently and inflexibly, but which formed at first a small minority. Between the two stood a centrist current, oscillating between the traitors and the internationalists, constantly hesitating to take unambiguous positions, and refusing to break clearly with the social-patriots. In Germany itself, opposition to the war divided into several groups:
After a first phase of disorientation and lost contacts, from the spring of 1915 onwards, international conferences of Socialist Women (26-28th March) and Young Socialists (5-7th April) were held in Bern. After several adjournments, from 5-8th September, 37 delegates from 12 European countries met in Zimmerwald (not far from Bern). The biggest delegation from Germany, with 10 delegates from three opposition groups: the centrists, the Die Internationale group (Meyer, Thalheimer), and the ISD (Borchardt). Whereas the centrists called for an end to the war without any social upheaval, the left made the link between war and revolution the central question. After bitter discussion, the Zimmerwald conference broke up, adopting a Manifesto calling on the workers in every country to struggle for the emancipation of the working class and the goal of socialism, by the most intransigent proletarian struggle. By contrast, the centrists refused to include any reference to the need for an organisational break with social-chauvinism, or to the call to overthrow one’s own imperialist government. Nonetheless, the Zimmerwald Manifesto had a huge echo in the working class and among the troops. Despite being a compromise, criticised by the left because the centrists still hesitated in the face of clear cut positions, the Manifesto was nonetheless a decisive step in the unification of revolutionary forces.
In a previous article in the International Review, we have already criticised the Die Internationale group, which at first hesitated over the need to transform the imperialist war into a civil war.
The revolutionaries thus gave an impetus to their process of unification and their intervention encountered and ever greater echo.
On 1st May 1916, some 10,000 workers demonstrated against the war. Liebknecht spoke, to shout out “Down with the war! Down with the government!” At these words, he was arrested, which sparked off a huge wave of protest. Liebknecht’s courageous intervention served as a stimulus and orientation for the workers. The revolutionaries’ determination to struggle against the social-patriotic current, to continue the defence of proletarian principles, did not lead them into greater isolation, but encouraged the rest of the working class to enter the struggle.
In May 1916, the Beuthen miners struck for a wage increase. In Leipzig, Brunswick and Koblenz, workers demonstrated against hunger and the cost of living. A state of siege was decreed in Leipzig. The action of the revolutionaries, and the fact that despite the censorship and banning of meetings, news about the growing resistance to the war began to spread, gave further impetus to the combativity of the working class as a whole.
On 27th May 1916, 25,000 Berlin workers demonstrated against Liebknecht’s arrest. The next day, 55,000 workers began the first political mass strike against his imprisonment. In Brunswick, Bremen, Leipzig and many other towns, there were solidarity meetings and demonstrations against food shortages. Workers’ meetings were held in a dozen towns. Here we have a clear concretisation of the relationship between revolutionaries and the working class. The revolutionaries are neither outside nor above the working class, they are simply its clearest and most determined part, gathered together in political organisations. But their influence depends on the receptivity of the working class as a whole. Even if the number of elements organised in the Spartakist movement was still small, hundreds of thousands of workers nonetheless followed their slogans. More and more, they were the spokesmen for the spirit of the masses.
Consequently, the bourgeoisie did everything it could to isolate the revolutionaries from the class, by a wave of repression. Many members of the Spartakist League were placed in preventative detention. Rosa Luxembourg and almost the entire Spartakus central committee were arrested during the second half of 1916. Many Spartakists were denounced by SPD bureaucrats for having distributed leaflets in the SPD’s meetings; the police gaols filled up with Spartakist militants.
While the massacres on the Western front (especially at Verdun) claimed more and more victims, the bourgeoisie demanded more and more of the workers on the home front, in the factories. No war can be fought unless the working class is ready to sacrifice its entire life for the profit of capital. Now, the ruling class was encountering an increasingly strong resistance.
Protests against hunger developed constantly (the population was only receiving a third of its needs in calories). During the autumn of 1916, protests and demonstrations took place almost daily in the great towns: September in Kiel, November in Dresden, a movement of the Ruhr miners in January 1917. The balance of forces between capital and labour was little by little being overturned. Within the SPD, the social-patriotic leadership encountered more and more difficulties. Despite its collaboration with the police, which arrested and sent to the front any oppositional worker, and despite its ability to keep a majority in the votes within the party through manipulation, the leadership was unable to put down the growing resistance to its attitude. Bit by bit, the revolutionary minority began to gain influence within the party. From the autumn of 1916, more and more of the local sections (Orstvereine) refused to pay their dues to the leadership.
By unifying its forces, the opposition from this moment on tried to eliminate the central committee in order to take control of the party.
The SPD central committee could see clearly that the balance of forces was beginning to go against it. Following the meeting of a national conference of the opposition, on 7th January 1917, the central committee decided to expel the entire opposition. The split had come. An organisational break was inevitable. Internationalist activity, and the political life of the working class, could hence forth no longer develop within the SPD but only outside it. Following the expulsion of revolutionary minorities, all proletarian life in the SPD was extinguished. Work within the SPD was no longer possible: the revolutionaries had to organise outside[3] .
The opposition was henceforth confronted with a question: what sort of organisation? Suffice it to say here, that during this period of spring 1917 the different currents in the German Left went in different directions.
In a future article we will go, at greater depth, into an appreciation of the organisational work at that time.
At the same time, internationally, the pressure of the working class was going beyond a decisive threshold. In February (March by the Western calendar), the workers and soldiers in Russia once again, as they had done in 1905, created their workers’ and soldiers councils. The Tsar was overthrown. A revolutionary process began which was very soon to spread to neighbouring countries and throughout the world. The event gave birth to an immense hope in the workers’ ranks.
The struggle’s further development can only be understood in the light of the Russian Revolution. The fact that the working class had overthrown the ruling class in one country, that it had begun to shake the foundations of capitalism, acted as a beacon showing the direction to follow. And the working class throughout the world began to look in this direction.
The working class’s struggle in Russia met a powerful echo, and above all in Germany.
A wave of strikes broke out in the Ruhr between 16-22nd February 1917. Mass actions took place in many German towns. Not a week passed without some important act of resistance, demands for higher wages or better provisions. Disorders due to problems of food supply were reported in almost all the great cities. When a new reduction in food rations was announced in April, the workers’ anger overflowed. From 16th April, a great wave of mass strikes broke out in Berlin, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Hanover, Brunswick and Dresden. The army chiefs of staff, the main bourgeois politicians, and the leaders of the SPD and the unions all worked together to try to control the strike movement.
More than 300,000 workers in 30 factories were on strike. This was the second great mass strike after the struggles in July 1916 over Liebknecht’s arrest.
The working class in Germany thus followed closely in the steps of its class brothers in Russia, who were confronting capital in a gigantic revolutionary struggle.
They fought with exactly the methods described by Rosa Luxemburg in her pamphlet The Mass Strike, written after the struggles of 1905: mass meetings, demonstrations, discussions and common resolutions in the factories, factory assemblies, right up to the formation of workers’ councils.
Since the unions had been integrated into the state in 1914, they had served as a rampart against the reaction of the working class. They sabotaged the struggle by every means available. The proletariat had to act by itself, organise by itself and unify by itself. No organisation created in advance could spare it this task. And the workers in Germany, the most developed country of its time, showed that they could organise themselves. Contrary to all the speeches we hear today, the working class is perfectly capable of entering massively into struggle and of organising to do so. In this perspective, the struggle could no longer take place within the union and reformist framework, that is by industrial branch, separated from each other. The working class showed that henceforth, it is capable of uniting irrespective of trade or industry, and of entering into action for demands shared by all: bread and peace, and the liberation of its revolutionary militants. Everywhere the demand went up for Liebknecht’s liberation.
Struggles can no longer be carefully prepared in advance, as if by a general staff, as they were in the previous century. The task of the political organisation is not to organise the workers but to assume the role of political leadership.
During the 1917 strike wave in Germany, the workers confronted the unions directly for the first time. Although the latter had been created by the class itself during the previous century, from the outset of the war they had become the defenders of capital in the factories and henceforth formed an obstacle to proletarian struggle. The workers in Germany were the first to discover that they could only go forward by going against the unions
The beginning of the Russian Revolution had its first effects among the soldiers. The revolutionary events were discussed with immense enthusiasm; fraternisation between German and Russian troops was frequent on the Eastern front. In the summer of 1917, the first mutinies took place in the German fleet. Here too bloody repression could stifle the first flames but it could no longer put a halt to the revolutionary movement in the long term.
The partisans of Spartakus and the Bremen Linksradikalen had a strong influence among the sailors.
In the industrial towns, the working class counter-attack continued to develop from the Ruhr to central Germany, from Berlin to the Baltic, everywhere the working class confronted the bourgeoisie. On 16th April, the workers of Leipzig published a call to the workers of other towns to unite with them.
The Spartakists were to be found in the forefront of these movements. From the spring of 1917 they recognised the significance of the movement in Russia and extended a bridge in the direction of the Russian working class, putting forward the perspective of the international extension of the revolutionary struggles. In their pamphlets, in their leaflets, in their polemics towards the working class they intervened ceaselessly against the centrists who with their oscillation and hesitations avoided taking clear positions. They contributed to an understanding of the new situation, ceaselessly exposed the betrayal of the social-patriots and showed the working class how to rediscover the path onto its own class terrain.
In particular, the Spartakists constantly put forward the positions that:
At this level, the proletariat in Germany occupied a central and decisive position!
The radical left was aware of its responsibility and fully understood what was at stake if the revolution in Russia remained isolated: “…On the fate of the Russian revolution: it will attain its objective only if it is a prologue to the European revolution of the proletariat. If on the other hand the European, German workers go on behaving as if they were spectators at this fascinating drama, gawping at it, then the power of the Russian soviets awaits the same destiny as the Paris Commune (that is, bloody defeat)” (Spartakus, January 1918).
That is why it was necessary for the proletariat in Germany, which was in a key position to extend the revolution, to become conscious of its historic role. “The German proletariat is the most faithful, the surest ally of the Russian revolution and of the international proletarian revolution” (Lenin)
A look at the content of the Spartakists’ intervention shows us that it was clearly internationalist and that it gave a correct orientation to the workers’ struggles: the overthrow of the bourgeois government with the perspective of the international overthrow of capitalist society; the exposure of the sabotaging tactics of those forces that were in the service of the bourgeoisie.
Although the revolutionary movement that began in Russia in February 1917 was mainly directed against the war it did not have the strength of itself to end that war by itself. To do that it was absolutely vital that the working class in the large industrial bastions of capitalism enter onto the scene. And it was with a profound awareness of this necessity that when the soviets seized power in October 1917, the Russian proletariat launched an appeal to all the workers of the belligerent countries:
For its part the world bourgeoisie was aware of the danger to its domination posed by such a situation. That is why it was bound at that moment to do all in its power to stifle the flame that had been lit in Russia. That is why the German bourgeoisie, with the general blessing of all, continued its war offensive against Russia even after it had signed a peace agreement with the soviet government at Brest-Litovsk in January 1918. In their leaflet entitled “The moment of decision”, the Spartakists published a warning to the workers about this:
However another year was to pass before the working class in the industrial centres was sufficiently strong to push back the murderous arms of imperialism.
But from 1917 onwards the reverberations of the victorious revolution in Russia on the one hand and the imperialists’ intensification of the war on the other pushed the workers more and more to want to put an end to the war.
The revolutionary flame did in fact spread to other countries.
As the German offensive continued against the young workers’ revolutionary power in Russia, the anger within the workers’ ranks overflowed. On 28th January 400,000 workers, mainly in the armaments factories, went on strike in Berlin. On 29th January the number of strikers rose to as many as 500,000. The movement spread to other cities: in Munich a general assembly of strikers launched the following appeal: “The workers of Munich send their fraternal greetings to the Belgian, French, English, Italian, Russian and American workers. We feel at one with them in their determination to put an end to the world war … We want to impose world peace in solidarity … Proletarians of all countries, unite!” (Quoted by R Müller, p 148 [of his 3-volume history of the German Revolution]).
During the mass movement, the most important of the war, the proletarians formed a workers’ council in Berlin. A Spartakist leaflet addressed them thus:
Another Spartakist leaflet stresses: “We must speak Russian in response to the reaction.” They called for street demonstrations in solidarity.
Given that the struggle had involved a million workers the ruling class was to chose a tactic that it would subsequently employ again and again against the working class. It was the SPD that was the bourgeoisie’s spearhead in torpedoing the movement from within. By taking advantage of the still-significant influence that it enjoyed among the workers this treacherous party managed to send three of its own representatives into the action committee, into the leadership of the strike, who did all they could to break the movement. They acted as saboteurs from within. Ebert clearly recognises this: “I went into the leadership of the strike with the deliberate intention of rapidly finishing it and saving the country from any harm … It was the ultimate duty of the workers to support their brothers and fathers at the front and supply them with the best arms. The workers of France and England don’t miss an hour’s work that can help their brothers at the front. Obviously, all Germans wish for victory,” (Ebert, 30th January, 1918). The workers were to pay a very high price for their illusions in social democracy and its leaders.
In 1914 the SPD had mobilised the workers for war, now they did all in their power to block the strikes. This shows the clear-sightedness and survival instinct of the ruling class, its awareness of the danger that the working class represents to it. The Spartakists for their part denounced long and loud the deadly danger that social-democracy represented and warned the proletariat against it. To the perfidious methods of social-democracy the ruling class added direct and brutal interventions against the strikers with the help of the army. A dozen workers were cut down and several tens of thousands were forcibly enlisted… although the latter contributed to the destabilisation of the army by agitating within it in the following months.
The strikes were finally broken on 3rd February.
We can see that the working class in Germany used exactly the same means of struggle as it did in Russia: mass strikes, workers’ councils, elected and revocable delegates, massive street demonstrations … and these have subsequently constituted the “classic” weapons of the working class.
The Spartakists developed a correct orientation for the movement but did not yet have a decisive influence. “There were a number of our militants among the delegates but they were dispersed, had no plan of action and were lost among the masses,” (Barthel, p591)
This weakness on the part of the revolutionaries, together with social democracy’s work of sabotage, were the decisive factors that led to the impasse that the movement of the class experienced at that moment.
The movement in Germany came up against a much stronger enemy than in Russia. The capitalist class here had in fact already learnt its lesson in order to do all in its power against the working class. Already at this time the SPD proved its ability to set traps to break the movement by taking the lead in it. In later struggles this was to prove even more destructive.
The defeat in January 1918 gave the capitalist forces the possibility to continue their war for a few more months. During 1918 the army was to engage in other offensives. For Germany alone and in 1918 only, this cost 550,000 deaths and almost a million wounded.
The workers’ combativity had still not been broken after the events of January 1918, in spite of everything. Under the pressure of the worsening military situation, a growing number of solders deserted and the front began to disintegrate. From the summer onwards, not only did the willingness to struggle begin to develop again in the factories but the army chiefs were also forced to acknowledge that they were unable to keep the soldiers at the front. For the bourgeoisie, a cease-fire consequently became an urgent necessity.
The ruling class thus showed that it had drawn the lessons of what had happened in Russia.
Although in April 1917 the German bourgeoisie had let Lenin cross Germany in a sealed train in the hope that the action of the Russian revolutionaries would lead to a development of chaos in Russia and so facilitate the realisation of Germany’s imperialist aims (the German army did not foresee at the time that what would ensue was the proletarian revolution of 1917), now they had at all costs to avoid an identical revolutionary development as that in Russia.
So the SPD entered the newly-formed bourgeois government to act as a brake on the movement. “In the circumstances if we refuse to collaborate we must expect a very serious danger … that the movement will overreach us and a Bolshevik regime momentarily appears at home too” (G Noske, 23.09.18)
At the end of 1918 the factories were once more in ferment, strikes broke out constantly in different places. It was just a matter of time before the mass strike movement was spread over the whole country. The growing combativity supplied the soil to nourish the action of the soldiers. When the army ordered a new offensive of the fleet in October, mutinies broke out. The sailors at Kiel and other Baltic ports refused to go to sea. On 3rd November a wave of protests and strikes took place against the war. Workers and soldiers councils were created everywhere. In the space of a week the whole of Germany was “submerged” by a wave of workers’ and soldiers councils.
In the period after February 1917 in Russia it had been the continuation of the war by the Kerensky government that had given a decisive push to the struggle of the proletariat, to the point that the government was driven from power in October so that a definitive end could be made to the imperialist butchery. In Germany the ruling class was better armed than the Russian bourgeoisie and did all it could to maintain its power.
So on 11 November, just a week after the development of workers’ struggles and their lightening extension and after the appearance of workers’ councils, the German bourgeoisie signed the armistice. Drawing the lessons of the Russian experience they did not make the mistake of provoking a fatal radicalisation of the proletarian wave by continuing the war at all costs. By ending it they tried to cut the ground from beneath the feet of the movement and so block its extension. Moreover they introduced into the campaign their most important piece of artillery: the SPD with the unions at its side.
At the end of December Rosa Luxemburg stated: “In all previous revolutions the opponents confronted each other in an open way, class against class, sword against shield … In today’s revolution the troops that defend the old order are not drawn up under their own flag and in the uniform of the ruling class … but under the flag of the revolution. It is a socialist party that has become the most important instrument of the bourgeois counter-offensive”.
In a future article we will go into the counter-revolutionary role of the SPD when confronted with the further development of the struggles.
The working class in Germany would never have been able to develop its capacity to put a stop to the imperialist butchery without the constant participation and intervention of revolutionaries within its ranks. The transformation from the situation of nationalist intoxication in which the working class was steeped in 1914 to the uprising of November 1918 which put an end to the war was possible only by the virtue of the tireless activity of revolutionaries. It was not pacifism that made the end of the massacres possible but the revolutionary uprising of the proletariat.
If from the beginning the internationalists had not courageously exposed the betrayal of the social patriots, if they had not raised their voices loud and clear in the assemblies, factories, in the streets, if they had not determinedly unmasked the saboteurs of the class struggle, the working class response could not have developed and could still less have reached a climax.
By casting a clear glance at this period in the history of the workers’ movement and assessing it from the point of view of the work of revolutionaries we can draw out the crucial lessons for today.
The handful of revolutionaries who continued to defend internationalist principles in August 1914 did not allow themselves to be intimidated or demoralised by their reduced numbers and the enormity of the task they had to accomplish. They maintained their confidence in their class and continued to intervene resolutely, in spite of the immense difficulties, to try and reverse the balance of class forces which was particularly unfavourable. In the party’s sections the revolutionaries rallied their forces as rapidly as possible and never turned their back on their responsibilities.
By defending excellent political orientations before the workers on the basis of a correct analysis of imperialism and the balance of forces between classes they showed the real perspective with the greatest clarity and they served to orient their class politically.
Their defence of the political organisation of the proletariat was also consistent. They did so as much when the point was not to abandon the SPD in the hands of the traitors without a struggle as when it was necessary to build a new organisation. In the next issue we will go into the main elements of this combat.
From the beginning of the war the revolutionaries intervened to defend proletarian internationalism, the international unification of revolutionaries (Zimmerwald and Kienthal) as well as that of the working class as a whole.
Because they realised that the war could not be ended by pacifist means but only through class war, civil war, and that it was therefore necessary to overthrow capitalist domination to free the world from barbarism, they intervened concretely to go beyond capitalist society.
This political work could not have been possible without the theoretical and programmatic clarification carried out before the war. Their fight, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin, was in continuity with the positions of the Left within the Second International.
We can say that although the number of revolutionaries and their impact was small at the beginning of the war (Rosa Luxemburg’s apartment had room to hold the main militants of the left on 4th August 1914; all the delegates at Zimmerwald were able to get into three taxis), their work was to prove decisive. Even though at the beginning only small numbers of their press were circulated, the positions and orientations that they contained were crucial for the further development of the consciousness and the combat of the working class.
All this must serve as an example and open our eyes to the importance of the work of revolutionaries. In 1914 the class still needed four years to get over its defeat and present a massive opposition to the war. Today the workers of the industrial centres are not tearing each other to pieces in an imperialist butchery; they must defend themselves against more and more wretched living conditions that capitalism in crisis imposes upon them.
But in the same way as at the beginning of the century when they would never have been able to put an end to the war if the revolutionaries among them and not fought clearly and decisively, to carry out its struggle today and carry out its responsibilities as a revolutionary class, the working class urgently needs its political organisations and their intervention. We will concretise this point in future articles. DV
International Review 81, 2nd Quarter 1995
[1] “But no, it’s a lie! A falsification of those imperialist gentlemen! The real Vorwärts has very probably been sequestrated,” (Zinoviev writing about Lenin)
[2] Anton Pannekoek: Socialism and the great European war; Mehring: On the nature of the war; Lenin: The collapse of the IInd International, Socialism and the war, The tasks of revolutionary social-democracy in the European war; C. Zetkin and K Dunker: Theses on the war; R. Luxemburg: The crisis of social-democracy (also known as the “Junius Pamphlet”); K Liebnecht: The main enemy is at home.
[3] From 1914 to 1917 the membership of the SPD went from one million to about 200,000.
As this series has developed, we have shown how Marx’s revolutionary work went through different phases corresponding to the changing conditions of bourgeois society, and of the class struggle in particular. The last decade of his life, following the defeat of the Paris Commune and the dissolution of the First International, was therefore, as in the 1850s, primarily devoted to scientific research and theoretical reflection rather than open militant activity.
A considerable part of Marx’s energies during this period was directed towards his mammoth critique of bourgeois political economy, to the remaining volumes of Capital, which were never completed by him. Ill health certainly played a considerable part in this. But what has come to light in recent years is the extent to which Marx during this period was “distracted” by questions which, at first sight, might appear to represent a diversion from this key aspect of his life’s work: we refer to the anthropological and ethnological preoccupations stimulated by the appearance of Henry Morgan’s Ancient Society in 1877. The degree to which Marx was absorbed in these issues has been revealed by the publication in 1974 of his Ethnological Notebooks, which he had worked on in the period 1881-2, and which were the basis for Engels’ Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State. Engels wrote the latter as a “bequest” to Marx, in other words in recognition of the central importance that Marx accorded to the scientific study of earlier forms of human society, in particular those preceding the formation of classes and the state.
Closely related to these investigations was Marx’s growing interest in the Russian question, which had developed from the early seventies but was given considerable impetus by the publication of Morgan’s book. It is well known that Marx’s reflections on the problems posed to the nascent revolutionary movement in Russia prompted him to learn Russian and accumulate a huge library of books on Russia. He was even led to conceal from Engels - who had to nag Marx constantly to press on to the completion of Capital - the amount of time he was devoting to the Russian question.
These preoccupations of the “Late” Marx have given rise to conflicting interpretations and controversies which bear comparison to the arguments over the work of the “Young” Marx. There is for example the view of Ryzanov, who on behalf of the Moscow Marx-Engels Institute published Marx’s letter to Vera Zasulich and its preceding drafts in 1924, after they had been “buried” by elements in the Russian marxist movement (Zasulich, Axelrod, Plekhanov, etc). According to Ryzanov, Marx’s absorption in these matters, particularly the Russian question, was essentially the result of Marx’s declining intellectual powers. Others, in particular elements who have been on the “edge” of the proletarian political movement, such as Raya Dunayevskaya and Franklin Rosemont [1], have correctly argued against such ideas and have attempted to draw out the importance of the “Late” Marx’s concerns. But in doing so they have introduced a number of confusions that open the door wide to a bourgeois misuse of this phase of Marx’s work.
The article that follows is not at all an attempt to investigate the Ethnological Notebooks, Marx’s writings on Russia, or even Engels’ Origins of the Family in the depth that they require. The Notebooks in particular are almost unchartered territory and require a huge amount of exploration and “decoding’: they are very much in note form, a collection of marginal notes and extracts, and much of this written in a curious mixture of English and German. Furthermore, most of the “excavation” that has been done on them so far concerns the section dealing with Morgan’s book. This was certainly the most important section and served as the principal basis for The Origins of the Family. But the Notebooks also include Marx’s notes on JB Phear’s The Aryan Village (a study of communal social forms in India), HS Maine’s Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (which focuses on the vestiges of communal social formations in Ireland) and J Lubbock’s The Origins of Civilisation, which reveals Marx’s interest in the ideological creations of primitive societies, particularly the development of religion). There is a great deal that could be said about the latter in particular, but we have no intention of trying to go into these problems here. Our aim is the much more limited one of affirming the importance and relevance of Marx’s work on these areas, while at the same time criticising certain of the false interpretations that have been made of them.
This is not the first time in this series that Marx’s interest in the question of “primitive communism” has come up. We have shown, for example, in International Review no.75, that the Grundrisse and Capital already defend the notion that the first human societies were characterised by an absence of class exploitation and private property; that vestiges of these communal forms had persisted in all the pre-capitalist class systems; and that these vestiges, together with the half-distorted memories that lived on in popular consciousness, had frequently provided the basis for the revolts of exploited classes in these systems. Capitalism, by generalising commodity relations and the economic war of each against all, had effectively dissolved these communal remnants (at least in those countries where it had taken root); but in doing so had laid the material foundations for a higher form of communism. The recognition that the further back you traced the history of human society, the more you found it to be based on communal forms of property, was already a vital argument against the bourgeois notion that communism was somehow against the fundamentals of human nature.
The publication of Morgan’s study of American Indian society (in particular the Iroquois) was thus of considerable importance to Marx and Engels. Although Morgan was no revolutionary, his empirical studies provided a striking confirmation of the thesis of primitive communism, making it plain that institutions which, as foundation stones of the bourgeois order, were deemed to be eternal and immutable, had a history: they had not existed at all in remote epochs, had emerged only through a long and tortuous process, had altered in form as society had altered in form - and could thus be altered and indeed abolished in a different kind of society.
Morgan’s view of history was not altogether the same as that of Marx and Engels, but it was not incompatible with the materialist view. In fact it laid considerable stress on the central importance of the production of life’s necessities as a factor in the evolution of one social form into another, and attempted to systematise a series of stages in human history (“savagery”, “barbarism”, “civilisation”, and various sub-phases within these epochs) that Engels essentially took over in his Origins of the Family. This periodisation was extremely important for understanding the whole process of historical development and the origins of class society. Furthermore, in Marx’s previous works, the source material for studying primitive communism was mainly drawn from archaic, and extinct, European social forms (eg the Teutonic and the classical) or those communal vestiges which persisted in the Asiatic systems being wiped out by colonial development. Now Marx and Engels were able to broaden the scope by extending their study to peoples who were still in the “pre-civilised” stage, but whose institutions were advanced enough to make it possible to understand the mechanics of the transition from primitive or rather barbarian society to a society based on class divisions. In short, this was a living laboratory for the study of evolving social forms. Small wonder that Marx was so enthusiastic and strove to understand it in such depth. Pages and pages of his notes go into vast detail about the kinship patterns, customs and social organisation of the tribes that Morgan studied. It is as if Marx is seeking to get as clear as possible a picture of a social formation which provides empirical proof that communism is no idle dream, but a concrete possibility rooted in humanity’s material conditions.
“Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State”: Engels’ title reflects the main sub-divisions of Marx’s notes on Morgan, in which Marx seeks to establish how, on the one hand, these “sacred” pillars of bourgeois order had once not existed, and how, on the other, they had evolved from within the archaic communities.
Thus, Marx’s notes concentrate on the fact that in “savage” society (ie, hunter-gatherer societies), there is virtually no idea of property at all except for a few personal possessions. In more advanced (‘barbarian’) societies, particularly with the development of agriculture, property at first remains essentially collective, and there is still no class living off the labour of another. But the germs of differentiation can be discerned through the organisation of the “gens”, of clan systems within the tribe where property can be passed on through a more restricted group. “Inheritance: its first great rule came in with the institution of the gens, which distributed the effects of a deceased person among his gentiles”(The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, edited by Lawrence Krader, the Netherlands, 1974, p 128). The “worm in the bud” of private property is thus contained within the ancient communal system, which existed not because of humanity’s innate goodness but because the material conditions in which the first human communities evolved could permit of no other form; in changing material conditions connected to the development of the productive forces, communal ownership was eventually transformed into a barrier to this development and was superseded by forms more compatible with the accumulation of wealth. But the price paid for this development was the appearance of class divisions - the appropriation of social wealth by a privileged minority. And here again, it was through the transformation of the clan or gens into castes and then classes that this fateful development took place.
The appearance of classes also results in the appearance of the state. Marx’s recognition of a tendency inside the Iroquois “governing” institutions for there to be a separation between public fiction and real practise is developed by Engels into the thesis that the state “is by no means a power imposed on society from the outside” (Origins of the Family); that it was no plot imposed by a minority but emerged from the soil of society at a certain stage of its development (a thesis magnificently confirmed by the experience of the Russian revolution and the emergence of the transitional Soviet state out of the post-revolutionary situation). Like private property and classes, the state arises out of contradictions appearing in the original communal order. But at the same time, and no doubt with the experience of the Paris Commune still very fresh in his mind, Marx is clearly fascinated by the Iroquois “council” system, going into considerable detail about the structure of decision making and the customs and traditions that accompanied the tribal assemblies: “The Council - instrument of government und supreme authority uber gens, tribe confederacy ... simplest u lowest form of the Council - that of the Gens; a democratic assembly, wo every adult male u female member had a voice upon all questions brought before it; it elected and deposed its sachem u. chiefs .... It was the germ of the higher council of the tribe, and that still higher of the confederacy, each of which was composed exclusively of chiefs as representatives...” (ibid, p 150).
Thus, just as the notion that property was originally collective struck a blow against bourgeois notions of political economy, the “Robinsonades” which saw the urge towards private property as innate in human nature, Morgan’s work confirmed that human beings had not always needed an authority controlled by a specialised minority, a state power, to manage their social life. Like the Commune, the Iroquois councils were proof of humanity’s ability to govern itself.
The quotation above mentions the equality of men and women in the tribal democracy. Again, Marx notes that even here, the signs of a differentiation can be seen: “In this area as elsewhere Marx discerned germs of social stratification within the gentile organisation, again in terms of the separation of “public” and “private” spheres, which he saw in turn as the reflection of the gradual emergence of a propertied and privileged tribal caste. After copying Morgan’s observation that, in the Council of Chiefs, women were free to express their wishes and opinions “through an orator of their own choosing”, he added, with emphasis, that the “decision (was) made by the (all-male) Council’” (Rosemont, “Karl Marx and the Iroquois”, in Arsenal, Surrealist Subversion, no. 4, 1989). But as Rosemont goes on to say, “Marx was nonetheless unmistakably impressed by the fact that, among the Iroquois, women enjoyed a freedom and a degree of social involvement far beyond that of the women (or men!) of any civilised nation”. This understanding was part of the real breakthrough that Morgan’s researches enabled Marx and Engels to make on the question of the family.
As early as the Communist Manifesto, the tendency around Marx and Engels had denounced the hypocritical and oppressive nature of the bourgeois family and had openly advocated its abolition in a communist society. But now Morgan’s work enabled the marxists to demonstrate through historical example the fact that the patriarchal, monogamous family was not the irreplaceable moral foundation of any social order; in fact it was a rather late arrival in humanity’s history and, here again, the further back one looks, the more it becomes evident that marriage and child-rearing were originally communal functions, that a “communism in living” (Notebooks, p 115) prevailed among the tribal peoples. This isn’t the place to go into the very complicated details about the evolution of marriage institutions noted by Marx and summarised by Engels, or to assess Engels’ views in the light of more recent anthropological research. But even if some of their assumptions about the history of the family were mistaken, the essential point remains: the patriarchal family where the man considers the woman to be his private property is not “the way things have always been” but a product of a particular kind of society - a society founded upon private property (indeed, as Engels points out in Origins of the Family, the very term “family”, from the Latin “familias” is totally bound up with slavery, since it originally meant, in ancient Rome, the household of a slaveowner, those over whom he had the power of life and death - slaves and women included). In a society where neither classes or private property existed, women could not be seen as chattels or servants and indeed enjoyed a much higher status than in “civilised” societies; the oppression of women thus develops with the gradual emergence of class society, even if, as with private property and the state, its germs can already be seen in the old community.
This social and historical view of the oppression of women was a refutation of all the openly reactionary views which assume some inherent, biological basis for the “inferior” status of women. The key to women’s inferior status down the ages is not to be found in biology (even if biological differences have their input into the development of male dominance) but in history - in the evolution of particular social forms corresponding to the material development of the productive forces. But this analysis also goes against the feminist interpretation which (however much it might borrow from the marxist position) also inevitably tends to make the oppression of women something biologically inherent, though this time in the male rather than the female. In any case, both feminism and the out-and-out reactionary view lead to the same conclusion: that women’s oppression can never be abolished as long as society is made up of men and women (“radical separatism”, for all its absurdity, is really the most consistent form of feminism). For the communists, on the other hand, if the oppression of women had its beginnings in history, it can also have its end - in the communist revolution that will provide men and women with the material conditions to relate to each other, and to bring up children, free of the social and economic pressures that have hitherto forced them into their respective, restrictive roles. We will return to this point in a subsequent article.
Both Dunayevskaya and Rosemont have noted, in their comments on the Notebooks, that the “Late” Marx’s interest in primitive communism represented a return to some of the themes of his youth, in particular of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. The latter had represented a more “philosophical” anthropology; in the Notebooks Marx was moving towards a historical anthropology, but without renouncing the preoccupations of his earlier work. Likewise the theme of the man-woman relation had been posed, if somewhat abstractly, in 1844, and was now being dealt with “in the flesh’. These comments are accurate as long as one also bears in mind, as we showed in International Review 75, that the “themes of 1844” had continued to be a vital element in Marx’s thought in “mature” works like Capital and the Grundrisse, and didn’t suddenly revive in 1881. In any case, what does emerge from a reading of the Notebooks is Marx’s respect not only for the social organisation of the “savages” and “barbarians”, but also for their cultural achievements, their way of life, their “vitality”, which he saw as being “incomparably greater ... than the Semitic, Greek, Roman and a fortiori the modern capitalist societies” (‘Drafts of a reply” to Vera Zasulich, in Teodor Shanin, ed, Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the Peripheries of Capitalism, New York, 1983, p107n). This respect can be seen from his frequent defence of their intelligence against bourgeois (and racist) “blockheads” like Lubbock and Maine, of the imaginative qualities inherent in their myths and legends; it can be seen, above all, in his detailed depiction of their customs, feasts, festivals and dances, of a mode of living in which work and play, politics and celebration had not yet become totally separate categories. This is a concretisation of one of the central themes that emerge from the 1844 MS and the Grundrisse: that in the pre-capitalist societies, and especially in the pre-civilised ones, human life was in many respects less alienated than it has become under capitalism; that the people of primitive communism provide us with a glimpse of the all-round human being of tomorrow’s communism. Thus Marx in his reply to Vera Zasulich on the Russian commune (see below) was quite prepared to endorse the view that “the new system to which modern society is tending “will be a revival, in a superior form, of an archaic social type’” (ibid, p107. Marx here was probably quoting from memory the lines by Morgan with which Engels closes The Origins of the Family).
This concept of a “revival” on a higher level is integral to dialectical thinking but it is a real puzzle to the bourgeois outlook, which offers us a choice between a linear view of history and a naive idealisation of the past. When Marx was writing, the dominant trend in bourgeois thought was a simplistic evolutionism in which the past, above all the primitive past, was repudiated as a fog of darkness and childish superstition, the better to justify “present day civilisation” and its enslavement or extermination of the primitives who stood in its way. Today the bourgeoisie carries on exterminating what’s left of the primitives, but it no longer has the same unshakable faith in its civilising mission, and there is a strong counter-trend, especially among the petty bourgeoisie, towards “primitivism”, the hopeless desire to return to the primitive way of life, now imagined as a kind of lost paradise.
For both these outlooks, it is impossible to look at primitive society lucidly, recognising both its “grandeur”, as Engels put it, and its limitations: the lack of real individuality and freedom in a community dominated by scarcity; the restriction of the community to the tribe, and thus the essential fragmentation of the species in this epoch; the inability of mankind in these formations to see himself as an active, creative being, and thus his subordination to mythical projections and unchallengeable ancestral traditions. The dialectical view is summed up by Engels in The Origins of the Family: “The power of these primordial communities had to be broken, and it was broken” - thus permitting humankind to free itself from the limitations enumerated above. “But it was broken by influences which from the outset appear to us as a degradation, a fall from the simple moral grandeur of the ancient gentile society”. A fall that is also an advance; elsewhere in the same work Engels writes that “Monogamy was a great historical advance, but at the same time it inaugurated, along with slavery and private wealth, that epoch, lasting until today, in which every advance is likewise a relative regression, in which the well-being and development of one group are attained by the misery and repression of the other”. These are scandalous concepts to bourgeois common sense, but, just like the “revival on a higher level” which complements them, they make perfect sense from the dialectical point of view, which sees history moving forward through the clash of contradictions.
It is important to quote Engels in this regard because there are many who consider that he deviated from Marx’s view of history into a version of bourgeois evolutionism. This is a broader question which we will have to take up elsewhere; for the moment suffice it to say that a whole body of literature, embracing academic “marxism”, academic anti-marxism, and various strands of modernism and councilism, has emerged in recent years to try to prove the degree to which Engels was guilty of falling into economic determinism, mechanical materialism and even reformism, distorting Marx’s thinking on a whole number of vital questions. The argument is often closely linked to the idea of a total break in continuity between the First and Second Internationals, a concept dear to councilism. But particularly relevant here is the fact that Raya Dunayevskaya, echoed by Rosemont, has also accused Engels of failing to carry out Marx’s bequest when he transposed the Ethnological Notebooks into The Origins of the Family.
According to Dunayevskaya, Engels’ book is at fault for talking about a “world historic defeat of the female sex” as being coincident with the appearance of civilisation. For her this is a simplification of Marx’s thought; in the Notebooks, the latter finds that the seeds of the oppression of women are already developing along with the stratification of barbarian society, with the growing power of the chiefs and the resulting transformation of tribal councils into formal rather than real organs of decision. More generally, she sees Engels as losing sight of Marx’s dialectical view, reducing his complex, multilinear views of historical development to a unilinear vision of progress through rigidly defined stages.
It may be the case that Engels’ use of the phrase “world historical defeat of the female sex” (which he took from Bachofen rather than Marx) gives more the impression of a one-off, concrete historical event than of a very long process which already has its origins inside the primitive community, especially its later phases. But this does not prove that Engels’ basic approach deviates from Marx: both are aware that the contradictions which led to the appearance of the “family, private property and the state” arise from contradictions within the old gentile order. Indeed, in the case of the state, Engels made considerable advances on the theoretical level: the Notebooks themselves contain very little raw material for the important arguments about the emergence of the state contained in The Origins of the Family; and we have already shown how, in this matter, Engels was entirely in accord with Marx in seeing the state as a product of a long historical evolution within the old communities.
We have also shown that Engels was in accord with Marx in rebutting the linear bourgeois evolutionism which fails to understand the “price” mankind has paid for progress, and the possibility of reappropriating, on a higher level, what he has “lost’.
If anything, Dunayevskaya fails to make the most pertinent criticism of Engels’ presentation of the history of class society in his book: its complete failure to integrate the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, its picture of a straightforward and universal movement from primitive society to slavery, feudalism and capitalism. Even as a description of the origins of “western” civilisation this is simplistic, since the slave societies of antiquity were influenced at a number of levels by the Asiatic forms which pre-existed them and co-existed with them. Engels’ omission here not only blots out a vast chapter in the history of civilisations, but also gives the impression of a fixed, unilinear evolution valid for all parts of the globe, and in this respect adds some grist to the mill of bourgeois evolutionism. Most important of all, his error was exploited later on by the Stalinist bureaucrats who had a vested interest in obscuring the whole concept of Asiatic despotism, since it proved that class exploitation could exist without any discernible form of “individual” private property - and thus that the Stalinist system could itself be seen as a system of class exploitation. And of course, as bourgeois thinkers, the Stalinists felt much more at home with a linear view of progress advancing inexorably from slavery to feudalism and capitalism, and culminating in the supreme achievement of history: the “real socialism” of the USSR.
Despite this important mistake, the attempt to drive a wedge between Marx and Engels is fundamentally at odds with the long history of collaboration between the two. Indeed, when it comes to explaining the dialectical movement of history, and of nature itself, Engels has given us some of the best and clearest accounts in the whole of marxist literature. The historical and textual evidence gives little support to this “divorce” between Marx and Engels. Those who argue for it often pose as radical defenders of Marx and scourges of reformism. But they generally end up by destroying the essential continuity of the marxist movement.
The defence of the notion of primitive communism was a defence of the communist project in general. But this was not only the case at the most historical and global level. It also had a more concrete and immediate political relevance. Here it is necessary to recall the historical context in which Marx and Engels elaborated their works on the “ethnological” question. In the 1870s and 1880s, a new phase in the life of capital was opening up. The bourgeoisie had just vanquished the Paris Commune; and while this did not yet mean that the entire capitalist system had entered into its epoch of senility, it certainly brought to a definite end the period of national wars in the centers of capitalism, and, more generally, the period in which the bourgeoisie could play a revolutionary role on the stage of history. The capitalist system now entered into its last phase of expansion and world conquest, not through a struggle by rising bourgeois classes seeking to establish viable national states, but through the methods of imperialism, of colonial conquests. The last three decades of the 19th century thus saw virtually the entire globe being seized and divided up amongst the great imperialist powers.
And everywhere the most immediate victims of this conquest were the “colonial peoples” - mainly peasants still tied to old communal forms of production, and numerous tribal groupings. As Luxemburg explained in her book The Accumulation of Capital, “Capitalism needs non-capitalist social strata as a market for its surplus value, as a source of supply for its means of production and as a reservoir of labour power for its wage system. For all these purposes, forms of production based upon natural economy are of no use to capital” (chapter XXVII, p 368, London 1951). Hence the necessity for capital to sweep aside, by all the military and economic force at its disposal, those remnants of communistic production which it encountered everywhere in the newly-conquered territories. Of these victims of the imperialist juggernaut, the “savages”, those living in the most basic form of primitive communism, fared worst of all: as Luxemburg showed, while peasant communities could be destroyed by the “colonialism of the commodity”, by taxation and other economic pressures, the primitive hunters could only be exterminated or dragged into forced labour because not only did they range across wide territories coveted by capitalist agriculture, they produced no surplus capable of entering into the capitalist circulation process.
The “savages” did not simply lie down and surrender to this process. The year before Morgan published his study of the Iroquois, an Indian tribe from the eastern parts of the USA, the “western” tribes had defeated Custer at the Little Big Horn. But “Custer’s Last Stand” was in reality the last stand of the native Americans against the definitive destruction of their ancient way of life.
The question of understanding the nature of primitive society was thus of immediate political importance for communists in this period. First, because, just as Christianity had been the ideological excuse for colonial conquests in an earlier period of capitalism’s life, the 19th century ethnological theories of the bourgeoisie were often used as a “scientific” justification for imperialism. This was the period which saw the beginning of racist theories about the White Man’s Burden and the necessity to bring civilisation to the benighted savages. The bourgeoisie’s evolutionist ethnology, which posited a linear ascent from primitive to modern society, provided a more subtle justification for the same “civilising mission’. Furthermore, these notions were already beginning to seep into the workers’ movement, although they reached their apogee with the theory of “Socialist Colonialism” in the period of the Second International, with the “Jingo” socialism of figures like Hyndman in Britain. Indeed, the question of colonial policy was to be a clear line of demarcation between the right and the left fractions of social democracy, a test for internationalist credentials, as in the case of the Italian Socialist Party (see our pamphlet on the Italian communist left).
When Marx and Engels were writing on ethnological questions, these problems were only just beginning to emerge. But the contours of the future were already taking shape. Marx had already recognised that the Commune marked the end of the period of revolutionary national wars. He had seen the British conquest of India, French colonial policy in Algeria (where he went for a rest cure shortly before his death), the pillaging of China, the slaughter of the native Americans; all this indicates that his growing interest in the problem of the primitive community was not simply an “archaeological” one; nor was it restricted to the very real necessity to denounce the hypocrisy and cruelty of the bourgeoisie and its “civilisation’. In fact it was directly connected to the need to elaborate a communist perspective for the period then opening up. This was demonstrated above all by Marx’s attitude to the Russian question.
Marx’s interest in the Russian question went back to the beginning of the 1870s. But the most intriguing angle on the development of his thought on the question is provided by his reply to Vera Zasulich, then a member of that fraction of revolutionary populism which later, along with Plekhanov, Axelrod and others, went on to form the Emancipation of Labour group, the first clearly marxist current in Russia. Zasulich’s letter, dated 16 February 1881, asked Marx to clarify his views on the future of the rural commune, the obschina: was it to be dissolved by the advance of capitalism in Russia, or was it capable, “freed of exorbitant tax demands, payment to the nobility and arbitrary administration ... of developing in a socialist direction, that is, gradually organising its production and distribution on a collectivist basis”.
Marx’s previous writings had tended to see the Russian commune as a direct source of Russian “barbarism”; and in a reply to the Russian Jacobin Tkachev (1875), Engels had put the emphasis on the tendency towards the dissolution of the obschina.
Marx spent a number of weeks pondering his answer, which ran into four separate drafts, all of the rejected ones being much longer than the letter of reply he finally sent. These drafts are full of important reflections on the archaic commune and the development of capitalism, and explicitly show the degree to which his reading of Morgan had led him to rethink certain previously held assumptions. In the end, admitting that ill health was preventing him from completing a more elaborated response, he summed up his reflections firstly by rejecting the idea that his method of analysis led to the conclusion that every country or region was mechanically fated to go through the bourgeois phase of production; and secondly by concluding that “the special study I have made of it, including a search for original source-material, has convinced me that the commune is the fulcrum for social regeneration in Russia. But in order that it might function as such, the harmful influences assailing it on all sides must first be eliminated, and it must then be assured the normal conditions for spontaneous development” (8 March 1881).
The drafts of the reply were not discovered until 1911 and were not published until 1924; the letter itself was “buried” by the Russian marxists for decades. Ryzanov, who was responsible for publishing the drafts, tries to find psychological reasons for this “omission” but it appears that the “founders of Russian marxism” were not very happy with this letter from the “founder of marxism’. Such an interpretation is strengthened by the fact that Marx tended to support the terrorist wing of populism, the People’s Will, against what he referred to as the “boring doctrines” of Plekhanov and Zasulich’s Black Repartition group, even though, as we have seen, it was the latter that formed the basis of the Emancipation of Labour group on a marxist programme.
The leftist academics who specialise in studying the Late Marx have made much of this shift in Marx’s position in the final years of his life. Shanin, editor of Late Marx and the Russian Road, the main compilation of texts on this question, correctly sees the drafts and the final letter as a superb example of Marx’s scientific method, his refusal to impose rigid schemas on reality, his capacity to change his mind when previous theories did not fit the facts. But as with all forms of leftism, this basic truth is then distorted in the service of capitalist ends.
For Shanin, Marx’s questioning of the linear, evolutionist idea that Russia had to go through a phase of capitalist development before it could be integrated into socialism proves that Marx was a Maoist before Mao; that socialism could be the result of peasant revolutions in the peripheries. “While on the level of theory Marx was being “engelsised” and Engels, still further, “kautskised” and “plekhanovised” into an evolutionist mould, revolutions were spreading by the turn of the century through the backward/’developing” societies: Russia 1905 and 1917, Turkey 1906, Iran 1909, Mexico 1910, China 1910 and 1927. Peasant insurrection was central to most of them. None of them were “bourgeois revolutions” in the West European sense and some of them proved eventually socialist in leadership and results. In the political life of socialist movements of the twentieth century there was an urgent need to revise strategies or go under. Lenin, Mao and Ho chose the first. It meant speaking with “double-tongues” - one of strategy and tactics, the other of doctrine and conceptual substitutes, of which the “proletarian revolutions” in China or Vietnam, executed by peasants and “cadres”, with no industrial workers involved, are but particularly dramatic examples” (Late Marx and the Russian Road, p24-25).
All of Shanin’s sophisticated musings about the dialectic and the scientific method thus reveal their real purpose: to provide an apologia for the Stalinist counter-revolution in the peripheries of capital, and to trace Mao’s or Ho’s horrible distortions of marxism to none other than Marx himself.
Writers like Dunayevskaya and Rosemont consider that Stalinism is a form of state capitalism. But they are full of admiration for Shanin’s book (“a work of impeccable scholarship that is also a major contribution to the clarification of revolutionary perspective today” (Rosemont, “Karl Marx and the Iroquois’). And for good reason: these writers may not share Shanin’s admiration for the likes of Ho and Mao, but they too consider that the crux of Marx’s “Late” synthesis is the search for a revolutionary subject other than the working class. For Rosemont, Late Marx was “diving headlong into the study of (for him) new experiences of resistance and revolt against oppression - by North American Indians, Australian aborigines, Egyptians and Russian peasants”; and these interests “also look ahead to today’s most promising revolutionary movements in the Third world, and the Fourth, and our own” (ibid). The “Fourth world” is the world of the remaining tribal peoples; ergo, today’s primitive peoples, like those in Marx’s day, are part of a new revolutionary subject. Dunayevskaya’s writings are similarly full of a search for new revolutionary subjects, and they are generally made up of a hotch-potch of categories such as Women, Gays, Industrial Workers, Blacks and Third World “National Liberation” movements.
But all these readings of the Late Marx take his contributions out of their real historical context. The period in which Marx was wrestling with the problem of the archaic commune was, as we have seen, a “transitional” period in the sense that while it pointed to the future demise of bourgeois society (the Paris Commune being the harbinger of the future proletarian revolution), there was still a vast field for the expansion of capital into its peripheries. Marx’s recognition of the ambiguous nature of this period is summed up in a phrase from the “Second draft” of his reply to Zasulich: “...the capitalist system is past its prime in the West, approaching the time when it will be no more than a regressive social regime..” (Karl Marx and the Russian Road, p103).
In this situation, where symptoms of decay had already appeared in the centers of the system, but the system as a whole continued to expand at an extraordinary pace, communists were faced with a real dilemma. For, as we have already said, this expansion no longer took the form of bourgeois revolutions against feudal or other outmoded class societies, but of colonial conquests, the increasingly violent imperialist annexation of the remaining non-capitalist areas of the globe. There could be no question of the proletariat “supporting” colonialism as it had supported the bourgeoisie against feudalism; the concern in Marx’s inquiry into the Russian question was rather this: could humanity in these areas be spared being dragged through the inferno of capitalist development? Certainly, nothing in Marx’s analysis suggested that every single country had to pass mechanically through the phase of capitalist development before a world communist revolution was possible; he had in fact rejected the claim of one of his Russian critics, Mikhailovskii, that his theory was a “historico-philosophical theory of Universal Progress” (letter to the editor of Otechesvennye Zapiski, 1878) which insisted that the process whereby the peasants were expropriated and turned into proletarians must inevitably be the same in all countries. For Marx and Engels, the key was the proletarian revolution in Europe, as Engels had already argued in his reply to Tkachev, and as was made perfectly explicit in the introduction to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, published in 1882. If the revolution was successful in the industrialised centers of capital, then humanity could be spared a great deal of torment right across the globe, and the vestigial forms of communal property could be directly integrated into the world communist system: “if the Russian revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that the two can supplement each other, then present Russian communal land ownership can serve as a point of departure for a communist development”.
This was a perfectly reasonable hypothesis at the time. Indeed, it is evident today that if the proletarian revolutions of 1917-23 had been victorious - if the proletarian revolution in the West had come to the aid of the Russian revolution - the terrible ravages of capitalist “development” in the peripheries could have been avoided, remaining forms of communal property could have become part of a global communism, and we would not now be faced with the social, economic and ecological catastrophe that is most of the “third world’.
Furthermore, there is a great deal that is prophetic in Marx’s preoccupation with Russia. Ever since the Crimean War Marx and Engels had had the profound conviction that some kind of social upheaval in Russia was about to take place (which partially explains their support for the People’s Will, who were judged to be the most sincere and dynamic revolutionaries in the Russian movement); and that even if it did not assume a clearly proletarian character, it would indeed be the spark that lit the general revolutionary confrontation in Europe [2].
Marx was mistaken about the imminence of this upheaval. Capitalism did develop in Russia, even without the emergence of a strong and independent bourgeois class; it did largely, though not completely, dissolve the archaic peasant commune; and the main protagonist of the actual Russian revolution was indeed the industrial working class. Above all, the revolution in Russia did not dawn until capitalism as a whole had become a “regressive social regime”, ie had entered its phase of decadence, a reality demonstrated by the imperialist war of 1914-18.
Nevertheless, Marx’s rejection of the necessity for each country to go through mechanical stages, his reluctance to support the nascent forces of capitalism in Russia, his intuition that a social upheaval in Russia would be the opening shot of the international proletarian revolution - in all this he was brilliantly anticipating the critique of Menshevik gradualism and “stageism” initiated by Trotsky, continued by Bolshevism and practically vindicated by the October revolution. By the same token, it is no accident that the Russian marxists, who had been formally correct in seeing that capitalism would develop in Russia, should have “lost” Marx’s letter: the majority of them, after all, were the founding fathers of Menshevism...
But what for Marx was a series of profound anticipations made in a particularly complex period in the history of capitalism, becomes with today’s “interpreters” of the Late Marx an ahistorical apology for new “roads to revolution” and new “revolutionary subjects” at a time when capitalism has been in decay for eighty years. One of the clearest indicators of this decay has been precisely the manner in which capitalism in the peripheries has destroyed the old peasant economies, the vestiges of the ancient communal systems, without being able to integrate the resulting mass of landless peasants into productive labour. The misery, the slums, the famines and wars which ravage the “third world” today are a direct consequence of this barrier reached by capitalist “development’. Consequently, there can be no question today of using archaic communal vestiges as a stepping stone to communist production, because capitalism has effectively destroyed them without putting anything in their place. And there are no new revolutionary subjects waiting to be discovered among the peasants, the displaced sub-proletarians, or the tragic remnants of the primitive peoples. The remorseless “progress” of decadence this century has if anything made it clearer than ever not only that the working class is the only revolutionary subject, but that the working class of the most developed capitalist nations is the key to the entire world revolution.
The next article in this series will look more closely at the way that the founders of marxism treated the “woman” question.
CDW
[1] Raya Dunayevskaya (aka F Forest) was a leading figure in the Johnson-Forest tendency which broke from Trotskyism after the second world war on the question of state capitalism and the defence of the USSR. But it was a very partial break that led Dunayevskaya into the dead end of the “News and Letters” group which took Hegelianism, councilism, feminism and plain old leftism and mixed them into a strange cult of personality around Raya’s “philosophical” innovations. She writes about the Ethnological Notebooks in her book Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution, New Jersey, 1981), which seeks to recuperate both Luxemburg and the Ethnological Notebooks to the Idea of Women’s Liberation. Rosemont, whose article “Karl Marx and the Iroquois” contains a lot of interesting elements, is a leading figure in the American Surrealist Group, which has defended certain proletarian positions but which by its very nature has been unable to make a clear critique of leftism and still less of the petty bourgeois rebelliousness from which it emerged in the early 70s.
[2] According to another leftist academic in Shanin’s book, Haruki Wada, Marx and Engels even held out the prospect of some kind of “separate” socialist development in Russia, based on the peasant commune and more or less independent from the European workers’ revolution. He argues that the formulation in the Manifesto isn’t supported by the drafts to Zasulich, and that they corresponded more to Engels’ particular viewpoint than Marx’s. The paucity of Wada’s evidence for this is already exposed in another article in the book - “Late Marx, continuity, contradiction and learning”, by Derek Sayer and Philip Corrigan. In any case, as we have shown in our article in International Review 72 (‘Communism as a political programme’) - the idea of socialism in one country, even when based on a proletarian revolution, was entirely foreign to both Marx and Engels.
The thick tissue of lies which covers up the criminal acts of the main imperialisms of the planet in this war has been torn a little bit more, revealing the sordid interests which really motivate them.
For the workers, especially those in Europe, the disquiet caused by all this butchery should not be a reason for impotent lamentations but must feed the development of their consciousness about the responsibility of their own governments, about the hypocrisy of the sermons of the ruling class; but also about the fact that the working class of the main industrial powers is the only force capable of putting an end to this war and to all wars.
The women, children and old people who, in Sarajevo as in many other towns in ex-Yugoslavia, are forced to hide in cellars and basements, without water and electricity, to escape the shells and the snipers' bullets; the young people who in Bosnia as in Croatia or Serbia are being forcibly mobilized to risk their lives at the front - do any of these people have anything to hope for from the latest massive influx of "soldiers of peace"? The 2,000 American marines who have accompanied the aircraft carrier Roosevelt dispatched to the Adriatic in May, the 4,000 French and British troops who have already begun to arrive with tons of new weapons - have they come, as their governments claim, to lighten the sufferings of a population which has already seen 250,000 dead and three and a half million people "displaced" in this war?
The UN Blue Berets look like benefactors when they escort convoys of food to the besieged cities, when they interpose themselves between the belligerents. They look like victims when, as recently, they are taken hostage by the local armies. But behind this appearance is the reality of the cynical policies of the ruling classes of the great powers which command them, and for whom the population of ex-Yugoslavia is just cannon- fodder in a war in which they are fighting each other to win spheres of influence in this strategically vital part of Europe. The latest aggravation of the war is a striking confirmation of this. The Croatian army's offensive which began in May in western Slavonia, the Bosnian offensive launched at the same moment following the end of the "truce" signed last December, but also the masquerade of the UN hostage crisis, are not local incidents determined by the logic of merely local confrontations. They are actions prepared and carried out with the active participation, and even at the initiative, of the great imperialist powers.
As we have shown in all the articles we have written in this Review about the war over the past four years, the five powers who constitute the so-called "Contact Group" (the USA, Russia, France, Germany, Britain), an entity which is supposed to be looking for ways to end this conflict, have actively supported one or other of the local camps. And the present aggravation of the war cannot be understood outside this logic, outside the action of the gangsters at the head of these powers. It was Germany, by pushing Slovenia and Croatia to declare their independence from the old Yugoslavia, which brought about the break-up of the country and played a primordial role in the unleashing of the war in 1991. In response to this thrust by German imperialism. The other four powers supported and encouraged the counter-offensive of the Belgrade government. This was the first phase of the war, a particularly murderous one. It led to the point in 1992 when Croatia saw nearly a third of its territory under the control of Serb armies and militias. Under the cover of the UN, France and Britain then sent the biggest contingent of Blue Berets who, under the pretext of preventing further confrontations, systematically maintained the status quo in favor of the Serbian army. In 1992 the US government pronounced itself in favor of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and supported the Muslim sector of this province in a war against the Croatian army (still supported by Germany) and the Serbs (supported by Britain, France and Russia). In 1994, the Clinton administration managed to set up a confederation between Bosnia and Croatia, an agreement against Serbia; at the end of the year, under the guidance of ex-President Carter, the US obtained a truce between Bosnia and Serbia. At the beginning of 1995 the main fronts in Croatia and Bosnia thus seemed to be relatively quiet. And Washington did not hesitate to present this state of affairs as the triumph of the peacemaking efforts of the great powers, especially its own. In reality all this was a partial respite to allow the rearmament of Bosnia, essentially by the USA, in order to prepare a counter-offensive against the Serb armies. After four years of war, the latter, with the support of Britain, France and Russia, still controlled 70% of Bosnia's territory and over a quarter of Croatia's. The Belgrade government itself recognized that its camp, which includes the recently "reunified" "Serb republics" in Bosnia and Croatia (Krajina), had to give, ground. But, despite the negotiations in which all the differences between the big powers came out[1], no agreement was reached. What could not be obtained through negotiation could thus only be won through military force. So what we are seeing today is the logical, premeditated follow-up to a war in which the great powers have played the preponderant role, although in an underhand way.
Contrary to what is hypocritically claimed by the great powers' governments, who present their increased involvement in the conflict as being aimed at limiting the violence of the new confrontations, the latter are in fact a direct product of their war-mongering activity.
The invasion of part of western Slavonia by Croatia, at the beginning of May, as well as the renewed fighting at various points along the 1,200 kilometer front between the Zaghreb government and the Krajina Serbs; the unleashing, at the same moment, of the Bosnian army's offensive around the Bihac pocket, in the region of the Serb corridor of Breko, and also around Sarajevo, aimed at reducing the pressure of the Sarajevo siege - none of this took place separately from the will of the big powers, and still less against a unified wish for peace on the latters' part. It is clear that these actions were undertaken with the agreement and initiative of the American and German governments[2].
The reaction of the opposing camp was no less significant of the commitment of the other powers, Britain, France and Russia, to the Serbian side. But here things were less obvious. Of the powers allied to Serbia, only Russia openly admits its involvement. France and Britain, by contrast, have always claimed to be "neutral" in this conflict. On numerous occasions, their governments have even made loud declarations of hostility to the Serbs. This has never stopped them assisting their allies both on the military and the diplomatic terrain.
The facts are well known. Following the Croatian-Bosnian offensive, the Serb army replied by intensifying the bombardments in Bosnia, especially against Sarajevo. NATO, ie essentially the Clinton government, carried out two air raids in reprisal, against a munitions depot close to Pale, the Serb capital in Bosnia. The Pale government replied by taking as hostages 343 Blue Berets, the majority of them French and British.
Some were placed as "human shields", chained up close to military installations at risk of being bombed. Immediately a huge media operation got underway, complete with photos of the chained-up soldiers. The French and British governments denounced this "odious terrorist action" against the UN forces, and in the first place against the countries who were supplying the most number of soldiers to the Blue Berets: Britain and France. The Milosevic government in Belgrade declared that it was not in agreement with the action of the Bosnian Serbs, while at the same time denouncing the NATO air raids. But very quickly, what at the beginning might have looked like a weakening of the Franco-British alliance with Serbia, as a verification of the neutral, humanitarian, and not pro-Serb role of the UN forces, showed its real face: that of yet another masquerade serving both the Serb governments and their big power allies.
For the governments of these two powers, the "hostage crisis" had two major advantages for their action in this war. First, in an immediate way, it forced NATO, ie the USA, to stop any further air raids against their Serb allies. At the beginning of the crisis, the French government was forced to accept the first air raid, but it openly and vigorously criticized the second. The Serb government's use of the hostages as shields made it possible to solve this problem straight away. Secondly, and above all, the taking of hostages, presented as an "unbearable humiliation" served as an excellent pretext to justify the immediate dispatch by the two powers of thousands of new troops to ex-Yugoslavia. Britain alone announced that its forces would be trebled. The play-acting was done very well. On the one side, the British and French governments demanded to be able to send in new forces in order to "save the honor and dignity of our soldiers humiliated by the Bosnian Serbs"; on the other, Karadzic, the head of the Pale government, justified his attitude by the necessity to protect his troops against NATO bombings; in the middle of all this, Milosevic, head of the Belgrade government, played the part of "mediator". The result was spectacular. Whereas for weeks the British and French governments had been "threatening" to withdraw their troops from ex-Yugoslavia if the UN didn't grant them greater freedom of action (in particular, the possibility of regrouping in order to "defend themselves" more effectively), now they had decided to increase massively the number of their ground forces[3].
At the beginning of the masquerade, at the moment when the first hostages were taken, the press suggested that the hostages might be tortured. A few days later, when the first French hostages were freed, some of them gave their testimonies: "we did weight training and played table tennis (...) we visited the whole of Bosnia, went for walks (...) The Serbs did not see us as enemies" (Liberation, 7.6.95). Equally eloquent is the conciliatory attitude taken by the French commander of the French UN forces on the ground, a few days after the French government had shouted from the rooftops about how firm it was being with the Serbs: "We will strictly apply the principles of peacekeeping until we get any new orders (...) We can try to establish contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, we can try to take food through and to supply our troops" (Le Monde, 14.6.95). The French paper Le Monde was openly shocked: "Calmly, while 144 UN soldiers were still hostages to the Serbs, UNPROFOR solemnly claimed to be paralyzed". And it cited an UNPROFOR officer: "For several days we have had the feeling that things are easing up. The emotion provoked by the images of the human shields is settling down, and we are afraid that our governments are going to say no more about it, in order to avoid a confrontation". If the Bosnian Serbs didn't consider the French "hostages" to be their enemies, if this UNPROFOR officer had the impression that the French and British governments wanted to avoid a confrontation, it is simply because, whatever problems may blow up between Serb troops and UN troops on the ground, their governments are allies in this war and the "hostage crisis" was just one more chapter in the book of lies and manipulations written by the ruling class to hide its murderous and barbaric work.
The main result of this farce was the formation of the Rapid Reaction Force. The definition of the function of this new Franco-British military corps, supposedly formed to assist the UN forces in ex-Yugoslavia, has varied during the weeks in which the two governments have tried, not without difficulty, to get their "partners" on the UN Security Council to accept its existence and to finance it[4]. But whatever the diplomatic formulations used in this debate between hypocrites, what is important is the profound significance of this initiative. This must be understood on two levels: on the one hand, the will of the great powers to reinforce their military involvement in this conflict; on the other hand, the necessity for these powers to disengage themselves, or at least to take their distance, from the framework of the "humanitarian" "UN" masquerade, which puts such limitations on their capacity for action.
The French and British bourgeoisies know that their pretension to continue playing a role as world powers depends, to a large extent, on their capacity to affirm their presence in this strategically crucial zone. The Balkans, like the Middle East, is a major stake in the planet-wide contest between the great powers. Being absent from this region means giving up any great power status. The reaction of the German government to the formation of the RRF is particularly significant of this concern, common to all the European powers: "Germany could not ask its French and British allies to do the dirty work for very long, while it remains a spectator in the Adriatic and at the same time lays claim to a global political role. It must also take some of the risks itself" (Liberation, 12.6.95). This declaration from Bonn government circles is particularly hypocritical: as we have seen, since the beginning of the war in ex-Yugoslavia, German capital has played a big part in the "dirty work" of the great powers. But it also shows up what really motivates the so-called "humanitarian peacemakers" when they set up a RRF to "come to the aid" of the civil population in the Balkans.
The other important aspect of the RRF's formation is the great powers' concern to give themselves the means to ensure the defense of their specific imperialist interests. Thus, at the end of May, a spokesman of the British Ministry of Defense, interviewed about whether the RRF would be under the control of the UN, replied that "the special reinforcements will be under UN command", but he added that "they will also have their own commanders" (Liberation, 31.5.95). At the same moment, French officers were saying that these forces would have "their own colors and battle insignia", that they would no longer be wearing blue berets and that their vehicles would not necessarily be painted white. At the time of writing, the question of the colors to be worn by the soldiers of the RRF remains in the air. But the significance of the constitution of this new military force is perfectly clear: the imperialist powers are affirming more clearly than before the autonomy of their imperialist acts.
No, the population of ex-Yugoslavia, which for four years has been subjected to the horrors of war, has nothing positive to expect from the arrival of these new "peacekeeping forces". The latter have come only to continue and intensify the bloody and barbaric work that the great powers have been carrying out since the conflict began.
All the governments in ex -Yugoslavia are now engaged in escalating the war. Izetbegovic, the head of the Bosnian government, has clearly announced the breadth of the offensive that his army has launched: Sarajevo must not go through another winter besieged by the Serb armies. UN experts have estimated that an attempt to break this siege would cost the Bosnian forces 15,000 men. Equally clearly, the Croatian government has stressed that the offensive in western Slavonia is only the beginning of an operation which will be extended throughout the front with the Krajina Serbs, especially on the Dalmatian coast. As for the government of the Bosnian Serbs, it has declared a state of war in the zone around Sarajevo and has mobilized the whole population. In mid-June, while the American diplomats were negotiating with the Serb governments to try to get them to recognize Bosnia, Slavisa Rakovic, one of the advisers to the Pale government coldly asserted that he was "pessimistic in the short term" and that he believed" there is more chance of the war flaring up than the negotiations succeeding, because summer is ideal for fighting" (Le Monde, 14.5.95).
The Bosnian Serbs are obviously not fighting alone. The "Serb Republics" of Bosnia and Krajina have just proclaimed their unification. As for the Belgrade government, which is supposed to be applying an arms embargo ion the Bosnian Serbs, it is well known that it has never done so and that whatever the more or less real divergences that may exist between the different Serb parties in power, their military cooperation against the Bosnian and Croatian armies is unquestioned[5].
But the antagonisms between the different nationalisms in ex-Yugoslavia would not be enough to fuel and intensify the war if the great imperialist powers were not fuelling and intensifying it, if their "pacifist" speeches were not just an ideological cover for their own imperialist policies. The worst enemy of peace in ex-Yugoslavia is none other than the pitiless war between the great powers. All of them, to different degrees, have an interest in maintaining the war in the Balkans. Apart from the geo-strategic positions which each one defends or is trying to conquer, they are there above all to prevent or destroy alliances between other rival powers: "In such a situation of instability, it is easier for each power to make trouble for its adversaries, to sabotage alliances that it objects to, than to develop solid alliances and ensure stability in its own spheres" (Resolution on the international situation, XIth Congress of the ICC).
For German and French capital, this war has been a powerful tool for breaking the alliance between the USA and Britain, and for sabotaging the structures of NATO, American capital's weapon of domination over the former members of the western bloc. A high official of the American State Department recognized this explicitly recently: "The war in Bosnia has caused the gravest strains in NATO since Suez" (International Herald Tribune, 13.6.95). Parallel to this, for Washington, the war is a means to prevent the consolidation of the European Union around Germany. Santer, the new president of the Commission of the European Union complained bitterly about this, at the beginning of June, when commenting on the evolution of the situation in the Balkans.
The present aggravation of military barbarism in ex-Yugoslavia is thus the concretization of the advance of capitalist decomposition, which exacerbates all the antagonisms between fractions of capital, imposing the reign of "every man for himself' and "each against all".
The war in ex-Yugoslavia is the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. For half a century Europe was spared the numerous wars between the imperialist powers, all the "national liberation struggles" which ravaged the countries of the ‘Third World'. Europe was a "haven of peace" during this period. The war in ex-Yugoslavia, by bringing this period to an end, thus has a major historic significance. For the European proletariat, war is less and less an exotic reality which happens thousands of miles away, where you follow the developments on TV at dinner time.
Up till now this war has only been a minor preoccupation for the workers of the industrialized countries of Western Europe. The European bourgeoisies have been able to present this conflict as another "far off" war, where the "democratic" powers are undertaking a "humanitarian", "civilizing" mission, trying to bring peace to "ethnic" groups who are slaughtering each other for no reason. Even if four years of manipulated media images have not hidden the savage and sordid reality of this war, even if in the workers' minds this war is one of the horrors now emerging all over the planet, the predominant sentiment among the exploited has been a relatively resigned indifference. Without any great enthusiasm, they have accepted more or less the official speeches about the "humanitarian missions" of the UN and NATO soldiers.
The present evolution of the conflict, the new attitude that the main powers involved in it have had to adopt, are about to change this state of affairs. The fact that the French and British governments have decided to send in thousands of new troops; the fact that the latter are being sent not only as representatives of an international organization like NATO, but as soldiers bearing the uniform and the flag of their country, all this is giving a new dimension to the way this war is being perceived. The great powers' active participation in the conflict is being exposed to the light of day. The "humanitarian" cover used by the great powers is being ripped apart, revealing the sordid imperialist motives underneath.
The current aggravation of the war in ex-Yugoslavia is taking place at a time when the perspectives for the world economic situation are getting worse and worse, heralding new attacks on working class living conditions, especially in the most industrialized countries. War and economic crisis, barbarism and poverty, chaos and pauperization - more than ever, the bankruptcy of capitalism, the disaster that this decomposing system has become, will place the world proletariat in front of its historic responsibilities. The qualitative aggravation of the war in ex-Yugoslavia will in this context become a supplementary factor in the development of the proletariat's awareness of this responsibility. And it is up to revolutionaries to contribute to this process with all their might, because they are an indispensable part of it.
In particular, they must show that understanding the real role played by the big powers in this war makes it possible to fight against the feeling of impotence about the conflict that the ruling class has from the beginning tried to instill in the workers. The governments of the great industrial and military powers can only make war because the working class of these countries allows them to so, because they have not managed to unify consciously against capital. The proletariat of these countries, because of its historical experience, because the bourgeoisie has not succeeded in mobilizing it ideologically to the point where it could send it off to another world war, is the only force that can put an end to all this military barbarity, to capitalist barbarity in general. This is the message that the aggravation of the war in ex-Yugoslavia must bring home to the workers.
19.6.95
[1] It is particularly significant that the negotiations with the different Serb governments over the recognition of Bosnia have been carried out not through Bosnian representatives, but through diplomats from Washington, Equally telling about the involvement of the big powers in this war alongside this or that belligerent are the positions defended by each one of the former with regard to these negotiations, One of the deals proposed to the Milosevic government is that he should recognize Bosnia in exchange for a lifting of the international economic sanctions which are still in force against Serbia, But when it comes to defining how the sanctions will be lifted, there are big differences between the powers: the USA wants it to be entirely conditional, so that it can be suspended at any moment depending on the actions taken by the Serb government; France and Britain want it to be guaranteed for a period of at least six months; Russia wants it to be unconditional and without any time limit.
[2] On 6th March this year, a military agreement was signed between the Croatian and Bosnian governments to "defend themselves against a common aggressor". However, this accord between Croatia and Bosnia, and parallel to that between the USA and Germany, to wage a counter-offensive against the Serb armies, can only be temporary and provisional. In the part of Bosnia controlled by Croatia, the two armies are face to face and conflict could resume at any moment, as during the first years of the war. The situation in the town of Mostar, the most important of the region, and the object of particularly bloody clashes between Croats and Muslims, is highly eloquent in this respect. Although it is supposed to be run by a joint Croatian-Bosnian government, with the active presence of members of the European Union, the town remains divided into two distinct parts and Muslim men of fighting age are strictly forbidden from entering the Croatian sector. But above all, the antagonism between American and German capital, in ex-Yugoslavia as in the rest of the world, is the main line of fissure in inter-imperialist tensions since the collapse of the eastern bloc (see "Each against all", International Review no 80)
[3] The demand by France and Britain that UN forces on the ground should regroup in order to "defend themselves better against the Serbs" is also a hypocritical maneuver. Far from expressing any action against the Serbs, such a measure would mean the Blue Berets abandoning practically all the enclaves encircled by the Serbs in Bosnia (with the exception of the three main ones). This would give them every chance of taking them over once and for all, while making it possible to concentrate the Blue Berets' "aid" in the most important zones.
[4] The discussion on this point between the French president Chirac, when he went to the G7 summit in June, and the speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, was described as "direct" and "vigorous". The Russian government only accepted the principle after openly expressing its opposition and distrust.
[5] The Belgrade government had obtained an easing of the international economic embargo against Serbia in exchange for a commitment not to go on supplying arms to the Pale government. But the salaries of Serb officers in Bosnia are still being paid by Belgrade. The latter has not stopped secretly supplying arms to its "brothers" in Bosnia, while the anti-aircraft radar system of the two "republics" is still connected up.
IR82, 3rd Quarter
1995
The IBRP has responded, in the International Communist Review no 13, to our polemical article “The IBRP’s Conception of Decadent Capitalism” which appeared in no. 79 of our International Review.
The IBRP clearly expound their positions. Thus the article is a contribution to the necessary debate that must exist between the organisations of the Communist Left, which have a decisive responsibility in the struggle for the formation of the proletariat’s communist party.
The debate between the IBRP and the ICC is situated inside the framework of the Communist Left:
- it is not an academic or abstract debate, but constitutes a militant polemic in order to develop clear positions, free from any ambiguity or concession to bourgeois ideology, especially on the questions of the nature of imperialist wars and the fundamental conditions necessary for the communist revolution.
- it is a debate between supporters of the analysis of the decadence of capitalism: since the beginning of the century the system has entered into a permanent crisis which contains a growing threat of the annihilation of humanity and the planet.
Within this framework, the IBRP’s article of response insists on its vision of imperialist war as a means of the devaluation of capital and the renewal of the cycle of accumulation and explains this position by an explanation of the historic crisis of capitalism based on the tendency of falling rate of profit.
These two questions are the object of our response [1] [435].
In a polemic between revolutionaries and precisely because of its militant character we begin from what unites us in order to approach what separates us within a global framework. This is the method that the ICC has always applied, following Marx, Lenin, Bilan etc, and which we used to polemicise with PCI (Programma) [2] [436] about the same question that we are now taking up with the IBRP. For us it is very important to underline this, because in the first place, polemics between revolutionaries always have as their guiding thread the struggle for clarification and regroupment within the perspective of the constitution of the world party of the proletariat. In the second place, because between the IBRP and the ICC, without denying or relativising the implications of the our disagreements about the understanding of the nature of imperialist war, what we share is much more important:
1. For the IBRP imperialist wars do not have objective limits but are total wars whose consequences far surpass anything that could have arisen in those of the ascendant period.
2. Imperialist wars unite the economic and political factors in an inseparable knot.
3. The IBRP rejects militarism and arms production as a means of the “accumulation of capital” [3] [437].
4. As the expression of the decadence of capitalism, imperialist wars contain the growing threat of the destruction of humanity.
5. There now exist in capitalism important tendencies to chaos and decomposition (although as we will see the IBRP does not give them the same importance that we do).
These elements of convergence express the common capacity that we have for denouncing and combatting imperialist wars as the supreme moments of the historic crisis of capitalism, calling on the proletariat not to choose between the different imperialist wolves, and calling for the world proletarian revolution as the only solution to the bloody impasse that capitalism has led humanity into, combating to the end the pacifist opium and denouncing the capitalist lies about how “we are moving out of the crisis”.
These elements, expressions of the common tradition of the Communist Left, make it necessary and possible that when confronted with events of the magnitude of the Gulf War or Yugoslavia, the groups of the Communist Left produce joint manifestoes which express the united voice of revolutionaries in front of the class. Therefore we proposed in the framework of the International Conferences of 1977-80 to make a joint declaration faced with the Afghan war and we regret that neither Battaglia Comunista nor the Communist Workers’ Organisation (who since have formed the present IBRP) did not accept this initiative. Far from this being a proposal for “circumstantial and opportunist union” such initiatives are tools in the struggle for clarification and delimitation of positions within the Communist Left because they establish a concrete and militant framework (an obligation to the working class confronted with important situations of historical evolution) within which seriously to debate divergences. This was the method of Marx or Lenin: at Zimmerwald despite the existence of divergences of greater importance than could exist today between the ICC and the IBRP, Lenin agreed to sign the Zimmerwald Manifesto. Likewise, when the 3rd International was constituted there were important disagreements between the founders not only on the analyses of imperialist war but on questions such as the utilisation of parliament or the unions; nevertheless this did not stop them uniting in order to struggle for the unfolding world revolution. This common struggle was not the framework for silencing divergences but, on the contrary, the militant platform within which they could be seriously confronted and not in an academic way nor according to sectarian impulses.
The divergences between the IBRP and the ICC are not about the general causes of imperialist war. Adhering to the common tradition of the Communist Left we both see imperialist war as the expression of the historic crisis of capitalism. However the divergence arises when it comes to seeing the role of war within the progress of decadent capitalism. The IBRP thinks that imperialist war fulfils an economic function: allowing the massive devaluation of capital and, as a consequence, opening the possibility of capitalism embarking on a new cycle of accumulation.
This appreciation appears to be logically consistent: have there not been generalised crises before a war, as for example that of 1929? When there is a crisis of overproduction of men and goods is imperialist war not a “solution” because of the large-scale destruction of workers, machines and buildings? Isn’t there reconstruction after the war, and with this the overcoming of the crisis? However, this vision, apparently so simple and coherent, is extremely superficial. It takes - as we will see - a part of the problem (the fact that decadent capitalism goes through an infernal cycle of crisis-war-reconstruction-new crisis...) however, it does not pose the root of the problem: on the one hand, war is much more than a simple means of re-establishing the cycle of capitalist accumulation and, on the other hand, this cycle is profoundly degenerated and corrupted and is far from beginning the classical cycle of the ascendant period.
This superficial vision of imperialist war has important militant consequences that the IBRP is not capable of grasping. In fact, if war permits the re-establishing of the mechanism of capitalist accumulation, this amounts to saying that capitalism will always be able to get out of the crises through the painful and brutal mechanism of war. This is basically the vision that the bourgeoisie poses to us: war is a terrible thing that no government wants, but it is the inevitable means that will permit a new era of peace and prosperity.
The IBRP denounces such lies but does not comprehend that this denunciation is undermined by its theory of war as “the means of devaluation of capital”. In order to understand the dangerous consequences that its position has it should examine this declaration of the IBRP of the PCI (Programma): “The origin of the crisis lies in the impossibility of continuing accumulation, an impossibility which manifests itself when the growth of the mass of production can no longer compensate for the fall in the rate of profit. The mass of surplus labour is no longer sufficient to ensure a profit on the capital advanced, to reproduce the condition for a return on the investment. By destroying constant capital (dead labour) on a grand scale, war then plays a fundamental economic role (our emphasis): to the dreadful destruction of the productive apparatus, it permits a gigantic expansion of production later on to replace what has been destroyed, and thus a parallel expansion of profit, of the total surplus value, i.e. the surplus labour which is the source of capital. The conditions for the revival of the accumulation process have been re-established. The economic cycle picks up again... The world capitalist system enters into the war aged, but there receives a bath of blood which gives it a new lease of life and it comes out with the vitality of a robust new-born child” (Programma Comunista No 90 page 24, quoted in our polemic in International Review No 77 page 20).
To say that capitalism gains “a new lease of life” each time it emerges from a World War has clear revisionist consequences: World War could not make the Proletarian Revolution the order of the day but the reconstitution of capitalism which has returned to its beginnings. This uproots the IIIrd International’s analysis, which clearly says “A new epoch is born. The epoch of the disintegration of capitalism, of its internal collapse. The epoch of the communist revolution of the proletariat”. Purely and simply, it means a break with a fundamental position of marxism: capitalism is not an eternal system but a mode of production whose historic limits impose on it an epoch of decadence in which the communist revolution is the order of the day
In International Review no’s 77/78 we quote and criticise this declaration in our polemic dealing with the PCI’s (Programma) concept of war and decadence. This is ignored by the IBRP who in their reply appear to defend the PCI (Programma) when they affirm that: “Their (the ICC’s) debate with the Bordigists centres on the latter’s apparent view that there is a mechanical causal relation between war and the cycle of accumulation. We say “apparent” because typically the ICC doesn’t actually quote anything to show that the Bordigists view history so schematically. We are even less inclined to accept the assertions about Programme Communiste when we see the way they interpret our views” (Their reply “The Material Basis of Imperialist War” International Communist Review No.13).
The quotation that we have given in International Review no 77 speaks for itself, and reveals that there is a little more than “schematism” to the PCI’s position: if the IBRP avoids the issue by whining about our “misinterpretations”, it is because although they do not dare repeat the PCI’s aberrations, their own ambiguities lead them in the same direction: “We say that the economic function (emphasis in the original) of world war (i.e. its consequences for capitalism) is to devalue capital as the necessary prelude to a possible new cycle of accumulation” (International Communist Review No.13).
This view of the “economic function of imperialist war” comes from Bukharin. He puts it forward in a book he wrote in 1915 (Imperialism and the World Economy) which constitutes a contribution on such questions as state capitalism and national liberation, nonetheless slips into an important error, seeing imperialist war as an instrument of capitalist development: “Thus if war cannot halt the general development of world capital, if, on the contrary, it expresses the greatest expansion of the centralisation process... War in many aspects recalls to mind industrial crises, differing from the latter only by a greater intensity of social convulsions and devastations” (page 148, English edition).
Imperialist war is not a means to “devalue capital” but an expression of the historic process of destruction and sterilisation of the means of production and life, that globally characterises decadent capitalism.
The destruction and sterilisation of capital is not the same as the devaluation of capital The ascendant period of capitalism entailed periodic crises that led to the periodic devaluation of capital: “Simultaneously with the fall in the rate of profit, the mass of capital grows, and this is associated with a devaluation of existing capital, which puts a stop to this fall and gives an accelerating impulse to the accumulation of capital value... The periodic devaluation of the existing capital, which is a means, immanent to the capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall in the profit rate and the accelerating the accumulation of capital value by the formation of new capital, disturbs the given conditions in which the circulation and reproduction process of capital takes places, and is therefore accompanied by sudden stoppages in the production process” (Capital Vol 3, part 3, chapter XV, part 2).
Capitalism, due to its nature, since its origins, as much in the ascendant period as in decadence, has constantly fallen into overproduction and, in this context, these periodic bleedings of capital were necessary in order to restart its normal movement of production and circulation of commodities with more force. In the ascendant period, each stage of devaluation of capital led to the expansion of the capitalist relations of production on a larger scale. And this was possible because capitalism encountered new pre-capitalist territories that could be integrated into its sphere submitting them to its wage and trade relations. For this reason: “The crises of the 19th century which Marx described were still crisis of growth, crises from which capitalism came out strengthened... After each crisis, there were still new outlets to be conquered by the capitalist countries” (“Theories of Crisis, from Marx to the Communist International”. International Review No 22, page 14).
In the decadent period these crises of the devaluation of capital continue and have become more or less chronic (see our polemical article with the IBRP in International Review no 79, the section “The nature of “cycles of accumulation” in capitalist decadence”). However, this inherent and consubstantial feature of capitalism, superimposes itself on another characteristic of its decadent epoch, which is the fruit of the extreme aggravation of the contradictions carried within this epoch: the tendency to the destruction and sterilisation of capital.
This tendency arises from the situation of historical blockage that determines the decadent epoch of capitalism: “What is imperialist world war?. It is the struggle by violent means, that the different capitalist groups are obliged to unleash, not in order to conquer new markets and sources of raw materials, but in order to divide up the already existing ones, a division from which some gain at the expense of others. The unfolding war has its roots, in the general and permanent economic crisis that has broken out, indicating that the capitalist regime has reached the end of its developmental possibilities” (“The Renegade Vercesi”. May 1944 in the International Bulletin of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left No 5). In the same sense, “Decadent capitalism is the phase in which production can continue only as a condition (underlined in the original) for products and means of production to take a material form that does not bring about the development and expansion of production but its restriction and destruction” (Idem)
In decadence, the nature of capitalism has not changed at all. It continues to be a system of exploitation, it is still affected (to a much greater degree) by the tendency to the depreciation of capital (a tendency that has become permanent). However, the essence of decadence is the historical blockage of the system which has given birth to a powerful tendency towards self-destruction and chaos: “In the absence of a revolutionary class presenting the historic possibility of generating and presiding over the establishment of an economic system corresponding to historical necessity, society and its civilisation is driven into an impasse, where collapse and internal disintegration, are inevitable. Marx gave as an example the similar historic impasse of the Roman and Greek civilisations of antiquity. Engels applied this thesis to bourgeois society, coming to the conclusion that the absence, or the incapacity of the proletariat to solve, through overcoming it, the antithetical contradictions that arise in capitalist society, can have no other result than a return to barbarity” (Idem)
The IBRP ridicules our insistence on this feature of decadent capitalism: “For the ICC everything is just “chaos” and “decomposition” and we need not trouble ourselves too much with a detailed analysis of anything. This is the crux of their position” (their reply, page 30). We will return to this question, but we want to make clear that this accusation of ‘simplism’ which in their opinion represents a negation of Marxism as a method of analysing reality, should also be directed at the 1st Congress of the Communist International, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg.
The aim of this article is not to deal with the limitations of the CI’s positions [4] [438] but to support its clear points. Examining the founding documents of the Communist International we can see in them clear indications of a rejection of the idea of war as a “solution” to the capitalist crisis and the vision that capitalism would return to “normal” functioning in line with the cycles of accumulation of its ascendant period.
“Thus its “peace policy” conclusively reveals the essence of Entente imperialism, and of imperialism in general, to the international proletariat. It also shows that the imperialist governments are unable to conclude a just and stable peace and that finance capital is not capable of restoring the ruined economy. The continued rule of finance capital will lead either to the complete destruction of civilised society or to an unprecedented increase in the level of exploitation, and enslavement, to political reaction and a policy of armament, and eventually to new destructive wars” (“The International Situation and the Policy of the Entente” in Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International, page 58).
The CI made it clear that capital could not re-establish the ruined economy, that is to say, it could not re-establish, after the war, a “normal” cycle of accumulation and health, in short it could not become, “a new born child” as the PCI (Programma) said. More than this, a return to such a “re-establishment” would be profoundly corrupted and altered by the development of an “increase in levels of exploitation... political reaction and a policy of armament”.
In the Manifesto of the 1st Congress, the CI declared that: “The distribution of raw materials, the utilisation of Baku or Romanian oil, Donbas coal, Ukrainian wheat, the fate of German locomotives, freight cars and automobiles, the rationing of relief for starving Europe - all these fundamental questions of the world’s economic life are not being regulated by free competition, nor by associations of national and international trusts and consortiums, but by the direct application of military force, for the sake of its continued preservation. If the complete subjection of the state power of finance capital had led mankind into the imperialist slaughter, then through this slaughter finance capital has succeeded in completely militarising not only the state but also itself; and it is no longer capable of fulfilling its basic economic functions otherwise than by means of blood and iron” (Idem pages 29/30).
The perspective laid out by the CI is one of the “militarisation of the economy” a question that all Marxists in their analysis show to be an expression of the aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism and not as their alleviation or relativisation no matter how temporary (the IBRP in their reply, page 33, reject militarism as a means of accumulation). The CI also insisted that the world economy could not return either to the liberal period or to that of the trusts and, finally, expressed a very important idea that “capitalism is no longer capable of fulfilling its basic economic functions other than by means of blood and iron” This can only be interpreted as meaning: that after the world war the mechanism of accumulation could no longer function normally, in order to continue it needed “blood and iron”.
The CI pointed out that the perspective for the post-war period was one of the aggravations of wars: “The opportunist, who before the World War summoned the workers to practice moderation for the sake of the gradual transition to socialism, and who during the war demanded class docility in the name of civil peace and national defence, are again demanding self-renunciation of the proletariat - this time for the purpose of overcoming the terrible consequences of the war. If such preaching was to find acceptance amongst the working masses, capitalist development in new, much more concentrated and monstrous forms would be restored on the bones of several generations - with the perspective of new and inevitable world war” (Idem, page 30, our emphasis).
It was an historic tragedy that the CI was unable to develop this clear body of analysis and, furthermore, that in its stage of degeneration it openly contradicted this with positions that insinuated the concept of capitalism “returning to normality” reducing its analysis of the decline and barbarity of the system to mere rhetorical proclamations. Nevertheless, the task of the Communist Left is to deepen and detail the general lines arrived at by the CI and it is clear from the above quotes that this cannot lead to an orientation that goes in the direction of capitalism going through a constant cycle of accumulation-crisis-war devaluation-new accumulation... but rather in the sense of a profoundly altered world economy, incapable of returning to the conditions of normal accumulation and leading to new convulsions and destruction.
This underestimation of the CI’s (and Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin’s) fundamental analysis becomes clear in the IBRP’s rejection of our notion of the irrationality of war: “But the ICC article alters the issue by its next comment [on the function of war] that this means we are “according an economic rationality to the phenomenon of war”. Now this implies that we see the destruction of capital values as the capitalist’s aim i.e. that this is a direct cause [emphasis in the original] of war. But causes are not the same as consequences. The ruling classes of imperialist states do not consciously go to war to devalue capital” (their reply page 29).
In the ascendant period of capitalism the cyclical crises were not deliberately caused by the ruling class. Nevertheless, the cyclical crises had an “economic rationale”: allowing capital to devalue and, as a consequence, renewing capitalist accumulation at a new level. The IBRP think that the world wars of decadence fulfil the role of the devaluation of capital and the renewal of accumulation. That is to say, they attribute to them an economic rationality of a similar nature to that of the cyclical crises of the ascendant period.
This is precisely the central error that we pointed out to the IBRP 16 years ago in our article, “Economic Theories and the Struggle for socialism”: “We can see Bukharin’s error repeated in the analysis of the CWO: “Each crisis leads (through war) to a devaluation of constant capital, thus raising the rate of profit and allowing the cycle of reconstruction- boom, slump, war - to be repeated again” [a quote from the CWO taken from its publication Revolutionary Perspectives, No 6 page 18, its article “The accumulation of Contradictions”]. Thus, for the CWO, the crises of decadent capitalism are seen, in economic terms, as the cyclical crises of ascendant capitalism repeated at a higher level” (International Review, No. 16, page 15).
The IBRP situates the difference between ascendancy and decadence solely at the level of the magnitude of the periodic interruptions of the cycle of accumulation: “The causes of war stem from the bourgeoisie’s efforts to defend those capital values against their rivals. Under ascendant capitalism such rivalry was largely on the economic level and between rival firms. Those who could achieve a greater degree of concentration of capital (capital’s tendency to centralisation and monopoly) would be in a position... to drive their competitors to the wall. This rivalry also led to an over-accumulation of capital which resulted in the decennial crises of the nineteenth century. In these the weaker firms would collapse or be taken over by the more powerful rivals. Capital would be devalued in each crisis and thus a new round of accumulation could begin, but each time capital would become more centralised and concentrated... In the era of monopoly capitalism, however, that concentration has reached the level of the nation state. The economic and political have now become intertwined in the imperialist or decadent stage of capitalism... In this epoch the policies which demand the defence of capital values involve the states themselves and heighten the rivalries between the imperialist powers” (Their reply pages 29-30). As a consequence of this: “imperialist wars have no such limited objectives [ie as in ascendancy]. The bourgeoisie... once embarked upon them there is only a struggle to annihilation, until one nation or bloc of nations is militarily and economically destroyed. The consequences of war are that, not only has capital been physically destroyed, but that there has also been a massive devaluation of existing capital” (their reply).
At the root of this analysis there is a strong “economism” which conceives war only as an immediate and mechanical product of economic evolution. In our article in International Review No 79 we show that imperialist war has a global economic root (the historic crisis of capitalism) but from this we cannot deduce that each war has an immediate and direct economic motive. The IBRP searched for the economic cause of the Gulf War and fell onto the terrain of a very vulgar economism saying that it was a war for oil wells. Likewise they explain the Yugoslavian war as being due to the appetite of the great powers [5] [439] for who knows what markets. It is certain then, that under the pressure of our critique and the empirical evidence, they have corrected their analysis but they have not been able to put into question this vulgar economism which cannot conceive of war without an immediate and mechanical “economic” cause behind it [6] [440].
The IBRP confuses commercial and imperialist rivalries, which are not necessarily the same. Imperialist rivalries have a root cause in the economic situation of the general saturation of the world market, but this is not to say that they have mere commercial competition as their direct origins. Their origins are economic, strategic and military and within this are concentrated historic and political factors.
In the same way, in capitalism’s ascendant period, wars (of national liberation or colonial) had a global economic purpose (the constitution of new nations or the expansion of capitalism through the formation of colonies) that did not arise directly from commercial rivalries. For example, the Franco-German war had dynastic and strategic origins but it did not come out of an insoluble commercial crisis for either of the contenders nor from a particular commercial rivalry. The IBRP is capable of understanding this up to a certain point when it says: “Whilst the post-Napoleonic Wars of the nineteenth century world had their horrors (as the ICC correctly sees) the real difference is that they were fought for specific aims which allowed them to reach rapid and often negotiated solutions. The bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century still had its programmatic mission to get rid of old relics of previous modes of production and create truly national (i.e. bourgeois states)” (their reply page 30). Furthermore, the IBRP sees very well the difference with the decadent period: “The costs of further capitalist development of the productive forces are no longer materially inevitable. Moreover, these costs have reached such a scale that they threaten the destruction of civilised life both in the short term (environmental decay, famines, genocide) and longer term (generalised imperialist war)” (page 31).
We fully share these observations that the IBRP makes. But we have to ask them a very simple question: What are the “total aims” of wars of decadence and what is the cost of maintaining capitalism to the point of posing the destruction of humanity? Can these situations of convulsion and destruction, which the IBRP recognises as being qualitatively different to those of the ascendant period, correspond to an economic situation of normal reproduction and to the renewal of the cycles of accumulation of capital, which would be identical to those of the ascendant period?
The mortal illness of decadent capitalism the IBRP uniquely situates in the moments of generalised wars, but they do not see it in the moments of apparent normality, in the period where, according to them, the cycle of capital accumulation develops. This leads them into a dangerous dichotomy: on the one hand, they see times of the development of normal cycles of capital accumulation where we witness real economic growth, which produce “technological revolutions”, the growth of the proletariat. In these periods of the full operation of the cycle of accumulation, capitalism appears to return to its origins; its growth appears to show an identical situation to that of its youthful period (the IBRP dares not say this, while the PCI (Programma) openly affirms it). On the other hand, there are periods of generalised war in which the barbarity of decadent capitalism is manifested in all its brutality and violence.
This dichotomy is strongly reminiscent of what Kautsky said in his thesis of “super-imperialism”: on the one hand, he recognised that after the First World War capitalism would enter a period which could produce great catastrophes and convulsions, however, and at the same time, it could produce an “objective” tendency towards the supreme concentration of capitalism into a great imperialist trust which would allow a peaceful capitalism to be established. In the Prologue to the above quoted book of Bukharin (The World Economy and Imperialism) Lenin denounces this centrist contradiction of Kautsky: “Kautsky promised to be a Marxist in the coming restless and catastrophic epoch, which he was compelled to foresee and definitely recognise when writing his work in 1909 about the coming war. Now, when it has become absolutely clear that this epoch has arrived, Kautsky again only promises to be a Marxist in the coming epoch of ultra-imperialism, a period which he doesn’t know whether it will arrive or not! In other words, we have any number of his promises to be a Marxist some time in another epoch, but not under the present conditions, not at this moment” (page 13 of the English version).
Far be it from us to suggest that the same thing could happen to the IBRP. They zealously guard the Marxist analysis of the decadence of capitalism in relation to the periods when war breaks out, meanwhile in the periods of accumulation they allow an analysis which makes concessions to the bourgeoisie’s lies about the “prosperity” and “growth” of the system.
This tendency to defend the Marxist analysis of decadence for the period of generalised war explains the difficulty the IBRP has in understanding the present stage of the historical crisis of capitalism: “The ICC have been consistent since their foundation twenty years ago in dismissing all attempts to analyse how the capitalists have managed the current crisis. Indeed they seem to think that any attempt to look at the historically specific features of the present crisis is tantamount to saying that capitalism has solved the crisis. This is not the case. What is incumbent on Marxists is to actually try to understand why this has been the longest drawn-out crisis in the present capitalist epoch and is now about to surpass that of the Great Depression of 1873-96. But while the latter was a crisis created as capitalism entered its monopoly phase and was still soluble by purely economic devaluation the crisis of today threatens humanity with a far greater catastrophe” (their response page 34).
They seem certain that the ICC has renounced an analysis of the features of the present crisis. The IBRP can convince itself of the contrary by studying the articles that we regularly publish in each issue of the International Review, following the crisis in all its aspects. For us the opening of the crisis in 1967 is the reappearance, in an open manner, of the chronic and permanent crisis of decadent capitalism, it is the manifestation of a profound and increasingly uncontrollable blockage of the mechanism of capitalist accumulation. The “specific features” of the present crisis constitute the different attempts by capital through the reinforcing of state intervention, the flight into debt and monetary and commercial manipulations, to avoid an uncontrollable explosion of its basic crisis and, simultaneously, the evident failure of such potions and their perverse effects of increasingly aggravating the capitalism’s incurable illness.
The IBRP sees explaining the longevity of the present crisis as the “main task” for Marxists. We are not surprised by the impact of the length of the crisis on the IBRP, given that they don’t understand the root of the problem: we are not at the end of the cycle of accumulation but in a situation of the historic prolongation of the blockage, the profound disturbance, of the mechanism of accumulation. A situation, as the CI said, where capitalism cannot assure its essential economic functions other than “by blood and iron”.
This fundamental problem that the IBRP has leads it once again to ridicule our position on the present historical situation of chaos and the decomposition of capitalism: “Whilst we can all agree that there are tendencies of decomposition and chaos (after twenty years of the end of the cycle of accumulation it is difficult to see how there could not be) these should not be used as slogans to avoid a concrete analysis of what is happening” (their reply page 35).
As we can see, that what most preoccupies the IBRP is our supposed “simplism”, a type of “intellectual laziness” that takes refuge in clichéd radical cries about the seriousness and chaos of capitalism’s situation, in order not to get into a concrete analysis of what is happening.
The IBRP’s preoccupation is correct. Marxists are and will have to be concerned (this is one of our duties in the proletariat’s struggle) to analyse events in detail instead of falling into rhetorical generalisations in the style of the Longuet’s “orthodox Marxism” in France, or the anarchist vagueness that comforts many but which in decisive moments leads to serious opportunist ravings when it’s not brazen treachery.
However in order to be able to make a concrete analysis of “what is happening” it is necessary to have a clear global framework and it is here that the IBRP has problems. Since they do not understand the seriousness and depth of the disturbances and the level of degeneration and contradictions of capitalism in the “normal times” of the phase of the cycle of accumulation the whole process of the decomposition and chaos of world capitalism, which has accelerated since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989, escapes their grasp and thus they are incapable of understanding it.
The IBRP ought to remember the lamentable stupidities they produced when faced with the collapse of the Stalinist countries: they speculated about the “fabulous markets” that these ruins could offer the countries of the West and believed that they could represent an easing of the capitalist crisis. Since then, overwhelmed by empirical evidence and thanks to our critique, the IBRP have corrected their errors. This is very good and shows their responsibility and seriousness in front of the proletariat. However, the IBRP have to go to the heart of the question: Why such blunders? Why is it that the change had to be brought about by events themselves? What vanguard is it that has to change position by being pulled along by events, always incapable of foreseeing them? The IBRP should study attentively the texts where we put forward the general lines of the process of the decomposition of capitalism [7] [441]. They would see that there is not a problem of “simplism” on our part but slowness and incoherence on their part.
These problems are once again demonstrated in the following speculation by the IBRP: “If further proof of ICC idealism was required their final accusation against the Bureau is that it has “no unitary and global vision of war” which leads to the “blindness and irresponsibility (sic)” of not seeing that the next war would mean “nothing other than the complete annihilation of the planet”. The ICC might be right, although we’d like to know the scientific basis on which they predict it. We ourselves have always said that the next war “threatens the continued existence of humanity”. However there is no certainty about this wiping out everything. The next imperialist war may actually lead to the final destruction of humanity. There have been weapons of mass destruction which have not been used in previous conflicts (e.g. biological and chemical weapons) and there is no guarantee that a nuclear holocaust would envelope the planet next time round. In fact the present war preparations of the imperialist powers include the de-commissioning of weapons of mass destruction whilst developing so-called conventional weapons. Even the bourgeoisie understand that a destroyed planet is of no value to anyone (even if the forces which lead to war and the nature of war are ultimately beyond their control)” (their reply pages 35-36).
The IBRP should learn a little history: in World War I all the gangs employed all the forces of destruction, while desperately searching for ever more lethal devices. In World War II, when Germany was already defeated there were the massive bombing raids on Dresden using incendiary and fragmentation bombs and the United States used the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when Japan was also already defeated. Since then, in 1971 the weight of bombs dropped on Hanoi in one night surpassed all that dropped on Germany in 1945. In turn, the “carpet bombing” of Baghdad carried out by the “allies” beat Hanoi’s terrible record. In the same Gulf War it is proven that the new chemical and nuclear-conventional type weaponry were tried out on North American soldiers by the US. It has now become known that in the 1950’s the United States carried out experiments on its own population with bacteriological weapons... Yet faced with this mass of evidence, which the IBRP could read in any bourgeois publication, they have the dishonesty and the ignorance to speculate about the bourgeoisie’s level of control, about “their interest” in avoiding a total holocaust. It is suicidal for the IBRP to dream about them using “less destructive” arms when 80 years of history proves the opposite.
In this senseless speculation the IBRP not only don’t understand the theory but high-handedly ignore the crushing and repeated evidence of the facts. They have to understand the serious and revisionist nature of these stupid illusions of the impotent petty-bourgeois who clutch at the straw of the idea that “Even the bourgeoisie understand that a destroyed planet is of no value to anyone”.
The IBRP have to overcome their centrism, their oscillation between a coherent position on war and the decadence of capitalism and their speculative theorisations that we have criticised, about war as a means of the devaluation of capital and the renewal of accumulation. These errors lead them not to consider or take seriously as a coherent instrument their own analysis that tells us that: “the forces which lead to war and the nature of war are ultimately beyond their [the bourgeoisie’s] control”.
For the IBRP this phrase is a mere rhetorical parenthesis, whereas, if they want to place themselves fully in the ranks of the Communist Left and understand historical reality, it should be their analytical guide, the axis of their thinking in order concretely to comprehend the facts and historical tendencies of capitalism today.
Adalen 27-5-95
[1] [442] In its reply the IBRP develops other questions, such as a particular conception of state capitalism that we will not deal with here.
[2] [443] See in International Review numbers 77/78 our series “Rejecting The Theory of Decadence”.
[3] [444] The comrades affirm their agreement with our position, but instead of recognisin
[4] [445] The CI at its first two Congresses had as its urgent task and priority to lead the revolutionary efforts of the world proletariat and to regroup its vanguard forces. In this sense its analysis of the war and of the post-war period, of the evolution of capitalism etc, could not go beyond the elaboration of some general features. The later course of events, the defeats of the proletariat and the swift advance of the opportunist gangrene in the heart of the CI, led it to contradict these general features and attempted theoretical elaborations (in particular, Bukharin’s polemic against Rosa Luxemburg in his book Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capitalism of 1924) constituted a brutal regression in respect to the clarity of first two Congresses.
[5] [446] See our article “The Proletarian Political Milieu Faced with the Gulf War” International Review No 64.
[6] [447] In the January 1991 issue of Battaglia Communista (newspaper of the PCInt) the PCInt announced with regard to the Gulf War that “The Third World War began on the 17th of January” (the day of the “allies” first direct bombings of Bagdad). In the following issue they realised they had dropped a clanger but instead of drawing the lessons from it they persisted: “In this sense, to affirm that the war which began on 17th January marks the beginning of the third world conflict is not a flight of fantasy, but a recognition of the fact that we are now in a phase in which trade conflicts, which began to sharpen at the beginning of the 1970’s, have no possibility of being resolved except through the prospect of generalised war”. See our International Review No 72, “How not to understand the development of chaos and imperialist conflicts” where this is criticised and we analyse these and other lamentable blunders by the IBRP.
[7] [448] See International Review No. 60 the “Theses on the countries of the East” concerning the collapse of Stalinism, in International Review No. 62, “The Decomposition of Capitalism” and in International Review No 64, “Militarism and decomposition”.
1) The recognition by the communists of the historically limited character of the capitalist mode of production, of the irreversible crisis in which the system is plunged today, constitutes the granite foundation upon which the revolutionary perspective of the combat of the proletariat is based. In this sense, all the attempts, such as those that we see at the present moment, on the part of the bourgeoisie and of its agents to make believe that the world economy is "coming out of crisis" or that certain "emerging" national economies can boost the old exhausted economic sectors, constitute a systematic attack against proletarian consciousness.
2) The official speeches on the "recovery" make a big thing out of the evolution of the indicators for industrial production, or the redressment of company profits. While we have indeed, in particular in the Anglo-Saxon countries, seen such a phenomenon recently, the foundation on which this rest must be pointed out:
- the recovery of profits is very often, especially for the big companies, the result of speculative windfalls; its counterpart is a new upsurge of public debts; it also flows from the elimination of "dead wood" by the big companies, in other words of their less productive sectors;
- the progress of industrial production results to a large extent from a very substantial increase in the productivity of labor based on the massive utilization of automation and informatics.
It is for these reasons that one of the major characteristics of the present "recovery" is that it has not been able to create employment, to significantly reduce unemployment or temporary employment, which, on the contrary, can only increase, since capital constantly wants to keep a free hand in order to be able to throw its superfluous work force onto the streets at any moment.
3) While it is above all an attack against the working class, a brutal factor of the development of misery and exclusion, unemployment also constitutes a major indication of capitalism's bankruptcy. Capital lives from the exploitation of living labor: in the same way as the shutting down of entire parts of the industrial apparatus, and indeed even more so, the laying off of a considerable part of labor force constitutes a real self-mutilation on capital's part. It shows the definitive bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production, whose historic function was precisely to extend wage labor across the globe. This definitive bankruptcy of capitalism is also illustrated by the dramatic indebtedness of states which in the past years has reached a new crescendo: between 1989 and 1994 the public debt has gone up from 53% to 65% of the gross national product in the United States, from 57% to 73% in Europe, reaching 142% in the case of Belgium. In fact, the capitalist states are defaulting on their debts; if they were to be subjected to the same laws as private companies, they would already have been officially declared bankrupt. This situation only expresses the fact that the capitalist state constitutes the system's response to its impasse, but a response which is in no way a solution and which it cannot use forever.
4) The growth rates, sometimes in two figures, of the famous "emerging economies", do not in any way contradict the judgment on the general bankruptcy of the world economy. They result from a massive influx of capital drawn by the incredibly low cost of labor in these countries, from a ferocious exploitation of proletarians, something the bourgeoisie impudently refers to as "relocating'. This means that this economic development cannot but affect the production of the most advanced countries, whose states, increasingly, protest against the" dishonest commercial practices" of these "emerging" countries. Apart from this, the spectacular performances which they like to point to coincide very often with a wiping out of entire sectors of the economy of these countries: the "economic miracle" of China means more than 250 million unemployed by the year 2000. Finally, the recent financial collapse of another "exemplary" country, Mexico, whose money lost half of its value overnight, necessitating an urgent injection of close to $50 billion of credit (by far the largest "rescue" operation in capitalism's history), sums up the reality of the mirage of the" emergence" of certain Third World countries. The "emerging" economies are not the new hope of the world economy. They are but the very fragile and aberrant manifestation of a system gone mad. And this reality is not going to be contradicted by the situation of Eastern European countries, whose economies were not long ago supposed to be flowering under the sun of liberalism. If a few countries (such as Poland) have been able for the moment to avoid the worst, the chaos unfurling in the Russian economy (a 30% fall in production in two years, a more than 2,000% price rise over the same period) shows conclusively to what extent the talk which went on in 1989 was a lie. The state of the Russian economy is so catastrophic, that the Mafia, which controls a large part of the apparatus, appears, not as a parasite as in certain western countries, but as one of the pillars assuring a minimum of stability.
5) Finally, the state of potential bankruptcy in which capitalism finds itself, the fact that it cannot live forever by borrowing from the future, trying to get round the general and definitive saturation of the market by a headlong flight into debt, makes stronger and stronger the threat to the entire world financial system. The nervousness caused by the collapse of the British Barings Bank in the wake of the acrobatics of a "golden boy", the panic which followed the announcement of the crisis of the Mexican peso, out of all proportion with Mexico's weight in the world economy, are the undeniable indications of the real anguish which grips the ruling class in face of the perspective of a "true world catastrophe" of its finances, according to the words of the head of the IMF. But this financial catastrophe is nothing other than the revelation of the catastrophe into which the capitalist mode of production is plunging, and which hurls the whole world into the greatest convulsions in history.
6) The terrain on which these convulsions are most cruelly manifested is that of imperialist confrontations. Hardly five years have passed since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, since the promises of a "new world order" given by the leaders of the main western countries, and never has the disorder in the relations between states been so striking. Although it was based on the threat of a terrifying confrontation between the nuclear superpowers, and although its two super-powers without cease confronted each other through interposed countries, the "order of Yalta" contained, precisely, a certain element of "order". In the absence of the possibility of a new world war because the proletariat of the central countries is not mobilized, the two world policemen had to maintain imperialist confrontations within an "acceptable" framework. They had to avoid notably the sowing of chaos and destruction in the advanced countries and particularly on the principle terrain of two world wars, Europe. This edifice has fallen apart. With the bloody confrontations in ex-Yugoslavia, Europe has ceased to be a "sanctuary". At the same time, these confrontations have shown how difficult it is to set up a new "equilibrium", a new "division of the world" to succeed that of Yalta.
7) While the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was to a large extent unpredictable, the disappearance of its western rival was not in the least so. One would need to understand nothing of marxism (and follow Kautsky's thesis of "super-imperialism", swept away by the revolutionaries in World War I) to think that a single bloc could maintain itself alone. Fundamentally, all the bourgeoisies are rivals against each other. One can see this clearly in the domain of trade, where "the war of each against all" dominates. Diplomatic and military alliances are but the concretization of the fact that no bourgeoisie can choose to pursue its strategic interests alone against all the others. The common adversary is the only cement of such alliances, not any kind of "friendship between peoples". We can see today how far these are elastic and dishonest, since the enemies of yesterday (such as Russia and the United States) have discovered a sudden "friendship" and a friendship of decades (such as between Germany and the United States) is replaced by dispute.
In this sense, while the events of 1989 signified the end of the division of the world coming out of the Second World War, with Russia ceasing definitively to be able to lead an imperialist bloc, they contain the tendency towards the reconstruction of new imperialist constellations. However, although its economic power and its geographic location designate Germany to be the only country able to succeed Russia in the role of leader of an eventual future bloc opposed to the United States, its military situation is very far from allowing it for the moment to realize such an ambition. And in the absence of any new imperialist alignments able to replace the one swept away by the upheaval of 1989, the world arena is submitted as never before in the past, due to the unprecedented gravity of the economic crisis which kindles military tensions unleashing "each for himself", to a chaos aggravating even more the general decomposition of the capitalist mode of production.
8) The situation resulting from the end of the two blocks of the "cold war" is thus dominated by two contradictory tendencies - on the one hand disorder, instability in aIIiances between states, and on the other the process of the reconstruction of two new blocks - but which nevertheless are complimentary since the second factor cannot but aggravate the first one. The history of these past years illustrates this clearly:
- the crisis and the Gulf war of 90-91, sparked off by the United States, were part of the attempt of the American policeman to maintain its tutelage over its cold war aIlies, a tutelage which the latter are led to put in question with the end of the soviet menace;
- the war in ex -Yugoslavia is the direct result of the affirmation of the new ambitions of Germany, the main instigator of the Slovenian and Croatian secession, setting fire to the powder keg in the region;
- the pursuit of this war sows discord both within the German-French couple associated in the leadership of the European Union (which constitutes the first foundation stone of the edifice of a potential new imperialist bloc), and within the Anglo-American couple, the oldest and most faithful one which the 20th century has seen.
9) Even more than the peckings between the French cock and the German eagle, the extent of the present infidelities between Perfidious Albion and Uncle Sam constitute an irrefutable indication of the state of chaos of the system of international relations today. If, after 1989, the British bourgeoisie at first showed itself to be the most loyal ally of its American colleague, notably at the moment of the Gulf war, the slightness of the advantages it gained from this fidelity, as weIl as the defense of its specific interests in the Mediterranean area and in the Balkans, dictating a pro-Serbian policy, led it to distance itself considerably from its ally and to systematically sabotage the American policy of supporting Bosnia. With this policy, the British bourgeoisie has succeeded in setting up a solid tactical aIliance with the French bourgeoisie, with the objective of enforcing the discord in the German-French tandem, an approach towards which this latter is favorably disposed to the extent that the increase in power of its German ally worries it. This new situation is notably concretized by an intensification of the military collaboration between the British and the French bourgeoisie, for example with the proposed creation of a common air force unit and above all with the agreement creating an inter-African force "to maintain peace and prevent crises in Africa", which constitutes a spectacular revision of the British attitude after its support for the American policy in Ruanda aimed at banishing French influence in that country.
10) This evolution of the attitude of Britain towards its great ally, whose discontent was expressed with particular vigor on 17 March when Clinton welcomed Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein, is one of the major events of the last period in the world arena. This reveals the scale of the defeat for the United States represented by the evolution of the situation in ex-Yugoslavia, where the direct occupation of the terrain by the British and French armies in the uniform of UNPROFOR has greatly contributed to thwarting American attempts to take position solidly in the region, via its Bosnian ally.
It is a significant fact that the first world power encounters more and more difficulties in playing its role of world gendarme, a role supported less and less by the other bourgeoisies who are trying to exorcise the past, when the soviet menace obliged them to submit to the orders corning from Washington. There exists today a serious weakening, even a crisis of American leadership which is confirmed throughout the world, and the image of which is given by the pitiful departure of the GI's from Somalia, 2 years after their spectacular, mediatized arrival. This crisis of leadership of the United States permits us to explain why certain other powers have permitted themselves to come and tease it in its Latin American backyard:
- the attempt of the French and Spanish bourgeoisies to promote a "democratic transition" in Cuba with Castro, and not without him, as Uncle Sam would like;
- the Peruvian bourgeoisie's rapprochement with Japan, confirmed by the re-election of Fujimori;
- the support of the European bourgeoisie, notably through the Church, for the Zapatista guerilla in Mexico.
11) In fact, this serious weakening of American leadership is expressed through the fact that the dominant tendency, at the present moment, is not the one towards a new bloc, but towards "every man for himself". For the first world power, equipped with overwhelming military superiority, it is much more difficult to master a situation marked by generalized instability, the precariousness of alliances in all corners of the globe, than by the obligatory discipline of states under the threat of the great imperialist powers and nuclear apocalypse. In such a situation of instability, it is easier for each power to stir up trouble for its adversaries, to sabotage the alliances that threaten it, than to develop for their own part solid alliances, and to assure stability on their own ground. Such a situation evidently favors the game of secondary powers, to the extent that it is always easier to stir up trouble than to maintain order. This reality is accentuated even more by the plunging of capitalist society into generalized decomposition. That is why the United States itself is called on make abundant use of this kind of policy. That is how we can explain, for instance, American support for the recent Turkish offensive against the Kurdish nationalists in northern Iraq, an offensive which the traditional ally of Turkey, Germany, has considered to be a provocation, and has condemned. It is not a kind of "overthrow of the alliance" between Turkey and Germany, but a (large) spanner thrown in the works of this "alliance", which reveals the importance of a country like Turkey for the two imperialist godfathers. Similarly, it is a sign of the state of the world situation today, that the USA should be led, in a country like Algeria for example, to use the same weapons as a Gadhafi or a Khomeini: support for terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. This said, in this reciprocal practice of destabilizing each other's positions by the US and the other countries, there is no equality: while American diplomacy can allow itself to intervene in the internal political game of countries like Italy (support for Belusconi), Spain (the GAL scandal stirred up by Washington), Belgium (the Augusta affair) or Britain (the opposition to Major by the "Eurosceptics"), the opposite is not the case. In this sense, the trouble which may appear within the American bourgeoisie faced with its diplomatic failures, or the internal debates about delicate strategic choices (eg over its alliance with Russia) cannot be put on the same level as the political convulsions which may affect other countries. Thus, for example, the dissensions which appeared over the sending of US troops to Haiti were essentially the result of a division of labor between bourgeois sectors and not of real divisions.
12) Despite its enormous military superiority and the fact that this can no longer be used to the same degree as in the past, despite the fact, owing to its budget deficits, that it has been obliged to reduce somewhat its military spending, the US has not given up the modernization of its armaments, developing ever more sophisticated weapons, notably by carrying on with the" Star Wars" project. The use or threat of brute force is now the main means at the US disposal to make its authority respected (even though it does not hesitate to use the weapons of economic war: pressure on international institutions such as the WTO, trade sanctions, etc). The fact that that this weapon has proved to be impotent, or even a factor that increases chaos, as could be seen after the Gulf war and as Somalia has illustrated more recently, can only confirm the insurmountable the capitalist world. The considerable reinforcement we are now seeing of the military capacities of powers like China and Japan, who are competing with the US in South East Asia and the Pacific, can only push the US to develop and to make use of its weaponry.
13) The bloody chaos in imperialist relations which characterizes the world situation today has a privileged place in the peripheral countries, but the example of ex-Yugoslavia a few hundred kilometers from the big industrial concentrations of Europe proves that this chaos is approaching the central countries also. To the tens of thousands of deaths provoked by the troubles in Algeria in the last few years, to the million corpses in Rwanda can be added the hundreds of thousands killed in Croatia and Bosnia. In fact, there are now dozens of bloody confrontations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, witness to the indescribable chaos which decomposing capitalism is engendering in society. In this sense, the more or less general complicity over the massacres in Chechnya perpetrated by the Russian army, which is trying to prevent the break-up of Russia in the wake of the dislocation of the old USSR, reveals the anxiety of the ruling class about the prospect of intensifying chaos. It has to be said clearly: only the overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat can prevent this growing chaos leading to the destruction of humanity.
14) More than ever, the struggle of the proletariat represents the only hope for the future of human society. This struggle, which revived with great power at the end of the 60s, putting an end to the most terrible counter-revolution the working class has ever known, went into a major retreat with the collapse of the Stalinist regimes, the ideological campaigns which accompanied them, and all the events which followed (Gulf war, war in Yugoslavia). The working class suffered this reflux in a massive way at the level both of its combativity and its consciousness, without this putting the historic course towards class confrontation into question, as the ICC affirmed already at the time. The struggles waged by the proletariat in recent years confirm this. Particularly since 1992 these struggles have been testimony to the proletariat's capacity to get back onto the path of struggle, thus confirming that the historic course has not been overturned. They are also testimony to the enormous difficulties which it is encountering on this path, owing to the breadth and depth of the reflux. The workers struggles are developing in a sinuous, jagged manner full of advances and retreats.
15) The massive movements in Italy in the autumn of 92, those in Germany in 93 and many others showed the huge potential combativity growing in the workers' ranks. Since then, this combativity has expressed itself slowly, with long refuted. The massive mobilizations in Italy in the autumn of 94, the series of strikes in the public sector in France in the spring of 95, are expressions, among others, of this combativity. However, it is important to show that the tendencies towards going beyond the unions, which appeared in 1992 in Italy, have not been confirmed - far from it. In 1994 the "monster" demonstration in Rome was a masterpiece of union control. Similarly, the tendency towards spontaneous unification, in the street which appeared (although only embryonically) in autumn 1993 in the Ruhr in Germany, has since given way to large scale union maneuvers, such as the engineering "strike" of early 1995, which have been entirely controlled by the bourgeoisie. By the same token, the recent strikes in France, in fact union days of action, have been a success for the latter.
16) Apart from the depth of the reflux that began in 1989, the difficulties facing the workers today in their efforts to move forward are the result of a whole series of further obstacles set up or exploited by the enemy class. These difficulties have to be put in the context of the negative weight exerted by the general decomposition of capitalism on the consciousness of the workers, sapping the proletariat's confidence in itself, and in the perspectives of its struggle. More concretely, although it is an indisputable sign of the bankruptcy of capitalism, a major effect of the massive and permanent unemployment developing today has been to provoke a strong feeling of demoralization and despair in important sectors of the working class, some of whom have been plunged into social exclusion and even lumpenisation. This unemployment is also used by the bourgeoisie as an instrument to threaten and repress sectors of the class who still have a job. Similarly, the sermons about the "recovery", and the few positive results shown by the economies of the main countries (in terms of profits and growth rates), have been amply exploited to justify union talk about "the bosses can pay". This talk is especially dangerous in that it strengthens the reformist illusions of the workers, making them much more vulnerable to union containment; at the same time it contains the idea that if the bosses 'can't pay' there's no use struggling. This is another factor of division (apart from the one between employed and unemployed) between the different sectors of the working class working in branches unequally affected by the crisis.
17) These obstacles have allowed the unions to get their grip on the workers' combativity, channeling them towards "actions" entirely under union control. However, the unions' present maneuvers have also, and above all, a preventative aim: that of strengthening their hold on the workers before the latter display a lot will necessarily result from their growing anger faced with the increasingly brutal attacks demanded by the crisis. In the same way, we have to underline the recent change in the way the ruling class has been talking. Whereas the first years after the fall of the eastern bloc were dominated by campaigns about the death of communism, the impossibility of the revolution, we are now to the extent seeing that it has again become fashionable to talk in favor of marxism, revolution, and communism on the part of the leftists - obviously - and even elsewhere. This again is a preventative measure on the part of the bourgeoisie, aimed at derailing the reflection that is tending to develop in the working class faced with the increasingly obvious bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production. It is up to revolutionaries, in their intervention, to denounce with the greatest vigor both the rotten maneuvers of the unions and these so-called "revolutionary" speeches. It falls to them to put forward the real perspective of the proletarian revolution and communism, as the only way out capable of saving humanity, and as the final outcome of the workers' struggle.
In the article in the last International Review we showed that the working class' response developed more forcefully as the First World War went on. At the beginning of 1917 - following two and a half years of barbarism - the working class managed to develop an international balance of forces that subjected the bourgeoisie to increasing pressure. In February 1917 the workers in Russia rose up and overthrew the Tsar, but they could only put an end to the war after they had deposed the bourgeois government and seized power in October 1917. Russia had shown that it was impossible to bring peace without overthrowing the ruling class. The victorious seizure of power was to encounter a powerful echo in the working class in other countries. For the first time in history the working class had managed to take power in a country. This was bound to act as a beacon for the workers of other countries, in particular those of Austria, Hungary and the whole of central Europe, and above all in Germany.
In fact, after the initial wave of patriotic chauvinism, the working class in Germany struggled increasingly against the war. Spurred on by the revolutionary development in Russia and in the wake of several precursory movements, a mass strike broke out in April 1917. In January 1918 about a million workers threw themselves into a new strike movement and formed a workers' council in Berlin. Under the influence of the Russian events combativity on the military fronts crumbled more and more throughout the summer of 1918. The factories were at boiling point; more and more worker gathered in the streets to strengthen the response to the war. The ruling class in Germany was aware that the Russian revolution was reaching out toward the workers and did their utmost to raise a barrier against the extension of the revolution - in order to save their own hides.
Learning from the revolutionary events in Russia, when faced with a very strong movement of workers' struggles, the army forced the Kaiser to abdicate (at the end of September) and installed a new government. But the working class' combativity forged ahead and there was no let-up in the agitation.
On 28th October there began in Austria, in the Czech and Slovak provinces as well as in Budapest, a wave of strikes which led to the overthrow of the monarchy. Workers' and soldiers' councils in the image of the Russian soviets sprang up everywhere.
The ruling class, and also the revolutionaries, prepared for the decisive phase in the confrontations. The revolutionaries prepared for the uprising. Although the majority of the Spartakist leaders (Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Jogiches) were in prison, and in spite of the fact that the party's illegal printing press had been paralyzed for some time by a police raid, the revolutionaries nevertheless continued to prepare the insurrection around the Spartakus group.
At the beginning of October the Spartakists held a conference with the Linksradikale of Bremen and other towns. This conference recognized the beginnings of open revolutionary confrontations, drafted an appeal and distributed it widely throughout the country as well as at the front. The main ideas defended in it were: the soldiers have begun to free themselves from their yoke, the army is crumbling; but this first step of the revolution meets with a counter-revolution that is ready at its post, As the means of repression of the ruling class was weakening, the counter-revolution tried to staunch the movement by reconciling the "democratic" pseudo-right wing. The aim of parliamentarianism and the new voting system was to make the proletariat go on putting up with its situation.
"During the discussion on the international situation it was pointed out that the Russian revolution had given a fundamental moral support to the movement in Germany. The delegates decided to convey their gratitude, solidarity and fraternal sympathy to their comrades in Russia and promised to confirm that solidarity not in words but in deeds that followed the Russian example.
We must support in every way the mutinies of the soldiers, go on to the armed insurrection, broaden the armed insurrection into a struggle to transfer power to the workers and soldiers and ensure victory through the workers' mass strikes. This is the task of the coming days and weeks".
We can see that from the beginning of these revolutionary confrontations the Spartakists also exposed the political maneuvers of the ruling class. They stripped bare the lie of democracy and unhesitatingly identified the steps that were vital if the movement were to advance: to prepare the insurrection was to support the working class in Russia not only in words but also in deeds. They understood that the solidarity of the working class in this new situation could not be restricted to declarations, that it was necessary for the workers to go into struggle themselves. This lesson forms a red thread throughout the history of the workers' movement and its struggles.
The bourgeoisie too refurbished its arms. On 3rd October 1918 they deposed the Kaiser and replaced him with a new prince, Max von Baden; they also included the SPD in the government.
The leadership of the SPD (a party that was founded in the previous century by the working class itself) had betrayed in 1914 and had excluded the internationalists, regrouped around the Spartakists and the Linksradikalen, as well as the centrists. From that time on the SPD harbored no proletarian life whatsoever within it. From the beginning of the war it supported an imperialist policy. It was also to act against the revolutionary upsurge of the working class.
For the first time the bourgeoisie included in the government a party that came from the working class and had recently passed into the camp of capital, in order to protect the capitalist state in this revolutionary situation. Although many workers still had illusions, the revolutionaries immediately understood the new role that fell to the social-democracy. In October 1918 Rosa Luxemburg wrote: "By entering the ministry, governmental socialism is putting itself forward as capitalism's defender and is barring the way to the mounting proletarian revolution".
From January 1918, when the first workers' council appeared during the mass strike in Berlin, the "revolutionary Delegates" (Revolutionare Oblate) and the Spartakists met regularly and secretly. The Delegates were very close to the SPD. On the basis of the growing combativity, the disintegration of the front and the fact that the workers were pushing for action, at the end of October they began to discuss concrete plans for an insurrection in the context of an action committee formed after the conference mentioned above.
On 23rd October Liebknecht was freed from prison. More than 20,000 workers came to greet him when he arrived in Berlin.
After the German government had expelled the members of the Russian embassy from Berlin at the insistence of the SPD, and after the demonstrations of support for the Russian revolution organized by the revolutionaries, the action committee met to discuss the situation. Liebknecht insisted on the need for the general strike and mass, armed demonstrations. At the "Delegates" meeting of 2nd November he even proposed a date - the 5th - with the slogan: "Peace at once and the removal of the state of siege, the socialist German republic, the formation of a government of workers' and soldiers' councils" (Drabkin, pg 104).
The "Delegates" who thought that the situation was not ripe enough pleaded that it was necessary to wait longer. During this time the members of the USPD in the various towns waited for new instructionsbecause no one wanted to go into action before Berlin. However the news of an imminent uprising spread to other towns of the Reich. All this was to be accelerated by the events in Kiel.
When on 3rd November the fleet in Kiel was to go to sea to continue the war, the sailors mutinied. Soldiers' councils were created and workers' councils followed in the same wave. The army high command threatened to bomb the town but, realizing that they could not stem the mutiny through violence, they sent for their Trojan horse, the SPD leader Noske. The latter turned up there and succeeded fraudulently in getting himself onto the workers' council.
But this movement of workers' and soldiers' councils had already sent out a signal to the whole proletariat. The councils formed massive delegations of workers and soldiers that made their way to other towns. Enormous delegations were sent to Hamburg, Bremen, Flensburg, to the Ruhr and even as far as Cologne. They addressed assemblies of workers and called for the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils. Thousands of workers travelled from towns in the north of Germany to Berlin and other towns in the provinces. A number of them were arrested by soldiers remaining loyal to the government (more than 1,300 arrests in Berlin alone on 6th November) and were retained in the barracks - where they continued agitating however.
Within a week workers' and soldiers' councils appeared in the main towns in Germany and the workers themselves took control of the extension of their movement. They did not leave it in the hands of the unions or parliament. They no longer fought by branch, isolated from each other, with demands specific to their sector; on the contrary in each town they united and formulated common demands. They acted on their own initiative and sought to unite with workers in other towns[1].
Less than two years after their brothers in Russia, the German workers demonstrated their capacity to direct their struggle themselves. Up until 8th November workers' and soldiers' councils were set up in almost every city, except Berlin.
On 8th November the "men of confidence" of the SPD made this report: "It is impossible to stop the revolutionary movement; if the SPD were to try and oppose the movement it would be swept away by the current".
When the first news from Kiel reached Berlin on 4th November, Liebknecht made a proposal to the executive committee for an insurrection on 8th November. Although the movement was spreading spontaneously throughout the country it was clear that an uprising in Berlin (the seat of government) made it necessary for the working class to have an organized trajectory and be clearly oriented towards one objective: to gather together all its forces. But the executive committee continued to hesitate. It was only after the arrest of two of its members who were in possession of the proposal for the insurrection that it decided in favor of action for the following day. On 8th November 1918 the Spartakists published the following appeal:
"Now that the moment to act has arrived there must be no hesitation. The same "socialists" who have spent four years supporting the government and in its service (...) are now doing all they can to weaken your struggle and undermine the movement.
Workers and soldiers! What your comrades have managed to do in Kiel, Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Rostock, Flensburg, Hanover, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Munich and Stuttgart you too must do. Because the victory of your brothers there, and the victory of the proletariat of the whole world depends on the height that your struggle is able to reach, its tenacity and success. Soldiers! Do what your comrades of the fleet have done; unite with your brothers in workmen's clothes. Don't let yourselves be used against your brothers, don't obey the orders of your officers, don't fire on those who are fighting for freedom. Workers and soldiers! The immediate aims of your struggle must be:
1) The freeing of all civilian and military prisoners.
2) The abolition of all states and the elimination of all dynasties.
3) The election of workers' and soldiers' councils, the election of delegates in all factories and all military units.
4) The immediate establishing of relations with other workers' councils and German soldiers.
5) The government to be controlled by the commissars of the workers' and soldiers' councils.
6) Immediate liaison with the international proletariat and particularly with the Russian Workers' Republic.
Long live the socialist Republic!
Long live the International!"
The "International" group (Spartakus group), 8th November.
The events of 9th November
In the early hours of 9th November the revolutionary uprising began in Berlin.
"Workers, soldiers, comrades!
The moment of decision has come! We must be up to our historic task...
We aren't simply demanding the abdication of one man, we're demanding the republic!
The socialist republic and all that it entails. Forward with the struggle for peace, freedom and bread.
Come out of the factories! Come out of the barracks! Hold out your hands! Long live the socialist republic" (Spartakus leaflet).
Hundreds of thousands of workers answered the call of the Spartakus group and the executive committee, stopped work and surged towards the city center in huge processions. At their head marched groups of armed workers. The great majority of the troops united with the demonstrating workers and fraternized with them. By midday Berlin was in the hands of the revolutionary workers and soldiers. A column of demonstrators made their way to the residence of the Hohenzollern. Liebknecht addressed them: "Capitalist domination, that has transformed Europe into a cemetery, is now broken. (...) We mustn't think that our task is finished because the past is dead. We must use all our strength to build the workers' and soldiers' government (...) We hold out our hands to the workers of the whole world and invite them to make the world revolution (...). I proclaim the free socialist republic of Germany" (Liebknecht, 9th November).
In addition he warned the workers not to make do with what they had achieved, and called on them to seize power and for the international unification of the working class.
The old regime did not use force on 9th of November to defend itself. However this was not because it hesitated to shed blood (it had millions of dead on its conscience) but because the revolution had disorganized the army by withdrawing a large number of soldiers who could have fired on the people. Just as in Russia in February 1917, when the soldiers sided with the workers in struggle, the reaction of the German soldiers was an important factor in the balance of class forces. But it was only because the working class organized itself, came out of the factories to "occupy the street" and unified en masse that the crucial question of the workers in uniform could be resolved. By convincing them of the need to fraternize the workers showed that it was they who had the leading role!
In the afternoon of 9th November thousands of delegates met at Cirque Busch. R. Muller, one of the main leaders of the revolutionary "Delegates" made an appeal that "the election of workers' and soldiers' councils be organized in every factory and military unit on 10th November. The councils elected must hold an assembly at Cirque Busch at 17:00 hours to elect a provisional government. The factories must elect one member to the workers' council for every 1,000 workers (male and female). Likewise the soldiers must elect one member to the soldiers' council per battalion. The smaller factories (less than 500 workers) must each elect a delegate. The assembly insists that an organ of authority be nominated by the assembly of councils".
In this way the workers took the first steps to create a situation of dual power. Would they manage to go as far as their class brothers in Russia?
The Spartakists, for their part, were in favor of strengthening the pressure and initiatives emanating from the local councils. The living democracy of the working class, the active participation of the workers, general assemblies in the factories, the designation of delegates who are responsible to these and are revocable; this is what the practice of the working class must be!
The revolutionary workers and soldiers occupied the print works of the Berliner-Lokal-Anzeiger on the evening of 9th November and printed the first issue of the newspaper Die rote Fahne; which promptly warned that: "There is no community of interests with those who have betrayed you for the last four years. Down with capitalism and its agents! Long live the revolution! Long live the International!".
The question of the seizure of power by the working class: the bourgeoisie stands to its guns
The first workers' and soldiers' council in Berlin (called the Executive) soon saw itself as an organ of authority; in its first proclamation on 11th November it declared itself to be the supreme unit of control over the whole of the public administration of the districts, the Lander and the Reich as well as the military administration.
But the ruling class did not cheerfully cede territory to the working class. On the contrary, it was to put up a most bitter resistance.
In fact, when Liebknecht declared the socialist republic in front of the Hohenzollern residence, the prince Max von Baden abdicated and handed over government affairs to Ebert as chancellor. The SPD proclaimed the "free republic of Germany".
So the SPD took official charge of governmental affairs; they called "for calm and order" and announced the holding of early ''free elections"; they realized that they could only oppose the movement by sapping it from within.
They set up their own workers' and soldiers' council that was composed entirely of SPD functionaries and upon which no-one had conferred any sort of legitimacy. Following this the SPD announced that the movement would be directed by itself and the USPD in unison.
Since then this tactic of encircling the movement and destroying it from within has been re-used constantly by the leftists with their bogus, self-proclaimed strike committees and their co-ordinations. Social-democracy and its successors, the groups on the extreme left of capital, specialize in placing themselves at the head of the movement and giving the impression that they are its legitimate representatives.
While trying to cut the ground from beneath the feet of the Executive by acting directly within it, the SPD announced the formation of a government including the USPD. The latter accepted but the Spartakists (who were still members of the USPD at the time) declined the offer. Although the difference between the USPD and the Spartakists was not very clear to the vast majority of workers, the Spartakists nevertheless were correct on the formation of the government. They sensed the trap and understood that you should not get into the same boat as the class enemy.
The best way to combat the workers' illusions in the left parties is not, as the Trotskyists and other leftists repeat unceasingly today, to put them into power and let them unmask themselves. What is necessary for the development of the class' consciousness is an absolutely clear and strict demarcation between classes, nothing less.
On the evening of 9th November the SPD and the leadership of the USPD proclaimed themselves the people's commissars and the government invested by the Executive Council.
The SPD demonstrated all its dexterity. It could now act against the working class from the government benches as well as in the name of the Executive of the councils. Ebert was both chancellor of the Reich and commissar of the people elected by the Executive of the councils; in this way he could seem to be on the side of the revolution. The SPD already had die confidence of the bourgeoisie but to succeed so skillfully in winning that of the workers, it demonstrated its ability to maneuver and mystify. There is a lesson for the working class here too: about the deceitful way the left forces of capital work.
Let us examine more closely how the SPD worked, specifically at the assembly of the workers' and soldiers' council on 10th November where there were about 3, 000 delegates present. No control over the mandates was exercised which meant that the soldiers' representatives were in the majority.
Ebert was the first to speak. According to him "the old fratricidal dispute" had ended now that the SPD and the USPD had formed a common government, it was now a matter of "undertaking the development of the economy together on the basis of socialist principles. Long live the unity of the German working class and the German soldiers". In the name of the USPD Haase celebrated "the refound unity": "We want to consolidate the victories of the great socialist revolution. The government will be a socialist government".
"Those who only yesterday were against the revolution are no longer against it" (E. Barth, 10th November 1918). "Everything must to done to prevent the coming of a counter-revolution".
So while the SPD did all in its power to mystify the working class, the USPD helped serve as a cover for its maneuvers. The Spartakists were aware of the danger; during this assembly Liebknecht stated: "I must water down the wine of your enthusiasm. The counter-revolution is already on the march, it's already in action ... I tell you this: the enemy is all around you! (He listed the counter-revolutionary aims of social-democracy). I realize how disagreeable this disturbance is to you, but even if you shoot me I'll say what I think it's essential to say".
So the Spartakists warned against the presence of the class enemy and insisted on the need to overthrow the system. For them what was at stake was not a change of personnel but the overthrow of the system itself.
On the other hand the SPD, with the USPD in its wake, worked to keep the system in place, pretending that by changing the leaders and installing a new government the working class had obtained a victory.
Here too the SPD have provided a lesson for the defenders of capital; a lesson on how to turn to anger of the workers against individual leaders in order to prevent it from being directed against the system as a whole. This way of working has been constantly used since then[2].
The SPD hammered this home in its newspaper of 10th November where it wrote, under the title "Unity and not a fratricidal struggle":
Capital's two weapons of political sabotage
From this moment on, the SPD threw a whole arsenal of weapons into the campaign against the working class. Alongside the "call to unity", it injected the poison of bourgeois democracy. According to the SPD, the introduction of "universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage for all men and women was presented both as the revolution's most important political conquest, and as the means to transform the order of capitalist society into socialism, by the will of the people and following a methodical plan". The SPD made believe that the goal had been reached, with the proclamation of the republic and the appointment of its own ministers; and that the Kaiser's abdication and Ebert's nomination as Chancellor meant the creation of a free People's State. In reality, all that had happened was the elimination of an unimportant anachronism, since the bourgeoisie had long been the politically dominant class; now the head of state was no longer a monarch, but a bourgeois. That did not change things much ... Moreover it is clear that the call for democratic elections was aimed directly against the workers' councils. The SPD bombarded the working class with an intensive, lying and criminal propaganda:
"Whoever wants bread, must want peace. Whoever wants peace, must want the Constituant, the freely elected representation of the whole German people. Whoever goes against the Constituant, or hesitates, is taking peace, bread and liberty away from you, is robbing you of the immediate fruits of the victory of the revolution: he is a counter-revolutionary.
Socialization will and must take place (...) by the will of the working people who, fundamentally, want to abolish this economy driven by the individual search for profit. But it will be a thousand times easier to impose if it is decreed by the Constituant, than ordered by the dictatorship of some revolutionary committee or other (...)
If we cite the SPD at such length, it is only to get an idea of the cunning and specious arguments used by Capital's left wing.
This reveals a classic characteristic of the bourgeoisie's action against the class struggle in highly industrialized countries: when the proletariat expresses its strength and aspires to its own unification, it is always the left forces who intervene with the most adroit demagogy. It is they who pretend to act in the interest of the workers, and try to sabotage the struggle from the inside, preventing the movement from taking its decisive steps.
In Germany, the revolutionary working class confronted a far stronger adversary than had the Russian workers. To deceive the class, the SPD adopted a radical language, supposedly in the interest of the revolution, and took the head of the movement when in reality it was the main agent of the bourgeois state. It acted against the working class, not as a party outside the state, but as its spearhead.
The first days of revolutionary confrontation had already shown the general nature of the class struggle in highly industrialized countries: a bourgeoisie versed in every cunning ruse confronted a strong working class. It would be an illusion to think that the class could gain a victory so easily.
As we will see later, the unions acted as Capital's second pillar, and collaborated with the bosses immediately after the movement's outbreak. After organizing military production during the war, they intervened with the SPD to defeat the movement. A few concessions were made, including the eight-hour day, in order to prevent any further radicalization of the working class.
But even political sabotage and the SPD's undermining of the working class' consciousness were not enough: the traitor party simultaneously made an agreement with the army for military action.
Repression
General Groener, the army Chief of Staff, who had collaborated daily with the SPD and the unions throughout the war, explained:
"We allied ourselves to fight Bolshevism. It was impossible to restore the monarchy (...) I had advised the Feldmarschall not to combat the revolution by force, because given the state of mind of the troops, it was to be feared that such a method would end in failure. I proposed that the military high command should ally with the SPD, since there was no party with enough influence among the people, and the masses, to rebuild a governmental force with the military command. The parties of the right had completely disappeared, and it was out of the question to work with the radical extremists. In the first place, we had to snatch power from the hands of the Berlin workers' and soldiers' councils. An undertaking was planned with this aim in view. Ten divisions were to enter Berlin. Ebert agreed (...) We had worked out a program which planned, after the arrival of the troops, to clean up Berlin and disarm the Spartakists. This was also agreed with Ebert, to whom I was especially grateful for his absolute love for the fatherland (...) This alliance was sealed against the Bolshevik danger and the system of councils" (October-November 1925, Zeugenaussage).
With this aim in view, Groener, Ebert and their accomplices maintained a daily telephone contact between 11: 00 at night and 1:00 in the morning, on secret telephone lines, and met to concert their action.
Contrary to October in Russia, where power fell into the workers' hands with scarcely a drop of blood shed, the German bourgeoisie immediately prepared, alongside its political sabotage, to unleash civil war. For the very first day, it began gathering the means necessary for military repression.
The intervention of revolutionaries
To evaluate the intervention of revolutionaries, we need to examine their ability to analyses correctly the movement of the class, the evolution of the balance of class forces, what had been achieved, and their ability to put forward the clearest perspectives. What were the Spartakists saying?
"The revolution has begun. What is called for now is not jubilation at what has been accomplished, not triumph over the beaten foe, but the strictest self-criticism and iron concentration of energy in order to continue the work we have begun. For our accomplishments are small and the foe has not been beaten.
What has been achieved? The monarchy has been swept away, supreme governing power had been transferred into the hands of the workers' and soldiers' representatives. But the monarchy was never the real enemy; it was only a facade, the frontispiece of imperialism (...)
The abolition of the rule of capitalism, the realization of the social order of socialism
- this and nothing less is the historical theme of the present revolution. This is a huge work which cannot be completed in the twinkling of an eye by a few decrees from above; it can be born only of the conscious action of the mass of workers in the cities and in the country, and brought successfully through the maze of difficulties only by the highest intellectual maturity and unflagging idealism of the masses of the people.
The path of the revolution follows clearly from its ends, its method follows from its task. All power in the hands of the working masses, in the hands of the workers' and soldiers' councils, protection of the work of the revolution against its lurking enemies - this is the guiding principle of all measures to be taken by the revolutionary government.
Every step, every act by the government must, like a compass, point in this direction:
- re-election and improvement of the local workers' and soldiers' councils so that the first chaotic and impulsive gestures of their formation are replaced by a conscious process of understanding the goals, tasks and methods of the revolution;
- regularly scheduled meetings of these representatives of the masses and the transfer of real political power from the small committee of the Executive Council into the broader basis of the workers' and soldiers' councils;
- immediate convocation of the national council of workers and soldiers in order to establish the proletariat of all Germany as a class, as a compact political power, and to make them the bulwark and impetus of the revolution;
- immediate organization, not of the "farmers ", but of the agrarian proletariat and smallholders who, as a class, have until now been outside the revolution;
- formation of a proletarian Red Guard for the permanent protection of the revolution, and training of a workers' militia in order to prepare the whole proletariat to be on guard at all times;
- suppression of the old organs of administration, justice and the army of the absolutist militarist police state;
- immediate confiscation of dynastic property and possessions, and of landed property as initial temporary measures to guarantee the people's food supply, since hunger is the most dangerous ally of the counter-revolution;
- immediate convocation of a World Labour Congress in Germany in order to emphasize clearly and distinctly the socialist and international character of the revolution, for only in the International, in the world revolution of the proletariat, is the future of the German revolution anchored" (Rosa Luxemburg, "The Beginning", Die Rote Fahne, 18th November 1918).
Destruction of the counter-revolution's positions of political power, erection and consolidation of the proletarian power, these were the two tasks that the Spartakists put to the fore with remarkable clarity.
"The result of the first week of the revolution is as follows: in the state of the Hohenzollerns, not much has basically changed; the workers' and soldiers' government is acting as the deputy of the imperialist government that has gone bankrupt. All its acts and omissions are governed by fear of the working masses (...)
The reactionary state of the civilized world will not become a revolutionary people's state within twenty-four hours. Soldiers who yesterday, were murdering the revolutionary proletariat in Finland, Russia and the Ukraine, and workers who calmly allowed this to happen, have not become in twenty-four hours supporters of socialism or clearly aware of their goals" (Luxemburg, op cit).
The Spartakists' analysis, that this was no bourgeois revolution but the counter-revolution already on the march, their ability to analyze the situation clearly and with a grasp of the overall situation, show how vital for the class' movement are its revolutionary political organizations.
The workers' councils, spearhead of the revolution
As we have said above, in the great cities workers' and soldiers' councils were formed everywhere during the first days of November. Although the councils appeared "spontaneously", this came as no surprise to the revolutionaries. They had already appeared in Russia, and also in Austria and Hungary. As Lenin said in March 1919, speaking for the Communist International: "This form is the Soviet regime with the dictatorship of the proletariat: these words were "Greek" to the masses until recently. Now, thanks to the system of Soviets, this Greek has been translated into all the world's modern languages; the practical form of the dictatorship has been discovered by the working masses" (Speech at the opening of the first Congress of the Communist International).
The appearance of the workers' councils reflects the determination of the working class to take its own destiny in hand. The workers' councils can only appear when there is a massive activity throughout the class, and a massive and profound development of class consciousness is under way. This is why the councils are no more than the spearhead of a profound global movement within the class, and why they are so strongly dependent on the activity of the class as a whole. If the class' activity in the factories weakens, if its combativity and its consciousness retreat, this necessarily affects the life of the councils. They are the means of centralizing the class struggle; they are the lever whereby the class lays claim to and imposes its power in society.
In many towns, the councils did indeed begin to take measures to oppose the bourgeois state. As soon as the councils came into existence, the workers tried to paralyze the bourgeois state apparatus, to take decisions themselves in the place of the bourgeois government, and to put them into practice. This was the beginning of the period of dual power, just as it had been in February 1917 in Russia. This happened everywhere, but it was most visible in Berlin, the seat of government.
Bourgeois sabotage
Because the workers' councils are the lever for centralizing the workers' struggle, because all the initiative of the masses converges within them, it is vital for the class to keep control of them.
In Germany, the capitalist class used a real Trojan horse against the councils, thanks to the SPD. A workers' party up until 1914, the SPD fought the councils, then sabotaged them from inside and turned them away from their real objective, all in the name of the working class.
The SPD used every trick imaginable to get its own delegates into the councils. The Berlin Executive Council was at first composed of six delegates each from the SPD and USPD, and a dozen soldiers' delegates. And yet, in Berlin the SPD used the pretext of a necessary parity of votes and unity of the working class to introduce many of its own men into the Executive Council, without any decision being taken by any kind of workers' assembly. Thanks to this tactic of insisting on "parity of votes between the parties", the SPD received more delegates than its real influence in the class warranted. In the provinces, things were much the same: out of 40 major cities, about 30 workers' and soldiers' councils were under the dominant influence of the SPD and USPD leaders. Only in those towns where the Spartakists had more influence did the workers' councils take a more radical direction.
As far as the councils' tasks were concerned, the SPD tried to sterilize them. Whereas the councils by their very nature tend to act as a counter-power to that of the bourgeois state, and even to destroy the latter, the SPD managed to weaken the class' organs, and subject them to the bourgeois state. It did so by spreading the idea, first that the councils should consider themselves as transitional organs, until the elections for the national assembly, but also, to strip them of their class character, that they should be opened to the whole population, to all strata of the population. In many towns, the SPD created "committees of public safety", which included all sections of the population - from peasants and small shopkeepers to the workers - with the same rights in these organisms.
From the outset, the Spartakists pushed for the formation of Red Guards, to impose the councils' decisions by force if necessary. The SPD torpedoed this initiative in the soldiers' councils on the pretext that it "expressed a lack of confidence in the soldiers".
In the Berlin Executive Council, there were constant confrontations on the measures to be adopted and the direction to be taken. Although it cannot be said that all the workers' delegates were sufficiently clear or determined on every question, the SPD did everything it could to undermine the council's authority from both inside and out:
- as soon as the Executive Council gave one set of orders, others would be imposed by the Council of People's Commissars (led by the SPD);
- the Executive never disposed of its own press, and had to beg for space in the bourgeois press in order to publish its own resolutions. The SPD delegates did everything to keep it this way;
- when, in November and December, strikes broke out in the Berlin factories, the Executive Committee under the influence of the SPD took position against them, although they expressed the strength of the working class, and could have made it possible to correct the errors of the Executive Council;
- finally, the SPD - as a leading force in the bourgeois government - used the threat of the Allies, supposedly ready to intervene militarily and occupy Germany to prevent its "Bolshevization", to make the workers hesitate, and put a break on the movement. For example, they put it about that if the workers' councils went too far, then the USA would stop the delivery of food supplies to the starving population.
Whether through the threat of outside intervention, or by internal sabotage, the SPD used every possible means against the working class in movement.
From the outset, the SPD did everything in its power to isolate the councils from their base in the factories.
In every enterprise, the councils were made up delegates elected by the general assemblies, and responsible to them. If the workers were to lose their power of decision in the general assemblies, or if the councils became detached from their roots, their base in the factories, then they would themselves be weakened and would inevitably fall victim to the bourgeois counter-offensive. This is why, from the outset, the SPD pushed for the councils to be constituted by sharing out seats proportionally among the political parties. The assemblies' power to elect and revoke their delegates is no formal principle of workers' democracy, but the lever whereby the proletariat can - from its most basic component - direct and control its struggle. The experience in Russia had already shown how essential was the activity of the factory committees. If the workers' councils were no longer required to account for themselves before the class, before the assemblies which elected them, and if the class is no longer capable of exercising its control over them, then this means that its movement is weakening, and that power is slipping from its hands.
In Russia, Lenin had made this clear:
"To control, it is necessary to hold power (...) If I put control to the fore, masking this fundamental condition, then I am telling an untruth and playing the game of the capitalists and imperialists (...) Without power, control is a hollow petty-bourgeois phrase which hinders the march and development of the revolution" (Lenin, "Report on the Present Situation" to the April Conference).
Whereas in Russia, from the very first weeks the councils based on the workers and soldiers disposed of real power, the Executive of Berlin Councils had none. As Rosa Luxemburg rightly said: "The Executive of the united Russian councils is - whatever may be written against it - something else again from the Berlin executive. One is the head and brain of a powerful revolutionary proletarian organization, the other is the fifth wheel on the carriage of a crypto-capitalist governmental clique; the first is the inexhaustible fountain of total proletarian power, the other is without strength and without orientation; the first is the living spirit of the revolution, the other is its tomb" (Rosa Luxemburg, 12th December 1918).
The national Congress of councils
On 23rd November, the Berlin Executive called a national congress of councils, to be held ill Berlin on 16th December. This initiative was supposed to unite all lie forces of lie working class: in fact, it would be used against them. The SPD imposed the election, in the different regions of the Reich, of one worker delegate per 200,000 inhabitants and one soldier delegate per 100,000 soldiers, whereby the workers' representation was diminished, while that of the soldiers was increased. Instead of reflecting the strength and activity of the class in the factories, this congress, under the impetus of the SPD, was to slip from the workers' control.
Moreover, according to these same saboteurs, only "workers' delegates", of the "workers by hand or brain" should be elected. All the SPD bureaucrats were present, under the pretext of their original trades; by contrast, the members of the Spartakus League, who appeared in the open, were excluded. By pulling every imaginable string, the forces of the bourgeoisie managed to impose themselves, whereas the revolutionaries who acted openly were prevented from speaking.
When the Congress of councils met on 16th December, it began by rejecting the participation of delegates from Russia. "The general assembly meeting on 16th December does not deal with international deliberations, but only with German affairs in which foreigners cannot of course participate (...) The Russian delegation is nothing other than a representative of the Bolshevik dictatorship". This was the justification given in Vorwarts (no 340, 11th December 1918). By getting this decision adopted, the SPD immediately stripped the conference of what should have been its most fundamental character: as an expression of the world proletarian revolution which had begun in Russia.
In the same logic of sabotage and derailment, the SPD got the Congress to vote the call for the election of a constituent assembly for the 19th January 1919.
The Spartakists understood the maneuver, and called for a mass demonstration in front of the Congress. More than 250,000 demonstrators gathered under the slogan: "For the workers' and soldiers' councils, no to the national assembly!".
As the Congress acted against the interests of the working class, Liebknecht addressed the demonstrators: "We demand that the Congress take all political power into its hands to bring in socialism, and that it should not transfer it to the constituent assembly, which will not be in any way a revolutionary organ. We demand that the Congress of councils stretch out its hand to our class brothers in Russia, for them to join in the work of this Congress. We want the world revolution and the unification of all the workers in every country, in the workers' and soldiers' councils" (17th December 1918).
The revolutionaries understood the vital necessity of mobilizing the working masses, of putting pressure on their delegates, of electing new ones, of developing the initiative of the general assemblies in the factories, of defending the councils' autonomy against the bourgeois national assembly, and of insisting on the international unification of the working class.
Yet even after this massive demonstration, the congress continued to refuse the participation of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, on the pretext that they were not workers, while the bourgeoisie had already managed to get its own men into the councils. During the Congress, the SPD representatives took the defense of the army, to prevent its further disintegration by the soldiers' councils. The congress also decided not to receive any more delegations from workers and soldiers, so as not to be put under pressure by them.
At the end of its sessions, the congress made the confusion still worse by blathering on about the so-called first measures of socialization, when the workers had not even taken power. "Carrying out socio-political measures in isolated, individual companies is an illusion, as long as the bourgeoisie still hold political power in its hands" (IKD, Der Kommunist). The central questions of disarming the counter-revolution and overthrowing the bourgeois government were pushed aside.
What should the revolutionaries do against such a development?
On 16th December in Dresden, Otto Ruhle - who had meanwhile moved towards councilism - threw in the towel as soon as the town's social-democrats got the upper hand in the local workers' and soldiers' councils. The Spartakists, however, did not abandon the battlefield to the enemy. After denouncing the national congress of councils, they called for the initiative of the working class: "The congress of councils has overstepped its powers, it has betrayed the mandate it was given by the workers' and soldiers' councils, it has cut away the ground on which its existence and authority were based. The workers' and soldiers' councils must henceforth develop their power and defend their right to exist with tenfold energy. They will declare null and void the counter-revolutionary work of their unworthy men of confidence" (Rosa Luxemburg, Ebert's Janissaries, 20th December 1918).
The revolution's lifeblood is the activity of the masses
The Spartakists' responsibility was to push forward the masses' initiative, to intensify their activity. This is the orientation that they were to put forward ten days later at the founding Congress of the KPD. We will deal with the work of this congress in a later article.
The Spartakists had understood that the pulse of the revolution beats in the councils; the proletarian revolution is the first to be carried out by the great majority of the population, by the exploited class. Unlike the bourgeois revolutions which could be carried out by minorities, the proletariat can only be victorious if the revolution is constantly fed and pushed forward by the activity of the whole class. The councils, and the council delegates, are not a separate pan of the class which can isolate themselves from the rest, or even protect themselves from it, or maintain the rest of the class in a state of passivity. No, the revolution can only advance through the conscious, vigilant, active and critical activity of the entire class.
For the working class in Germany, this meant entering into a new phase, where it would have to increase the pressure coming from the factories. As for the Communists, the absolute priority was their agitation in the local councils. The Spartakists thus followed the policy that Lenin had already advocated in April 1917, when the situation in Russia was comparable to that now in Germany:
"The masses must be made to see that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the only possible form of revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is, as long as this government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic, and persistent explanation of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.
As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticizing and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the people may overcome their mistakes by experience" (Lenin, April Theses no 4).
We cannot properly understand the dynamic in the councils unless we analyze closely the role of the soldiers.
Liebknecht reported: "this had the effect of destabilizing the army. But as soon as the bourgeoisie put an end to the war, a split appeared within the army. The mass of soldiers is revolutionary against militarism, against the war and against the open representatives of imperialism. With regard to socialism, they are still undecided, hesitant and immature" (Liebknecht, 19th November 1918). While the war continued and the troops remained mobilized, soldiers' councils were formed.
"The soldiers' councils are the expression of a mass composed of all the classes in society, within which the proletariat is by far the largest, but certainly not the proletariat conscious of its aims and ready for the class struggle. Often they are formed directly from above, on the initiative of officers and circles of the high nobility, who by adapting adroitly seek to keep their influence over the soldiers by getting themselves elected as the latter's representatives" (Liebknecht, 21st November 1918).
As such, the army is a classic instrument of repression and imperialist conquest, controlled and led by officers under the exploiting state. In a revolutionary situation, where thousands of soldiers are in effervescence, where normal hierarchical relations are no longer respected, but where the workers in uniform take decisions collectively, all this can lead to the disintegration of the army, especially since they are armed. But to arrive at such a situation, it is necessary that the working class, by its activity, should provide a sufficiently strong reference point for the soldiers.
This dynamic existed during the final phase of the war. And this is why the bourgeoisie, feeling the danger rising, stopped the war to prevent a still further radicalization in the army. The new situation that was thus created allowed the ruling class to "calm" the soldiers and to separate them from the revolution, while the movement of the working class was not itself strong enough to attract the majority of the soldiers to its own side. This allowed the bourgeoisie all the better to manipulate the soldiers in its own favor.
The weight of the soldiers was important during the movement's ascendant phase - and indeed was vital in putting an end to the war; but their role was to change when the bourgeoisie began its counter -offensive.
The revolution can only be carried out internationally
The capitalists had fought for four years, sacrificing millions of human lives, but no sooner had the revolution broken out in Russia, and above all when the German proletariat began to move, than they all united against the working class. The Spartakists understood the danger that could result from the isolation of the working class in Germany and Russia. On 25th November, they raised the following call: "To the proletarians of all countries! The hour has struck to settle accounts with capitalist rule. But this great task cannot be carried out by the German proletariat alone. It can only struggle and win by calling on the solidarity of the proletarians of the entire world. Comrades of the belligerent nations, you know our situation. You know that your governments, because they have gained the victory, are blinding many elements of the people with the sparkle of victory (...) Your victorious capitalists are ready to drown in blood our revolution, which they fear as much as yours'. "Victory" has not made you more free, it has only enslaved you more. If your ruling classes succeed in stifling the revolution in Russia and Germany, they will turn against you with redoubled ferocity (...) Germany is giving birth to the social revolution, but only the international proletariat can build socialism" (To the proletarians of all countries, Spartakusbund, 25th November 1918).
While the SPD did everything it could to separate the German workers from those in Russia, the revolutionaries committed all their strength to unify the working class.
In this respect, the Spartakists were aware that "Today there naturally reigns among the peoples of the Entente a strong intoxication of victory; and the jubilation at the ruin of German imperialism and the liberation of France and Belgium makes so much noise that we cannot expect for the moment a revolutionary echo from the working classes in those countries which were our enemies until yesterday" (Liebknecht, 23rdDecember 1918). They knew that the revolution had created a serious split in the ranks of the working class. Capital's defenders, and in particular the SPD, began to set the workers in Germany against those in other countries. They even brandished the threat of foreign intervention. All this has often been used since by the ruling class.
The bourgeoisie learnt the lessons of Russia
Under the SPD's leadership, the bourgeoisie signed the armistice putting an end to the war on 11th November for fear that the working class would continue its radicalization, and go down "the Russian road". This ushered in a new situation.
As R Muller, one of the leading revolutionary "Delegates", put it: "The whole war policy, with all its effects on the workers' situation, the Sacred Union with the bourgeoisie, everything that had provoked the workers' anger, was forgotten".
The bourgeoisie had learnt its lesson from Russia. If the Russian bourgeoisie had put an end to the war in April of March 1917, the October Revolution would certainly have been either impossible, or at the least far more difficult. It was therefore necessary to stop the war, in the hope of cutting the ground from under the feet of the revolutionary class movement. Here also, the German workers faced a different situation from that confronting their class brothers in Russia.
"If we place ourselves on the terrain of historical development, then we cannot expect, in a Germany which has given us the frightful spectacle of 4th August and the four years that followed, a sudden upsurge, the 9th November 1918, of a grandiose class revolution conscious of its goals; what we experienced on 9th November, was three quarters the collapse of the existing imperialism, rather than the victory of a new principle. It was simply that for imperialism, a colossus with feet of clay, rotten from within, its time had come, it had to collapse; what followed was a more or less chaotic movement, without any battle plan, and with very little consciousness; the only coherent link, the only constant and liberating principle was summed up in one slogan: creation of workers' and soldiers' councils" (R Luxemburg at the founding Congress of the KPD).
This is why we should not confuse the beginning of the movement with its final goal, for "no proletariat in the world, not even the German proletariat, can rid itself overnight of the stigmata of thousands of years of servitude. The proletariat's situation does not reach its highest level, either politically or spiritually, on the first day of the revolution. It is only the struggle of the revolution that will, in this sense, raise the proletariat to its complete maturity" (R Luxemburg, 3rd December 1918).
The weight of the past
The Spartakists were right to seek the causes of these great difficulties of the class, in the weight of the past. The confidence that many workers still had in the policies of the SPD was a serious weakness. There were many who thought that the party's war policy had been due to a passing confusion. Worse, many saw the war being solely due to the ignoble machinations of the governmental clique which had just been overthrown. Remembering the more or less tolerable situation prior to the war, they hoped to escape soon and for good, from the misery of the present. Moreover, US President Wilson's promises of the unity of nations and democracy seemed to offer guarantee against new wars. The democratic republic they were "offered" appeared, not as the bourgeois republic, but as the soil where socialism could blossom. In short, the pressure of democratic illusions, and the lack of experience in confronting the sabotage of the unions and the SPD were determining.
"In all previous revolutions, the combatants confronted each other openly, class against class, program against program, shield against sword (...) [Beforehand] it was always the supporters of the system under threat or overthrown who took counter-revolutionary measures in the hope of saving it (...) In the revolution today the troops defending the old order are drawn up, not under their own flag and in the uniform of the ruling class, but under the flag of the social-democratic party (...) Bourgeois class rule is today fighting its last historic world struggle under a foreign flag, under the flag of the revolution itself. It is a socialist party, in other words the most original creation of the workers' movement and the class struggle, which has transformed itself into the most important instrument of the bourgeois counter-revolution. The basis, the tendency, the politics, the psychology, the method, are all capitalist to the core. All that remains is the flag, the apparatus and the phraseology of socialism" (R Luxemburg, A Pyrrhic VIctory, 21st December 1918).
The SPD's counter-revolutionary character could not be more clearly described.
This is why the Spartakists defined the next stage of the movement as follows:
"The passage from the predominantly soldiers' revolution of 9th November 1918 to a specifically workers' revolution, the passage from a superficial, purely political upheaval, to the long-term process of a general economic confrontation between Capital and Labor, demands of the working class quite another degree of political maturity, education and tenacity than that which has sufficed for the first phase of the beginning" (R Luxemburg, 3rd January 1919).
Certainly, the movement at the beginning of November was not solely a "soldiers' revolution", for without the workers in the factories the soldiers would never have reached such a level of radicalization. The Spartakists saw the perspective of a real step forward when in late November and early December, strikes broke out in the Ruhr and Upper Silesia. This revealed the activity of the working class in the factories and a diminution in the weight of the war and the role of the soldiers. With the end of hostilities, the economic collapse led to a still greater deterioration in the working class' living conditions. In the Ruhr many miners stopped work, and to impose their demands they would travel to other mines to seek the solidarity of their class brothers, and so build a powerful front. The struggles were thus to develop, then retreat, then go forward again with new strength.
Once the bourgeoisie had put an end to the war under the pressure of the working class, and had passed onto the offensive to counter the proletariat's first attempts to take power, the movement entered a new phase. Either the factory workers were to prove capable of developing a new thrust, to pass to a "specifically workers' revolution", or the bourgeoisie would be able to continue its counter-offensive.
In the next article, we will look at the question of the insurrection, the fundamental conceptions of the workers' revolution, the role that revolutionaries must and did, play in it.
DV
[1] The revolutionary movement was especially strong in Cologne. Within the space of 24 hours, on 9th November, 45,000 soldiers refused to obey their officers and deserted. On 7th November the revolutionary soldiers from Kiel were already on the way to Cologne. The future chancellor K. Adenauer, who was at that time the city's mayor, and the leadership of the SPD took measures to "calm the situation".
[2] From that time on capital has repeatedly used the same tactic: in 1980, when Poland was in the grip of a workers' mass strike, the bourgeoisie changed the government. The list of examples, where the dominant class has changed personnel to prevent the workers' anger being directed against capitalist domination, is endless.
In April, the ICC held its 11th International Congress. In so far as communist organizations are a part of the proletariat, a historic product of the class and an active factor in its struggle for emancipation, their Congresses, which are their supreme body, are extremely important to the working class. This is why communists have to give an account of this essential moment in the life of their organization.
Organizational problems in the history of the workers' movement...
The historic experience of the revolutionary organizations of the proletariat demonstrates that questions regarding their functioning are political questions in their own right and need to be looked at with considerable attention and depth.
There are many examples in the workers' movement of this importance of the organizational question, but we can speak more particularly here of the IWMA (International Working Men's Association, later known as the 1st International), and of the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), held in 1903.
The IWMA was founded in September 1864 in London, on the initiative of a number of French and English workers. It adopted a centralized structure straight away, with a central Council, which after the 1866 Geneva Congress was known as the General Council. Marx was to play a leading role within the Council, since it fell to him to write a large number of its basic texts, such as the IWMA's founding address, its statutes, and the address on the Paris Commune (The Civil War in France, May 1871). The IWMA (or "The International", as the workers called it) quickly became a "power" in the advanced countries (above all in Western Europe). Up till the 1871 Paris Commune, it regrouped a growing number of workers and was a leading-factor in the development of the proletariat's two essential weapons: its organization and its consciousness. This is why, indeed, the International was subjected to increasingly bitter attacks by the bourgeoisie: slander in the press, infiltration by informers, persecution of its members, etc. But the IWMA ran the greatest danger from the attacks of some of its own members against the International's very mode of organization.
Already, when the IWMA was founded, the provisional rules were translated by the Parisian sections, strongly influenced by Proudhon's federalist conceptions, in a way which considerably weakened the International's centralized character. But the most dangerous attacks were to come later, with the entry into its ranks of the "Alliance de la democratic socialiste" founded by Bakunin. This latter was to find fertile ground within important sections of the International, due to its own weaknesses which were in turn the result of the weaknesses of the proletariat at the time, a proletariat which had still not disengaged itself from the weaknesses of its previous stage of development.
Against the whimsical and antagonistic organizations of the sects, the International is a real, militant organization of the proletarian class of every country, linked together in their common struggle against the capitalists, the landowners, and their class power organized in the state. The statutes of the International therefore only recognize simple workers' societies, all pursuing the same aim, and all accepting the same program which limits itself to sketching the main traits of the proletarian movement, leaving the theoretical elaboration to the impulse given by the demands of the practical struggle, by the exchange of ideas in the sections, admitting all socialist convictions in their publications and congresses.
Just as, in any new historical phase, the old mistakes reappear for an instant only to disappear soon afterwards, so in the International we have seen the rebirth of sectarian sections within it ..." (The fictitious splits in the International, chapter IV, Circular of the General Council of 5th March 1872)
This weakness was especially marked in the most backward sectors of the European proletariat where it had only just emerged from the peasant and artisan classes. Bakunin, who entered the International in 1868 after the collapse of the "League for Peace and Liberty" (which regrouped bourgeois republicans, and of which he was a leading member), used these weaknesses to try to subject the International to his anarchist conceptions, and to bring it under his control. The tool for this operation was to be the "Alliance de la democratic socialiste"; which he had founded as a minority in the "League for Peace and Li berry". The AIIiance was both a public and a secret society, which in fact intended to form an International within the International. Its secret structure and the collusion this allowed amongst its members was supposed to ensure its "influence" over as many of the IWMA's sections as possible, especially those where anarchist conceptions encountered the greatest echo. In itself, the existence of several different trends of thought within the IWMA did not pose any problem[3]. By contrast, the activity of the Alliance, aimed at replacing the official structure of the International, was a serious factor of disorganization, and endangered the latter's very existence. The Alliance first tried to take control of the International at the Basle Congress in September 1869. With this aim in view, its members, in particular Bakunin and James Guillaume, warmly supported an administrative resolution strengthening the powers of the General Council. Failing in this, however, the Alliance (which itself had adopted secret statutes based on an extreme centralization[4] began a campaign against the "dictatorship" of the General Council, which it aimed to reduce to the role of a "statistical and correspondance bureau" to use the Alliancists terms, or to a mere "letter-box" as Marx answered them. Against the principle of centralization as an expression of the proletariat's international unity, the Alliance preached "federalism", the complete "autonomy of the sections", and the non-obligatory nature of Congress decisions. In fact, the Alliance wanted to do whatever it liked in the sections which had come under its control. The way would be open to the complete disorganization of the IWMA.
IWMA out of the hands of the Alliance, they also proposed that the General Council be moved to New York, far from the conflicts that were dividing the International. This was also a means for allowing the International to die a natural death (confirmed by the 1876 Philadelphia Conference), without its prestige being hijacked by the Bakuninist intriguers.
The latter, and the anarchists have perpetuated this legend, claimed that Marx and the General Council excluded Bakunin and Guillaume because of their different vision of the question of the state5] (when they did not explain the conflict between Marx and Bakunin by questions of personality). In short, Marx was supposed to have wanted to settle a disagreement on general theoretical questions with administrative measures. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The Hague Congress took no measures against the members of the Spanish delegation, who shared Bakunin's ideas and had belonged to the Alliance, but who declared that they no longer did so. Similarly, the "anti-authoritarian" IWMA formed after the Hague Congress from the Federations which refused to accept its decisions was not made up solely of anarchists, since it also included the German Lassalleans, who were great defenders of "state socialism" to use Marx's words. In fact, the real struggle within the IWMA was between those who stood for the unity of the workers' movement (and therefore the binding nature of Congress decisions), and those, who demanded the right to do whatever they pleased, each isolated from the others, treating the Congresses as mere assemblies, where everyone could exchange "points of view" without taking any decisions. With this informal mode of organization, it would fall to the Alliance to carry out, in secret, a real centralization of the Federations, as indeed Bakunin's correspondence explicitly stated. Putting these "anti-authoritarian" conceptions to work in the International would have been the best way to deliver it up to the intrigues, and the hidden and uncontrolled power of the Alliance, in other words the adventurers who led it.
The 2nd Congress of the RSDLP was the occasion for a similar confrontation between the defenders of a proletarian conception of the revolutionary organization, and the petty-bourgeois conception.
There are similarities between the situation in the West European workers' movement at the time of the IWMA, and the movement in Russia at the turn of the century. In both cases, the workers' movement was still in its youth, the separation in time being due to Russia's late industrial development. The IWMA's purpose was to regroup in a united organization, the different workers' societies that the proletariat's development had created. Similarly, the aim of the RSDLP's 2nd Congress was to unite the different committees, groups and circles of the social democracy which had developed in Russia and in exile. Following the disappearance of the Central Committee which had been formed by the RSDLP's 1st Congress in 1897, there had been almost no formal links between these different formations. The 2nd Congress thus saw, as with the IWMA, a confrontation between a conception of the organization representing the movement's past, that of the "Mensheviks" ("minorityites") and a conception expressing the requirements of the new situation, that of the "Bolsheviks" ("majorityites"):
"Under the name of the "minority" heterogeneous elements are regrouped in the Party who are united by the desire, conscious or not, to maintain the relations of a circle, the previous organizational form to the Party. Certain eminent militants of the most influential old circles, not having the habit of organizational restrictions that the Party must impose, are inclined to mechanically confuse the general interests of the Party and their circle interests, which can coincide in the period of circles" (Lenin, One step forward, two steps back).
Like the anarchists after the Hague Congress, the Mensheviks refused to recognize and apply the decisions of the 2nd RSDLP Congress, declaring that "the Congress is not divine" and that "its decisions are not sacred". In particular, just as the Bakuninists went to war against the principle of centralization and the "dictatorship of the General Council" after failing to take control of it, one reason that the Mensheviks began to reject centralization after the Congress was the fact that several of them had been removed from the central organs elected by the Congress. There are even likenesses in the way the Mensheviks campaigned against the Lenin's "personal dictatorship" and "iron fist", which echo Bakunin's accusations of Marx's "dictatorship" over the General Council.
"When I consider the approach of the friends of Martov after the Congress (...) I can only say that this is an insane attempt, unworthy of Party members, to tear the Party apart (...) And why? Solely because one is discontented at the makeup of the central organs, because objectively this is the only question which separated us, since the subjective appreciations (such as offence, insults, expulsions, pushing aside, casting slurs, etc) were nothing but the fruit of wounded pride and a sick imagination. This sick imagination and wounded pride lead straight to the most shameful gossiping: without waiting to find out about the activity of the new centers, nor having seen them in action, some go about spreading gossip about their "inadequacy" or about the "iron glove" of Ivan Ivanovitch, or the "fist" of Ivan Nikiforovitch, etc (...) Russian social-democracy still has a difficult step to take, from the circle spirit to the party spirit from a petty-bourgeois mentality to a consciousness of its revolutionary duty; gossip and the pressure of circles considered as a means of action, against discipline" (Lenin, Report on the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP).
Given the examples of the IWMA and the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, we can see the importance of questions linked to the mode of organization of revolutionary formations. In fact, these were the questions which were to produce the first decisive decantation between the proletarian current on the one hand, and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois currents on the other. This importance is no accident. It springs precisely from the fact that one of the main channels for the infiltration of ideologies foreign to the proletariat - bourgeois or petty-bourgeois - is precisely that of their functioning.
The history of the workers' movement is full of examples like this. We have only spoken of these two cases here, partly of course for reasons of space, but also because, as we will see later, there are striking similarities in the circumstances in which the IWMA, the RSDLP, and the ICC were formed.
... and in the history of the ICC
The ICC has already had to pay close attention to such questions on a number of occasions. This was the case for example, at its Founding Conference in January 1975, where it examined the question of international centralization (see "Report on the question of organization in our current", International Review no 1). A year later, at its First Congress, our organization returned to this question, adopting its statutes (see "The statutes of the revolutionary organization of the proletariat", International Review no 5). Finally, in January 1982, the ICC held an extraordinary international conference on this question following the crisis it had been through in 1981[6]. The I CC did not hide from the working class and the proletarian political milieu the difficulties it had faced at the beginning of the 80s. This is how they were described in the resolution adopted by its 5th Congress, cited in International Review no 35:
"Since its Fourth Congress, the ICC has been through the most serious crisis in its existence[7]. A crisis which wasn't limited to the vicissitudes of the "Chenier affair" and which profoundly shook the organization, very nearly making it fall apart, resulting, directly or indirectly in the departure of forty members and cutting in half the membership of its second largest section. A crisis which took the form of a blindness and disorientation the like of which the ICC has not seen since its creation. A crisis which demanded the mobilization of exceptional methods if it was to be overcome: the holding of an extraordinary international conference, the discussion and adoption of basic orientation texts on the functions and functioning of the revolutionary organization, the adoption of new statutes."
Such a transparent attitude vis-à-vis the difficulties encountered by our organization has nothing to do with any 'exhibitionism' on our part. The experience of communist organizations is an integral part of the experience of the working class. This is why Lenin devoted an entire book, One step forward, two steps back to the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP. By giving an account of its organizational life, the ICC is thus doing nothing other than assuming its responsibility in the face of the working class.
Obviously, when a revolutionary organization publicizes its problems and internal discussions, this is a choice dish for all the adversaries waiting to denigrate it. This is also, and even especially the case for the ICC. Certainly, we won't find any jubilation in the bourgeois press over the difficulties that our organization is going through today: the ICC is still too small, both in its size and in its influence amongst the working masses, for the bourgeoisie to have any interest in talking about it and trying to discredit it. It is preferable for the bourgeoisie to erect a wall of silence around the positions and even the existence of revolutionary organizations. This is why the work of denigrating them, and sabotaging their intervention, is undertaken by a whole series of groups and parasitic elements whose function is to drive away individuals who are coming towards class positions, to disgust them with any participation in the difficult task of developing a proletarian political milieu.
time sympathizers of the organization, whom the organization decided not to integrate, judging their clarity inadequate, or who gave up of themselves for fear of losing their "individuality" within the collective framework (this is the case, for example, with the late" Alptraum collective" in Mexico, or with Kamunist Kranti in India). In every case, they are elements whose frustration at their own lack of courage, flabbiness and impotence has been converted into a systematic hostility towards our organization. Obviously, these elements are absolutely incapable of building anything whatever. By contrast, they are often very effective, with their petty agitation and their concierge's chatter, at discrediting and destroying what the organization is trying to build.
However, it is not the wriggling of the parasites that will prevent the ICC from setting before the whole proletarian milieu the lessons of its own experience. In the preface to One step forward .... in 1904, Lenin wrote:
"They [our adversaries] exult and grimace at the sight of our discussions; obviously, they will try, to serve their own purposes, to brandish my pamphlet devoted to the defects and weaknesses in our Party. The Russian social-democrats are sufficiently tempered in battle not to be troubled by such pinpricks, and to continue in spite of everything with their task of self-criticism, mercilessly unveiling their own weaknesses, which will be overcome necessarily and without fail by the growth of the workers' movement. Let our adversaries try to give us an image of the situation in their own "parties" which comes close to that presented by the minutes of our 2nd Congress!".
It is in exactly the same spirit that we put before our readers substantial extracts from the resolution adopted at our XIth Congress. This is not a sign of the ICC's weakness, but on the contrary a testimony to its strength.
The problems faced by the ICC in the recent period
- "The 11th Congress thus clearly affirms: the ICC was in a situation of latent crisis, a crisis much deeper than the one which hit the organization at the beginning of the 80s, a crisis which, if the roots of the weaknesses weren't identified, threatened the very life of the organization." (Activities resolution, point I)
- "The causes of this grave illness threatening the organization are numerous, but we can highlight the main ones:
- the fact that the extraordinary conference of January 1982, which had the task of setting the organization back on its feet after the crisis of 1981, did not go far enough in analyzing the weaknesses that affect the ICC;
- even more, the fact that the ICC had not fully assimilated the acquisitions of this conference (...);
- the reinforcement of the destructive pressure of capitalist decomposition on the class and its communist organizations.
In this sense the only way the ICC could effectively deal with the mortal danger it faced was:
- to identify the importance of this danger (... );
- to mobilize the whole ICC, its militants, sections and organs around the priority of the defense of the organization;
- to reappropriate the acquisitions of the 1982 conference;
- to deepen these acquisitions on the basis of the framework they had provided." (ibid, point 2)
The struggle to redress the ICC began in autumn 1993 when we opened a discussion throughout the organization on an orientation text which recalled and updated the lessons of 1982 while going further into the historical origins of our weaknesses. The following concerns were at the center of this approach: the reappropriation of the acquisitions of our own organization and of the workers' movement as a whole, the continuity with the struggles of the movement, especially the fight against the penetration of alien ideologies, bourgeois and petty bourgeois.
"The framework of analysis the ICC adopted for laying bare the origins of its weaknesses was in continuity with the historic struggle waged by marxism against the influence of petty bourgeois ideology that weighed on the organization of the proletariat. More precisely, it referred to the struggle of the General Council of the IWMA against the activities of Bakunin and his followers, and of Lenin and the Bolsheviks against the opportunist and anarchistic conceptions of the Mensheviks during and after the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP. In particular, it was vital for the organization to have as its central concern, as it was for the Bolsheviks after 1903, the struggle against the circle spirit and for the party spirit. This was a priority for the ICC given the kinds of weaknesses which weighed on the ICC because of its origin in the circles which appeared in the wake of the historic resurgence of the proletariat and the end of the 60s; circles strongly marked by affinity type conceptions, contestationism, individualism, in a word, the anarchistic conceptions which came with the student revolts that accompanied and polluted the proletarian revival. It is in this sense that becoming aware of the weight of the circle spirit in our origins was an integral part of a general analysis elaborated long before, the one which saw the basis of our weaknesses in the break in the organic continuity with previous communist organizations, the result of the counter-revolution which descended on the working class at the end of the 20s. However, this realization allowed us to go further than we had done before and to go to the deeper roots of our difficulties, In particular, it allowed us to understand the phenomenon - already noted in the past but not sufficiently elucidated - of the formation of clans in the organization: these clans were in reality the result of the decomposition of the circle spirit which kept going long after the period in which circles had been an unavoidable step in the reconstruction of the communist vanguard. In so doing, those clans in turn became an active factor. The best guarantee for the large-scale survival of the circle spirit in the organization." (ibid, point 4).
Here the resolution makes a reference to a point from the autumn 93 orientation text, which highlighted the following question:
"One of the grave dangers which permanently threaten the organization, which put its unity in question and risk destroying it, is the constitution, even if it is not deliberate or conscious, of 'clans'. In a dynamic of the clan, common approaches do not share a real political agreement but links of friendship, loyalty, the convergence of specific personal interests or shared frustrations. Often, such a dynamic, to the extent that it is not founded on a real political convergence, accompanied by the existence of 'gurus', clan leaders, who guarantee the unity of the clan, and who may draw their power from a particular charisma, can even stifle political capacities and the judgment of other militants as a result of the fact they are presented or present themselves, as victims of such or such policy of the organization. When such a dynamic appears, the members or sympathizers of the clan can no longer decide for themselves, in their behavior or the decisions that they take, as a result of a conscious and rational choice based on the general interests of the organization, but as a result of the interests of the clan which tends to oppose itself to those of the rest of the organization."
This analysis was based on previous experiences of the workers' movement (for example, the attitude of the former editors of Iskra grouped around Martov who, unhappy with the decisions of the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, had formed the Menshevik fraction), but also on precedents in the history of the ICC. We can't go into detail here but what we can say is that the 'tendencies' which have appeared in the ICC (the one which split in 1978 to form the Groupe Communiste International, the 'Chenier tendency' in 1981, the 'tendency' which left the ICC at its 6th Congress to form the 'External Fraction of the ICC') corresponded much more to such a clan dynamic than to real tendencies based on an alternative positive orientation. The principal motor of these 'tendencies' wasn't the divergences their members may have had with the orientations of the organization (these divergences were completely heterogeneous, as the later trajectory of these 'tendencies' proved). Instead they were based on an agglomeration of elements frustrated and discontented with the central organs, of those 'loyal' to individuals who saw themselves as being 'persecuted' or insufficiently recognized.
The recovery of the ICC
While the existence of clans no longer had the same spectacular character as in the past, it still continued to undermine the organizational tissue in a quiet but dramatic way. In particular, the whole ICC (including the militants most directly involved in it) recognized that it was faced with a clan which occupied a particularly important position in the organization and which, while it was not simply an organic product of the ICC's weaknesses, had "concentrated and crystallized a great number of the deleterious characteristics which affected the organization and whose common denominator was anarchism ..." (Activities resolution, point .5).
This is why: "The ICC's understanding of the phenomenon of the clans and their particularly destructive role has allowed it to put its finger on a large amount of the bad functioning which affected most of the territorial sections. (...) It has also allowed it to understand the loss, pointed out by the activities report of the 10th Congress, of the 'spirit of regroupment' which characterized the first years of the ICC." (ibid).
Finally, after several days of very animated debates, in which there was a profound commitment from and a real unity between the delegations, the 11th Congress reached the following conclusions:
"... the Congress
notes the overall success of the combat engaged by the ICC in the autumn of
1993 (...) the -sometimes spectacular - redressment of some of
the sections with the greatest organizational difficulties in 1993 (...), the
deepening that has come from a number of sections in the ICC (...), all
these facts confirm the full validity of the combat both in its theoretical
bases and its concrete application (...) The Congress emphasizes particularly
the organization's deepening in its understanding of a whole series
"On the basis of these elements, the Xlth ICC Congress notes that the ICC is stronger today than it was at the previous Congress, that it is incomparably better armed to confront its responsibilities in future upsurges of the class struggle, although it is obviously still in a state of convalescence." (ibid, point 11).
This recognition of the positive outcome of the combat waged by the organization since the autumn of 1993 did not however lead to any feelings of euphoria in the Congress. The ICC has learned to mistrust any tendency to get carried away, which expresses less a proletarian approach than the penetration into the communists' ranks of petty bourgeois impatience. The combat waged by communist organizations and militants is a patient, long-term, often obscure process, and a real militant enthusiasm is not measured by outbursts of euphoria but the capacity to hold out against storms and stress, to resist the pernicious pressure of the ideology of the ruling class. This is why a recognition that the organization's struggle has been a success has not at all led us into any triumphalism:
"This does not mean that the combat we have conducted to date should come to an end. (...) The ICC will have to continue this combat through a permanent vigilance, the determination to identify every weakness and to confront it without delay. (...) In reality, the history of the workers' movement, including that of the ICC, teaches us, and the debate has fully confirmed this, that the struggle for the defence of the organization is a permanent one, and without respite. In particular, the ICC must remember that the Bolsheviks' struggle for the party spirit and against the circle spirit continued for many years. It will be the same for our organization, which will have to watch for and eliminate any demoralization, any feeling of impotence as a result of the length of the combat." (ibid, point 13).
Before concluding this part on the questions of organization discussed at the Congress, it is important to point out that the debates conducted by the ICC for 18 months did not lead to any splits (contrary, for example, to what happened at the Vlth Congress or in 1981). This is because right from the start the organization expressed an agreement with the theoretical arguments put forward for understanding the difficulties it was encountering. The absence of disagreement on this framework made it possible to avoid the crystallization of any "tendency" or even a "minority" theorizing its own particularities. A great part of the discussions were focused on how this framework should be concretized in the ICC's daily functioning, with a constant concern to attach such concretization to the experience of the workers' movement. The fact that there was no split is a testimony to the I CC's strength, its greater maturity, the determination shown by the majority of its militants to carry on the combat for its defense, and to renew the health of its organizational fabric, to overcome the circle spirit, and all the anarchistic conceptions which consider the organization as a sum of individuals or of little groups based on affinity.
Perspectives of the international situation
Obviously a communist organization does not exist for its own sake. It is an actor, not a spectator, in the struggles of the working class, and the intransigent defense of the organization has precisely the aim of enabling it to carry out its role.
To this end the Congress devoted part of its debates to examining the international situation. It discussed and adopted several reports on this question as well as a resolution which synthesized the latter, which is published in this issue of the International Review. This is why we will not deal at greater length here with this aspect of the Congress. Here, we will simply consider, briefly, the last of the three aspects (evolution of the economic crisis, imperialist conflicts, and the balance of class forces) of the international situation which were discussed at the Congress.
This resolution declares clearly that: "More than ever, the struggle of the proletariat represents the only hope for the future of human society." (point 14).
However, the Congress confirmed what the ICC had already put forward in the autumn of 1989: "This struggle, which revived with great power at the end of the 60s, putting an end to the most terrible counter-revolution the working class has ever known, went into a major retreat with the collapse of the stalinist regimes, the ideological campaigns which accompanied them, and all the events which followed (Gulf war, war in Yugoslavia)." (ibid).
And it is mainly for this reason that today: "The workers' struggles are developing in a sinuous, jagged manner full of advances and retreats." (ibid).
However, the bourgeoisie knows very well that the aggravation of attacks against the working class can only provoke increasingly conscious struggles. It is preparing for this by developing a whole series of union maneuvers as well as entrusting certain of its agents with the task of reviving talk about 'revolution', 'Communism' or 'marxism. This is why: "It is up to revolutionaries, in their intervention, to denounce with the greatest vigor both the rotten maneuvers of the unions and these so-called 'revolutionary' speeches. They have to put forward the real perspective of the proletarian revolution and of communism as the only way of saving humanity and as the ultimate result of the workers' struggles." (point 17).
Having reconstituted and gathered together its forces, the ICC is ready, after its Xlth Congress, to assume this responsibility.
[1] Germany, Belgium, USA, Spain, France, Britain, India, Italy, Mexico, Holland, Sweden, Venezuela.
[2] We had also planned 10 have an item on the proletarian political milieu which is a permanent concern of our organization. For lack of time, we had to drop this but this in no way means that we will let our attention slip on this question. On the contrary: it is by overcoming our own organizational difficulties that we can make our best contribution to the development of the proletarian milieu as a whole.
[3] "The sections of the working class in various countries being placed in different conditions of development, it necessarily follows that their theoretical opinions, which reflect the real movement, are also different. However, the community of action established by the International Working Men's Association, the exchange of ideas made easier by their publication in the organs of the different national sections, and finally the direct discussions at the General Congresses, will not fail gradually to engender a common theoretical program" (Response by the General Council to the Alliance's request for membership, 9th March 1869). It should be noted that the Alliance first asked to join with its own statutes, where it was planned that it would adopt an international structure parallel to that of the IWMA (with a central committee and Congress held separately from those of the IWMA). The General Council refused this request, pointing out that the Alliance's statutes were contrary to those of the IWMA. It made it clear that it was ready to admit the Alliance sections, if the latter gave up its international structure. The Alliance accepted these conditions, but continued to existence in conformity to its secret statutes.
[4] In an appeal "To the officers of the Russian army", Bakunin boasted the merits of the secret organization "whose strength lies in discipline, in the passionate devotion and abnegation of its members, and in blind obedience to a single Committee which knows everything and is known to nobody".
[6] See 'The crisis of the revolutionary milieu', 'Report on the structure and functioning of the organization of revolutionaries' and 'Presentation of the 5th Congress of the ICC' in International Reviews 28, 33 and 35 respectively.
[7] Chenier, exploiting our organization's lack of vigilance, became a member of the French section in 1978. From 1980, he undertook a whole subterranean work aimed at destroying our organization. To do this, he very skillfully exploited both the ICC's lack of organizational rigor and the tensions that existed in our section in Britain. This situation had led to the formation of two antagonistic clans in the section, blocking its work and leading to the loss of half the section as well as a number of resignations in other sections. Chenier was excluded from the ICC in September 81 and we published in our press a communiqué warning the proletarian milieu against this "shady and dangerous" element. Shortly after this, Chenier began a career in trade unionism, the Socialist Party and the state apparatus for which he had very probably been working for some time.
Faced with the growing anarchy of international relations since the Eastern bloc collapsed six years ago, the United States is once again applying strong pressure, as it did during the Gulf War, to reassert its threatened leadership and its role as policeman of the "New World Order". One of the most significant examples of this pressure is to be found in the Middle East, which remains a choice terrain for the maneuvers of the American bourgeoisie. The USA is using its grip on a regionally isolated Israeli state, and Arafat's situation of dependence, to accelerate the process of the pax americana, and strengthen its control over this vital strategic zone which is more than ever subject to upheaval.
In reality, the proliferation and growing size of these police operations are nothing but the expression of a headlong flight into the militarization of the entire capitalist system, and its plunge into the barbarism of war.
Reality has dealt a stunning blow to the myth that the war unleashed for four years on ex-Yugoslavia is merely a matter of inter-ethnic confrontations between local nationalist cliques.
The number of air strikes against Serb positions around Sarajevo and other "safe areas" (almost 3,500 sorties in twelve days of the operation known as "Deliberate Force") makes this operation NATO's biggest military engagement since its creation in 1949.
The great powers are the real culprits
For four years, the same powers have been playing their pawns against each other on the Yugoslav chess-board. We need only look at the composition of the "contact group" which pretends to be seeking a means to put an end to the conflict - the United States, Germany, Russia, Britain, and France - to see that it includes all the greatest imperialist powers of the planet (except Japan and China, which are too far from the theatre of operations) .
As we have already shown, "It was Germany, by pushing Slovenia and Croatia to declare their independence from the old Yugoslavia, which brought about the break-up of the country and played a primordial role in the unleashing of the war in 1991. In response to this thrust by German imperialism, the other four powers supported and encouraged the counter -offensive of the Belgrade government. This was the first phase of the war, a particularly murderous one (...) Under the cover of the UN, France and Britain then sent the biggest contingent of Blue Berets who, under the pretext of preventing further confrontations, systematically maintained the status quo in favor of the Serbian army. In 1992 the US government pronounced itself in favor of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and supported the Muslim sector of this province in a war against the Croatian army (still supported by Germany) and the Serbs (supported by Britain, France and Russia). In 1994, the Clinton administration managed to set up a confederation between Bosnia and Croatia, an agreement against Serbia; at the end of the year, under the guidance of ex-President Carter, the US obtained a truce between Bosnia and Serbia (...) But, despite the negotiations in which all the differences between the big powers came out, no agreement was reached. What could not be obtained through negotiation could thus only be won through military force. So what we are seeing today is the logical, premeditated follow-up to a war in which the great powers have played the preponderant role, although in an underhand way.
Contrary to what is hypocritically claimed by the great powers' governments, who present their increased involvement in the conflict as being aimed at limiting the violence of the new confrontations, the latter are in fact a direct product of their war-mongering activity.
The invasion of part of western Slavonia by Croatia, at the beginning of May, as well as the renewed fighting at various points along the 1,200 kilometer front between the Zaghreb government and the Krajina Serbs; the unleashing, at the same moment, of the Bosnian army's offensive around the Bihac pocket, in the region of the Serb corridor of Brcko, and also around Sarajevo, aimed at reducing the pressure of the Sarajevo siege - none of this took place separately from the will of the big powers, and still less against a unified wish for peace on the tatters' part. It is clear that these actions were undertaken with the agreement and initiative of the American and German governments"[1]. The reaction of the opposite camp is no less significant of the other powers' involvement.
In our previous issue (1), we developed at length the content and the meaning of the Franco-British maneuver, in collusion with the Serb forces, which led to the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), and the dispatch of troops from the two powers, under their national flags. This maneuver, by sabotaging the NATO forces, was a stinging rebuff for the imperialist power which claims to play the role of the world's policeman.
The United States needed to strike hard, in order to recover the situation to their benefit. To do so, they used the civilian population with the same cynicism as their opponents.
All these imperialist brigands are fighting each other, through the intermediary of Slav cliques. Each is defending its own sordid interests, at the direct expense of the population, which is transformed into permanent hostages and victims of their fighting.
The great powers are the real culprits in the massacres, and the exodus which since 1991 has thrown more than 4.5 million refugees, men, women and children, old and young, onto the road, pushed from one combat zone to the next. It is the great capitalist powers and their bloody imperialist rivalries which have encouraged the "mopping up" operations, the "ethnic cleansing" carried out on the ground by the rival nationalist cliques.
The American bourgeoisie has used the same disgusting methods. To cover the Croat offensive in Krajina, the US inundated the media with satellite photos of freshly dug earth, supposedly revealing the presence of mass graves resulting from the Serbian massacre at Srebrenica. The NATO counter-attack was justified by the horrifying pictures of the aftermath of the mortar attack on Sarajevo market. The pretext for a military response was as clear as day. And it is indeed unlikely that Karadzic should have been mad enough to invite heavy reprisals by shelling the Sarajevo market, leaving 37 dead and 100 injured. When we consider that the shells were fired from the front line separating the Serb and Bosnian armies (each of which laid the blame for the massacre on the other), we can presume that this was a "provocation" planned in advance. An operation on the scale of the NATO bombings cannot be improvised, and the attack on the market served US interests very conveniently. This would not be the first time that the world's greatest imperialist power organized such a show. We should remember, amongst other examples, that Lyndon Johnson used the pretext of a North Vietnamese attack on a US ship to start the war in Vietnam. It was only some years later that we learnt that nothing of the kind had happened, and that the whole operation had been set up by the Pentagon. The use of such pretexts to justify their actions proves the great powers' gangster methods.
For the United States, the pretentions of the French and British, their growing arrogance and bellicosity, were becoming more and more intolerable. It was necessary to respond with other maneuvers, to lay other traps, to demonstrate a superior imperialist capability, a real military supremacy.
After its failure to do anything but mark time for three years in Bosnia, the American bourgeoisie had to reassert its world leadership.
It was not possible for me world's greatest power, which had given its support to the Muslim fraction that turned out to be the weakest in the conflict, to be pushed aside in a vital conflict, on European soil. It was absolutely vital to reassert its hegemony.
However, the US was confronted with a major difficulty, which emphasizes the fundamental weakness of their situation in Yugoslavia. Their recourse to successive changes in tactics, supporting Serbia in 1991, then Bosnia in 1992 and Croatia in 1994 (on condition that the latter collaborate with the Bosnian army), demonstrates that they do not dispose of any reliable allies in the region.
Behind the Croat offensive, joint action by the United States and Germany
In the first phase, the United States found itself obliged to move to center stage of the imperialist game by using the stronger partner, Croatia, and abandoning its previous ally, Bosnia. The White House used the Croat-Muslim federation, and the latter's confederation with Croatia which it had supervised in the spring of 1994. Their role, and the Pentagon's logistical support, was determinant in ensuring the success of the Croat army's "blitzkrieg" in Krajina (notably thanks to the localization by satellite of Serb positions). The United States moreover were alone in welcoming the success of the Croat offensive. The Croat offensive was thus planned in advance masterfully organized and directed by both the German and the American bourgeoisies. Paradoxically, the American ruling class has accepted a "pact with the devil", by allying Itself temporarily with its most dangerous imperialist adversary, Germany, and assisting the interests which are the most directly antagonistic to its own.
Germany has given powerful assistance to the formation of a real Croat army (100,000 men occupied the Krajina), and has given discreet but constant and effective support, in particular through the delivery of heavy weapons from me ex-DDR, via Hungary. The reconquest of the Krajina is an undoubted success and advance for Germany. First and foremost, it allows the German bourgeoisie to take a big step towards its main strategic objective: .access to the Dalmatian ports on the Adriatic coast, which would give it a deep-water outlet to the Mediterranean. The liberation of the Krajina, and especially of Knin, has opened up for Croatia and its old German ally a rail and road crossroads, linking north and south Dalmatia. Like Croatia, the German bourgeoisie was particularly interested in the elimination of the Serb threat to the Bihac pocket, which locked up the whole Dalmatian coast.
This strategy, by inflicting their first defeat on the Serbs[2], was fundamentally directed against the French and British. The RRF has been humiliated and has been made to appear still more useless, in that it was busy creating an unnecessary narrow access route towards Sarajevo, while the Croat bulldozer was demolishing the Serb defences in Krajina. Stuck on Mount Igman, in the pseudo-defense of Sarajevo, the RRF is for the moment discredited both internationally, and with the Serbs themselves, which can only benefit another rival: the Russians who have shown themselves to be the best and most reliable ally in the Serbs' eyes.
The anti-Serb bombings conceal a struggle between the US and the other imperialist powers
In the next stage, the American bourgeoisie's scenario recalls the Gulf War. The intensive NATO bombardment of exclusively Serb positions reasserted American supremacy, and was addressed still more directly to all the other great powers.
In particular, it was necessary to put an end to all the military stratagems[3] and diplomatic maneuvering between the Serbs and the Anglo-French couple.
In fact, in this second part of the operation, the USA acted on its own account, and forced all the other imperialisms to submit to its will. German aircraft took part for the first time in a N ATO action, but it was without enthusiasm. Confronted with the American Lone Ranger's fait accompli, the German bourgeoisie could only follow in an action which did not serve its own plans. Similarly, Russia, which has been the Serbs' main ally, despite noisy objections and gestures like the appeal to the UN Security Council, appeared impotent to confront the NATO bombings, and caught in a situation which had been imposed on it.
The USA has succeeded in marking an important point. They have managed to reassert their imperialist supremacy with a crushing display of military superiority. They have shown once again that the strength of their diplomacy is based on force of arms. They have shown that they are the only ones able to impose a real negotiation because they were able to weigh in the bargaining with the threat of their armed force, backed up by an impressive arsenal.
This situation confirms the fact that in the logic of imperialism, the only real force is to be found on the military terrain. The policeman can only intervene by hitting harder than any of the other powers are able to.
Nonetheless, this offensive has come up against a number of obstacles, and the NATO strike force is only a pale shadow of the Gulf War.
- The air raids' effectiveness can only be limited, and has allowed the Serbian troops to bury most of their artillery without suffering too much damage. In modern war, air power is a decisive weapon, but it cannot win a war by itself. Armor and infantry remain vital.
- American strategy is itself limited: the USA has no interest in wiping out Serbian forces and making total war on them, inasmuch as they intend to preserve Serbian military power, to turn it later against Croatia as part of the more fundamental rivalry with Germany. Moreover, all-out war against Serbia would run the risk of poisoning relations with Russia, and compromising the privileged alliance with the Yeltsin government.
These limitations encourage sabotage by the "allies" who have been forced to join in the American raids. Their maneuvers appeared barely four days after the Geneva agreement, which should have been the jewel in the crown of American diplomatic skill.
On the one hand, the French bourgeoisie returned to the fore of those demanding an end to the NATO bombing raids, "to let the Serbs evacuate their heavy weapons", whereas the US ultimatum demanded exactly the opposite: a stop to the bombing on condition that heavy weapons were withdrawn from around Sarajevo. On the other hand, when the US wanted to turn up the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs by bombing Karadzic's HQ in Pale, it was UNPROFOR that put a spanner in the works, by hesitating and opposing the bombardment of "civilian targets"[6].
The Geneva agreement signed by the belligerents on 8th September, under the aegis of the American bourgeoisie and in the presence of all the Contact Group members, is not in the least a ''first step towards peace" , contrary to the claims of the American diplomat Holbrooke. It merely sets the seal on a temporary balance of forces which in fact is a further step in the barbarism whose appalling cost is borne by the local population. They are the ones paying the price of the operation in new massacres.
Just as they did during the Gulf War, the media have the nerve to talk to us about a clean war, about "surgical strikes". What vile lies! It will need months or years just to lift a corner of the veil being drawn over the horror for the population of these new massacres by the "democratic" and "civilized" nations.
In the confrontation, each great power feeds its warmongering propaganda over ex-Yugoslavia. In Germany, virulent anti-Serb campaigns are organized over the atrocities committed by the Chetnik partisans. In France, the campaign has a variable geometry depending on the camp being supported for the moment: one day, no opportunity is missed to recall the role of the Croat Ustachis alongside the Nazi troops during World War II, another they talk about the bloodthirsty madness of the Bosnian Serbs, while on yet another the Islamic fanaticism of the Bosnian muslim comes under fire.
Capitalism's plunge into decomposition
The present situation has become a real detonator, which runs the risk of touching off a real explosion in the Balkans.
With NATO's intervention, never has there been such an impressive accumulation and concentration of instruments of death on Yugoslav soil.
The new perspective is for a new direct confrontation between the Serb and Croat armies, not just between rag-tag militias.
The continuing military operations by the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb armies has already proved that the Geneva agreement and its consequences have only sharpened the tensions between the belligerents, who all tend to turn the new situation to their own benefit:
- while NATO's massive and deadly bombardments are aimed at reducing the ambitions of the Serbian forces, the latter will try to resist the reverse they have suffered, and will contest still more bitterly the fate of the enclaves of Sarajevo and Gorazde, and of the Brcko corridor;
- the Croatian nationalists have been encouraged by their recent military success, and pushed by Germany they can only reassert their aim of reconquering the rich territory of Eastern Slavonia, on the border with Serbia;
- the Bosnian forces will do everything they can not to be left out of the "peace plan", and will continue their offensive in the north of Bosnia, around the region of Banja Luka.
The influx of all kinds of refugees creates a major risk of dragging into the conflict not just other regions, especially Macedonia and Kosovo, but also other European nations from Albania to Romania and Hungary.
The situation threatens to snowball and involve more closely the great European powers, including neighbors of major strategic importance like Turkey and Italy[7].
France and Britain, which have been forced for the moment to play second fiddle, can only make more attempts to put a spanner in the works of the other protagonists, especially the United States[8].
A new step has been taken in the escalation of barbarism. Far from moving towards a settlement of the conflict, ex-Yugoslavia is heading for ever bloodier and more violent disorder, thanks to the "muscular" action of the great powers. All these elements confirm the preponderance and acceleration of "every man for himself", at work since the dissolution of the imperialist blocs, and at the same time they express an acceleration of the imperialist dynamic into military adventure.
The proliferation of all these military efforts is the pure product of capitalism's decomposition, like the metastases of a generalized cancer, gangrening society's weakest organs first, where the proletariat does not have the ability to oppose the most abject and hysterical nationalism. The bourgeoisie of the advanced countries is hoping to profit from the Yugoslav imbroglio, and from the humanitarian robes in which it cloaks its activity, to build an atmosphere of national unity. For the working class, it must be clear that it has no choice to make here, nor can it let itself by drawn onto this rotten terrain.
CB, 14th September 95
[1] See International Review, no.82, 3rd Quarter 1995, the article "The more the great powers talk of peace, the more they stir up war".
[2] Milosevic preferred to let the Croatian army take the Krajina without resistance, in order to try to bargain with the USA for the Gorazde enclave, and above all for the removal of economic sanctions against Serbia.
[3] Apart from the simulated "kidnapping" of UN soldiers and observers - an operation set up in June by France and Britain together with Serbia - the French bombing of the Serb capital Pale in July should be seen as a fake reprisal to mask the real action of the RRF, since we know that the bombardment was not directed against any strategic target, and caused no inconvenience to Serbia's military operations. On the contrary, it provided a pretext for the Serbian coup against the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.
[4] The French and British appeared alongside Milosevic to try to exploit the divisions within the Bosnian Serb camp. Their open support for general Mladic against "president" Karadzic, and the pressure they put on the latter, was designed to show him that the real enemies of Serbia were no longer the Bosnians, but the Croats.
[5] It is instructive that it was a British paper - The Times - which revealed the existence of the famous Tudjman drawing dividing Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia, provoking fury in the Bosnian camp.
[6] As Le Monde put it on 14th September, with delicate euphemism: "The UN forces, essentially made up of French troops, have the impression that day after day, they are losing control over operations to NATO's benefit. True, the Atlantic Alliance is conducting air raids on targets jointly designated with the UN. But operational details are planned in the NATO bases in Italy and in the Pentagon. Last Sunday's use of Tomahawk missiles against Serb installations in Banja Luka [without any prior consultation with the UN or with any of the other governments associated in the raids. ed. note] has only strengthened these fears".
[7] It is particularly significant to see Italy demanding a greater share in the management of the Bosnian conflict, and refusing to host American F-117 stealth bombers in the NATO bases on its territory, to protest at being left out of the Contact Group and of NATO's deciding bodies.
[8] In the first place, to be capable of answering the American offensive at the necessary level, to avoid being thrown out of the region, the Franco-British couple can only be pushed further into the conflict, by reinforcing their military commitment.
IR 83, 4th Quarter 1995
100 years ago...
"Friedrich Engels died in London on 5th August 1895. After the death of his friend Karl Marx (in 1883) (...) Marx and Engels were the first to show that the working class and its demands are the necessary product of the present economic system, which inevitably creates and organises the proletariat at the same time as the bourgeoisie; they showed that humanity will not be delivered from the ills which weigh on it today, by the well-intentioned efforts of generous hearted men, but by the class struggle of the organised proletariat. Marx and Engels were the first to explain, in their scientific works, that socialism is not a chimera, but the final and necessary result of the development of the productive forces of today's society".
With these lines, written a month after the death of Marx's companion, Lenin began a short biography of one of the best militants of the communist struggle.
Born at Barmen in 1820, in what was then the Rhenish province of Prussia, Engels was an example of a militant devoted all his life to the struggle of the working class. He came from a family of industrialists, and could have lived in wealth and comfort without paying any attention to the political struggle. But like Marx, and many other young students revolted by the misery of the world in which they lived, while still young he acquired an exceptional political maturity, in contact with the workers' struggle in Britain, France, and then Germany. It was inevitable that the proletariat should attract a certain number of intellectual elements to its ranks, in this period when it was forming itself as a class, and developing its political struggle.
Engels was always modest about his individual trajectory, pointing out the important contribution of his friend Marx. Nonetheless, at the age of only 25, he acted as a forerunner. In England, he witnessed the catastrophic march of industrialisation and pauperism. He perceived both the promise and the weaknesses of the workers' movement in its beginnings (Chartism). He became aware that the "enigma of history" lay in this despised and unknown proletariat, he went to workers' meetings in Manchester where he saw them attacking Christianity, and laying claim to their right to control their own future.
In 1844, Engels wrote an article for the Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher (a review published in Paris by Arnold Ruge, a young democrat, and Marx, who at the time still stood on the terrain of the struggle for democracy against Prussian absolutism), a "Contribution to the critique of political economy". It was this text which opened Marx's eyes to the fundamental nature of the capitalist economy. His work on The Condition of the Working Class in England, published in 1845, was to become a reference book for a whole generation of revolutionaries. As Lenin wrote, Engels was thus the first to declare that the proletariat is "not only" a class that suffers, but that the shameful economic situation in which it suffers pushes it irresistibly forwards, and forces it to struggle for its final emancipation. Two years later, it was also Engels who drew up "The Principles of Communism", in the form of a questionnaire, which was to serve as a preliminary sketch for the composition of the world-famous Communist Manifesto, signed jointly by Marx and Engels.
In fact, most of Marx' and Engels' immense contribution to the workers' movement was the fruit of their mutual collaboration. They first really got to know each other in Paris during the summer of 1844. Henceforth, there began a joint work, which lasted all their lives, a rare mutual confidence which was based not just on an exceptional friendship, but on a shared conviction in the historic role of the proletariat and a constant struggle for the party spirit, to win over more and more elements to the revolutionary combat.
From the time they met, Marx and Engels together quickly went beyond their philosophical visions of the world, to devote themselves to this unprecedented historical event: the development of an exploited class, the proletariat, which was also a revolutionary class. A class all the more revolutionary in that it could acquire a clear "class consciousness", rid of the prejudices and self-mystifications that weighed on past revolutionary classes like the bourgeoisie. This common reflection produced two books: The Holy Family, published in 1844, and The German Ideology, which was written between 1844 and 1846 bit only published in the 20th century. In these books, Marx and Engels settled accounts with the philosophical conceptions of the "young Hegelians", their first comrades in struggle who had proved incapable of going beyond a bourgeois, or petty bourgeois vision of the world. At the same time, they set out a materialist and dialectical vision of history, which broke both with idealism (which considers that "the world is governed by ideas"), but also with vulgar materialism, which recognises no active role for consciousness. Marx and Engels considered that "when theory takes hold of the masses, then it becomes a material force". And the two friends, utterly convinced of this unity between being and consciousness, were never to separate the proletariat's theoretical from its practical combat, nor their own participation from either.
Contrary to the image which has often been given by the bourgeoisie, neither Marx nor Engels were ever "savants in an ivory tower", cut off from reality and the practical struggle. The Manifesto which they wrote in 1847 was in fact called the Manifesto of the Communist Party, and was to serve as the programme of the Communist League, an organisation which was preparing for the struggle that was brewing. In 1848, a series of bourgeois revolutions broke out across the European continent. Marx and Engels took part actively, in order to contribute to the emergence of conditions which would allow the political and economic development of the proletariat. Returning to Germany, they published a daily - the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, which became an instrument of the struggle. More concretely still, Engels joined the revolutionary troops fighting in the state of Baden.
After the defeat of this European revolutionary wave, both Marx and Engels were pursued by the all police of Europe for their participation in the struggle, which forced them into exile in Britain. Marx settled for good in London, while Engels worked until 1870 in the family business in Manchester. Exile did not for a moment put an end to their participation in the class struggle. They continued their activity in the Communist League until 1852, when they announced its dissolution to prevent it degenerating as a result of the reflux in struggle.
In 1864, in the midst of an international recovery in workers' struggles, they took an active part in the formation of the International Workingmen's Association (IWA). Marx became a member of the IWA's General Council, to be joined in 1870 by Engels when he managed to escape from his job in Manchester. It was a crucial moment in the life of the IWA, and the two friends took part side by side in the struggles of the International: the Paris Commune of 1871, the solidarity with its refugees (on the General Council, it was Engels organised the material assistance given to the Communards who emigrated to London), and above all the defence of the IWA against the activities of Bakunin's Alliance for Socialist Democracy. In September 1872, Marx and Engels were present at the Hague Congress which blocked the way against the Alliance, and it was Engels who wrote most of the report, which the Congress had entrusted to the General Council, on the Bakuninists' intrigues.
The destruction of the Commune dealt a brutal blow to the European proletariat, and the IWA - the "old International" as Marx and Engels called it thereafter - died in 1876. Nonetheless, the two comrades did not retire from the political strugle. They followed closely the formation and development of socialist parties in most European countries, and Engels continued to do so energetically after Marx' death in 1883. They paid special attention to the movement developing in Germany, and which became a beacon for the international proletariat. They intervened against all the confusions that weighed on the party, as can be seen from the Critique of the Gotha Programme (written by Marx in 1875), and the Critique of the Erfurt Programme (by Engels in 1891).
Engels, like Marx, was thus above all a militant of the proletariat, and an active participant in its struggle.
At the end of his life, Engels confided that nothing in it had been so exciting as the struggle for militant propaganda, and he spoke especially of the pleasure of taking part in an illegal daily publication: the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in 1848, and then the Sozialdemokrat during the 1880s, when the party was subjected to the rigours of Bismarck's anti-socialist laws.
The collaboration between Marx and Engels was particularly fruitful. Even when they were separated, or when their organisations were dissolved, they continued to struggle, with comrades faithful like them to the vital work of the fraction during periods of reflux, keeping alive the minority's activity through a mass of correspondance.
It is thanks to this collaboration that we now have the major theoretical works of both Marx and Engels. Those written by Engels were in large part the result of his permanent exchange of ideas with Marx. This is the case with the Anti-Dhring (which was published in 1878, and proved an essential instrument in training socialist militants in Germany), and with Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884), which sets forward with great precision the communist conception of the state that later revolutionaries were to take as a foundation (notably Lenin in State and Revolution). Even Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy, published after Marx' death, could not have been written without the two friends' joint reflection ever since their youth.
Likewise, without Engels' contribution Marx' great work Capital would never have seen the light of day. As we have seen, it was Engels in 1844 who first showed Marx the need to deal with the critique of political economy. Thereafter, every step forward, every hypothesis contained in Capital was the object of long correspondance: Engels, for example, was able to provide first hand information on the functioning of a capitalist enterprise in which he was directly involved. Engels' permanent encouragement and advice played a large part in getting the book's first part published in 1867. Finally, after Marx's death, it was Engels who worked to bring together a vast mass of rough notes for publication as books 2 and 3 of Capital (published in 1885 and 1894).
Although Engels never claimed to be anything but second fiddle, he nonetheless left the proletariat a profound and very readable theoretical work. But also, and above all after Marx' death he made it possible for the "party spirit", a continuity of organisational principles and experience, to be transmitted right up to the IIIrd International.
Engels took part in the foundation of the Communist League in 1847, and then of the IWA in 1864. After the dissolution of the Ist International, Engels played an important part in maintaining its principles during the constitution of the IInd International to which he gave untiring and critical advice. He had considered the Internationa;'s foundation premature, but to combat the reappearance of intriguers like Lassalle, or the resurgence of anarchistic opportunism, he threw all his weight in the balance to defeat opportunism at the international founding congress in Paris in 1889. In fact, until the day he died Engels did his utmost to struggle against the opportunism which was raising its head again especially in the German social-democracy, against the influence of petty-bourgeois spinelessness, against the anarchist element which threatened to destroy all organisational life, and against the reformist wing, increasingly seduced by the siren song of bourgeois democracy.
At the end of the last century, the bourgeoisie tolerated the development of universal suffrage in Germany in particular, and the number of socialist deputies gave an impression of strength within the legal framework, to the opportunist and reformist elements within the party. Bourgeois historiography and the enemies of Marxism have used Engels' - partly justified - declarations against the outdated "barricade mentality" to give the impression that the old militant had also become a pacifist reformist [1] [451]. In particular, in 1895, his preface to Marx' texts on The class struggles in France has been used to show that Engels thought that the time for revolution was passed. It is true that this introduction contained formulations that were incorrect [2] [452], but the published text had precious little to do with the original. In fact, it was first cut by Kautsky to avoid legal problems, then expurgated by Wilhelm Liebknecht. Engels wrote to Kautsky to express his indignation at finding in Vorw„rts an extract of his introduction which made him "seem like a partisan of legality at all costs" (1st April, 1895). Two days later, he complained to Lafargue: "Liebknecht has just played my a fine trick. He has taken from my introduction to Marx's articles on Frnace 1848-50, everything that could serve to support his tactic of peace and non-violence at all costs, which it has pleased him to preach for a while now".
Despite Engels' many warnings, the IInd International's domination by the opportunism of Bernstein, Kautsky and Co was to lead to its breakup in 1914, in the storm of social-chauvinism. But this International was still an arena of revolutionary combat, contrary to the denials of our modern storytellers of the GCI variety [3] [453]. Its political gains, the internationalism asserted at its congresses (in particular at Stuttgart in 1907 and Basle in 1912), and its organisational principles (defence of centralisation, combat against intrigues and young climbers etc) were not lost for the left wing of Engels' International, since Lenin, Luxemburg, Pannekoek and Bordiga, amongst many others, were to raise anew the revolutionary standard that the old fighter had so fiercely defended to the end of his days.
Marx's daughter, Eleanor, paid a deserved homage to Engels the man and the militant: "There is only one thing that Engels never forgives: falseness. A man who is untrue to him, or worse still untrue to the party, can look for no pity from Engels. For him, these are unforgivable sins. Engels does not know any other sins... Engels, who is the most precise man in the world, who more than anyone has a lively sense of duty and above all discipline towards the party, is not in the least a puritan. Nobody has his ability to understand everything, and yet nobody forgives so easily our little weaknesses". As she wrote these lines, Eleanor did not know that Engels was dying. The socialist press of the day, when it published this letter, saluted the memory of the great man: "A man has died, who stayed in the background, when he could have been in the limelight. The idea, his idea, is upright, and alive everywhere, more alive than ever, defying all attacks, thanks to the weapons which, with Marx, he helped to arm it. We will no longer hear this valiant blacksmith's hammer ring on the anvil; the good workman has fallen; the hammer has dropped from his powerful hands to the ground, and will perhaps remain there a long time; but the weapons he forged are still there, solid and bright. Not many will be able to forge new ones, but what we can and must do, is not to let rust those he has left us; on this condition, there will win for us the victory for which they were made".
Mederic
[1] [454] Bourgeois historiography is not alone in trying to show Engels in political decline at the end of his life. Our modern "Marxologues" of the Maximilien Rubel variety accuse him of both deforming and idolising Marx. The result of these slanders, if not their aim, is to stifle the voice of Engels, and what it represents: faith in the revolutionary struggle.
[2] [455] During the formation of the German Communist Party (KPD) on 31st December 1918, Rosa Luxemburg rightly criticised these formulations of Engels, and showed how they had been grist to the reformists' mill in their effort to banalise marxism. But she pointed out at the same time that "Engels did not live long enough to see the results, the practical consequences of the use that was made of his preface (...) But I am sure of one thing: knowing the works of Marx and Engels, knowing the authentic, living, unadulterated revolutionary spirit that breathes from all their writing, all their teachings, we can be convinced that Engels would have been the first to protest against the excesses that have been the result of parliamentarism pure and simple (...) Engels, and Marx if he had lived, would have been the first to react violently against them, to have held back, braked the vehicle to prevent it getting stuck in the mire" (Rosa Luxemburg, Speech on the Programme). At the time, Luxemburg did not know that Engels had already protested vigorously over this preface. Moreover, we can point out to those who enjoy setting Engels against Marx that the latter also said things which were widely exploited by the reformists. For example, less than two years after the Paris Commune he could declare: "...we do not deny that there are countries like America, Britain, and if I knew your institutions better I would add Holland, where the workers can reach their goal by peaceful means (...)" (Speech at the closure of the IWA's Hague Congress, 8th September 1872). All the revolutionaries, even the greatest, have made mistakes. While it is normal that the Stalinist, social-democrat or Trotskyist falsifiers should have an interest in raising these mistakes to the level of dogma, it is down to communists to recognise them, on the basis of their predecessors' work in its entirety.
[3] [456] On the defence of the proletarian nature of the IInd International, see our article on "The continuity of the proletariat's political organisations: the class nature of social-democracy", in International Review no50.
With the 50th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bourgeoisie has plumbed new depths of cynicism and mendacity. For this high point of barbarity was executed, not by some dictator or bloodcrazed madman, but by the very "virtuous" American democracy. To justify the monstrous crime, the whole world bourgeoisie has shamelessly repeated the lie peddled at the time that the atomic bomb was only used to shorten and limit the suffering caused by the continuation of the war with Japan. The American bourgeoisie even proposed to issue an anniversary stamp, inscribed: "atomic bombs accelerated the end of the war. August 1945". Even if this anniversary was a further opportunity to mark the growing opposition in Japan towards the US ex-godfather, the Japanese Prime Minister nonetheless made his own precious contribution to the lie about the necessity of the bomb, by presenting for the first time Japan's apologies for its crimes committed during World War II. Victors and vanquished thus came together to develop this disgusting campaign aimed at justifying one of history's greatest crimes.
The justification for Hiroshima and Nagasaki: a gross falsehood
In total, the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan in August 1945 claimed 522,000 victims. Many cancers of the lung and thyroid only became apparent during the 50s and 60s, and even today the effects of radiation still claim victims: cases of leukemia are ten times more frequent in Hiroshima than in the rest of Japan.
If we examine Japan's military situation when Germany capitulated, it is clear that the country was already completely defeated. Its air force, that vital weapon of World War II, had been reduced to a handful of aircraft, generally piloted by adolescents whose fanaticism was only matched by their inexperience. Both the navy and the merchant marine had been virtually wiped out. The anti-aircraft defences were so full of holes, that the US B29s were able to carry out thousands of raids throughout the spring of 1945, almost without losses. Churchill himself points this out in Volume 12 of his war memoirs.
A 1945 study by the US secret service, published by the New York Times in 1989, revealed that: "Realizing that the country was defeated, the Japanese emperor had decided by 20th June 1945, to end all hostilities and to start negotiations from 11th July onwards, with a view to bringing hostilities to an end" (Le Monde Diplomatique August 1990).
Truman was perfectly well aware of the situation. Nonetheless, once he was told of the success of the first experimental atomic test in the New Mexico desert in July 1945[1], he decided in the middle of the Potsdam Conference between himself, Churchill, and Stalin[2], to use the atomic weapon against Japanese towns. This decision had nothing to do with a desire to hasten the end of the war with Japan, as is testified by a conversation between Leo Szilard, one of the fathers of the bomb, and the US Secretary of State for War, J. Byrnes. When Szilard expressed concern at the dangers of using the atomic weapon, Byrnes replied that "he did not claim that it was necessary to use the bomb to win the war. His idea was that the possession and use of the bomb would make Russia more controllable" (Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1990).
And if any further argument were necessary, let us leave some of the most important US military leaders to speak for themselves. For Chief of General Staff Admiral Leahy, "The Japanese were already beaten and ready to capitulate. The use of this barbaric weapon made no material contribution to our fight against Japan" (Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1990). This opinion was also shared by Eisenhower.
The idea that the atomic bomb was used to force Japan to capitulate, and to stop the slaughter, has nothing to do with reality. It is a lie which has been constructed to meet the needs of the bourgeoisie's war propaganda, one of the greatest achievements of the massive brain-washing campaign needed to justify the greatest massacre in world history: the 1939/45 war.
We should emphasize that, whatever the hesitations or short-term view of certain members of the ruling class, faced with this terrifying weapon, Truman's decision was anything but that of a madman, or an isolated individual. On the contrary, it expressed the implacable logic of all imperialisms: death and destruction for humanity, so that one class, the bourgeoisie, should survive despite the historic crisis of its system of exploitation, and its own irreversible decadence.
The real objective of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs
Contrary to all the lies that have been peddled since 1945, about the supposed victory of a democracy synonymous with peace, World War II was barely over when the new front line of imperialist confrontation was being drawn. Just as the Treaty of Versailles contained inevitably within itself the seeds of another war, so Yalta already contained the split between the main victor of 1945, the USA, and its Russian challenger. Thanks to World War II, Russia had risen from being a minor economic power to a world ranking imperialism, which could not but threaten the American superpower. In spring 1945, the USSR was already using its military strength to carve out a bloc in Eastern Europe. Yalta did nothing but sanction the existing balance of forces between the main imperialist sharks. What one balance of forces could set up, another could undo. In the summer of 1945, the real problem facing the American state was thus not, as the schoolbooks tell us, how to make Japan capitulate as soon as possible, but how to confront and contain the imperialist drive of its "great Russian ally".
Winston Churchill, the real leader on the Allied side of World War II, was quick to understand that a new front was opening, and constantly to exhort the Americans to face up to it. He wrote in his memoirs: "The closer a war conducted by a coalition comes to its end, the more importance is taken by the political aspects. Above all, in Washington they should have seen further and wider (...) The destruction of Germany's military power had provoked a radical transformation of the relationship between Communist Russia and the Western democracies. They had lost that common enemy which was practically the only thing uniting them". He concluded that "Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger for the free world, that it was necessary without delay to create a new front to stop its forward march, and that this front should be as far East as possible" (Memoirs, Vol 12, May 1945). Nothing could be clearer. Churchill analyzed, very lucidly, the fact that a new war was already beginning while World War II had not yet come to an end.
In the spring of 1945, Churchill was already doing everything he could to oppose the advance of Russian armies into Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc). Doggedly, he sought to bring the new American president Truman around to his own opinion. The latter, after some hesitations[3] completely accepted Churchill's thesis that "the Soviet threat had already replaced the Nazi enemy" (Memoirs, Vol 12, May 1945).
It is not difficult to understand the complete and unanimous support that the Churchill government gave to Truman's decision to begin the atomic bombardment of Japanese cities. On 22nd July, 1945, Churchill wrote: "[with the bomb] we now have something in hand which will re-establish the equilibrium with the Russians. The secret of this explosive and the ability to use it will completely transform the diplomatic equilibrium, which had been adrift since the defeat of Germany". That this should cause the deaths, in atrocious suffering, of hundreds of thousands of human beings, left this "defender of the free world" and "savior of democracy" cold. When he heard the news of the Hiroshima explosion, he jumped for joy, and Lord Allenbrooke, one of Churchill's advisers, even wrote: "Churchill was enthusiastic, and already saw himself with the ability to eliminate all Russia's industrial major population centers" (Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1990). This is what was in the mind of this great defender of civilization and irreplaceable humanist values, at the end of five years of carnage that had left 50 million dead!
The nuclear holocaust which broke over Japan in August 1945, this terrifying expression of war's absolute barbarity in capitalist decadence, was thus not designed by the "clean" American democracy to limit the suffering caused by a continuation of the war with Japan, any more than it met a direct military need. Its real aim was to send a message of terror to the USSR, to force the latter to restrain its imperialist ambitions, and accept the conditions of the pax americana. To give the message greater strength, the American state dropped a second bomb on Nagasaki, a town of minor importance at the military level, which wiped out the main working class district. This was also why Truman refused the suggestion of some of his advisers, that the explosion of a nuclear weapon over a sparsely populated region would be amply sufficient to force Japan to capitulate. No, in the murderous logic of imperialism, two cities had to be vitrified to intimidate Stalin, and to restrain the one-time Soviet ally's imperialist ambitions.
The lessons of these terrible events
What lessons should the working class draw from this terrible tragedy, and its revolting use by the bourgeoisie?
In the first place, there is nothing inevitable about the unleashing of capitalist barbarism. The scientific organization of such carnage was only possible because the proletariat had been beaten worldwide by the most terrible and implacable counter-revolution of its entire history. Broken by the stalinist and fascist terror, completely confused by the enormous lie identifying stalinism with communism, the working class allowed itself to be caught in the deadly trap of the defense of democracy, with the stalinists' active and indispensable complicity. This reduced it to a great mass of cannon-fodder completely at the mercy of the bourgeoisie. Today, whatever the proletariat's difficulty in deepening its struggle, the situation is quite different. In the great proletarian concentrations, this is not a time of union with the exploiters, but of the expansion and deepening of the class struggle.
Contrary to the bourgeoisie's endlessly repeated lie, which presents the 1939-45 imperialist war as one between the fascist and democratic "systems", the war's 50 million dead were victims of the capitalist system as a whole. Barbarity, crimes against humanity, were not the acts of fascism alone. Our famous "Allies", those self-proclaimed "defenders of civilization" gathered under the banner of "democracy", have hands as red with blood as do the Axis powers. The nuclear storm unleashed in August 1945 was particularly atrocious, but it was only one of many crimes perpetrated throughout the war by these "white knights of democracy"[4].
The horror of Hiroshima also opened a new period in capitalism's plunge into decadence. Henceforth, permanent war became capitalism's daily way of life. The Treaty of Versailles heralded the next world war; the bomb dropped on Hiroshima marked the real beginning of the "Cold War" between the USA and USSR, which was to spread bloodshed over the four comers of the earth for more than forty years. This is why, unlike the years after 1918, those that followed, 1945 saw no disarmament, but on the contrary a huge growth in arms spending amongst all the victors of the conflict (the USSR already had the atomic bomb in 1949). Within this framework, the entire economy, under the direction of state capitalism in its various forms, was run in the service of war. Also unlike the period at the end of World War I, state capitalism everywhere strengthened its totalitarian grip on the whole of society. Only the state could mobilize the gigantic resources necessary, in particular for the development of a nuclear arsenal. The Manhattan Project was thus only the first in a long and sinister series, leading to the most gigantic and insane arms race in history.
Far from heralding an era of peace, 1945 opened a period of barbarity, made still worse by the constant threat of nuclear vitrification of the entire planet. If Hiroshima and Nagasaki still haunt humanity's memory today, it is because they are such tragic symbols of how directly decadent capitalism threatens the very survival of the human species.
This terrible Damoclean sword, hanging over humanity's head, thus confers an enormous responsibility on the proletariat, the only force capable of real opposition to capitalism's military barbarity. Although the threat has temporarily retreated with the collapse of the Russian and American blocs, the responsibility is still there, and the proletariat cannot let its guard drop for an instant. Indeed, war has never been so evident as it is today, from Africa, to the territories of the ex-USSR, to the bloody conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, which has brought war to Europe for the first time since 1945[5].
And we need only look at the bourgeoisie's determination to justify the bombs of August 45, to understand that when Clinton declares" if we had to do it again, we would" (Liberation, 11th April1995), he is only expressing the opinion of all his class. Behind the hypocritical speeches about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, each state is doing everything it can either to obtain just such an arsenal, or to perfect its existing one. The research aimed at miniaturizing nuclear weapons, and so making their use easier and more commonplace, is accelerating. As Liberation put it: "The studies by Western general staffs based on the response "of the strong man to the madman" are reviving the idea of a limited, tactical use of nuclear weapons. After Hiroshima, their use became taboo. After the Cold War, the taboo has become uncertain" (5th August, 1995).
The horror of nuclear warfare is not something that belongs to a distant past. Quite the contrary: it is the future that decomposing capitalism has in store for humanity. If the proletariat lets it happens. Decomposition does not stop or diminish the omnipresence of war. The chaos and the law of "every man for himself" only makes its danger still more uncontrollable. The great imperialist powers are already stirring chaos to defend their own sordid interests, and we can be certain that if the working class fails to halt their criminal activity, they will not hesitate to use all the weapons at their disposal, from the fuel-air bombs used so extensively in the Gulf War, to nuclear and chemical weapons. Capitalist decomposition has only one perspective to offer: the destruction, bit by bit, of the planet and its inhabitants. The proletariat must not give an inch, either to the siren calls of pacifism, or to the defense of the democracy, in whose name the towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated. On the contrary, it must remain firmly on its class terrain: the struggle against this system of death and destruction, capitalism.
Julien, 24/8/95
[1] To develop the atomic bomb, the US state mobilized all the resources of science and put them at the military's disposal. Two billion dollars were devoted to the Manhattan Project, set up by that great humanist Roosevelt. Every university in the country joined in. Directly or indirectly, all the greatest physicists from Einstein to Oppenheimer were involved, including six Nobel prizewinners. This gigantic mobilization of every scientific resource for war expresses a general characteristic of decadent capitalism. State capitalism, whether openly totalitarian or draped in the democratic flag, colonizes and militarizes the whole of science. Under the reign of capitalism, science lives and develops through and for war. This reality has not ceased to get worse since 1945.
[2] The essential aim of this conference, especially for Churchill who was its main instigator, was to make it clear to Stalin's USSR that it should restrain its imperialist ambitions, and that there were limits which should not be passed.
- an experience which the British bourgeoisie possessed in abundance. But it was also the expression of not particularly friendly feelings towards its British ally. The fact that Britain emerged seriously weakened from the war, and that its positions in Europe were threatened by the Russian bear, could only make her more docile in the face of the diktats which Uncle Sam was going to impose, without delay, even on its closest "friends". It is another example of the "frank and harmonious" relationships that reign among the imperialist sharks.
[4] See International Review no. 66, "Crimes of the great democracies".
[5] Immediately after 1945, the bourgeoisie presented the "Cold War" as a war between two different systems: democracy against communist totalitarianism. With this lie, it continued to confuse the working class, at the same time hiding the classical and sordid imperialist nature of the one-time "allies". a sense, they managed to pull off the same coup in 1989, proclaiming that peace would reign at last with the fall of "communism", From the Gulf to Yugoslavia, we have seen since then just what the promises of Bush, Gorbachev and Co were worth.
In the International Review No. 82, and in our territorial press in 12 countries, the ICC published articles on its 11th Congress. These articles informed the revolutionary milieu and the working class about the political struggle which has taken place in the ICC recently for the establishment of a really marxist functioning at all levels of our organizational life. At the center of this combat was the overcoming of what Lenin called the "circle spirit". This required in particular the liquidation of informal groupings based on personal loyalties and petty bourgeois individualism, what Rosa Luxemburg referred to as "tribes" or "clans".
The articles we published placed the present combat in continuity with that waged by the Marxists against the Bakuninists in the 1st International, by the Bolsheviks against Menshevism in the Russian party, but also by the ICC throughout its history. In particular, we affirmed the petty bourgeois anti-organizational basis of the different splits which have taken place in the history of the ICC, which were neither motivated nor justified by political divergences. They were the result of non-marxist, non-proletarian organizational behavior, of what Lenin called the anarchism of the intelligentsia and the literary bohemian.
A problem of the whole milieu
We did not report in our press on our internal debate out of exhibitionism, but because we are convinced that the problems we are confronting are not at all specific to the ICC. We are convinced that the ICC would not have been able to survive without the radical stamping out of the anarchism in organizational matters in our ranks. We see the same danger threatening the revolutionary milieu as a whole. The weight of the ideas and behavior of the petty bourgeoisie, its resistance to organizational discipline and collective principles, has affected all groups to a greater or lesser extent. The break in organic continuity with revolutionary organizations of the past through 50 years of counter revolution, the interruption of the living process of the passing on of priceless organizational experience from one generation of marxists to the next, has made the new generation of proletarian militants after 1968 particularly vulnerable to the inf1uence of the petty bourgeoisie in revolt (student and protest movements, etc).
Thus, our present struggle is not the internal affair of the ICC. The Congress articles are aimed at the defense of the entire proletarian milieu. They constitute an appeal to all serious marxist groupings to clarify on the proletarian concept of functioning, and to make known the lesson of their struggle with petty bourgeois disorganization. The revolutionary milieu as a whole needs to be much more vigilant towards the intrusion of modes of behavior foreign to the proletariat. It needs to consciously and openly organize its own defense.
The attack of parasitism against the revolutionary camp
"Salem or Waco would have been an appropriate venue for this particular congress. While it is tempting to lampoon or ridicule the monstrous proceedings of this congress-cum-kangaroo court, where, inter alia, Bakunin and Lassalle were denounced as "not necessarily" police spies and Martov characterized as an "anarchist ", the overwhelming emotion is of great sadness that a once so dynamic and positive organization should be reduced to this sorry state".
"In the best Stalinist tradition the ICC then proceeds to rewrite its history (just as it did after the 1985 split) to show that every major difference (...) has been caused not by militants with different opinions of a question but by the intrusion of alien ideologies into the body of the ICC".
"What the ICC cannot grasp is that it is their own monolithic practice that is the problem here. What happened at the 11th congress was surely simply the bureaucratic triumph of one clan over another, a jostling for control of the Central Organs, something that was widely predicted after the death of their founder member MC".
For the CBG, what took place at the ICC Congress must have been "two or more days of psychological battering. Readers who have any knowledge of the brainwashing techniques of religious sects will understand this process. Those who have read of the mental tortures inflicted on those who confessed to impossible "crimes" at the Moscow Show Trials will, likewise, suss what went on".
And here, the CBG quotes itself from 1982, after its members left the ICC:
"For every militant there will always be the question: How far can I go in this discussion before I am condemned as an alien force, a menace, a petty bourgeois? How far can I go before I am regarded with suspicion? How far before I am a police spy?".
These quotations speak for themselves.
They reveal better than anything else the true nature, not of the ICC but of the "CBG". Their message is clear: revolutionary organizations are like the mafia. "Power struggles" take place exactly as within the bourgeoisie.
It is not only the whole present day revolutionary milieu which is being attacked here. It is the entire history and all the traditions of the workers' movement which are being abused.
In reality, the lies and slanders of the CBG are perfectly in line with the campaign of the world bourgeoisie about the alleged death of communism and of marxism. At the center of this propaganda is the greatest lie in history: that the organizational rigor of Lenin and the Bolsheviks necessarily led to Stalinism. In the CBG's version of this propaganda, it is the Bolshevism of the ICC which "necessarily" leads to its alleged" Stalinism". Evidently, the CBG neither knows what the revolutionary milieu is, nor does it know what Stalinism is about.
What has provoked the petty bourgeois frenzy of the CBG is once again the resolute, unmistakable manner with which the ICC has affirmed its allegiance to the organizational approach of Lenin. We can assure all the parasitic elements: the more the bourgeoisie attacks the history of our class, the more proudly we will affirm our allegiance to Bolshevism.
By pouring garbage upon the proletarian vanguard, the CBG has demonstrated once again that it is not a part of the revolutionary milieu, but its opponent. The fact that the ICC has waged the most important organizational struggle in its history, does not interest it in the least.
In itself, there is nothing new in the fact that those revolutionaries who defend organizational rigor against the petty bourgeoisie are attacked, even denigrated. Marx became the object of a whole bourgeois campaign because of his resistance to Bakunin's Alliance. Lenin was personally insulted because of his stand against the Mensheviks in 1903: not only by the reformists and open opportunists, but even by comrades such as Trotsky. But nobody within the workers movement, not Trotsky and not even the reformists ever spoke of Marx or Lenin's struggle in the terms employed by the CBG. The difference is that the "polemic" of the CBG is clearly aimed at the destruction of the revolutionary milieu - not just the ICC.
The nature of parasitism
We will have to disappoint the CBG, who claim that the ICC deals with those who disagree with it by labeling them as police spies. Although the CBG "disagrees" with us, we consider them to be neither spies nor a bourgeois organization. People like the CBG do not have a bourgeois political platform. Programmatically, they even adhere to certain proletarian positions. They are against trade unions and support for "national liberation" struggles.
cease existence! But it is clear that in fact the real reason for publication was to attack the ICC Congress! Significantly, the number 16 does not attack the bourgeoisie; there is no defense of proletarian internationalism in face of the Balkan War, for instance. This is in line with the other 15 issues which were also mainly devoted to slandering proletarian groups. And we feel sure that despite their announced dissolution they will continue to do so. In fact the abandonment of the formal pretense of being a political group will allow them to concentrate even more exclusively on the "work" of denigrating the marxist camp.
The existence of groups which, while being neither mandated nor paid by the bourgeoisie, nevertheless voluntarily do part of the job of the ruling class, is a highly significant phenomenon. In the marxist movement we call such people parasites, bloodsuckers living on the backs of the revolutionary forces. They do not attack the marxist camp out of allegiance to capital, but out of a blind and impotent hatred for the mode of life of the working class, the collective and impersonal nature of its struggle. Such petty bourgeois and declassed elements are motivated by a spirit of vengeance towards a political movement which cannot afford to make concessions to their individualist needs, to their cravings for self-presentation, flattery and pompousness.
The trajectory of the "CBG"
In order to grasp the nature of this parasitism (which is not new in the workers movement), it is necessary to study its origins and development. The CBG can serve as a typical example. Its origins lie in the circle phase of the new generation of revolutionaries developing after 1968, giving rise to a small group of militants linked by a mixture of political and personal loyalties. The informal group in question broke with the Communist Workers Organization (CWO) and moved towards the ICC towards the end of the 1970s. In the discussions at that time we criticized the fact that they wanted to enter the ICC "as a group" rather than individually. This posed the danger that they might form an organization within the organization on a non-political, affinitary basis thus menacing proletarian organizational unity. We also condemned the fact that, on leaving the CWO, they had taken part of its material with them - a breach of revolutionary principles.
Inside the ICC, the group tried to maintain its informal separate identity, despite the fact that the pressure within an international centralized organization to submit each of its parts to the whole must have been much greater than within the CWO. However, the "autonomy" of the "friends" who later formed the CBG could survive due to the fact that within the ICC other such groupings, the leftovers of the circles out of which the ICC was formed, continued to exist. This was particularly the case for our British section, World Revolution, which the ex-CWO members joined, and which was divided through the existence of two already existing "clans". These clans quickly became the main obstacle to the application in practice of the statutes of the ICC in all of its parts.
When the ICC, around this time was infiltrated by an agent of the state, Chenier, a member of Mitterrand's French Socialist Party, who rejoined this party after his expulsion from the ICC, the British section thus became the main target of his manipulations. As a result of these manipulations, and with the uncovering of the agent Chenier by the organization, half of our British section left the ICC. None of them were expelled, contrary to the assertions of the CBG.
The ex-CWO elements, who also left at this moment, then formed the "CBG".
We can draw the following lessons:
- although they had no particular political positions distinguishing them from others, basically the same clique entered and left both the CWO and the ICC before becoming the "CBG". This reveals the unwillingness and incapacity of these people to integrate themselves into the workers' movement, to surrender their petty group identity to something greater than themselves.
- although they claim to have been expelled from the ICC, or that they could not remain within it because of its "inability to debate", in reality these people ran away from the political debates taking place in the organization. In the name of "fighting sectarianism" they turned their backs on the two most important communist organizations existing in Britain, the CWO and the ICC - despite the absence of any major political divergence. This is the way in which they "struggle against sectarianism".
The milieu should not be deceived by the empty phrases about "monolithism" and the ICC's supposed "fear of debate". The ICC stands in the tradition of the Italian Left, of Bilan which during the Spanish Civil War even refused to expel or split with the minority openly calling for participation in imperialist war - since political clarification must always precede any political separation.
- what the CBG objected to in the ICC was its rigorous proletarian method of debate, via polemic and polarization, where a spade is called a spade, and a petty bourgeois or opportunist stance is called by name. An atmosphere hardly congenial for circles and clans with their double language and false diplomacy, their personal loyalties and disloyalties. And certainly one which did not please the petty bourgeois cowards who ran away from political confrontation and withdrew from the life of the class.
- graver still, and for the second time, the future CBG participated in the theft of the material of the organization it was leaving. They justified this with the vision of the Marxist party as a stockholders company: whoever invests their time in the ICC has the right to take their share of its resources with them when they leave. Moreover they allowed themselves to determine what "share" they would entitle themselves to. It should go without saying that if such methods were to be accepted, they would mean the end of the very possibility of the existence of marxist organizations. Revolutionary principles are here replaced by the bourgeois law of the jungle:
- when the ICC set out to recover the stolen resources of the organization, these courageous "revolutionaries" threatened to call the police against us;
A blind and impotent hatred
It is this total resistance by petty bourgeois and declassed anarchist elements against their integration into and subordination to the great world historic mission of the proletariat, which despite sympathies for certain of its political positions leads to parasitism, to open hatred and political sabotage of the marxist movement.
The sordid and corrosive reality of the CBG itself gives the lie to its claims to have left the ICC "in order to be able to discuss". Here again, we will let the parasites speak for themselves. First of all their abandonment of any allegiance to the proletariat begins to be openly theoretized. "A very bleak vision of the nature of the period began to be articulated", they tell us; "elements within the CBG asked whether the class could now emerge at all?".
In face of the "difficult debate", here is how the CBG, this "anti-monolithic" giants, copes with "divergences": "We were ill-equipped to confront these questions. There was a more-or-less deafening silence in response to them (...) the debate didn't so much fizzle out as remain largely ignored. This was profoundly unhealthy for the organization. The CBG had prided itself on being open to any discussions within the revolutionary movement, but here it was in one of its own debates on a subject at the very heart of its existence plugging its ears and shutting its mouth".
It is therefore only logical that at the end of its crusade against the Marxist concept of organizational and methodological rigor as the prerequisite for any real debate, the CBG "discovers" that organisation itself blocks discussion: "In order to allow this debate to take place (...) we have decided to end the life of the CBG".
The organization as barrier to debate! Long live anarchism! Long live organizational liquidationism! Imagine the gratitude of the ruling class in face of the propagation of such "principles" in the name of "marxism"!
Parasitism: spearhead against the proletarian forces
Although the class domination of the bourgeoisie is, for the moment, certainly not threatened, the main aspects of the present world situation oblige it to be particularly vigilant in the defense of its interests. The inexorable deepening of its economic crisis, the sharpening of imperialist tensions, and the resistance of a generation of the working class which has not yet suffered a decisive defeat, contain the perspective of a dramatic destabilization of bourgeois society. All of this imposes on the bourgeoisie the world historic task of destroying the proletariat's revolutionary Marxist vanguard. As insignificant as the Marxist camp appears today, the ruling class is already obliged to make serious efforts to disrupt and weaken it.
At the time of the 1st International the bourgeoisie itself undertook the task of public denigration of proletarian revolutionaries. The entire bourgeois press slandered the International Workers' Association and its General Council, opposing to the alleged "dictatorial centralism" of Marx the allures of its own progressive and revolutionary past.
The bourgeoisie knows very well that the best and most thorough means of destroying the revolutionary camp is from within, by denigrating, demoralizing and dividing it. The parasites assume this task without even having to be asked. By presenting the marxist groups as Stalinist, as bourgeois sects dominated by power struggles, as the mirror image of the bourgeoisie itself, as historically insignificant, they support the offensive of capital against the proletariat. By destroying the reputation of the milieu, parasitism not only contributes to the political subversion of the proletarian forces today - it prepares the terrain for the politically effective repression of the marxist camp in the future. If the bourgeoisie stays in the background today in order to allow parasitism to do its dirty work today, it is with the intention of emerging from the shadows to decapitate the revolutionary vanguard tomorrow.
The incapacity of most of the revolutionary groups to recognize the real character of the parasitic groups is one of the greatest weaknesses of the milieu today. The ICC is determined to assume its responsibility in combatting this weakness. It is high time for the serious groups, for the milieu as a whole to organize its own defense against the most rotten elements of the vengeful petty bourgeoisie. Instead of opportunistically flirting with such groups, it is the responsibility of the milieu to wage a merciless and unrelenting struggle against political parasitism. The formation of the future class party, the success of the liberation struggle of the proletariat, will depend to a large extent on our capacity to wage this combat to the end.
Kr 01.09.95
IR83, 4th Quarter 1995
The International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP) has replied in International Communist Review no.13 to our polemical article "The IBRP's Conception of decadence in capitalism" which appeared in our International Review no.79. In International Review no.82 [461] we published the first part of this article, which demonstrated the negative implications of the IBRP's conception of imperialist war as a means for the devaluation of capital and the renewal of the cycles of accumulation. In this second part we are going to analyse the economic theory that sustains this conception: the theory of the tendential fall in the rate of profit.
Bourgeois economists, ever since the classics (Smith, Ricardo, etc), have based themselves on two dogmas:
1. The worker is a free citizen who sells his labour power in exchange for a wage. The wage is his share of the social income from which the employer is also paid his profit.
2 Capitalism is an eternal system. Its crises are temporary and conjunctural, due to the disproportion between the different branches of production, disequilibrium in distribution or bad management. Nevertheless, in the long term, there is no problem with the realisation of commodities; production always finds a market, advancing the balance between supply (production) and demand (consumption).
Marx fought these dogmas of bourgeois economics to the day he died. He demonstrated that capitalism is not an eternal system: "At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms- with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution" (Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, page 21, English edition, 1971). This period of the historic crisis, of the irreversible decadence of capitalism, opened up with the First World War. The survival of capitalism, following the defeat of the attempted world revolution by the proletariat between 1917-23, has cost humanity oceans of blood (hundreds of millions killed in imperialist wars between 1914-68, sweat (a brutal increase in the exploitation of the working class) and tears (the terror of unemployment, barbarity of every type, the dehumanisation of social relations).
However, this fundamental analysis, the common tradition of the Communist Left, is not explained in the same way in the present revolutionary political milieu: two theories exist for explaining the decadence of capitalism, the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and that which is called the "market theory" based essentially on the work of Rosa Luxemburg.
The IBRP adhere to the first theory while we prefer the second [1] [462]. In order for a polemic on both theories to be fruitful it is necessary to base it on an understanding of the evolution of the debate in the Marxist movement.
Marx lived in the period of the ascent of capitalism. Although the historic crisis of the system was not posed as dramatically as it is today, he was able to see in its periodic cyclical crises a manifestation of its contradictions and an announcement of the convulsions that would lead to ruin: "Marx pointed to two basic contradictions in the process of capitalist accumulation: two contradictions that lay at the root of the cyclical crises of growth capitalism went through in the nineteenth century, and which would, at a given moment, impel the communist revolution onto the agenda. These two contradictions are the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, given the inevitability of an ever higher organic composition of capital and the problem of overproduction, capital's innate disease of producing more than its market can absorb" ("Marxism and Crisis Theory" International Review no.13, page 27, our emphasis).
From this we can see that: "Though he developed a framework in which these two phenomena were intimately linked, Marx never completed his examination of capitalism, so that, in different writings, more or less emphasis is given to one or the other as the underlying cause of the crisis... It is the unfinished character of this crucial area of Marx's thought - something, as we have said, determined not merely by Marx's personal inability to finish Capital, but by the limitations of the historic period in which he was living" (idem. Page 27).
At the end of last century, the conditions of capitalism began to change: imperialism as a policy of robbery and confrontation between the powers developed in great strides. On the other hand, capitalism was expressing growing signs of illness (inflation, growth in exploitation) that contrasted strongly with a growth and prosperity, which had been uninterrupted since 1890. In this context there appeared inside the 2nd International an opportunist current that called into question the Marxist thesis of the collapse of capitalism and put forward a gradual transition to socialism through successive reforms of capitalism that would "alleviate these contradictions". The theoreticians of this current concentrated their artillery precisely against the second of the contradictions pointed out by Marx: the tendency to overproduction. Thus, Bernstein said: "Marx contradicts himself when he sees the ultimate cause of crises in the limitation of the consumption of the masses. In reality, Marx's theory about the crisis is not much different from the underconsumptionism of Rodbertus" [2] [463] (Bernstein: Theoretical Socialism and Social Democratic Practice).
In 1902, Tugan Baranovsky, a Russian revisionist, attacked Marx's theory of the crisis of capitalism denying that there could be a problem of the market and demonstrating that the crisis is due to "disproportionality" between different sectors.
Tugan Baranovsky went even further than his German revisionist colleagues (Bernstein, Schmidt, Vollmar, etc). He went back to the dogmas of bourgeois economics, concretely returning to the ideas of Say [3] [464] (openly criticised by Marx) based on the thesis that "capitalism doesn't have a problem of realisation beyond some temporary disturbances". There was a very firm response in the 2nd International on the part of Kautsky, who was then still in the ranks of the revolution: "Although capitalists increase their wealth and the number of exploited workers grows, they cannot themselves form a sufficient market for the capitalist produced commodities, as accumulation of capital and productivity grow even faster. They must find a market in those strata and nations which are still non-capitalist... this additional market hardly has the flexibility and ability to expand the capitalist process of production... This, in short, is the theory of crises which, as far as we can see, is generally accepted by ‘orthodox' Marxists and which was set up by Marx" (Quoted by Rosa Luxemburg in her book The Accumulation of Capital an Anti-critique, Modern Reader edition, 1972, page 79. The emphasis is Rosa Luxemburg's).
However, this polemic was radicalised when Rosa Luxemburg published her book The Accumulation of Capital. In this book, Rosa Luxemburg tried to explain the dizzy growth of imperialism and the increasingly profound crisis of capitalism. In the book she demonstrated that capitalism developed historically through expanding its relations of production based on wage labour into non-capitalist regions and sectors, that it would reach its historic limits when it had embraced the whole planet, and that it was already failing to find the new territories that were necessary for the expansion demanded by the growth of productivity of labour and the organic composition of capital: "Thus capitalism expands because of its mutual relationship with non-capitalist social strata and countries, accumulating at their expense and at the same time pushing them aside to take their place. The more capitalists participate in this hunt for areas of accumulation, the rarer the non-capitalist places still open to the expansion of capital become and the tougher the competition; its raids turn into a chain of economic and political catastrophes: world crises, wars, revolution" (Rosa Luxemburg: Anti-critique, page 60.)
Rosa Luxemburg's critics denied that capitalism has a problem of realisation, which is to say, they forget the contradiction of the system that Marx vigorously defended against the bourgeois economists and which constituted the base of "the crisis theory founded by Marx" as Kautsky had recalled some years before against the revisionist Tugan-Baranovsky.
Rosa Luxemburg's detractors set themselves up as the "orthodox and unconditional" defenders of Marx, and particularly, of his schemas of expanded reproduction put forward in Vol.2 of Capital. That is to say, they nullified Marx's thinking by exaggerating a passage from his work [4] [465]. Their arguments were very varied: Eckstein said there was no problem of realisation because in the tables of expanded reproduction Marx had explained "perfectly" that there was no part of production that could not be sold. Hilferding revived the theory of "disproportionality between sectors" saying that the crisis was due to the anarchy of production and that the tendency towards the concentration of capitalism reduced this anarchy and therefore the crisis. Finally, Bauer said that Rosa Luxemburg had pointed out a real problem but that this had a solution under capitalism: accumulation followed the growth of population.
During this period only one editor of a local socialist newspaper opposed the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall to that of Rosa Luxemburg's, thus: "...we are left with the somewhat oblique comfort provided by a little ‘expert' from the Dresdener Volkszeitung who, after thoroughly destroying my book, explains that capitalism will eventually collapse ‘because of the falling rate of profit'. One is not too sure exactly how the dear man envisages this: whether the capitalist class will at a certain point commit suicide in despair at the low rate of profit, or whether it will somehow declare that business is so bad that it is simply not worth the trouble, whereupon it will hand the key over to the proletariat? However that may be, this comfort is unfortunately dispelled by a single sentence by Marx, namely the statement that "large capitals will compensate for the fall in the rate by mass production". Thus there is still some time to pass before capitalism collapses because of the falling rate of profit, roughly until the sun burns out". (Rosa Luxemburg Anti-critique, page 76.).
Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not take part in this polemic [5] [466]. Certainly, Lenin had fought the Populist theory of markets, an underconsumptionist theory in continuity with the errors of Sismondi. However, Lenin never denied the problem of the market: in his analysis of imperialism, despite placing the main emphasis on Hilferding's theory about the concentration in finance capital [6] [467], he did not forget that this took place under the pressure of the saturation of the world market. Thus, in Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, responding to Kautsky, he emphasized that "It is the tendency to the annexation not only of the agrarian regions, but also the most industrial that precisely characterises imperialism, thus, the already completed division of the world demands it proceeds to a new division, to extend its hand towards all types of territory".
In the period of the degeneration of the 3rd International, Bukharin in his book Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital, attacked the thesis of Rosa Luxemburg in the development of a theory that opened up the doors to the triumph of Stalinism: the theory of the "stabilization" of capitalism (which presupposed the revisionist thesis that the crisis could be overcome) and the "necessity" that the USSR "coexist" for a prolonged period with the capitalist system. Bukharin's fundamental critique of Rosa Luxemburg was that she was limited to giving a privileged place to the contradiction related to the market forgetting all the others, amongst them, the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall [7] [468].
At the end of the 20's and at the beginning of the 30's, "Paul Mattick of the American Council Communists took up Henryk Grossman's criticisms of Luxemburg and his contention that capitalism's permanent crisis emerges when the organic composition of capital reaches such a magnitude that there is less and less surplus value to fuel the process of accumulation. This basic idea - though further elaborated on a number of points - is today defended by revolutionary groups like the CWO, Battaglia Comunista and some of the groups emerging in Scandinavia". ("Marxism and Crisis Theory" in International Review no.13, page 28).
It must remain clear that the contradiction that capitalism suffers in respect of the realisation of surplus value plays a fundamental role in the Marxist theory of the crisis and that the revisionist tendencies attacked this thesis with particular rage. The IBRP claim the contrary. Thus, in their response they tell us that "For Marx the source of all real crises lay within the capitalist system itself, within the relationship between capitalists and workers. He sometimes expressed this as a crisis created by the limited capacity of the workers to consume the product of their own labours...He went on to add that this was not because of overproduction per se... And Marx goes on to explain that the crisis arises out of the falling rate of profit...The crises devalue capital and allow a new cycle of accumulation to begin" (The IBRP's response, pages 32-33). Their confidence is such that it permits them to add that, "The "schematic cycles of accumulation" in which we are happy to be imprisoned happens to be what Marx left us with" (The IBRP's response, page 32).
It is a deformation of Marx's thought to say that the historic crisis of capital is explained solely by the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. For three reasons:
1. Marx placed emphasis on the two contradictions
* He established that capitalist production has two parts, production properly speaking and its realisation. Put simply, the profit inherent in exploitation means nothing either to the individual capitalist nor to capitalism in its totality, if the commodities they produce are not sold: "The total mass of commodities, the total product, must be sold, both that portion which replaces constant capital and variable capital and that which represents surplus-value. If this does not happen, or happens only partly, or only at prices that are less than the price of production, then although the worker is certainly exploited, his exploitation is not realised as such for the capitalist". (Capital Vol.3, page 352, Penguin edition. Our emphasis).
* He demonstrated the vital importance of the market in the development of capitalism: "The market, therefore must be continually extended, so that its relationships and the conditions governing them assume ever more the form of a natural law... The internal contradiction seeks resolution by extending the external field of production" (idem, page 353). Further on, he asks: "How else could there be a lack of demand for those very goods that the mass of the people are short of, and how could it be that this demand has to be sought abroad, in distant markets, in order to pay the workers back home the average measure of the necessary means of subsistence? It is because it is only in this specific, capitalist context that the surplus product receives a form in which its proprietor can make it available for consumption as soon as it has been transformed back into capital for himself" (idem, page 366).
* He condemned without any hesitations Say's thesis that there was no problem of realisation in capitalism: "The conception... adopted by Ricardo from the tedious Say... that overproduction is not possible or at least that no general glut of the market is possible, is based on the proposition that products are exchanged against products, or as Mill puts it, on the ‘metaphysical equilibrium of sellers and buyers', and this led to the conclusion that demand is determined only by production." (Theories of Surplus Value Vol.2, page 493, Moscow edition).
* He insisted that permanent overproduction expressed the historical limits of capitalism: "...the mere admission that the market must expand with production is, on the other hand, an admission of the possibility of overproduction, for the market is limited externally in the geographical sense... it is then possible... that the limits of the market are not extended rapidly enough for production, or that new markets - new extensions of the market - may be rapidly outpaced by production, so that the expanded market becomes just as much a barrier as the narrower market was formerly" (idem, page 524-5).
2. Secondly, Marx established the whole of the causes that counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall: in Chapter XIV of Vol.3 of Capital he analysed six factors that counteract this tendency: more intense exploitation of labour, reduction of wages below their value, reduction in the cost of constant capital, the relative surplus population, foreign trade, the growth of share capital.
* He saw the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as an expression of the constant increase in the productivity of labour, a tendency that capitalism developed to a level never seen in previous modes of production: "With the progressive decline in variable capital in relation to constant capital, this tendency leads to a rising organic composition of the total capital, and the direct result of this is that the rate of surplus-value, with the level of exploitation of labour remaining the same or even rising, is expressed in a steadily falling general rate of profit... The progressive tendency of the general rate of profit to fall is thus simply the expression, peculiar to the capitalist mode of production, of the progressive development of the social productivity of labour" (Capital, Vol.3, pages 318-19. Emphasis in the original).
* Marx made clear that this is not an absolute law but a tendency that contained a whole series of counteracting forces (as shown above) that it gives rise to: "We have shown in general, therefore, how the same causes that bring about a fall in the general rate of profit provoke counter-effects that inhibit this fall, delay it and in part even paralyse it. These do not annul the law, but they weaken its effects. If this were not the case, it would not be the fall in the general rate of profit that was incomprehensible, but rather the relative slowness of this fall. The law operates therefore simply as a tendency, whose effect is decisive only under certain particular circumstances and over long periods" (idem, page 346).
* In relation to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall he posed the primordial importance of "foreign trade" and above all the continual search for new markets: "...this same foreign trade develops the capitalist mode of production at home, and hence promotes a decline in variable capital as against constant, though it also produces overproduction in relation to the foreign country, so that it again has the opposite effect in the further course of development" (idem, page 346).
3. Finally, contrary to what the comrades think, Marx did not see the devaluation of capital as the only means that capitalism has for overcoming the crisis, he also insisted about the other means: the conquest of new markets: "How does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by the enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones" (The Communist Manifesto, in The Revolutions of 1848, page 73, Penguin Books). "Capitalist production being a transitory economical phase, is full of internal contradictions which develop and become evident in proportion as it develops. This tendency to destroy its own market at the same time as it creates it, is one of them. Another is the "hopeless situation" to which it leads, and which is developed sooner in a country without a foreign market, like Russia, than in countries which more or less are capable of competing on the open world market. This situation without an apparent issue finds its issue, for the latter countries, in commercial convulsions, in the forcible opening of new markets. But even then the cul-de-sac stares one in the face. Look at England. The last new market which could bring on a temporary revival of prosperity by its being thrown open to English commerce, is China" (Engels to Danielson, 1892. Letters on Capital, page 274, New Park).
However, the comrades give us another "weighty" argument: "As we have pointed out before, this theory [they are referring to that of Rosa Luxemburg] makes nonsense of Capital since Marx carried out his analysis assuming a closed capitalist system that was already devoid of "third buyers" (and yet he still found a crisis mechanism)" (The IBRP's response, page 33).
It is quite true that Marx pointed out that; "To bring foreign trade into an analysis of the value of the product annually reproduced can therefore only confuse things, without supplying any new factor either to the problem or to its solution" (Capital Vol.2, page 546, Penguin edition). It is true that Marx, in the final chapter of Vol.2, in trying to understand the mechanism of capitalism's expanded reproduction, says that it is necessary to omit "exterior elements", that it is necessary to assume that there are only capitalists and workers, and on this basis he elaborates the tables of capital's expanded reproduction. These famous tables have served as the revisionists' "bible" in order "to demonstrate" that "Marx's illustrations in the second volume of Capital were a sufficient and exhaustive explanation of accumulation; the models there proved quite conclusively that capital could grow excellently, and production could expand, if there was no other mode of production in the world than the capitalist one; it was its own market, and only my complete inability to understand the ABC of Marx's models could persuade me to see the problem here" (Rosa Luxemburg: Anti-critique, page 62.).
It is absurd to pretend that the explanation of the crisis of capitalism is contained within the famous tables of reproduction. The centre of Rosa Luxemburg's critique is precisely the assumption on which this is based: "...the realisation of surplus value for the purposes of accumulation is an impossible task for a society which consists solely of workers and capitalists" (Luxemburg. The Accumulation of Capital, page 350. Monthly Review Press). With this as a starting point, she demonstrates its inconsistency: "...if and in so far as, the capitalists do not themselves consume their products but ‘practise abstinence', i.e. accumulate, for whose sake do they produce? Even less can the maintenance of an ever larger army of workers be the ultimate purpose of the continuous accumulation of capital. From the capitalist point of view, the consumption of the workers is a consequence of accumulation, it is never its object... Who, then, realises the permanently increasing surplus value? The diagram answers: the capitalists themselves and they alone [8] [469]. - And what do they do with this increasing surplus value? - The diagram replies: They use it for an ever greater expansion of their production. These capitalists are thus fanatical supporters of an expansion of production for production's sake. They see to it that ever more machines are built for the sake of building - with their help - ever more new machines. Yet the upshot of all this is not accumulation of capital but an increasing production of producer goods to no purpose whatever. Indeed one must be as reckless as Tugan Baranovsky, and rejoice as much in paradoxical statements, to assume that this untiring merry-go-round in thin air could be a faithful reflection in theory of capitalist reality, a true deduction from Marx's doctrine" (idem, page 335).
Therefore, she concludes that: "The whole of Marx's work, volume 3 particularly, contains a most elaborate and lucid exposition of his general views regarding the typical course of capitalist accumulation. If we once fully understand this interpretation, the deficiencies of the diagram at the end of volume 2 are immediately evident. If we examine critically the diagram of enlarged reproduction in the light of Marx's theory, we find various contradictions between the two." (idem, page 335)
For its historical development, capitalism depended on a surrounding pre-capitalist milieu with which to establish a relationship. This comprised three indissoluble elements: trade (the acquisition of raw materials and the exchange of manufactured goods), destruction of these social forms (the annihilation of the natural subsistence economy, separation of the peasants and artisans from their means of labour) and integration into capitalist production (the development of wage labour and all the capitalist institutions).
This relationship of trade-destruction-integration spans the long process of the formation of the capitalist system (the 16th - 18th centuries), summit (the 19th century) and decadence (the 20th century) and constituted a vital necessity for the whole of the relations of production: "The interrelations of accumulating capital and non-capitalist forms of production extend over values as well as over material conditions, for constant capital, variable capital and surplus value alike. The non-capitalist mode of production is the given historical setting for this process. Since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the capitalist mode of production" (idem, page 365).
For Battaglia Comunista this historic process that unfolds at the level of the world market is nothing but the reflection of a much more profound process: "Although we may start with the market, and the contradictions which appear there (production-distribution, imbalance between supply and demand), we must return to the mechanisms governing accumulation to get a more correct vision of the problem. As a productive - distributive unity, capital demands that we consider what happens on the market as a consequence of the ripening of contradictions lying at the base of the relations of production, and not the reverse. It is the economic cycle and the necessity for the valorisation of capital which condition the market. Only by starting with the contradictory laws which rule the process of accumulation is it possible to explain the ‘laws of the market'"
(2nd Conference of groups of the Communist Left, volume 1 preparatory texts, page 10).
The realisation of surplus value, the famous "salto mortale of the commodity" as Marx called it, constitutes the "surface" of the phenomena, the "sounding box" of the contradictions of accumulation. This vision with its airs of "profundity" contains nothing else than profound idealism: the "laws of the market" are the "external" result of the "internal" laws of the process of accumulation. This is not the view of Marx, for whom the two moments of capitalist production (production and realisation) are not the reflection one of the other, but two inseparable parts of the global unity that is the historical evolution of capitalism: "...the commodity enters the sphere of circulation not just as a particular use-value, eg, a ton of iron, but as a use-value with a definite price... The price while on the one hand indicating the amount of labour-time contained in the iron, namely its value, at the same time signifies the pious wish to convert the iron into gold... If this transformation fails to take place then the iron ceases to be not only a commodity but also a product; since it is a commodity only because it is not a use-value for its owner, that is to say his labour is only really labour if it is useful labour for others, and it is useful for him only if it is abstract general labour. It is therefore the task of the iron or its owner to find that location in the world of commodities where iron attracts gold. But if the sale actually takes place, as we assume in this analysis of simple circulation, then this difficulty, the salto mortale of the commodity, is surmounted" (Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Chapter 2, Page 88, Moscow edition).
Any attempt to separate production from realisation impedes the understanding of the historical movement of capitalism which led to its summit (the formation of the world market) and its historical crisis (chronic saturation of the world market): "... the capitalists are compelled to exploit the already existing gigantic means of production on a larger scale...as the mass of production, and consequently the need for extended markets, grows, the world market becomes more and more contracted, fewer and fewer new markets remain available for exploitation, since every preceding crisis has subjected to world trade a market hitherto unconquered or only superficially exploited" (Marx and Engels: Wage Labour and Capital. Selected Works, page 93, Moscow edition). Only in the framework of this unity is it possible to coherently integrate the tendency for the continual increase of the productivity of labour: "Capital does not consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a means for maintaining and multiplying the exchange value of the latter" (idem, page 81).
When Lenin studied the development of capitalism in Russia he used the same method: "What is important is that capitalism cannot exist and develop without constantly expanding the sphere of its domination, without colonising new countries and drawing old non-capitalist countries into the whirlpool of world economy. And this feature of capitalism has been and continues to be manifested with tremendous force in post-Reform Russia" (Lenin: "The Development of Capitalism in Russia". Collected Works Vol 3, page 594).
The comrades of the IBRP think, however, that Rosa Luxemburg insisted on looking for "external" causes to the crisis of capitalism: "Initially Luxemburg supported the idea that the cause of crises was to be found in the value relations inherent in the capitalist mode of production itself...But in the fight against revisionism inside German Social Democracy seems to have led her in 1913 to search for another economic theory with which to counter the revisionist assertion that the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall was no longer valid. In The Accumulation of Capital she concluded that there was "a flaw in Marx's analysis" and she decided that the cause of capitalist crisis lay outside capitalist relations". (The IBRP's response, page 33).
The revisionists throw in Rosa Luxemburg's face the accusation that she was posing a problem that didn't exist, according to them, Marx's tables of expanded reproduction had "demonstrated" that all surplus value was realised within capitalism. The comrades of the IBRP don't appeal to these tables but their method amounts to the same thing: for them Marx with his schemas of the cycles of accumulation has given the solution. Capital goes on producing and developing until the rate of profit falls and production is blocked which then brings about the tendency to "objectively" resolve itself through a massive depreciation of capital. After this depreciation, the rate of profit is restored and the process begins again and thus successively. It is true that the comrades admit that historically this evolution is much more complicated due to the growth in the organic composition of capital and the tendency to the concentration and centralisation of capital: that in the 20th century this process of concentration, means that the necessary devaluations of capital cannot be limited to strictly economic means (closure of factories and laying off workers) but requires the enormous destruction of world war (see the first part of this article).
This explanation is, in the majority of cases, a description of the conjunctural movements of capitalism but does not allow an understanding of the global, historical movement of capitalism. It provides us with a very unreliable thermometer (we have explained, following Marx, the counteracting causes of the law) for the convolutions and progress of capitalism but it doesn't allow us to understand, nor even begin to pose, the reason, the profound cause for the illness. With the additional burden of decadence (see our articles in International Review, nos. 79 & 82) accumulation is profoundly blocked and its mechanisms (including therefore the tendency of the rate of profit to fall) have been altered and perverted by massive state intervention.
The comrades remind us that for Marx the causes of the crisis are internal to capitalism.
Do the comrades want something "more internal" to capitalism than the imperious necessity to constantly expand production beyond the limits of the market? Capitalism's aim is not the satisfaction of the needs of consumption (unlike feudalism whose aim was the consumption of the nobles and priests). Neither is it a system of simple production of commodities (such methods could be seen in Antiquity or up to a certain point in the 14th-15th centuries). Its aim of production is a constantly increasing surplus value arising from value relations based on wage labour. This demands that it permanently searches for new markets: why? In order to establish a régime of simple exchange of commodities? For robbery and the taking of slaves? No, although these methods have accompanied the development of capitalism, they don't constitute its internal essence, which resides in the necessity to increasingly extend its relations of production based on wage labour: "Sadly for itself, capital cannot do business with its non-capitalist clients without ruining them. Whether it sells them consumer goods or means of production, it automatically destroys the precarious equilibrium of any pre-capitalist (and therefore less productive) economy. Introducing cheap clothes, building railways, installing a factory, are enough to destroy the whole of pre-capitalist economic organisation. Capital likes it pre-capitalist clients just as the ogre ‘likes' children: it eats them. The workers of a pre-capitalist economy who have the ‘misfortune to have had dealings with the capitalists' know that sooner or later, he will end up, at best proletarianised and at worst - and this has become more and more frequent since capitalism's slide into decadence - reduced to misery and bankruptcy" (Critique of Bukharin, part 2 in International Review no 30)
In the ascendant period, in the 19th century, this problem of realisation appeared to be secondary given that capitalism constantly found new pre-capitalist areas which to integrate into its network and therefore to sell its commodities to. However, the problem of realisation has become decisive in the 20th century where the pre-capitalist territories have increasingly become less significant in relation to the needs of expansion. Therefore we say that Rosa Luxemburg's theory: "... provides an explanation for the historically concrete conditions determining the onset of the permanent crisis of the system: the more capitalism integrated the remaining non-capitalist areas of the economy into itself, the more it created a world in its own image, the less it could constantly extend the market and find new outlets for the realisation of that portion of surplus value which could be realised neither by the capitalists nor the proletariat. The inability of the system to go on expanding in the old way brought about the new epoch of imperialism and inter-imperialist wars, signalling the end of capitalism's progressive historical mission and threatening humanity with a relapse into barbarism" ("Communism is not a nice idea but a material necessity" part VII in International Review no.76, page 24).
We do not deny the tendency of the rate of profit to fall: we see it working as part of capitalism's historical evolution. This is affected by a whole series of contradictions; the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of appropriation, between the incessant growth in the productivity of labour and the decreasing portion of living labour, the already mentioned tendency of the rate of profit to fall... However, these contradictions could be a stimulant to the development of capitalism as far as it had the possibility of extending its system of production on the world scale. When capitalism reached its historical limits, these stimulating contradictions, were converted into heavy chains, into factors that accelerated the difficulties and convulsions of the system.
The comrades of the IBRP make a really startling objection: "If the markets were already saturated in 1913, if all pre-capitalist outlets had been exhausted no new ones could be re-recreated (short of a trip to Mars). If capitalism goes beyond the level of growth of the previous cycle how could it possibly do it in Luxemburg theory?" (The IBRP's response, page 33).
While our polemical article in International Review no.79 made clear the nature and composition of the "economic growth" experienced after World War 2, the comrades criticise us in their response by saying that there had been a "real economic growth of capitalism in decadence" and faced with our defence of Rosa Luxemburg's positions they go on: "We have already seen how the ICC resolve the dilemma - by empirically denying that there has been real growth"(idem, page 33).
We can't repeat here an analysis of the nature of the "growth" since 1945. We invite comrades to read the article "Understanding the decadence of capitalism (part VI)" in International Review no.56, which makes clear that as regards: "...the rates of growth in the period following 1945 (the highest in capitalism's history)...we will demonstrate that this momentary upsurge is the product of a doped growth, which is nothing other than the desperate struggle of a system in its death-throes. The means that have been used to achieve it (massive debts, state intervention, growing military production, unproductive expenditure, etc) are wearing out, opening the way to an unprecedented crisis." What we want to deal with is something fundamental to marxism: the quantitative growth of production does not necessarily signify the development of capitalism.
The chronic, unending, problem that capitalism has in decadence is the absence of the new markets that are demanded by the increases in production due to the constant growth of labour productivity and the organic composition of capital. This constant increase aggravates still more the problem of the already increasing overproduction of accumulated labour (constant capital) in relation to living labour (variable capital, the workers' means of life).
The whole history of the survival of capitalism in the 20th century after the defeat of the 1917-23 revolutionary wave, is of a desperate effort to manipulate the law of value, through debt, hyper-inflation of unproductive costs and the monstrous development of armaments in order to alleviate the chronic absence of new markets. And history shows that these efforts have done nothing but aggravate the problems and stoke up decadent capitalism's tendencies towards self-destruction: the aggravation of the chronic crisis of capitalism accentuating the permanent tendencies to imperialist war, to generalised destruction (see the first part of this article in International Review no.82).
In reality this "fabulous" growth of production that dazzles the comrades so much illustrates the insuperable contradiction imposed on capitalism by its tendency to the unlimited development of production beyond the market's capacity of absorption. These figures, far from undermining Rosa Luxemburg's theories fully confirm them. When we see the uncontrolled and runaway growth of debt, without comparison in human history, when we see the existence of structural and permanent inflation, when we see that since the abandoning of the Gold Standard capitalism has recklessly eliminated any guaranteed backing for money (presently Fort Knox only covers 3% of the dollars circulating in the United States), when one recognises the massive intervention by the state in order to shore up the economic edifice (and this for more than 50 years) any minimally serious Marxist has to reject this "fabulous growth" as a bluff and conclude that it is a question of doped and fraudulent growth.
The comrades, instead of confronting this reality, prefer speculating about the "new realities" of capitalism. Thus, in their response they put forward: "The restructuring (and, dare we say it, growth) of the working class, the tendency for capitalist states to be economically dwarfed by the volume of world trade and the amount of capital which is controlled by world financial institutions (which is now at least four times the budget of all the states put together) have produced a further extension of the world economy of Bukharin and Luxemburg's day into a globalised economy." (The IBRP's reply, page 35).
When there are 820 million unemployed in the world (figures from ILO, December 1994), the comrades talk about the growth of the working class! When there is an irreversible growth in temporary work, the comrades, like modern Don Quixotes, see the windmills of the "growth" and "reconstruction" of the working class. When capitalism draws ever closure to a financial crisis of incalculable proportions, the comrades merrily speculate about the "global economy" and "capital controlled by the financial institutions". Once more, in their dreams they see their Dulcinea del Toboso of the "world economy" whose prosaic reality consists of the desperate efforts of these - "increasingly childlike" - states to control the scale of speculation provoked precisely by the saturation of the markets; these giants constituted by the "capital controlled by the financial institutions" are balloons monstrously inflated by the very speculation that could unleash a catastrophe upon the world economy.
The comrades announce: "All of the above has to be subjected to a rigorous Marxist analysis which takes time to develop" (the IBRP's reply, page 35). Isn't it more appropriate for the militant work of the Communist Left for the comrades to dedicate their time to explaining the phenomena that demonstrate the paralysis and mortal illness of accumulation throughout capitalist decadence? Marx said the mistake was not in the answer but in the question itself. Posing such questions as the "global economy" and the "restructuring of the working class" is to sink into the quicksand of revisionism, while there are "other questions" such as the nature of mass unemployment, indebtedness, that help to confront the fundamental problems in the understanding of capitalist decadence.
In the first part of this article we insisted on what united us with the comrades of the IBRP: the intransigent defence of the Marxist position on the decadence of capitalism, the bedrock of the necessity of the Communist Revolution. It is fundamental to defend, coherently understand, and take the implications of this position to the end. As we explained in "Marxism and Crisis Theory" (International Review no.13) it is possible to defend the position on the decadence of capitalism without fully sharing our theory of the crisis based on Rosa Luxemburg's analysis [9] [470]. However, such a posture contains the danger of not coherently holding this position, of "holding it together with tape". The militant sense of our polemic is precisely this: the comrades' inconsistencies and deviations lead them to weakening the class position on the decadence of capitalism.
With its innate and sectarian rejection of Rosa Luxemburg's (and Marx's) thesis on the question of the markets, the comrades' analysis opens the door to the revisionist ideas of Tugan-Baranovsky, et al: "Cycles of accumulation are inherent to capitalism and they explain why, at different moments, capitalist production and capitalist growth can be higher or lower than in the preceding periods" (the IBRP's reply, page 31). With this they take up an old affirmation made by BC during the International Conferences of the Groups of the Communist Left: "The market is not a physical entity existing outside the capitalist system of production, which puts the brakes on the productive system once it is filled in; on the contrary, it is an economic reality within the system and outside it which dilates and contracts following the contradictory course of the process of accumulation" (2nd Conference of the Groups of the Communist Left, Preparatory Texts, page 13).
Do the comrades understand that this "method" enters fully into Say's world where, outside of conjunctural disproportionalities, "All that is produced is consumed and all that is consumed is produced"? Do the comrades comprehend that with this analysis all that happens is they go back to the merry-go-round of "proving" that the market: "dilates or contracts according to the rhythm of accumulation" and that this explains absolutely nothing about the historical evolution of capitalist accumulation? Don't the comrades see that they are falling into the very same errors that Marx criticised: "The metaphysical equilibrium of purchases and sales is confined to the fact that every purchase is a sale and every sale a purchase, but this is poor comfort to the possessors of commodities who unable to make a sale cannot accordingly make a purchase either" (Marx: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, page 97).
This door that the comrades leave ajar to revisionist theories explains the propensity they have to lose themselves in sterile and absurd speculations about the "reconstruction of the working class" or the "global economy". They should also be aware of a tendency to allow themselves to be pulled in by the siren calls of the bourgeoisie: first there was the "technological revolution". Then the fabulous markets of the East, later there was the "business" of the Yugoslavian war. Certainly, the comrades corrected these absurdities under the weight of the ICC's criticism and the crushing evidence of facts. This demonstrates their responsibility and their firm links with the Communist Left. But will the comrades agree with us that these errors demonstrate that their position on the decadence of capitalism is not sufficiently consistent, that it's a patchwork, and that they have to establish themselves on much firmer ground.
The comrades concur with the revisionist adversaries of Rosa Luxemburg in their refusal to take the problem of realisation seriously, but radically diverge from them by rejecting their vision of the tendency to the amelioration of the contradictions of capitalism. On the contrary, and with full justice, the comrades see that each crisis phase of the cycle of accumulation means a much greater and more profound aggravation of capitalism's contradictions. The problem lies precisely in the periods in which, according to them, capitalist accumulation is fully restored. Confronted with these periods, while only considering the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and refusing to see the chronic saturation of the market, the comrades forget or relativise the revolutionary position on the decadence of capitalism.
Adalen 16.6.95.
[1] [471] We have developed our position in numerous articles in our International Review: we want to point out "Marxism and Crisis Theory" (no.13), "Economic Theories and the Struggle for Socialism" (no.16), "Crisis Theory from Marx to the CI" (no.22), "Critique of Bukharin" (nos 29 & 30) part VII of the series "Communism is not a nice idea but a material necessity" (no.76). The comrades in their response say that the ICC has not continued its critique of their positions announced in the article " Marxism and Crisis Theory" International Review no.13. The simple enumeration of the previous list of articles makes clear that this is a mistake.
[2] [472] Rodbertus was a bourgeois socialist from the middle of the last century who formulated his "law" of the diminishing share of wages. According to him the crisis of capitalism was due to this law and due to this he proposed state intervention in order to increase wages as a remedy to the crisis. The revisionists in the 2nd International accused Marx of having given into Rodbertus' thesis, calling him an "underconsumptionist" and later repeating the same accusation against Rosa Luxemburg.
Today, many trade unionists and also certain leftist currents of capital are unrecognised followers of Rodbertus, affirming that capitalism is primarily interested in improving the workers living as a way of overcome its crises.
[3] [473] Say was a bourgeois economist from the beginning of the 19th century who in his apologia for capitalism insisted that there is not a problem of the market since, according to him, "production creates its own market". Such a theory is equivalent to proposing capitalism as an eternal system without any possibility of crises beyond temporary convulsions provoked by "bad management" or by "disproportion between different productive sectors". Thus we can see that the bourgeosie's present messages about the "recovery" are nothing new!
[4] [474] This technique of opportunism has long been adopted by Stalinism and Social Democracy and other forces of the left of capital (particularly the leftists) who brazenly use this or that passage of Lenin, Marx, etc, in order to endorse positions that had nothing to do with them.
[5] [475] It is important to point out that in this polemic unleashed by Rosa Luxemburg's book, Pannekoek, who was neither an opportunist nor a revionist in that epoch but who on the contrary was on the left wing of the 2nd International, was against Rosa Luxemberg's thesis.
[6] [476] We have explained many times that Lenin, faced with the problem of the First World War and particularly in his book Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, correctly defended the revolutionary position on the historic crisis of capitalism (which he called the crisis of decomposition and parasitism of capital) and the necessity of the world proletarian revolution. This is the essential. However, he did support Hilferding's erroneous theories on finance capital and the "concentration of capital", which particularly in the hands of his epigones, weakened the force and coherence of his position against imperialism. See out critique in International Review no.19 "On Imperialism".
[7] [477] For a critique of Bukharin see International Review no 29 & 30, the article "To go beyond capitalism: Abolish the wage system".
[8] [478] In Capital Vol.3 Marx points out that "to say that it is only possible for the capitalists to exchange and consume their commodities amongst themselves is to completely forget that it is a question of the realisation of capital, not of its consumption" (Section 3, Chapter XV).
[9] [479] The Platform of the ICC says that comrades can defend the explanation of the crisis based on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
This third article devoted to the revolutionary struggle in Germany between 1918 and 1919[1] deals with one of the most difficult questions of the proletarian struggle: the preconditions for, and timing of the insurrection. Although negative, the German experience is a rich vein of lessons for the revolutionary struggle to come.
The premature insurrection
When it made its insurrection in November 1918 the working class forced the bourgeoisie in Germany to end the war. In order to sabotage the radicalization of the movement and prevent a repeat of the "Russian events" the capitalist class used the SPD[2] within the struggles as a spearhead against the working class. Thanks to a particularly effective policy of sabotage the SPD, with the help of the unions, did all it could to sap the strength of the workers' councils.
In the face of the explosive development of the movement with soldiers' mutinying everywhere and going over to the side of the insurrectionary workers, the bourgeoisie could not possibly envisage an immediate policy of repression. It had first to act politically against the working class and then go on to obtain a military victory. We went over the details of the political sabotage it carried out in International Review no. 82.
However the preparations for military action were made from the very beginning. It was not the right wing parties of the bourgeoisie which organized this repression but rather the one that still passed for "the great party of the proletariat", the SPD, and it did so in tight collaboration with the army. It was these famous "democrats" who went into action as capitalism's last line of defense. They were the ones who turned out to be the most effective rampart of capital. The SPD began by systematically setting up commando units as the companies of regular troops infected by the "virus of the workers' struggles" were less and less inclined to follow the bourgeois government. These companies of volunteers, privileged with special pay, would act as auxiliaries for the repression.
The military provocations of 6th & 24th December 1918
Confronted with these provocations from the government, the revolutionaries did not push for an immediate insurrection but called for the massive mobilization of the workers. The Spartakists made the analysis that the conditions were not yet ripe for the overthrow of the bourgeois government, particularly in so far as the capacities of the working class were concerned[3].
The bourgeoisie did not give way however. It continued to push for the disarmament of the proletariat which was still armed in Berlin and it made preparations to deliver it up to the decisive blow.
The SPD calls for death to the Communists
In order to set the population against the class movement, the SPD became the mouth piece of a shameful and powerful campaign of slander against the revolutionaries and even went so far as to call for death to the Spartakists in particular: "You want peace? Then you must all see to it that the tyranny of Spartakus' people is stopped! You want freedom? Then get the armed loafers of Liebknecht out of harm's way! You want famine? Then follow Liebknecht! You want to become the slaves of the Entente? Liebknecht will see to it! Down with the anarchist dictatorship of Spartakus! Only violence can oppose the brutal violence of this band of criminals!" (Leaflet of the municipal council of Greater Berlin, 29th December 1918).
"The shameful actions of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg sully the revolution and put all its gains in danger. The masses must not tolerate for one minute more that these tyrants and their partisans paralyze the republic in this way. (...) It is by means of lies, slander and violence that they overturn and knock down every obstacle that dares oppose them.
We made the revolution to end the war! Spartakus wants a new revolution to start a new war" (leaflet of the SPD, January 1919).
At the end of December the Spartakus group left the USPD and joined with the IKD[5] to form the KPD. And so the working class possessed a Communist Party that was born in the heat of the movement and which was the target of attacks from the SPD, the main defender of capital.
For the KPD the activity of as large a number as possible of the working masses was indispensable if this tactic of capital was to be opposed. "After the initial phase of the revolution, that of the essentially political struggle, there opens up a phase of strengthened, intensified and mainly economic struggle." (R. Luxemburg at the founding Congress of the KPD). The SPD government "won't approach the lively flames of the economic class struggle." (Ibid). That is why capital, with the SPD at its head, did all it could to prevent any extension of the struggles on this terrain by provoking premature armed uprisings of the workers and then repressing them. They needed to weaken the movement at its center, Berlin, in the early days in order to then go on to attack the rest of the working class.
The trap of the premature insurrection in Berlin
In January the bourgeoisie reorganized its troops stationed in Berlin. In all they had more than 80,000 soldiers throughout the city, of which 10,000 were storm troops. At the beginning of the month they launched another provocation against the workers in order to disperse them militarily. On 4th January the prefect of police in Berlin, Eichhorn, who had been nominated by the workers in November, was relieved of his functions by the bourgeois government. This was seen as an attack by the working class. In the evening of 4th January the "revolutionary men of confidence"[6] held a meeting which Liebknecht and Pieck attended in the name of the newly formed KPD. A "Provisional Revolutionary Committee", which was based on the "delegates" circle, was formed. But at the same time the executive Committee of the Berlin councils (Vollzugsrat) and the central committee (Zentralrat) nominated by the national congress of councils - both nominated by the SPD - continued to exist and to act within the class.
The Committee for revolutionary action called for a protest gathering for Sunday 5th January. About 150,000 workers attended following a demonstration in front of the prefecture of police. On the evening of 5th January some of the demonstrators occupied the offices of the SPD paper, Vorwaerts, and other publishing houses. These actions were probably incited by agent provocateurs; at any rate they took place without the knowledge or approval of the committee.
But the conditions were not ripe for overthrowing the government and the KPD made this clear in a leaflet they put out at the beginning of January:
"If the Berlin workers dissolve the National Assembly today, if they throw the Ebert-Scheidemanns in prison while the workers of the Ruhr, Upper Silesia and the agricultural workers on the lands east of the Elba remain calm, tomorrow the capitalists will be able to starve out Berlin. The offensive of the working class against the bourgeoisie, the battle for the workers' and soldiers' councils to take power must be the work of all working people throughout the Reich. Only the struggle of the workers of town and country, everywhere and permanently, accelerating and growing until it becomes a powerful wave that spreads resoundingly over the whole of Germany, only a wave initiated by the victims of exploitation and oppression and covering the whole country can explode the capitalist government, disperse the National Assembly and build on the ruins the power of the working class which will lead the proletariat to complete victory in the ultimate struggle against the bourgeoisie. (...)
Workers, male and female, soldiers and sailors! Call assemblies everywhere and make it clear to the masses that the National Assembly is a bluff. In every workshop, in every military unit, in every town take a look at and check whether your workers' and soldiers' council has really been elected, whether it doesn't contain representatives of the capitalist system, traitors to the working class such as Scheidemann's men, or inconsistent and oscillating elements such as the Independents. Convince the workers and get them to elect the Communists. (...) Where you are in the majority in the workers' councils get these workers' councils to immediately establish relations with the other workers' councils in the area. (...) If this program is realized (...) the German republic of councils together with the Russian workers' republic of councils will draw the workers of England, France, Italy to the flag of the revolution ..." It follows from this analysis that the KPD saw clearly that the overthrow of the capitalist class was not yet immediately possible and that the insurrection wasn't yet on the agenda.
The action committee distributed a leaflet calling for insurrection with the slogan: "Fight for the power of the revolutionary proletariat! Down with the Ebert-Scheidemann government!"
The mass of demonstrating workers awaited directions in the streets while their leaders were disabled. Although the proletarian leadership held back, hesitated, had no plan of action, the SPD-led government for its part rapidly got over the shock caused by this initial workers' offensive. Help came to rally round it on all sides. The SPD called for strikes and supporting demonstrations in favor of the government. A bitter and perfidious campaign was launched against the communists: "Where Spartakus reigns all freedom and safety of the individual is abolished. The most serious danger threatens the German people and particularly the German working class. We will not let ourselves be terrorized any longer by these wild criminals. Order must finally be restored in Berlin and the peaceful establishment of a new revolutionary Germany must be guaranteed. We call upon you to stop work in protest at the brutality of the Spartakist gangs and to immediately assemble in front of the government building of the Reich." (...)
"We must not rest until order had been restored in Berlin and until the enjoyment of the revolutionary gains has been guaranteed for the whole of the German people. Down with the murderers and criminals! Long live the socialist republic!" (Executive committee of the SPD, 6th January 1919).
The work cell of the Berlin students wrote:
"Citizens, leave off your torpor and side with the socialist majority!" (Leaflet of 7/8th January 1919).
For his part Noske cynically declared on 11th January:
"The government of the Reich has transferred the command of the republican soldiers to me. So a worker is at the head of the forces of the socialist Republic. You know me, me and my history in the Party. I guarantee that blood will not be spilled senselessly. I want to heal, not to destroy. Working class unity must be forged against Spartakus so that democracy and socialism will not founder."
The SPD and its accomplices were thus preparing to massacre the revolutionaries of the KPD in the name of the revolution and the proletariat's interests. With the basest duplicity, it called on councils to stand behind the government in acting against what it called "armed gangs". The SPD even supplied a military section, which received weapons from the barracks, and Noske was placed at the head of the forces of repression with the words: "We need a bloodhound, I will not draw back from such a responsibility".
By 6th January, isolated skirmishes were taking place. While the government massed its troops around Berlin, on the evening of the 6th the Executive of the Berlin councils was in session. Dominated by the SPD and the USPD, it proposed to the Committee for Revolutionary Action that there should be negotiations between the "revolutionary men of confidence" and the government, for whose overthrow the Revolutionary Committee had just been calling. The Executive played the "conciliator", by proposing to reconcile the irreconcilable. This attitude confused the workers, and especially the soldiers who were already hesitant. The sailors thus decided to adopt a policy of "neutrality". In a situation of direct class confrontation, any indecision can rapidly lead the working class to lose confidence in its own capacities, and to adopt a suspicious attitude towards its own political organizations. By playing this card, the SPD helped to weaken the proletariat dramatically. At the same time, it used agents provocateurs (as was proven later) to push the workers into a confrontation. The latter thus forcibly occupied the offices of several newspapers on 7th January.
Faced with this situation, the KPD leadership, unlike the Revolutionary Action Committee, had a very clear position: based on the analysis of the situation made at its founding Congress, it considered the insurrection to be premature.
On 8th January, Die Rote Fahne wrote: "Today, we must proceed to the reelection of the workers' and soldiers' councils, to take back the Executive of the Berlin councils under the slogan: get rid of Ebert and his henchmen! Today, we must draw the lessons of the experiences of the last eight weeks in the workers' and soldiers' councils, and elect councils which correspond to the conceptions, aims, and aspirations of the masses. In a word, we have to beat Ebert and Scheidemann in the very foundations of the revolution: the workers' and soldiers' councils. Then, and only then, will the masses of Berlin and throughout the Reich have in the workers' and soldiers' councils real revolutionary organs which will give them, in all the decisive moments, real leaders, real centers for action, for struggle, and for victory".
The Spartakists thus called on the workers first and foremost to strengthen the councils by developing the struggle on their own class terrain, in the factories, and by getting rid of Ebert, Scheidemann, and Co. By intensifying their pressure through the councils, they could give the movement a new impetus, and then launch into the battle for the seizure of political power.
On the same day, Luxemburg and Jogisches violently criticized the slogan of immediate overthrow of the government put forward by the Action Committee, but also and above all the fact that the latter had shown itself, by its hesitant and even capitulationist attitude, incapable of directing the class movement. In particular, they reproached Liebknecht for acting on his own authority, letting himself be carried away by his enthusiasm and impatience, instead of referring to the Party leadership, and basing himself on the KPD's program and analyses.
This situation shows that it was neither the program nor the political analyses that were lacking, but the Party's ability, as an organization, to fulfill its role as the proletariat's political leadership. Founded only a few days before, the KPD had not the influence in the class, much less the solidity and organizational cohesion of the Bolshevik party one year earlier in Russia. The Communist Party's immaturity in Germany was at the heart of the dispersal in its ranks, which was to weigh heavily and dramatically in the events that followed.
In the night of the 8th/9th January, the government troops went on the attack. The Action Committee, which had still not correctly analyzed the balance of forces, called for action against the government: "General strike! To arms! There is no choice! We must fight to the last man!". Many workers answered the call, but once again they waited in vain for precise instructions from the Committee. In fact, nothing was done to organize the masses, to push for fraternization between the revolutionary workers and the troops ... And so the government's troops entered Berlin, and for several days engaged in violent street fighting with armed workers. Many were killed or wounded in scattered confrontations in different parts of the city. On 13th January, the USPD declared the general strike at an end, and on 15th January Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were assassinated by the thugs of the Social-democrat led regime! The SPD' s criminal campaign to "Kill Liebknecht!" thus ended in a success for the bourgeoisie. The KPD was deprived of its most important leaders.
Whereas the newly founded KPD had correctly analyzed the balance of forces, and warned against a premature insurrection, the Action Committee dominated by the "revolutionary men of confidence" had a false appreciation of the situation. To talk of a "Spartakus week" is a falsification of history. On the contrary, the Spartakists had taken position against hasty action. Proof of this, a contrario, was given by Liebknecht's and Pieck's breaking Party discipline. This bloody defeat was caused by the overhasty attitude of the "revolutionary men of confidence", burning with impatience but lacking in thought. The KPD did not have the strength to hold the movement back, as the Bolsheviks had done in July 1917. In the words of Ernst, the new social-democratic chief of police who replaced the ousted Eichorn: "Any success for the Spartakus people was out of the question from the start, since by our preparations we had forced them to strike prematurely. Their cards were uncovered sooner than they wished, and that is why we were able to combat them".
Following this military success, the bourgeoisie immediately understood that it should build on its advantage. It launched a bloody wave of repression, in which thousands of Berlin workers and communists were assassinated, tortured, and thrown into prison. The murders of Liebknecht and Luxemburg were no exception, but reveal the bourgeoisie's vile determination to eliminate its mortal enemies: the revolutionaries.
On 19th January, "democracy" triumphed: elections were held for the National Assembly. Under the pressure of the workers' struggles, the government in the meantime had transferred its sittings to Weimar. The Weimar Republic was thus established on the corpses of thousands of workers.
Is the insurrection a party affair?
On this question of the insurrection, the KPD clearly based itself on Marxist positions, and in particular on what Engels had written after the experience of the struggles of 1848:
"Insurrection is an art. It is an equation whose data is more than uncertain, and whose values can change at any moment; the enemy's forces have in their favor all the advantages of organization, discipline and authority; as soon as it becomes impossible to oppose them from a position of strong superiority, then one is beaten and annihilated. Secondly, once one has taken the road of insurrection, it is necessary to act with the greatest determination, and go onto the offensive. The defensive is the death of any armed insurrection; it is lost before even getting a chance to measure itself against the enemy. Take your opponent by surprise, while his strength is still dispersed; make sure to win new victories every day, however small; hold on to the moral supremacy that the movement's first victory has won you; attract the hesitant elements who always follow the impetus of the strongest, and take the safest side; force your enemies to retreat even before they have been able to gather their forces against you ..." (Revolution and counter-revolution in Germany).
The Spartakists adopted the same approach to insurrection as Lenin in April 1917:
"To succeed, the insurrection must be based not on a plot, not on a party, but on the vanguard class. This is the first point. The insurrection must be based on the revolutionary élan of the people. That is the second point. The insurrection must appear at a turning point in the history of the rising revolution, where the activity of the people's vanguard is at its strongest, where hesitation is strong in the ranks of the enemy, and weak among the friends of the revolution. That is the third point. These are the three conditions which distinguish marxism from blanquism, in its way of posing the question of insurrection" (Letter to the RSDLP Central Committee, September 1917).
What was the concrete situation in January 1919, with regard to this fundamental question?
Insurrection is based on the revolutionary élan of the masses
At its founding Congress, the KPD held that the class was not yet ripe for insurrection. After the movement initially dominated by the soldiers, a new impetus based on the factories, mass assemblies, and demonstrations was vital. This was a precondition for the class to gain, through its movement greater strength and greater self-confidence. It was a condition for the revolution to be more than the affair of just a minority, or of a few desperate or impatient elements, but on the contrary to be based on the revolutionary élan of the great majority of workers.
Moreover in January the workers' councils did not exercise a real dual power, in that the SPD has succeeded in sabotaging them from within. As we showed in the previous Issue, the councils' National Congress held in mid-December had been a victory for the bourgeoisie, and unfortunately nothing new had come to stimulate the councils since then. The KPD's appreciation of the class movement and the balance of forces were perfectly lucid and realistic.
Some think that it is the party that takes power. But then, we would have to explain how a revolutionary organization, no matter how strong, could do so when the great majority of the working class has not yet sufficiently developed its class consciousness, is hesitant and oscillating, and has not yet been able to create workers' councils with enough strength to oppose the bourgeois regime. Such a position completely misunderstands the fundamental characteristics of the proletarian revolution, and of the insurrection, which Lenin was the first to point out: "the insurrection must be based, not on a plot, not on a party, but on the vanguard class". Even in October 1917, the Bolsheviks were particularly concerned that it should be the Petrograd Soviet that took power, not the Bolshevik Party.
The proletarian insurrection cannot be "decreed from on high". On the contrary, it is a conscious action of the masses, which must first develop their initiative, and achieve a mastery of their own struggles. Only on this basis will the directives and orientations given by the councils and the party be followed.
The proletarian insurrection cannot be a putsch, as the bourgeois ideologues try to make us believe. It is the work of the entire working class. To shake off capitalism's yoke, the will of a few, even the class' clearest and most determined elements, is not enough: "the insurgent proletariat can only count on its numbers, its cohesion, its cadres, and its general staff" (Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, "The Art of Insurrection").
In January the working class in Germany had not yet reached this level of maturity.
The role of the communists is central
The KPD was aware that its main responsibility was to push for the strengthening of the working class, and in particular for the development of its consciousness in the same way as Lenin had done previously in Russia, in the April Theses:
"This seems to be "nothing more" than propaganda work, but in reality it is most practical revolutionary work; for there is no advancing a revolution that has come to a standstill that has choked itself with phrases, and that keeps "marking time", not because of external obstacles, not because of the violence of the bourgeoisie (...), but because of the unreasoning trust of the people.
Only by overcoming this unreasoning trust (...) can we set ourselves free from the prevailing orgy of revolutionary phrase-mongering and really stimulate the consciousness both of the proletariat and of the mass in general, as well as their bold and determined initiative (...)" (Lenin, "The tasks of the proletariat in our revolution", April 1917).
When boiling point has been reached, the party must "at the opportune moment, catch the mounting insurrection", to allow the class to launch the insurrection at the right moment. The proletariat must feel that "it has above it a clear-sighted, firm and audacious leadership", in the form of a party (Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, "The Art of Insurrection").
But unlike the Bolsheviks in July 1917, in January 1919 the KPD did not have enough weight to have a decisive effect on the course of the struggle. It was not enough for the party's position to be correct: it had to have a wide influence in the class. And this could not be developed by the premature insurrection in Berlin, still less by the bloody defeat that followed. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie succeeded in dramatically weakening the revolutionary vanguard by eliminating its best militants, but also by banning its main weapon of intervention in the class: Die Rote Fahne. In a situation where the widest possible intervention by the party was crucial, the KPD found itself deprived of its press for weeks at a time.
The drama of dispersed struggles
During these same weeks, the proletariat confronted capital in several countries. Whereas in Russia, the counter-revolutionary White troops strengthened their onslaught on the workers' power, the end of the war brought a certain calm to the social front in the "victorious countries". In Britain and France, there were a series of strikes, but the struggle did not take on the same radical orientation as it had in Russia and Germany. The struggles in Germany and central Europe thus remained relatively isolated from those in the other European industrial centers. In March, the Hungarian workers set up a Soviet Republic, which was quickly and bloodily crushed by counter-revolutionary troops, thanks once again to the skillful work of the local social-democracy.
In Berlin, after defeating the workers' insurrection the bourgeoisie set out to dissolve the soldiers' councils, and build an army ready for civil war. It also worked systematically to disarm the proletariat. But workers' combativity continued to break out all over the country. During the months that followed, the struggle's center of gravity was to shift through Germany. Extremely violent confrontations between proletariat and bourgeoisie took place in almost all the major towns, but unfortunately isolated from each other.
Bremen in January...
On 10th January, in solidarity with the Berlin workers, the Bremen workers' and soldiers' council proclaimed the creation of the Soviet Republic. It decided to evict the members of the SPD, to arm the workers, and to disarm counter-revolutionary elements. It appointed a council government, responsible to it. On 4th February, the Reich government gathered troops around Bremen and went on the offensive. The rebel town remained isolated, and fell on the same day.
The Ruhr in February...
In the Ruhr, the biggest working class concentration, expressions of combativity had broken out since the end of the war. Already prior to the war, in 1912 there had been a long wave of strikes. In July 1916, January 1917, January 1918, and August 1918, the workers launched large movements of struggle against the war. In November 1918, the workers' and soldiers' councils were mostly under the influence of the SPD. January and February saw the outbreak of many wildcat strikes. The striking miners went to neighboring pits to enlarge and unify the movement. There were often violent confrontations between the workers in struggle, and the councils still dominated by members of the SPD. The KPD intervened:
"The seizure of power by the proletariat, and the creation of socialism, presupposes that the great majority of the proletariat has the will to exercise the dictatorship. We do not think that that moment has yet arrived. We think that the development of the next weeks and months will cause to ripen within the whole proletariat, the conviction that its salvation can only lie in its dictatorship. The Ebert-Schiedemann government is seeking out the slightest opportunity to stifle this development in blood. As in Berlin, as in Bremen, it will try to strangle each revolutionary outbreak in isolation, in order to avoid the general revolution. The proletariat has the duty to make these provocations fail, by avoiding armed uprisings which would offer itself to the executioners as a willing sacrifice. It is far more important, right up to the moment of the seizure of power, to raise the revolutionary masses' energy to the highest point by demonstrations, meetings, propaganda, agitation and organization, to win over a greater and greater number of the masses, and to prepare minds for the time to come. Above all, it is necessary to push for the re-election of the councils under the slogan:
The Ebert-Scheidemanns out of the councils!
Get rid of the executioners!"
(Call by the KPD Centrale for the reelection of the workers' councils, 3rd February).
On 6th February, 109 council delegates met to demand the socialization of the means of production. Behind this demand, lay the workers' increasing realization that control of the means of production could not remain in the hands of capital. But as long as the proletariat did not hold political power, as long as it had not overthrown the bourgeois government, this demand could turn against it. Without political power, all the measures of socialization are not only a deception, but a means for the ruling class to stifle the struggle. The SPD thus promised a law providing for "participation" and a pseudo-control by the working class over the state. "The workers' councils are constitutionally recognized as the representation of economic interests and participation, and are anchored in the Constitution. Their election and prerogatives will be regulated by a special law to take effect immediately".
It was planned that the councils should be transformed into "enterprise committees" (Betribrate), and that their function should be to take part in the economic process through joint management. The prime aim of this proposal was to adulterate the councils, and to integrate them into the state. They were thus no longer organs of dual power against the bourgeois state, but on the contrary served to regulate capitalist production. Moreover, this mystification maintained the illusion of an immediate transformation of the economy "in one's own factory", and the workers were thus easily enclosed in a local and specific struggle, instead of engaging in a movement of extension and unification of the combat. This tactic, used for the first time by the German bourgeoisie, was illustrated in several factory occupations. In the struggles in Italy during 1919-20, it was again put to very successful use by the ruling class.
From 10th February, the troops responsible for the bloodbaths in Bremen and Berlin were marching on the Ruhr. The workers' and soldiers' councils throughout the Ruhr valley decided on a general strike, and called for armed struggle against the Freikorps. Everywhere, came the slogan "Out of the factories!" There were many armed confrontations, all of which went along similar lines. So angry were the workers, that SPD offices were often attacked, as on 22nd February in Mulheim-Ruhr where a social-democrat meeting was machine-gunned. There were thousands of workers under arms in Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund, Bochum, Duisburg, Oberhausen, Wuppertal, Mulheim-Ruhr and Dusseldorf. But just as in Berlin, the movement's organization was sadly lacking. There was no united leadership to orientate the working class' strength, while the capitalist state, with the SPD at its head, acted with organization and centralization.
Central Germany in February and March
At the end of February, just as the movement in the Ruhr was being crushed by the army, the proletariat in central Germany entered the scene. Whereas the movement in the Ruhr was limited to the workers in the iron and coal industries, here it involved the workers in every industry, including transportation. Workers joined the movement in almost every factory and large town.
On 24th February, the general strike was declared. The workers' and soldiers' councils immediately called on the Berlin workers to unify the movement. Once again, the KPD warned against any hasty action: "As long as the revolution has no central organs of action, we must oppose the action of organizing councils, which develop locally in a thousand places" (leaflet from the KPD Zentrum). It was time to strengthen the pressure from the factories, to intensify the economic struggle, and to renew the councils. There was no slogan for the overthrow of the government.
Here again, thanks to an agreement on socialization, the bourgeoisie succeeded in breaking the movement. And once again, there was united action between the SPD and the army: "For all military operations (...) it is helpful to make contact with the leading members of the SPD who are faithful to the government" (Marcker, military leader of the repression in central Germany). The bourgeoisie's thugs continued the repression into May, as the strike wave had spilled over into Saxony, Thuringia, and Anhalt.
Berlin, once again, in March...
The SPD declared itself opposed to such a slogan. Once again, it set out to sabotage the movement politically, but also as we have seen, by repression. When the Berlin workers went on strike at the beginning of March, the executive council made up of delegates from the SPD and USPD took the leadership of the strike. The KPD refused to join it: "To accept the representatives of this policy into the strike committee means the betrayal of the general strike and the revolution".
Like the socialists, stalinists, and other representatives of the left of capital today, the SPD succeeded in taking over the strike committee thanks to credulity on the part of some workers, but above all thanks to all kinds of maneuvers, tricks and double-dealing. It was to avoid having their hands tied that the Spartakists refused at this point to sit alongside the executioners of the working class.
The SPD was able to print its paper, whereas the government had banned Die Rote Fahne. The counter-revolutionaries were thus free to develop their disgusting propaganda, while the revolutionaries were reduced to silence. Before it was banned, Die Rote Fahne warned the workers: "Stop work! For the moment, stay in the factories. Gather in the factories. Convince those who hesitate. Don't let yourselves be drawn into useless fighting, which Noske is only waiting for to start a new bloodletting".
In fact, the bourgeoisie was quick to use its agent provocateurs to start looting, which was used as the official excuse for bringing in the army. First and foremost, Noske's troops destroyed the printing presses of Die Rote Fahne. The KPD's leading members were thrown in jail. Leo Jogisches was shot. It was precisely because it had warned the working class against the bourgeoisie's provocations that it became the immediate target for the counter -revolutionary troops.
The general strike was broken in central Germany by 6th March, and in Berlin the 8th. In Saxony, Baden, and Bavaria important struggles took place during these same weeks, but the different movements never managed to link up between themselves.
The Bavarian Soviet Republic in April 1919
In Bavaria too, the working class entered the struggle. On 7th April, the SPD and USPD, hoping "to win back the favor of the masses by a pseudo-revolutionary action" as the revolutionary Levine put it, proclaimed the Republic of Councils. Just as in January in Berlin, the KPD saw that the balance of forces was not favorable to the workers, and took position against the creation of the Republic. Nonetheless, the Bavarian communists called the workers to elect a "truly revolutionary council", with a view to setting up a real communist Soviet Republic. By 13th April, Eugen Levine found himself at the head of a new government which took energetic economic, political, and military measures against the bourgeoisie. Despite these measures, this initiative was a serious error on the part of the Bavarian revolutionaries, who acted against the Party's orientations and analyses. Completely isolated from the rest of Germany, the movement had to confront a huge bourgeois counter-offensive. Munich was starved out, and 100,000 troops massed around the city. On 27th April, the Munich Executive Council was overthrown, and bloody repression struck again: thousands of workers were killed in the fighting, or executed; the communists were hunted down, and Levine condemned to death.
***
Today's proletarian generations can scarcely imagine the power of a wave of almost simultaneous struggles in the great centers of capitalism, and the pressure that this put on the ruling class.
Through its revolutionary movement in Germany, the working class proved against one of the world's most experienced ruling classes, that it is capable of establishing a balance of forces which could have overthrown capitalism. This experience shows that the revolutionary movement at the beginning of the century was not something reserved for the proletariat of "backward countries" like Russia, but involved masses of workers in most industrially developed country of its day.
But the development of the revolutionary wave from January to April 1919 suffered from dispersion. Concentrated and united, its forces would have been enough to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie. But they were scattered, and the government was thus able to confront and annihilate them one by one. Already in January, in Berlin, the government had succeeded in breaking the back of the revolution.
Richard Muller, one of the "revolutionary men of confidence", who showed themselves so hesitant for so long, could not help observing: "If the repression against the January struggles in Berlin had not happened, then the movement would have been able to gather a greater impetus elsewhere in the spring, and the question of power would have been posed more precisely, in all its implications. But the military provocation cut the ground from under the feet of the movement. The January action provided the arguments for the campaigns of calumny, harassment, and the creation of an atmosphere of civil war".
Without this defeat, the Berlin proletariat would have been able to support the struggles which developed in other parts of Germany. This weakening of the revolution's central battalion allowed the forces of capital to go on the offensive, and to draw the workers all over the country into premature and dispersed military confrontations. The working class, in fact, had not succeeded in establishing a broad, united, and centralized movement. It had been unable to impose a dual power throughout the country, by strengthening and centralizing the councils. Only by creating such a balance of forces would it have been possible to launch an insurrection that demanded the greatest conviction and coordination. And this dynamic cannot develop without the clear and determined intervention of a political party inside the movement. This is how the proletariat can emerge victorious from its historic struggle.
The revolution's defeat in Germany during the early months of 1919 was not solely due to the skill of the local ruling class. It was also the result of a concerted action by the international capitalist class.
While the working class in Germany was engaging in scattered struggles, in March the Hungarian workers rose in a revolutionary confrontation with capital.
The Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Hungary on21st March 1919, only to be crushed by counter-revolutionary troops in the summer.
The international capitalist class stood united behind the German bourgeoisie. For four years, the different bourgeoisies had done their best to destroy each other, and yet they stood united against the working class. Lenin showed clearly that "everything was done to come to an understanding with the German conciliators in order to stifle the German revolution" (Report by the Central Committee to the 9th Congress of the RCP). There is a lesson that the working class must remember: whenever it puts capitalism in danger, it will have to confront, not a divided ruling class, but the internationally united forces of capital.
But, if the proletariat had taken power in Germany, the capitalist front would have been driven in, and the Russian revolution would not have been left isolated.
When the IIIrd International was founded in Moscow in March 1919, as the struggles were developing in Germany, this perspective seemed to all the communists to be within their grasp. But the workers' defeat in Germany began the decline of the international revolutionary wave, and in particular that of the Russian revolution. It was the action of the bourgeoisie, with the SPD as its bridgehead, which made possible the isolation, then the degeneration of the Bolshevik revolution, and then the birth of Stalinism.
DV
[1] See the two previous issues of this Review: "The revolutionaries in Germany during World War I" and "The beginning of the revolution".
[2] The German Social-Democratic Party, was the largest socialist party in the world before 1914, when its leadership, headed by its parliamentary group and trades union leaders, betrayed all the party's internationalist commitments and joined ranks, bags and baggage, with the national bourgeoisie as a recruiting sergeant for the imperialist bloodbath.
[3] In 1980 the CWO demonstrated to what an irresponsible attitude a revolutionary organization without clear analyses can be led. At the time of the mass struggles in Poland they called for the revolution immediately ("Revolution now").
[4] German Independent Socialist Party, a "centrist" split from the SPD, which rejected the latter' s most openly bourgeois aspects, but without taking the clearly revolutionary positions of the internationalist communists, The Spartakus League joined the USPD in 1917, with a view to spreading its influence amongst the workers, increasingly disgusted by the policy of the SPD.
[5] German Internationalist Communists, known as German Internationalist Socialists prior to 23rd November 1918, when they decided, in Bremen, to replace the word Socialist by Communist. They were less numerous and influential than the Spartakus group, whose revolutionary internationalism they shared. They were members of the Zimmerwald Left, and closely linked to the international Communist Left, in particular the Dutch Left (Pannekoek and Gorter were among their theoreticians before the war), and the Russian (Radek worked in their ranks). Their rejection of the unions and parliamentarism was in the majority at the KPD's founding Congress, against the position of Rosa Luxemburg.
[6] The "revolutionary men of confidence" (Revolutionnare Obleate) were originally made up largely of union delegates elected in the factories, but who had broken with the social-chauvinist union leaderships. They were the direct product of the working class' resistance to the war, and to the treason of the unions and workers' parties. Sadly, their revolt against the union leadership made them suspicious of any idea of centralization, and led them to develop a too Iocalist, or even "factoryist" viewpoint. They were always uneasy when confronted with questions of general politics, and often an easy prey for the policies of the USPD.
This series has now reached the period that followed the death of Karl Marx in 1883; coincidentally, the bulk of the material that will be examined in the following two articles is located in the years between Marx’s death and the passing of Engels, which took place 100 years ago this year. The immensity of Marx’s contribution to the scientific understanding of communism has meant that a considerable part of this series has been devoted to the work of this one great figure in the workers’ movement. But just as Marx did not invent communism (see the second article in this series “How the proletariat won Marx to communism”, in International Review no.69), the communist movement did not cease elaborating and clarifying its historic goals once Marx had died. This task was taken on by the Social Democratic or Socialist parties which began to become a considerable force in the last two decades of the 19th century; Marx’s lifelong friend and comrade Engels naturally played a key role in the continuation of this work. As we shall see, he was not alone in this; but we can certainly offer Engels no more fitting tribute than to show the importance of his own share in defining the communist project of the working class.
There are many currents today who think that to claim the mantle of revolutionary communism means throwing off the garments of Social Democracy - disowning the whole period from Marx’s death until World War I (at least) as a kind of Dark Age, or an evolutionary blind alley in the road that leads from Marx to themselves. Councilists, modernists, anarcho-Bordigists like the Groupe Communiste Internationaliste and a host of other swamp-inhabiting sub-species insist that far from adding anything to our understanding of the communist revolution, the Socialist parties were no more than instruments for integrating the proletariat into bourgeois society. They “prove” this in the main by pointing to Social Democracy’s parliamentary and trade union activities, but at the same time they usually inform us that the very goal of these parties - the society which they most frequently referred to as “socialism” - was in reality no more than a form of state capitalism. In short, the parties which call themselves “socialist” today - Blair’s Labour party, Mitterand’s or Gonzales’ Socialist parties - are indeed the legitimate heirs of the Social Democratic parties of the 1880s, 90s and 1900s.
For some of these “anti-social-democratic” currents, authentic communism was only restored by the likes of Lenin and Luxemburg after World War I, the definitive death of the Second International and the betrayal of its parties. Others, more “radical”, have discovered that the Bolsheviks and the Spartacists were themselves no more than left social democrats: the first true revolutionaries of the 20th century were thus the left communists of the 20s and 30s. But since there is a direct line of continuity between the social democratic lefts (ie not only Lenin and Luxemburg, but also Pannekoek, Gorter, Bordiga and others) and the later communist left, our ultra-radicals often play safe by identifying none but themselves as the century’s first real communists. What’s more, this remorseless retrospective radicalism is applied to the precursors of Social Democracy as well: initially to Engels who, we are told, never really grasped Marx’s method and certainly became a bit of an old reformist in later life; then, not infrequently, the axe falls on Marx himself, with his tedious insistence on “bourgeois” notions like science, or historical progress and decline. By a strange coincidence, the final discovery is often this: that the true revolutionary tradition lies with the fiery insurrectionism of the Luddites or ... Mikhail Bakunin.
The ICC has already devoted an entire article to arguments of this type in International Review no.50, in our series in defence of the notion of capitalist decadence. We don’t intend to repeat all our counter-arguments here. Suffice it to say for now that the “method” behind such arguments is precisely that of ahistorical, idealist, moralising anarchism. For anarchism, consciousness is not seen as the product of a collective and historically evolving movement, so that the real lines of continuity and discontinuity in the real movement of the working class are of no interest to it. Thus, revolutionary ideas cease to be the product of a revolutionary class and its organisations, but become, in essence, the brainwave of brilliant individuals or circles of initiates. Hence the pathetic inability of the anti-social-democrats to see that today’s revolutionary groups and concepts have not sprung fully formed like Athene from the brow of Zeus, but are the organic descendants of a long process of gestation, of a whole series of struggles within the workers’ movement: the struggle to form the Communist League against the vestiges of utopianism and sectarianism; the struggle of the marxist tendency in the First International against “state socialism” on the one hand and anarchism on the other; the struggle to form the Second International on a marxist basis and the later struggle of the lefts to keep it on a marxist basis against the development of revisionism and centrism; the struggle of these same lefts to form the Third International after the death of the Second, and the struggle of the left fractions against the degeneration of the Communist International in the reflux of the post-war revolutionary wave; the struggle of these fractions to preserve communist principles and develop communist theory during the dark years of the counter-revolution; the struggle for the reappropriation of communist positions with the historical resurgence of the proletariat at the end of the 1960s. And indeed the central theme of this series has been that our very understanding of the means and goals of the communist revolution would not exist without these struggles.
But an understanding of what communist society is, and the means to reach it, cannot exist in a vacuum, in the heads of privileged individuals. It is developed and defended above all in the collective organisations of the working class: and the struggles listed above were nothing if not struggles for the revolutionary organisation, struggles for the party. The communist consciousness of the present would not exist without the chain of proletarian political organisations that connects us to the very beginnings of the workers’ movement.
For anarchists, by contrast, the struggle that connects them to the past is a struggle against the party, since anarchist ideology reflects the petty bourgeoisie’s despairing resistance against the precious organisational acquisitions of the working class. The marxist combat against the destructive actions of the Bakuninists in the First International took a heavy toll on the latter. But the fact that this combat was a historical, if not an immediate, success, was confirmed by the formation of the Social Democratic parties and the Second International on a more advanced basis than the International Workingmen’s Association. Whereas the latter was a heterogeneous collection of different political tendencies, the Socialist parties were explicitly founded on the basis of marxism; whereas the First International combined political tasks with those of the unitary organisations of the class, the parties of the Second International were quite distinct from the unitary organisations of the class of that time - the trade unions. All this is why, for all their criticisms of its programmatic weaknesses, the main Social Democratic party of the time, the German SPD, received the enthusiastic support of Marx and Engels.
We will not go further into the specific question of organisation here, although, precisely because it is so fundamental, such a sine qua non for any kind of revolutionary activity, it will inevitably reappear in the next phase of this study as it has in previous phases. Nor can we spend much time answering the arguments of the anti-social-democrats about the trade union and parliamentary questions, although we will be compelled to return to the latter in particular later on. The one thing that should be said here is that there is no common ground between the blanket condemnations of our ultra-radicals and the genuine criticisms that have to be made of the practises and theories of the Socialist parties. Whereas the latter come from inside the same movement, the former come from a totally divergent starting point. Thus, the anti-social-democrats will not listen to the marxist argument that trade union and parliamentary activities did have a sense for the working class last century, when capitalism was still in the ascendant and could still grant meaningful reforms, but lost this sense and became anti-working class in the period of decadence, when the proletarian revolution is on the historical agenda. This argument is rejected because the notion of decadence is rejected; the notion of decadence, in an increasing number of cases, is rejected, because it implies that capitalism was once ascendant; and this is rejected because it implies some concession to the notion of historical progress, which in the case of “consistent” anti-decadentists like the GCI or Wildcat, is an utterly bourgeois notion. But by now it has become clear that these hyper-ultra radicals have rejected any notion of historical materialism and have again lined up with the anarchists, for whom the social revolution has been possible for as long as there has been any suffering in the world.
The central aim of the next phase in this study, in order to maintain its continuity with the previous articles in the series, must be to show that the “society of the future” defined by the Socialist parties was indeed a communist society; that despite Marx’s death, the communist vision did not disappear or stagnate during this period, but advanced and deepened. It is only on this basis that we can examine the limitations of this vision and the weaknesses of these parties - particularly when it came to elaborating the “road to power”, the way the working class would arrive at the communist revolution.
In a previous article in this series (International Review no.78, “Communism against state socialism’), we saw that Marx and Engels were extremely critical of the programmatic bases of he SPD, formed in 1875 through the fusion of Bebel’s and Liebknecht’s marxist fraction with the Lassalean General Workers Association. Even the name of the new party irritated them: “Social Democratic” being a completely inadequate term for a party “whose economic programme is not just completely socialist, but directly communist, and whose final goal is the disappearance of the state, and thus also of democracy” (Engels, 1875). More significantly, Marx wrote his thorough-going Critique of the Gotha Programme to highlight the SPD’s shallow grasp of what the communist transformation actually entailed, showing that the German marxists had made altogether too many concessions to the Lassalean “state socialist” ideology. Engels did not water down these criticisms in later years. Indeed, his dissatisfaction with the SPD’s Erfurt Programme of 1891 prompted him to push through the publication of the Critique of the Gotha Programme. The latter had originally been “blocked” by Liebknecht, and Marx and Engels had not pursued the matter for fear of breaking the unity of the new party. But Engels obviously felt that the criticisms of the old programme were still relevant to the new one. We shall return to the question of the Erfurt programme later on, when we pay particular attention to the Social Democrats’ attitude to parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy.
Nevertheless, Engels’ writings on socialism in this period provide the clearest proof that, in the final analysis, the programme of Social Democracy was indeed “directly communist”. Engels’ most important theoretical work during this time was Anti-Dühring, first written in 1878 but revised, republished and translated several times during the 1880s and 90s. A section of the book was also published as a popular pamphlet in 1892, entitled Socialism: Utopian and Scientific; and this was without doubt one of the most widely read and influential marxist works of the day. And of course, Anti-Dühring was eminently a “party” text, since it was written in response to the grandiose claims of the German academic Dr Dühring that he had founded a complete “socialist system” far in advance of any hitherto existing theory of socialism, from the utopians to Marx himself. In particular, Marx and Engels had been concerned that “Dr Dühring openly proceeded to form around himself a sect, the nucleus of a future separate party. It thus became necessary to take up the gauntlet thrown down to us, and to fight out the struggle whether we liked it or not” (Introduction to the English edition of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, 1892). The first motivation of the text was thus to defend the unity of the party against the destructive effects of sectarianism. This led Engels to dwell at great length on Duhring’s pretentious “discoveries” in the fields of science, philosophy and history, defending the historical materialist method against Duhring’s new brew of stale idealism and vulgar materialism. At the same time, and particularly in the section that appeared as a separate pamphlet, Engels was also obliged to reaffirm a fundamental postulate of the Communist Manifesto: that socialist or communist ideas were not the invention of “would-be universal reformers” like professor Dühring, but were the product of a real historical movement, the movement of the proletariat. Dühring considered himself to be far above this prosaic movement of the masses; but in fact his “system” was an utter regression vis-à-vis the scientific socialism developed by Marx; indeed, even compared to utopians like Fourier, for whom Dühring had only disdain but who was greatly respected by Marx and Engels, Dühring was an intellectual dwarf.
Most pertinent to the context of this study is the fact that, against Duhring’s false vision of a “socialism” operating on the basis of commodity exchange, ie of the existing relations of production, Engels was led to reaffirm certain communist fundamentals, in particular:
- that capitalist commodity relations, once a factor of unprecedented material progress, could ultimately only lead bourgeois society into insoluble contradictions, crises and self-destruction: “the mode of production is in rebellion against the mode of exchange ... On the one hand, therefore, the capitalistic mode of production stands convicted of its own incapacity to further direct these productive forces. On the other, these productive forces themselves, with increasing energy, press forward to the removal of the existing contradiction, to the abolition of their quality as capital, to the practical recognition of their character as social productive forces” (Anti-Dühring, Part III, Theoretical, Moscow edition, first printed in 1947, p327-8);
- that the take over of the means of production by the capitalist state was the bourgeoisie’s response to this situation, but not its solution. There could be no question of confusing this bourgeois statification with communist socialisation: “The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of productive forces, the more it actually becomes the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage workers - proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head” (ibid, p330-1). Communists today are understandably fond of using this prophetic passage against all the modern varieties of state “socialism” - in fact, state capitalism - propagated today by those who claim to be the heirs of the 19th century workers’ movement - Labourites, Stalinists, Trotskyists, with their endless song and dance about the progressive nature of nationalisations and the need to “defend Clause 4” as the Labour Party’s socialist promise. Engels’ words show that clarity on this question existed in the workers movement a hundred years ago and more;
- that, against Duhring’s Prussian socialism where all citizens will be happy underneath a paternalistic state, the state has no place at all in a genuinely socialist society [1]: “As soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society - the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society [2] - this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then withers away of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not “abolished”. It withers away” (ibid, p333);
- and, finally, against all attempts to manage the existing relations of production, socialism requires the abolition of commodity production: “With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by plan-conforming, conscious organisation. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, for the first time man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become master of his own social organisation. The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man’s own social organisation, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself. Only from that time will man himself, with full consciousness, make his own history - only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom” (ibid, p335-6). In this exalted passage, Engels is clearly looking ahead to a very advanced stage of the communist future. But it certainly shows, against all those who try to drive a wedge between Marx and Engels, that the “General” shared the “Moor’s” conviction that the highest imaginable goal of communism is to cast off the scourge of alienation and begin a truly human life, where man’s social and creative powers no longer turn against him, but serve his true needs and desires.
But elsewhere in the same work, Engels returns from these “cosmic” reflections to a more earthly issue: the “ground principles of communist production and distribution” as the Dutch left was later to call them. After lambasting Duhring’s neo-Proudhonist fantasy of establishing “true value” and returning to the workers “the full value of what they produce”, Engels explains:
“From the moment when society enters into possession of the means of production and uses them in direct association for production, the labour of each individual, however varied its specifically useful character may be, becomes at the start and directly social labour. The quantity of social labour contained in a product need not then be established in a roundabout way; daily experience shows in a direct way how much of it is required on the average. Society can simply calculate how many hours of labour are contained in a steam engine, a bushel of wheat of the last harvest, or a hundred square yards of cloth of a certain quality. It could therefore never occur to it still to express the quantities of labour put into the products, quantities which it will then know directly and in their absolute amounts, in a third product, in a measure which, besides, is only relative, fluctuating, inadequate, though formerly unavoidable for lack of a better, rather than express them in their natural, adequate and absolute measure, time....Hence, on the assumptions we made above, society will not assign values to products. It will not express the simple fact that the hundred square yards of cloth have required for their production, say, a thousand hours of labour in the oblique and meaningless way, stating that they have the value of a thousand hours of labour. It is true that even then it will still be necessary for society to know how much labour each article of consumption requires for its production. It will have to arrange its plan of production in accordance with its means of production, which include, in particular, its labour power. The useful effects of the various articles of consumption, compared with one another and with the quantities of labour required for their production, will in the end determine the plan. People will be able to manage everything very simply, without the intervention of much-vaunted “value’” (ibid, “Distribution”, p 367)
This was Engels’ conception of socialist or communist society; but it was not his personal property. His position expressed all that was best in the Social Democratic parties, even if the latter contained elements and currents who did not see things so clearly.
To demonstrate that Engels’ views were not some individual exception, but the patrimony of a collective movement, we intend to examine the positions taken up by other figures in this movement who showed a particular preoccupation with the shape of the future society. And we do not think it accidental that the period we are considering is unusually rich in reflections about what a communist society might look like. We should recall that the 1880s and 1890s were the “swan song” of bourgeois society, the zenith of its imperial glory, the last phase of capitalist optimism before the darkling years that led up to the first world war. A period of tremendous economic and colonial conquests in which the last “uncivilised” areas of the globe were being opened up by the imperialist giants; a period too of rapid technological progress which saw the massive development of electricity, the coming of the telephone, the automobile and much else besides. It was a period in which painting pictures of the future became a stock in trade for numerous writers, scientists, historians ... and not a few out and out hucksters [3]. Although this dizzying bourgeois “progress” fascinated and turned the heads of many elements in the socialist movement, giving rise to the illusions of revisionism, the clearest elements in the movement, as we shall see shortly, were not taken in: they could see the storm clouds gathering in the distance. But while they did not lose their conviction that the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism would still be a necessity, they did begin to envisage the immense possibilities contained in the productive forces that capitalism had developed. They thus began to inquire into how these potentialities might be realised by socialist society in a more detailed manner than Marx or Engels had ever attempted - to the point indeed, where much of their work has been dismissed as “utopian”. This is a charge that we will consider carefully, but we can state forthwith that, even if there is some truth to the charge, it does not render all these reflections useless to us.
To be more specific, we intend to concentrate on three major figures in the socialist movement: August Bebel, William Morris, and Karl Kautsky. The latter we will look at in a future article, not at all because he is a lesser figure, but because his most important work was written in a slightly later period; and because he, more than the other two, raises the question of the means towards the social revolution. The first two, on the other hand, can be looked at mainly from the angle of determining how the late 19th century socialists defined the ultimate goals of their movement
The choice of these two is by no means arbitrary. Bebel, as we have seen, was a founding member of the SPD, a close associate of Marx and Engels for many years, and a figure of considerable authority in the international socialist movement. His best known political work, Woman and Socialism (first published in 1883, but substantially revised and developed over the next two decades) became one of the most influential documents of the workers’ movement in the late 19th century, not only because it dealt with the woman question, but above all because it contains a clear exposition of how things might operate in a socialist society, in all the main areas of life: not only the relation between the sexes, but also in the areas of work, of education, of the relationship between town and country ... Bebel’s book was an inspiration for hundreds of thousands of class conscious workers, eager to learn and to discuss how life could be lived in a truly human society. It is thus a very precise yardstick for measuring the Social Democratic movement’s understanding of its goals during this period.
William Morris is a far less well-known figure outside of Britain, but we still think it important to include some of his contributions on the question. A very “English” socialist, some marxists have been made wary of him by the fact that he is probably known more widely not as a socialist but as an artist and designer, as a poet and writer of heroic romances; Engels himself tended to dismiss him as a “sentimental socialist” and no doubt many comrades have, like Engels, been put off his book News from Nowhere (1890) not only because it approaches the question of communist society in the form of a “dream journey” to the future, but also by the tinge of mediaevalist nostalgia which hangs over this and much of his other work. But if William Morris began his criticism of bourgeois civilisation form the point of view of an artist, he became a genuine disciple of marxism and gave the whole of his later life to the cause of the class war and to the building a of a socialist organisation in Britain; and it was on this basis that he was able to develop a particularly strong insight into the alienation of labour under capitalism, and was able to make a real contribution to showing how this alienation might be overcome.
In the next article in this series, we will examine in greater depth the portraits of socialist society painted by Engels, Bebel and Morris, in particular the points they make about the more “social” aspects of the revolutionary transformation, such as the relations between men and women, and humanity’s interaction with the natural environment. But before doing that, it is necessary to add further proof that these mouthpieces of Social Democracy understood the fundamental characteristics of communist society, and that this understanding was in all essential features in accord with that of Marx and Engels.
The basic trick of the anti-social-democrats in their argument that social democracy was an instrument of capitalist recuperation from the start is to identify the Socialist parties with the reformist currents which arose within them. But these currents arose not as their organic product, but as a parasitic growth, nurtured by the noxious fumes of the surrounding bourgeois society. It is well known, for example, that the first thing the revisionist Bernstein “revised” was the marxist theory of crisis. Theorising the long period of capitalist “prosperity” at the end of the last century, revisionism declared crises to be a thing of the past and thus opened the door to the prospect of a gradual and peaceful transition to socialism. Later on in the history of the SPD, some of the former defenders of marxist “orthodoxy” on such questions, such as Kautsky, and Bebel himself, were indeed to make all kinds of concessions to these reformist perspectives. But at the time when Woman and Socialism was being written, this is what Bebel was saying: “the future of bourgeois society is threatened from all sides with grave dangers, and there is no way to escape them. Thus the crisis becomes permanent and international. It is a result of all the markets being overstocked with goods. And yet, still more could be produced; but the large majority of people suffer want in the necessaries of life because they have no income wherewith to satisfy their wants by purchase. They lack clothing, underwear, furniture, homes, food for the body and mind, and means of enjoyment, all of which they could consume in large quantities. But all that does not exist for them. Hundreds of thousands of workingmen are even thrown upon the sidewalk, and rendered wholly unable to consume because their labour power has become “superfluous” to the capitalists. Is it not obvious that our social system suffers of serious aliments? How could there be any “overproduction” when there is no lack of capacity to consume, ie of wants that crave satisfaction? Obviously, it is not production, in and of itself, that breeds these unhallowed conditions and contradictions: it is the system under which production is carried on, and the product is distributed” (Woman and Socialism, chapter VI, p252 of the 1904 English edition, reprinted as a Schocken paperback in 1971).
Far from repudiating the notion of capitalist crisis, Bebel here reaffirms that it is rooted in the basic contradictions of the system itself; furthermore, by introducing the concept of a “permanent” crisis, Bebel anticipates the onset of the historic decline of the system. And, like Engels who, shortly before his death, expressed his fears that the growth of militarism was dragging Europe towards a devastating war, Bebel also saw that the economic downfall of the system must bring about a military disaster:
“The political and military state of Europe has taken a development that cannot but end in a catastrophe, which will drag capitalist society down to its ruin. Having reached the height of its development, it produces conditions that end with rendering its own existence impossible; it digs its own grave; it slays itself with the identical means that itself, as the most revolutionary of all previous social systems, has called into life” (ibid, p 238).
It is precisely capitalism’s course towards catastrophe that makes the revolutionary overthrow of the system an absolute necessity:
“Accordingly, we suppose the arrival of a day when all the evils described will have reached such maturity that they will have become oppressingly sensible to the feeling as to the sight of the vast majority, to the extent of no longer being bearable; whereupon a general irresistible desire for radical change will seize society, and then the quickest will be regarded as the most effective remedy” (ibid, p 271).
Bebel also echoes Engels in making it clear that the statification of the economy by the existing regime is not the answer to the crisis of the system, still less a step towards socialism:
“ ... these institutions (telegraph, railway, post office, etc), administered by the state, are not socialist institutions, as they are mistakenly taken for. They are business plants that are exploited as capitalistically as if they were in private hands ... the socialist guards against allowing the present state ownership being regarded as socialism, as the realisation of socialist aspirations” (ibid, chap VII, p299).
William Morris wrote many diatribes against the encroaching tendencies towards “state socialism”, which in Britain were represented in particular by the reformist Fabian Society of Bernard Shaw, the Webbs, HG Wells and others. And News from Nowhere was written as a riposte to Edward Bellamy’s novel Looking Backward, which also purported to describe a socialist future, but one which came about quite pacifically, as the huge capitalist trusts evolved into “socialist” bodies; not surprisingly, this was a “socialism” where every detail of the individual’s life was planned by an omnipotent bureaucracy; in News from Nowhere, by contrast, the great revolution (set in 1952 ...) came about as the workers’ reaction against a long period of “state socialism”, when the latter was no longer able to stave off the contradictions of the system.
Against the apostles of “state socialism”, Bebel and Morris affirmed the basic tenet of marxism that socialism is a society without a state:
“The state is, accordingly, the inevitably necessary organisation of a social order that rests upon class rule. The moment class antagonisms fall through the abolition of private property, the state loses both the necessity and possibility for its existence...” (Woman and Socialism, chap VII, p 273). The old state machine, for Bebel, was to be replaced by a system of popular self-administration obviously modelled upon the Paris Commune:
“As in primitive society, all members of the community who are of age participate in the elections, without distinction of sex, and have a voice in the choice of persons who are to be entrusted with the administration. At the head of all the local administrations stands the central administration - as will be noted, not a Government, with power to rule, but an executive college of administrative functions. Whether the central administration shall be chosen directly by popular vote or appointed by the local administration is immaterial. These questions will not then have the importance they have today; the question is the no longer one of filling posts that bestow special honour, or that vest the incumbent with greater power and influence, or that yield larger incomes; it is then a question of filling positions of trust, for which the fittest, whether male or female, are taken; and these may be recalled or re-elected as circumstances may demand, or the electors may deem preferable. All posts are for given terms. The incumbents are, accordingly, clothed with no special “official qualities’; the feature of continuity of office is absent, likewise a hierarchical order of promotion” (ibid, p276). Similarly, in News from Nowhere, Morris envisions a society operating from a basis of local assemblies where all debate has the aim of achieving unanimity, but which uses the principle of majority rule where this cannot be reached. All this was diametrically opposed to the paternalistic conceptions of the Fabians and other “state socialists”, who, in their dotage, were horrified by the direct democracy of the October 1917 revolution, but found Stalin’s way of doing things quite to their taste: “we have seen the future, and it works”, as the Webbs put it after their trip to a Russia where the counter-revolution had done its work on all that troublesome “rule from below” nonsense.
Equally in accord with Engels’ definition of the new society, both Morris and Bebel affirm that socialism means the end of commodity production. Much of the humour in News from Nowhere consists in the visitor from the bad old days getting used to a society where neither goods nor labour have any “value”. Bebel puts it as follows: “Socialist society produces not “merchandise” in order to “buy” and to “sell’; it produces necessaries of life, that are used, consumed, and otherwise have no object. In socialist society, accordingly, the capacity to consume is not bounded, as in bourgeois society, by the individual’s capacity to buy; it is bounded by the collective capacity to produce. If labour and instruments of labour are in existence, all wants can be satisfied; the social capacity to consume is bounded only by the satisfaction of the consumers” (Woman and Socialism, chap VII, p 291).
And Bebel goes on to say that “there being no “merchandise” in socialist society, neither can there be any “money””(ibid); elsewhere, he talks about the system of labour time vouchers as a medium of distribution. This expresses a definite weakness in the way that Bebel presents the future society, making little or no distinction between the fully developed communist society and the transitional period towards it: for Marx, (and also for Morris, cf his notes to the Socialist League Manifesto, 1885), labour time vouchers were simply a transitional form towards completely free distribution, and carried certain of the scars of bourgeois society with them (see “Communism against state socialism”, International Review no.78). The full significance of this theoretical weakness will be examined in another article. What is important here is to establish that the Social Democratic movement was basically clear about its overall goals, even if the means to attain them often caused it much deeper problems.
In “Communism against state socialism” we noted that, in certain passages, even Marx and Engels made concessions to the idea that communism could, at least for a while, exist within the boundaries of a nation state. But such confusions were not hardened into a theory of “national” socialism; the overwhelming thrust of their thought is towards demonstrating that both the proletarian revolution itself, and the construction of communism, are only possible on an international scale.
The same can be said for the Socialist parties in the period we are considering. Even though a party like the SPD was weakened from the start by a programme which made far too many concessions in the direction of a “national” road to socialism, and even though such conceptions were to be theorised, with fatal consequences, as the Socialist parties became a more “respectable” part of national political life, the writings of Bebel and Morris are informed by an essentially international, and internationalist, vision of socialism:
“The new social system will then rear itself upon an international basis. The peoples will fraternise; they will reach one another the hand, and they will endeavour to gradually extend the new conditions over all the races of the earth” (Woman and Socialism, “Internationality”, p 352).
The Manifesto of Morris’ Socialist League, written in 1885, introduces the organisation as “advocating the principles of Revolutionary International Socialism; that is we seek a change in the basis of society - a change which would destroy the distinctions of classes and nationalities” (published in EP Thompson, William Morris, Romantic to Revolutionary, 1955). The Manifesto goes on to stress that “complete Revolutionary Socialism ... can never happen in any one country without the help of the workers of all civilisation. For us neither geographical boundaries, political history, race nor creed makes rivals or enemies; for us there are no nations, but only varied masses of workers and friends, whose mutual sympathies are checked or perverted by groups of masters and fleecers whose interest it is to stir up rivalries and hatreds between the dwellers in different lands”.
In an article published in The Commonweal, the League’s paper, in 1887, Morris links this international perspective with the question of production for use; in socialist society “all civilised [4] nations would form one great community, agreeing together as to the kind and amount of production and distribution needed; working at such and such production where it could be best produced; avoiding waste by all means. Please to think of the amount of waste which they would avoid, how much such a revolution would add to the wealth of the world!” (“How we live and how we might live”, republished in The Political Writings of William Morris, Lawrence and Wishart, 1973). Production for use can only be established when the world market has been replaced by a global community. It is possible to find passages where all the great socialist militants “forget” this. But these lapses did not express the real dynamic of their thought.
Furthermore, this international vision was not restricted to the distant revolutionary future; as can be seen from the passage from the Socialist League Manifesto, the vision also demanded an active opposition to the bourgeoisie’s present-day efforts to stir up national rivalries between workers. It demanded above all a concrete and intransigent attitude to inter-capitalist war.
For Marx and Engels, the internationalist position taken up by Bebel and Liebknecht during the Franco-Prussian war was the proof of their socialist credentials and convinced them of the need to persevere with the German comrades for all their theoretical shortcomings. Similarly, one of the reasons why Engels originally supported the group that was to form the Socialist League in their split with Hyndman’s Social Democratic Federation in 1884 was the former’s principled opposition to Hyndman’s “Jingo socialism”, which approved of British imperialism’s colonial conquests and massacres under the pretext that they were bringing civilisation to the “barbarous” and “savage” peoples. And as the threat grew that the great imperialist powers would soon be fighting each other directly, Morris and the League took a clear internationalist position on the question of war:
“If war really becomes imminent our duties as socialists are clear enough, and do not differ from those we have to act on ordinarily. To further the spread of international feeling between the workers by all means possible; to point out to our own workmen that foreign competition and rivalry, or commercial war, culminating at last in open war, are necessities of the plundering classes, and that the race and commercial quarrels of these classes only concern us so far as we can use them as opportunities for fostering discontent and revolution; that the interests of the workmen are the same in all countries and they can never really be enemies of each other; that the men of our labouring classes, therefore, should turn a deaf ear to the recruiting sergeant, and refuse to allow themselves to be dressed up in red and taught to form a part of the modern killing machine for the honour and glory of a country in which they have only a dog’s share of many kicks and few halfpence - all this we have to preach always, though in the event of imminent war we may have to preach it more emphatically” (Commonweal, January 1, 1887, cited in EP Thompson, p 684).
There is no continuity whatever between such a declaration and the outpourings of the social-chauvinists who, in 1914, themselves became the recruiting sergeants of the bourgeoisie. Between one and the other there is a class rupture, a betrayal of the working class and its communist mission, which had been defended for three decades by the Socialist parties and the Second International.
CDW
[1] Engels makes little or no distinction between “socialism” or “communism” in this work, even if the latter, owing to its more proletarian and insurrectionary connotations, had generally been Marx’s and Engels’ preferred term for the future classless society. It was above all Stalinism which, picking on this or that phrase in the work of previous revolutionaries, was most concerned to make a hard and fast distinction between socialism and communism, since it had to be able to prove that a society dominated by an all-powerful bureaucracy and functioning on the basis of wage labour was indeed “socialism” or “the lower stage of communism”. And in fact the Stalinist hack who introduces the 1971 Moscow edition of The Society of the Future, a pamphlet drawn from the concluding sections of Bebel’s Woman and Socialism, is very anxious to criticise Bebel for calling his stateless, moneyless future society “socialism”. It’s also worth pointing out that an “anti-social democratic” group like Radical Chains also drives a wedge between socialism and communism: the latter is the real thing; the former accurately defines the programme of Stalinism, 20th century social democracy and the leftists. Radical Chains kindly informs us that this socialism has “failed”. This formulation thus saves Radical Chains’ fundamentally Trotskyist view that Stalinism and other forms of totalitarian state capitalism are not really capitalist at all. For all its criticisms of this horrible “socialism”, Radical Chains is still handcuffed to it.
[2] Here we should repeat the qualification made when we cited this passage in International Review no.78: “Engels is doubtless referring here to the post-revolutionary state formed after the destruction of the old bourgeois state. The experience of the Russian revolution, however, has led the revolutionary movement to question even this formulation: ownership of the means of production even by the “Commune state” does not lead to the disappearance of the state, and can even contribute to its reinforcement and perpetuation. But Engels could not have had the benefit of such hindsight of course”.
[3] This was a period in which the future, above all the future as both apparently and genuinely revealed by science, had a powerful gravitational pull. In the literary sphere, these years saw a rapid development of the “science fiction” genre (HG Wells being the most significant example).
[4] The use of the word “civilised” in this context reflects the fact that there were still areas of the globe that capitalism had only just begun to penetrate. It did not have any chauvinist connotations of superiority over indigenous peoples. We have already noted that Morris was a relentless critic of colonial oppression. And in his footnotes to the Manifesto of the Socialist League, written along with Belfort Bax, he demonstrates a clear grasp of the marxist historical dialectic, explaining that future communist society is the return to “a point which represents the older principle elevated to a higher plane” - the older principle being that of primitive communism (cited in Thompson, p739). See “Communism of the past and future” in International Review no.81 for a further elaboration of this theme.
To listen to the media, you would think that reason had triumphed at last: the action of the great powers, led by the United States, has made it possible to begin the resolution of the bloodiest conflict Europe has seen since 1945. The Dayton accord means the return of peace in ex- Yugoslavia. Similarly, optimism is uppermost in the Middle East, where Rabin's assassination has only strengthened the determination of the "doves" and their American mentor to take the "peace process" to its conclusion. And Washington's final Christmas present has been the hope of overcoming the oldest conflict in Europe, between the British state and the Republicans in Northern Ireland.
These are cynical lies. When they hear them, workers would do well to remember what the bourgeoisie was promising in 1989, after the collapse of the Eastern bloc: a "new world order", and a "new era of peace". We know what really happened: the Gulf War, the war in Yugoslavia, in Somalia, Rwanda, etc. Today, even less than five years ago, is no era of peace but of an unrestrained war of all against all that characterizes the relations between the planet's major imperialist powers.
The great imperialist powers are not, as the bourgeoisie's hired media hacks present them, "doves of peace" or firemen struggling to put out the fires of war. On the contrary, from Yugoslavia to Rwanda, via Algeria and the Middle East, they are the worst of the warmongers. Through the medium of client cliques or countries, they are waging a war which is no less ferocious for being partly hidden. The famous Dayton accords are only a moment in the war between the world's greatest power and its ex-allies of the defunct American bloc.
Behind the Dayton accords, the success of an American counter-offensive
The imposition of the Dayton accords, and the 30,000 heavily armed troops sent to ex-Yugoslavia, are aimed not at the Serbs or Croats, but at the United States' one-time European allies, who have become the main opponents of its world supremacy: France, Britain, and Germany, The USA's aim is not peace, but the reimposition of its own domination. In the same way, if the French, British and German bourgeoisies are sending their own contingents to ex-Yugoslavia, this is not to impose peace on the warring parties there or to defend the martyred population of Sarajevo, but to defend their own imperialist interests. Under cover of humanitarian action and the so-called peace forces of UNPROFOR, Paris, London and Bonn (the latter more discreetly, but with formidable efficacy) have not ceased to stir up the war by encouraging the action of their proteges. Under the aegis of NATO, I-For (the Implementation Force) will continue the same criminal activity, as we can see from the numbers of men and equipment that have been committed. The territory of ex-Yugoslavia will continue to be the main battle-field for the great imperialist powers in Europe.
The Americans' determination to dominate the situation in ex-Yugoslavia is as great as the strategic stakes involved in this country, placed at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East. But more important still, as Clinton has emphasized in speeches justifying the dispatch of US troops, and with the support of the whole American bourgeoisie, is "the assertion of American world leadership". And so that nobody should be in any doubt as to Washington's determination to reach its objective, he stated explicitly that he would "accept entire responsibility for any losses that might be suffered by American soldiers". This openly warlike language, and the firmness which contrasts so sharply with the American bourgeoisie's previous hesitations over ex-Yugoslavia, is explained by the extent of the opposition to US domination by Japan, Germany, and France, but also - a historic change - by its oldest and most faithful ally, Great Britain. Reduced to the role of a mere challenger in ex-Yugoslavia, the USA had to strike a strong blow to put a stop to the most serious contestation of its world superiority since 1945.
We have dealt in detail in International Review no.83 with the strategy set in motion in ex-Yugoslavia; we will not return to it here, but will consider the results of the prime world power's counter-offensive. This has been largely successful. Until now, the British and French bourgeoisie's have occupied the terrain almost alone, which gave them a wide margin of maneuver against their imperialist rivals, and culminated in the creation of the RRF (Rapid Reaction Force). Now that the UN has been pushed aside, to make way for an I-For under the aegis of NATO and so under direct American command, they will have to "coexist" with a powerful American contingent, and will have to submit, willy-nilly, to the dictates of Washington. Even the Dayton negotiations were completely circumscribed by the balance of forces that the Americans imposed on their European "allies". "According to a French source, these negotiations took place in an "intolerable" euro-american atmosphere. According to this source, these three weeks have been nothing but a series of vexations and humiliations inflicted on the Europeans by the Americans, who wanted to lead the dance alone" (Le Monde, 29th November, 1995). In Dayton, the famous "contact group" dominated by the Anglo-French couple was reduced to playing a bit part, and essentially had to accede to the conditions dictated by the USA:
- relegation of the UN to the status of mere observer, with the disappearance of UNPROFOR, the precious tool of French and British imperialist interests, and its replacement by the I-For, dominated and commanded by the Americans;
- the dissolution of the RRF;
- American delivery of weapons and training to the Bosnian army.
As for the French attempts to use the Russians' resistance to the American steamroller, by proposing to put the Russian I-For troops under their own control, thus trying to make a dent in the Russo-American alliance, they were a pitiful failure; in the end, the Russian contingent was placed under American command. Washington hammered the point home by emphasizing that the real negotiations were taking place in Dayton, and that the conference planned for December in Paris was nothing but a sounding-board for decisions taken in the United States ... and by them.
Thanks above all to their military power, and to the fact that might is the only right in the jungle of imperialism, the world's greatest power has not only spectacularly succeeded in re-establishing itself in ex-Yugoslavia; it has also dealt a serious blow to the pretentions of all those who dared to contest its domination, and in particular to the Anglo-French duo. The shock has been all the harder for the French and British bourgeoisies, because with their presence in ex-Yugoslavia, they were defending their status as top rank Mediterranean powers, and hence as powers which, though secondary and in decline, nonetheless intend to continue playing a role on the world stage. The reinforcement of the American presence in the Mediterranean directly threatens their imperialist rank. This vast American counter-offensive is aimed above all at punishing the British and French troublemakers.
Germany is also affected by this strategy. What is at stake for Germany is essentially access, through ex-Yugoslavia, to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Thanks to the victories of its Croat clients, it had begun to achieve this objective. The American presence can only hinder it by limiting its room for maneuver. The fact that Hungary, a country which is tied to Germany, should agree to serve as a base for the American troops can only be a direct threat to the interests of German imperialism. This confirms that the alliance between Germany and America in the spring of 1995 was only temporary. The USA used Germany, via the Croats, to re-establish their position. Once the objective was reached, there was no longer any question of giving a free hand to their most dangerous rival, the only one of the great powers with the ability, eventually, to become the leader of a new imperialist bloc.
The United States have thus given a clear demonstration of who is in charge in the strategically vital Mediterranean region. They have dealt a heavy blow to all their rivals in imperialist banditry, right where the decisive conflicts are played out: in Europe. But this reminder of American determination to use its military strength is also part of a worldwide counter-offensive: for the US, the problem of defending its supremacy against the threat of unbridled self-interest, and the slow rise in power of German imperialism is posed worldwide. In the Middle East, from Iran to Iraq, by way of Syria the USA has increased its pressure to impose the pax americana, isolating and destabilising states which refuse Washington's dictates, and are open to the siren songs of Europe or Japan. It is trying to evict French imperialism from its African hunting grounds. It encourages the action of the Islamic fractions in Algeria, and does not hesitate an instant to use a weapon that until recently was reserved for the poor: terrorism[1]. The USA is certainly not unconnected with the disorder in Ivory Coast and Senegal, and just as Paris is trying to stabilize its relations with the new regime in Rwanda, the immediate result of the inexhaustible Jimmy Carter's latest mission has been a degradation in the relations between Paris and Kigali. In Asia, confronted with a Japan increasingly unwilling to put up with US domination - illustrated by the massive demonstrations against the US bases in Okinawa - and with a China that has every intention of profiting from the end of the blocs to assert its own imperialist pretentions, even when these go against America's, the US has alternated carrot and stick to keep control of all those that contest its domination. It has, for example, succeeded in imposing on Japan the continued presence of its military bases.
But the clearest demonstration of the American bourgeoisie's determination to punish "traitors", and re-establish its position, is undoubtedly Clinton's trip to Ireland. By imposing negotiations with the Irish nationalists on the British bourgeoisie, and by openly showing his sympathies with Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, Clinton is giving Britain a clear message, which basically boils down to the following: "if you don toe the line, and return to a complete loyalty to your American friend, then not even your own territory will be safe from our reprisals". This journey, then, was designed to apply a strong pressure to its British ex-ally, at the same level as the importance of the historic break within the 20th century's oldest and most solid imperialist alliance. However, the very fact that the Americans should be obliged to use such methods to bring what used to be their closest ally back into their orbit shows that despite its undoubted successes, there are limits to the American counter-offensive.
The limits to the counter-offensive
As the diplomats recognize themselves, the Dayton accords have settled none of the fundamental questions, either as to the future of a Bosnia divided into two, or even three parts, or as to the basic antagonism between Belgrade and Zaghreb. This "peace" is thus nothing other than a heavily armed truce, above all because the agreement imposed by Washington is only a moment in the balance of forces between the USA and the other great imperialist powers. For the moment, the balance of forces is clearly in favor of the United States, which has forced its rivals to give way; but the US has still only won the battle, not the war. The slow erosion of its world domination has been halted, but only for the moment.
No imperialism can hope to rival the world's greatest power on the strictly military terrain; this gives the latter a formidable advantage against its opponents, and considerably restricts their margin of maneuver. But the laws of imperialism force them, if only to remain in the imperialist arena, to continue to try by every means to free themselves from American tutelage. Since it is difficult for them to oppose the US directly, they have recourse to more indirect strategies.
France and Britain have thus been forced to accept the eviction of UNPROFOR and the RRF from ex-Yugoslavia, and their replacement with I-For, but the fact that they are taking part in the latter, with forces which, combined, are more numerous that the US contingent, does not in the least mean that they will docilely accept the orders of the American commander. With this kind of force, the Franco-British duo is giving itself the means to defend its imperialist prerogatives, and to counter Washington's activity at the first opportunity. The sabotage will be easier than during the Gulf War, first because of the nature of the terrain, second and most important because this time London and Paris are in the same camp opposing American policy, and lastly because the US contingent is much less imposing than during the "Desert Storm" operation. If France and Britain have increased still further their military presence in ex-Yugoslavia, it is to keep intact their ability to damage the USA and to put as many spanners in its works as possible, while preserving the means to counter the advance of German imperialism in the region.
Equally significant of this indirect strategy is the French bourgeoisie's noisy concern for the Serb districts of Sarajevo, with Chirac's letter to Clinton on the subject, and the support shown for Serb nationalist demonstrations by the French UNPROFOR officers stationed in Sarajevo. Faced with a firm reaction from Washington, Paris retreated, and pretended that this was only clumsiness on the part of a general who has since been relieved of his command, but the contest has only been put off for later. Another example is the successful French operation with the Algerian elections and the comfortable re-election of the French bourgeoisie's man, the sinister Zeroual. Paris' maneuvers around the so-called "failed meeting" between Chirac and Zeroual in New York, allowed France to take up the American demand for "free elections" in Algeria, and the US was thus unable to contest the results of such a well-attended election.
The recent French decision to rejoin NATO, with a permanent presence of its army chief of staff, is another illustration of the same strategy. Knowing that it cannot confront the American bourgeoisie head-on, the French bourgeoisie is doing the same within a US-dominated NATO, as the British are doing in a European Union dominated by Germany: joining in order to counter its policy.
The Euro-Mediterranean summit in Barcelona had also seen France hunting in an American preserve. On the one hand, it has strengthened Europe's ties with the main protagonists of the Middle-Eastern conflict, Syria and Israel, after the US had reduced Europe to the status of mere observer of the "peace process". On the other hand, France has opposed the destabilizing maneuvers directed against it in the Maghreb, by an attempt to coordinate security policy against Islamic terrorism. The results of this summit may have been limited, but their importance should not be underestimated, just as the Americans are strengthening their presence in the Mediterranean, and doing their utmost to impose the pax americana in the Middle East.
But the clearest expression of the US counter -offensive's limitations is the continuation, and even the reinforcement, of the Franco-British alliance. This has developed in recent months on issues as crucial as military cooperation, ex-Yugoslavia, and the coordination of the struggle against Islamic terrorism. After noisily supporting the renewal of French nuclear testing, the British bourgeoisie has directly opposed Washington by agreeing to help France in the struggle against an Islamic terrorism which is largely remote controlled from Washington, thereby emphasizing the extent of its estrangement with the US bourgeoisie.
All this illustrates the scale of the obstacles barring the way to a reassertion of US hegemony. The US can score points against its adversaries, and achieve some spectacular successes, but it cannot build a new order around itself on anything like the scale existing at the time of the American bloc. The disappearance of the two imperialist blocs that dominated the planet for forty years has put an end to the nuclear blackmail that allowed the two leaders to impose their dictates on their respective blocs, and has liberated unbridled self-interest, which has now become the dominant tendency in imperialist relationships. Whenever the US puffs itself up and makes a display of its military superiority, its rivals retreat, but the retreat is only tactical and temporary and in no way represents allegiance and submission. The more the USA tries to reassert its imperialist domination, brutally reminding its rivals who is the strongest, the more determined become the opponents of American order to put it in question, since for them it is a matter of life or death, of their ability to keep their rank in the imperialist arena.
This explains why the US success during the Gulf War has been so ephemeral, and why it was so quickly followed by the contestation of American authority at the world level - the divorce between Britain and the US being the most striking illustration. The operation being mounted by the US in ex-Yugoslavia is only a shadow of the deployment against Iraq, and the important points scored by the US since summer 1995 cannot fundamentally reverse the tendency to a historic weakening of its world supremacy, despite its military superiority.
"Every man for himself" and the instability of imperialist alliances
The unbridled self-interest which increasingly characterizes imperialist relationships lies at the root of the weakening of the American super-power, but it is not alone in suffering the consequences. Every imperialist alliance has been affected, including the most solid. The USA cannot resuscitate an alliance completely under its control, but its German rival, its most dangerous competitor and the only one that can hope one day to lead its own bloc, suffers from the same problem. Germany has scored a number or points on the imperialist scene: in ex-Yugoslavia, it has come closer to its goal of access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East via Croatia; it is solidly installed in Eastern Europe; in Africa, it has not hesitated to stir up trouble in the French sphere of influence; it is trying to develop its positions in the Far East, and in the Middle East where it is an influence to be reckoned with; not forgetting Latin America. Everywhere, German imperialism tends to assert itself as a conquering power against a United States on the defensive, and against the "second raters", France and Britain. Germany uses its economic strength to the hilt, but more and more it is also making discreet use of its military strength. The arsenal of conventional weapons recovered from East Germany has made Germany the world's second arms exporter, far ahead of Britain and France combined. Since 1945, the German army has never played such an important role as now. This advance corresponds to the embryonic tendency towards the formation of a German bloc, but the more German imperialism reveals its power, the more obstacles emerge against this tendency. The more Germany flexes its muscles, the more its most faithful and solid ally, France, takes its distance with its too powerful neighbor. One dispute after another has emerged between the two states: the question of ex-Yugoslavia, the renewal of French nuclear tests - essentially directed against Germany - the future of Europe. By contrast, excellent relations are being established between France and Germany's old and irreconcilable enemy, Great Britain. We should not be deceived by the proliferation of meetings between Chirac and Kohl, and the soothing declarations that follow them: these are more a sign of the degradation of Franco-German relations than of their good health. Within the framework of "every man for himself", the overall political, geographical, and historical factors tend towards a cooling of the Franco-German alliance. This was forged during the Cold War, within the framework of the Western bloc, and on the French side was seen as a way of countering the activity of the USA's Trojan horse in Europe, Great Britain. With the death of the Western bloc and the cooling of relations between the British bourgeoisie and its American mentor, these two factors have disappeared. Frightened by the power of its neighbor, which has defeated it in three wars since 1870, France is being pushed into a rapprochement with Britain, both to resist the pressure from the USA and to protect itself against an over-powerful Germany. France and Britain, the two declining imperialist powers, are trying to pool what is left of their military power to defend themselves against both Washington and Bonn. This is the root of the solidity of the Paris-London axis in ex-Yugoslavia, especially since neither of these Mediterranean powers can see their status diminished by a German advance and an increased American presence.
Given the close and long-standing relations between France and Germany, it is impossible abruptly to cut all the ties between them, especially on the economic level. But the Franco-German alliance looks more and more like a mere memory and this seriously hinders the formation of a future imperialist bloc
around Germany.
The development of unbridled self-interest engendered by the decomposition of the capitalist system, undermines the most solid of imperialist alliances: between Britain and the USA, or between France and Germany, albeit the latter did not have same solidity or age. This does not mean that there will be no more imperialist alliances. Alliances are vital to the survival of any imperialism. But henceforth, they will be less stable, more fragile, more prone to being broken. Some will be relatively solid, like the present Franco-British alliance, but this cannot be compared to the solidity of the almost century-long alliance between London and Washington, or even of that between Paris and Bonn since World War II. Others will be purely circumstantial, like that in the spring of 1995 between Germany and the USA. Still others will have a variable geometry, with one power on one question, with another on a different one.
The result will be a still more dangerous and unstable world, where the war of each against all of the great imperialist powers will bring in its wake ever more war, destruction and suffering for the vast mass of humanity. The use of brute force, on the same lines as the so-called civilized states in ex-Yugoslavia, cannot but intensify. As a new open recession of world capitalism pushes the bourgeoisie to rain new and terrible blows on the proletariat, workers must remember that capitalism is not just poverty, but also war and its train of awful barbarism, which only their struggle can bring to an end.
RN, 11th December 1995
[1] It would not be at all surprising if the USA were involved at some level in the wave of bomb attacks in France since summer 1995.
In the first part of this article (International Review No.81) we endeavoured to reclaim the real historical revolutionary experience of the working class in China. The Shanghai proletariat’s heroic attempted insurrection of 21st March 1927 was both the culmination of the spontaneous movement of the working class begun in 1919 in China, and the last glimmer of the international revolutionary wave that had shaken the capitalist world since 1917.
However, the combined forces of capitalist reaction - the Kuomintang, the “war lords”, the great imperialist powers, relying on the complicity of the Executive of the rapidly degenerating IIIrd International - completely defeated this movement.
The events that took place after this had nothing at all to do with the proletarian revolution. What official historians call the “Chinese popular revolution” was, in reality, an unbridled succession of struggles for control of the country between antagonistic bourgeois fractions, behind whom were always to be found one or other of the great powers. China was converted into one of the “hottest” regions of the imperialist confrontations that came to a head in World War II.
The year 1928, distinguished by the official historians as decisive in the life of the Communist Party of China, was the year of the creation of the “Red Army” and the beginning of the “New Strategy” based on the mobilisation of the peasants, the so-called foundations of the “popular revolution”. And, indeed, this was a decisive year for the CPC, although not in the sense the official historians mean. In fact, the year 1928 marked the liquidation of the Communist Party of China as an instrument of the working class. Understanding this event constitutes the point of departure for understanding subsequent events in China.
On the one hand, with the defeat of the proletariat, the party was broken up and decimated. As we have already mentioned, around 25,000 communist militants were killed and many thousands more persecuted by the Kuomintang. The militants constituted the cream of the revolutionary proletariat of the great cities, who, due to a lack of council type organisations, had regrouped inside the party during the previous years. From now on, not only would no new generation of workers be integrated into the party, but its social composition would be as radically changed - as we will see below - as its political principles.
The liquidation of the party was not only physical but, above all, political. The period of the most ferocious persecution against the communist party coincided with the unstoppable rise of Stalinism in the USSR and in the International. These simultaneous events dramatically accelerated the opportunism which had been inculcated in the CPC for many years by the Executive of the International, until it turned into a process of rapid degeneration. Thus, between August and December the party lead a series of reckless, desperate and chaotic uprisings, this “Autumn Revolt” also included: an uprising by thousands of peasants in certain regions which had fallen under the control of the party, a mutiny of nationalist troops in Nanchang (in which some communists were active); and finally, the so-called Canton “insurrection” - 11/14th December, which in reality was a “planned” attempted assault, which was not supported by the whole of the proletariat of the city and ended in yet another blood-bath. All of these actions ended in disastrous defeats at the hands of the forces of the Kuomintang, accelerating the dispersion and demoralisation of the Communist Party, and they marked the crushing of the last revolutionary impulses of the working class.
These reckless uprisings had been instigated by the elements that Stalin had placed at the head of the PCP, whose objective was to justify Stalin’s thesis about the “promotion of the Chinese revolution”. Later these failures were used to expel his opponents.
The year 1928 marked the triumph of the Stalinist counter-revolution. The 9th Plenum of the International accepted the “rejection of Trotskyism” as a condition for adhesion and , finally, the 6th Congress of the International adopted the infamous theory of “Socialism in one country”, in other words the definitive abandonment of proletarian internationalism, which marked the death of the International as an organisation of the working class. In this context, the 6th Congress of the CPC, also held in the USSR, took the decision to prepare a team of young leaders who unconditionally supported Stalin, beginning, the “official” Stalinisation of the party, in other words, its transformation into a different party, an instrument of ascendant Russian imperialism. This team of so-called “returned students” were to take over the leadership of the party two years later, in 1930.
Stalinism was not the only road that the CPC took towards degeneration. The defeat of the series of adventures in the second half of 1927 had also lead to the flight of some participating groups towards regions where the governmental forces found access difficult. These groups began to unite into broader military detachments. One of these was that of Mao Tsetung.
It should be noted, that from his earliest years as a militant, Mao Tsetung had not given much proof of proletarian intransigence. As a representative of the opportunist wing, he had held an administrative post of secondary importance during the period of the alliance with the Kuomintang. When this broke up he fled to his native region of Hunan, where following the Stalinist dictates, he set about leading the “the Autumn peasants’ revolt”. The disastrous end of this adventure obliged him, along with hundreds of peasants, to withdraw even further, until they reached the massive mountain range of Chingkang. There, in order to establish himself, he made a pact with the bandits that controlled the area, whose methods of assault he learnt. Finally, his group fused with the remnants of a detachment of the Kuomintang under the command of the officer Chu Et, which had fled to the mountains after the failed uprising at Nanchang.
According to the official historians, Mao’s group was at the origins of the so-called “Red Army” or “People’s Army” and the “Red bases” (regions controlled by the CPC). Mao is supposed to have finally “discovered” the “correct strategy” for the Chinese revolution, according to this account. In reality, Mao’s detachment was one amongst many others in dozens of different regions. All of them began a policy of recruiting the peasants, offensives and the occupation of certain regions, which led to the resistance to the Kuomintang’s attacks for some years, until 1934. What is important to remember here is the ideological and political fusion between the opportunist wing of the CPC with parts of the Kuomintang (the party of the bourgeoisie), including mercenaries provided by gangs of déclassé peasants. In fact, the geographic displacement which took place in this historic scenario, from the cities to the countryside, did not correspond merely to a change in strategy, but clearly marked the change of the class character that took place in the Communist Party.
The Maoist historians tell us that the “Red Army” was a peasant army guided by the proletariat. In reality, it was not the working class which headed this army, but militants of the CPC almost all of them from petty-bourgeois backgrounds.These elements had never made the historical perspective of the class struggle completely theirs (a perspective that was definitively abandoned with the defeat of the revolutionary wave). Mixed in with these elements were embittered officials of the Kuomintang. Some years later, this mixture was further consolidated, by a new displacement of professors, university students, nationalists and liberals towards the countryside: these were to form the cadre of “educators” of the peasants during the war against Japan.
Socially, the Communist Party of China was thus converted into the representative of layers of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie displaced by the prevailing conditions in China: intellectuals, professionals and career soldiers, who could find no place, either with the local governments which could only submit to the nobles, nor in Chiang Kai-Shek’s closed and monopolistic central government.
Consequently, the ideology of the leaders of the “Red Army” became a mixture of Stalinism and Sun Yat-Senism. A language full of pseudo-Marxist phrases about the “proletariat” hardly covered the increasingly openly declared aim of establishing another equally bourgeois, although “democratic”, government (with the support of a “friendly government”), opposed to the “dictatorship” of Chiang Kai-Shek. In the real world of capitalist decadence this meant completely immersing the new CPC and its “Red Army” in imperialist struggles.
One thing is certain however: that the ranks of the “Red Army” were basically formed by poor peasants. This fact (along with the party continuing to call itself “Communist”) is to be found at the base of the creation of the myth of the “Chinese popular revolution”.
From the middle of the 1920’s there already existed in the CPC a theorisation, especially amongst those with the least confidence in the working class, that attributed to the Chinese peasantry the character of being an especially revolutionary class. One could read, for example, that “the great peasant masses have risen up in order to complete their historic mission: breaking down of the rural feudal forces”.[1] [484] In other words, they considered the peasants as an historic class, capable of realising certain revolutionary aims independently of other classes. With the political degeneration of the CPC, these theorisations went even further, attributing to the Chinese peasantry the capacity to substitute itself for the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle![2] [485]
By pointing to the history of peasant rebellions in China, they claimed to demonstrate the existence of a revolutionary “tradition” (however, they do not talk about “consciousness”) amongst the Chinese peasantry. In reality, what this history demonstrates is precisely that the Chinese peasantry have lacked a viable revolutionary historic project of their own, as has been the case for the peasants in the rest of the world, and as Marxism has demonstrated time and time again. In the ascendant period of capitalism, in the majority of cases, they opened the way for the bourgeois revolution, but in the decadent period of capitalism the poor peasants can only carry out a revolutionary struggle if they adhere to the revolutionary aims of the working class, since otherwise they are turned into a tool of the ruling class.
Thus, the Taiping rebellion (the “purest” and most important movement of the Chinese peasantry, which exploded in 1850 against the Manchu dynasty and which was totally crushed by 1864) already demonstrated the limits of the peasant struggle. The Taiping wanted to install the reign of the gods on earth, a society without individual private property, in which an authentic monarch, truly the son of the gods, would dispose of all the riches of the community. That is to say, a recognition that private property was the cause of their ills. However, this didn’t lead to a viable project for a future society, but only a return to a utopia of an idyllic lost dynasty. During the initial years the European powers left the Taiping alone because they destabilised the dynasty and the rebellion spread throughout the reign, but the peasants were incapable of forming a central government and administering the land. The movement reached its culminating point in 1856 with the failure to take Peking the imperial capital and, finally, it began to be extinguished through massive repression in which the great capitalist powers collaborated. In this way, the Taiping rebellion weakened the Manchu dynasty, only in order to open the doors to the imperialist expansion of Great Britain, France and Russia. The peasantry did the bidding of the bourgeoisie.[3] [486]
Decades later, in 1898, a new, less widespread, revolt broke out, that of the Yi Ho-tuan (Boxers). Initially it was against the dynasty and foreigners. However, this revolt marked the decomposition of the independent peasant movements, since the Empress gained control of it and used it in her own war against the foreigners. With the disintegration of the dynasty and the fragmentation of China at the beginning of the century, an increasing number from among the floating mass of poor and landless peasants began to enrol in the professional armies of the regional “Warlords”. Finally, the traditional secret societies for the protection of the peasants were transformed into Mafiosi in the service of the capitalists, who used them in the cities to control the labour force and to act as strike-breakers.
It is true that the theorisations about the revolutionary character of the peasantry found a justification in the effective re-animation of the peasant movement, above all in Southern China. Nevertheless, these theorisations passed over the fact that it was the revolution in the great cities that had provoked this reanimation and that any hope of emancipation for the peasantry only could come from the victorious revolution of the urban proletariat.
But the formation of the Chinese “Red Army” had nothing to do with the proletariat nor with the revolution. Nor did it have anything, as we have said, to do with the formation of revolutionary militias in periods of insurrection. It is certain that the terrible living conditions the peasants suffered pushed them to joined the “Red Army” in the hope of winning and defending their land, but these were the same reasons that caused other peasants to join the armies of the warlords that infested China at the time.
In fact the “Red Army”’s leaders had to issue orders prohibiting the looting of conquered regions. For the proletariat, the “Red Army” was something totally alien, as was shown in 1930, when it took the important city of Changsha and was only able to hold the city for a few days, due fundamentally to the indifferent, if not hostile, reception it received from the workers of the city, who refused the call to support it through a new “insurrection”.
The difference between the traditional “warlords” and the leaders of the “Red Army”, was that the new “warlords”, had already established themselves within the social structure of China and were visibly part of the ruling class, while the second had to struggle just to open up the way into it. This allowed them to feed the hopes of the peasants and it also conferred a more dynamic and aggressive character on them, a more clever and flexible disposition in order to make alliances and to sell themselves to the highest imperialist bidder.
In short, the defeat of the working class in 1927 did not catapult the peasants to the head of the revolution but, on the contrary, left them to be tossed about in the storms of the nationalist and imperialist struggles. In these struggles the peasants served only as cannon fodder.
With the defeat of the working class, the Kuomintang, for a while, was turned into the most powerful institution in China, the only one capable of guaranteeing the unity of the country -combating and forming alliances with the regional “warlords”- and, therefore, was converted into the focus of disputes between the imperialist powers.
We have already mentioned, in the first part of this article, how from 1911, the great imperialist powers were to be found behind the struggle to form the national government. At the beginning of the 1930’s the relations of force between them had been modified in various ways.
On the one hand, the Stalinist counter-revolution initiated a new Russian imperialist policy. The “defence of the Socialist fatherland” of the USSR signified the creation of a zone of influence around it, which would also serve as a protective buffer at the same time. In China’s case, this became support for the “Red bases” formed from 1928 onwards - for which Stalin did not see a great future - and above all the search for an alliance with the Kuomintang government.
On the other hand, the United States, which was increasingly becoming an aspirant for the exclusive domination of all the regions bordering the Pacific Ocean, was replacing the old colonial domination by the old powers such as Britain and France with its growing financial domination. Moreover, in order to achieve this, it first had to deal with the expansionist dreams of Japan. In fact, at the beginning of the century it was already clear that the Pacific was not big enough for the United States and Japan. And an open confrontation between Japan and the United States broke out (10 years before Pearl Harbour) with the war for the control of China and the Kuomintang government.
Finally, there was Japan, one of the powers meddling most in China, whose increasing need for markets, sources of raw materials, and cheap labour, led it to take the initiative in the imperialist struggles for China. In September 1931 it occupied Manchuria, and from January it began to invade the Northern provinces of China, establishing its bridgehead in Shanghai, after which it carried out “preventive” bombings of the working class areas of the city. Japan formed alliances with some of the warlords and began to install its own puppet régimes. Chiang Kai-Shek only offered a token resistance to the invasion, since he had already entered into a treaty with the Japanese. Then the United States and the USSR reacted, each for their own interests, putting pressure on the government of Chiang Kai-Shek to begin an effective resistance against Japan. The United States, however, took things very calmly, since it hoped that Japan would become bogged down in a long and exhausting war in China (which is what effectively happened).
Stalin, for his part, in 1932 ordered the “Red bases” to declare war on Japan, while simultaneously establishing diplomatic relations with the régime of Chiang Kai-Shek during the same period as this régime was launching savage attacks on the “Red bases”. In 1933, Mao Tsetung and Fang Chimin proposed an alliance with some generals of the Kuomintang that had rebelled against Chiang Kai-Shek because of his policy of collaboration with the Japanese. However, the “Returned students” rejected this alliance in order not break the links between Russia and Chiang’s régime. This episode demonstrates that the CPC was already tied up in the game of inter-bourgeois struggles and alliances. At this time Stalin saw the “Red Army” only as an “element of pressure” and preferred to rely more on a enduring alliance with Chiang Kai-Shek.
It was in the framework of these mounting imperialist tensions during the Summer of 1934 that detachments of the “Red Army” based in the “guerrilla bases” in the South and Centre, began a movement towards the Northwest of China, through the rural regions most remote from the control of the Kuomintang, in order to concentrate themselves in the Shensi region. The movement known as the “Long March” is, for the official historians, the most significant and epic act of the “Chinese popular revolution”. The history books are full of heroic chapters about how detachments crossed rivers, swamps and mountains. However, an analysis of the events shows that hidden behind this movement are sordid bourgeois interests.
Above all, the fundamental aim of the “Long March” was to enrol the peasants in the imperialist war which was brewing between Japan, China, Russia and the United States. In fact, Po Ku (a Stalinist of the group of “returned students”) had already posed the possibility of some units of the “Red Army” being sent to fight against the Japanese. The history books underline that the departure from the “Soviet zone” of the Southern region of Kiangsi was due to the unbearable siege by the Kuomintang, but become ambiguous when they deal with the fact that the forces of the “Red Army” were expelled , in great part, because of a change of tactics ordered by the Stalinists: from the guerrilla struggles that allowed the “Red Army” to resist for several years, to frontal attacks on the Kuomintang. These confrontations provoked the rupture of the guerrilla zone’s “security” frontier and consequently meant it had to be abandoned. This was not a “grave error” by the “returned students” ( as Mao said later, although he participated in this strategy). This success for the Stalinists forced the armed peasants to abandon their land, which they had defended with much effort up until then, in order to march North and formed them into a regular army suitable only for the approaching war.
The history books usually confer on the “long march” the character of a kind of social movement or class struggle. The “Red Army” is supposed to have been “sowing the seeds of the revolution”, propagandising and also redistributing the land between the peasants as it went along. In reality, these actions had as their aim the utilisation of the peasants as protection for the rearguard of the “Red Army”. Already at the beginning of the “long march” the civilian population of the “Red bases” had been used as a defence to allow the retreat of the army. This tactic - praised by some historians as “very ingenious” and consisting of turning civilians into targets in order to protect the movement of the regular army - is a tactic of the armies of the ruling classes. Contrary to the history books there is nothing “heroic” about allowing children and old people to be killed in order that the soldiers can save themselves.
The “Long March” was not on the road of the class struggle. On the contrary, it was the road towards accords and alliances with those who up until then had been categorised as “feudal and capitalist reactionaries” and who as if by magic had been turned into “good patriots”. Thus, on the 1st of August 1935, with the detachments of the “long march” stationed in Sechuan, the CPC launched the call for the national unity of all classes in order to drive the Japanese from China. In other words, the CPC called on all workers to abandon the class struggle in order to unite with their exploiters and serve as cannon fodder in their wars. The call was the anticipated application of the resolutions of the Seventh and last Congress of the Communist International, which had taken place during this time, and which launched the infamous slogan of the “anti-fascist popular front”, through which the Stalinised Communist Parties collaborated with the national bourgeoisie, converting them into recruiters of the workers for the second world slaughter that was already approaching.
The “long march” officially ended in October 1935, when Mao’s detachment arrived in Yenan (the Shensi province in the North West of China). In later years, in the Maoist pantheon the “long march” was the exclusive and glorious work of Mao Tsetung. The official histories skip over the fact that Mao arrived at a “Red base” that had already been established before hand, and that his arrival marked a disaster because only about 7,000 of the 90,000 men who had originally left Kiangsi made it. Thousands had died (victims of nature more than of Kuomintang attacks), and thousands more remained in Sechuan, because of a split amongst the leading cliques. It was only at the end of 1936 that the bulk of the “Red army” was really gathered together with the arrival of the detachments from Junan and Sechuan.
From 1936, the work of recruiting the peasants carried out by the CPC was backed up by hundreds of nationalist students who moved to the countryside after the anti-Japanese movement of the intellectuals at the end of 1935.[4] [487] This does not mean the students became “Communists”, on the contrary, as we said above, the CPC was already an organisation that the bourgeoisie saw as one of their own, sharing the same class interests.
The Chinese bourgeoisie, however, was not unanimous in its opposition to the Japanese. There were divisions in their inclinations towards one or other of the great powers. This was reflected by Generalismo Chiang Kai-Shek who, as we have already seen, was uncertain about launching a frontal attack against the Japanese and tried to wait until the balance of imperialist forces clearly leant towards one gang or other. The Kuomintang generals and the regional “warlords” were similarly divided.
The so-called “Sian incident” took place in this atmosphere. In December 1936, Chang Hsuehliang - an anti-Japanese Kuomintang - and Yang Hucheng - the “warlord” of Sian - who were on good terms with the CPC, arrested Chiang Kai-Shek and were going to prosecute him as a traitor. However, Stalin immediately and incisively ordered the CPC not only to free Chiang Kai-Shek, but furthermore to include his forces in the “popular front”. In the days that followed talks took place between Chou Enlai, Yeh Chienying and Po Ku as representatives of the CPC (in other words of Stalin), Tu Song (the biggest and most corrupt monopolist in China, a relative of Chiang) as the United States’ representative, and Chiang Kai-Shek himself. The result of these negociations was that Chiang was “obliged” to take the United State’s and the USSR’s side - at this time the US and Russia were allied against Japan. In return for doing this he was allowed to remain as head of the national government, while the CPC and the “Red Army” (which would change its name to the “Eighth Army”) were placed under his command. Chou Enlai and other “Communists” took part in Chiang’s government, while the United States and the USSR supplied Chiang Kai-Shek with military support. As for Chang Hsuehliang and Yang Hucheng, they were abandoned to Chiang’s revenge, the first was imprisoned and the second killed.
Thus, the new alliance between the CPC and the Kuomintang was signed. It was only by means of the most grotesque ideological contortions and the most abject propaganda that the CPC could justify in the workers’ eyes its new treaty with Chiang Kai-Shek, the same butcher that had ordered the crushing of the proletarian revolution and the killing of tens of thousands of workers and communists in 1927. It is true, that from the middle of 1938, the hostilities between the forces of the Kuomintang led by Chiang and those of the “Red Army” were renewed. This allows the official historians to maintain the idea that the pact with the Kuomintang was only a “tactic” of the CPC in the “revolution”. However, the historical significance of the pact lay not in its disintegration or in the collaboration between the CPC and the Kuomintang, but in the fact that between these two forces there were no class antagonisms but on the contrary, the same class interests. This CPC had nothing in common with the CPC of the 20’s that had confronted capital: it was now nothing but a tool of capital, the number one recruiting sergeant of the peasants for the imperialist massacre.
In July 1937, the Japanese undertook a large-scale invasion of China: this was the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. Only a handful of Left Communist groups that had survived the counter-revolution, such as the Dutch Internationalist Communist Group or the Italian Left Communist Group that published Bilan in France, were able to forecast and denounce the fact that what was happening in China was no “national liberation” war, still less the “revolution”, but a war for domination between the great powers with interests in the region: Japan, the USSR, and the United States; that the Sino-Japanese war, like the Spanish Civil War and other regional conflicts, was the deafening prelude to the second world imperialist slaughter. By contrast, Trotsky’s Left Opposition, which at its formation in 1928 had also denounced Stalin’s criminal policy of collaboration with the Kuomintang as one of the causes of the defeat of the proletarian revolution in China, was now prisoner of an incorrect analysis of the historic course, which made it see a new revolutionary possibility in each new regional imperialist conflict. Prisoner also of its own growing opportunism, it considered the Sino-Japanese war as “progressive”, and a step forwards towards the “third Chinese revolution”. At the end of 1937, Trotsky shamelessly declared that “if there is such a thing as a just war, then it is the war of the Chinese people against its conquerors... all the Chinese working class organisations, all the progressive forces in China, without giving up anything of their programme or political independence, will do their duty to the utmost in this war of liberation, independently of their attitude to the Chiang Kai-Shek government”.[5] [488] With this opportunist policy of national defence “independently of their attitude to the Chiang Kai-Shek government”, Trotsky opened wide the doors to recruiting the workers in imperialist war behind their governments, and with World War II, to the transformation of the Trotskyist groups into recruiting officers for capital. By contrast, the Italian Communist Left’s analysis of China firmly maintained the internationalist position of the working class. The position on China was one of the crucial points of rupture in its relations with Trotsky’s Left Opposition. For Bilan, “The communist position on the events in China, Spain, and the current international situation can only be fixed on the basis of the rigorous elimination of all those forces acting within the proletariat, and which tell the proletariat to take part in the slaughter of imperialist war”.[6] [489] “The whole problem is to determine which class is conducting the war, and to a establish a policy accordingly. In the present case, it cannot be denied that it is the Chinese bourgeoisie which is waging the war, and whether it be aggressor or victim, the proletariat’s duty is to struggle for revolutionary defeatism in China as much as in Japan”.[7] [490] In the same sense, the Belgian Fraction of the International Communist Left (allied with Bilan) wrote: “Alongside Chang Kai-Shek, the butcher of Canton, Stalinism is taking part in the assassination of the Chinese workers and peasants under the banner of a “war of independence”. And only a total break with the National Front, their fraternisation with the Japanese workers and peasants, their civil war against the Kuomintang and all its allies, under the leadership of a class party, can save them from disaster”.[8] [491] A defeated and demoralised working class failed to hear the firm voice of the groups of the Communist Left, and allowed itself to be dragged down into a worldwide massacre. However, these groups’ analytical method and positions represented the permanence and deepening of marxism and formed the bridge between the old revolutionary generation which had lived through the proletariat’s insurrectional wave at the beginning of the century, and the new revolutionary generation which emerged with the end of the counter-revolution at the end of the 1960s.
As we know, World War II ended in 1945 with the defeat of Japan and the Axis powers, and this defeat meant Japan's complete withdrawal from China. However, the end of World War II was not the end of imperialist confrontations, since immediately afterwards a rivalry between the two great powers - the USA and USSR - was established, which lasted for more than 40 years and brought the world close to a third - and last - world war. And China was immediately turned into a terrain of confrontation between the two powers.
The aim of this article is to demystify the so-called “Chinese popular revolution”, not to present the many interests related to the vicissitudes of the Sino-Japanese war. However, these interests highlight two aspects in relation to the policies carried out by the CPC during these years.
The first is related to the rapid expansion of the area occupied by the “Red Army” between 1936-1945. As we have said Chiang Kai-Shek did not engage his forces directly against the Japanese. Faced with the Japanese advance his forces fell back, retreated. On the other hand, the Japanese army’s rapid advance towards the Chinese interior was not backed up by an ability to set up their own administration in all the regions they occupied, and they were rapidly limited to occupying the communication routes and important cities. This situation gave rise to two phenomena: firstly, the regional warlords either remained loyal to the central government but were isolated from it, collaborated with the Japanese in the formation of puppet governments, or else collaborated with the “Red Army” in resisting the invasion. Secondly, the CPC cleverly used the power vacuum in the rural North West of China, created by the Japanese invasion, to establish its own administration.
This administration, known as the “new democracy”, has been praised by historians precisely as a “democratic” régime of a “new kind”. The only novelty about it, was that for the first time in history, a “Communist” party established a government of class collaboration,[9] [492] that is to say, it was concerned about zealously protecting the interests of the capitalists and the great landlords: the maintenance of stable relations of exploitation. The CPC discovered that it was not necessary to confiscate the land and give it to the peasants in order to gain their support. The peasants were so overburdened with levies that it was enough to bring about a small reduction in taxes (so small in fact that the landlords and capitalists agreed with it) for the peasants willingly to accept the CPC’s administration and enrol in the “Red Army”. In accordance with this “new régime” the CPC also established a government of class collaboration (between the bourgeoisie, the landlords and peasants), known as the government “of three parts”, where a third of posts were held by the “Communists”, a third by peasants’ organisations and another third by the landlords and capitalists. Once again, it was only through the most convoluted ideological contortions by “theoreticians” such as Mao Tsetung that the CPC could explain this “new kind” of government to the workers.
The second aspect of the CPC’s policy is less well known, since for ideological reasons, both the Maoist and pro-US historians want to hide it. The CPC was moving strongly towards the United States for the following reasons:
From 1944 the United States government established an observation commission in the main “Red Base” in Yenan, with the aim of sounding out the possibility of collaboration between the USA and the CPC. The leaders of the CPC - in particular Mao Tsetung and the Chu Teh clique - were clear that the United States would be the strongest victorious power at the end of the war and wanted to shelter in its shadow. The correspondence of John Service,[11] [494] one of the agents of the mission, insistently pointed out that the leaders of the CPC said:
The members of the United States mission insisted to their government that the future was on the side of the CPC. However, the United States never decided to help the “Communists” and, finally one year later in 1945, before the defeat of Japan, Russia rapidly invaded Northern China, leaving the CPC and Mao no other choice than to align themselves (temporarily!) with the USSR.
***
From 1946 to 1949, the confrontation between the two super powers led directly to a war between the CPC and the Kuomintang. During the war other Kuomintang generals went over, along with their arms and men,to the side of the “popular forces”. In this way, we can see four successive stages in which the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie nourished the CPC: the one that followed the defeat of the working class, from 1928; the one rooted in the student movement of 1935; the period of the war against Japan and finally that provoked by the collapse of the Kuomintang. The “old” bourgeoisie - with the exception of the great monopolists linked directly with Chiang Kai-Shek, such as Soong - merged into the CPC and founded the “new” bourgeoisie that arose during the war.
In 1949 the Communist Party of China, headed by the Red Army, took power and proclaimed the People’s Republic. But this never had anything to do with Communism. The class character of the “Communist” party that took power in China was completely alien to communism and antagonistic to the working class. From the beginning, the régime was only a form of state capitalism. The USSR controlled China for hardly a decade and this ended with the breaking off of relations between both countries. From 1960, China played an “independent” game from the super powers and saw itself as a great power capable of creating a “third bloc”, although from 1970 it had moved definitively towards the US-dominated Western bloc. Many historians - beginning with the Russians - accused Mao of being a “traitor”. We now know that the China’s journey towards the United states was not treason by Mao, but the final realisation of his dream.
Ldo
[1] [495] “Report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan”. March 1927. In Collected Works of Mao Tsetung, Peking 1976.
[2] [496] Isaac Deutscher, amongst others, some years later arrived at the same absurd conclusion that, if the displaced sections of the bourgeoisie and urban petty-bourgeoisie could lead the Communist Party, then there was no reason why the peasantry could not replace the proletariat in a “Socialist” revolution (Maoism, its origin and Outlook. The Chinese cultural revolution, 1971)
[3] [497] The absence of a viable historical project was a general characteristic shared by the great peasant movements (for example, the war in Germany in the 16th century, the Taiping rebellion and the 1910 “Mexican revolution” in the South): despite their communitarian features, their utopian ideology looked for the recovery of an irretrievably lost social situation; despite the way that the peasant armies were able to demolish the great landlords, they were unable to form unified central governments, the result of this was the opening of the way for the bourgeoisie (or fractions of it).
[4] [498] We need to remember that the universities of this period were not the massive universities of our day, to which some workers’ children go. In that period, amongst the students “many were the sons of well-to-do bourgeois or state functionaries of various levels... who had seen their incomes fall with the ruin of China and could see even more disasters to come due to the Japanese invasion” (La rivoluzione cinese, Enrica Colloti Pischel).
[5] [499] Lutte Ouvrière no.37, quoted in Bilan no.46, January 1938.
[6] [500] Bilan no.45, November 1937.
[7] [501] Bilan no.46, January 1938.
[8] [502] Communisme no.8, November 1937.
[9] [503] In the USSR the bourgeoisie also dominated, but that was a question of a new bourgeoisie, emerging from the counter-revolution.
[10] [504] From the middle of 1938, Chiang Kai-Shek once again began to act against the CPC. In the August of that year he outlawed the organisations of the “Communist” party and in October he laid siege to its Shensi base. Between 1939 and 1940 there were a number of confrontations between the Kuomintang and the “Red Army”, in January 1941 Chiang ambushed the 4th Army (another detachment of the “Red Army”), which had been formed in central China. With all these actions he looked to gain the support of the Japanese without breaking his ties with the Allies. Chiang continued to play one side off against the other, while waiting for a definite outcome to the war.
[11] [505] Published in 1974 after China’s turn towards the United States, with the title Lost chances in China. The World War II despatches of John S. Service, JW Esherick (editor), Vintage Books, 1974.
Hundreds of thousands of workers on strike. Public transport completely paralyzed. A strike spreading throughout the public sector: railways first, then the metro and buses, followed by the post office, electricity production and distribution, gas distribution, telecommunications, education, the health service. Some branches of private industry also involved in the struggle, like the miners who violently confront the police. Demonstrations that gather ever growing numbers from different sectors: on 7th December, about one million workers in the main French cities answered the call of various unions[1] to demonstrate against the Juppe plan[2]. On 12th December, there were 2 million.
The movement of workers' strikes and demonstrations unfolds against a background of student agitation, with the latter taking part in some of the workers' demonstrations and mass meetings. References to May 1968 are more and more frequent in the media, which do not hesitate to draw a parallel: a widespread feeling of exasperation, the students in the streets, and the spreading strikes.
Are we in the midst of a new social movement comparable to that of May 68, which started off the first international wave of class struggle after 50 years of counter-revolution? Nothing of the sort. In reality, the French proletariat is the target of a massive maneuver aimed at weakening its consciousness and combativity; a maneuver, moreover, which is also aimed at the working class in other countries, designed at making it draw the wrong lessons from the events in France. This is why the bourgeoisie in France and elsewhere has made sure that there events have been widely reported, whereas the opposite is the case when the working class struggles on its own initiative and its own terrain.
The bourgeoisie is using and reinforcing the difficulties of the working class
The events of May 68 in France were marked by a whole series of strikes, whose major characteristic was a tendency to overflow, or even to confront the trades unions. The situation is nothing like that today, in France or anywhere else.
It is true that the extent and generalization of attacks directed against the working class since the beginning of the 1990s tends to arouse its combativity, as we pointed out in the Resolution on the International Situation, adopted at our 11th International Congress:
"The massive movements in Italy in the autumn of 92, those in Germany in 93 and many others showed the huge potential combativity growing in the workers' ranks. Since then, this combativity has expressed itself slowly, with long moments of quiet; but it has not been refuted. The massive mobilizations in Italy in the autumn of 94, the series of strikes in the public sector in France in the spring of 95, are expressions, among others, of this combativity", (International Review no.82)
However, the development of this combativity is still profoundly marked by the retreat that the working class suffered after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and the unleashing of all the campaigns on the "death of communism". This retreat was the worst since the historic recovery of class struggle in 1968: "[The workers' struggles in recent years] are also testimony to the enormous difficulties which it is encountering on this path, owing to the breadth and depth of the reflux. The workers struggles are developing in a sinuous, jagged manner full of advances and retreats".
Everywhere, the working class faces a bourgeoisie on the offensive politically in order to weaken its ability to counter-attack, and to overcome the deep reflux in its class consciousness. And in the front line of this offensive, are the unions:
"However, the unions' present maneuvers have also, and above all, a preventive aim: that of strengthening their hold on the workers before the latter display a lot more combativity, a combativity which will necessarily result from their growing anger faced with the increasingly brutal attacks demanded by the crisis (...) the recent strikes in France, in fact union days of action, have been a success for the latter".
For several months, the working class internationally has been subjected to a veritable bombardment. Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Spain are only the latest examples. In France, the bourgeoisie has not dared to deal such a blow to the workers since the first Delors plan in 1983: an increase in VAT (a sales tax, ie a tax on consumption which of course means a rise in prices), in income tax, and in the daily charge for hospital care, a wage freeze for state employees, a diminution in pensions, and an increase in the number of years that must be worked in order to benefit from a pension; at the same time, the bourgeoisie's official figures are beginning to reveal a new rise in unemployment. As in other countries, the French bourgeoisie is facing an increasingly serious world capitalist crisis, which forces it into more and more violent attacks on proletarian living conditions. And it is all the more vital for the French bourgeoisie, coming after the years where the left, with Mitterrand and the SP, were in government, which left the social front largely unguarded, and compelled the bourgeoisie to observe a certain caution in its attacks on the workers.
Such an avalanche of attacks could only nourish the workers' combativity, which has already found expression at different times and in different countries: Sweden, France, Belgium, Spain ...
And indeed, the workers cannot remain passive. They have no way out, other than to defend themselves in struggle. But to prevent the working class from entering the combat with its own weapons, the bourgeoisie has taken the lead, and has pushed the workers into a premature struggle, completely under the control of the unions. It has not left the workers time to mobilize at their own rhythm and with their own methods: mass meetings, discussion, participation in other workers' meetings, the strike if the balance of forces is favorable, the election of strike committees, sending delegations to other workers involved in the struggle.
Thus although the recent strike movement in France reveals a deep discontent within the working class, it is above all the result of a maneuver on a very large scale by the bourgeoisie, aimed at leading the workers into a massive defeat, and above all at creating a profound disorientation in their ranks.
A trap for the workers
The bourgeoisie maneuvered masterfully to set its trap, creating an extremely effective cooperation among its different fractions: the right, the left, the media, and the unions, with their radical rank and file made up essentially of militants of the far left.
In the first place, to start the ball roIling, the bourgeoisie had to push one sector of the working class to strike. Although a real discontent was developing within the class in France, aggravated by the recent attacks on the Social Security, it was not yet at the point where it would provoke a massive entry into struggle by the most decisive sectors, especially the industrial ones. This worked in the bourgeoisie's favor, since it could provoke one sector to strike without any risk of the others following spontaneously and escaping from union control. The "chosen" sector was the train drivers. The "contract plan" announced for the national railways (SNCF) threatened the drivers with an extra eight years work before retirement, on the pretext that they were more "privileged" from this point of view than other state employees. This was so gross that the workers did not even stop to think before launching themselves into the conflict. This was precisely what the bourgeoisie wanted: they plunged headfirst into the control prepared by the unions. Within 24 hours, the drivers on the Paris buses and metro, threatened with the loss of similar benefits, were drawn into the same kind of trap. The unions did everything they could to get the strike started, whereas many workers remained perplexed at their haste. The management of the RATP (Paris public transport network) came to the unions' rescue, by closing down some lines and doing everything possible to prevent those who wanted to work from doing so.
Why did the bourgeoisie choose these two categories of workers to engage its maneuver?
Firstly, both categories do indeed have special contractual arrangements, whose modification was a ready-made pretext for unleashing an attack aimed explicitly at them. But most important was the guarantee that once the workers on the railways, metro, and buses came out, the entire public transport system would be paralyzed. Apart from the fact that no worker could fail to notice the event, this gave the bourgeoisie a further, and highly effective means of keeping the movement under control, since the aim was to spread the strike to other branches of the public sector. Without public transport, virtually the only way for workers to get to the demonstrations was to use the coaches laid on by the unions. It became impossible to send massive delegations to meet other striking workers in their own mass meetings. Finally, the transport strike is also a means of dividing workers by setting those who were confronting enormous difficulties in getting to work, against those on strike.
However, the rail workers were not just a means of the maneuver, they were also one of its targets. The bourgeoisie was aware of the advantage to be gained by exhausting and confusing the consciousness of this sector of the working class, which had demonstrated in December 1986 its ability to confront the unions' control in order to engage the struggle.
Once these two sectors were on strike, completely under union control, the next phase of the maneuver could be set in motion: the strike in a traditionally advanced and combative fraction of the working class, the post office, and especially the sorting offices. During the 1980s, the latter had often resisted the unions' traps, confronting the latter without hesitation. By incorporating this sector in the "movement", the bourgeoisie aimed to trammel it in the meshes of the maneuver, and inflict on it the same defeat as on other sectors. Moreover, the maneuver would gain in credibility amongst other sectors not yet on strike, by diminishing any distrust or skepticism about it. Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie had to approach this sector with more finesse than it had used on the railway or metro workers. It thus encouraged and organized "workers' delegations", with no outward signs of union membership (and probably made up of sincere workers deceived by the rank-and-file unionists), who came to mass meetings in the sorting offices, to call on their workers to join the strike. Deceived as to the real significance of these delegations, the workers of the main sorting offices let themselves be drawn into the struggle. To give the event maximum media impact, the bourgeoisie dispatched its journalists to the scene, and it was on the front page of Le Monde's evening edition that very day.
At this stage of the maneuver, its size gave the unions a further argument to involve new sectors: workers in the electricity, gas, and telecommunications industries, as well as the teachers. When some workers hesitated to "struggle now", and insisted on first discussing the methods of struggle and their demands, the unions were peremptory in insisting that "we've got to go for it now", and imposing a feeling of guilt on those not yet in the struggle: "we're the last ones not to have joined the strike".
To increase the number of strikers still further, it was necessary to give the impression of a vast, deep-rooted, and developing social movement. To listen to the left, the leftists, and the unions, the movement even provoked an immense hope throughout the working class. In this they were supported by the media's daily publication of the strike's "popularity index", which was always in favor, throughout the "population". It is true that the strike was "popular", and that many workers saw it as a means to prevent the government from pushing through its attacks. But the solicitude of the media, and above all of the TV, is a sure sign that this was just what the bourgeoisie intended.
The students were also used, unwittingly, as part of the show. They were led out into the streets to give the impression of a general rise in discontent, and of a similarity with the events of May 68. At the same time, they were used to drown the workers' demands with the inter-classist demands that are characteristic of students. They were even to be found, with the unions' blessing, in mass meetings in the workplace, "to join the workers' struggle"[3].
The working class, deprived of any initiative, had no alternative but to follow the unions. In the mass meetings called by the unions, the latter's insistence that workers should express themselves had no purpose other than to give a pretense of life to meetings where everything had already been decided elsewhere. Within the assemblies, there was such pressure to join the strike that many workers, dubious to say the least about the nature of the strike, dared not speak out. Others were completely taken in by the euphoria of an artificial unity. In fact, one of the keys' to this maneuver's success was the way in which the unions systematically adopted the working class' aspirations and methods of struggle, only to empty them and turn them against the workers:
- the need to react massively, in closed ranks, against the bourgeoisie's attacks'
- spreading the strike to several sectors, going beyond the boundaries of corporatism;
- daily mass meetings in every workplace, with the responsibility, in particular, of deciding on whether to join or to continue the movement;
- the organization of street demonstrations where masses of workers, from different sectors and different workplaces, can gain a feeling of solidarity and strength[4].
The unions also took care, for most of the movement, to make a show of unity. The media made much of the handshake between the leaders of the two traditionally antagonistic unions: the CGT and FO (which was formed during the Cold War after a split from the CGT, supported by the American trades unions). This trade union "unity", often found on demonstrations in the joint CGT-FO-CFDT-FSU banners, was a means to draw the largest possible number of workers into the strike; for years, the unions' endless bickering had been precisely one of the main reasons for their loss of credibility and for the workers' refusal to follow their slogans. The Trotskyists made their own little contribution in this domain, since they clamored endlessly for union unity, making it almost a precondition for the development of the struggle.
As for the right in power, after an initial display of determination, it pre-all the necessary publicity by the media), giving the impression that the strikers could win, force the withdrawal of the Juppe plan and even - why not? - the downfall of the government. In fact, the government dragged things out, knowing very well that workers who have fought a long strike are not disposed to return to work for nothing. Only after three weeks did it announce the withdrawal of some of the measures which had sparked off the explosion: the "contract plan" on the railways and, more generally, the measures concerning state employees' pensions. However, the essential elements of its policy remained: tax increases, wage freeze for state employees, and above all the attacks on social security.
The unions and the left parties immediately shouted victory, and thereafter set to getting the strikers back to work. They went about it so skillfully that they did not unmask themselves: their tactic consisted in allowing those assemblies in favor of a return to work express themselves freely. The unions trumpeted the railway workers' "victory", and it was the railway workers who, on Friday 15th December, gave the signal for the return to work, just as they had given the signal for the strike. The TV repeated over and over its pictures of the first trains to run again. On Saturday, the unions organized enormous demonstrations which the workers in private industry were urged to join. The movement was buried in great pomp, with a final wave of the flag to sugar the bitter pill of defeat on the workers' most important demands. In depot after depot, the railwaymen voted to end the strike. In the other sectors, this impetus combined with a general fatigue did the rest. By Monday, the return to work was almost complete. On Tuesday, the CGT organized, alone, a day of action and demonstrations: the mobilization was pitiful compared with that of previous weeks, which could only convince the remaining "die-hards" that the time had come to end the strike. On Thursday 21st, a "summit" and unions, which gave the unions the opportunity to denounce the government's proposals, and put themselves forward as "defenders of the workers".
A political attack against the working class
The ruling class has just succeeded in putting over a major attack - the Juppe plan - and exhausting the workers in order to reduce their ability to respond to more attacks in the future.
But the bourgeoisie's ambitions go much further. The way in which the maneuver was organized was designed not only to ensure that the workers would learn no lessons for future struggles from this defeat, but above all to render them vulnerable to the poisoned messages it wants to put over.
The bourgeoisie has provoked the most important mobilization for years, as far as the number of strikers and demonstrators is concerned, and the unions were clearly its architect. All this is designed to give weight to the idea that it is possible to achieve something with the unions. And this idea is lent all the more credit in that throughout the struggle, the unions were never in danger of being unmasked, even partially, as has been the case when they have had to break a spontaneous class movement. Their strategy even took account of the fact that although the majority of the class might follow them, fundamentally it does not trust them. This is why they were so careful to ensure the visible "participation" of non-unionized workers (either the sincere and naive, or the unions' own agents) in the various "organs of struggle", such as the self-proclaimed "strike committees". Thus, just as the maneuver will strengthen the unions' grip on the working class, so will it also diminish for some time to come the workers' confidence in their own strength, in other words in their ability to enter the struggle of their own accord, and to take charge of it themselves. This renewed credibility of the unions was one of the bourgeoisie's fundamental objectives, a vital precondition for dealing blows still more brutal than today's. Only on this condition can it hope to sabotage the struggles which will certainly surge up against these new attacks. It is certainly one of the most important aspects of the political defeat that the bourgeoisie has inflicted on the working class.
Another beneficiary of the maneuver, within the bourgeoisie itself, is the left of capital. The French presidential elections of May 1995 have placed all the forces of the left in opposition. None of them have been directly involved in deciding the present attacks. They have had their hands free to denounce the attacks, and to make workers forget that they themselves - the CP and the SP together have conducted the same anti-working class policy. The maneuver has thus strengthened the policy of the division of labor between the right in power and the left in opposition with the role of mystifying the proletariat, of controlling and sabotaging its struggles, especially through the trades unions.
Another of the bourgeoisie's prime objectives, on the basis of the defeat of a struggle that spread to different sectors, is to make the workers believe that there is no point in extending the struggle. There are large fractions of the working class which think that they have succeeded in extending the struggle to different sectors[5], in other words that they have achieved the tendency of workers' struggles since 1968, and until the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The bourgeoisie even relied on these gains of the struggle since 1968 to draw the sorting office workers into the struggle, as we can see from the arguments used by the unions to persuade them to walk out: "In 1974, the postal workers were defeated because they remained isolated. Just like the railwaymen in 1986, because they did not succeed in spreading their movement. Today, we have to seize the chance that is offered". It was these gains that the maneuver aimed to eradicate.
It is still too early to judge the impact of this aspect of the maneuver (whereas there is no doubt about the unions' renewed credibility). But it is clear that the workers' confusion is likely to be increased by the fact that the railway workers at least have won on the demand that started their struggle, following the withdrawal of the "company plan", and the attacks on pension rights. The illusion that it is possible to win something by struggling alone in one sector will thus develop, and provide a powerful stimulus to the growth of sectoralism. Not to mention the division created in the workers' ranks by the fact that those who followed the railwaymen into the struggle, and have won nothing at all, will feel betrayed.
At this level, there are important similarities with another maneuver: the one used in the health workers' struggle in autumn 1988. Then, it was designed to defuse a rise in combativity throughout the class, by provoking a premature struggle in a specific sector: the nurses. The latter were organized in an ultra-sectoralist coordination, prefabricated by the bourgeoisie to take the place of the discredited unions, and at the end of the struggle were granted a certain number of wage increases (the government had set aside a billion francs for precisely this even before the strike began). The other hospital workers, who had entered the strike at the same time as the nurses, got nothing. In other sectors, the combativity fell back as a result of the workers' disarray in the face of the nurses' elitism and sectoralism.
Finally, by invoking so persistently the supposed similarities with the movement of May 1968, the bourgeoisie hoped, as we have said, to involve as many workers as possible in the maneuver. But it was also a means to attack the workers' class consciousness. For millions of workers, May 68 is still a reference point, even for those who were too young to take part, or were not even born, or lived in other countries but nonetheless were fired with enthusiasm at this first sign of the proletariat's resurgence on its class terrain after forty years of counter-revolution. Those generations of workers, or fractions of the working class, who did not take a direct part in the events of 68, and who are more vulnerable to ideological intoxication around this theme, were a special target for the bourgeoisie, which aimed to give them the impression that there was not much difference between May 68 and today's union controlled strike. This is therefore yet another attack on the very identity of the working class; not as profound as the campaigns on "the death of communism", but a further obstacle on the road to recovery from the reflux that followed the collapse of the Eastern bloc.
The real lessons to be drawn from these events
Tragically, the first lesson that the ICC drew from nurses' struggle in 1988[6] remains true today: "it is important to emphasize the bourgeoisie's ability to take preventive action, and in particular to provoke premature social movements at a time when the proletariat as a whole is still not mature enough to achieve a real mobilization. This tactic has been used often in the past by the ruling class, in particular in situations where the stakes were far higher than in the present period. The most striking example is that of January 1919, when the Berlin workers answered a deliberate provocation by the social-democratic government by launching an uprising, despite the fact that workers in the provinces were not yet ready for insurrection. The massacre of workers which followed (as well as the murder of the German Communist Party's two main leaders: Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht) dealt a fatal blow to the revolution in Germany, where the working class was finally defeated piecemeal".
Faced with such a danger, it is vital that the working class should learn the lessons of its experience as widely as possible, both at the historic level, and at the level of its struggles during the last decade.
Another important lesson is that the class struggle is a major preoccupation for the international bourgeoisie, and as its reaction to the struggle in Poland during 1980 has shown us, at this level it can put its divisions to one side. A blackout is imposed on movements that take place on a class terrain and run the risk of drawing other workers in their wake, whereas the spotlight is turned on the results of successful maneuvers against the working class, from one country to the next. We can have no illusions that the unleashing of trade wars and imperialist rivalries will prove any barrier to the bourgeoisie's international unity against the class struggle.
The recent strikes in France also show that the extension of the struggle in the hands of the unions is a weapon of the bourgeoisie. The wider the extension, the worse the defeat for the workers. Here again, it is vital that the workers learn to detect the traps of the bourgeoisie. Whenever the unions call for extension, it is either to stick with the movement as it develops, so as not to lose control of it, or to drag as many workers as possible to defeat when the movement enters a downturn. This is what they did with the rail workers in France at the beginning of 1987, when they called for the movement to "spread" and "harden", not as the movement was on the rise (when they actively opposed any extension), but during its decline, with the aim of drawing as many sectors of the working class as possible into the rail workers' defeat. These two situations highlight the absolute necessity for the workers to control their struggle, from beginning to end. Their sovereign general assemblies must take charge of spreading the struggle if it is not to fall into the hands of the unions. Obviously, the latter will not give up without a fight. The confrontation with the unions must be fought out in broad daylight, in general assemblies that elect their own revocable delegates, instead of being mere gatherings manipulated at will by the unions, as has been the case in the present wave of strikes.
But to take charge of their struggle, the workers must necessarily centralize all their assemblies, by sending delegates to a central assembly, which in turn elects a central struggle committee. It is this assembly's job to guarantee the permanent unity of the class, and which makes it possible to coordinate the struggle's action: whether a strike should be declared for such-and-such a day; which sectors should come out, etc. It is also the central assembly which must decide the return to work, and the retreat in good order when the immediate balance of forces makes this necessary. There is nothing abstract about this. The Russian workers created just such an organ - the Soviet - in 1905, then in 1917 during the Revolution. The centralization of the struggle by the Soviet was a vital lesson of the century's first revolutionary movement, which workers will have to reappropriate in their future struggles. This is what Trotsky had to say about them in his book, 1905:
"What was the soviet of workers' deputies? The soviet came into being as a response to an objective need - a need born of the course of events. It was an organization which was authoritative and yet had no traditions; which could immediately involve a scattered mass of hundreds of thousands of people while having virtually no organizational machinery; which united the revolutionary currents within the proletariat; which was capable of initiative and spontaneous self-control - and most important of all which could be brought out from underground within 24 hours (...) In order to have authority in the eyes of the masses on the very day it came into being, such an organization had to be based on the broadest representation. How was this to be achieved? The answer came of its own accord. Since the production process was the sole link between the proletarian masses who, in the organizational sense, were still quite inexperienced, representation had to be adapted to the factories and businesses"[7].
Although the first example of such living centralization of a class movement comes to us from a revolutionary period, this does not mean that it is only in such a period that the working class can centralize its struggle. The mass strike of Polish workers in 1980, while it did not produce soviets, which are organs for the seizure of power, nonetheless has given us a magnificent example. Very quickly, from the outset of the strike, general assemblies sent their delegates (in general, two for each company) to a central assembly for an entire region, the MKS. This assembly would meet daily in the premises of the leading company - the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk - and the delegates would then return to give an account of the discussions to the assemblies which had elected them, and which would then take position on these deliberations. In a country where previous class struggles had been mercilessly drowned in blood, the movement's strength paralyzed the bloody hand of the government, and forced it to come and negotiate with the MKS on the latter's home ground. Of course, the Polish workers in 1980 were able to adopt this organizational form because the official unions were completely discredited by their role as guardians of the Stalinist state (and the workers were crushed in blood in December 1981 only thanks to the formation of the "independent" union Solidarnosc). This is the best possible proof, not only that the unions are not even an imperfect organization of the workers' struggle, but on the contrary, as long as they are able to sow illusions, are the greatest obstacle to a real organization of the struggle. Their presence and action blocks the class' spontaneous movement towards a self-organization born of the needs of the struggle itself.
Obviously, the weight of trade unionism within the central capitalist countries means that the class' next struggles will not take the form of the MKS, still less of the soviets. Nonetheless, these must serve as a reference-point and a guide, and the workers will have to fight for their general assemblies to be really sovereign, and allow the extension, control and centralization of the movement by the workers themselves.
In fact, the next struggles of the working class, for some time to come, will be marked by the effects of the reflux, which the bourgeoisie will exploit with all sorts of maneuvers. Faced with this difficult situation, which still does not put in question the perspective of decisive class confrontations between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the intervention of revolutionaries is irreplaceable. For it to be as effective as possible, and not to aid, even unwittingly, the bourgeoisie's plans, revolutionaries in their analyses and slogans must leave not the slightest opening to the dominant ideology, and must be the first to discern and denounce the maneuvers of the class enemy.
The size of the maneuver set up by the French bourgeoisie, and especially the fact that it has gone so far as to provoke massive strikes which can only help to aggravate its economic problems, is an indication in itself that the working class and its struggle have not disappeared, contrary to all the assertions of the hired academic "experts". It shows that the ruling class knows perfectly well that the increasingly brutal attacks which it will have to unleash will necessarily provoke massive struggles in response. While it has scored a point today, and won a political victory, the battle is far from over. The bourgeoisie, in particular, cannot prevent the increasing collapse of its economic system, or the loss of credibility by the unions, as was the case during the 1980s, the more they sabotaged the workers' struggles. But the working class will only win if it is able to understand fully its enemy's ability, even on the basis of a moribund system, to lay the most subtle and sophisticated obstacles in its path.
BN, 23rd December 1995
[1] The Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), transmission belt for the French "Communist" Party; the "social-democratic" Force Ouvriere (FO); the main teachers' union, the Federation de l'Education Nationale (FEN), close to the Socialist Party; the FSU, closer to the CP and the leftists, which split from the FEN a few years ago.
[2] Named after the Prime Minister called on to put it in motion. Amongst other things, this plan includes a whole series of attacks on Social Security and health insurance.
[3] It is worth noting that in 1968, the unions systematically barred entry to the factories, in order to prevent any contact between workers and students. It is true that, at the time, it was the students that talked most of "revolution", and above all that denounced most strongly the left parties (SP and CP). There was no danger then of the working class taking up the idea of revolution: it was only taking its first steps in struggle after four decades of counter-revolution. Moreover, the idea itself was singularly vague in the minds of the students, who gave it the kind of petty-bourgeois significance characteristic of their "movement". What the unions feared more than anything, was a still greater difficulty in controlling a movement which had begun independently, and which had surprised the entire ruling class.
[4] In his own way, Prime Minister Juppe helped swell the demonstrations by declaring, when announcing his plan, that the government would not survive if 2 million people came out on the streets: after each day of demonstrations, the unions and the media would count the numbers, to show that the figure could be reached. Some sections of the ruling class, including abroad, made believe that Juppe's declaration was a "blunder". In the same way, they reproached him for his "clumsiness" in launching all his attacks at the same moment:
"The strike movements are in large pan due to the fact that the government has behaved clumsily in trying to get all its reforms through at once" (The Wall Street Journal). He was also accused of arrogance: "Public anger is largely directed against Alain Juppe's autocratic style of government (...) This is as much a revolt against the arrogance of Gaullismas against budget rigor" (The Guardian). In reality, Juppe's "clumsiness" and "arrogance" were an important part of the provocation: the right in government was using the most effective means to increase the workers' anger and to make the unions' play easier.
[5] This was expressed clearly by one engine driver: "I joined the fight as a driver. Next day, I considered myself first and foremost a railwayman. Then I took on the pan of a state employee. Now, I just consider myself as a wage earner, just like those in the private sector whom I would like to rally to the cause ... If I were to stop tomorrow, I could never look a postman in the face again" (reported in Le Monde, l2/13th December).
[6] See the article on "The coordinations in the vanguard of sabotaging the struggle" International Review no. 56, and our French-language pamphlet on the nurses' struggle.
[7] See our article on "The Lessons of the 1905 Revolution" in International Review no 43.
Alongside the struggle of Bolshevism against Menshevism at the beginning of this century, the clash between marxism and anarchism within the 1st International is probably the most famous example of the defense of proletarian organizational principles in the history of the workers' movement. It is essential for revolutionaries today, separated from the living organizational history of their own class through half a century of Stalinist counter-revolution, to reappropriate the lessons of this experience. This first article will concentrate on the pre-history of this confrontation, showing how Bakunin came to the concept of taking over the leadership of the workers' movement by means of a secret organization under his own personal control. We will show how this concept led necessarily to Bakunin's manipulation by the ruling class with the aim of destroying the International. And we will demonstrate Bakunin's fundamentally anti-proletarian roots precisely at the organizational level.
The second article will then deal with the struggle which took place within the International itself, showing the radical opposition on the concept of functioning and of militantism between the marxist proletarian and the anarchist petty-bourgeois and déclassé viewpoints.
The historical significance of marxism's struggle against organizational anarchism
The 1st International has gone down in history above all because of the struggle between Marx and Bakunin, which at the Hague Congress in 1872 reached its first conclusion with the exclusion of Bakunin and his right hand man Guillaume. But what bourgeois historians present as a clash of personalities, and the anarchists as a fight between "authoritarian" and "libertarian" versions of socialism, was in reality a struggle of the entire International against those who trampled on its statutes. Bakunin and Guillaume were excluded in The Hague, because they had constructed a secret "brotherhood" within the International, an organization within the organization with its own structures and statutes. This organization, the so-called "Alliance of Socialist Democracy" existed and acted in hiding, with the goal of tearing the International out of the hands of its members and placing it under the control of Bakunin.
A deadly struggle between different organizational visions
The struggle which took place within the International was thus not between "authority and freedom" but rather between two completely opposed and hostile organizational principles.
1) On the one hand there was the position most determinedly defended by Marx and Engels, but which was that of the General Council as a whole and of the vast majority of members, according to which a proletarian organization cannot depend on the will of individuals, on the whims of "leading comrades", but has to function according to binding rules agreed on by all and binding for all, called statutes. These statutes have to guarantee the unitary, centralized, collective character of such an organization, ensuring an open, disciplined form of political debate and decision-making involving all its members. Whoever disagrees with the decisions of the organization, or no longer agrees with points of the statutes etc, has not only the possibility but the duty to present his or her critique openly in front of the whole organization, but within the framework designed for this purpose. This view of the organization, which the International Workingmen's Association developed for itself, corresponded to the collective, unitary, revolutionary character of the proletariat.
2) On the other hand Bakunin represented the elitist, petty-bourgeois vision of "brilliant leaders" whose extraordinary political clarity and determination is supposed to guarantee the revolutionary "passion" and trajectory. This leadership thus considers itself to be "morally justified" in collecting and organizing its disciples behind the back of the organization, in order to achieve control of the organization and assure the fulfillment of its historic mission. Since the membership as a whole is considered to be too stupid to be able to grasp the necessity of such revolutionary messiahs, they have to be brought to do what is "good for them" without them being aware of it, even against their will. The statutes, the sovereign decisions of congresses or elected bodies, are there for the others, but are only in the way of the elite.
This was the point of view of Bakunin. Before he joined the IWA, he explained to his disciples why the International was not a revolutionary organization, the Proudhonists having become reformist, the Blanquists old, the Germans and the General Council which they allegedly dominated being "authoritarian". It is striking how Bakunin considered the International to be the sum of its parts. What was above all lacking, according to Bakunin, was "revolutionary will". It was this which the Alliance intended to provide, by walking roughshod over the International's program and statutes and deceiving its members.
For Bakunin, the organization which the proletariat had constructed through years of hard work was worth nothing. What were everything to him were the conspiratorial sects which he himself created and controlled. It was not the class organisation which interested him, but his own personal status and reputation, his anarchist "freedom" or what is today known as "self realization". For Bakunin and his like the workers' movement was nothing but a vehicle for the realization of his own individual, individualist plans.
Without revolutionary organization, no revolutionary workers' movement
Marx and Engels, on the contrary, knew what the construction of the organization means for the proletariat. Whereas the history books believe that the conflict between Marx and Bakunin was essentially of a general political nature, the real history of the International reveals above all a struggle for the organization. Something which appears to be quite a boring affair to bourgeois historians. For us, on the contrary, its something excitingly important and full of lessons. What Marx shows us is that without proletarian organization there can be neither a revolutionary class movement nor a revolutionary theory.
And indeed, the idea that organizational solidity, development and growth are the prerequisites for the programmatic unfolding of the workers' movement, lies at the very heart of Marx and Engels' entire political activity[1]. The founders of scientific socialism knew only too well that proletarian class consciousness cannot be the product of individuals, but requires a collective, organized framework. This is why the construction of the revolutionary organization is one of the most important, if also one of the most difficult tasks of the revolutionary proletariat.
The struggle over the Statutes
Nowhere did Marx and Engels struggle with such determination, and as fruitfully, for this understanding as in the ranks of the 1st International. Founded in 1864, the International appeared at a time when the organized workers' movement was still mainly dominated by petty-bourgeois and reformist ideologies and sects. The International Workingmen's Association was in the first instance made up of these different tendencies. The opportunist representatives of the English trade unions, the petty-bourgeois reformist Proudhonism of the Latin countries, conspiratorial Blanquism, and in Germany the sect dominated by Lassalle, played a leading role within it. Although the different programs and world views clashed with each other, revolutionaries at that time were under enormous pressure for regroupment, from a working class clamoring for its unity. During the first meeting in London hardly anybody had the least idea how this unification was supposed to take place. In this situation the truly proletarian elements, with Marx at their head, pleaded for temporary postponement of the programmatic clarification between the different groupings. The revolutionaries' long years of political experience, and the international wave of struggle of the whole class should be used above all to forge a unitary organization. The international unity of this organization, embodied through the central organs, especially the General Council, and through the statutes, which had to be accepted by all members, would enable the International step by step to clarify the political divergences and achieve a unified point of view. This large scale regroupment had a chance of success as long as the international class struggle was still on the rise.
Marxism's most decisive contribution to the foundation of the 1st International lay therefore clearly at the level of the organizational question. The different sects present at the founding meeting were not able to concretize the will to international ties which the English and French workers above all had called for. The bourgeois Atto di Fratellanza, the followers of Mazzini, wanted to impose the conspiratorial statutes of a secret sect. The "inaugural address" and the statutes, which Marx, commissioned by the organizational committee, then presented, defended the proletarian and unitary character of the organization, and laid the indispensable basis for the further work of clarification. The International's ability to go further in overcoming utopian, petty-bourgeois, sectarian and conspiratorial visions, was in the first instance due to the fact that its different currents, in a more or less disciplined manner, abided by the common rules.
Amongst these different currents, the Bakuninists' specificity lay in their refusal to respect the statutes. That is why it was the Bakuninist Alliance which came close to destroying the first international party of the proletariat. The struggle against the Alliance has gone down in history as the great confrontation between marxism and anarchism. That was certainly the case. But at the heart of this confrontation were not general political questions such as the relation to the state, but organizational principles.
The Proudhonists, for example, shared many of Bakunin's views. But they were in favor of the clarification of their positions according to the rules of the organization. They also believed that the statutes of the organization should be respected by all members without exception. That is why in particular the Belgian "collectivists" were able to approach marxism on some important questions. Their best known spokesman, De Paepe, was a principled opponent of the kind of secret organization considered necessary by Bakunin.
Bakunin's secret Brotherhood
Precisely this question was at the center of the International's struggle against Bakunin. It is a fact which anarchist historians also accept, that Bakunin, when he joined the IWA in 1869, had a secret fraternity at his disposal, with which he wanted to seize control of the International.
"We are confronted here with a society, which behind the mask of extreme anarchism directs its attacks, not against the existing governments, but against the revolutionaries who do not submit to its orthodoxy and its leadership. Founded by the minority of a bourgeois congress, its members crept into the ranks of the international organizations of the working class, first of all trying to take over its leadership, and working towards its disorganization as soon as they saw that this plan had failed. In the most shameless manner they tried to slip in their own sectarian program and their limited ideas in place of the global program, the great efforts of our organization; it organizes in the public sections of the international its own little secret sections, which, obeying the same slogans, through common action agreed on in advance, in many cases has succeeded in getting control of them; they publically attack in their papers all those who refuse to submit to their leadership; they provoke open war - those are their own words - in our ranks".
These are the words of the report on "A Plot against the International Workingmen's Association" which Marx and Engels were commissioned to write by the Hague Congress of 1872 (Marx-Engels-Werke, Volume 18 Page 333).
The struggle of Bakunin and his supporters against the International was both the product of the specific historic situation at that time, and of more general factors still existing today. At the basis of his activities lay the infiltration of petty-bourgeois individualism and factionalism, incapable of submitting to the will and discipline of the organization. To this was added the conspiratorial attitude of the declasse Bohemian, who cannot do without maneuvers and plots in favor of his own personal goals. The workers' movement has always been confronted with such behavior, since the organization cannot completely shield itself from the influence of other social classes. On the other hand, Bakunin's plot took on the concrete historical form of the secret organization, something which also belonged to the past of the workers' movement of that time. We will have to look at the concrete history of Bakunin, in order also to be able to understand what is more generally valid, what is important for us to understand today.
Bakuninism opposed to the proletariat's break with petty-bourgeois sectarianism
The foundation of the International, signaling the end of the period of counter revolution after 1849, provoked the strongest (according to Marx even exaggerated) reactions of fear and hatred among the ruling classes: the remains of the feudal aristocracy and above all the bourgeoisie as the direct and historic opponent of the proletariat. Spies and agents provocateurs were sent to infiltrate its ranks. Coordinated, often hysterical slander campaigns were whipped up against it in the press. Its activities were wherever possible harassed and repressed by the police. Members were put on trial and in prison. But the ineffectiveness of these measures soon became clear as long as the class struggle and revolutionary movements were on the rise. It was not until the defeat of the Paris Commune 1871 that disarray in the ranks of the association began to get the upper hand.
What alarmed the bourgeoisie most, apart from the international unification of its enemy, was the rise of marxism and the fact that the workers' movement was abandoning the sectarian forms of clandestine organization and becoming a mass movement. The bourgeoisie felt much safer as long as the revolutionary workers' movement took the form of closed sectarian secret groupings around a single leading figure, representing some utopian scheme or plot, more or less completely isolated from the proletariat as a whole. Such sects were much more easily observed, infiltrated, misused and manipulated than a mass organization finding its main strength and security in its anchorage in the working class as a whole. For the bourgeoisie, it was above all the perspective of revolutionary socialist activity towards the proletariat as a class, something the utopian and conspiratorial sects of the prior period could never assume, which posed a danger for its very class domination. The link between socialism and class struggle, between the Communist Manifesto and large strike movements, between the political and the economic aspects of the class struggle of the proletriat - this was what caused the bourgeoisie so many sleepless nights from 1864 on. This was what explains the almost unbelievable savagery with which it slaughtered the Paris Commune, and the force of the international solidarity of all fractions of the exploiting classes with this massacre.
Thus, one of the main themes of bourgeois propaganda against the International was the accusation that in reality a powerful secret organization was behind it, and that the latter was conspiring to bring down the ruling order. Behind this propaganda, which also was an additional excuse for repressive measures, was above all the attempt of the bourgeoisie to convince the workers that what it still feared most were the secret conspirators and not its mass movement. It's clear that the exploiters did all they could to encourage the different sects and conspirers still active in the workers' movement to exert themselves at the expense of marxism and of the mass movement. In Germany Bismarck encouraged the Lassallean sect in its resistance to the strike movements of the class and to the marxist traditions of the Communist League. In France the press, but also the agents provocateurs, tried to whip up the ever present suspicion of the conspiratorial Blanquists against the mass activity of the International. In the Latin and Slavic countries a hysterical press campaign was whipped up against the alleged "German domination" of the International by the "authoritarian state-worshipping marxists".
But it was above all Bakuninism which felt encouraged by this propaganda. Before 1864, Bakunin had, despite himself, at least partly recognized the superiority of marxism over his own petty-bourgeois putschist version of revolutionary socialism. Since the rise of the International, and with it of the bourgeois political onslaught against it, Bakunin felt confirmed and strengthened in his suspicion towards marxism and the proletarian movement. In Italy, which had become the center of his activity, the different secret societies, the Carbonari, Mazzini, the Camorra etc. who had begun to denounce the International and combat its influence on the peninsula, acclaimed Bakunin as a "true" revolutionary. There were public declarations advocating that Bakunin take over the leadership of the European revolution. Bakunin's pan-slavism was welcomed as the natural ally of Italy in its struggle against the Austrian occupation forces. As opposed to this it was recalled that Marx considered the unification of Germany more important for the development of the revolution in Europe than the unification of Italy. Both the Italian and the more farsighted parts of the Swiss authorities began benevolently to tolerate the presence of Bakunin, who prior to this had been the victim of the most brutal European wide state repression.
The organizational debates on the question of conspiracy
Michael Bakunin, the son of small gentry, broke with his milieu and his class above all because of this great thirst for personal freedom, something which at that time could be achieved neither in the army, nor in the state bureaucracy nor on a landed estate. Already this motive shows how far away his political career was from the disciplined, collective character of the working class. At that time there was hardly any proletariat in Russia.
When Bakunin, at the beginning of the 1840s, reached Western Europe as a political refugee, with a history of political conspiracy already behind him, the debates within the workers' movement about organizational questions were already in full swing. Especially in France.
At that time the revolutionary workers' movement was mainly organized in the form of secret societies. This form arose not only because the workers' organizations were outlawed, but also because the proletariat, still numerically small and hardly yet separated from petty-bourgeois artisanry, had still not found its own road. As Marx wrote about the situation in France:
"It is a known fact that until 1830 the liberal bourgeoisie was at the head of the conspiracies against the restoration. After the July revolution the republican bourgeoisie took its place; the proletariat, already educated to conspire under the restoration, moved to the foreground to the extent that the republican bourgeoisie was scared off from conspiracy by the futile street battles. The Societe des Saisons, with which Barbes and Blanqui made the Uprising of 1839, was already exclusively proletarian, and so was the Nouvelles Saisons formed after the defeat (...) This conspiracy of course never embraced the great mass of the Paris proletariat" (Extracts from the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Marx-Engels- Werke Vol 7 page 273).
But the proletarian elements did not restrict themselves to this decisive break with the bourgeoisie. They began to question, in practice, the domination of conspiracies and conspirators.
"To the extent that the Parisian proletariat itself came into the foreground as a political party, the conspirators lost their leading position, were broken up, found a dangerous competition in the proletarian secret societies, which were aimed, not at an immediate insurrection, but at the organization and development of the proletariat. Already the Insurrection of 1839 had a decisive proletarian and communist character. After it the splits began, about which the old conspirators complained so much; splits which arose from the needs of the workers to clarify their class interests, and which expressed themselves partly in the old conspiracies themselves, partly in the new propagandistic groupings. The powerful communist agitation which Cabet began soon after 1839, the controversy which arose within the communist party, soon went over the heads of the conspirators. Both Chemu and De la Hodde admit that the communists at the time of the February revolution were far and away the strongest fraction of the proletariat. The conspirators, in order not to lose their influence over the workers (...) had to follow this movement and adopt socialist or communist ideas" (Marx, ibid, Vol7, page 275).
The intermediate conclusion of this process was the Communist League, which not only adopted the Communist Manifesto, but also the first proletarian statutes of a class party freed of all conspiracy.
"The Communist League was thus no conspiratorial society, but rather a society, which went about the organization of the proletarian party in secret, since the German proletariat igni et aqua was publically outlawed from writing, speech and association. When such a society conspires, this takes place only in the sense in which steam and electricity conspire against the status quo" (Marx, "Revelations concerning the Communist Trials in Cologne", Werke Vol.8 P.461)
It was also this question which led to the split of the Willich-Schapper fraction.
"From the Communist League a fraction split off, or was split off, as you wish, which demanded, if not conspiracy, so at least the appearance of conspiracy, and therefore direct alliance with the democratic heroes of the day - the Willich-Schapper fraction" (ibid).
What made these people dissatisfied was the same thing that separated Bakunin from the workers' movement:
"It goes without saying that such a secret society, which aims at the formation of the future oppositional party and not the future government, is of little attraction for individuals who on the one hand hang the theatrical cloak of conspiracy over their own insignificance, and on the other want to satisfy their parochial ambitions on the day of the next revolution, but above all want to appear important, share in the booty of demagogy and be welcomed by the democratic market hawkers" (ibid).
After the defeat of the European revolutions of 1848-49 the League demonstrated one last time how far it had gone beyond the sect. It tried through a regroupment with the Chartists in England and the Blanquists in France, to found a new international organization: the Societe Universelle des Communistes Revolutionnaires. Such an organization was to be governed by statutes applicable internationally to all members, abolishing the division between a secret leadership and a base membership seen as a mass to be manipulated. This project, like the League itself, broke up because of the international retreat of the proletariat after the revolutionary defeat. That is why it was only more than a decade later, with the appearance of a new proletarian wave of struggle and the founding of the International, that this decisive blow against sectarianism could be struck.
First principles of proletarian organization
When Bakunin arrived back in Western Europe from Siberia at the beginning of the 1860s, the first main lessons of the proletariat's organizational struggle had already been drawn, and were available to anyone who wanted to assimilate them. These lessons were acquired in years of bitter experience during which the workers had consistently been used as cannon fodder by the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in its own struggle against feudalism. During this struggle, the proletarian revolutionary elements had separated from the bourgeoisie not only politically but organizationally, developing principles of organization in accordance with their own class nature. The new statutes defined the organization as a united, collective and conscious organism. The separation between the base, composed of workers unaware of the real political life of the organization, and a leadership composed of professional conspirators, was overcome. The new principles of rigorous centralization, including the organization of illegal work, excluded the possibility of a secret organization within the organization or at its head. Whereas the petty bourgeoisie, and above all the radicalized déclassé elements, had justified the necessity of a secret functioning of a part of the organization in relation to the whole as a means of protecting it from the class enemy, the new proletarian understanding showed that precisely this conspiratorial elite led to the infiltration of the class enemy, in particular the political police, into the proletarian ranks. It was above all the Communist League which demonstrated that organizational transparency and solidity is the best protection against destruction through the state.
Marx drew a portrait of the conspirators from Paris before the 1848 revolution which could just as easily be applied to Bakunin. Here we find a clear expression of the critique of the petty-bourgeois nature of sectarianism, which opened the door wide not only to the police but also to the déclassé Bohemian.
"Their wavering existence, dependent in some cases more on luck than on their activity, their life without rules, whose only fixed points of reference are the pubs and wine merchants - the habitual meeting place of the conspirator - their unavoidable acquaintance with all kinds of dubious people, places them in that circle which in Paris is called "Bohemia". This democratic Bohemian of proletarian origin - there is also a democratic Bohemian of bourgeois origin, the democratic dossers and bar props - are either workers who have given up their work and thus become dissolute, or people from the lumpen proletariat, who bring all the dissolute habits of this class into their new existence. One can understand how under these circumstances we find a few jailbirds involved in almost every conspiracy.
The whole life of these professional conspirators expresses the most marked characteristics of the Bohemian. Recruiting officers of conspiracy, they go from one pub to the next, feeling the workers' pulse, picking out their people, cajoling them into their conspiracy, burdening either the society treasury or their new friends with the cost of the inevitable drinks (...) He can at any moment be called to the barricades and fall, at each step the police lay traps for him which can send him to prison or even to the gallows. Such dangers actually comprise the attraction of this craft; the greater the insecurity, the more the conspirator hurries to hold on to the pleasure of the moment. At the same time the habit of danger makes one to the greatest extent indifferent towards life and freedom" (ibid p.273).
It goes without saying that such people "despise most profoundly the more theoretical enlightenment of the workers about their class interests" (p.272)
"The main characteristic in the life of the conspirator is the struggle with the police, to which they have exactly the same relationship as the thief or the prostitute. The police tolerate the conspiracies, and not only as a necessary evil. They tolerate them as easily observed centers (...) The conspirators constantly maintain feelers to the police, they come into collision with them at every moment; they hunt the informers just as the informers hunt them. Spying is one of their main occupations. It is no wonder, therefore, that the small leap from the artisan of conspiracy to paid police spy, facilitated by misery and prison, by threats and promises, is made so often" (ibid, p.274).
This was the understanding at the basis of the statutes of the International, and which worried the bourgeoisie enough to make it openly express its preference for Bakuninism.
The politics of conspiracy: Bakunin in Italy
In order to understand how Bakunin could end up being manipulated by the ruling classes against the International, it is necessary briefly to recall his political trajectory, as well as the situation in Italy after 1864. Anarchist historians are full of praise for Bakunin's "great revolutionary work" in Italy, where he set up a series of secret sects, and attempted to infiltrate and gain influence over different "conspiracies". They generally agree that it was Italy which hoisted Bakunin onto the pedestal of a "pope of revolutionary Europe". But since they carefully avoid going into the details of the reality of this milieu, we will have to go to the trouble here.
Bakunin earned a reputation for himself within the socialist camp through his participation in the revolution of 1848-49 as a military leader in Dresden. Imprisoned, extradited to Russia, and finally banished to Siberia, Bakunin did not reach Europe again until he fled in 1861. As soon as he arrived in London he went to Herzen, the well-known Russian liberal revolutionary leader. There he immediately began, independently of Herzen, to group the political emigration around his own person. It was a circle of Slavs, which Bakunin attached to himself via a pan-slavism tinged with anarchism. He kept away both from the English workers' movement and from the communist, above all German workers' educational club in London. Lacking an opportunity for conspiracy, (the foundation of the International was approaching) he set off for Italy in 1864, in search of disciples for his reactionary "pan-slavism" and his secret groupings.
"In Italy he found a lot of political secret societies; he found here a déclassé intelligentsia ever ready to get involved in all kinds of conspiracies; a peasant mass always on the verge of famine, and finally a pullulating lumpen proletariat, in particular the Lazzaroni of Naples, where he soon moved from Florence, and where he lived for several years. These classes appeared to him to be the real motor of revolution" (Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of his Life, p.411, 412).
Bakunin fled from the workers of Western Europe to the déclassé of Italy.
The secret societies as vehicles of revolt
In the period of reaction after the defeat of Napoleon, during which the Holy Alliance under Metternich pursued the principle of armed intervention of the great powers against every attempted social upheaval, those classes of society excluded from power were obliged to organize themselves in secret societies. This was not only the case for the workers, the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, but also for parts of the liberal bourgeoisie and even dissatisfied aristocrats. Almost all of these conspiracies, from 1820 on, whether the Decabrists in Russia or the Carbonari in Italy, organized themselves according to the model of freemasonry, which arose in the 17th century in England, and whose goals of "international brotherhood" and resistance to the Catholic church attracted European enlighteners like Diderot and Voltaire, Lessing and Goethe, Pushkin etc. But like so many things in this "century of enlightenment", like the "enlightened despots" Katarina and Friedrich the Great or Marie-Therese, freemasonry possessed a reactionary essence in the form of its mystical ideology, its elitist organization in different "grades of initiation", its aristocratic character and its murkiness, its leanings towards conspiracy and manipulation. In Italy, at that time the Mecca of the non-proletarian, unbridled maneuvering and conspiring secret societies, the Guelfi, Federati, Adelfi and Carbonari were sprawling from the 1820s and 1830s on. The most famous of them, the Carbonari, was a terrorist secret society which advocated catholic mysticism, and whose structures and "symbols" were taken from freemasonry.
But at the time Bakunin came to Italy, the Carbonari were already in the shadow of Mazzini's conspiracy. Mazzinism represented a step forward in relation to the Carbonari, since it struggled for a united, centralized Italian republic. Mazzini not only burrowed underground, but also agitated towards the population. After 1848 workers' sections were even formed. Mazzini also represented a progress organizationally, since he abolished the Carbonari system according to which the base militants had to follow blindly the order of the secret leadership on pain of death. But as soon as the International rose as a proletarian force independent of his control, he began to combat it as a threat to his own nationalist movement.
When Bakunin arrived in Naples, he immediately took up the struggle against Mazzini - but from the point of view of the Carbonari, whose methods he defended! Far from being on his guard, Bakunin plunged himself into this whole murky milieu, in order to take over the leadership of the conspiratorial movement. He founded the Alliance of Social Democracy, and as its leadership the secret International Brotherhood, an "order of disciplined revolutionaries".
A milieu manipulated by the reaction
The déclassé revolutionary aristocrat Bakunin found in Italy, much more even than in Russia, a suitable terrain. It was here that his organizational concept ripened to its fullest flowering. It was a murky swamp which brought forth a whole series of anti-proletarian organizations. These groupings of ruined, often depraved aristocrats, déclassé youth, or even of pure criminals, appeared to him more revolutionary than the proletariat. One of these groupings was the Camorra, which corresponded to Bakunin's romantic vision of revolutionary banditry. The domination of Naples by the Camorra, a secret society which had developed out of an organization of convicts, had become quasi-official after the amnesty of 1860. In Sicily, at about the same time, the armed wing of the dispossessed rural aristocracy infiltrated the local secret organization of Mazzini. From then on it called itself "Mafia" according to the capital letters of its slogan of battle: "Mazzini autorizza furti, incendi, awelenamenti" ("Mazzini allows us to steal, bum and poison"). Bakunin failed to denounce these elements or clearly distance himself from them.
Direct state manipulation was also not missing in this milieu. We can safely assume that this manipulation played a part in the way the Italian milieu celebrated Bakunin as the true revolutionary alternative to the "German dictatorship of Marx". Indeed, this propaganda was absolutely identical to that spread by the police organs of Louis-Napoleon in France.
As Engels informs us, the Carbonari and many similar groups were manipulated and infiltrated by the Russian and other secret services (see Engels: "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism", Werke Vo1.22). This state infiltration was reinforced above all after the defeat of the European-wide revolution of 1848. The French dictator, the adventurer Louis Napoleon, who after the defeat of this revolution, became the spearhead of the ensuing counter revolution, allied himself with Palmers ton in London, but above all with Russia, in order to hold down the European proletariat. From 1864 on, the secret police of Louis Napoleon was active above all in order to destroy the International. One of its agents was "Herr Vogt", an associate of Lassalle, who slandered Karl Marx in public as allegedly being the head of a blackmail gang.
But the main axis of the activity of Louis Napoleon's secret diplomacy lay in Italy, where France was trying to exploit the national movement to its own ends. In 1859 Marx and Engels pointed out that the French head of state was himself an ex-member of the Carbonari. ("The monetary policy in Europe; The Position of Louis-Napoleon". In Werke Vol. 13).
Bakunin, who was up to his neck in this swamp, of course believed that he could manipulate this rubbish heap for his own revolutionary purposes. In reality it was he himself who was manipulated. To this day we do not know in detail all the "elements" with whom he "conspired". But there are some indications. For example he wrote his "freemason's manuscripts" in 1865, "a text which aimed at presenting Bakunin's ideas to Italian freemasonry" as the anarchist historian Max Nettlau tells us.
"The freemason's manuscript refers to the infamous Syllabus, the papal damnation of human thought from 1864, and Bakunin wanted to connect up with the rage against the pope whipped up by this, in order to push forward freemasonry or at least that part of it capable of development; he begins by saying: in order to again become a living and useful body, freemasonry must once again seriously take up the service of mankind" (Nettlau, Geschichte der Anarchismus, Vol.2 p. 48, 49)
Nettlau even proudly tries to prove, through a comparison of different quotations, that Bakunin had influenced the thought of freemasonry at that time. In reality it was the other way around. It was at this time that Bakunin adopted parts of the reactionary, mystical, secret society ideology of freemasonry. A world view which Engels already perfectly described at the end of the 1840s concerning Karl Heinzen:
"He sees the communist writer as a prophet, priest or vicar, who possesses a secret wisdom of his own, but which he withholds from the uneducated in order to keep them on leash (...) as if the literary representatives of communism would have an interest in keeping the worker ignorant, as if they were simply using them as the Illuminati wanted to use the populace in the last century" (Engels, "The Communists and Karl Heinzen" , Vol.4 Werke, p.321)
Here also lies the key to the Bakuninist Mystery, according to which in the future anarchist society without state and authority a secret society will still be needed.
Marx and Engels, without having thought of Bakunin, expressed this in relation to the English philosopher and once pseudo socialist Carlyle:
"The historically created class difference thus becomes a natural difference, which one has to recognize and honor as part of the eternal laws of nature through bowing before what is noble and wise in nature: the cult of genius. The whole view of the historic process of development flattens into the shallow trivialities of the Illuminati and freemason wisdom of the last century (...) With this comes the old question, who then is supposed to rule, which is broadly discussed with the most self-important staleness and finally answered, that the noble, wise and knowledgeable shall rule" (Extracts from the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Werke Vol. 7 p.261).
Bakunin "discovers" the International
From the very outset the European bourgeoisie had attempted to use the swamp of Italy's secret societies against the International. Already at its foundation 1864 in London, Mazzini's supporters had attempted to impose their own sectarian statutes and thereby seize control of the Association. The representative of Mazzini in this action, Major Wolff, was later to be exposed as a police agent. After the failure of this attempt, the bourgeoisie started up the League of Peace and Freedom, using it to attract Bakunin into the cobweb of the underminers of the International.
Bakunin was expecting the "revolution" in Italy. While he was maneuvering in the swamp of the ruined nobility, déclassé youth, and the urban lumpen proletariat, the International Workingmen's Association had, without his involvement, risen to become the leading revolutionary force in the world. Bakunin had to recognize that, in his attempt to become Europe's revolutionary pope, he had backed the wrong horse. It was now, in 1867, that the bourgeois League of Peace and Freedom was founded, very obviously against the International. Bakunin with his "brotherhood" joined the League with the goal of "joining up the League, with the Brotherhood within it as its revolutionary inspiring force, with the International" (Nettlau, ibid, p. 100)
With this step, logically enough, but without even noticing it himself, Bakunin became the spearhead of the ruling classes' attempt to destroy the International.
The League of Peace and Freedom
The League, originally the idea of the Italian guerilla leader Garibaldi and the French author Victor Hugo, was founded in particular by the Swiss bourgeoisie, and supported by part of the Italian secret societies. Its pacifist disarmament propaganda and its demands for a "United States of Europe" were in reality mainly aimed at splitting and weakening the First International. At a time when Europe was split between a western part developing capitalistically, and a feudal part under the Russian knout, the call for disarmament was a favorite demand of Russian diplomacy. The International, like the whole workers' movement, had from the beginning adopted the slogan of the reestablishment of a democratic Poland as a bulwark against Russia, which at that time was the mainstay of European reaction. The League now denounced this policy as "militarist", whereas Bakunin's pan-slavism was presented as being truly revolutionary and directed against all militarism. In this way the bourgeoisie strengthened the Bakuninists against the International.
"The Alliance of socialist democracy is truly of bourgeois origin. It did not originate from the International; it is a branch of the League of Peace and Freedom, a stillborn society of bourgeois republicans. The International was already solidly founded, when Michael Bakunin took it into his head to play the part of emancipator of the proletariat. It could only offer him the field of activity common to all members. In order to acquire a reputation within it, he would first of all have had to win his spurs through consistent and self-sacrificing work; he believed that he would find better prospects and an easier path on the side of the bourgeoisie of the League" ("A Plot Against the IWA - Report on the Activities of Bakunin", Werke Vol. 18, p.335)
The proposal that Bakunin himself made, of an alliance of the League with the IWA, was however rejected by the Brussels Congress of the International. At this time it was also already becoming clear that an overwhelming majority would reject the abandonment of the support for Poland against Russian reaction. Thus there was nothing left for Bakunin but to join the International in order to undermine it from within. This orientation was supported by the leadership of the League, within which he had already set up a power base.
"The alliance between bourgeois and workers should not be limited to an open alliance. The secret statutes of the Alliance (...) include indications, that Bakunin laid the basis, in the midst of the League itself, for a secret society which should rule over the latter. Not only are the names of the leading groups identical with those of the League ... but also it are declared in the secret statutes that the founding members of the Alliance are for the most part ex-members of the Bern Congress" ("A plot..." ibid p.337)
Those who are acquainted with the politics of the League can assume that from the outset it intended to use Bakunin against the International - a task for which Bakunin was well prepared in Italy. Also the fact that several activists in the proximity both of Bakunin and the League were later exposed as police agents, speaks for this. Indeed, nothing could be more dangerous for the International than its corrosion from within by elements who themselves were not agents of the state, and who had a certain reputation in the workers' movement, but who pursued their own personal goals at the expense of the movement.
Even if Bakunin did not want to serve the counter revolution in this manner, he and his like carry the full responsibility for this through the way in which they put themselves close to the most reactionary and murky elements of the ruling class.
It is true that the Workers' International was conscious of the dangers represented by such an infiltration. The London Delegate Conference, for instance, adopted the following resolution:
"In those countries where the regular organization of the International is presently not possible due to governmental interference, the Association and its local sections can reconstruct themselves under some other name. However, any formation of international sections in the form of secret societies is and remains forbidden" (Werke Vol. 17.P.422).
Marx, who proposed this resolution, justified it as follows:
"In France and Italy, where such a political situation exists, that the right of assembly is a penal act, people will be strongly inclined to let themselves get drawn into secret societies, the results of which are always negative. Apart from this, such kinds of organization stand in contradiction to the development of the proletarian movement, because these societies, instead of educating the workers, submit them to authoritarian and mystical laws which hinder their independence and lead their consciousness in a wrong direction" (Intervention by Marx at the London Conference, September 1871).
Nevertheless, despite this vigilance Bakunin's Alliance succeeded in penetrating the International. In the second article in this series we will describe the struggle within its ranks, going to the roots of the different conceptions of organization and militantism between the proletarian party and the petty-bourgeois sect.
Kr, December 1995
[1] Clearly, the starting-point for the formation of a revolutionary organization is agreement on a political program. Nothing is more foreign to marxism, and to the workers' movement generally, than regroupment without programmatic principles. This being said, and contrary to the Bordigist vision, the proletarian program is not given once and for all. On the contrary, it is developed, enriched, and its mistakes corrected through the living experience of the class. When the IWA was formed, in other words in the early days of the workers' movement, the program's essential elements - that which determined an organization's membership of the proletarian camp - came down to a few general principles, contained in the preamble to the International's Statutes. Bakunin and his followers did not call these principles into question. Their attack on the IWA was essentially against the Statutes themselves, the IWA's rules of functioning. However, this does not mean that program and statutes can be separated. The latter express and concretize the essential principles of the working class, and no other, and are therefore an integral part of the program.
The workers' strikes and demonstrations that shook France at the end of autumn 1995 have illustrated both the proletariat's ability to return to the combat, but also the enormous difficulties that it encounters on the way. In the last issue of the International Review, we gave an immediate appreciation of these social movements' significance:
... the workers cannot remain passive [in the face of the brutal attacks that a crisis-ridden capitalism is dealing out to them]. They have no way out, other than to defend themselves in struggle. But to prevent the working class from entering the combat with its own weapons, the bourgeoisie has taken the lead, and has pushed the workers into a premature struggle, completely under the control of the unions. It has not left the workers time to mobilize at their own rhythm and with their own methods (...)
Thus although the recent strike movement in France reveals a deep discontent within the working class, it is above all the result of a maneuver on a very large scale by the bourgeoisie, aimed at leading the workers into a massive defeat, and above all at creating a profound disorientation in their ranks"2.
The importance of the events in France at the end of 1995
The fact that social movements in France were fundamentally the result of a bourgeois maneuver in no way reduces their importance, nor does it mean that the working class is today nothing better than a flock of sheep at the mercy of the ruling class. In particular, these events are a stinging rebuttal of all the "theories" (given abundant publicity at the time of the Stalinist regimes' collapse) on the "disappearance" of the working class, and to the variations that spoke of the "end of working class struggle", or (the "left" variety) of the "recomposition" of the class, which has supposedly dealt a serious blow to the struggle3.
The very fact and extent of the strikes and demonstrations of November-December 1995 is testimony to the class' real potential today: hundreds of thousands of strikers, several million demonstrators. However, we cannot simply be satisfied with this observation: after all, during the 1930s, we saw huge movements like the strikes of May-June 1936 in France, or the workers' insurrection against the fascist coup in Spain, on 18th July of the same year. The fundamental difference between today's class movements and those of the 1930s, is that the latter were part of a long string of working class defeats following the revolutionary wave that began during World War I, defeats which plunged the working class into the deepest counter-revolution of its history. In this context of physical, and above all political defeat, expressions of working class combativity were easily derailed by the bourgeoisie onto the rotten terrain of anti-fascism, in other words the preparation for the second imperialist massacre. We will not return here to our analysis of the historic course4, but it is necessary to state clearly here that the situation today is not the same as in the 1930s. Today's mobilizations of the working class are in no way steps towards the preparation of imperialist war. Their significance lies in the perspective of decisive class confrontations, in a capitalism plunged into irreversible crisis.
This being said, the importance of the French social movements at the end of autumn 1995 lies not so much in the workers' strikes and demonstrations in themselves, as in the size of the bourgeois maneuver that provoked them.
We can often judge the real balance of class forces from the way that the bourgeoisie acts against the proletariat. The ruling class, after all, has many means of evaluating these forces: opinion polls, police reports (in France, for example, one of the jobs of the Renseignements Genereux, ie the political police, is to "feel the pulse" of potentially dangerous sectors of the population, and in particular the working class). But the most important of them is the union apparatus, which is much more effective than all the sociologists, opinion pollsters, or police functionaries. Since this apparatus is responsible above all for controlling the exploited, in the service of capitalist interests, and has 80 years of experience in the matter, it is especially sensitive to the workers' state of mind, their readiness and ability to engage in struggle against the bourgeoisie. It is the unions' job to keep the bourgeoisie's leaders constantly informed as to the extent of the danger represented by the class struggle. And this is the purpose of the periodic meetings between union leaders and the bosses, or the government: plan together the best and most effective strategy for the bourgeoisie's attacks on the working class. In the case of the movements in France at the end of 1995, the size and sophistication of the maneuver organized against the working class are enough in themselves to show how far the class struggle, and the perspective of massive workers' combats, are a central concern for the bourgeoisie.
Bourgeois maneuvers against the working class
The article in the previous issue of this Review described in detail the various aspects of the maneuver, and how all the sectors of the ruling class, from the right to the far left, collaborated in it. Here, we will simply recall the main elements:
- starting in the summer of 1995, an avalanche of attacks (from a brutal tax hike, to a threat to the pensions of state employees, via a wage freeze for the latter, and the whole topped off with a plan for Social Security reform, the "Juppe plan" designed to increase wage earners ' subscriptions, while reducing the reimbursement of medical expenses);
- a veritable provocation directed at the rail workers, in the form of a "contract plan" between the state and the SNCF (the nationalized rail company), imposing an extra 7 years work on drivers before reaching pension rights, and thousands of job cuts;
- use of the rail workers' immediate mobilization as an "example to follow" by the other workers of the state sector: contrary to their usual practice of confining the struggle, this time the unions became zealous propagandists for their extension and succeeded in drawing in many other workers, notably in city transport, the postal service, gas and electricity, and tax offices;
- massive media coverage of the strikes, presented in a highly favorable light on the TV, and even accompanied by intellectuals signing declarations for "an awakening of society", and against "monolithic thought";
- the leftists' contribution to the maneuver, giving their total approval to the unions, reproaching them solely with not having done the same thing earlier;
- then, after three weeks of strikes, the government withdraws the "contract plan" on the railways, and the measures against state employees' pensions: the unions hail their victory and talk of a government "retreat"; despite the resistance of some of the "tough" railyards, the rail workers go back to work, giving the signal for the other sectors to end the strike.
Overall, the bourgeoisie won a victory by pushing through most of the measures which concern every sector of the working class, such as the increase in taxes and the reform of the Social Security, and even some of the measures aimed at specific sectors, such as the wage freeze for state employees. But the bourgeoisie's greatest victory was political: the workers who have just engaged in three weeks of strikes are not ready to launch a new movement when the next attacks fall. Moreover, and above all, these strikes and demonstrations have given the unions the opportunity to polish up their image considerably: whereas previously, the unions in France had the reputation of dispersing the struggle, of organizing worn-out and divisive days of action, now they appeared throughout the movement (especially the two most important of them: the Stalinist CGT and Force Ouvriere led by the Socialists) as indispensable to the movement's extension and unity, to the organization of massive demonstrations, and as responsible for the government's so-called "retreat". As we said in the article in our last Review:
In fact, the considerable importance that the bourgeoisie gave to renewing the unions' credibility was amply confirmed after the movement, especially in the press with numerous articles emphasizing the union "comeback". It is interesting to read, in one of the bourgeoisie's confidential newsheets, that it uses for talking unambiguously: "One of the clearest signs of this union recovery is the way the coordinations have volatilized. They has been seen as a testimony of the unions' inability to represent the workers. The fact that they did not appear this time shows that the unions' efforts to "stick to the terrain", and restore a "unionism close to the workers" have not been in vain"5. The same newsheet is happy to quote a declaration - presented as a "sigh of relief" - from a private sector boss: "At last we've got strong trade unions back again".
A lack of understanding in the revolutionary milieu
This is not a hasty judgment on BC's part, as a result of insufficient information, since in its January 1996 issue, BC returns to the same idea:
"The employees of the state sector mobilized spontaneously against the Juppe plan. And it is good to remember that the workers' first demonstrations took place on the terrain of the immediate defense of class interests, taking the union organizations themselves by surprise, and showing once again that when the proletariat moves to defend itself against the bourgeoisie's attacks, it almost always does so outside and against union directives. It was only in the second phase that the French unions, above all Force Ouvriere and the CGT, caught up with the movement and thus recovered their credibility in the workers' eyes. But the involvement, with such apparent radicalism, of Force Ouvriere and the other unions in fact hid the sordid interests of the union bureaucracy, which can only be understood if one knows the French system of social protection [where the unions, notably Force Ouvriere, manage me funds, which is precisely one of the things called into question by the Juppe plan].
We find a similar idea put forward by BC's sister organization within the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Parry (IBRP), the Communist Workers Organization (CWO). In no. 1, 3rd Series, of its review Revolutionary Perspectives, we read:
In the analysis of the two IBRP groups, there is much insistence on the fact the unions only sought to defend their own "sordid interests" when they called for mobilization against the Juppe plan on Social Security. Obviously, the union leaders are sensitive to their own petty interests, such an analysis of reality comes down to looking at reality through the wrong end of a telescope. It's like seeing the customary disputes between the different unions as nothing more than an expression of the competition that exists between them, without seeing the fundamental aspect: that this is an excellent way of dividing the working class. In reality, these "sordid interests" of the trades unions can only find expression within the framework of their role in capitalist society: that of the social firemen of the capitalist order; the bourgeois state's police within the workers' ranks. And if they should have to renounce their "sordid interests" in order to keep up this role, then they will do so without hesitation: their sense of responsibility in the defense of capitalist interests against the working class is impeccable. At the end of 1995, the union leaders knew perfectly well that letting Juppe put through the major part of his plan would deprive them of some of their financial prerogatives, but they kissed them in the higher capitalist interest. It is far better for the unions to be thought to be fighting their own corner (they can always take refuge behind the argument that their own strength contributes to that of the working class), than to be unmasked for what they really are: cogs in the machinery of the capitalist state.
In fact, while our comrades of the IBRP are perfectly clear on the trade unions' capitalist nature, they still express the idea, nuanced it is true7, that the unions were surprised, even outflanked, by the initiative of the working class. Nothing could be further from the truth. If there is one example during the last 10 years in France of the unions perfectly anticipating and controlling a social movement, then 1995 is it. This movement was not just controlled by the unions, they systematically provoked it, with the government's complicity, as we have seen above and analyzed at length in our previous article. And the best proof that the bourgeoisie and its union apparatus was neither "surprised" nor "outflanked", is the media coverage that the bourgeoisie in other countries immediately gave to the movement. Especially since the big strikes in Belgium 1983, which heralded the class' emergence from the demoralization and disorientation which accompanied the workers' 1981 defeat in Poland, the bourgeoisie has been careful to organize a complete international blackout around workers' struggles. Only when the struggle corresponds to a maneuver planned in advance by the ruling class, as was the case in Germany 1992, does the blackout give way to a plethora of information. In 1992, the strikes in the public sector, especially in public transport, already had the aim of "presenting the unions, which had systematically organized all the actions and kept the workers completely passive, as the real protagonists of the movement against the bosses"8. From this point of view, the movements in France at the end of 1995 were a "remake" of those stirred up by the bourgeoisie in Germany three and a half years earlier. The intense media bombardment that accompanied these movements (even in Japan, it was daily headline news on the TV) shows not only that they were planned and controlled from start to finish by the unions, but that the ruling class organized the maneuver on an international scale to strike a blow at working class consciousness in the advanced countries.
The best proof lies in the way that the Belgian bourgeoisie maneuvered in the wake of the social movements in France:
- while the media were speaking of a "new May 68" in France, at the end of November 1995, the unions launched movements exactly like those in France against the attacks on the state sector, especially against the reform of social security;
- the bourgeoisie then mounted a brutal provocation by announcing attacks of unprecedented violence against workers on the railways (SNCB) and in the national airline (Sabena); just as in France, the muons resolutely took the lead in mobilizing these two sectors, presented as the example to follow, while the rail workers were invited to follow the example of their French colleagues;
- two days later, the government and the bosses organized a new provocation at the SNCB and Sabena, with the management announcing that its austerity measures were to be maintained: the unions renewed the "hardline" struggle (confrontations between police and strikers blockading Brussels airport), and tried to spread the movement to other branches of the state sector, as well as to the private sectors, with union delegations declaring "solidarity" with the Sabena workers, and declaring that "their struggle is a social laboratory for all the workers";
- finally, at the beginning of January, the bosses once again pretended to retreat, announcing that they would open a "social dialogue" at both the SNCB and Sabena "under the pressure of the movement"; as in France, the movement ended in victory and increased credibility for the unions.
Comrades of the IBRP, do you really believe that this remarkable resemblance between events in France and in Belgium was a mere accident, and that the bourgeoisie and the unions internationally had planned none of this?
Comrades of Battaglia Comunista, when you end up writing such nonsense, then at the least you should try to draw the lessons afterwards. In particular, you should be a little more skeptical at what the bourgeoisie has to stay. If you let yourself be taken in by all the ruling class uses to try to fool the working masses, how can you claim to be the latter's vanguard?
The need for a historical analytical framework
An immediatism which allows us to understand why the groups of the IBRP, for example in 1987-88, swing between complete skepticism and an equally complete enthusiasm at the workers' struggles. In 1987, BC began by putting the struggle in the Italian schools on the same level as that of the magistrates or airline pilots, only to transform it into "a new and interesting phase in the class struggle in Italy". The CWO oscillated in the same way over the strikes in Britain during the same period12.
In January 1996, it was the same immediatism that made BC write that "The strike of the French workers, whatever the opportunist (sic) attitude of the unions, is really an episode of extraordinary importance in the recovery of the class struggle". For BC, what was sadly lacking in this struggle, to avoid its defeat, was a proletarian party. If the party - which must indeed be built for the proletariat to carry out the communist revolution - were to be inspired by the same immediatist approach as BC, than we can only fear for the fate of the revolution.
Only by turning our backs firmly on immediatism, and placing the present moments of the class struggle in their historic context, can we understand them and truly play the part of vanguard of the working class.
Obviously, this framework is the course of history , and we won't go back over it. More precisely, the framework has been defined by the collapse of the Stalinist regimes at the end of the 1980s, which we recalled briefly at the beginning of this article. At the end of the summer of 1989, two months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ICC set out the new analytical framework which would allow us to understand the evolution of the class struggle:
Given the historic importance of the events that are determining it, the present retreat of the proletariat - although it doesn't call into question the historic course, the general perspective of class confrontations - is going to be much deeper than the one which accompanied the defeat of 1981 in Poland"13.
The ICC had to integrate further new and extremely important events into this framework:
These tragic events certainly put paid to the lies about the "new world order" announced by the bourgeoisie at the time of the disappearance of the Eastern bloc, which was supposed to be the main source of military tensions in the world (...) But at the same time, the great majority of the working class in the advanced countries, following a new round of bourgeois propaganda campaigns, submitted to this war with a strong sense of powerlessness, which considerably weakened its struggles. The August 1991 putsch in the USSR and the new destabilization it provoked, as well as the civil war in Yugoslavia, contributed in their turn to reinforce this feeling of powerlessness. The breakup of the USSR and the barbaric war unfolding in Yugoslavia are expressions of the advanced decomposition of capitalist society today. But thanks to all the lies spread by the media, the bourgeoisie has managed to hide the real cause of these events and present them as a further manifestation of the "death of communism" or as a question of the "right of nations to self-determination", in the face of which workers have nothing to do but be passive spectators trusting to the wisdom of their governments"14.
The horror and duration of the war in Yugoslavia, unfolding right next to the great proletarian concentrations of Western Europe has been one of major elements that explain the extent of the proletariat's difficulties at the present time. The war combines (though to a lesser extent) the damage done by the collapse of the Eastern bloc - a deep disarray and illusions among the workers - and by the war in the Gulf - a profound feeling of impotence - without, unlike the latter, revealing the crimes and barbarity of great "democracies". The war provides a clear illustration of how capitalism's decomposition, of which it is one of today's most spectacular expressions, acts as a serious obstacle to the development of the workers' struggle and consciousness.
Another aspect which needs to be emphasized, in particular because it concerns the bourgeoisie's main weapon against the workers, the unions, is the fact that we pointed out in our Theses of September 1989: "reformist ideology will weigh very heavily on the struggle in the period ahead, greatly facilitating the action of the unions". This sprang from the fact not that the workers still had any illusions in the "socialist paradise", but that the existence of a supposedly "non-capitalist" society seemed to indicate the possibility of some society other than a capitalist one. The end of these regimes was presented as the "end of history" (a term used quite seriously by certain bourgeois "thinkers"). Inasmuch as trade unionism is supposed to act on the terrain of improving workers' living conditions within capitalism, the events of 1989, aggravated by all the blows suffered by the working class since then, could only strengthen the unions, as we have seen - and which the bourgeoisie has made the most of in the social movements at the end of 1989.
The unions' lost credibility could not be restored all at once. Throughout the 1980s, they had been so discredited by their repeated sabotage of the workers' struggles, that it was difficult for them to set themselves up immediately as the intransigent defenders of the working class. Their return to the limelight was thus conducted in several stages, where they were more and more strongly presented as the vital instrument of the workers' struggle. An example of this progressive return of the unions is given by the situation in Germany, where the grand maneuvers in the public sector during the spring of 1992 still left room for the spontaneous struggles, without union instructions, of autumn 1993 in the Ruhr. By contrast, in the engineering workers' strikes at the beginning of 1995, the unions were much more firmly in the saddle. But the most significant example comes from Italy. In the autumn of 1992, the unions became the target for the great outburst of workers' anger against the Amato plan. A year later, the "mobilization" of the working class and the massive demonstrations throughout the country were led by the "factory council coordinations", in other words by the structures of rank -and- file unionism. Finally, the monster demonstration of 1994 in Rome, the biggest since World War II, was a masterpiece of union control.
To understand this renewed vigor of the trade unions, it is important to emphasize that it has been made possible by the survival of the union ideology, whose ultimate defenders are the "rank-and-file" or "fighting" unionists. In Italy, for example, the latter led the contestation of the official unions (by bringing to demonstrations the ball-bearings and rotten tomatoes that were used against the union leaders), before opening the way to the union recovery of 1994 with their own "mobilizations" during 1993. In the combats to come, once the official unions have once again been discredited by their sabotage in the service of the ruling class, the workers will still have to attack the unionist ideology represented by the rank-and-file unionists.
The bourgeoisie thus confirms what revolutionaries have always said: the crisis is the workers' best ally. It will open their eyes to the dead-end of the world today, and give it the will to overthrow it, despite all the obstacles that the ruling class will not fail to sow in its path.
FM, 12/03/96
1 "Resolution on the International Situation", adopted by the 11th Congress of the ICC, in International Review no.82.
2 International Review no.84, "Struggle behind the unions leads to defeat".
3 See our article "The proletariat is still the revolutionary class" in International Review no. 74.
4 See our article "Report on the course of history" in International Review no.18.
5 Supplement to the bulletin Entreprise et Personnel, titled "The social conflict at the end of 1995 and its probable consequences".
6 This is a mistake. The CFDT - a social-democratic union with Christian origins - approved the Juppe plan for the Social Security.
7 The CWO's tone is a good deal less optimistic than BC's: "The bourgeoisie is so confident that it will control the workers, that the Paris Stock Exchange is rising". We should add that the Franc remained stable during the entire movement. Two proofs that the bourgeoisie welcomed the movement with satisfaction. And with good reason!
8 See International Review no. 70, "Faced with chaos and massacres, only the working class can provide an answer".
9 See our article "The Wind from the East and the Response of Revolutionaries" in International Review no. 61.
10 See in particular our articles "In response to Battaglia Comunista on the course of history" and nature of a historic course: "When we talk about a "historic course and "The confusion of communist groups on the present period: the under-estimation of the class struggle", in International Review nos. 50 and 54.
11 International Review no. 54.
12 On this subject, see our article "Decantation in the proletarian political milieu and the oscillations of the IBRP" in International Review no. 55.
13 "Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the Eastern bloc countries", International Review no. 60.
14 "Only the working class can take humanity out of this barbarism", International Review no. 68.
15 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, previously director of the Harvard Business Review, quoted by Le Monde Diplomatique of March 1996.
In the three preceding articles we showed how the struggles of the working class forced capital to bring World War I to a close. In order to prevent an extension of the revolutionary struggle, capital did all in its power to divide the working class in Germany from that in Russia, to sabotage any further radicalization. In this article we want to show how revolutionaries in Germany were confronted with the question of building the organization, faced with the betrayal of the social-democracy.
The outbreak of World War I was possible only because the majority of the parties of the Second International submitted to the interests of their various national capitals. Once the unions participated unhesitatingly in the "holy alliance" with the national capital, the approval of war credits came as no surprise; it was the consequence of the whole process of degeneration of the opportunist wing of Social Democracy. Before the war, its left wing had fought with all its strength against this degeneration, so there was an immediate response to this betrayal. From the very beginning of the war the internationalists regrouped around the banner of the group that would soon become known as "Spartakus". They identified their first responsibility as the defense of working class internationalism against the betrayal of the SPD leadership. This meant not only propagandizing in favor of this programmatic position but also, and most importantly, defending the organization of the working class, whose leadership had betrayed it, from being throttled by capitalist forces. Following the betrayal of the party leadership, there was unanimous agreement on the part of all the internationalists not to allow the party to fall into the hands of the traitors. All of them worked to win back the party. None wanted to leave of their own accord, on the contrary they all wanted to work as a fraction within the party with the aim of expelling the social patriotic leadership.
The traitors' bastion was the union representatives, who had been irrevocably integrated into the state, and nothing could be reclaimed for the working class there. The SPD however was a point of resistance. Even the parliamentary fraction in the Reichstag was clearly divided between the traitors and the internationalists. Even though - as we showed in the article in International Review no 81 - it was only with great difficulty and great hesitation that a voice was raised in the Reichstag against the war. But the most potent lever against betrayal developed above all within the rank and file of the party itself.
"We accuse the Reichstag fraction of having betrayed the fundamental principles of the party and, with them, the spirit of the class struggle. The parliamentary fraction has thus placed itself outside the party; it has ceased to be the official representative of German Social-Democracy" (Leaflet of the opposition, quoted by R. Muller).
All the internationalists were agreed not to abandon the organization to the traitors. "This does not mean that immediate separation from the opportunists is desirable, or even possible, in every country. It means that such a separation is ripe historically, that it has become inevitable and that it represents a step forward, a necessity for the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat. It means that the historic turning point, marked by "peaceful" capitalism's entry into its imperialist phase, puts such a separation on the agenda" (Lenin, "Opportunism and the foundation of the Second International", Works, vol 21).
In International Review no 81 we showed that the Spartakists and the "Linksradikale" in other towns aimed at forging a balance of forces that would put the social-patriotic leadership in a minority. How could the organizational break with the traitors be brought about? Obviously the traitors and the internationalists could not coexist in the same party. One had to get rid of the other. The balance of forces had to be reversed in the course of this struggle. As we showed in International Review no 81, the Spartakists' resistance put the leadership in an increasingly difficult situation found itself; the party as a whole followed the traitors less and less. In fact the social-patriots in the leadership were forced to go onto the offensive against the internationalists in order to asphyxiate them. How were they to react to this? By slamming the door and immediately forming a new organization outside the SPD?
There were divergences on this question within the left. The social-patriots began to chase the revolutionaries out of the SPD - first from the parliamentary fraction, then from the party itself; after Liebnecht, who was excluded in December 1915, it was the turn of those deputies who had voted against the war credits to be thrown out of the parliamentary group in spring 1916. At this point there was discussion on how long it was necessary to fight for the organization.
Rosa Luxemburg's attitude was clear: "You can "leave" tiny sects and circles when they no longer suit you, to found new sects and circles. To want to free the proletarian masses from a horribly heavy and damaging yoke simply by "leaving" and to show them by this valiant example the road to follow, is just a childish dream. To have the illusion of freeing the masses by tearing up your membership card is just the other side of the coin to fetishising the party card as an illusory power. These two attitudes are just different sides of organizational cretinism (...) The decomposition of German social-democracy is part of an historic process of the broadest scope, of the general confrontation between bourgeoisie and working class, a battle ground that you cannot abandon out of disgust. We must wage this titanic battle to the bitter end. We must strain with all our united forces to break the deadly knot that official German democracy, the official free unions and the ruling class have slipped over the neck of the masses, who have been duped and betrayed. The liquidation of this pile of organized putrefaction, that today goes under the name of social-democracy, is not a private affair that depends on the personal decision of one or several groups (...) It must be sorted out as a broad public question of power by deploying all our strength" (Rosa Luxemburg, Der Kampf no 31, "Offene Briefe an Geninnungsfreunde. Von Spattung, Einheit und Austritt" , Duisberg, 6 January 1917).
"The slogan is neither split nor unite; it is not for a new party or for the old party. It is to reconquer the party from bottom to top by means of the rebellion of the masses who must take the organizations and their resources into their own hands, not in words but in deeds, by rebellion (...) The decisive combat for the party has began" (Spartakusbriefe, 30th March 1916).
The work of a fraction
While Rosa Luxemburg firmly defended the idea of remaining as long as possible in the SPD and was the most strongly convinced of the need to work as a fraction, the Bremen left began to defend the idea that an independent organization was necessary.
Up to the end of 1916, beginning of 1917. this question was not a focus of disagreement. K. Radek, one of the main representatives of the Bremen left himself said: "To propagandize for a split does not mean that we must leave the party immediately. On the contrary, we must aim to take control of all the organizations and party organs possible (...) It is our duty to remain at our posts as long as possible because the longer we remain, the greater will be the number of workers who will follow us if we are excluded by the social imperialists, who obviously understand quite well what our tactic is even if we do not state it openly (...) One of the tasks of the hour is to unite the local party organizations that are in opposition and establish a provisional leadership of an opposition that is clearly defined" (Radek, Unter eigenem Banner, p327, end of I 916) .
So it is not true that the Bremen left wanted an immediate organizational separation in August 1914. It was only from 1916, when the balance of forces within the SPD began to waver more and more, that the Dresden and Hamburg groups argued for an independent organization - even if they did not have solid organizational conceptions on this question.
An assessment of the first two years of the war showed that the revolutionaries did not allow themselves to be silenced and that none of the groups gave up their organizational independence. That is why, if they had abandoned the organization to the social patriots in 1914, they would have been throwing their principles overboard. Even in 1915, as the pressure of the workers themselves was growing, with an increasing number of acts of resistance, this was still not a reason to set up a new organization independent of and outside the SPD. As long as the balance of forces remained inadequate, as long as there was not the strength necessary to fight within the ranks of the workers and as long as the revolutionaries were still a small minority; in short, as long as the conditions for "the formation of the party" were not fulfilled, it was necessary to work as a fraction within the SPD.
A brief survey of the situation at the time shows that the shock of the party leadership's betrayal in August 1914 continued to be felt, that with the nationalism's temporary victory the working class had suffered a defeat, and that it was consequently impossible to found a new party. It was first necessary to fight for the old party, carry out the difficult work of a fraction and then prepare for the construction of a new party - but to found it immediately in 1914 was unthinkable. The working class had first to recover from the effects of the defeat of 1914. For the internationalists, neither the immediate exit from the SPD, nor the foundation of a new party was on the agenda in 1914.
In September 1916 the party's Executive Committee called a national conference of the SPD. Although the leadership manipulated the mandates given to the delegates, they nevertheless lost their hold over the opposition. The latter decided not to pay dues to the Executive. The Executive replied by excluding all those who refused to pay dues, starting with the Bremen left.
In a situation which rapidly became acrimonious, where the party's Executive Committee was increasingly challenged within the party, where the class offered more and more resistance to the war, and where the Executive had begun to make significant exclusions, the Spartakists were against leaving the SPD "piecemeal" as some of the Bremen comrades advocated with their tactic of refusing to pay dues.
E. Meyer stated: "We remain within the party only as long as we can wage a class struggle against the directive committee of the party. From the moment that we are prevented from doing this, we no longer want to stay. We are not in favor of a split" (quoted Lenin, Wohlegemuth, p 167).
The Spartakist League wanted to form an organization of the whole opposition within the SPD. This was the orientation of the Zimmerwald conference. As Lenin rightly stressed: "The German opposition still greatly lacks a solid basis. It is still dispersed, scattered in autonomous currents which lack above all a common foundation which is indispensable for its ability to act. We consider it our duty to forge the dispersed forces into an organism capable of action" (Lenin, Wohlegemuth, p 118).
As long as the Spartakists remained within the SPD as an autonomous group, they formed a political reference point fighting against the degeneration of the party, against the betrayal of a part of itself. According to the organizational principles of the workers' movement, a fraction does not have a separate existence, does not have organizational independence, it remains within the party. The independent existence of the fraction at an organizational level is only possible if it is excluded from the party.
By contrast, the other left regroupments, especially around Borchardt ("Lichtstrahlen") and in Hamburg, began to declare themselves clearly in favor of the construction of an independent organization in this phase, during 1916.
As we have shown, this wing of the left (especially that of Hamburg and Dresden) used the betrayal of the social patriotic leadership as a pretext for putting into question the need for the party in general. Out of a fear of a new bureaucratism, afraid of seeing the workers' struggle stifled by the left because of the organization, they began to reject all political organization. At the beginning this took the form of distrust in the centralized nature of the organization, a return to federalism. During this phase this was expressed by their deserting the struggle against the social patriots within the party. This was what gave birth to what would later become council communism which was to develop substantially in the years that followed.
The principle of working as a fraction, carrying on the resistance within the SPD, as was applied in Germany by the left in this period was later to serve as an example for the comrades of the Italian left scarcely ten years later, in their fight within the Communist International against its degeneration. This principle which was defended by Rosa Luxemburg and the vast majority of the Spartakists was rejected very early on by the parties of the KPD who left the organization as quickly as possible with the betrayal of the social patriots as soon as divergences arose and before there were any common measures agreed.
The different currents within the workers' movement
For more than two years of the war, the workers' movement in every country was divided into three currents. In The tasks of the proletariat in our revolution, April 1917, Lenin described these three currents in the following way.
- (...) the real internationalists who are best represented by "the Zimmerwald left". Essential distinguishing characteristic: complete rupture with social-chauvinism (...). Intransigent revolutionary struggle against one's own imperialist government and one's own imperialist bourgeoisie";
- between these two tendencies there was a third current that Lenin describes as the ""center", which hesitates between the social-chauvinists and the real internationalists.(...) The "center" swears by its great gods that it is (...) for peace, (...) and for peace with the social chauvinists. The "center" is for "unity ", the center is against a split (...) the "center" is not convinced of the need for a revolution against its own government, does not advocate it, does not carry out an intransigent revolutionary struggle, invents the most banal false perspectives, even if they have an arch-marxist ring to them, in order to avoid it".
This centrist current had no programmatic clarity but was, on the contrary, incoherent, inconsistent, ready to make any concession it could, retreated before any attempt to elaborate a program, tried to adapt itself to any new situation. It was the zone in which petty-bourgeois and revolutionary influences confronted one another. This current was in the majority at the Zimmerwald conference in 1915, and in 1916; in Germany, its numbers were considerable. At the time of the opposition's conference held on 7th January 1917, it represented the majority of the 187 delegates; only 35 delegates were Spartakists.
The centrist current itself contained a right and left wing. The right wing followed more and more closely the social-patriots while the left wing was moreopen to the intervention of the revolutionaries.
In Germany, Kautsky led this current, which united within the SPD in March 1916 under the name of "Socialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft" (SAG: Social-democratic work collective), and which was particularly strong in the parliamentary fraction. Haase and Ledebour were the main centrist deputies in the Reichstag. So there were not only the traitors and the revolutionaries but also a centrist current which drew the majority of the workers to it for some time.
"And those who avoid reality by refusing to recognize the existence of these three tendencies, who refuse to analyze them and to fight in an appropriate way for what is really internationalist, condemn themselves to inertia, impotence and error" (Lenin, "The tasks of the proletariat in our revolution", Works, vol 24, p.68).
Whereas the social patriots went on trying to inject large doses of the nationalist poison into the working class and the Spartakists waged a ferocious battle against them, the centrists oscillated between these two poles. What attitude should the Spartakists adopt towards the centrists? The wing regrouped around Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebnecht insisted that "we must hit the centrists politically", that revolutionaries must intervene towards them.
Intervention towards centrism: political clarity first, unity afterwards
In January 1916, during a conference called by those who were against the war, Rosa Luxemburg explained her position in relation to the centrists.
For her, any organizational association with the centrists within the SPD was to be excluded: "Of course unity is strength, but the unity of solid and profound convictions, not that of a mechanical and superficial addition of elements that are fundamentally divergent. Its strength is not in numbers but in the spirit, the clarity, in the determination that animates us" (R. Luxemburg, The policy of the social-democratic minority, spring 1916).
Likewise, in February 1916 Liebnecht stressed: "Not unity at any cost, but clarity above all. The path we must trace is to bring out intransigently and discuss in depth all divergences in order to reach agreement on principles and tactics with the perspective of being able to act, with the perspective of unity. Unity must not be the starting point of this fermentation process, it must be the conclusion" (Spartakusbriefe. p.112).
The cornerstone of the method of Luxemburg and the other Spartakists was the demand for programmatic clarity. By demanding programmatic solidity, refusing to be drowned politically, accepting that they be numerically scarce but remain clear in content, Luxemburg was not being sectarian, she was in continuity with the old marxist method. R. Luxemburg is not the only repository of this rigor and programmatic firmness: the same method would later be used by the comrades of the Italian left when, in analyzing the lessons of the of Russia and in the 30s, they warned against the tendency to make political concessions at a programmatic level with the sole aim of numeric growth. Perhaps Rosa Luxemburg already felt the repercussions of the new situation inaugurated by the decadence of capitalism. In the period of capitalist decadence, there can no longer exist mass parties of the working class, but only numerically smaller parties which must be solid at a programmatic level. This is why this theoretical solidification represents a compass point for the work of revolutionaries in relation to the centrists, who - by definition - oscillate and fear political clarity at the programmatic level.
When in March 1917 the centrists - after their expulsion from the SPD - wanted to found their own organization, the Spartakists recognized the need for an intervention towards them. They took up the responsibility which is that of revolutionaries towards their class. On the basis of the revolutionary development in Russia and the growing radicalization of the working class in Germany itself, the task of the Spartakists was to keep the best elements, who were under the influence of centrism, out of harm's way and push them to go forward and clarify their positions. We must conceive centrist currents such as the "social democratic work collective" (SAG) - just like a number of parties who adhered to the Communist International in March 1919 - as disparate and offering no stability or coherence.
Lenin summed up this task as follows:
"The most important failing of the whole of revolutionary marxism in Germany is the absence of an illegal organization, which follows a systematic line and educates the masses in the spirit of the new tasks: such an organization would have to take a clear position towards both opportunism and Kautskyism" (Lenin, July 1916 in Works, Vol 22).
How was this activity of a pole of reference to be carried out?
In February, the centrists proposed a conference to be held on 6/8th April 1917, with a view to founding a common organization, which would bear the name USPD (Independent Social-Democratic Party). Profound differences emerged among the internationalist revolutionaries as to how to react.
The Bremen Left took position against the revolutionary lefts taking part in this common organization. Radek thought that: "Only a clear and organized nucleus can exert any influence on the radical workers of the Center. Up until now, while we were acting on the terrain of the old party,we could get by with loose links between different left radicals. Now (...) only a radical left party, with a clear program and its own organs can gather dispersed forces, to unite them and make them grow. [We can only do our duty] by organizing the left radicals into their own party" (Karl Radek, Unter eigenem Banner, p414).
The Spartakists themselves were not united on the question. At a preparatory conference of the Spartakist League on 5th April, many delegates took position against entry into the USPD. The Spartakists aimed to attract the best elements out of the new party, and win them for the revolutionary cause.
"The Social-Democratic work collective includes in its ranks many worker elements who are on our side, either politically or by their state of mind, and who only follow the work collective by lack of contact with us, or by lack of knowledge of the real relationships within the opposition, of for some other chance reason ... " (Leo Jogisches, 25th December 1916).
"We must therefore use the new party, which will bring together greater numbers of workers, as a recruiting ground for our ideas, for the determined opposition tendency; we must then contest the work collective's political and moral influence on the masses within the new party itself; finally, we must push forward the party as a whole both by our activity in its organizations, and by our own independent actions, and eventually act against its damaging influence on the class" (Spartakus im Kriege, p184).
There were many arguments, within the Left, both for and against joining. The question posed was: should we carry out fraction work outside the USPD, or act on it from the inside? While the Spartakists' concern to intervene towards the USPD to draw away its best elements was perfectly valid, it was far more difficult to see whether this should be done "from the inside" or "from the outside".
However, the question could only be posed at all because the Spartakists rightly considered the USPD as a centrist current within the working class. It was not a bourgeois party.
We can only understand the significance of the centrist USPD, and the fact that it still possessed a great influence among the working masses, by considering the increasingly turbulent situation within the working class. A wave of strikes swept through north Germany in spring, and the Ruhr in March. In April, a series of mass strikes involving more than 300,000 workers hit Berlin. During the summer, a movement of strikes and protests affected Halle, Brunswick, Magdeburg, Kiel, Wuppertal, Hamburg, and Nuremberg. In June, the first mutinies took place in the fleet. These movements could only be stopped by the most brutal repression.
At all events, the Left was temporarily divided between the Spartakists on the one hand, and the Bremen Left and other revolutionary lefts on the other. The Bremen Left demanded the rapid formation of the Party, whereas the majority of the Spartakists joined the USPD as a fraction.
DV
As we saw in December 1995 with the maneuver orchestrated against the working class in France and more generally against the European proletariat, the bourgeoisie is always able to unite on an international scale to confront the exploited. It is quite a different matter at the level of inter-imperialist relations, where the law of the jungle claims all its rights. The "great victories for peace" which the media feted so noisily at the end of1995, are nothing but a sinister lie since in reality they are episodes in the deadly struggle between the great imperialist powers, which either goes on openly, or, more often, behind the cover of "intervention forces" such as the "Implementation Force" (I-For) in ex-Yugoslavia. The truth is that this final phase of the decline of the capitalist system, the phase of decomposition, is above all marked at the level of inter-imperialist relations by the war of each against all, a tendency which has been so dominant since the end of the Gulf war that it has for the moment almost completely replaced the other tendency inherent in imperialism in decadence the tendency towards the constitution of new imperialist blocs. Thus we have seen:
- an exacerbation of that typical expression of capitalism's historic crisis: militarism, the systematic resort to brute force in the struggle against one's rivals, bringing the daily of horror of war to ever-growing fractions of the world population, who are the powerless victims of this deadly imperialist free for all. If the US military superpower is in the vanguard when it comes to the use of force, the "great democracies" like Britain, France and - a fact of historic significance - Germany, are no less determined to follow the same course1;
- the leadership of the world's first power being more and more contested by most of its ex-allies and vassals;
- a questioning or weakening of the oldest and most solid imperialist alliances, as witness the historic break between America and Britain and the cooling of relations between France and Germany;
- the inability of the European Union to constitute an alternative pole to the US superpower, as illustrated strikingly by the divisions between the different European states over a conflict on their very doorstep - ie in ex-Yugoslavia.
It is within this framework that we can understand the evolution of an imperialist situation which is infinitely more complex and unstable than in the epoch of the two great imperialist blocs. The main traits of this situation are:
- the success of the American counter-offensive with its epicenter in ex-Yugoslavia
- the limits of this offensive, marked in particular by Britain's persistence in putting its alliance with America into question;
- the rapprochement between France and Britain at the same time as France distances itself from its German ally.
The success of the US counter-offensive
In the spring of 1995, the situation was indeed dominated by the weakening of the first world power, but it has clearly been altered since then, and since the summer of 1996 has been marked by a vigorous counter-offensive led by Clinton and his team. The formation of the RRF by Britain and France, which reduced the US to the role of a mere challenger on the Yugoslav scene, and, even more fundamentally, the betrayal by their oldest and most faithful lieutenant, Britain, seriously weakened America's position in Europe and made it vital that it respond on a level capable of reversing the decline in its world leadership. This counter-offensive, which has been waged with gusto, has been based on two fundamental assets. First, the USA's status as the only military superpower, capable of rapidly mobilizing its military forces to a degree far beyond the capacities of its rivals. The RRF was completely eclipsed by I-For, with the formidable logistics of the American army at its disposal: transport, sea-air forces, enormous firepower and military observation satellites. It was this demonstration of force which obliged the Europeans to sign the Dayton agreement. Then, solidly supported by this military force, Clinton, on the diplomatic level, played on the rivalries between the European powers most heavily committed in ex-Yugoslavia, in particular making skilful use of the opposition between France and Germany, which has recently been added to the more traditional antagonism between Britain and Germany2.
The direct presence of a strong American contingent in ex-Yugoslavia and in the Mediterranean as a whole has been a rude blow to the two states most involved in contesting American leadership : France and Britain. This is all tile more true in that both of these claim a leading imperialist status in the Mediterranean, and in order to preserve this status, they have done all they could since the beginning of the war in ex-Yugoslavia to prevent an American intervention that could only weaken their position in the Mediterranean.
Since then, the US has clearly shown itself to be master of the game in ex-Yugoslavia. It has had a certain degree of success in pressing Milosevic to loosen his ties with France and Britain, by alternating between the carrot and the stick. It has kept a strong hold over its Bosnian "proteges" by firmly calling them to order whenever they exhibit the least sign of independent behavior, as we saw with a recent coup constructed from start to finish by the USA, in which the latter loudly publicized certain links between Bosnia and Iran. The Americans are also trying to arrange the future by making a definite rapprochement with Zaghreb, since Croatia is the only force able to offer any opposition to Serbia. And, for the moment, they have been able to turn to their advantage the sharp tensions troubling their own creation, the Muslim-Croat Federation in the town of Mostar. All the evidence suggests that they allowed, or even encouraged the Croatian nationalists to seize the German administrator of the town, which led to the hurried departure of the latter and his replacement by an American mediator, a replacement called for by both the Croatian and Muslim factions. By establishing good relations with Croatia, the USA is above all targeting Germany, which is still Croatia's great protector. But even though, in doing this, they are exerting a certain pressure on Germany, they are also acting to accentuate the serious divisions in the Franco-German alliance over ex-Yugoslavia. Moreover, by maintaining a tactical and circumstantial alliance with Bonn in ex-Yugoslavia, they can hope to exert a better control over the activities of Germany, which remains their most dangerous imperialist rival. America's massive military presence severely limits German imperialism's margin of maneuver. Thus, three months after the setting up of I-For, the American bourgeoisie is in solid control of the situation and for the moment has neutralized the "banana skins" thrown down by Britain and France in order to sabotage the machinery of American power. From being the epicenter of the challenge to US world supremacy, ex-Yugoslavia has now become a point of departure for the defense of US leadership in Europe and the Mediterranean, ie in the central battleground of imperialist rivalries. Thus, the American military presence in Hungary can only constitute a threat to the traditional sphere of influence for German imperialism in eastern Europe. It is certainly no accident that significant tensions have arisen recently between Prague and Bonn over the Sudetenland, with tile US clearly supporting the Czechs. Similarly, a traditional ally of France like Rumania is bound to feel the effects of this American installation.
The position of strength acquired by the US in ex-Yugoslavia took a concrete form when tensions mounted in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey. Washington's voice was heard very quickly and almost at once the two antagonists gave way to its injunctions, even if the embers are still smoldering. But apart from the warning to these two countries, the USA above all took advantage of these events to underline the impotence of the European Union in dealing with conflicts in its own back yard, and thus to show who is the real boss in the Mediterranean. All this could hardly fail to be extremely annoying to Her Majesty's foreign minister!
But while Europe still represents the main stake in the preservation of American leadership, the US has to defend this on a more global scale as well. The Middle East in particular is a major field of maneuver for US imperialism. Despite the Barcelona summit initiated by France and the latter's attempts to reintroduce itself on the Middle Eastern scene, despite the success French imperialism has had with the Zeroual's election in Algeria, and the various attempts by Britain and Germany to stir up trouble in this US reserve, Uncle Sam has increased the pressure and has scored important points this last year. By pushing forward the Israel-Palestine agreement, (with the triumphant election of Arafat in the Palestinian regions), and by making the most of the dynamic created by the assassination of Rabin (to accelerate the negotiations between Israel and Syria), the US has tightened its grip on the region, while at the same time leaning more heavily on states like Iran which continue to contest US supremacy in tile Middle East3. We should also note that after an ephemeral and partial stabilization of the situation in Algeria thanks to the election of the sinister Zeroual, the fraction of the Algerian bourgeoisie linked to French imperialism is faced with a series of terrorist attacks behind which, via the "Islamists", lies the hand of the USA.
The world's first power against "every man for himself"
The vigorous counter-offensive of the American bourgeoisie has altered the whole imperialist scene, but it has not changed its essence. The US has clearly managed to demonstrate that it is still the only world superpower and that it will not hesitate to mobilize its formidable military machine to defend its leadership wherever it is under threat. Any imperialist power that seeks to contest American supremacy will find itself exposed to the wrath of the USA. At this level success has been total and the message has been clearly understood. However, despite winning some important battles, the US has not managed to eradicate the phenomenon which has obliged it to deploy such force: the tendency towards every man for himself which predominates on the imperialist arena. Momentarily and partially held back, but in no way eliminated this tendency continues to shake the whole arena, and is fed by the decomposition which affects the entire capitalist system. It remains the dominant tendency, the one which reigns over all imperialist relations, obliging each of the USA's imperialist rivals to challenge it either openly or covertly, even if there is no equality between the contending forces. Decomposition and its monstrous offspring, the war of each against all, has brought to its full flower that typical trait of the decadence of capitalism - the irrationality of war. This is the main obstacle confronting the world's superpower, an obstacle which can only generate more and more problems for the country that aspires to be the "gendarme of the world".
Having seen their margin of maneuver seriously limited in ex-Yugoslavia, France, Britain but also Germany will go elsewhere to continue their efforts to weaken and undermine US leadership. In this respect French imperialism has been particularly active. Almost totally squeezed out of the Middle East, France is using every means at its disposal to reinsert itself into this eminently strategic region. Basing itself on its traditional links with Iraq, it is mediating between the latter and the UN, shedding many a crocodile tear about the terrible consequences for the Iraqi population of the embargo imposed by the US. At the same time it is trying to increase its influence in Yemen and Qatar. It has no hesitation about stepping on Uncle Sam's toes, by claiming a role in the negotiations between Israel and Syria and once again offering its military services in Lebanon. It is still trying to maintain its sphere of influence in the Maghreb and has been very much on the offensive in Morocco and Tunisia, while at the same time defending its traditional spheres of influence in sub-Saharan Africa. And there, now assisted by its new British accomplice - whom it has thanked by allowing the Cameroon to join the Commonwealth, which would have been inconceivable a few years ago - it is maneuvering left, right and center, from the Ivory Coast to Niger (where it recently supported the coup d'etat) and on to Rwanda. Chased out of the latter country by the US, it is now cynically using the Hutu refugees in Zaire to destabilize the pro-American clique running Rwanda.
But the two most significant expressions of the French bourgeoisie's determination to resist the US bulldozer whatever the cost are, first, Chirac's visit to the USA and secondly the decision radically to transform France's armed forces. By going to meet the American godfather, the French president was expressing recognition of the new situation created by the USA's demonstration of force, but he was by no means there to pledge allegiance to Washington. The French president clearly asserted French imperialism's will to be independent by exalting European defense. But recognizing the fact that it is very difficult to openly oppose US military power, he was inaugurating a new strategy, based on the wooden horse trick. This is the whole meaning of the almost total reintegration of France into NATO. From now on, French imperialism will attempt to undermine the USA's "order" from the inside. The decision to transform the French army into a professional army, capable of mobilizing 60,000 men at any moment for external operations, is the other plank of this new strategy, and expresses the French bourgeoisie's determination to defend its imperialist interests, and that includes against those of the US gendarme. Here we should underline an important fact: with this wooden horse tactic, as with the reorganization of its armed forces, France has been studying keenly at the "British school". Britain has a long experience of this strategy. It joined the EEC with the essential aim of sabotaging this structure from within. Similarly, Britain's professional army has amply proved its effectiveness, since, with far fewer troops overall than the French army, during the Gulf war and the war in ex-Yugoslavia, it was able to mobilize numerically superior forces more quickly than the latter. Thus today, behind Chirac's activism on the imperialist scene, we have to recognize the more discrete presence of Britain. The French bourgeoisie's relative ability to defend its rank in the imperialist pecking order no doubt owes a lot to the sage advise of the most experienced bourgeoisie in the world and the close collaboration between these two states over the past year.
But the strength of the tendency of every man for himself, and the limits of the USA's demonstration of force, are shown most patently by the breakdown in the imperialist alliance that has united Britain and the US for nearly a century. Despite the formidable pressure exerted by the US to punish the treachery of "perfidious Albion" and pull it back towards its former bloc leader, the British bourgeoisie has stuck to its policy of distancing itself from Washington, as witness in particular its growing rapprochement with France, even if, through this alliance, Britain is also aiming to counter Germany. This policy is not supported unanimously by the whole British bourgeoisie, but the fraction incarnated by Thatcher, which calls for maintaining the alliance with the US, is for the moment very much in the minority and at this level Major has the total support of the Labor party. This rupture between London and Washington underlines the enormous difference with the situation at the time of the Gulf war when Britain was still Uncle Sam's faithful lieutenant. The defection of its oldest and most reliable ally is a real blow to the world's leading power, which cannot tolerate such an affront to its supremacy. This is why Clinton is using the old question of Ireland as a means to bring the traitor to heel. At the end of 1995, Clinton made a triumphant visit to Ireland during which he treated the world's oldest democracy like a banana republic, openly taking the side of the Irish nationalists and forcing London to put up with an American mediator in the person of Senator Mitchell. The plan concocted by the latter having been turned down by Major, Washington then went onto a higher level, using the weapon of terrorism in the form of the latest bombings by the IRA, which has become the armed wing of US dirty work on British soil. This illustrates the determination of the American bourgeoisie not to shrink from any means to get its former lieutenant to beg for mercy; but more than that, this resort to terrorism is testimony to the depth of the divorce between these two former allies and to the incredible chaos that now characterizes imperialist relations between the former members of the western bloc, despite the facade of "unbreakable friendship" between the two great democratic powers on either side of the Atlantic. For the moment, all this pressure from the former bloc leader only seems to have strengthened British imperialism's will to resist, even if the USA is far from having said the last word and will do everything it can to change the situation.
This development of every man for himself confronting the world's gendarme has recently manifested itself in a spectacular manner in Asia, to the point where we can say that a new front is opening in this region for the US. Thus, Japan is less and less the docile ally, since, freed from the constraints of the blocs, it can aspire to obtain an imperialist rank much more in conformity with its economic power. Hence its demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
The demonstrations against the US military presence on the Okinawa archipelago, the nomination of a new Japanese prime minister known for his anti-American diatribes and his intransigent nationalism, are witness to the fact that Japan is increasingly unwilling to put up with the American yoke and wants to assert its own imperialist interests. This can only destabilize a region where there are many latent conflicts over sovereignty, such as the one between South Korea and Japan over the small Tokdo archipelago. But the most revealing sign of the development of imperialist tensions in this part of the world is China's new aggressive attitude towards Taiwan. Looking beyond the internal motives of the Chinese bourgeoisie, which is faced with the delicate question of the succession to Deng Xiao Ping, and beyond even the Taiwan question itself, this warlike stance by Chinese imperialism means above all that it is prepared to challenge its former bloc leader, the USA, in order to defend its own imperialist prerogatives. Thus China has openly rejected Washington's many warnings, which to say the least has strained its ties to the US, with the latter being obliged to flex its muscles and dispatch an armada to the straits of Formosa. In this context of accumulating imperialist tensions and of open or covert challenges to US leadership in Asia. We can see the full significance of the rapprochement between Paris and Peking marked by the visit of H de Charette and Li Pengs invitation to Paris, as well as the holding of the first Euro-Asiatic summit. While there are definite economic motives behind this meeting, it was above all an occasion for the European Union to tread on Uncle Sam's toes, claiming to constitute the" third pole of the Europe-Asia-America triangle".
Thus. despite the firm reassertion of its supremacy, the world's gendarme is again and again faced by this wall of every man for himself. This is a real threat to its global leadership and the USA will be forced more and more to resort to brute force in response; as a result, the gendarme will become one of the main propagators of the chaos it claims to combat. This chaos, engendered by the decomposition of the capitalist system on a world scale, can only cut an increasingly destructive and murderous swathe across the whole planet.
The Franco-German alliance is put to the test
If the USA's world leadership is threatened by the exacerbation of the war of each against the growing chaos that characterizes imperialist relationships has also consigned to a more and more hypothetical future the tendency towards the formation of new imperialist blocs. This is strikingly illustrated by the turbulence through which the Franco-German alliance has been passing.
Marxism has always stressed that an imperialist alliance has nothing in common with a marriage of love or with real friendship between peoples. Self-interest alone governs such alliances and each member of an imperialist constellation aims first and foremost to defend their own interests within it and to draw the maximum profit from it. All this applies perfectly to the "motor of Europe" which the Franco-German couple used to be, and explains why it is essentially France which has been the one to start cooling off. In fact, the vision of this alliance has never been the same on the two sides of the Rhine. For Germany, things are simple. The leading economic power in Europe, handicapped by its weakness at the military level, Germany has every interest in an alliance with a European nuclear power, and this could only be with France, since Britain, despite its break with the US, remains its sworn enemy. Historically, Britain has always fought against the domination of Europe by Germany, and since reunification, the increased weight of German imperialism in Europe has only strengthened Britain's determination to oppose any German leadership of the European continent. France has often hesitated about opposing German imperialism: in the thirties, certain fractions of the French bourgeoisie were rather inclined towards an alliance with Berlin. For its part, however, Britain has always been against any imperialist constellation dominated by Germany. In the face of this historic antagonism, the German bourgeoisie has no other choice in Western Europe and it feels all the more at ease in its alliance with France in that, for all the pretensions of the "Gallic cock", it knows that it is in the stronger position. Hence the pressure it has mounted on a more and more recalcitrant ally can only have the goal of forcing it to remain faithful.
It is a very different matter for the French bourgeoisie, for whom allying itself with Germany was above all a means of controlling the latter, while hoping to exert a kind of co-leadership in Europe. The war in ex-Yugoslavia and more generally the rise of German power shattered this utopia entertained by the majority of the French bourgeoisie, who now beheld the return of the specter of "Greater Germany", haunted as they are by the memory of three wars lost to their too-powerful German neighbor.
This development of a tight collaboration between France and Britain can only weaken of the Franco-German alliance. This may in part correspond to the interests of the USA, by considerably postponing the prospect of a new bloc dominated by Germany, but it is totally against the interests of the latter. The radical reorientation of the army and military industry decided on by Chirac, while expressing the capacity of the French bourgeoisie to draw the lessons of the Gulf war and the serious reverses suffered in ex-Yugoslavia, and thus to respond to the general necessities confronting French imperialism in the world-wide defense of its positions, is also aimed directly at Germany, at several levels:
- despite Chirac's proclamations that nothing would be done without close consultation with Bonn, the German bourgeoisie has been presented with a fait accompli. France has merely communicated its decisions and does not expect any comeback;
- through the creation of a professional army and through giving priority to its external operations forces, France is clearly signaling its desire for autonomy from Germany and has facilitated the conditions for joint interventions with Britain, since while the German army is essentially based on conscription, the French army is going to be based on the British model, built around a professional corps;
- finally, the Eurocorps, symbol par excellence of the Prance-German alliance, is directly ilireatened by this reorganization; the group responsible for defense in the dominant party of the French bourgeoisie, the RPR, is demanding its abolition pure and simple.
The more the capitalist system sinks into decomposition, the more inter-imperialist relations are marked by a growing chaos, breaking up the oldest and most solid alliances and unleashing the war of each against all. The resort to brute force on the part of the world's first power is not only proving powerless to hold back this advance into chaos, but is becoming a supplementary factor in propagating the leprosy which is eating away at the imperialist system. The only real winners in this infernal spiral are militarism and war, which like Moloch demand more and more victims to satisfy their frightful appetites. Six years after the collapse of the eastern bloc, which was supposed to usher in an "era of peace", more than ever the only alternative is the one outlined by the Communist International at its first Congress: "socialism or barbarism".
RN 10.3.96
1 The decline in military budgets which is supposed to be part of the "peace dividend", far from expressing a real disarmament such as that following World War I, is really a gigantic reorganization of military forces aimed at making them more effective, more murderous, in the context of the new imperialist situation created by the formidable development of every man for himself.
2 The USA did not hesitate to tactically get the support of Germany, via Croatia (see International Review no.83).
3 The recent series of bombings in Israel, whoever ordered them, can only play to the advantage of the USA' rivals. The latter was not deceived when it immediately pointed the finger at Iran and summoned the Europeans to break all relations with this "terrorist state", which is no small nerve on the part of a state which is using terrorism very widely, from Algeria to London via Paris! The response of the Europeans was unambiguous: no. In a general way, terrorism, once the classic weapon of the weak, is now more and more being used by the great powers in the deadly struggle amongst themselves. This is a typical expression of the chaos engendered by decomposition.
4 Similarly, concerning the vision of Europe's future, France has clearly distanced itself from the federal vision defended by Germany, moving closer to the schema upheld by Britain.
In part two of this article, we will concentrate on the way Bakunin' s Alliance went about taking over and destroying the International. We will try to show the tactics used against the workers' movement as concretely as possible, basing ourselves on the analysis made by the International itself. We are convinced that the identification of these tactics of the bourgeoisie and of parasitism, the drawing of the lessons of the fight against Bakuninism, are indispensable for the defense of the revolutionary milieu today.
The war of capital against the International
From the outset, the bourgeoisie used its police, courts, prisons, and later its execution squads against the International. But this was not its most dangerous weapon. Indeed, the Hague Congress showed how "the IWA, the representative of labor, grew all the stronger as persecutions increased" (The Hague Congress of the First International,Minutes and Documents, Progress Publishers, Moscow p.146).
The bourgeoisie's most dangerous weapon was precisely the attempt to destroy the International from within, through infiltration, manipulation and intrigue. This strategy consists in provoking suspicion, demoralization, divisions and open splits within a proletarian organization, in order to make it destroy itself. Whereas repression always carries the risk of provoking the solidarity of the working class with the victims, destruction from within is capable, not only of destroying a proletarian party or group, but of ruining its reputation and thus erasing it from the collective memory and traditions of the working class. More generally speaking, it aims at slandering organizational discipline, at presenting the struggle against police infiltration, the fight against the ambitions of the declassed elements of the ruling class to take over and destroy proletarian groups, the resistance against petty bourgeois individualism, as a "dictatorship" or as the "administrative elimination of rivals. "
Before showing how the bourgeoisie with the help of political parasitism, in particular Bakuninism, went about this work of destruction and denigration, we will briefly recall the nature of the fear provoked within the bourgeoisie by the International.
The bourgeoisie feels threatened by the International
Thus, on the eve of the plebiscite with which Louis Napoleon prepared his war against Prussia, the Paris members of the International, under the pretext of having taken part in a plot to assassinate Louis Bonaparte, were arrested on the 23rd of April, 1870. Simultaneous arrests of Internationalists took place at Lyon, Rouen, Marseilles, Brest and other towns.
With the capitulation of Sedan, when the second empire ended as it began, by a parody, the French-German War entered upon its second phase. It became war against the French people ... From that moment she found herself compelled not only to fight the Republic in France, but simultaneously the International in Germany" (Report of the General Council to the Hague Congress, Minutes and Documents, p.213)
"If the war against the International had been localized, first in France (...) then in Germany (...) it became general since the rise, and after the fall, of the Paris Commune. On the 6th of June, 1871, Jules Favre issued his circular to the Foreign Powers demanding the extradition of the refugees of the Commune as common criminals, and a general crusade against the International as the enemy of family, religion, order and property" (ibid p.215).
By the time of the Paris Commune, at the latest, all sectors of the ruling classes had realized the mortal danger which international socialist organization posed to their rule. Although the International could not itself play a leading role during the events of the Paris Commune, the bourgeoisie was perfectly aware that this uprising, the first attempt of the working class to destroy the bourgeois state and replace it with its own class rule, would not have been possible without the political and organizational autonomy and maturity of the proletariat - a maturity which the International represented.
Moreover, it was the political menace which the very existence of the International posed for the long term domination of capital which to a large extent explained the savagery with which the Paris Commune was jointly repressed by the French and German states.
After the Paris Commune: the bourgeoisie tries to break up and discredit the IWA
In fact, as Marx and Engels were just beginning to realize at the time of the famous Hague Congress in 1872, the defeat of the Paris Commune and of the French proletariat as a whole spelled the beginning of the end of the International. The association of the leading sectors of the European and American workers, founded in 1864, was not an artificial creation, but the product of the international upswing of the class struggle at that time. The crushing of the Commune spelled the end of this upsurge, opening a period of defeat and political disarray. Just as the Communist League had fallen prey to a similar disarray after the defeat of the revolutions of 1848-49, with many of its members refusing to recognize that the revolutionary period was over, the International after 1871 was entering a period of decline. In this situation, the principle concern of Marx and Engels became to allow the International to conclude its work in good order. It was with this in mind that, at the Hague Congress, they proposed transferring the General Council of the IWA to New York, where it would be out of the front line of bourgeois repression and internal feuds. They wanted above all to preserve the reputation of the Association, to defend its political and organizational principles, so that they could be passed on to future generations of revolutionaries. In particular, the experience of the First International should serve as a basis for the construction of a Second International as soon as the objective conditions allowed.
For the ruling classes, however, there was no question of allowing the International to conclude its work in good order, to let it pass on the lessons of its first steps in international centralized organization on the basis of statutes to future proletarian generations. The slaughter of the Paris workers was the signal for bringing to a conclusion the whole work of internal undermining and discrediting which had already begun long before the Commune. The most intelligent representatives of the ruling classes feared that the First International would go down in history as a decisive moment in the adoption of marxism by the workers' movement. One such intelligent representative of the exploiters was Bismarck, who throughout the 1860s had secretly, and sometimes openly, supported the Lassalleans within the German workers' movement in order to combat the development of marxism. But there were others, as we shall see, who joined together to disrupt and wreck the political vanguard of the working class.
Bakunin's Alliance, the main weapon in Capital's war against the International
Bakunin had failed in his original scheme to unite the International with the bourgeois League for Peace and Freedom under his own control, his propositions having been refused by the general congress of the whole International in Brussels. Bakunin explained this defeat to his bourgeois friends of the League as follows: "I could not have foreseen that the Congress of the International would reply with an insult as gross as it was pretentious, but this was due to the intrigues of a certain clique of Germans who detest the Russians and everybody except themselves" (Bakunin's letter to Gustav Vogt of the League, quoted in the documents of the Hague Congress p.388).
Regarding this letter, Nicolai Utin, in his report to the Hague Congress, pointed out one of the central aspects of Bakunin 's politics. Instead of openly attacking the program and statutes of a proletarian organization, he makes a personal attack against certain members of its central organs, accusing them of wielding a personal dictatorship.
"It proves that it is to that time, if not earlier, that Bakunin's calumnies date, against citizen Marx, against the Germans, and against the whole of the International, which was already accused then,and a priori - since Bakunin had no knowledge at that time either of the organization or of the activity of the Association - of being a blind tool in the hands of Citizen Marx, of the German clique (later distorted by Bakunin's supporters into an authoritarian clique of Bismarckian minds); to that time also dates Bakunin's rancorous hatred of the General Council and above all of certain of its members" ("Utin's Report to the Hague Congress, presented by the Investigation Commission on the Alliance", Minutes and Documents p.388).
This approach is fundamental to political parasitism. Instead of confronting its opponents openly, and on a political terrain, it spreads personal calumnies behind the back of proletarian organs. These attacks are aimed against certain persons seen as particularly staunch defenders of the statutes of such organizations. More generally, they serve to whip up a general feeling of suspicion within and around the organization under attack. At the same time, this approach reflects the feeling of the likes of Bakunin that since we conspire on the basis of personal politics, our opponents probably do too.
However, the Alliance's first application for membership had to be refused, since its organizational practice did not conform to the statutes of the Association.
"The General Council refused to admit the Alliance as long as it retained its distinct international character; it promised to admit the Alliance only on the condition that the latter would dissolve its special international organization, that its sections would become ordinary sections of our Association, and that the Council should be informed of the seat and numerical strength of each new section formed" (ibid).
This latter point was insisted on by the General Council to prevent the Alliance entering the International secretly, under different names.
The Alliance replied: "The question of dissolution has today been decided. In communicating this decision to the various groups of the Alliance, we have invited them to follow our example and constitute themselves into sections of the International Working Men's Association, and seek recognition as such either from you or from the Federal Councils of the Association in their respective countries" (ibid p.349, quoted by Engels in his report).
However, the Alliance did nothing of the kind. Its sections neither declared their location and numerical strength, nor did they openly apply for membership in their own name.
"The Geneva section proved to be the only one to request admission to the International. Nothing was heard about other allegedly existing sections of the Alliance. Nevertheless, in spite of the constant intrigues of the Alliancists who sought to impose their special program on the entire International and gain control of our Association, one was bound to accept that the Alliance had kept its word and disbanded itself. The General Council, however, has received fairly clear indications which forced it to conclude that the Alliance was not even contemplating dissolution and that, in spite of its solemn undertaking, it existed and was continuing to function as a secret society, using this underground organization to realize its original aim - the securing of complete control" ("Report to the Hague Congress", ibid, p.349).
In fact, at the moment the Alliance declared its dissolution, the General Council did not possess sufficient proofs to justify a refusal to admit it to the International. And it had been "misled by some signatures on the program which gave the impression that the Alliance had been recognized by the Romance Federal Committee" ("The Alliance and the IWA", Minutes and Documents p.522).
But this had not been the case, since the Romance Federal Committee did not trust the Alliancists one inch, and with good reason.
"The secret organization hidden behind the public Alliance now went into full action. Behind the International's Geneva section was the Central Bureau of the Secret Alliance: behind the International's sections of Naples, Barcelona, Lyons and Jura lay the secret sections of the Alliance. Relying on this freemasonry, whose existence was suspected neither by the mass of the International's membership nor by their administrative centers, Bakunin hoped to win control of the International at the Basle Congress in September 1869" (ibid p.522-523).
To this end, the Alliance began to set in motion its secret international apparatus.
"The secret Alliance sent instructions to its adherents in every corner of Europe, directing them whom to choose as delegates and to whom to give a mandate if they could not send one of their own men. In many areas members were very surprised indeed to find that for the first time in the history of the International the selection of delegates was not being carried out in a straightforward, open, matter-of-fact way, and letters reached the General Council asking what was in the wind" (Karl Marx: Man and Fighter, Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, p.31l).
At the Basle Congress. the Alliance failed to achieve its main goal: that of transferring the General Council from London to Geneva, where Bakunin expected to be able to dominate it. The Alliance did not give up: it changed tactics.
"Right from the start the activities of the Alliance fall into two distinct phases. The first is characterized by the assumption that it would be successful in gaining control of the General Council and thereby securing supreme direction of our Association. It was at this stage that the Alliance urged its adherents to uphold the "strong organization" of the International and, above all, "the authority of the General Council and of the Federal Councils and Central Committees"; and it was at this stage that gentlemen of the Alliance demanded at the Basle Congress that the General Council be invested with those wide powers which they later rejected with such horror as being authoritarian" ("Report on the Alliance", Minutes and Documents p.354).
Only after their defeat at Basle did the Bakuninists unfurl the flag of anti-authoritarianism throughout the International. This shows that for the Alliance, taking over control of the International was its essential goal, whereas its "program" was secondary, a mere means to an end. For Bakunin himself, who propagated authoritarianism and anti-authoritarianism, peasant revolution and worship of the Russian Czar, proletarian internationalism and rabid pan-slavism, depending on whom he was addressing himself to, questions of programmatic principles were quite irrelevant.
The bourgeoisie assists Bakunin's work of sabotage
In part one of this article, on the pre-history of Bakunin's conspiracy, we have already indicated the class nature of his secret society. Even if the majority of its members were not aware of the fact, the Alliance represented nothing less than a Trojan horse through which the bourgeoisie attempted to destroy the International from within.
Bakunin's attempt to take control of the IWA at the Basle Congress, not even a year after joining it, was only possible because he was assisted by the bourgeoisie. This assistance provided him with a political and organizational power base even before he joined the International.
Fanelli was a long standing member of the Italian parliament with the most intimate connections with the highest representatives of the Italian bourgeoisie.
The second bourgeois origin of Bakunin's power base was thus his linkage to "influential circles" in Italy. In October 1864, in London, Bakunin told Marx he was going to Italy to work for the International, and Marx wrote to Engels to say how impressed he was by this intention. But Bakunin was lying.
"Through Dolfi he was introduced into the society of the Freemasons where the Fee thinking elements of Italy were united", as Bakunin's German aristocratic admirer and biographer Richarda Huch tells us (Huch: Bakunin und die Anarchic, p.147). As we saw in part one of this article. Bakunin, who left London for Italy in 1864 took advantage of the absence of the International in that country to prepare sections there under his own control and after his own image. Those who, like the German Cuno who founded the Milan section, opposed the domination by the secret "brotherhood", were conveniently arrested or deported by the police at decisive moments.
Commenting on this, the report adds: "The Holy Father is right. The Alliance in Italy is not a "workers' union" but a rabble of declasses. All the so-called sections of the Italian International are run by lawyers without clients, doctors with neither patients nor medical knowledge, students of billiards, commercial travelers and other tradespeople, and principally journalists from small papers with a more or less dubious reputation. Italy is the only country where the International press - or what calls itself such - has acquired the characteristics of Le Figaro. One need only glance at the writing of the secretaries of these so-called sections to realize that it is the work of clerks or professional authors. By taking over all the official posts in the sections in this way, the Alliance managed to compel the Italian workers, each time they wanted to enter into relations with one another or with the other councils of the International to resort to the services of declasse members of the Alliance who found in the International a "career" and a "way out"" ("The Alliance and the IWA", Minutes and Documents p.556).
It was thanks to this infrastructure coming from the League that organ of the West European bourgeoisie influenced by the secret diplomacy of the Russian Tsar and from the "free-thinking" and "masonic" Italian bourgeois declassed riff-raff, that Bakunin could launch such a strong attack against the International.
Thus, it was after the Berne Congress of the League of Peace (September 1868) that the above mentioned Fanelli, Italian member of parliament and founding member of the Alliance, was sent to Spain "furnished with references by Bakunin for Garrido, deputy at the Cortes who put him in touch with republican circles,bourgeois and working class alike" in order to set up the Alliance on the Iberian peninsula. ("The Alliance and the IWA", ibid p.537). Here we see the typical methods of the "abstentionist" anarchists allegedly refusing to have anything to do with "politics".
It was through such methods that the Alliance spread itself in those parts of Europe where the industrial proletariat was still extremely underdeveloped: Italy and Spain, the south of France and the Jura mountains in Switzerland. Using such methods, at the Basle Congress "thanks to its dishonest methods, the secret Alliance found itself represented by at least ten delegates including the famous Albert Richard and Bakunin himself ("The Alliance and the IWA", p.523).
But all these Bakuninist sections secretly dominated by the Alliance were not in themselves sufficient. In order to take control of the International, it was necessary for Bakunin and his followers to be accepted by, and take control of, one of the already established, oldest and most important sections of the Association. Coming from the outside, Bakunin realized the need to invest himself with the authority of such a section already widely recognized inside the organization. This is why Bakunin had from the outset moved to Geneva, where he founded his own "Geneva Section of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy". Even before the open conflict with the General Council began, it was here that the first decisive resistance of the International to Bakuninist sabotage began.
The battle for control of the Swiss-Romance Federation
"But in December 1868 the Alliance of Socialist Democracy had just been formed in Geneva and declared itself a section of the IWA. This new section asked three times in fifteen months for admission to the group of Geneva sections, and three times was refused, first by the Central Council of all the Geneva sections and then by the Romance Federal Committee. In September 1869, Bakunin, the founder of the Alliance, was defeated at Geneva when he stood as candidate for the delegation to the Basle Congress. and his candidature was rejected, the Geneva members appointing Grosselin as their delegate. The discussions begun then (...) by Bakunin's supporters led by himself to force Grosselin to resign and give way to Bakunin - these discussions must have convinced Bakunin that Geneva was not a favorable place for his scheming. At their meetings the Geneva workers did not conceal their dissatisfaction. Their scorn for his high sounding words. This fact, together with other Russian matters, provided the motive for Bakunin's voluntary departure from Geneva" ("Utin's Report", ibid p.378).
At a time when the General Council in London was still acting very hesitantly, admitting the Alliance against its own better judgment, the workers' sections in Switzerland were already openly resisting Bakunin's attempts to impose his will in violation of the statutes. Whereas bourgeois historians, true to their vision of history made by "great individuals", portray the struggle in the International as a contest "between Marx and Bakunin", and whereas the anarchists present Bakunin as the innocent victim of Marx, the very first battle against the Bakuninists in Switzerland immediately reveals that this was a struggle by the whole organization in its own defense.
However, this proletarian resistance to Bakunin's open attempts at a takeover did not prevent him from splitting the Swiss sections. Behind the scenes, Bakunin had already begun to gain his own peronal supporters in the country. These he gained mainly through non-political means of persuasion, in particular the charisma of his own personality, with which he conquered the Locle Internationalist section in the Jura watch-making region. Locle had been a center of resistance to the Lassallean policy of support for the conservatives against the bourgeois radicals pursued by Coullery, the opportunist pioneer of the International in Switzerland. Although Marx and Engels were the most prominent opponents of Lassalle in Germany, Bakunin told the artisans in Locle that the rottenness of Coullery's politics was the result of the authoritarianism of Marx within the International, so that a secret society was necessary to "revolutionize" the Association. The local branch of the secret Alliance led by Guillaume became the couspirational center from which the struggle against the Swiss International was directed.
Bakunin's supporters were scarcely represented in the industrial towns, but had a strong presence among the artisan craftsmen of the Jura. They now split the Chaux-de-Fonds Congress of the Romance Federation around their attempts to oblige the Geneva section to admit the Alliance, and to take the Federal Committee and the editorial board of the press away from Geneva to be placed in the hands of Bakunin's right hand man Guillaume in Neuchatel. The Bakuninists completely sabotaged the Congress agenda, admitting discussion on no other point except the matter of the Alliance. Unable to impose their will, the Alliancists broke off from the Congress, moved to a nearby cafe, and immediately entitled themselves "Congress of the Romance Federation" and appointed "their own" Romance Federal Committee - in open breach of articles 53, 54 and 55 of the Federation's statutes.
Face with this coup, the Geneva delegation declared that "it was a matter of deciding whether the Association wished to remain a federation of working men's societies, aiming at the emancipation of the workers by the workers themselves, or whether it wished to abandon its program in face of a plot formed by a few bourgeois with the evident aim of seizing the leadership of the Association by means of its public organs and its secret conspiracies" ("Utin's Report", ibid p.383).
With this, the Geneva delegation had immediately grasped the entirety of what was going on.
Indeed, the split which the bourgeoisie longed for had been achieved.
In Germany there was the struggle between the true Internationalists and the blind followers of Schweizer, but that struggle did not go beyond the borders of Germany, and the members of the International in all countries soon condemned that Prussian government agent, though at first he was well masked and seemed to be a great revolutionary.
In Belgium an attempt to misuse and exploit our Association was made by a certain Mr. Coudray, who also seemed at first to be an influential member, highly devoted to our cause, but in the end turned out to be nothing but a schemer whom the Belgian Federal Council and sections soon dealt with despite the important role which he had managed to assume.
With the exception of this fleeting incident the International was progressing like a real family of brothers animated by the same strivings and having no time to waste in idle and personal disputes.
In the same issue La Solidarite foretold that there would soon be a profound split between the reactionaries (the Geneva delegates to the Chaux-de-Fonds Congress) and several members of the Geneva Building Workers' Section. At the same time posters appeared on the walls in Geneva signed by Chevalley, Cognon, Heng and Charles Perron [well known Bakuninists] announcing that the undersigned had arrived as delegates from Neuchatel to reveal to the Geneva members of the International the truth about the Chaux-de-Fonds Congress. This was logically equivalent to a public accusation against all the Geneva delegates, who were thus treated as liars hiding the truth from the members of the International.
The Swiss bourgeois newspapers then announced to the world that there was a split in the International" ("Utin's Report", Minutes and Documents p.376, 377).
The stakes in this first great battle were enormous for the International, but also for the Alliance, since its failure to be accepted in Geneva "would prove to all the members of the International in other places that there was something abnormal about the Alliance (...) and this would naturally undermine, paralyze the "prestige" that the founder of the Alliance was dreaming of for his creation and the influence which it was to exert above all outside of Geneva.
On the other hand, if it was a nucleus recognized and accepted by the Geneva and Romance group, the Alliance could, according to its founder's plan, usurp the right to speak in the name of the whole of the Romance Federation, which would necessarily give it great weight outside Switzerland ...
Confronted with this situation, Bakunin remained true to his destructive principle: one must split what one cannot take over.
"Nevertheless, the Alliance continued to insist on joining the Romance Federation which was then forced to decide on the expulsion of Bakunin and the other ringleaders. And so there were now two Romance Federal Committees, one at Geneva. the other at La Chaux-de-Fonds. The vast majority of the sections remained loyal to the former, while the latter had a following of only fifteen sections, many of which (...) one by one ceased to exist" ("Utin's Report", ibid p.526).
The Alliance now appealed to the General Council to decide which of the two should be considered as the true central organ, hoping to profit from the name Bakunin and from the ignorance of Swiss affairs assumed to reign in London. But as soon as the General Council pronounced in favor of the original federation of Geneva. calling on the La Chaux-de-Fonds group to transform itself into a local section, London was immediately denounced as "authoritarian" for meddling in Swiss affairs.
The London Conference 1871
During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the class struggles in France leading to the Paris Commune of 1871, the organizational struggle within the International receded into the background, without however disappearing. The defeat of the Commune, and the new quality of the attacks of the bourgeoisie, soon made it necessary to redouble all the measures of defense of the revolutionary organization. By the time of the London Conference (September 1871), it was becoming clear that the IWA was being attacked in a coordinated manner from without and within, and that in reality the bourgeoisie was the coordinator.
Only a few months previously, this had been less clear. "When material dealing with the Bakuninist organizations fell into the hands of the Paris police as a result of the arrests in May 1871, and the public prosecutor announced in the press that a secret society of conspirators existed besides the official International. Marx believed it to be one of the usual police forgeries". "Its the old tomfoolery" he wrote to Engels. "In the end the police won't even believe each other any more"" (Karl Marx: Man and Fighter p.315).
In September 1871, the London Conference, held in the teeth of international repression and slanders, proved equal to its task. For the first time ever, the international, internal, organizational questions dominated an international meeting of the Association. The conference adopted the proposition of Vaillant, insisting that the political and the social questions are two sides of the same task of the proletariat to destroy class society. The documents, in particular the resolution "On the Political Action of the Working Class" drawing the lessons of the Commune, showing the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for a separate working class party were a blow against the political abstentionists: "those assistants of the bourgeoisie whether consciously or not", as was pointed out at the conference (Die Erste International Vol.2 p.143).
At the organizational level, this struggle was concertized by the reinforcement of the responsibilities of the General Council. giving it the power if necessary, to suspend sections between international congresses. It was concertized by the resolution against secret societies, outlawing their existence within the organization. And it was concertized by the resolution against the activities of Nechayev, a collaborator of Bakunin in Russia. The Russian Nikolai Utin, since he was able to read all the documents of the Bakuninists in Russian, was commissioned by the Conference to draw up a report on this latter question. Since this report threatened to expose the whole Bakuninist conspiracy, much was undertaken to prevent it being drawn up. After an attempt of the Swiss authorities to expel Utin had to be withdrawn in the face of a massive public campaign by the International, an (almost successful) assassination attempt against Utin was made in Zurich by the Bakuninists.
Hand in hand with this bourgeois violence went the Sonvillier circular of the Bakuninist Jura Federation attacking the London Conference. This open attack had become all the more necessary for the Alliance, since the London Conference had brought the manipulations of Bakunin's followers in Spain out into the open.
"Even the most devoted members of the International in Spain were led to believe that the program of the Alliance was identical to that of the International, that this secret organization existed everywhere and that it was almost the duty of all to belong to it. This illusion was destroyed by the London Conference, where the Spanish delegate, himself a member of the Central Council of the Alliance in his country, could convince himself that the contrary was the fact, and also by the Jura circular itself, whose bitter attacks and lies against the Conference and the General Council were immediately taken up by all the organs of the Alliance. The first result of the Jura circular in Spain was the emergence of disagreements within the Spanish Alliance between those who were first and foremost members of the International and those who would not recognize it, since it had not come under Alliance control" ("Report on the Alliance", Minutes and Documents, p.355-356).
The Alliance in Russia: provocation in the interests of reaction
The "Nechayev affair" dealt with at the London Conference risked totally discrediting the International and thus menacing its very existence. During the first public political trial in Russian history, in July 1871, 80 men and women were accused of belonging to a secret society which had usurped the name of the IWA. Nechayev, who claimed to be an emissary of a so-called International Revolutionary Committee allegedly working for the International, obliged Russian youth to engage in a series of frauds, and forced some of them to assist in the murder of one of their members, who had been found guilty of doubting the existence of Nechayev's all powerful committee. This Nechayev, who escaped from Russia leaving these young revolutionaries to their fate, and went to Switzerland where he also engaged in blackmail, and tried to set up a gang to rob foreign tourists, was the direct collaborator of Bakunin. Behind the back of the Association, Bakunin had supplied Nechayev not only with a "mandate" to act in the Association's name in Russia, but also with an ideological justification for his acts. This was the "Revolutionary Catechism" based on the morality of Jesuitism so much admired by Bakunin, according to which the end justifies any means whatever, including lies, murder, extortion, blackmail, the elimination of comrades who "get in the way" etc.
In the fourth part of this series we will come back to Bakunin's Russian activities in more detail. Here, it is essential to understand the role they played in Bakunin's war against the International.
On the practice of sending ultra-radical proclamations by post to Russia, even to unpolitical people, Utin wrote: "Since letters are opened by the secret police in Russia, how could Bakunin and Nechayev seriously suppose that proclamations could be sent to Russia in envelopes to persons, known or unknown, on the one hand without compromising those persons and on the other hand without risking running up against a spy?" (Minutes and Documents, p.416).
We consider the explanation for this given by Utin's report to be the most likely.
In other words, by provoking the arrest of so many people in this way, and thus making Western Europe believe that he was the leader of a vast and audacious revolutionary organization in Russia, Bakunin intended to crown his attempts to present himself as Europe's greatest revolutionary deserving to lead the International.
Since, as Marx and Engels often pointed out, the Russian political police at home, and its "brotherhood" of agents abroad, was internationally the most formidable of its day, with agents in every radical political movement throughout Europe, it can be assumed that this so-called "third department" knew of Bakunin' s plans and tolerated them.
Conclusion
The construction of revolutionary proletarian organizations is not a peaceful process. It is a permanent struggle in the face, not only of the intrusions of petty bourgeois and other intermediate and declassed influences and attitudes, but of planned sabotage organized by the class enemy. The First International's struggle against this sabotage on the part of the Alliance is one of the most important organizational struggles in the history of the workers' movement. This struggle is full of lessons for today. The assimilation of these lessons is more vital than ever if the defense of the revolutionary milieu and the preparation of the class party is to succeed. These lessons are all the more relevant, since they have been formulated in a most concrete manner, and with the direct participation of the founders of scientific socialism, Marx and Engels. The whole struggle against Bakunin is a single lesson in the application of the marxist method to the defense and construction of communist organization. It is in assimilating these examples set by our great predecessors that the present generation of revolutionaries, still suffering from the break in organic continuity with the past workers' movement caused by the Stalinist counter-revolution, can more firmly place themselves in the tradition of this great organizational struggle. The lessons of these struggles waged by the IWA, by the Bolsheviks, by the Italian Left and others are an essential arm in the present struggle of marxism against the circle spirit, liquidationism and political parasitism. This is why we consider it necessary to go into very concrete detail in order to show the reality of this struggle in the history of the workers' movement.
KR
In the last article in this series we showed that, contrary to the doubt raised by many self-professed "communists", the fundamental aim of the socialist parties of the late 19th century was indeed socialism - a society without commodity relations, classes, or a state. In this sequel we will examine how the authentic socialists of that time envisaged the way that the future communist society would tackle some of mankind's most pressing social problems: in this case, the relationship between man and woman and between humankind and the nature from which it has sprung. Here, once again in defending the communists of the Second International, we offer a more general defence of marxism against some its more recent "critics", above all the petty bourgeois radicalism that lies at the origins of feminism and ecologism, which have now become fully-fledged instruments of the dominant ideology.
We have already mentioned that the enormous popularity of Bebel's Woman and Socialism lay to a great extent in the fact that this work took the "woman question" as a point of embarkation for a theoretical journey towards a socialist society, whose geography was to be described in some detail. It was primarily as a guide to this socialist landscape that the book had such a powerful impact on the contemporary workers' movement. But this does not mean that the question of women's oppression was merely a convenient hook or artifice. On the contrary, it was a real and growing concern of the proletarian movement of that period: it is no accident that Bebel's book was more or less coterminous with Engels' Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State (see the article in this series in International Review no. 81).
It will be necessary to emphasis this point, because for certain crude versions of feminism - particularly the kind that has flowered among the radical intelligentsia in the USA - marxism itself is just another patriarchal ideology, an invention of those "Dead White Males" who have nothing to say about the oppression of women. The most thoroughgoing of these feminist-feminists will even argue that marxism can be dismissed instantly because Marx himself was a Victorian Husband and Father who secretly sired an illegitimate son on his housekeeper. We will not waste any time here refuting the latter argument since it amply reveals its own banality. But the idea that marxism has nothing to say on the "woman question" does need to be dealt with, not least because it has been leant some weight by certain economistic and mechanical interpretations of marxism itself.
We have placed the term "woman question" in inverted commas up till now not because this question does not exist for marxism, but because it can only be posed as a problem for humanity, as the problem of the relationship between men and women, and not as a question apart. From the very beginning of his work as a communist, legitimately inspired by Fourier's insights on this matter, Marx posed the question as follows: "The immediate, natural and necessary relation of human being to human being is also the relation of man to woman. In this natural species relationship man's relation to nature is directly his relation to man, and his relation to man is directly his relation to nature, to his own natural function. Thus, in this relation is sensuously revealed, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which human nature has become nature for man and to which nature has become human nature for him. From this relationship man's whole level of development can be assessed. It follows from the character of this relationship how far man had become, and has understood himself as, a species being, a human being" (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, "Private Property and Labour").
Here, the man-woman relationship is placed in its fundamental natural and historical framework. The passage was written against those misconceived notions of communism which argued for (or accused communists of arguing for) a "community of women", the total subordination of women to male lust. On the contrary, a really human life could only be attained when relations between men and women were free of all taint of domination and oppression - and this was only possible in a communist society.
This theme was constantly reiterated throughout the subsequent evolution of rnarxist thought. From the Communist Manifesto's denunciation of the hypocritical bourgeois cant about the eternal values of the family - values which capitalist exploitation was itself constantly undermining - to the historical analysis of the transformation of family structures in different social systems contained in Engels' Origins of the Family, marxism had sought to explain not only that the particular oppression of women was a reality, but also to locate its material and social origins in order to point the way to its supercession (see International Review no. 81). In the period of the Second International, these concerns were taken up by the likes of Eleanor Marx, Klara Zetkin, Alexandra Kollontai and Lenin. Opposed to bourgeois feminism which, like its latter day incarnations, aimed to dissolve class antagonisms into the gaseous concept of "sisterhood", the Socialist parties of this period also recognised the need for a particular effort to draw proletarian women, who were often cut off from productive and associated labour, into the struggle for the social revolution.
In tins context, Bebel's Woman and Socialism was a definite landmark in the marxist approach to the problem of women's oppression. The following first-hand account illustrates graphically the impact the book had in challenging the rigidities of the sexual division of labour in the "Victorian" age - rigidities which were also present and operational in the workers' movement itself: "Although I was not a Social democrat I had friends who belonged to the party. Through them I got the precious work. I read it nights through. It was my own fate and that of thousands of my sisters. Neither in the family nor in public life had I ever heard of all the pain the woman must endure. One ignored her life. Bebel's book courageously broke with the old secretiveness. I read the book not once but ten times. Because everything was so new, it took considerable effort to come to grips with Bebel's views. I had to break with so many things that I had previously regarded as correct" (Ottilie Baader, cited in Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of Women, Pluto Press 1983, p 97).
Baader went on to join the party, which is of seminal importance: by laying bare the real origins of their oppression, Bebel's book had the effect of bringing proletarian women (and men) into the struggle of their class, the struggle for socialism. The immense impact the book had in its day can be measured by the number of editions it went through: 50 between 1879 and 1910, including a number of revisions and translations.
In its more developed editions, the book is divided into three parts - woman in the past, in the present and in the future, thereby conveying the essential strength of the marxist method: its capacity to situate all the questions it examines in a broad historical framework which also points the way to the future resolution of existing conflicts and contradictions.
The first part, "Woman in the past" does not add a great deal to what Engels put forward in his Origins of the Family. In fact, it was the publication of Engels' work which led Bebel to revise his first version, which had rather tended towards the idea that women had been "equally" oppressed in all previous societies. Engels, following Morgan, had demonstrated that this oppression had developed in a qualitative manner with the emergence of private property and class divisions. Thus Bebel's revised edition was able to show the link between the rise of the patriarchal family and that of private property: "With the dissolution of the old gentile organisation, the influence and position of women sank rapidly. The mother-right vanished; the father-right stepped into its shoes. Man now became a private property holder: he had an interest in children, whom he could look upon as legitimate and whom he made the heirs of his property: hence he forced upon woman the command of abstinence from intercourse with other men" (Bebel, Schocken paperback edition, 1971, p28).
The most important parts of the book are the next two sections: the third, as we have seen (see International Review no. 84) because it broadened out into a general vista of the future socialist society; the second because, on the basis of extensive research, it aimed to prove concretely how the existing bourgeois society, for all its pretensions about freedom and equality, ensured the perpetuation of woman's subordination. Bebel demonstrated this not only with regard to the immediately political sphere - women were denied the vote even in the majority of the" democratic" countries of the day, let alone in Junker-dominated Germany - but also in the social sphere, in particular the sphere of marriage, where woman was subordinate to the man in all matters - financial, legal, and sexual. This inequality applied to all classes but struck the proletarian wife with added force, since apart from all the pressures of poverty she also frequently suffered the dual obligation of daily wage labour and the unending demands of domestic work and childrearing. Bebel's detailed depiction of how the combined stresses of wage and domestic labour ruthlessly undermined the possibility of harmonious relationships between men and women has a remarkably contemporary feel, even in the age of the so-called "Liberated Woman" and of the "New Man".
Bebel also shows that if "marriage presents one side of the sexual life of the capitalist or bourgeois world, prostitution presents the other. Marriage is the obverse, prostitution the reverse of the medal" (p146). Bebel angrily denounces this society's hypocritical attitude to prostitution; not only because bourgeois marriage, in which the wife - above all in the upper classes - is virtually bought and owned by the husband, is itself akin to a legalised form of prostitution, but also because the majority of prostitutes are proletarian women forced "downwards" out of their class by the economic constraints of capitalism, by poverty and unemployment. And not only this: the respectable bourgeois society, which brings women to this state in the first place, unfailingly punishes the prostitute and protects the "client", especially if he is from the upper reaches of that society. Particularly odious were the police "hygiene" checks on prostitutes which not only humiliated the women under examination but had no worth whatever in halting the spread of venereal diseases.
Between marriage and prostitution, bourgeois society was completely unable to provide human beings with the bases of sexual fulfilment. No doubt some of Bebel's pronouncements on sexual behaviour reflect the prejudices of his day, but their underlying dynamic is definitely towards the future. Anticipating Freud, he argued forcefully that the repression of the sexual drive leads to neurosis: "It is a commandment of the human being to itself - a commandment that it must obey if it wishes to develop normally and in health - that it neglect the exercise of no member of its body, deny gratification to no natural impulse. The laws of the physical development of man must be studied and observed, the same as those of mental development. The mental activity of the human being is the expression of the physiological composition of its organs. The complete health of the former is intimately connected with the health of the latter. A disturbance of the one inevitably has a disturbing effect on the other. Nor do the so-called animal desires take lower rank than the so-called mental ones. This holds good for man as for woman" (p80). Freud, of course was to take such insights onto a much deeper level1. But the particular strength of marxism is that, on the basis of such scientific observations of human needs, it is able to show that a truly healthy human being can only exist in a healthy society, and that the real cure for neurosis lies in the social rather than the purely individual domain.
In the more directly "economic" sphere, Bebel shows that, for all the reforms achieved by the workers' movement, for all its gains in eliminating the early excesses of female and child labour, women workers continue to suffer particular hardships: precariousness of employment, lower wages, employment in unhealthy and dangerous trades. Like Engels, Bebel recognised that the extension and industrialisation of female labour was playing a progressive role in freeing women from the sterility and isolation of domestic chores, creating the bases for proletarian unity in the class struggle. But he also showed the negative side of this process - the particularly ruthless exploitation of female labour and the increasing difficulty faced by proletarian families in the care and education of their children.
Evidently, for Bebel, for Engels, in short for marxism, there is indeed a "woman question" and capitalism is unable to provide the answer to it. The seriousness with which the question was taken up by these marxists amply demonstrates the hollowness of the crude feminist idea that marxism has nothing to say on such matters. But there are much more sophisticated versions of feminism. The "socialist feminists", whose main mission was to draw the "women's liberation movement" of the 60s into the orbit of established leftism are perfectly capable of "recognising the marxist contribution" to the problem of women's liberation - only to "prove" the existence of gaps, flaws or errors in the classical marxist approach, so requiring the subtle admixture of feminism to arrive at a "total critique".
The criticisms such "socialist feminists" make of Bebel's work are fairly indicative of this approach. In Women's Estate, Juliet Mitchell, having acknowledged that Bebel had advanced Marx and Engels' understanding of woman's role by pointing out how her maternal function had served to place her in a position of dependency, then complains that "Bebel too was unable to do more than state that sexual equality was impossible without socialism. His vision of the future was a vague reverie, quite disconnected from his description of the past. The absence of a strategic concern forced him into voluntarist optimism divorced from reality" (p80, Penguin Books, 1971).
A similar charge is levelled in Lise Vogel's Marxism and the Oppression of Women, certainly one of the most sophisticated attempts to find a "marxist" justification for feminism: Bebel's vision of the future "reflects a utopian socialist outlook reminiscent of Fourier and the other early nineteenth-century socialists" (p101); his strategic approach is contradictory, so that Bebel could not "despite his best socialist intentions, sufficiently specify the relationship between the liberation of women in the communist future and the struggle for equality in the capitalist present" (p103). Not only is there no connection between today and tomorrow: even his view of tomorrow is flawed, since "socialism is pictured largely in terms of the redistribution of goods and services already available in capitalist society to independent individuals, rather than in terms of the wholesale reorganisation of production and social relations" (p102). This idea that "even socialism" doesn't go far enough in the direction of women's liberation is a common refrain amongst feminists: Mitchell for example, cites Engels on the necessity for society to collectivise domestic labour (through the provision of communal facilities for cooking, cleaning, childcare and so on) and concludes that both Marx and Engels had an "overly economistic stress" (opcit) to what is fundamentally a question of social relationships and their transformation.
We shall have something to say about the problem of "utopianism" during the period of the Second International. But let us make it perfectly clear that such a charge is inadmissible from the feminists. If a problem of utopianism emerges in the workers' movement of that time, it is because of the difficulties of seeing the link between the immediate defensive working class movement and the future communist goal. But for the feminists this connection is not provided at all by the movement of the proletariat, by a class movement, but by an "autonomous women's movement" which claims to cut across class divisions and provide the missing strategic link between the fight against women's inequality today and the construction of new social relations in the future. This is the most important "secret ingredient" which all the socialist feminists want to add to marxism. Unfortunately, it's an ingredient which can only spoil the dish.
The working class movement of the 19th century did not and could not take exactly the same form as it has in the 20th. Operating within a capitalist society which could still grant meaningful reforms, it was legitimate for the social democratic parties to put forward a minimum programme containing demands for economic, legal, and political improvements for women workers, including the granting of suffrage. It's true that the social democratic movement was not always precise in its distinction between immediate aims and final goals. There are ambiguous formulations in both The Origins of the Family and Woman and Socialism in this respect, and a well-read "socialist feminist" like Vogel does not hesitate to point these out. But fundamentally, the marxists of the day understood that the real significance of the fight for reforms was that it united and strengthened the working class and so schooled it in the historic struggle for a new society. It was for this reason above all that the proletarian movement always opposed bourgeois feminism: not merely because it limited its aims to the horizons of present-day society, but because far from aiding the unification of the working class, it sharpened divisions within it and led it off its own class terrain altogether.
This is truer than ever in the period of capitalism's decay, where bourgeois reform movements can no longer have any progressive content at all. In this period, the minimum programme no longer applies. The only real "strategic" question is how to forge the unity of the class movement against all the institutions of capitalist society in order to prepare for the latter's overthrow. Sexual divisions within the class, like all others (racial, religious, etc), evidently weaken the movement and have to be fought at every level. but they can only be fought with the methods of the class struggle - through unity in struggle and organisation. The feminists' demand for an autonomous women's movement can be seen as a direct assault on such methods; like black nationalism and other so-called "movements of the oppressed", it has become an instrument of capitalist society for exacerbating the divisions within the proletariat.
The perspective of a separate women's movement, seen as the only guarantee of a "nonsexist" future, actually turns its back on the future and ends up fixating on the most immediate and particular "women's" issues such as maternity and childcare - which in fact only have a real future when posed in class terms (for example, the demands of the Polish workers in 1980). It is thus fundamentally reformist. The same goes for that other "radical" feminist critique of marxism: that the marxist emphasis on the need to transfer childcare and domestic chores of all kinds from the individual to the communal sphere is "overly economist".
Throughout this series we have attacked the idea that communism is anything but the total transformation of social relationships. The feminist claim that communism does not go far enough, does not look beyond politics and economics to the true overcoming of alienation, is not merely false: it is a direct adjunct to the leftist programme of state capitalism, since the feminists unfailingly point to the existing "socialist" models (China, Cuba, formerly the USSR, etc) to prove that economic and political changes aren't enough without a conscious struggle for women's liberation. In short: the feminists set themselves up as a pressure group for state capitalism, its "anti-sexist" conscience. The symbiotic relationship between feminism and the "male dominated" capitalist left is proof enough of this.
For marxism, however, just as the political seizure of power by the working class is only the first step towards the inauguration of a communist society, so the destruction of commodity relations and the collectivisation of production and consumption, in short the "economic" content of the revolution, merely provides the material base for the creation of qualitatively new relations between human beings.
In his "Commentaries on the 1844 Manuscripts", Bordiga eloquently explains why this must be the case in a society that has completed the alienation of human relations, not least sexual relations, by subordinating them all to the domination of the market. "The relationship between the sexes in bourgeois society obliges the woman, starting from a passive position, to make an economic calculation each time she accedes to love. The male makes this calculation in an active fashion by making a balance sheet of a sum allotted against a need satisfied. Thus in bourgeois society not only are all needs expressed in money - as in the male's need for love - but, for the woman, the need for money kills the need for love" (Bordiga et la passion du communisme, Spartacus, 1972, p156). There can be no supercession of this alienation without the abolition of the commodity economy and the material insecurity which goes with it (an insecurity felt first and foremost by the female). But this also requires the elimination of all the social-economic structures that reflect and reproduce the market relationship, in particular the atomised family household which has become a barrier to the real fulfilment of love between the sexes: "In communism without money, love will, as a need, have the same weight for both sexes and the act which consecrates it will realise the social formula that the other's human need is my human need, to the extent that the need of one sex is realised as the need of the other. This cannot be proposed simply as a moral relationship founded on a certain physical connection, because the passage to a higher form of society is effected in the economic domain: the care of children is no longer just the concern of the two parents but of the community" (ibid).
Against this materialist programme for the genuine humanisation of sexual relationships, what do the feminists, with their claim that marxism doesn't go far enough, have to offer?By negating the question of revolution - of the absolute necessity for the political and economic overturn of capital - feminism "at best" can offer no more than a "moral relationship founded on a certain physical connection", in short, moralistic sermons against sexist attitudes or utopian experiments in new relationships inside the prison of bourgeois society. The true poverty of the feminist critique is probably best summed up in the atrocities of "political correctness", where the obsession to change words has exhausted all passion to change the world. Feminism thus reveals itself as yet another obstacle to the development of a truly radical consciousness and action.
a) False radicalism in green
Feminism is not alone in its "discovery" of marxism's failure to get to the root of things. Its close cousin, the "ecology" movement, makes the same claim. We have already summarised the "green" critique of marxism in a previous article in this Review ("It's capitalism that is poisoning the Earth", International Review no. 63): put simply, the argument is that marxism, like capitalism, is just another ideology of growth, expressing a "productionist" view of man and an alienated view of nature.
This trick is usually performed by assimilating marxism with Stalinism: the hideous state of the environment in the former "Communist" countries is cited as the true legacy of Marx and Engels. There are, however, more sophisticated versions of this trick. Disenchanted councilists, Bordigists and others who are now flirting with primitivism and other greeneries know that the Stalinist regimes were capitalist, not communist; and they are also aware of the profound insights into the relationship between man and nature contained in the writings of Marx, in particular the 1844 Manuscripts. Such currents therefore concentrate their fire on the period of the Second International, a period in which Marx's dialectical vision was allegedly buried without trace, to be replaced by a mechanistic approach which passively worshipped bourgeois science and technology and placed the abstract "development of the productive forces" above any real programme of human liberation. The intellectual snobs of Aufheben specialise in elaborating this view, particularly in their long series attacking the notion of capitalist decadence. Kautsky and Lenin are often cited as the chief offenders, but Engels himself does not escape the whip.
b) The universal dialectic
This is not the place to deal with these arguments in detail, particularly since we want to focus, in this article, not on philosophical issues but on what the socialists of the Second International said about socialism, about the society they were fighting for. Nevertheless, a few observations about "philosophy", about the general world view of marxism, would not go amiss, since it does connect to the way in which the workers' movement dealt with the more concrete question of the natural environment in a socialist society.
In previous articles in this series, we have already showed how Marx viewed the question, both in his early and his more mature work (see International Review nos. 70,71 and 75). In the dialectical view, man is a part of nature, not some" being squatting outside the world". Nature, as Marx put it, was man's body and he could as well live without it as a head without a body. But man was not "just" another animal, a passive product of nature. He was a uniquely active, creative being who alone among the animals was capable of transforming the world around him in accordance with his needs and desires.
It is true that tile dialectical view was not always clearly understood by Marx's followers, and that as various bourgeois ideologies infested the parties of the Second International, these viruses also expressed themselves on the "philosophical" terrain. In a period in which the bourgeoisie was marching triumphantly forward, the notion that science and technology, in themselves, contained the answer to all of humanity's problems became an adjunct to the development of reformist and revisionist theories within the movement. But even the more "orthodox" marxists were not immune: some of Kautsky's work, for example tends to reduce human history to a purely natural scientific process in which the victory of socialism becomes virtually automatic. Similarly, Pannekoek has shown that some of Lenin's philosophical conceptions reflected the mechanical materialism of the bourgeoisie. But, as the comrades of the Gauche Communiste de France pointed out in their series on Pannekoek's Lenin as Philosopher (see International Review nos. 25, 27,28, and 30), even if Pannekoek made some pertinent criticisms of Lenin's ideas about the relationship between human consciousness and the natural world, his basic method was flawed, because he himself made a mechanical link between Lenin's philosophical errors and the class nature of Bolshevism. The same applies to the Second International in general. Those who argue that it was a bourgeois movement because it was influenced by the dominant ideology have no understanding of the workers' movement in general, of its unceasing combat against the penetration of the ideas of the ruling class within its ranks, nor the particular conditions in which the parties of the Second International themselves waged this struggle. The social democratic parties were proletarian in spite of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois influences which affected them to a greater or lesser extent at different moments in their history.
We have already shown, in the previous article in this series, that Engels was certainly the foremost exponent and defender of the proletarian vision of socialism during the early years of social democracy, and that this vision was defended by other comrades against the deviations that evolved later on in this period. The same applies to the more abstract question of man's relationship to nature. From the early 1870s to the end of his life Engels was working on The Dialectics of Nature, in which he tried to encapsulate the marxist approach to this question. The essential thesis in this wide-ranging, but incomplete work, is that both the natural world and the world of human thought follow a dialectical movement. Far from placing humanity outside or above nature, Engels affirms that "at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like something standing outside nature - but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature,and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly" ("The part played by labour in the transition from ape to man", which is part of The Dialectics of Nature).
However, for a whole strand of academic "marxists" (the so-called Western Marxists, who are the real mentors of Aufheben and the like), The Dialectics of Nature is the theoretical source of all evil, the scientific justification for the mechanical materialism and reformism of the Second International. In a previous article in this series (see International Review no. 81) we have already given some elements of a response to these charges; that of reformism in particular was dealt with at more length in the article on the centenary of Engel's death in International Review no. 83 (see also the Communist Workers Organisation's rebuttal of the notion of a split between Marx and Engels in Revolutionary Perspectives no. 1, series 3). But restricting ourselves to the terrain of "philosophy", it is worth noting that for "Western Marxists" like Alfred Schmidt, Engels' argument that the "cosmic" and the "human" dialectic are at root one and the same is a species not merely of mechanical materialism but even of "pantheism" and "mysticism" (cf The Concept of Nature in Marx, 1962). Schmidt here was following the example of Lukacs, who also argued that the dialectic was restricted to the "realms of history and society" and criticised the fact that "Engels -following Hegel's mistaken lead - extended the method to apply also to nature" (note 6, p 24, in History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, 1971).
In fact this charge of "mysticism" is groundless. It is true, and Engels himself recognises this in The Dialectics of Nature, that some pre-scientific world outlooks, such as Buddhism, had developed genuine insights into the dialectical movement both in nature and in the human psyche. Hegel himself had been strongly influenced by such approaches. But while all these systems remained mystical in the sense that they could not go beyond a passive vision of the unity between man and nature. Engels' view, the view of the proletariat, is active and creative. Man is a product of the cosmic movement. But, as the above passage from "The part played by labour..." emphasises, he has the capacity - and this moreover as a species and not merely as an illuminated individual - to master the laws of this movement and so to use them to change and direct it.
At this level, Lukacs and the "Western Marxists" are wrong to counter-pose Engels to Marx, since both agreed with Hegel that the dialectical principle "holds good alike in history and natural science" (Marx, letter to Engels, cited in Revolutionary Perspectives, opcit). The inconsistency of Lukacs' criticism can moreover be seen in the fact that in this same work he approvingly cites two of Hegel's key sayings: that "truth must be understood and expressed not merely as substance but also as subject", and that "truth is not to treat objects as alien" (pp39 and 204 of History and Class Consciousness, quoting the preface from The Phenomenology of Mind and Werke, XII, p207). What Lukacs fails to see is that these sayings clarify the real relationship between man and nature. Whereas both pantheistic mysticism and mechanical materialism tend to see human consciousness as the passive reflection of the natural world, Marx and Engels grasped that it is in fact - above all, in its realised form as the self-awareness of social humanity - the dynamic subject of the natural movement. Such a viewpoint presages the communist future where man will no longer treat either the natural or the social world as a series of alien, hostile objects. We can only add that the developments of the natural sciences since Engels' day - particularly in the field of quantum physics - have added considerable weight to the notion of a dialectic of nature.
As good idealists, the greens often explain capitalism's propensity for destroying the natural environment as the logical outcome of the bourgeoisie's alienated view of nature; for marxists, the latter is fundamentally the product of the capitalist mode of production itself. Thus the battle to "save the planet" from the disastrous consequences of this civilisation is situated first and foremost not at the level of philosophy, but at the level of politics, and demands a practical programme for the reorganisation of society. And even if, in the 19th century, the destruction of the environment had not yet reached the same catastrophic proportions that it has in the later part of the 20th, the marxist movement recognised from its inception that the communist revolution involved a very radical reshaping of the human and natural landscape to make up for the damage inflicted on both by the unrestrained onslaught of capitalist accumulation. From the Communist Manifesto to the later writings of Engels and Bebel's Woman and Socialism, this recognition was summarised in the formula: abolition of the separation between town and country. Engels, whose first major work, The Condition of the Working Class in England, had railed against the poisonous living conditions that capitalist industry and housing imposed on the proletariat, returned to this theme in Anti-Duhring: " ... abolition of the antithesis between town and country is not merely possible. It has become a direct necessity of industrial production itself, just as it has become a necessity of agricultural production and, besides, of public health. The present poisoning of the air, water and land can be put an end to only by the fusion of town and country; and only such fusion will change the situation of the masses now languishing in the towns, and enable their excrement to be used for the production of plants instead of for the production of disease. It is true that in the huge towns civilisation has bequeathed us a heritage which it will take much time and trouble to get rid of. But it must and will be got rid of, however protracted a process it may be. Whatever destiny may be in store for the German Empire of the Prussian nation. Bismarck can go to his grave proudly aware that the desire of his heart is sure to be fulfilled: the great towns will perish" (Anti-Duhring,Part III, third part: "Production", p 351-2 of 1975 Moscow edition).
Furthermore, this "centralised decentralisation" is only possible because "capitalist industry has already made itself relatively independent of the local limitations arising from the location of sources of the raw materials it needs. Society liberated from the barriers of capitalist production can go much further still. By generating a race of producers with an all-round training who understand the scientific basis of industrial production as a whole, and each of whom has the practical experience in a whole series of branches of production from start to finish, this society will bring into being a new productive force which will abundantly compensate for the labour required to transport raw materials and fuel from great distances".
Without putting into question the understanding that this new society will be based on the most advanced technical developments. Bebel also anticipates that "Each community will, in a way, constitute a zone of culture; it will, to a large extent, itself raise its necessaries of life. Horticulture, perhaps the most agreeable of all practical occupations, will then reach fullest bloom. The cultivation of vegetables. fruit trees and bushes of all nature, ornamental flowers and shrubs - all over an inexhaustible field for human activity in a field, moreover, whose nature excludes machinery almost wholly" (ibid, p317).
Thus Bebel looks forward to a society which is highly productive but which produces at a human pace: "The nerve-racking noise, crowding and rushing of our large cities with their thousands of vehicles of all sorts ceases substantially: society assumes an aspect of greater repose" (ibid, p 300).
Here Bebel's portrait of the future is very similar to that of William Morris, who also used the image of the garden and who gave his futuristic novel News from Nowhere the alternative title "An Epoch of Rest". In his characteristically straight-forward style, Morris explained that all the "disadvantages" of the modem cities, their filth, their crazy rush and hideous appearance, were the direct product of capitalist accumulation, and could only be eliminated by eliminating capital: "Again. the aggregation of the population having served its purpose of giving people opportunities of inter-communication and of making the workers feel their solidarity, will also come to an end; and the huge manufacturing districts will be broken up, and nature heal the horrible scars that man's heedless greed and stupid terror have made for it will no longer be a dire necessity that cotton cloth should be made a fraction of a farthing cheaper this year than last" ("The society of the future", Political Writings of William Morris. p 196).
We could add that, as an artist, Morris had a particularly sharp concern to overcome the sheer ugliness of the capitalist environment and to remould it according to the canons of artistic creativity. This is how he posed the question in a speech on "Art under Plutocracy": "And first I must ask you to extend the word art beyond those matters which are consciously works of art, to take in not only painting and sculpture, and architecture, but the shapes and colours of all household goods, nay even the arrangement of the fields for tillage and pasture, the management of towns and of our highways of all kinds; in a word, to extend it to the aspect of all the externals of our life. For I must ask you to believe that every one of the things that goes to make up the surroundings among which we live must be either beautiful or ugly, either elevating or degrading to us, either a torment and burden to the maker of it to make, or a pleasure and a solace to him. How does it fare therefore with our external surroundings in these days? What kind of an account shall we be able to give to those who come after us of our dealings with the earth, which our forefathers handed down to us still beautiful, in spite of all the thousands of years of strife and carelessness and selfishness?" (Political Writings of William Morris, p 58).
Here Morris poses the question in the only way a marxist can pose it: from the standpoint of communism, of the communist future: the degrading external appearance of bourgeois civilisation can only be judged with the greatest severity by a world in which every aspect of production, from the smallest household good to the design and laying out of the physical landscape, is carried out, as Marx put it in the 1844 Manuscripts, "in accordance with the law of beauty". In this vision, the associated producers have become the associated artists, creating a physical environment that answers to mankind's profound need for beauty and harmony.
c) The Stalinist perversion
We have mentioned that the ecologists' "critique" of marxism is based on the false identification between Stalinism and communism. Stalinism embodies the capitalist destruction of nature and justifies it with marxist rhetoric. But Stalinism has never been able to leave the basics of marxist theory untouched; it began by revising the marxist conception of internationalism and it has gone on to attack every other fundamental principle of the proletariat, more or less explicitly. It is the same with the demand for abolishing the distinction between town and country. The Stalinist hack who introduces the 1971 Moscow edition of The Society of the Future, an extract from Bebel's Woman and Socialism, explains how Bebel (and thus Marx and Engels) have been proved wrong on this point: "The experience of socialist construction also does not confirm Bebel's statement that with the abolition of the antithesis between town and country, the population will move from the big towns to the country. The abolition of the antithesis between town and country implies that ultimately there will be neither town nor country in the modern meaning of the word. At the same time it is to be expected that big towns, even though their nature will change in developed communist society, will preserve their importance as historically evolved cultural centres".
The "experience of socialist construction" in the Stalinist regimes merely confirms that it is the tendency of bourgeois civilisation, above all in its epoch of decline, to herd more and more human beings into cities which have swelled beyond all human proportions, far outstripping the worst nightmares of the founders of marxist theory, who already thought the cities of their day were bad enough. The Stalinists have turned marxism on its head here as everywhere else: thus Romania's despot Ceaucescu proclaimed that the bulldozing of ancient villages and their replacement by gigantic "workers' tower blocks" was the practical abolition of the antithesis between town and country. The most pertinent answer to these perversions is provided by Bordiga in his "Space against Cement", written in the early 1950s. This text is a passionate denunciation of the sardine-like conditions imposed on the majority of humanity by capitalist urbanism, and a clear reaffirmation of the original marxist position on this question: "When, after the forcible crushing of this ever-more obscene dictatorship, it will be possible to subordinate every solution and every plan to the amelioration of the conditions of living labouraathen the brutal verticalism of the cement monsters will be made ridiculous and will be suppressed, and in the immense expanses of horizontal space, once the giant cities have been deflated, the strength and intelligence of the human animal will progressively tend to render uniform the density of life and labour over the inhabitable parts of the earth; and these forces will henceforth be in harmony, and no longer ferocious enemies as they are in the deformed civilisation of today, where they are only brought together by the spectre of servitude and hunger" (published in Espece Humaine et Croute Terrestre, Petite Bibilotheque Payot, p168).
This truly radical transformation of the environment is more than ever necessary in today's period of capitalist decomposition, where the megacities have not only become more and more swollen and uninhabitable, but have become the nodal points of capitalism's growing threat to the whole of planetary life. The communist programme is, here as in all other domains, the best refutation of Stalinism. And it is also a slap in the face to the pseudo-radicalism of the "greens", which can never go beyond a perpetual dance between two false solutions: on the one hand, the nostalgic dream of a backward flight into the past, which finds its most logical expression in the apocalypses of the "green anarchists" and primitivists, whose "return to nature" can only be founded on the extermination of the majority of mankind; and, on the other hand, the small-scale tinkering "reforms" and experiments of ecology's more respectable wing (tactically supported by the primitivists in any case), who seek purely piecemeal solutions to all the particular problems of modem city life - noise, stress, pollution, overcrowding, traffic jams and the rest. But if human beings are dominated by the machines, transport systems and buildings that they themselves have erected, it is because they are trapped in a society where dead labour dominates living labour at every turn. Only when mankind regains control over its own productive activity can it create an environment compatible with its needs; but the premise for this is the forcible overthrow of the "increasingly obscene dictatorship" of capitalism - in short, the proletarian revolution.
***
In the next articles in this series, we will examine how the late 19th century revolutionaries foresaw the most crucial of all social transformations - the transformation of "useless toil" into "useful work", in other words the practical overcoming of alienated labour. We will then return to the charge that has been levelled at these visions of socialism - that they represent a relapse into pre-marxist utopianism. This in tum will lead us onto the issue that was to become the major preoccupation of the revolutionary movement in the first decade of this century: not so much the problem of the ultimate goal of the movement, but of the means to attain it.
CDW
1 In this passage by Bebel, the relationship between physiology and mental states is presented in a somewhat mechanical manner. Freud took the exploration of neurosis onto a new level by showing that the human being cannot be understood as a closed mental/physical unit, but extends outwards into the field of social reality. But it should be remembered that Freud himself started with a highly mechanical model of the psyche and only later developed towards a more social, and a more dialectical view, of man's mental development.
In April 1996 the section in France of the International Communist Current held its 12th Congress. This was the congress of a territorial section of our international organisation, but the ICC had decided to invest it with a significance beyond that of the merely territorial framework, making it a kind of extraordinary international congress.
The congress was held a few months after we had seen in France a highly significant episode in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie: the strikes inthepublicsectorattheendof1995, which were the result of an international manoeuvre by the bourgeoisie aimed at the entire proletariat of the industrialised countries. But these events only constituted one aspect of the general offensive that the bourgeoisie is waging against the working class and its organisations. And it is precisely as a vital moment in the arming of the communist organisation against the different aspects of this offensive that the 12th Congress of the section in France assumes all its importance.
An unprecedented attack by the bourgeoisie against the proletariat
The bourgeoisie is forced to accompany its economic attack against the working class with a political attack. As we saw with the manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie at the end of 1995, this attack has both short and medium term aims: its objective is to weaken the proletariat in advance of the struggles which it will have to wage in the years ahead. However, it would be dangerously underestimating the ruling class if we thought that this attack didn't go further than this.
The most lucid sectors of the ruling class knew very well that the impact of the immense campaigns on the "death of communism" and the "definitive victory of capitalism" could not last forever, that it would inevitably be shattered by the aggravation of the capitalist crisis and the consequent revival of workers' struggles. This is why it has had to take precautions for the future.
"... We should underline the recent change in some of the language used by the ruling class. Whereas the first years after the collapse of the eastern bloc were dominated by campaigns around the theme of the "death of communism" and the "impossibility of revolution ", we are now seeing a certain return to fashion of talk about "marxism", "revolution" and "communism" - on the part of the leftists, obviously, but not only them" (Resolution on the International Situation, 11th ICC Congress).
Before a growing number of workers recognise marxism as the theory of the proletarian struggle for emancipation, it is necessary to elaborate and disseminate a false marxism designed to pollute and derail the whole process through which the working class becomes conscious of itself.
But this offensive doesn't end there. It is also necessary to discredit the left communist current, which at the time of the degeneration and death of the Communist International was the real defender of the communist principles which had presided over the October 1917 revolution. Thus, with the publication of the archives of Vercesi, the main animator of the Italian Left Fraction, the academics of Brussels University have presented this current as being anti-fascist, ie the very antithesis of what it really was. The most fundamental issue is to compromise the future of the left communist current, ie the only one which works towards the foundation of the communist party which the proletariat will need in order to carry through its revolution.
And this attack against the communist left isn't limited to the university. The "specialists" of the ruling class are quite aware of the danger represented by the groups of the proletarian political milieu, precisely the ones who claim continuity with the communist left. Obviously, this danger is not an immediate one. Continuing to suffer the effects of the terrible counter-revolution which fell on the proletariat at the end of the 1920s, and which lasted until the middle of the 1960s, the communist left is still marked both by a numerical weakness and by its low impact on the working class as a whole. A weakness that is further exacerbated by the dispersion into several currents (ICC, IBRP, the multiple "Parties" of the Bordigist current). But it would be singularly naive to think that the ruling class and its specialised institutions are not using, right now, all possible means to prevent this current from strengthening itself when the proletariat develops its consciousness, with the ultimate aim of liquidating it altogether. One of these means is obviously police repression. But in the context of the "democracies" which govern the industrialised countries, this is an instrument that the bourgeoisie uses very sparingly, in order to avoid unmasking itself. There is also infiltration by specialist organs of the capitalist state, with the aim of informing the latter and above all of destroying communist organisations from the inside. Thus, in 1981, the ICC unmasked the individual Chenier, whose activities helped to exacerbate the crisis the ICC was going through at the time and to provoke the loss of a number of militants. Finally, and above all, our organisation has exposed the particular role played today by the parasitic milieu as an instrument for the bourgeoisie's attack on the proletarian political milieu.
The attack by parasitism against the proletarian political milieu and against the ICC
This is not a new concern for our organisation. Thus, just after our 11th Congress, one year ago, we wrote:
"It is preferable for the bourgeoisie to erect a wall of silence around the positions and even the existence of revolutionary organisations. This is why the work of denigrating them, and sabotaging their intervention, is undertaken by a whole series of groups and parasitic elements whose function is to drive away individuals who are coming towards class positions, to disgust them with any participation in the difficult task of developing a proletarian political milieu.
All the communist groups have been subjected to the attacks of parasitism, but the latter has paid particular attention to the ICC, because it is today the most important organisation in the proletarian milieu" (International Review 82).
It was thus on the basis of a whole series of attacks by parasitism on the proletarian political milieu and the ICC in particular that the Congress discussed and adopted a resolution from which we will cite certain extracts:
"The notion of political parasitism is not an innovation of the ICC. It belongs to the history of the workers' movement. Thus, in the struggle of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association, Marx described Bakunin's Alliance as "parasitic". The parasitic groups do not belong to the proletarian political milieu. In no sense are they an expression of the effort of the class to become conscious. On the contrary, they represent an attempt to abort this effort. In this sense their activity completes the work of the forces of the bourgeoisie in sabotaging the intervention of revolutionary organisations within the class.
What animated the activity and determines the existence of these groups is not at all the defence of the class principles of the proletariat, but at best the spirit of the little sect or "circle of friends", the affirmation of individualism and individuality vis-a-vis the proletarian political milieu. The point of departure of the parasitic approach, which can lead to the formation of a parasitic group, is based on personal scores, resentments, frustrations and other squalid concerns typical of the ideology of the decomposing and futureless petty bourgeoisie. In this sense, what characterises a parasitic group is not the defence of a programmatic platform but essentially a political attitude to revolutionary organisations, and more particularly towards the main pole of regroupment, the ICC.
The function of parasitism is thus:
- to reinforce confusions in the class;
- to develop attacks on marxist organisations with a view to the destruction of the proletarian political milieu;
- to fuel the bourgeoisie's campaigns against communism by spreading the idea that any marxist organisation that lays claim to Lenin's combat for the party is by nature condemned to Stalinist degeneration;
- to ridicule the organisational principles of the proletariat by inoculating the idea that the intransigent defence of these positions can only lead to sectarianism.
All these themes, developed in the offensive of parasitism against the ICC, are a confirmation of the active contribution by the parasitic groups to the bourgeois state's attack on marxism since the collapse of the eastern bloc. They are there to sabotage the efforts of the proletariat to rediscover its revolutionary perspective. In this sense, the parasitic groups are a highly favourable soil for the manipulations of the state".
This doesn't mean that the parasitic groups are simple organs of the capitalist state, as are for example the leftist groups who defend a capitalist programme. Similarly it is certain that most of the elements of the parasitic milieu, whether organised or informal, have no direct link with the organs of the state. But bearing in mind the approach which animates this milieu, the organisational and political laxity which characterises it, the friendship networks that run through it, its predilection for all kinds of intrigues, nothing could be easier than for a few specialists to infiltrate it and guide it in the direction which most favours the action of the bourgeoisie against the communist organisations.
The organisational arming of the ICC
The 12th Congress of the section in France also had to make a balance sheet, one year after the international congress, of its capacity to put into practice the perspectives that the latter had drawn out. We will be brief on this point because, despite all its importance, it was secondary in relation to what has been developed above, and to a large extent subordinated to the latter. The resolution adopted by this Congress says:
" ... the 11th Congress affirmed that the ICC is much stronger than it was at its previous congress, that it is incomparably better armed to confront its responsibilities faced with future upsurges of the class, even if, obviously, it is still in a state of convalescence" (point 11).
"This does not mean that the combat that we have waged now has to end... The ICC must carry it on through being vigilant at all times, through its determination to identify each weakness and deal with it without delay ... In reality, the history of the workers' movement, including that of the ICC, teaches us, and the debate has amply confirmed this, that the combat for the defence of the organisation is permanent and without respite" (point 13).
All this has been fully confirmed in the past year for our section in France. Thus, faced with an event as important as the strikes at the end of 95, it was immediately able to identify the trap which the bourgeoisie had set for the working class and to intervene actively in the class.
The 12th Congress of our section in France has once again shown how the combat for the defence of the organisation is a long term combat, a permanent fight which cannot be relaxed. But for revolutionaries, difficulty is not a factor of demoralisation. On the contrary. As the vanguard of a class which draws from the daily struggles it wages against the capitalist enemy the strength that will allow it to change the world, communists can only strengthen their own conviction, their own determination, through the struggle against the attacks of the enemy class, such as we are seeing today, and against the difficulties
they encounter in their activity.
ICC
12th Congress of Revolution Intemationale
Resolution on the International Situation
1) In the year since the 11th ICC Congress, the state of the world economy has fully confirmed the perspective put forward at the Congress: the bourgeoisie's boasted "recovery" was no "end of the tunnel" for the capitalist economy, but only a moment in its plunge into a crisis without end. The 11th Congress emphasized that one of the main sources of this "recovery" - which we described at the time as a 'jobless recovery" - was a headlong flight into debt, which could only lead to new convulsions in the financial world, and a new dive into open recession. These financial convulsions - dramatic problems in the banking sector, and a spectacular collapse in the dollar - have been affecting capitalism since the beginning of autumn 1995, and have been merely the precursors of a new fall in the growth rates of most of the industrialised countries since the beginning of winter, with even more gloomy forecasts for 1996.
Irreversible deepening of the economic crisis
2) One of the most striking illustrations of the world economy's worsening state, is the difficult situation of the greatest power on the European continent. Germany today is confronted with the worst unemployment (4 million) since World War II, hitting not just the East, but spreading to the more "prosperous" Western regions. It is symbolic of the German economy's unprecedented difficulties that Daimler, one of its leading companies, has just announced that its shareholders will receive no dividends: Daimler has just suffered its first losses (and substantial ones at that) since the war. This has put an end to one of the myths so complacently put about by the bourgeoisie (and believed by some groups in the proletarian milieu) following the Eastern bloc's collapse and the reunification of Germany: the myth of a recovery fuelled by the reconstruction of the backward Eastern regions. As the ICC said, against the reigning euphoria of the time, it was impossible for the Eastern bloc countries emerging from the Stalinist variety of state capitalism to provide any breath of oxygen for the world economy. More particularly, the reconstruction of East Germany demanded a gigantic capital investment. Although this raised the German economy's growth rates for a few years, it was only at the cost of massive debt, which could only lead to an abrupt slowdown, mirroring the capitalist economy as a whole.
3) The plunge into open recession by Germany, which model of economic rectitude, is all the more significant of the depth of the crisis today, in that it is accompanied by the collapse of another "model": Japan's record-breaking dynamism and growth rates. Whereas Japan's growth rates ran at about 4-5% throughout the 80s, they have not risen above 1% since 1992. Five government recovery plans have had no effect: growth rates have continued to fall, reaching 0.3% in 1995. And not only have the recovery plans failed to improve the situation, the debt on which they are based has only made it worse. As we have said for a long time, the "remedies" of the capitalist economy must eventually worsen the disease and kill the patient a little more. The Japanese economy today is facing a mountain of$460 billion of bad debt, as a result of the frenzied speculation of the late 80s and early 90s. This is all the more catastrophic, not just for the world's second economic power but for the entire world economy, in that Japan constitutes the world's savings bank, providing 50% of the OECD countries' finance capital.
4) As for the world's greatest power, whose results last year were less sombre than those of its immediate followers, growth rates for 1996 are forecast at 2%, a clear decline from the rate of the previous year. For example, the 40,000 redundancies announced by ATT - the symbol of one of the economy's leading sectors, telecommunications - signify the American economy's worsening condition. And if, for the moment, the US is managing better than its rivals, this is only thanks to unprecedentedly brutal attacks against the workers (many of whom are forced to hold down two jobs to survive), and to using the advantages conferred by its special status as world super-power: financial, monetary, diplomatic and military pressure all put to the service of the trade war it is waging against its competitors.
Concretely, in a capitalist world stifled by generalised over-production, the strongest can only breathe better at the expense of its rivals: the German and Japanese bourgeoisies are the first to make this bitter observation. And this trade war is getting worse, since the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the disappearance of the Western bloc which inevitably followed, have meant that the coordination established for years between the countries of the Western bloc is more and more giving way to the rule of "look after number one", which can only exacerbate capitalism's convulsions.
The logic of "every man for himself" sharpens imperialist rivalries
5) "Every man for himself': this rule finds its most spectacular expression in the field of imperialist antagonisms. At the very moment of the Eastern bloc's collapse, the ICC denounced the bourgeoisie's false prophecies of a "new world order" of peace and prosperity. The division of the world into two blocs was not the cause of imperialist antagonisms, but their consequence, one of the means adopted by the different countries of the planet to confront them. Far from putting an end to antagonisms between states, and military confrontations, the disappearance of the bloc system that had emerged from World War II unleashed antagonisms which the bloc system had previously kept within certain limits. Although this put on the historical agenda the formation of new imperialist blocs - a perspective which could not take immediate effect given the relative weakness of the new potential bloc leader, Germany, in relation to the world's greatest power - in the immediate it led to an explosion of "look after number one", in an imperialist landscape marked by an upheaval of alliances unprecedented since the beginning of the century. The international situation has since only confirmed this perspective. And while the tendency towards the formation of new blocs appeared clearly at the beginning of the 1990s, it has since been replaced by the rule of "look after number one", one of the most significant expressions of capitalist society's general decomposition.
6) The ICC's 11th Congress showed that the effect of an unbridled policy of "look after number one" was "a considerable weakening, even a crisis, of American world leadership", whose most striking expressions were the estrangement between the US and Britain - the world's two most faithful allies since the beginning of the century - and the fact that the world's greatest power was virtually absent from the then most important zone of imperialist conflict, Yugoslavia. Since then, the estrangement between the two Anglo-Saxon powers has not healed - far from it. By contrast, the US has spectacularly improved its position in ex-Yugoslavia. Since last summer, and its support for the Croat offensive in the Krajina, the US has succeeded in radically reversing the situation in its favour. Thanks to its military superiority - its main means of action internationally - the US has completely eclipsed the British and French dominance in the region, which the two powers had exercised for years though UNPROFOR, and were proposing to strengthen with the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The USA's return in strength was not merely a response to the RRF. Whereas the Franco-British tandem's only ally on the spot was Serbia, the USA has succeeded today in bringing onto its side, willingly or not, not only their original Muslim allies, but also the "friends" of Germany, the Croats, and the "enemies" of yesterday, the Belgrade Serbs, thanks to the latter's divorce from the Pale Serbs.
7) The USA's recovery of the initiative is not limited to the situation in ex-Yugoslavia, but also extends to its traditional zones of hegemony, such as the Middle East, and to the Far East. The Sharm El Sheik summit on terrorism in Israel was thus a means for Uncle Sam to remind everybody who is the godfather in the region. The USA's firmness in the defence of Taiwan against China's posturing was the clearest warning to the latter's imperialist ambitions, as well as those of Japan (the resolution of the 11th International Congress already highlighted both powers' efforts at rearmament). Faced with this powerful American comeback, the second fiddles France and Britain have no choice but to keep a low profile. They came reluctantly to the Sharm El Sheik "Clinton show". And it was to avoid being totally side-lined that they reassigned their troops from UNPROFOR to I-FOR, which is a creature under the control of the USA, just as France was forced to take part in "Desert Storm" in 1990-91, despite being fundamentally opposed to it. Similarly, the rapprochement between the world's greatest power and its main rival, Germany, over ex-Yugoslavia has been principally to the benefit of the former. And although Germany's Croatian ally has conquered positions that it has coveted since independence, this apparent success for Germany has been largely thanks to the US, which is an uncomfortable position for an imperialist power, especially when it is posing as a candidate to the leadership of a new bloc. Like France and Britain, and in particular through its participation in I-FOR, Germany is thus obliged to submit to the conditions imposed by the USA.
Resistance to American leadership increases world chaos
8) The return to the limelight of the world's greatest power does not mean that it has definitively overcome the threat to its leadership. This threat, as we emphasized at our last international congress, springs essentially from the fact that today, there no longer exists the essential precondition for any real solidity and stability in alliances between bourgeois states in the imperialist arena: the existence of a common enemy threatening their security. The powers of the ex-Western bloc may be forced, at one time or another, to submit to Washington's diktats, but it is out of the question for them to remain faithful on a durable basis. On the contrary, they will seize any opportunity to sabotage the orientations and dispositions imposed by the USA. So the fact that Britain has been forced to toe the US line in ex-Yugoslavia has in no way re-established the former's allegiance to its transatlantic big brother. This is why the latter has renewed its pressure over the Irish question, notably by foisting the responsibility for the renewed IRA bombing campaign (which it is probably behind) onto London. This is why Chirac's recent journey to Beirut represents France's attempt to go poaching in America's Middle Eastern hunting grounds, after sponsoring the Barcelona conference designed to check US progress in the Mediterranean. In fact, the recent evolution of imperialist relations demonstrates the complete upheaval of alliances, their utter instability, following the end of the cold war bloc system. Old "friendships" of 40 or even 80 years' standing are breaking up. There is a deep rift between London and Washington. Similarly, every day that passes aggravates the differences between France and Germany, in other words the two leading architects of the European edifice.
9) Concerning these last aspects, it is important to emphasize the driving forces behind these imperialist alliances. The new Entente Cordiale between France and Britain can only be based on the estrangement between Washington and London on the one hand, and between Paris and Berlin on the other. The fact that France and Britain are both second-rate, historically declining, powers of essentially equal strength, confronted by the pressure of the two great powers - USA and Germany - confers a certain solidity on this new Entente Cordiale. This is all the more true in that there exists within Europe a fundamental, insurmountable antagonism between Britain and Germany, whereas despite three wars, there has been room for long periods of "friendship" between the latter and France. Indeed, some sectors of the French bourgeoisie rallied to the German alliance even during World War II. However, the rising power of German imperialism in recent years cannot help but revive the French bourgeoisie's old fears of its too powerful neighbour. Even without a complete break between Paris and Berlin, all this leads to a profound degradation in Franco-German relations. Even if France would like to play the umpire between its two great neighbours, such an alliance of the three is in fact impossible. In this sense, any real construction of a political union in Europe is a utopia, and can never be anything but a domain of mystification. The impotence of European institutions, illustrated in ex-Yugoslavia, where it gave the USA the chance to make its comeback in the region, will continue to appear in the future. America will continue to stir up the ant heap, as it did in the Balkans, to prevent any gathering of discontent directed against it. More generally, and as the ICC has said for a long time, the imperialist scene can only be marked by growing instability, with advances and retreats by the USA, and above all the continued and growing use of brute force, the clash of arms, and horrible massacres.
Bourgeois offensive against renewed class struggle
10) As we said in the resolution of the last International Congress, "More than ever, the struggle of the proletariat remains the only hope for the future of human society" (Point 14). And this last year has clearly illustrated the words of this resolution:
"Particularly since 1992, [the workers'] struggles have been testimony to the proletariat's capacity to get back onto the path of struggle, thus confirming that the historic course has not been overturned. They are also testimony to the enormous difficulties which it is encountering on this path, owing to the breadth and depth of the reflux [following the collapse of the stalinist regimes, the accompanying ideological campaigns, and everything that has followed]. The workers' struggles are developing in a jagged, sinuous manner, full of advances and retreats" (ibid). "These obstacles have allowed the unions to get their grip on the workers' combativity, channelling them towards "actions" entirelv under union control. However, the unions' present manoeuvres have also, and above all, a preventative aim: that of strengthening their hold on the workers before the latter deploy far more their combativity, which will necessarily result from their growing anger faced with the increasingly brutal attacks demanded by the crisis" (Point 17).
The French social movements of late 1995: a bourgeois manoeuvre against the international proletariat
The strikes in France at the end of autumn 1995 have thoroughly confirmed this perspective: " ... to prevent the working class from entering the combat with its own weapons, the bourgeoisie has taken the lead, and has pushed the workers into a premature struggle, completely under the control of the unions. It has not left the workers time to mobilise at their own rhythm and with their own methods" (International Review no.84). They have also confirmed that, as we have already pointed out, the bourgeoisie organises and carries out its actions against the working class at an international level:
- through the unprecedented media coverage of these strikes (whereas social movements which really worried the bourgeoisie have suffered from a total media blackout in other countries); a media coverage which tried in particular to exploit the reference to May 68, both to fix workers' attention on the events in France, and to distort their nature, while at the same time distorting the nature of 68 itself;
- the Belgian bourgeoisie's use, with the same success, of an identical repeat of the manoeuvre which trapped the workers in France, on the basis of this media campaign.
11) The renewed strength and credibility of the union apparatus, which was a specific characteristic of the social movements in France at the end of 95, is not a new phenomenon, either in France or internationally. This was already pointed out a year go by the last ICC Congress: " ... it is important to show that the tendencies towards going beyond the unions, which appeared in 1992 in Italy, have not been confirmed - far from it. In 1994 the "monster" demonstration in Rome was a masterpiece of union control. Similarly, the tendency towards spontaneous unification in the street, which appeared (although only embryonically) in autumn 1993 in the Ruhr in Germany, has since given way to large scale union manoeuvres, such as the engineering "strike" of early 1995, which have been entirely controlled by the bourgeoisie" (Point 15). This renewed credibility of the unions was one result of the Eastern bloc's collapse at the end of the 80s: "reformist ideology will weigh very heavily on the struggle in the coming period, making the activity of the unions much easier" ("Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc", September 1989). This sprang from the fact, not that the workers still had any illusions in the "socialist paradise", but that the existence of a kind of society presented as "non-capitalist" seemed to mean that something other than capitalism could exist on earth. The end of these regimes was presented as "the end of history". Given that the terrain par excellence of the unions and of unionism is the improvement of the proletariat's living conditions in capitalism, the events of 1989, aggravated by a whole series of blows dealt the working class since then (due to the Gulf War, the explosion of the USSR, the war in ex-Yugoslavia), could only lead to the return to influence of the trades unions, which can be seen in all countries today, and which was particularly highlighted by the events in France at the end of 1995. A return to strength which has not come overnight, but which is the result of a whole process in which "radical" forms of unionism (COBAS etc, in Italy, SUD and FSU in France, etc) have reinforced union ideology, to leave the limelight to the traditional union hierarchies.
What is today's balance of forces between the classes?
12) As a result, in the main capitalist countries, the working class has been brought back to a situation which is comparable to that of the 1970s as far as its relation to unions and unionism is concerned: a situation where the class, in general, struggled within the unions, followed their instructions and their slogans, and in the final analysis, left things up to them. In this sense, the bourgeoisie has temporarily succeeded in wiping out from working class consciousness the lessons learnt during the 80s, following the repeated experience of confrontation with the unions. The ruling class will make the most, for as long as possible, of this strengthening of the unions and unionism, which will force the working class into a long period of confrontation with the latter (as it did during the 70s and up until the end of the 80s, even if this period does not last as long) before it can once again get out of their grip. At the same time, it will have to see through all the ideological campaigns around the question of the "internationalisation of the economy", which the bourgeoisie uses to try to conceal the real cause of its attacks against the proletariat: the dead-end crisis of the capitalist system. The unions will propose to "counter" these campaigns, by dragging the workers onto the rotten ground of nationalism, and competition with their class brothers in other countries.
13) The working class thus still has a long way to go. But the difficulties and obstacles it encounters should not be a factor of demoralisation, and it is up to revolutionaries to combat any such demoralisation resolutely. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, knows perfectly well the potential that the proletariat bears within it. This is why it organises manoeuvres like that at the end of 1995. As revolutionaries have always said, and as the bourgeoisie itself confirms, the crisis of the capitalist economy is the proletariat's best ally, which will open the workers' eyes to the dead-end in which today's world finds itself, and give them the determination to destroy it despite all the obstacles which every sector of the ruling class will not fail to strew in their path.
I CC, June1996
Following the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in eastern Europe at the end of the 80s, and with all the media campaigns about the 'death of communism', the 'end of the class struggle', and even the 'disappearance of the working class', the world proletariat suffered a massive ideological defeat, a defeat aggravated by the events that followed, in particular the Gulf war in 1991, which further amplified its feelings of powerlessness. Since then, notably with the big movements in the Autumn of 92 in Italy, the proletariat rediscovered the path of the class struggle; this was undeniable even if it was still fraught with difficulties. What fed this revival of proletarian struggles were the incessant and increasingly brutal attacks which the bourgeoisies of all countries were forced to unleash as its system sank deeper into an insoluble crisis. The ruling class knows quite well that it can only get these attacks through, and prevent them provoking a radicalisation of workers' resistance, if it sets up a whole political arsenal aimed at derailing and sterilising the class struggle. To do this, it has to be able to count on the effectiveness of those organs of the bourgeois state in the ranks of the workers: the trade unions. In other words, the bourgeoisie's ability to impose its will on the exploited class depends and will continue to depend on the credibility of the unions and of trade unionism in general. This is demonstrated very clearly by the strikes in France and Belgium at the end of 1995. It is also being demonstrated at the time of writing by the union agitation in the main European country: Germany.
In our two previous issues of the International Review, we examined the means employed by the bourgeoisie, during the strike movement in France at the end of 1995, to take the initiative faced with a perspective of the resurgence of workers' struggles. The analysis which we have developed on these events can be summarised by the following extracts from the article that we published in IR 84, at a time when the movement was not yet over:
"In reality, the French proletariat is the target of a massive manoeuvre aimed at weakening its consciousness and combativity; a manoeuvre, moreover, which is also aimed at the working class in other countries, designed at making it draw the wrong lessons from the events in France"(‘Behind the unions, struggle leads to defeat').
And the first wrong lesson that the bourgeoisie wants the working class to draw is that the unions are genuine organs of the proletarian struggle:
"This renewed credibility of the unions was one of the bourgeoisie's fundamental objectives, a vital precondition for dealing blows still more brutal than today's. Only on this condition can it hope to sabotage the struggles which will certainly surge up against these new attacks "(ibid).
In number 85 of our Review, we indicated how, almost at the same time as the manoeuvre by the French bourgeoisie, the Belgian bourgeoisie, taking advantage of the latter, made a carbon copy which incorporated all its main ingredients:
- a series of capitalist attacks affecting all sectors of the working class (in this case, an attack on social security), but which were especially provocative for a particular sector (in France, the rail way workers and Paris transport workers; in Belgium, the railway workers and the national airline workers); the 'Juppe method' , concentrating in a short space of time an avalanche of attacks, carried out in a cynical and arrogant way, is all part of the manoeuvre: the discontent has to be detonated by;
- very radical appeals by the unions for the extension of the workers' riposte, putting forward the example of the 'vanguard' sector chosen by the bourgeoisie;
- a retreat by the bourgeoisie on the most provocative measures; the unions then cry 'victory' for the mobilisation they have organised, the 'leading' sectors then go back to work and this demobilises the other sectors.
The result of these manoeuvres has been that the bourgeoisie has been able to push through the measures which have the broadest effects, the ones which hit the whole working class, while giving the impression of having had to retreat in the face of the workers' struggle, which lends credit to the idea that they achieved a victory under the leadership of the trade unions. This benefits the government, the bosses and the trade unions. What appears to many workers to have been a 'victory' or a semi-victory (it was not hard for the great mass of workers to see that on the essential questions, like social security, the government did not retreat) and was, in reality, a defeat - a defeat at the material level, of course, but above all a political defeat since the main enemy of the working class, the most dangerous because it presents itself as its ally, the union apparatus, increased its grip and its power of mystification over the workers.
The analyses of the communist groups
The ICC's analyses of the social movements at the end of 1995, presented both in the IR, its territorial press and at public meetings, were met with interest and approval by the majority of its readers and those who came to its meetings. On the other hand, these analyses were not shared by most of the other organisations of the proletarian political milieu. In the previous issue of this Review, we showed how the two organisations who comprise the IBRP, the CWO and Battaglia Comunista, fell into the bourgeoisie's trap precisely because they were unable to identify the manoeuvre. These comrades, for example, made the reproach that our analyses lead to the idea that the workers are imbeciles because they allowed themselves to be taken in by the bourgeoisie's manoeuvres. More generally, they consider that, with our vision, the proletarian revolution is impossible because the workers will always be the victims of mystifications set up by the bourgeoisie. Nothing could be more wrong.
In the first place, the fact that today the workers have fallen into the bourgeoisie's trap does not mean that this will always be the case. The history of the workers' movement is full of examples in which the same workers who allowed themselves to be mobilised behind the flags of the bourgeoisie were subsequently capable of waging exemplary and even revolutionary struggles. It was the same Russian and German workers who had been slaughtering each other under their national banners in 1914 who launched themselves into the proletarian revolution in 1917, and who forced the bourgeoisie to put an end to the imperialist butchery in 1918. More generally, history has taught us that the working class is capable of drawing the lessons from its defeats, of springing the traps in which it has previously been ensnared.
And it is precisely the task of revolutionary minorities, of the communist organisations, to contribute actively to such a development of consciousness in the class, in particular by clearly and resolutely denouncing the traps that the bourgeoisie has laid.
Thus, in July 1917, the Russian bourgeoisie tried to provoke a premature insurrection by the proletariat of the capital. The most advanced fraction of the working class, the Bolshevik party, identified the trap and it is clear that without its far-seeing attitude which aimed to stop the Petrograd workers from rushing into an adventure, the latter would have suffered a bloody defeat, and that this would have blocked the movement that culminated in the victorious insurrection of October 1917. In January 1919 (see our articles on the German revolution in the IR), the German bourgeoisie reissued the same manoeuvre. This time, it was successful: the proletariat of Berlin, isolated, was crushed by the Freikorps, and this dealt a decisive blow to the revolution in Germany and on a world scale. The great revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg was able, alongside the majority of the leadership of the newly formed Communist Party, to understand the nature of the trap that the bourgeoisie had laid. On the other hand, Karl Liebknecht, even though he had been hardened by years of revolutionary militancy, notably during the course of the imperialist war, did fall into the trap. Thanks to his prestige, and despite himself, he participated in a tragic defeat of the working class, one which cost him his life and the lives of many of his comrades, including Rosa Luxemburg herself. But even though the latter had done all she could to warn the proletariat and her own comrades against the bourgeoisie's trap, she never thought that those who had fallen into it were idiots. On the contrary, her last article, written on the eve of her death, 'Order reigns in Berlin', insists on an essential idea: that the proletariat must learn from its defeats. Similarly, by affirming that the workers in France and Belgium at the end of 1995 have been the victims of a trap laid by the bourgeoisie, the I CC never thought or implied that the workers were idiots. In fact,
the very opposite is the case.
If the bourgeoisie took the trouble to construct such a sophisticated trap for the working class, the building of which involved the government, the bosses, the unions and even the leftist groups, it is precisely because it does not underestimate the working class. It knows perfectly well that the proletariat today is not the proletariat of the 1930s, that, unlike with the latter, the economic crisis is not driving it deeper into demoralisation but tends to push it towards increasingly powerful and conscious struggles. In fact, in order to understand the significance of the bourgeois manoeuvre at the end of 1995, it is first necessary to have recognised that we are not now in a historic course dominated by the counter-revolution, in which the mortal crisis of capitalism can only result in world imperialist war, but in a course toward class confrontations. One of the best proofs of this reality can be found in the kind of themes and methods used by the unions in these recent manoeuvres. During the 1930s, the ideological campaigns of the left and the unions were dominated by anti-fascism, the 'defence of democracy' and nationalism, and they succeeded in derailing the combativity of the proletariat into a tragic impasse and mobilising it for the imperialist butchery (the best examples of this were the June 1936 strikes in France and the civil war in Spain). If at the end of 1995 the unions were very low key about such themes, if by contrast they adopted a very 'workerist' language, putting forward the classic demands and methods of struggle of the working class, it's because they know quite well that they could not have managed such a massive mobilisation or restored their credibility in the eyes of the workers by making their usual speeches about the 'national interest' and other openly bourgeois mystifications. The national flag or the defence of democracy could be effective in the inter-war period, but now the unions need calls for 'extension', for 'the unity of all sectors of the working class', for sovereign general assemblies. But we should note that if the current discourse of the unions did succeed in deceiving the majority of the working class, it also succeeded in deceiving organisations which claim the heritage of the communist left. The best example of this is probably provided by the articles published in no. 435 of the newspaper Le Proletaire, organ of the International Communist Party ((lCP), which in Italy publishes II Comunista, ie one of the numerous ICP's of the Bordigist tendency.
The digressions of Le Proletaire
This issue of Le Proletaire devotes four pages out of ten to the 1995 strikes in France. Many details about these events are provided, and even false details which prove either that the author was poorly informed, or, and this is more probable, that he has taken his desires for reality[1]. But the most striking thing in this issue of Le Proletaire is the two page article entitled 'The ICC against the strikes'. This title already says a great deal about the tone of the whole article, in which we discover that:
- the ICC is the emulator of Thorez, the French Stalinist leader, who at the end of the second world war declared that "strikes are weapons of the trusts";
- the ICC expresses itself "just like a scab";
- we are "modern Proudhonists" and "deserters (their emphasis) of the proletarian struggle".
Obviously, this article immediately places itself alongside the parasitic milieu, for which everything is fair when it comes to denigrating the ICC. In this sense, Le Proletaire is now making its little contribution (deliberate or unconscious?) to this milieu's attack on our organisation. Of course we are not against polemics between organisations of the revolutionary milieu, and we have always shown this in our press. But a polemic, however vehement, implies that we are in the same camp in the class war. For example, we don't polemicise with the leftist organisations; we denounce them as organs of the capitalist class, something Le Proletaire is incapable of doing since it defines a group like Lutte Ouvriere, the flower of French Trotskyism, as "centrist". Le Proletaire reserves its sharpest arrows for organisations of the communist left like the ICC. If we are "deserters", it means that we have betrayed our class, thank you very much. Thanks also to the parasitic groups for whom the ICC has gone over to Stalinism. Nevertheless, the ICP should one day work out what camp it is in: that of the serious organisations of the communist left, or that of the parasites whose sole reason for existing is to discredit these organisations, to the unique advantage of the bourgeoisie.
Having said that, while Le Proletaire seeks to teach us a lesson about our analyses of the 1995 strikes, what its article demonstrates above all is:
- its lack of clarity, not to say its opportunism, on the question which is so vital for the working class, the question of trade unionism;
- its crass ignorance of the history of the workers' movement, which leads it to an incredible underestimation of the enemy class.
The union question: Achilles Heel of the ICP and Bordigism
The ICP talks about the ICC being "anti-trade union on principle", and in doing so proves that it does not consider the union question to be one of principle Le Proletaire tries to be very radical when it asserts:
"The union apparatuses have become, as the result of a process of degeneration accelerated by the international victory of the counter-revolution, instruments of class collaboration", and, even more, "if the big union organisations obstinately refuse to use these weapons (authentically proletarian methods of struggle) this is not simply because they have a bad leadership whom it would be enough to replace: decades of degeneration and of domestication by the bourgeoisie have emptied these big union apparatuses of their last class vestiges and have transformed them into organs of class collaboration, trading proletarian demands for social peace ... This fact is enough to show the falsity of the traditional Trotskyist perspective of conquering or reconquering for the proletarian struggle these apparatuses of professionals in conciliating workers' interests with the demands of capitalism. On the other hand, there are a thousand examples to show that it is very possible to transform a Trotskyist into a union bureaucrat ..."
In reality, what the ICP shows here is its lack of clarity and firmness on the nature of trade unionism. It doesn't denounce the latter as a weapon of the bourgeois class, but only the "union apparatuses". In doing so, despite its words, it doesn't manage to break free of the Trotskyist vision: nowadays you can find very similar statements in the press of a group like Lutte Ouvriere. What Le Proletaire, which considers itself to be faithful to the tradition of the Italian communist left, refuses to admit, is that any trade union form, whether small or large, legal and openly working at the highest levels of the bourgeois state, or illegal (as was the case with Solidamosc in Poland for several years, and the Workers' Commissions in Franco's Spain) can be nothing else but an organ for the defence of capitalism. Le Proletaire accuses the ICC of being hostile "to any organisation for the immediate defence of the proletariat". In doing so it reveals either its ignorance of our position or, most likely, its bad faith. We have never said that the working class must not organise itself to wage its struggles. What we do say, in line with that current of the communist left which Bordigism treats with such disdain, the German left, is that, in the present historic period, such an organisation is constituted by the general assemblies of the workers in struggle, by strike committees nominated by these assemblies and revocable by them, by central strike committees composed of delegates from the different strike committees. By their nature, these organisations exist by and for the struggle and are destined to disappear once the struggle is over. Their main difference with the unions in the past is precisely that they are not permanent and thus are not able to be absorbed by the capitalist state. This is precisely the lesson that Bordigism has never wanted to draw after decades of "betrayal" by all the union, whatever their form, their initial aims, their political positions and their founders, whether they see themselves as being for 'reforms' or for 'class struggle', or even as 'revolutionary'. In decadent capitalism, when the state tends to absorb all the structures of society, when the system is incapable of according the least lasting improvement in the living conditions of the working class, any permanent organisation which takes as its aim the defence of these living conditions is destined to be integrated into the state, to become one of its cogs. To quote what Marx said about the trade unions last century, as Le Proletaire does in the hope of shutting us up, just isn't enough to earn the title of 'marxist'. After all, the Trotskyists are very happy to resort to other quotes from Marx and Engels against the anarchists of their era to attack the position that the Bordigists defend today alongside the whole communist left: the refusal to participate in the electoral game. Le Proletaire's method here shows only that it has not understood a vital aspect of marxism - that it is a living and dialectical way of thinking. What was true yesterday, in the ascendant period of capitalism - the necessity for the working class to form trade unions, to participate in elections or to support certain national liberation struggles, is no longer true today, in decadent capitalism. To stick to the letter of quotes from Marx while turning your back on the conditions he was addressing, while refusing to apply the method of this great revolutionary, merely demonstrates the poverty of its own thought.
But the worst of it isn't this poverty in itself, it's that it leads to the sowing of illusions in the class about the possibility of a 'real trade unionism'; it's that it leads straight towards opportunism. And we find expressions of this opportunism in the articles of Le Proletaire when it shows the greatest timidity in denouncing the unions' game:
"What we can and must reproach the present unions with. ...". Revolutionaries don't reproach the unions with anything, any more than they reproach the bourgeoisie with exploiting the workers or the cops with repressing their struggles: they denounce them.
"... the organisations at the head of the movement, the CGT and FO, who to all appearances had been negotiating behind the scenes with the government to put a stop to the movement ...". The union leaders don't 'negotiate' with the government as though they had different interests, they march hand in hand with the latter against the working class. And this is not "to all appearances", it is certain! This is what is indispensable for the workers to know and this is what Le Proletaire is incapable of telling them.
The danger of the opportunist position of Le Proletaire on the union question becomes all the more clear when it writes:
"But if we reject the possibility of reconquering the union apparatuses, we don't draw from this the conclusion that we must reject working in these same unions, as long as this work is done at the base, in contact with the workers and not in the hierarchical organs, and on a class basis". In other words, when in an absolutely healthy and necessary way workers disgusted by union intrigues want to tear up their union cards, there will be a militant of the ICP to speak up like any Trotskyist: "don't do that comrades, we must stay and work in the unions!". What work, other than toiling at the base to restore the image of organs which are the enemies of the working class?
For the choice is clear:
- either you really want to carry out a militant activity "on a class basis", in which case one of the essential points you'd have to defend is the anti -working class nature of the unions, not simply because of their hierarchy, but as a whole; what clarity could the ICP militant bring to his comrades at work by saying: "the unions are our enemies, we have to fight outside and against them, but I'm staying inside them"?[2];
- or you want to stay "in contact" with the union "base", to make yourself "understood" by the workers who compose it, which means opposing the "base" to the "rotten hierarchy", ie the classic position of Trotskyism; certainly this means doing "work", but not on a "class basis", since you are preserving the illusion that certain structures of the union, the enterprise branch for example, can still be organs of the workers' struggle.
We really want to believe that the ICP militant, unlike his Trotskyist colleague, does not aspire to be a union bureaucrat. But he will still be carrying out the same anti-working class "work" of mystifying the nature of the trade unions. Thus, the application of the ICP's position on the union question has once again made a small contribution to demobilising the workers in the face of the danger represented by the unions. But this demobilising activity doesn't stop there. It comes out in broad daylight once again when the ICP shows a complete underestimation of the capacity of the bourgeoisie to carry out elaborate manoeuvres against the working class.
Underestimating the class enemy
In another article in Le Proletaire, 'After this winter's strikes, prepare the struggles ahead', we read:
"The movement this winter shows precisely that if, in these circumstances, the unions have shown an unusual flexibility and allowed the spontaneity of the most combative workers to express itself, rather than opposing it as they normally do, this tolerance allowed them to keep hold of the leadership of the struggle without any great difficulty, and thus to decide to a very great extent its orientation, the way it evolved and its outcome. When they judged that the moment had come, they gave the signal for the return to work, abandoning in the blink of an eye the central demand of the movement, without the strikers being able to come up with any alternative. The rank and file and democratic appearance of the way the movement was conducted was even used against the objective needs of the movement: it wasn't the thousands of daily general assemblies of strikers who gave the movement the centralisation and direction it needed, even if these organs did allow the massive participation of the workers. Only the union organisations could make up for this lack and so the struggle was suspended according to slogans and initiatives launched centrally by the union organisations and passed down through the apparatus to all the general assemblies. The climate of unity reigning in the movement was such that the mass of workers not only did not feel or express disagreements with the orientations of the unions, except with the orientations of the CFDT and their leadership of the struggle, but even saw their actions as one of the most important factors for victory".
Here Le Proletaire gives us the secret of the attitude of the unions in the strikes of 1995. Perhaps this is the result of reading what the ICC had already written about them. The problem is that when it comes to drawing the lessons from this obvious reality, Le Proletaire, in the same article, tells us that the movement was "the most important of the French proletariat since the general strike of May-June 68", that it salutes the "strength" which imposed a "partial retreat by the government". Decidedly, coherence of thought is not Le Proletaire's strongpoint. Do we have to recall here that opportunism, which is always trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, also avoids it like the plague?
For our part, we concluded that this movement was not able to prevent the government from pushing through its main anti-working class measures and that it had succeeded in restoring the image of the unions, as Le Proletaire shows very clearly. This movement was not initiated against the will of the unions or the government; they wanted it to happen precisely to obtain these objectives. Le Proletaire tells us that the feature of this movement "which must become an acquisition for the future struggles was the general tendency to breakout of sectional barriers and the limits of the enterprise or administration and spread to all sectors". This is quite true. The only thing is that this took place with the blessing, or rather, very often, the direct impulsion of the unions. The fact that workers have rediscovered a proletarian method of struggle no longer constitutes an advance for the working class the moment that this conquest is seen by the majority of the workers as being due to the action of the unions. The working class was bound to rediscover these methods of struggle sooner or later, through a whole series of experiences. But if such a rediscovery had been made through an open confrontation with the unions, this would have struck a mortal blow against the unions when they had already been strongly discredited, and this would have deprived the bourgeoisie of one of its essential weapons for sabotaging workers' struggles. Thus it was far preferable for the bourgeoisie that the rediscovery took place in a way that was poisoned and sterilised by trade unionist illusions.
The fact that the bourgeoisie could manoeuvre in such a way completely escapes Le Proletaire:
"If we are to believe the ICC, 'they' (no doubt the whole bourgeoisie) are extraordinarily tricky: pushing 'the workers' (this is how the ICC baptises all the wage-earners who went on strike) to enter into struggle against the government's decisions in order to control their struggle, to inflict a defeat on them and come back later on with even harder measures, this is a manoeuvre which would have stupefied Machiavelli himself.
The modern Proudhonists of the ICC go even further than their ancestor because they accuse the bourgeoisie of provoking the workers' struggle and allowing it to be victorious in order to derail the workers from the real solution: they hit themselves in order to avoid being hit. If we wait a while longer and look through the ICC's magic lantern we will see the bourgeoisie organise the proletarian revolution and the disappearance of capitalism with the sole aim of preventing the proletariat from doing it"[3].
Le Proletaire likes to think that it is very witty. Good luck to it. The problem is that its tirades show more than anything else the total vacuity of its political understanding. So, to prevent it from falling into total idiocy, we will permit ourselves to recall certain banalities:
1. It is not necessary for the whole bourgeoisie to be "extraordinarily tricky" for its interests to be well defended. In order to assume its defence, the bourgeois class has at its disposal a government and a state (although perhaps Le Proletaire doesn't know this) which defines its policies by relying on the advice of an army of specialists (historians, sociologists, political pundits ... and union leaders). The fact that there are still bosses in existence who think that the unions are the enemies of the bourgeoisie doesn't change anything: they are not the ones who are charged with elaborating the strategies of their class any more than sergeant-majors are given the job of running wars.
2. It is precisely the case that between the bourgeoisie and the working class there is a state of war, the class war. It's not necessary to be a specialist in military matters, but anyone who has a middling intelligence and a little bit of education (but perhaps this isn't the case with the editors of Le Proletaire?) knows that trickery is an essential weapon for any army. In order to defeat the enemy, it is usually necessary to deceive him, unless you enjoy a crushing material superiority.
3. The main weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is not the material strength of its forces of repression, but precisely its capacity for trickery, for mystifying the workers.
4. Even if Machiavelli, in his day, was laying down the bases of a bourgeois strategy for conquering and exercising power as well as for the art of war, the leaders of the ruling class, after centuries of experience, know a lot more than he did. Perhaps the editors of Le Proletaire think the opposite, but they would do well to spend a bit of time with their history books, particularly those dealing with recent wars, and above all with the workers' movement. They would discover that the machiavellianism which the military strategists are capable of in conflicts between national fractions of the same bourgeois class are nothing compared to what the bourgeoisie as a whole can come up with against its mortal enemy, the proletariat.
5. In particular, they would discover two elementary things: that provoking premature combats is one of the classic weapons of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, and that in a war, the generals have never hesitated to sacrifice part of their own troops or their own positions the better to lure the enemy into a trap, by giving him an illusory feeling of victory. The bourgeoisie will not make the proletarian revolution to stop the proletariat doing so. But in order to prevent it, it is quite prepared to make 'retreats', to grant apparent 'victories' to the workers.
6. And if the editors of LeProletaire take the trouble to read the classical analyses of the communist left, they will finally learn that one of the main ways the bourgeoisie inflicted on the proletariat the most terrible counter-revolution in its history was precisely to present its greatest defeats as 'victories': the 'building of socialism' in the USSR, the Popular Fronts, the 'victory over fascism'.
Thus, we can only say one thing to the editors of Le Proletaire: back to the drawing board. And before you do that, try to reflect a little and to overcome your terrible ignorance. Well-turned phrases and witty words are not enough to defend correctly the positions and interests of the working class. And we can give them one last word of advice: listen to what's really happening in the world. Try, for example, to understand what's just happened in Germany.
Union manoeuvres in Germany: a new example of the strategy of the bourgeoisie
If we needed further proof that the manoeuvre concocted by all the forces of the bourgeoisie at the end of 1995 in France had an international scope, the recent union agitation in Germany provides it in the most striking manner. In this country, obviously with its local specificities, we have seen a 'remake' of the French scenario.
At the beginning however, the situation seemed very different. Just after the French unions had been giving themselves an image of radicalism, of being intransigent organs of the class struggle, the German unions, faithful to their traditions of being negotiators and agents of the 'social consensus', signed with the bosses and the government, on 23 January, a 'pact for employment' which among other things contains wage reductions of up to 20% in the most threatened industries. At the end of these negotiations, Kohl declared that "everything must be done to avoid a scenario a la francais". At this point he was not contradicted by the unions who, a few weeks before, had been saluting the strikes in France: the DGB "assured its sympathy to the strikers who were defending themselves against a big attack on social rights"; IG-Metall affirmed that "the struggle of the French is an example of resistance against the blows aimed at social and political rights".
But in reality, the German unions' salute to the strikes in France was not at all Platonic; they are already getting prepared to carry out their own manoeuvres. The scope of these manoeuvres would be revealed in April. This was the moment Kohl chose to announce an unprecedented austerity plan: a wage freeze in the public sector, cuts in unemployment benefit and social security, increase in the working week, increase in the age of retirement, abandoning of the principle of 100% sick pay. And what was most striking was the way this plan was announced. As the French paper Le Monde put it on 20.6.96: "By imposing in such an authoritarian way his plan for economies of 50 million Marks at the end of April, Chancellor Kohl has given up the mantle of moderator, which he made so much of, to take up that of the decisive leader ... For the first time, the 'Kohl method' begins to resemble the 'Juppe method'".
For the unions, this was a real provocation which had to be met with new methods of action: "We have left consensus and are entering into confrontation" (Dieter Schulte, president of the DGB). The scenario 'a la francais', in its German version, was set up. The attitude of the unions hit a crescendo of radicalism: 'warning strikes' and demonstrations in the public sector (like at the beginning of autumn 95 in France): nurseries, public transport, postal services, cleaning services were hit. As in France, the media made a lot of noise about these movements, giving the image of a country paralysed, and making no secret of their sympathy for the strikes. References to the strikes in France became more and more commonplace and the unions even waved French flags in the demonstrations. Schulte invoking the French "hot autumn" promised a "hot summer" in the industrial sector. Then began the preparations for the huge demonstration of 15 June which was already announced in advance as "the most massive since 1945"[4]. Schulte predicted that it would "only be the beginning of sharp social conflicts that would lead to conditions a la francais". Similarly, whereas a few weeks before he had asserted that "there was no question of calling a general strike in the face of a democratically elected government", on June 10 he announced that "even a general strike cannot be ruled out". A few days before the 'march' on Bonn, the negotiations in the public sector gave birth to an accord which finally conceded some flimsy wage increases and the promise not to threaten sick pay, which allowed the unions to make it look like this 'retreat' was the result of their actions, as had been the case in France when the government had 'retreated' on the planned contract on the railways and on retirement in the public sector.
Finally, the immense success of "everyone to Bonn" (350,000 demonstrators), achieved thanks to an unprecedented media barrage and the enormous efforts made by the unions (thousands of coaches and nearly 100 special trains) looked like a show of force by the latter on a scale never seen before, while at the same time it made it possible to push into the background the fact that the government had not made any concessions on the essentials of its austerity plan.
The worldwide character of the manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie
Thus, within an interval of a few months, in the two main countries of continental Europe, the bourgeoisie has developed two very similar manoeuvres aimed not only at pushing through a whole train of brutal attacks but also at giving a new image to the trade unions. Of course there are differences in the precise objectives of the two national bourgeoisies. As regards France, it was necessary to restore the image of the unions in the eyes of the workers, an image that has been particularly tarnished by their support for the policies of the left when it was in the government; this is why they had to allow the coordinations to take centre stage in the task of sabotaging the struggles of the railway workers in 1986 and the hospital workers in 1988. As regards Germany, the problem wasn't that the unions were discredited. On the whole, these organs of the bourgeois state still had a considerable standing in the working class. On the other hand, the image they have had for the workers has been that of specialists in negotiation who have succeeded, thanks to the 'round tables' they have taken part in, to preserve something of the gains of the 'social state', a task obviously made easier by the fact that German capital has been better placed to resist the effects of the world crisis. But with the growing difficulties of the German economy (recession in 1995, record rates of unemployment, explosion of state deficits), this image could not have lasted much longer. At the negotiating table the government and the bosses will now only be able to propose increasingly brutal attacks on the workers' living standards and the dismantling of the 'social state'. The prospect of the outbreak of workers' anger is inevitable and this is why it has been necessary for the unions, if they are going to be up to the task of derailing this militancy, to shed their habits as 'negotiators' and take on the mantle of' organs of the workers' struggle'.
But granted the differences in the social situation in the two countries, the important thing is that the points these two episodes have in common should open the eyes of those who think that the strikes in France at the end of 1995 were 'spontaneous' and that they 'surprised the bourgeoisie', that they were not planned and provoked by the latter for its own ends.
Moreover, just as the bourgeois manoeuvre at the end of 1995 in France had an international significance, the different forces of the German bourgeoisie did not carry out their manoeuvre in the spring of 1996 for purely domestic reasons. F or example, in Belgium, if the bourgeoisie organised a copy of the French scenario last winter, it has again shown what an excellent mimic it is by also copying the German episode. Not long after the signing of the of 'pact for jobs' in Germany, a 'contract for the future of employment' was signed in Belgium between the unions, the bosses and the government, and this too proposed to introduce wage cuts in return for promises of jobs. Then the unions did a 180 degree turn and suddenly denounced this accord "after consulting the rank and file". This spectacular about-face, which again was given maximum coverage by the media, allowed the unions to take on a 'democratic' image, to pretend to be "interpreting the will of the workers", while at the same time washing their hands of any responsibility in the plans to attack the working class that have been prepared by the government (which is partly made up of the Socialist Party, the traditional ally of the most 'militant' union, the FGTB).
But if the international dimension of the manoeuvres of the French bourgeoisie at the end of 1995 were not limited to Belgium, as we've just seen with the manoeuvres in Germany in the spring, the significance of the events in Germany is also not restricted to this small country. The social agitation in Germany, well publicised by the TV in a number of countries, have a similar role to that of the strikes in France. Once again, it's a question of reinforcing illusions in the unions. The 'fighting' image of the French unions, spread far and wide by the media, has been used to rejuvenate the unions in other countries. Similarly, the radicalisation of the German unions, their threat to stir up a "hot summer" and the alarmist comments by the media in other countries about "the end of the German consensus" serves to relay the idea that the unions - even where they have a tradition of consultation and negotiation - can be authentic organs of the workers' struggle, and effective organs to boot, capable of defending workers' interests against the austerity of the bosses and the government.
Thus, it is indeed on a world scale that the bourgeoisie is carrying out its strategy against the working class. History has taught us that all the conflicts of interest between national bourgeoisies - commercial rivalries, imperialist antagonisms - fade out when it comes to confronting the only force in society that represents a mortal danger to the ruling class, the proletariat. The bourgeoisie elaborates its plans against the latter in a coordinated and concerted manner.
Today, faced with the workers' struggles that are brewing, the ruling class has to resort to a thousand traps in order to try to sabotage them, exhaust them and defeat them, to prevent them leading to a growth of consciousness in the working class about the ultimate perspective of its struggle: the communist revolution. Nothing would be more tragic for the working class than to underestimate the strength of its enemy, its ability to set such traps, to organise itself on a world scale to make them more effective. Communists have to be able to expose and denounce these traps in front of their class. If they can't do this, they are not worthy of their name.
FM, 24.6.96
[1] One of the most striking examples of this rewriting of the facts is the way the return to work at the end of the strike is dealt with: we are told this only began almost a week after the government announced its 'retreat', which is not true.
[2] It's true that the Bordigists are not lacking in contradictions: towards the end of the 70s, when there was a growing agitation amongst the immigrant workers, we often saw ICP militants explaining to flabbergasted immigrants that they should demand the right to vote in order to be able to ... abstain. You can't get more ridiculous than a Bordigist. It's also true that when ICC militants tried to intervene in a demonstration of immigrants in order to defend the necessity not to get trapped in bourgeois demands, members of the ICP lent a hand to the Maoists in chasing them away.
[3] We should note that issue number 3 of L 'Esclave Salarie, a parasitic bastard of the ex-Ferment Ouvriere Revolutionnaire, gives us an original version of the ICC's analysis of the bourgeoisie's manoeuvre: "We want to congratulate the ICC (ES thinks it's very witty to write the initials of our organisation in lower case) for its remarkable analysis which fills us with admiration and we would like to know how this elite of thinkers managed to infiltrate the bourgeois class to get so much information about its plans and traps. We wonder whether the ice isn't invited to the meetings of the bourgeoisie in order to study its anti-working class plots concocted in secret and through the rites of freemasonry". Marx was not a freemason and he wasn't invited to the meetings of the bourgeoisie, but he did devote a large part of his militant activity to studying, elucidating and denouncing the plans and traps of the bourgeoisie. We can only think that the writers of ES have never read The Class Struggles in France or The Civil War in France. This would be logical for people who have such contempt for thought, which is by no means the monopoly of an 'elite'. Frankly, it wasn't necessary to be a freemason to discover that the strikes at the end of 95 in France were the result of a bourgeois manoeuvre: it was enough to observe the way they were presented and publicised by the media in all the countries of Europe and America, and even as far as India, Australia or Japan. It's true that the presence in these countries of sections or sympathisers of the ICC assisted it in its work, but the real cause of the political poverty of ES does not reside in its weak geographical extension. What is provincial about this group is its political intelligence, which really is set in lower case.
[4] This refrain is a bit worn out: the demonstration of 12 December 95 in France was also presented as "the most massive since the war" in many provincial towns.
In the previous article, we showed how the revolutionaries in Germany had been confronted with the question of building the organisation in the face of the betrayal of social democracy: first by waging to the bitter end the struggle within the old party, carrying out the work of a fraction, and then, when this was no longer possible, preparing the foundation of a new party. It was this responsible attitude that the Spartakists adopted towards the SPD, and which later led them to adhere to the newly formed USPD, unlike the Bremen Left who called for the immediate foundation of the party. In this article we will deal with the foundation of the KPD and the organisational difficulties in the construction of this new party.
The Linksradikalen fail to form the new party
On 5th May 1917, the Bremen and Hamburg Left Radicals reproached the Spartakists for having given up their organisational independence by entering the USPD; they considered that "the time has come to organise the radical left in the Internationale Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands ".
During the summer, they organised preparatory meetings with a view to founding a new party. The founding conference was fixed for 25th August, in Berlin. Only thirteen delegates reached their destination, five of them from Berlin itself. The police had no difficulty in dispersing the conference. Determination is not enough by itself: adequate organisational resources are necessary as well. "It is not enough to brandish the 'banner of purity '. Our duty is to carry it to the masses, to win them over", wrote Rosa Luxemburg in the Duisburg Der Kampf
On 2nd September, a new attempt was made. This time, the organisation took the name "Internationaler Sozialistischer Arbeiterbund". Its statutes planned that the sections should be autonomous.
It considered that "the separation into political and economic organisations is historically out dated". Yet another indication of its great confusion in organisational matters. It would be a travesty of the truth to say that the Bremen Left was the clearest group at the political and practical level during the revolutionary movements in Germany. The Dresden group around Otto Ruhle, amongst other currents, was beginning to develop conceptions hostile to political organisation. The future council communism continued to ripen. Although the council communists did not themselves adopt political organisational forms, their voice nonetheless found an important echo in the class.
While the Spartakists' audience was growing, the Bremen Left and the ISD never succeeded in rising above the stage of a small circle. Although eighteen months of work in the USPD did not bring the Spartakus League all the results it had hoped, it never sacrificed its independence (despite the lSD's initial accusation). Without ever letting itself be gagged, Spartakus developed an active intervention within the USPD.
Whether during the polemics around the Brest-Litovsk negotiations from December 1917, or during the vast wave of strikes in January 1918, when a million workers downed tools and the workers' councils first appeared in Germany, the Spartakus League was more and more in the front line.
Just as German capital prepared to send yet more cannon fodder to the slaughter[1] the Spartakus League increased its organisational strength. It had eight publications, with a print run varying between 25,000 and 100,000 copies - and all this with almost its entire leadership in gaol[2].
Even when the Bremen Left decided to form an independent party, the Spartakus League refused to adopt a sectarian attitude, and continued to work for the regroupment of all the revolutionary forces in Germany.
On 7th October 1918, the Spartakus group called a national conference, with delegates from the various local groups of the Linksradikalen. It was decided that Spartakists and Radicals should collaborate, without the latter being obliged to join the USPD. Nonetheless, despite a developing revolutionary combat by the workers in Germany, the conference still failed to put forward, as a priority for its work, the necessity for the foundation of the party. Lenin emphasised the extreme importance of this question: "Europe's greatest misfortune, its greatest danger, is that there exists no revolutionary party ... Certainly, a powerful revolutionary movement by the masses may correct this defect, but the fact remains a great misfortune and a great danger"[3].
The Spartakists' intervention in the revolutionary struggle
When revolutionary struggles broke out in November 1918, the Spartakists accomplished a heroic labour, and the content of their intervention was of very high quality. They insisted first and foremost on the need to build a bridge to the working class in Russia. They unhesitatingly unmasked the manoeuvres and sabotage of the bourgeoisie. They recognised the role of the workers' councils, and emphasised the need once the war was over, for the movement to attain a higher level, where it could gain strength thanks to the pressure from the factories.
For reasons of space, we cannot deal with this intervention in greater detail. Despite their strength at the level of political content, the Spartakists nonetheless did not have a determining influence in the working class. To be a real party, correct political positions alone are not enough. A corresponding influence within the working class is also necessary. A party must have the strength to lead the movement, like a man at the tiller of a boat, for it to move forward in the right direction.
As the conflict broke, the Spartakists carried out a tremendous work of propaganda, but still remained only a loose regroupment. A closely knit organisation was sorely lacking.
A further difficulty should be pointed out: the Spartakists still belonged to the USPD, and for many workers the difference was still not clear between the centrists and the Spartakists. The SPD made the most of this confused situation, to put forward the indispensable "unity" between workers' parties, to its own benefit of course.
Organisational development only speeded up after the struggle broke out. On 11th November 1918, the "Spartakus Group" became the "Spartakus League", and a Central Committee of twelve members was formed.
Whereas the SPD possessed more than a hundred publications, and could base its counter-revolutionary activity on an extensive apparatus of bureaucrats and the unions, during the decisive week of 11th-18th November 1918, the Spartakists had no press at all: they were unable to publish Die Rote Fahne. They were forced to occupy the offices of a bourgeois paper. The SPD then did everything it could to prevent Die Rote F ahne from being printed on the occupied presses. Only after the occupation of another printing works could Die Rote Fahne appear again.
After failing to win their demand for an extraordinary congress of the USPD, the Spartakists decided on the formation of an independent party. On 24th December, the ISD (which in the meantime had changed its name to IKD) held a national conference in Berlin, with delegates from Wasserkante, the Rhineland, Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Berlin. During the conference, Karl Radek argued strongly for a merger between the IKD and the Spartakists. On 30th December 1918, and 1st January 1919, the Kommunistischer Partei Deutschland was formed from a regroupment ofthe IKD and the Spartakists.
The formation of the KPD
The first point on the agenda was an evaluation of the work in the USPD. On 29th November 1918, Rosa Luxemburg had already come to the conclusion that in a period of rising class struggle, "there is no place for a party of ambiguity and half measures"[4]. In a revolutionary situation, centrist parties like the USPD can only break up.
"We were in the USPD to take out of it what could be taken out, to push forward the valuable elements of the USPD, radicalise them, to reach our goal by a process of dissociation, and so to win over the strongest possible revolutionary forces, in order to bring them together in a united and unitary revolutionary proletarian Party ... The results achieved were extraordinarily meagre ... [Since then} the USPD has served as a fig-leaf for Ebert and Schiedemann. They have wiped out among the masses any notion of a difference between the policies of the USPD and those of the majority socialists ... Now, the time has come where all the revolutionary proletarian elements must turn their backs on the USPD in order to form a new, autonomous party, with a clear programme, firm goals, a unitary tactic, inspired by the highest possible degree of revolutionary determination, and conceived as a powerful weapon for the fulfilment of the social revolution which is beginning"[5].
The task of the moment was to regroup revolutionary forces in the KPD, and to make the clearest possible demarcation between them and the centrists.
In analysing the state of the revolutionary struggle, Rosa Luxemburg's Report on the programme and the political situation showed great clarity, in warning against any underestimation of the difficulties facing the new party:
"As I have described it to you, this whole process seems much slower than one would have thought at first sight. I think it is good for us to look clearly at all the difficulties, all the complications of this revolution. For I hope that, like me, none of you will be paralysed in your ardour, your energy, by a review of all the great difficulties and labours that await us".
Moreover, she strongly emphasised the importance of the party's role in the developing movement:
"The present revolution, which is now just beginning, and which has such vast horizons before it as well as problems of a historic and universal dimension to be overcome, must have assure compass, which at every stage of the struggle, whether in victory or in defeat, is able to point unfailingly towards the same supreme goal, the goal of world socialist revolution, of the proletariat's merciless struggle for power, and for the liberation of humanity from the yoke of Capital. To be this sure compass pointing out the road to follow, this spearhead thrusting forwards, this socialist proletarian yeast in the revolution, is the specific task of the Spartakus League in the present confrontation between two worlds"[6].
"We must teach the masses that the workers' and soldiers' councils must be the lever for the overthrow of the state machinery, that they must absorb all the forces of action and channel them into the furrow of socialist transformation. Even those working masses already organised into workers' and soldiers' councils are a thousand miles from carrying out these duties - except of course from a few small minorities who are clearly aware of them.[7]
Lenin considered that the Spartakus programme (What does Spartakus want?), which he received at the end of December, formed the corner-stone for the foundation of the Communist International.
"In this perspective we must: a) draw up the points on principles for the platform I think that we can draw on the theory and practice of Bolshevism; and b) more extensively from 'What does Spartakus want? ' with a + b the platform 's fundamental principles appear clearly enough.[8]
The organisational question at the Congress
At the Congress, 83 delegates were present, representing 46 sections, most of them with no real mandate. Their composition reflected the organisation's immaturity. Alongside the older generation of revolutionary workers who before the war had belonged to the Party's radical left opposition around Rosa Luxemburg, appeared young workers who during the war had become the carriers of revolutionary propaganda and action, but who possessed very little political experience, as well as soldiers marked by all the suffering and privations of war. They were joined by pacifists who had fought courageously against the war, had been pushed towards the left by repression, and who now saw the radical workers' movement as a favourable terrain for action, as well as by artists and intellectuals swept along by the revolutionary tide - in short just the sort of elements that any revolution suddenly sets in motion.
The struggle against the war united different forces in a single front. But at the same time, many leaders were in prison; many experienced workers from the Party were dead or missing, and their place taken by young radical elements with almost no organisational experience. All this goes to show that war does not necessarily create the most favourable conditions for building the party.
As far as the organisational question was concerned, the KPD contained a marxist wing represented by Luxemburg and Jogisches, an anti-organisation wing which would later give birth to the council communist current, and finally an activist wing which remained undecided on the organisational level, embodied by Liebknecht.
The Congress revealed the abyss between, on the one hand, the programmatic clarity (despite important disagreements that did exist) expressed by Luxemburg in her speech on the programme, and, on the other hand, weakness on organisational issues.
Weakness on organisational issues
To start with, organisational questions were given little time at the founding Congress; moreover, by the time the discussion started, some of the delegates had already left. The report for the Congress, drawn up by Eberlein, reflected the KPD' s weaknesses on the issue. Eberlein began with a balance-sheet of the revolutionaries' work to date:
"In name, and in all their activities, the old organisations were "electoral associations" [Wahlvereine}. The new organisation must be, not an electoral club, but a fighting political organisation ... The social-democratic organisations were Wahlvereine. Their whole organisation was based on preparation and agitation for elections, and in reality what little life there was in the organisation only appeared during elections or the preparation for them. The rest of the time, the organisation was empty and lifeless"[9].
This description of the pre-war SPD shows how the reformist gangrene had emptied its local organisations of political life, through the exclusive concentration on parliamentary elections. Parliamentary cretinism and the resulting attachment to bourgeois democracy had given rise to the dangerous illusion that the essential focus for the Party's struggle was its activity in parliament. This situation only began to be questioned in many local organisations after the outbreak of war and the betrayal of the parliamentary fraction in the Reichstag.
During the war, however, " ... we had to work illegally, and because of this illegal activity it was impossible to build a solid form of organisation"[10]. For example, Liebknecht spent the years between the summer of 1915 and October 1918, either in the army or in prison, and was thus forbidden any "free expression" or contact with his comrades. Luxemburg was imprisoned for three years and four months; from 1918, Jogisches was in the same situation. The majority of the Central Committee formed in 1916 was behind bars by 1917. Many only emerged on the very eve of the explosion of revolutionary struggle at the end of 1918.
The bourgeoisie was unable to silence Spartakus. Nonetheless, it dealt a heavy blow to the construction of the party by depriving an organisationally incomplete movement of its leadership.
But although the objective conditions of repression and illegality were serious hindrances to the formation of a revolutionary party, they should still not hide the fact that there existed among the revolutionary forces a serious underestimation of the need to build a new organisation. Eberlein revealed this weakness when he declared:
"You know that we are optimistic that the weeks and months to come will make our discussions on all this superfluous. So given the short time available to us today, I don't want to keep you any longer ... We are in the midst of a political struggle, which is why we have no time to waste on nitpicking over paragraphs ... During these days, we must not and we cannot focus on these little organisational questions. As far as possible, we want to leave you to deal with all that in the local sections during the coming weeks and months ... If we count on having more members, with conviction and ready to enter into action in the days to come, who bend their minds to the action of the coming period, then we will easily overcome the little problems of organisation and organisational form"[11].
Naturally everything was urgent, everything was pressing in the heat of the revolution; the time factor was crucial. This is why it would have been desirable, indeed vital, to have clarified the organisational questions in advance. But while all the delegates were preparing for an acceleration of the revolutionary combat in the weeks ahead, a number of them had developed feelings of distrust towards the organisation and began to think that the party would be superfluous.
In the same way, Eberlein's declarations expressed not only impatience but a dramatic underestimation of the organisation question: "For these last four years, we haven't had the time to spend on looking at the way we want to organise ourselves. During this time, we were, day by day, confronted with new facts and had to take the necessary decisions without asking ourselves whether we would be able to elaborate organisational statutes"[12].
It is doubtless true, as Lenin stressed, that the Spartakists had "accomplished a systematic work of revolutionary propaganda in the most difficult conditions ", but it is clear that there was one danger they were unable to avoid. A revolutionary organisation cannot 'sacrifice' itself for its intervention in the class; however necessary that intervention might be, it must not lead to the paralysis of its organisational activities. In a situation as dramatic as a war a revolutionary organisation may intervene intensively and heroically. But if when the workers' struggle revives it does not have a solid organisational tissue, ie if there is no political organisation at the proletariat's side, the work done previously will be lost. The construction of an organisational framework, the clarification of the organisation's function and way of functioning, the elaboration of organisational rules (statutes) are indispensable foundation stones for the existence, functioning and intervention of the organisation. This work of constructing the organisation must not be obstructed by intervention in the class. The latter can really only bear fruit if it is not carried out to the detriment of the construction of the organisation.
The defence and construction of the organisation is a permanent responsibility of revolutionaries, whether the class struggle is in deep reflux or at its highest points.
Furthermore, within the KPD, there was a tendency to react like a scalded cat to the experience of the SPD. The latter had developed a huge bureaucratic apparatus which, in the process of opportunist degeneration, allowed the party leadership to block local initiatives. Thus, out of fear of being stifled by a new Centrale, part of the KPD became the mouthpiece of federalism. Eberlein clearly joined this choir:
"It will be necessary in this form of organisation for the organisation as a whole to allow the greatest possible freedom for the different sections, to make sure that there are no schematic instructions from above ... We also think that the old system of subordinating local organisations to the Centrale must be abandoned, that the different local organisations, the different factory organisations must have a total autonomy. .. They must have the possibility of moving into action without needing instructions from the Centrale "[13].
The appearance of a wing hostile to centralisation, which would later give birth to the council communist current, led to a regression in the organisational history of the revolutionary movement.
The same went for the press: "We also think that the question of the press cannot be regulated at the central level; we think that the local organisations must have the possibility of creating their own papers ... Some comrades have attacked us (the Centrale) and said to us: 'You are bringing out a paper, what should we do? We can't use it, we will bring out our own paper'"[14].
This lack of confidence in the organisation, and above all in centralisation, manifested itself above all with the old Linksradikale of Bremen[15]. Starting from the correct understanding that the KPD could not be a simple continuation of the old SPD, they tended to fall into the opposite extreme of denying all continuity: "We have no need at all to plunge into the old organisational statutes in order to choose what bits we can use"[16].
Eberlein's declarations show the heterogeneity of the newly formed KPD on the organisational question.
The marxist wing in a minority on the organisational question
Only the wing grouped around Luxemburg and Jogisches intervened in a resolutely marxist manner during the Congress. Directly opposed to them was the council communist wing, which fundamentally underestimated the role of political organisations in the class, above all rejecting centralisation out of distrust of organisation, which led them to call for complete autonomy for the local sections. Otto Ruhle was their main representative.[17] Another wing, without a clear organisational alternative, was the one grouped around Karl Liebknecht. This wing was notable for being extremely combative. But to act as a party it's not enough to want to participate in workers' struggles; on the one hand, programmatic clarity and solidity are indispensable. Liebknecht and those who followed him orientated their activities almost exclusively towards intervention in the class.
This appeared clearly on October 23rd 1918 when he was released from prison. Around 20,000 workers came to welcome him at Anhalt station in Berlin. His very first action was to go immediately to the factory gates to agitate among the workers. However, in October 1918, with the temperature rising within the working class, the most pressing duty of revolutionaries was not simply to carry out agitation but to commit all their strength to the construction of the organisation, all the more so because the Spartakists still only formed a loose organisation, without solid structures. Liebknecht's attitude to organisation was very different from Lenin's. When Lenin arrived at the Petrograd station in April 1917 and was given a triumphal reception, he immediately made known the April Theses and did everything he could to pull the Bolshevik party out of the crisis it was in and to equip it with a clear programme through the convening of an extraordinary Congress. Liebknecht's first concern, by contrast, was not really the construction of the organisation. What's more, he seemed to be developing a conception of the organisation in which the revolutionary militant had to be a hero, a pre-eminent individual, rather than seeing that a proletarian political organisation lives above all by its collective strength. The fact that, subsequently, he continued to push for action off his own bat is the proof of his erroneous view of organisation, Luxemburg often complained about his attitude: "Karl is always rushing from one workers' meeting to another; he doesn't often come to editorial meetings of Die Rote Fahne. In general it's difficult to get him along to meetings of the organisation".
Liebknecht's image was that of the lone fighter. He never managed to understand that his main contribution was to participate in the construction of the organisation.
The weight of the past
The SPD had for years been steeped in the parliamentary tradition. The illusions created by the predominance of parliamentary-reformist activity had lent weight to the idea that the struggle in the framework of bourgeois parliament was the main weapon of the working class, rather than a transitory tool for taking advantage of the contradictions between the different factions of the ruling class in order to obtain momentary concessions from capital. Pampered by parliamentarism, there was a tendency to measure the strength of the struggle by the yardstick of votes obtained by the SPD in parliamentary elections.
This was one of the main differences between the conditions of struggle for the Bolsheviks and those of the left in Germany. The Bolsheviks had been through the experience of 1905 and were intervening in conditions of illegality and repression. They did intervene in the Russian parliament but through a much smaller group of deputies; in any case, their centre of gravity was not in the parliamentary and trade union struggle . While the SPD had become a powerful mass party deeply infected by opportunism, the Bolshevik party was relatively small and had more effectively resisted opportunism despite the crises it had been through. And it was no accident that, in the KPD, the marxist wing on questions of organisation, that of Luxemburg and Jogishes, had emerged from the Polish-Lithuanian party - the SDKPiL, that is a fraction of the revolutionary movement which had direct experience of the struggles of 1905 and had not been bogged down in the parliamentary swamp.
The construction of the party can only succeed on an international scale
The founding Congress of the KPD expressed another weakness of the revolutionary movement. While the bourgeoisie in Germany had immediately obtained help from the bourgeoisie of countries with whom it had just been at war, while capital was uniting at an international level in its struggle against the revolutionary working class (the White Armies of 21 countries had joined together to wage civil war against the new proletarian power in Russia), revolutionaries were way behind at this level. To some degree, this was due to conceptions inherited from the Second International. The parties of the Second International were built in a federalist manner. The federalist conception developed tendencies towards 'everyman for himself' in the organisation and prevented the question of organisation being posed in an international and centralised way. Thus the components of the left wing fought separately from each other in the different parties of the Second International.
"Lenin's fractional work was earned out uniquely within the Russian party, without him trying to take this onto the international level. To be convinced of this it's enough to read his interventions at the different Congresses, and we can affirm that this work was completely unknown outside the Russian sphere".[18]
Thus Karl Radek was the only foreign delegate at the founding Congress. And it was only through luck and perseverance that he was able to get through the net of controls set up by the German government run by the SPD. This Congress would surely have had a very different outcome if it had been attended by other important leaders of the revolutionary movement, such as Lenin or Trotsky from Russia, Bordiga from Italy or Gorter and Pannekoek from Holland.
We can today draw the lesson that the party can't be built in one country if revolutionaries don't carry out this task simultaneously at an international level, and in a centralised manner.
The parallel with the task of the working class is clear: communism can't be built in one isolated country. Likewise, the construction of the party demands that it be carried out on an international level.
The KPD was born as a very heterogeneous party, divided on the programmatic level, and with the marxist wing on organisational matters in a minority. Distrust towards organisation and in particular towards centralisation was already widespread among the delegates. The KPD did not yet have sufficient influence to decisively stamp its presence in the movement.
The experience of the KPD shows that the party must be built on solid organisational foundations. The elaboration of organisational principles, functioning on the basis of the party spirit, aren't things that can be created by decree but are the result of years of practice based on these principles. The construction of the organisation demands a lot of time and patience. It's obvious that revolutionaries today must draw the lessons from the weaknesses of the revolutionaries in Germany.
DV
[1] Between March and November 1918, Germany lost some 200,000 killed, 450,000 prisoners or missing in action, and 860,000 wounded on the Western Front.
[2] After Liebknecht's arrest at the beginning of the summer of 1916, a conference of the Left Social-Democracy was held on 4th June 1916. A five member action committee was formed to reconstitute the links between revolutionary groups, broken by repression. The committee included Dunker, Meyer, and Mehring, with Otto Ruhle as chairman. The fact that such a responsibility should be given to a comrade like Ruhle, who rejected centralisation and the construction of the organisation, shows just how difficult repression had made things for the Spartakists.
[3] Lenin, writing in Pravda, 11th October 1918.
[4] Rosa Luxemburg, 'The Congress of the Independent Socialist Party' in Die Rote Fahne, no.14.
[5] Karl Liebknecht, in Proceedings of the KPD founding Congress.
[6] Rosa Luxemburg, "National Conference of the Spartakus League", in Die Rote Fahne no.43, 29th December 1918.
[7] Rosa Luxemburg, Speech on the programme and the political situation", 30th December 1918.
[8] Lenin, Correspondence, December 1918.
[9] Eberlein's report on the organisation question to the KPD's founding Congress.
[10] idem
[11] idem
[12] idem
[13] idem
[14] idem
[15] Paul Froelich, a member of the Bremen Left during the war, elected to the Centrale by the founding Congress, thought that "in all their actions, the local organisations must have a complete right to self-determination. It follows that there must be a similar right of self-determination in all the rest of the party's work, within the framework of the programme and the resolutions adopted by the Congress" (11 January 1919, Der Kommunist). J Knief, a member of the Bremen left, defended the following conception:
"Without denying the necessity for a Centrale, the communists (of the IKD) demand, in conformity with the present revolutionary situation, the greatest autonomy and liberty for the local and regional organisations" (Arbeiterpolitik No 10, 1917).
[16] idem
[17] Already in 1917 J. Borchardt was declaring: "The important thing for us is the abolition of any form of leadership in the workers movement. What we need to reach socialism is pure democracy among comrades, that is to say equal rights and autonomy, free arbitration and the means for the personal activity of each individual. We don't need leaders, but only organs of execution, which instead of imposing their will on comrades, act simply as their mandates." (Arbeiterpolitik number 10, 1917)
[18] G. Mammone, Bilan 24, page 814, "La fraction dans les parties socialistes de la Seconde Internationale"
We have become used to the politicians, economists and media using the most extraordinary theories to hide the total bankruptcy of the capitalist system and to justify the interminable growth of the attacks on the working class's living conditions.
25 years ago, Nixon, an American president of the most rank conservatism, proclaimed to the whole world that "We are all Keynesians". In that period faced with the aggravation of the crisis the bourgeoisie offered "state intervention", the development of a "social and egalitarian state", as the solution. And in the name of this policy asked the workers for sacrifices in order to "reach the end of the tunnel".
In the 80s, confronted with the economic stagnation, the bourgeoisie changed horses. Now "less state" was the cure-all for all the problems of the state. These were the hard years of "Reaganomics" which meant the largest world-wide wave of state organised lay-offs since the 30's.
At present, the crisis of capitalism has reached such a serious level that the order of the day for all the industrialised states is purely and simply the liquidation of the minimum social guarantees (unemployment benefits, pensions, health and education spending: also length of the working day, job security etc.), that the workers still receive under the ideological disguise of the "welfare state".
This merciless attack, a qualitative leap in the tendency to the absolute pauperisation of the working class, announced by Karl Marx, a tendency which today is justified and accompanied by a new ideology: the "globalisation of the world economy".
The servants of capital have discovered the moon. 150 years after Engels demonstrated in the Principles of Communism (written in 1847): "That things have reached such a point that a new machine invented now in England can, in the space of a year, condemn millions of workers in China to starvation. In this way, big industry has linked all the peoples of the world to each other, it has united all of the local markets into one world market, everywhere it has prepared the ground for civilisation and progress and has organised things in such a way that what happens in the civilised countries must necessarily have repercussions in all the others" (Principles of Communism).
Capitalism had to expand across the world imposing its regime of wage slavery into every comer of the Earth. The integration into the world market, by the beginning of the century, of the most significant territories of the planet and the difficulty of finding others capable of satisfying expanding capitalism's ever growing needs, marked the decadence of the bourgeoisie order, as revolutionaries have said for 80 years.
In this framework of the chronic saturation of the world market, the XXth century has witnessed an unprecedented deepening of competition between the different national capitals. Faced with this ever increasing need to realise surplus value the markets have become increasingly smaller. This forces a double imperative on every national capital: on the one hand, to protect with all kinds of measures (monetary, legislative, etc) its own products faced with the assault of its rivals. On the other hand, to try to convince the other national capitals to open their doors to its commodities (trade treaties, bilateral accords etc.).
When bourgeois economists talk of "globalisation" they are trying to give the impression that capitalism can be consciously controlled and unified by the rules that mark the world market. What really happens is just the opposite: the realities of the world market impose their own laws, but in a framework dominated by the desperate efforts of each national capital to escape them and to push all their weight onto their rivals. The present "globalised" world market is not a framework for progress and unification but of anarchy and disintegration. The tendency of decadent capitalism is towards the break-up of the world market, under the powerful centrifugal forces of the national economies structured by hypertrophied states which try to protect with all means (including military) the product of their exploitation of the workers against the assault of their competitors. While in the last century competition between nations contributed to the formation and unification of the world market, in the XXth century, the organised competition between each national state tends just to the opposite: to the disintegration and decomposition of the world market.
It is exactly for this reason that "globalisation" is something that can only be imposed by force. In the world of Yalta, the United States and Russia, created very structured organisms, using the advantages given to them by the discipline of imperialist blocs, to regulate (in their favour, obviously) world trade: GATT, the IMF, the Common Market, Comecon in the Russian bloc etc. These organisms, the expression of the bloc leaders' military and economic strength, were never able to overcome the tendencies to anarchism and organise the world market in a harmonious and unified way. The collapse of the two old imperialist blocs after 1989[1] has considerably accelerated competition and the chaos on the world market.
But perhaps "Globalisation" will stop this tendency? According to the apostles of "globalism" the part of the world market which is "already unified" is going to have a "salutary effect" on all economies and is going to permit the entire world to come out of the crisis by freeing themselves from "national egotism".
If we examine each of the features that the economists identify with "Globalism" none of them will "overcome" the chaos of the world market nor the crisis it is aggravating. To begin with, "electronic transactions via the Internet" are going to considerably accentuate the already very high risk of non-payment, adding to the growing burden of insupportable debt. As for the globalisation of the monetary and financial markets we have already analysed this in International Review No 81 (Financial Storms: Madness?): "A financial crisis is inevitable. Indeed, in some respects it is already happening. Even from capitalism's point of view, a strong "purge" of the "speculative bubble" is vital " ... Today, the speculative bubble, and above all state indebtedness have increased fanatically. In these circumstances, nobody can tell where the violence of such a purge would stop. But at all events, it will involve a massive destruction of fictitious capital which will hurl whole areas of world capital into ruin".[2]
In reality, that which is presented as "globalism" is something very different from the celestial music that its enthusiasts sell us. It is a response to the two pressing problems that are posed by the present state of the capitalist crisis:
-the reduction of production costs
- the destruction of protective barriers in order that the most competitive capitalisms can make full use of the increasingly reduced markets.
In respect of the reduction in production costs we have already pointed out that "The intensification of competition between capitalists, exacerbated by the crisis of overproduction and the scarcity of solvent markets, pushes the capitalists to modernise continually the process of production, replacing men by machines, in a frenzied search for cost reductions. The same race obliges them to shift part of production to countries where labour power is cheaper (China and South East Asia today, for example)".[3]
This second aspect of the reduction of costs (transferring of certain parts of production to countries with low labour costs) has accelerated in the 90's. We can see how the "democratic" states, have made good use of the services of the Chinese regime in order to produce compact disks, sports shoes, hard disks, modems etc., at absurdly low cost. The take-off of the famous "Asiatic dragons" based on the manufacture of computers, steel, electronic components, fabrics etc. has transferred to these "low labour costs" paradises.
Capitalism, forced by the crisis, has to take full advantage of the differences in wage costs: "the total wage costs (including taxes) in the industry of the different countries on the road to development which produce and export manufactured goods as well as services, vary between 3% (Madagascar, Vietnam) to 40% in respect to those of the richest European countries. China is situated between 5-16% and India around 5%. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc there now exists on the doorstep of the European Union a labour reserve whose costs do not surpass 5% (Rumania) or 20% (Poland and Hungary) of those in Germany".[4]
This is the first aspect of "globalisation".
Its consequences are forcing a world-wide reduction in wages. In the second place, it is provoking massive lay-offs in the great industrial centres without these jobs being replaced, in the same numbers, through the supply of jobs in the new ultra-automated factories. Thirdly, far from remedying the chronic illness of capitalism (the saturation of the market) it has made it worse through reducing demand in the great industrial countries without an equivalent growth of consumption in the "emerging countries"[5]
As for the destruction of customs barriers, the pressure of the "great powers" have certainly made countries like India, Mexico and Brazil reduce their import duties at the price of a considerable indebtedness (repeating the same formulas employed in the 70' s and which led to the catastrophe of the 1982 debt crisis). The relief supplied to the whole of world capital however, is completely illusory: "the recent financial collapse of another "exemplary" country, Mexico, whose money lost half of its value overnight, necessitating an urgent injection of close to $50 billion of credit (by far the largest "rescue" operation in capitalism's history), sums up the reality of the mirage of the "emergence" of certain Third World countries"[6]. Under the pressure of "globalisation" we are not seeing a reduction in protectionism or of state intervention in respect to commercial exchange, what we are seeing is a recourse as much to the traditional means as to newer ones:
- the same Clinton who in 1995 obliged the Japanese to open their frontiers to American products, who never tires of asking his "associates" for "free trade" demonstrated this by ordering the increase of duties on planes, steel and agricultural products and limiting state agencies acquisition of foreign products.
- the famous Uruguay Round which led to the substitution of the old GATT by the new World Trade Organisation obtained a really derisory accord: only eliminating tariffs on 10 industrial products and reducing the percentage in 8 of these products by around 30% and that over a 10 year period!
- a massive expression of neo-protectionism is found in the environmental, health and even "welfare" standards, that the most industrialised nations use to impose unattainable criterion's on their competitors; "in the new WTO, industrial groups, union organisations and militant greens plead that the collective benefits from the environment, social welfare etc. and the standards they involve shouldn't be regulated by the market but, by national sovereignty which cannot share responsibility on this terrain".[7]
The formation of "regional areas" (European Union, The North American Free Trade Agreement, etc) do not contradict this tendency because they obey the necessity for groups of capitalist countries to create zones of protection from which to confront their most powerful rivals. Faced with the European Union the US responded with the Free Trade Agreement, while Japanese capital confronted with both promoted an accord with the Asiatic dragons. These "regional groups" try to protect from competition what at times looks like areal vipers nest where commercial confrontations between partners grow daily. It's enough to look at the edifying spectacle of the "harmonious" European Union rocked by the continuous litigation between its 15 member countries.
There is no effort to deceive anyone here, the most aberrant tendencies that express the decomposition of the world market constantly affirm this: "Today, international currency insecurity has reached such a point that we are seeing the resurgence of the most archaic form of exchange, in other words the direct exchange of commodities without having recourse to money as an intermediary."[8] Another type of weapon that capitalist states, even the richest, have at hand, is the devaluation of their currency which automatically permits them to sell their goods at a lower price and increases those of its rivals. All the straightjackets that have been used to stop the generalisation of this practice have in the majority of cases ended in fiascos and this was borne out by the collapse of the European Monetary System.
"Globalisation" an ideological attack on the proletariat
We can see therefore that "globalisation" is an ideological smoke screen used to hide the reality of capitalism's collapse into generalised crisis and the subsequent growth of chaos on the world market.
Nevertheless, "globalism" is very ambitious. It proclaims nothing less than the overcoming and even the "destruction" (in the words of the most daring of the globalists) of the nation state. One of them, the well-known Japanese business guru Kenichi Ohmae, says that: "In a few words, in terms of the real flows of economic activity, the nation state has lost its role as a significant participant in the frontierless economy of the present world."[9]. Further on he calls nation states "brutal filters" and promises us the paradise of a "global" economy: "due to the growth of the number of individuals who pass through the brutal filter which separates geographical areas through the old fashioned customs of the world economy,' power over economic activity will be inevitably transferred from the central governments of the nation states to the frontierless network of innumerable individual decisions, based on the maket."[10]
Up until now the only social class that fought the nation state was the proletariat. But we can see that the audacity of bourgeoisie ideologists is limitless: they set themselves up as the standard bearers of the "struggle against national interests". At the height of delirium two authors of this genre, Misters Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, have called their book "The First World Revolution".
However, the most dangerous aspect of this anti-nation "phobia" is the role that it plays in the bourgeoisie's ideological offensive against the whole proletariat. One part of this offensive is to entrap the proletariat in a false dilemma:
- on the one hand, the political forces that strongly defend "globalism" (in Europe they are the partisans of Maastricht), underlining the necessity to "overcome backwards national egotism" in order to integrate the "whole world" which will allow the crisis to be overcome;
- on the other, the parties of the left (above all when they are in opposition) and the unions that link the defence of worker's interests to that of the national interest supposedly trampled underfoot by "traitorous" governments.
The tenants of "Globalism", completely serve the national interest with their fulminations against so-called "minimum social guarantees", which means Social Security, redundancy pay, unemployment benefits, pensions, support for education and housing, and labour regulations that stipulate the length of the working day, the rhythm of production, the working age, etc. All the "horrors" forced on the nation state taken prisoner by "sinister" pressure groups formed by the workers .
Here we have the heart of globalism, stripped of its tinsel (about "overcoming the crisis" or "the internationalism of the free individual in a free market"). What we are presented with is the new alibi for the attacks imposed on all nation states by the crisis of capital: which means finishing with "minimum social guarantees", all social costs and labour legislation which with the development of the crisis are no longer insupportable.
And here, another pole of the bourgeoisie's ideological attack comes in to play: the unions and the Left. Over the last 50 years this "minimum social guarantee" has been the flagship of the "welfare state". This forms the "beautiful face" of state capitalism. The "social state" is presented to the workers as "evidence" that capitalist exploitation has been sweetened and has been placed within limits, as "proof" that within the national state class conciliation is possible and that their respective interests will be taken into account.
The unions and the Left (particularly when they are in opposition) pose as the greatest defenders of the "social state". They maintain that the conflict is between the "national interests" that demands the maintenance of a "social minimum" and "traitorous cosmopolitanism". This aspect played a very important role in the French bourgeoisie's manoeuvre through the strikes in the Autumn of 95. The movement was presented as a demonstration against Maastricht, as a an expression of the general populations' resentment against the demands of "convergence", into which the unions channelled this "movement".
The contradictions of Battaglia Comunista faced with "globalisation"
The task of the groups of the Communist Left (the basis for the future World Party of the proletariat) is to denounce, without concessions, the ideological poison of the dilemma between "savage globalisation" and "globalisation with guarantees". Faced with these new attacks the working class cannot choose between the spokesmen for the "national interest" or the standard bearers of "globalism". Its demands are not situated on the terrain of the defence of the "welfare state", but on the intransigent defence of its class interests. The perspective for the struggles is not in the false dilemma between "social-patriotism" and "globalisation", but in the destruction of the capitalist state in all countries.
The question of "globalisation" has been dealt with several times by Battaglia Comunista, through articles in its quarterly review Prometeo. BC firmly defends a series of positions of the Communist Left that we want to highlight:
- they unconditionally denounce "globalisation" as a powerful attack on the working class showing that it is based "on the progressive impoverishment of the world proletariat and the most violent forms of exploitation."[11]
- they reject the idea that "globalisation" represents an overcoming of capitalism's contradictions: "Here it is noteworthy to point out that even the most recent changes in the system of the world economy can be entirely reduced to the ambit of capital's concentration-centralisation process. Whilst a new phase in capital's history is undoubtedly underway this doesn't mean that the inherent contradictions of capital accumulation process have been overcome."[12]
- they recognise that the restructuring and "technological innovations" that capitalism introduced in the 80's and 90's do not represent a widening of the world market:
"Unlike the powerful economic growth of monopoly capitalism's first period; restructuring did not lead as expected to a 'virtuous circle' of new productive activity which would compensate for the manpower replaced by new technology. For the first time additional investments were leading, not to an expanded productive base and an overall growth in the productive labour force, but to their relative and absolute diminution."[13]
- they refuse any idea that sees "globalisation" as a way of creating an ordered and harmonious world production, instead they make it clear that "Thus we have a paradox of a system which pursues, via monopolies, the maximum rationality but which brings with it the highest level of irrationality: all against all; each capital against all the others; all capitals against each."[14]
- they record that: "the downfall (of the capitalist system) is not the mathematical result of the contradictions of the economic world, but the work of the proletariat which is conscious that this is not the best of all possible worlds."[15]
We support these positions and based on them we want to combat a series of insufficiencies and contradictions which, in our judgment, affect BC. This polemic has a clear militant aim: confronted with the aggravation of the crisis it is vital to denounce "theories" about "globalisation" whose aim is to obstruct the development of consciousness about the fact that the capitalist system is today "the worst of all possible worlds" and the necessity to destroy it world-wide.
What surprises us first of all is that BC thinks that: "Thanks to developments in microelectronics, both in the sphere of telecommunications and in relation to the actual organisation of the productive cycle the planet have really been unified."[16]. BC has been carried away by all the bourgeoisie's nonsense about telecommunications and the Internet supposedly being the "miracle unifier" and have forgotten that : "since the internationalisation of capitalist interests expresses only one side of the internationalisation of economic life, it is necessary also to review its other side, namely, that process of the nationalisation of capitalist interests which most strikingly empresses the anarchy of capitalist competition with the boundaries of the world economy, a process that leads to the greatest convulsions and catastrophes, to the greatest waste of human energy, and most forcefully raises the problem of establishing new forms of social life."[17]
Another weak flank that BC offers us is the strange discovery according to which:
"When Nixon, then President of the United States, took the historic decision to denounce the Bretton Woods Agreement and declared the dollars inconvertibility he had not the remotest idea that this was making way for one of the most gigantic transformations in the history of the capitalist mode of production, a period of extreme disturbance which in less than twenty years would change the shape of the world and push the relations of imperialist domination to their maximum limits."[18]
One cannot see as a cause (the famous decision in 1971 to declare the none-convertibility of the Dollar) what was nothing more than a simple effect of the aggravation of the capitalist crisis and in no way had enough importance to alter "the dominant imperialist relation", no less! We have already criticised the economism of BC which leads it to attribute effects that have no relevance to the confrontation between the previous imperialist blocs (Soviet and Western).
Nevertheless, the main danger is that they will open to door to the bourgeois mystification about capitalism's ability to "change and transform itself". In the past, BC has had a tendency to be dazzled by the "great transformations" that the bourgeoisie have dangled in front of our noses. It was seduced by the "innovations" of the "technological revolution", and then by the fabulous markets that would be opened up by "liberation" of the Eastern European countries. Today, they have taken at face value all the noise about "globalisation":
"The passing to the centralised management of the economic variables on a continental basis or through monetary zones has forced a change in the distribution of capital in different productive and financial sectors. It is not only small and medium sized businesses, but also large scale groups that are threatened with marginalisation or being taken over with the subsequent decline of their relative position of power. For many countries this could bring with it the danger of the fracturing of its national unity as the events in Yugoslavia or the ex-Soviet bloc have demonstrated. The balance of power between the different fractions of the world bourgeoisie is going to suffer profound mutations and will generate for a long time an aggravation of tensions and conflicts, with effects on the process of economic globalisation reflected that could slow down or even block it".[19]
To our amazement, we discover that imperialist tensions, the collapse of nations, the Yugoslavian conflict, are not explained by capitalism's decadence and decomposition, by the aggravation of the historic crisis of the system, but because they are internal phenomena of the process of "globalisation". Here BC slips away from the Communist Left's framework of analysis (decadence and the historic crisis of capitalism) and towards the bourgeoisie's framework of mystification's based on twaddle about "globalisation".
It is essential that the groups of the Communist Left make no concession to these mystification's and resolutely defend the revolutionary position according to which in decadence, and more concretely in the phase of crisis opened up at the end of the 60's, capitalism's attempts to try and stop its collapse will only aggravate and accelerate it and can produce no real change[20]. In our reply to the IBRP (International Review No 82) we make it clear that the question is not to ignore these attempts but to analysis them within the framework of the Communist Left and not to be hooked by the bait that bourgeois ideology dangles in front of us.
"Globalisation" and the nation state
However, where the contradictions of BC have their most dangerous consequences is in its position on the role of the nation state. BC believes that "globalisation" will profoundly alter the role of the nation state and imply a certain weakening of it. Certainly, they don't claim, as the samurai Kenichi Ohmea does, that the nation state is on the decline, and they recognise several important points:
- the class nature of the nation state has not changed
- the nation state is an active agent of the "changes" that capitalism is undergoing
- the nation state is not in crisis. Nevertheless, the comrades do say: "surely one of the most interesting aspects of the globalisation of the economy is expressed by the tendency to transversal and transnational integration of the great industrial and financial concentrations which, through their size and power, far surpasses that of the national states"[21]
What can be deduced from these "interesting aspects" is that under capitalism the famous "multinationals" can form entities superior to the nation state. This is a defence of the revisionist thesis that negates the Marxist principle according to which the highest and maximum unity of capitalism is the Nation State, the National Capital. Capitalism can never go beyond the framework of the nation state and even less can it be internationalist. As we have previously seen, it is limited to the aim of dominating its rival nations and gaining the largest possible share of the world market.
In the Editorial to Prometeo No 9 this revision of Marxism is confirmed when they say: "The productive and/or financial multinationals due to the economic interests and power they have surpass the different state formations they traverse. The fact that the central banks of the different states are incapable of controlling or counteracting the wave of speculation, that a monstrous handful of financial groups daily unleash, speaks volumes about the profound change in relations between states".
Is it really necessary recall that it is precisely these poor little, impotent national states that own (or at least strictly control) these mastodons of finance? Is it really necessary to show BC that this "monstrous handful" is formed by respectable banking and savings institutions whose responsibilities are designated either directly or indirectly by their respective national states?
BC is not only hooked by the bait about the supposed opposition between nation states and the monstrous multinationals, but goes even further, revealing that: "Thus, ever-larger capitals ... have given birth to those giants which now control the entire world economy. Indicative of this is the change in the so-called Big Three - the world's three largest companies. From the thirties right up until the seventies these were US car companies: General Motors, Chrysler and Ford. Today, they are three pension funds, again from the US: Fidelity Investments, Vanguard Group and Capital Research and Management. The cumulative power of these finance companies is enormous and extends beyond the individual states which have actually lost some of their capacity to control the world economy over recent years."[22]
In the 1970's the myth of the famous multinational oil companies was very fashionable. The Leftists told us that capital was "transnational" and due to this the "main demand" of the workers should be the defence of the national interest against this "stateless handful".
BC certainly rejected this mystification forcefully, nevertheless, they admit its "theoretical" justification, that is, they believed there was a possibility of an opposition, or at least, fundamental differences of interest, between the national state and the monopolies "traversing the national states" (this is their definition).
The multinationals are tools of the nation state. IBM, General Motors, Exxon, etc are tied to the American state by a whole series of channels: an important percentage of their production (40% in the case of IBM) is brought directly by the American state. It directly or indirectly influences the nomination of directors[23]. A copy of all new information technology products are sent straight to the Pentagon.
It is incredible that BC falls for the idea that there is a world superpower constituted by 3 investment funds! In the first place, the investment funds have no real autonomy, they are nothing but instruments of the banks, building societies, or state institutions such as syndicates, etc. Their direct and indirect bosses are their respective national states. Secondly, they are subject to strict state regulations which fix the percentage they can invest abroad in: shares, government bonds, etc.
"Globalisation" and State Capitalism
This brings us to an essential question: that of state capitalism. A fundamental feature of decadent capitalism is the concentration of the national capital in the hands of the state which has been converted into the pole around which the national capital organises its combat as much against the proletariat as other national capitals.
States are not the tools of enterprises, no matter how big they are, in fact, just the opposite has happened in decadent capitalism: the great monopolies, large enterprises, banks etc have submitted to the dictates of the national state and serve its designs as loyally as possible. Therefore, it is an error to think that in capitalism super-national powers exist which "cross" national states and dictate the policies they follow. On the contrary, the so-called multinationals are used by their mother-states as tools in the service of commercial and imperialist interests.
In no way, do we want to say that companies such as Ford or Exxon, are simply the puppets of their respective national states. They try to defend their particular interests, which on occasions clash with those of the national state. However, under "Western" state capitalism the complete fusion of private and state capital is organised in such a way that globally both, apart from the conflicts and contradictions that arise, act coherently in the defence of the national interest of Capital and under the protection of the totalitarian state.
BC says that it is difficult to know which state, for example Shell (Anglo-Dutch capital) or other multinationals which have multiple share capital, belong to. However, even if there are exceptional examples, these do not significantly nullify the reality of world capitalism, which is that property titles don't determine the control of a business. Under state capitalism it is the state that directs and determines the running of business, through whatever means necessary. It regulates prices, collective contracts, export quotes, level of production, etc. It determines the running of business when, as in the majority of productive sectors, it is the principle client. It controls "free trade" through its political, monetary, credit policies.
This essential aspect of the revolutionary analysis of decadent capitalism is not taken into consideration by BC. They prefer to loyally follow a partial aspect of Lenin's, and other revolutionaries of that period, efforts to understand the full magnitude of the problem of imperialism: Lenin's theory on financial capital, takes up that of Hilferding. In his book on imperialism, Lenin clearly sees that proletarian revolution is the order of the day in the epoch of capitalism's decadence. But this epoch is linked to the development of finance capital as a monstrous parasite arising out of the process of the concentration of capitalism, as a new phase in development of monopolies.
However, "many aspects of Lenin's definition of imperialism are inadequate today, and were even at the time he was elaborating it. Thus the period in which capital could be seen to be dominated by an oligarchy of "finance capital" and by "international monopolist combines" was already giving way to a new phase during the First World War- the period of state capitalism, of permanent war economy. In the epoch of chronic inter-imperialist rivalries on the world market, the entire national capital tends to be concentrated around the state apparatus, which subordinates and disciplines all particular fractions of capital to the needs of military/economic survival."[24]
What constitutes an error by Lenin linked to the process of understanding imperialism and all its consequences, is converted into a dangerous aberration by BC. The theory of "concentration in transnational super-monopolies" closes the door, in the first place, to the Marxist position on the concentration of the national capital in the state, the tendency to state capitalism, which subordinates all fractions of the bourgeoisie not matter what links or influence they may have at the international level. Secondly, this theory opens the door to the Kautskyist theory of "super-imperialism". All of which results in BC only criticising this theory as regards the impossibility of overcoming the anarchy of capital and not the crucial point: the selling of the myth that capitalism can unite across national frontiers. This difficulty leads BC to correctly reject the extreme thesis of the "fusion of nations", while at the same time admitting the existence of super-national entities. Thirdly, BC develop a speculation according to which: the nation state, within the framework of "globalisation", will have two aspects: one serving the interests of the multinationals and, the other, subordinated to the service of the national interest: "it is going to become increasingly evident that the state's intervention in the economic world is carried out at two levels: at one level it will offer to the super-national centre the centralised management of the monetary mass and the determination of macro-economic variables according to monetary area and at the other the local control of the comparability of this latter with national variables"[25]. BC turns the world upside down. A quick look at what happens in the European Union shows just the contrary: the interests of the national capital are entirely managed by the national state and no way is it a kind of "subordination" to "European interests", as the ambiguities of BC would lead us to understand.
Mounted on the speculative theory of "transnational" interests, it draws incredible conclusions: imperialist conflicts will not degenerate into generalised imperialist war because: "The ending of the confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs with the implosion of the former has not clearly delineated the foundations of a new strategic confrontation. Up until now, the strategic interests of the great and real centres of economic power have not been expressed in strategic confrontations between states, because they move transversely to them."
This is a very serious confusion. Imperialist war is no longer a confrontation between national capitals armed to the teeth (as Lenin made clear) but the result of confrontations between transnational groups using national states as their tools. National states are no longer the focus and cause of the conflagration but mere agents of the monstrous transnationals which "cross them". Fortunately, BC don't draw all the conclusions of this aberration, because this would lead them to say that the struggle of the proletariat against imperialist war is no longer the struggle against national states but the struggle "to free them" from submission to the interests of the transnationals. In other words, the vulgar mystifications of the Leftists. If BC wants to be serious it has to cohere to the positions of the Communist Left. It has to make a systematic critique of its speculations about monopolies and financial monsters. It must eradicate its aberrant slogans such as "a new era has been inaugurated characterised by the dictatorship of the financial market" (Prometeo No 9).[26] These weaknesses open up its flank to the penetration of bourgeois mystifications concerning "globalisation" and the supposed opposition between transnational and national interests, between Maastricht and popular interests, between Maastricht and the interests of the oppressed peoples.
This could lead BC to defend certain theses and mystifications of the ruling class, therefore to participate in the weakening of the working class's consciousness and struggle. This is surely not the role to be played by a proletarian revolutionary organisation.
Adalen, 5 June 1996.
[1] See "The impossibility of a "United Europe", in International Review No 73, 2nd Quarter of 1993, where we highlight the aggravation of competition and anarchy in the world market.
[2] "Financial Storms: Madness?", International Review No 81, 2rd Quarter. 1995.
[3] "The Cynicism of a Decadent Ruling Class", International Review No 78, 3rd Quarter, 1994.
[4] The World Annual 1996: "Relocation, Employment and Inequality".
[5] "This means that this economic development cannot but effect the production of the most advanced countries, whose states, increasingly, protest against the "dishonest commercial practices" of these emerging countries" ("International Situation Resolution", International Review No 82, 3rd Quarter 1995.)
[6] Idem.
[7] The World Annual 1996: "What is going to change with the WTO".
[8] "An Economy Undermined by Decomposition", International Review No. 75, 4th Quarter. 1993.
[9] Kenichi Ohmae "The End of the Nation State, The rise of regional economies".
[10] Idem.
[11] The quotes from this article are taken from the English translation of the original Prometeo article (no 9, June 1995) published in Internationalist Communist, No 14. This is the theoretical journal of the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, a joint organisation of BC and the Communist Workers Organisation.
[12] Idem, page.13.
[13] Idem page 14.
[14] Idem page 19.
[15] Idem page 14.
[16] Idem page 14.
[17] N. Bukharin, "Imperialism and the World Economy", page 62.
[18] "Capitals Against Capitalism" page 13.
[19] Prometeo No 10, "Two Dimensions of the State: the globalisation of the economy and the State"
[20] BC's incoherence is made clear when they say "In reality capitalism is the same as ever and is doing nothing other than reorganising itself in the interests of self-preservation along the lines dictated by the tendential fall in the average rate of profit". ("Capitals Against Capitalism", Internationalist Communist No 14).
[21] Prometeo No 10, "The Two Dimensions of the State: the G1obalisation of the economy and
the State".
[22] "Capitals Against Capitalism" Internationalist Communist No 14.
[23] It is common practise that many American politicians after they have left the Senate or their positions in the administration move into the leadership of the large Multinationals. The same takes place in Europe.
[24] "On Imperialism", International Review No 19, 4th quarter 1979.
[25] Prometeo No 10, "The Two Dimensions of the State: the globalisation of the economy and the state".
[26] Prometeo No 9, "Editorial".
In the previous article in this series, we showed how the authentic socialists of the end of the 19th century had envisaged the way that a future communist society would tackle some of mankind's most pressing social problems: the relationship between man and woman, and between humankind and the nature from which it has sprung. In this issue, we examine how the late 19th century revolutionaries foresaw the most crucial of all social transformations - the transformation of "useless toil" into "useful work" - in other words, the practical overcoming of alienated labour. In doing so, we will answer the charge that these visions represent a relapse into pre-marxist utopianism.
In a London of the future, much has been dismantled and replanted; you can pass from Kensington to Trafalgar Square by way of a woodland path. But some familiar buildings are still there: the old Houses of Parliament, now mainly used for storing manure, and the British Museum, which still retains many of its ancient functions. It is here that William Guest, time traveller from the late nineteenth century, meets old Hammond, a former librarian who has a profound historical knowledge and is thus best placed to explain the workings of a communist society which has been established for several centuries. After discussing several aspects of "the way things are managed", ie the methods of social organisation, they turn to the question of work:
"The man of the nineteenth century would say that there is a natural desire towards the procreation of children, and a natural desire not to work".
"Yes, yes", said Hammond, "I know the ancient platitude - wholly untrue; indeed, to us quite meaningless. Fourier, whom all men laughed at, understood the matter better".
"Why is it meaningless to you?" said I. He said: "because it implies that all work is suffering, and we are so far from thinking that, as you may have noticed, whereas we are not short of wealth, there is a kind of fear growing up amongst us that we shall one day be short of work. It is a pleasure which we are afraid of losing, not a pain."
"Yes", said I, "I have noticed that, and I was going to ask you about that also. But in the meantime, what do you positively mean to assert about the pleasurableness of work amongst you?"
"This, that all work is now pleasurable; either because of the hope of gain in honour and wealth with which the work is done, which causes pleasurable excitement, even when the actual work is not pleasant; or else because it has grown into a pleasurable habit, as is the case with what you may call mechanical work; and lastly (and most of our work is of this kind) because there is conscious sensuous pleasure in the work itself; it is done, that is, by artists."
"I see", said I. "Can you now tell me how you have come to this happy condition? For, to speak plainly, this change from the conditions of the older world seems to me far greater and more important than all the other changes you have told me about as to crime, politics, property, marriage."
"You are right there," said he. "Indeed you may say rather that it is this change which makes all the others possible. What is the object of Revolution? Surely to make people happy. Revolution having brought its foredoomed change about, how can you prevent the counter-revolution from setting in except by making people happy? What! Shall we expect peace and stability from unhappiness? ... .And happiness without happy daily work is impossible".
Thus William Morris, in his visionary novel News From Nowhere, seeks to describe the attitude to work that might exist in a developed communist society. The poetic method of this description should not blind us to the fact that he is only defending a fundamental postulate of marxism here. As we have shown in previous articles in this series (see in particular International Reviews 70 and75), Marxism begins with the understanding that labour is "man's act of self-genesis" as Marx put it in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, where he credited Hegel with having recognised this, albeit in a formal and abstract way. In 1876, Engels was able to make use of the most recent discoveries in the field of physical anthropology to confirm that "labour created man himself" ('The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man'). The powerful human brain, the dexterous human hand, language and the specifically human consciousness of self and world, are born through the process of tool-making, the shaping of the external environment; in short, through labour, which is the act of a social being working in common. This dialectical approach to human origins, which can only be defended consistently by a labouring class, is opposed both to the idealist view (humanity either as the product of an external supernatural being, or of its own intellectual powers conceived in isolation from practice) and the vulgar materialist view which reduces human intelligence to purely mechanical factors (the size of the brain for example).
But Marx also criticised Hegel because "he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labour. Labour is man's coming to be for himself within alienation, or as alienated man". (EPM, 'Critique of Hegelian Philosophy'). Under conditions of material scarcity, and in particular of class domination, the labour which creates and reproduces man has also resulted in man's own powers escaping his control and ruling over him. Engels again confirms this standpoint in 'The Part Played by Labour', showing that despite man's unique capacity for purposeful and planned action, the material conditions under which he has laboured so far have led to results very different to his plans. The dimension of alienation in this text is covered in Engels' references to the ecological catastrophes of past civilisations, but also to the emergence of religion, "that fantastic reflection of human things in the human mind".
Man's estrangement from himself is situated first and foremost in the sphere through which he creates himself, the sphere of labour. Overcoming the alienation of labour is thus the key to overcoming all the alienations that plague humanity, and there can be no real transformation of social relations - whether the creation of new relationships between the sexes, or a new dynamic between man and nature - without the transformation of alienated labour into pleasurable creative activity. Old Hammond thus stands by Marx - who in turn also defended Fourier on this point - when he insists that happiness is impossible without happy daily work.
Certain modernist sects, not least those like the Groupe Communiste Internationaliste who used to enjoy displaying their knowledge of Marx, have taken this critique of alienated labour to mean that communism means the abolition not only of wage labour - the last form of alienated labour in history - but of labour as such. Such attitudes to labour are typical of the disintegrating petty bourgeoisie and declassed elements who look down on the workers as mere slaves and think that the individual "refusal of work" is a revolutionary act. Indeed, such views have always been used to discredit communism. This charge was answered by August Bebel in Woman and Socialism, when he pointed out that the very starting point of the socialist transformation is not the immediate abolition of work but the universal obligation to do it:
"As soon as society is in possession of all the means of production, the duty to work, on the part of all able to work, without distinction of sex, becomes the organic law of socialist society. Without work society cannot exist. Hence, society has the right to demand that all who wish to satisfy their wants shall exert themselves, according to their physical and mental faculties, in the production of the requisite wealth. The silly claim that the Socialist does not wish to work, that he seeks to abolish work, is a matchless absurdity, which fits our adversaries alone. Non-workers, idlers, exist in capitalist society only. Socialism agrees with the Bible that 'he who will not work, neither shall he eat '. But work shall not be a mere activity; it shall be useful, productive activity. The new social system will demand that each and all pursue some industrial, agricultural or other useful occupation, whereby to furnish a certain amount of work towards the satisfaction of existing wants. Without work no pleasure, no pleasure without work" (chapter VII, p275).
In the initial stages of the revolution, the universal obligation of labour, as Bebel implies, contains an element of restraint. The proletariat in power will certainly rely first and foremost on the enthusiasm and active participation of the mass of the working class, who will be the first to see that they can only rid themselves of wage slavery if they are prepared to labour in common to produce and distribute life's necessities. Already in this phase of the revolutionary process, labour has its own reward, in that it is immediately seen as socially useful - work for a real and observable common good and not for the inhuman demands of the market and of profit. In such circumstances, even the hardest work takes on a liberating and human character, since "in your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human need ... In the individual expression of my own life. I would have brought about the immediate expression of your life, and so in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realised my authentic nature, my human, communal nature" (Marx, 'Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy'). Nevertheless, a gigantic social and political upheaval will at first inevitably call for very great material sacrifices, and such feelings alone would not be enough to convince those used to idling and living off the toil of others to voluntarily submit to the rigours and discipline of associated labour. The use of economic constraint - he who will not work, neither shall he eat - is thus a necessary weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only in a more developed socialist society will it be plain and obvious to all that it is in the interests of every individual to play his full part in social production.
At the same time, it is not at all the goal of the communist movement to remain at a stage where work's only reward is that it is benefiting someone else. If it does not become pleasurable in itself, the counter-revolution will indeed set in, and the proletariat's willing sacrifices for the common cause will become sacrifices for an alien cause - as witness the tragedy of the defeated Russian revolution. This is why immediately after the passage cited above, Bebel adds:
"All being obliged to work, all have an equal interest in seeing the following three conditions of work in force:
First, that work should be moderate, and shall overtax none;
Second, that work shall be as agreeable and varied as possible;
Third, that work shall be as productive as possible, seeing that both the hours of work and fruition depend upon that".
In distinguishing between "Useful Work" and "Useless Toil" William Morris makes a very similar threefold definition:
"What is the difference between them, then? This: one has hope in it, the other has not .... What is the nature of the hope which, when it is present in work, makes it worth doing?
It is threefold, I think: hope of rest, hope of product, hope of pleasure in the work itself; and hope of these also in some abundance and of good quality; rest enough and good enough to be worth having; product worth having by one who is neither a fool nor an ascetic; pleasure enough for all of us to be conscious of it while we are at work" ('Useful Work Versus Useless Toil', Political Writings of William Morris, London, 1973, p 87)
In Morris's definition of useful work cited above, and in Bebel's three conditions for work being made pleasant, the element of rest, of leisure and relaxation, is elaborated very concretely: they insisted on the possibility of reducing the working day to a fraction of what it then was (and still is). This is surely because, faced with a capitalist society which stole the best hours, days and years from the worker's life, it was an elementary duty of revolutionaries to demonstrate that the very development of capitalist machinery made this theft historically unjustifiable. This was also the theme of Paul Lafargue's sardonic pamphlet The Right to be Lazy, published in 1883. By then it was already abundantly evident that one of the most striking contradictions in capitalism's development of technology was that while it brought with it the possibility of freeing the worker from drudgery, it seemed to be used only to sweat him more intensively than ever. The reason for this was simple: under capitalism, technology is not developed for the benefits of humanity, but for the needs of capital:
"Our epoch has invented machines which would have appeared wild dreams to the men of past ages, and of those machines we have as yet made no use.
They are called 'labour saving' machines - a commonly used phrase which implies what we expect of them; but we do not get what we expect. What they really do is to reduce the skilled labourer to the ranks of the unskilled, to increase the number of the 'reserve army of labour' - that is, to increase the precariousness of life among the workers and to intensify the labour of those who serve the machines (as slaves their masters). All this they do by the way, while they pile up the profits of the employers of labour, or force them to expend those profits in bitter commercial war with each other. In a true society these miracles of ingenuity would be for the first time used for minimising the amount of time spent in unattractive labour, which by their means might be so reduced as to be but a very light burden on each individual. All the more as these machines would most certainly be very much improved when it was no longer a question as to whether their improvement would 'pay' the individual, but rather whether it would benefit the community" ('Useful Work. . .', p106).
In a similar vein, Bebel cites contemporary calculations by bourgeois scientists that with the technology already existing in his time, the working day could be reduced to one and a half hours! Bebel was particularly optimistic about the possibilities being opened up by the development of technology in that period of startling capitalist expansion. But this optimism was not a blanket apologia for capitalist progress. Writing about the enormous potential contained in the application of electricity, he also argued that "only in socialist society will electricity attain its fullest and most widespread application" (Woman and Socialism, ch. VII, p286). Even if today capitalism has 'electrified' most (though not all) of the planet, the full significance of Bebel's qualification can be grasped when he remarks a little further on that "our water courses, the ebb and tide of the sea, the winds, the sunlight - all furnish innumerable horse-powers, the moment we know how to utilise them in full" (ibid). The methods that capitalism has adopted for generating electricity - the burning of fossil fuels, and nuclear energy - have brought forth numerous harmful side-effects, notably in the form of pollution, while the needs of profit have led to the neglect of 'cleaner', and ultimately more abundant sources - such as the wind, the tides and the sun.
But the reduction of the working day for these socialists would not only be the result of the rational use of machinery. It would also be made possible by eliminating the gigantic waste of labour power inherent in the capitalist mode of production. As early as 1845 Engels, in one of his 'Speeches in Elberfeld' , had drawn attention to this reality, pointing to the way capitalism could not avoid squandering human resources in its employment of profiteers and financial middlemen, of policemen and prison guards to deal with the crimes it inevitably provoked amongst the poor, of soldiers and sailors to fight its wars, and above all in its forced unemployment of millions of labourers denied access to all productive work by the mechanisms of the economic crisis. The socialists of the late nineteenth century were no less struck by this wastefulness and showed the connection between overcoming it and ending the drudgery of the proletariat:
"As things are now, between the waste of labour-power in mere idleness and its waste in unproductive work, it is clear that the world of civilisation is supported by a small part of its people; when all were working usefully for its support, the share of work which each would have to do would be but small, if our standard of life were about on the footing of what well-to-do and refined people now think desirable" ('Useful Work ... ', p 96). Such sentiments are more true than ever today, in a decadent capitalism where waste production (arms, bureaucracy, advertising, speculation, drugs etc) have reached unprecedented proportions, and where mass unemployment has become a permanent fact of life, while the working day is for the majority of employed workers longer than it was for their Victorian ancestors. Such contradictions offer the most striking proof of the absurdity that capitalism has become, and thus of the necessity for the communist revolution.
Describing the pleasures of work to his nineteenth century visitor, old Hammond did not lay much emphasis on the need for rest, for leisure; and yet the subtitle of the novel is 'An epoch of rest'. Evidently, after several generations, the rigid separation between 'free time' and 'labour time' has been superseded, as Marx said it must. For the aim of the revolution is not simply to relieve human beings of unpleasant work: "labour is also to be made pleasant" as Bebel puts it. He then elaborates some of the conditions for this to be the case, echoed by Morris on each point.
The first condition is that work should be carried out in pleasant surroundings:
"To that end practical and tastefully contrived workshops are required; the utmost precautions against danger; the removal of disagreeable odours, gases and smoke - in short of all sources of injury or discomfort to health. At the start, the new social system will carry on production with the old means, inherited from the old. But these are utterly inadequate. Numerous and unsuitable workshops, disintegrated in all directions; imperfect tools and machinery, running through all the stages of usefulness - this heap is insufficient both for the number of the workers and for their demands of comfort and of pleasure. The establishment of a large number of spacious, light, airy, fully equipped and ornamented workshops is a pressing need. Art, technique, skill of head and hand immediately find a wide field of activity. All departments in the building of machinery, in the fashioning of tools, in architecture and in the branches of work connected with the internal equipment of houses have the amplest opportunity" (Woman and Socialism, ch. VII, p284). For Morris, productive activity might be carried out in a variety of surroundings, but he argues that some kind of factory system would "offer opportunities for a full and eager social life surrounded by many pleasures. The factories might be centres of intellectual activity also", where "work might vary from raising food from the surrounding country to the study and practice of art and science". Naturally Morris is also concerned that these factories of the future would not merely be clean and pollution-free, but aesthetic constructions in themselves: "beginning by making their factories, buildings and sheds decent and convenient like their homes, they would infallibly go on to make them not merely negatively good, inoffensive merely, but even beautiful, so that the glorious art of architecture, now for some time slain by commercial greed, would be born again and flourish" ('Useful Work ... ', p 103-4).
The factory is quite often described in the marxist tradition as being a true realisation of hell on earth. And this is true not merely of the ones that it is respectable to abhor - those of the dim distant days of the 'industrial revolution' with its admitted excesses - but equally the modem factory in the age of democracy and the welfare state. But for marxism, the factory is more than this: it is the place where the associated labourers come together, work together, struggle together, and is thus an indication of the possibilities of the communist association of the future. Thus, against the anarchist prejudice against the factory as such, the late nineteenth century marxists were quite correct to envisage a factory of the future, now transformed into a centre of learning, experiment, and creation.
For this to be the case, it is evident that the old capitalist division of labour, its reduction of virtually all jobs to a mind-numbing and repetitive routine, would have to be done away with as soon as possible. "To compel a man to do day after day the same task, without any hope of escape or change, means nothing short of turning life into a prison-torment" ('Useful Work. . .', p 101I). Thus our socialist writers, again following Marx, insist on work being varied, changing, and no longer crippled by the rigid separation of mental from physical activity. But the variety they proposed - based on the acquisition of a number of different skills, on a properly established balance between intellectual activity and bodily exertion - was much more than a mere negation of capitalist over specialisation, more than a simple distraction from the boredom of the latter. In its fullest sense it involved the development of a new kind of human activity which is finally in conformity with mankind's deepest needs:
"An aspiration, deeply implanted in the nature of man, is that of freedom in the choice and change of occupation. As uninterrupted repetition renders the daintiest of dishes repulsive, so with a daily treadmill-like recurring occupation; it dulls the senses. Man then does only mechanically what he must do; he does it without swing or enjoyment. There are latent in all men facilities and desires that need but to be awakened and developed to produce the most beautiful results. Only then does man become fully and truly man. Towards the satisfaction of this need of change, socialist society offers the fullest opportunity" (Woman and Socialism, ch. VII, p288).
This variation has nothing in common with the frenetic search for innovation for its own sake that has become more and more a hallmark of decaying capitalist culture. It is founded on a human rhythm of life where disposable time has become a measure of wealth: "we have now found out what we want, so we make no more than we want; and as we are not driven to make a vast quantity of useless things, we have time and resources enough to consider our pleasure in making them" (News from Nowhere, London, 1970 edition, p82).
Working with swing and enjoyment; the awakening of suppressed facilities and desires. In short, as Morris put it, work as consciously sensuous activity.
Morris did not have access to Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, but his use of this phrase shows that the late 19th century revolutionary movement was familiar with the basic conception of free human activity which Marx developed in these early texts. They knew, for example, that Marx had endorsed Fourier's insistence that labour, to be worthy of human beings, had to be based on "passionate attraction", which is surely another term for the "Eros" later investigated by Freud.
Freud once remarked that primitive man "made his work agreeable, so to speak, by treating it as the equivalent of and substitute for sexual activities" (General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, New York 1953, p 175). In other words, in the first forms of primitive communism, labour has not yet become what Hegel defined it to be in The Phenomenology of Mind: "desire checked and retrained ". In Marxist terms, the alienation of labour does not fully begin until the advent of class society. The communism of the future thus achieves a generalised return to erotic, sensuous forms of labour which in class society have generally been the privilege of the artistic elite.
At the same time, in the Grundrisse, Marx criticises Fourier's idea that work can become play, in the sense of "mere fun or amusement". This is because scientific communism has understood that utopianism is always dominated by a fixation on the past. A man cannot become a child again, as Marx notes in the same work. But then he goes on to emphasise that man can and indeed must recapture the spontaneity of childhood; the labouring, future seeing adult must learn to reintegrate the child's erotic connection to the world. The awakening of the senses described in the EPM requires a return to the lost kingdom of play; but the one who returns is no longer lost within it, like children are, because he has now acquired the conscious mastery of the fully developed, social human being.
We can no further in examining the vision of socialism elaborated by the late 19th century revolutionaries without facing the question: was their strenuous effort to describe the society of the future merely a new variety of utopianism, a kind of wish fulfilment unconnected to the real movement of history?
In the previous article in this series we considered the charge made against Bebel by the feminists - that his approach is indeed utopian because it fails to make the link between the socialist future, where the oppression of women has disappeared along with other forms of oppression and exploitation, and the struggle against this oppression in present day society. We can also hardly ignore the fact that Morris subtitled his News from Nowhere "a utopian romance". Nevertheless we rejected this charge, at least in the manner formulated by the feminists. The idea that any attempt to describe communism in anything but negative terms is equivalent to utopianism is common to most forms of leftism, which is always anxious to conceal the fact that its vision of socialism is nothing but a rejigging of present day exploitation. Of course it's true that communists cannot repeat the error of Fourier, drawing up day to day, even hour to hour prescriptions for what the future society will be like and how life will be lived. But as Bordiga once remarked, the real difference between utopian and scientific socialism resides not so much in the latter's refusal to describe and define communism, but in its recognition that the new society can only come about through the unfolding of a real movement, a real social struggle that is already taking place at the heart of bourgeois society. While the utopians dreamed up their "recipes for the cook books of the future" and appealed to benevolent philanthropists to provide the kitchen space and the cookers, the revolutionary communists identified the proletariat as the force that alone could bring the new society into being by taking its unavoidable struggle against capitalist exploitation to its logical conclusions.
The feminists, in any case, have no right to pass judgment on the 19th century socialists because for them the 'real movement' that leads to the revolutionary transformation is not a class movement at all, but an amorphous, interclassist alliance which can only serve to take the proletariat away from its own terrain of struggle. In this sense there is no utopianism at all in Morris, or Bebel, or the social democratic parties in general, because they based all their work on the clear recognition that it would be the working class and no other social force which would be compelled, by its own historic nature, to overthrow capitalist relations of production.
And yet a problem remains, because in this period, the apogee of capitalist development, the mountaintop that preceded the downward slope, the precise contours of this revolutionary overthrow began to get blurred. The late nineteenth century socialists were certainly able to see the communist potentialities revealed by the tremendous growth of capitalism, but since this growth removed the revolutionary action of the class from the foreseeable horizon, it became increasingly difficult to see how the existing defensive struggles of the class would mature into a full-scale onslaught on capital.
It's true the Paris Commune was not very far away in time, and indeed the socialist parties continued to celebrate its memory every year. The organisational forms that Bebel envisaged for the new society were certainly influenced by the experience of the Commune, and when Morris, in News from Nowhere, describes the transition from the old society to the new, he makes no bones about portraying it as the result of a violent civil war. The fact remains that the lessons of the Commune began to fade very quickly, and while Bebel's great work contains many important elaborations about the socialist future, there is very little clarification about the way that the working class would move towards taking power, or about the initial phases of the revolutionary confrontation with capital. As Victor Serge noted, during this period an "idyllic" vision of the socialist revolution began to take hold of the workers' movement:
"At the end of the last century, it was possible to entertain the great dream of an idyllic social transformation. Broadminded people went in for this, scorning or twisting Marx's science. They dreamed of the social revolution as the virtually painless expropriation of a tiny minority of plutocrats. Why should the proletariat in its magnanimity not break up the old blades and the modern firearms and grant an indemnity to its exploiters of yesterday? The last of the rich would peaceably die out, at leisure, surrounded by an atmosphere of healthy distrust. The expropriation of the treasures accumulated by capitalists, together with the rational organisation of production, would instantly procure well-being and security for the whole of society. All pre-war working class ideologies were to some degree penetrated by these false ideas. The radical myth of progress dominated. In the Second International, a handful of revolutionary marxists alone discerned the great outlines of historical development ..." (What Everyone Should Know about State Repression, chap 4, XI, first written in 1926)
This over-optimistic vision took different forms. In Germany, where the social democratic party grew into a mass party with a commanding presence not only in the trade unions but also in parliament and local councils, this notion of power falling like a ripe fruit into the hands of a movement that had already established its organisational bases inside the old system became more and more prevalent. The revolution was less and less seen as the old mole that erupts to the surface, the act of an outlaw class that has to bring down all the existing institutions and create a new form of power, and more and more understood as the culmination of a patient work of building, consolidating and canvassing inside the existing social and political institutions. And as we shall see when we look at the evolution of this conception in the work of Karl Kautsky, there was no Chinese Wall between this 'orthodox' view and the openly revisionist one of Bernstein and his followers, since if socialism can come about through gradually accumulating its forces inside the shell of capitalism, there may be no need for any final revolutionary overthrow at all.
In Britain, where out and out reformism, 'nothing but' trade unionism and parliamentary cretinism had in any case been more endemic within the workers' movement, the reaction of revolutionaries like Morris was rather one of retreating into a purist sectarianism that poured scorn on the fight for "palliatives" and insisted at all times that socialism was the only answer to the proletariat's problems. But since the defensive struggle was effectively dismissed, all that was left was the task of preaching socialism: "I say for us to make socialists is the business at present, and at present I do not think we can have any ·other useful business" ('Where are we now?', Commonweal, November 15, 1890), as though revolutionary consciousness would spread through society simply by more and more individuals being won over to the logic of socialist arguments. In fact towards the end of his life, Morris began to rethink his reservations about the fight for reforms, since the inability of his Socialist League to deal with this question helped bring about its demise and disappearance; but the sectarian vision continued to weigh heavily on the revolutionary movement in Britain. The Socialist Party of Great Britain, sterile from its very birth in 1903, is a classic embodiment of this trend.
Utopianism emerges in the workers' movement whenever the connection between the present-day struggles of the class and the future communist society disappears from sight. But we can't reproach the revolutionaries of this period too harshly for this. It was above all the objective conditions of the late nineteenth century which interfered with their vision. In the period that followed, the period in which capitalism began its descent down the mountain-side, changes in these objective conditions, and above all in the methods and forms of the class struggle, allowed the best elements in the social democratic movement to see the perspective more clearly. In the next articles in this series, we will therefore examine the debates which animated the social democratic parties in the 1900s, and particularly after the 1905 revolution in Russia - debates which were to centre not so much on the goal to be obtained, but on the means to obtain them.
CDW
(1) We cite this passage partly to refute the oft-repeated charge that Morris was 'anti-technology', which was raised as early as 1902, by Kautsky in his book The Social Revolution. Morris certainly thought that socialist society would witness a return of many of the skills and pleasures of handicraft production, but for him this would be a choice made possible by the fact that advanced machinery would substantially free the producers of repetitive and unattractive forms of labour.
**********
Morris as a revolutionary militant
William Morris had many political weaknesses. His rejection of parliament as a vehicle for socialist revolution was also accompanied by a refusal to apply any tactic of intervention in the parliamentary arena, which at that time was still on the historic agenda for workers' parties. Indeed, the Socialist League's lack of clarity on the problem of the immediate struggles of the working class led it towards a sectarian dead-end, where it was fully exposed to the destructive intrigues of the anarchists who entered it and soon interred it, with more than a little help from the bourgeois state.
Nevertheless, when the League was constituted, the result of a split with the Social Democratic Federation led by the 'Jingo Socialist' Hyndman, it had been supported by Engels as a step towards the development of a serious marxist current in Britain - and thus as a possible moment in the formation of a class party. And it is this aspect of Morris's socialism that the bourgeoisie most wants us to forget. Here it becomes plain that the attempt to reduce Morris to a kind of 'designer socialist', a harmless purveyor of art to the masses, is itself far from harmless. For Morris the socialist was not an isolated dreamer, but a militant who courageously broke with his class origins and willingly gave the last ten years of his life to the difficult labour of building a revolutionary organisation within the proletariat of Britain. And not only in Britain: the Socialist League saw itself as part of the international proletarian movement which gave birth to the Second International in 1889.
In his own day, Morris's devotion to the cause of socialism was ridiculed by the bourgeoisie who branded him a hypocrite, a fool and a traitor. Today the ruling class is even more determined to prove that committing one's life to the communist revolution is the purest folly. But the 'foolish' revolutionaries the 'crazy' communist organisations, are the only ones who can defend - and have the right to criticise - the political heritage of William Morris.
Amos (extract from 'The many false friends of William Morris' in World Revolution 195)
The following letter was sent to the ICC and to other groups and individuals in reply to a polemic in the paper in Britain of the ICC, World Revolution, entitled "The CWO falls victim to political parasitism". This polemic argued that the demise of the Communist Workers' Organisation's paper Workers' Voice, their apparent regroupment with the Communist Bulletin Group (CBG), and their refusal to help defend a public meeting of the ICC in Manchester from attack, were concessions to parasitism. Such concessions can be traced back to the inadequate bases of the CWO's formation and the organisational weaknesses of its regroupment with the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista).
"We have read your attack on us in World Revolution 190 with some astonishment. The ferocity of the polemic came as no surprise nor are we disputing the importance of the issue (revolutionary organisation) raised but from the fact that the entire basis for this polemic rests on a series of factual errors which could easily have been avoided by simply asking us what the situation was. When we read your very confusing account of your Eleventh Congress we did not launch into a polemic on the latest splits in the ICC on the basis of its supposed Stalinism. On the contrary the IBRP discussed this report with comrades of RI in Paris last June and were reassured by them that the ICC was merely ensuring that its future internal operation would be within the norms of principled proletarian politics. We entirely agree that the existence of "clans" (based on personal loyalties), unlike the existence of factions (based on political differences over new issues), are something that a healthy organisation has to avoid. However, we think your subsequent treatment of this question has led you into caricaturing the issue of political organisation for the present day. We will be dealing with this in a future article in our press. In the meantime we would like you to print this letter, by way of correction, for your readers to judge for themselves.
1. We will be writing a history of the CWO for our own members and sympathisers but we can assure your readers that long before the CWO or the ICC came into being the issue of federal rights had been settled in favour of a centralised international organisation. The request for federal rights FS refers to, is a single letter written before either the CWO or ICC existed, when Revolutionary Perspectives (RP) consisted of one person!
2. It was a condition of entering the CWO in September 1975 that the Russian Revolution of October 1917 was recognised as proletarian and remained so for the next three and half years.
3. The CWO's re-evaluation of the German and Italian Lefts contribution to the present day clarity of the international communist left did not take place overnight. It took five years of often difficult, and sometimes painful, argument with constantly changing factions as the issues themselves developed. The CWO's texts on this debate are to be found in Revolutionary Perspectives nos 18, l9 and 20. Our discussions with Il Partito Comunista Internazionalista (Battaglia Comunista) began when they fraternally criticised our Platform in September 1975 and we did not form the Bureau until 1984. Hardly a quick opportunist fix!
4. The Iranian "Maoists" you speak of were the Student Supporters of the Unity of Communist Militants. They could not have been Maoists since the ICC would not have conducted (unbeknown to us at the time) secret discussions with them for months before we met them. They could not have been Maoists because they accepted all the criteria fixed as the basic proletarian criteria by the International Conferences of the Communist Left. Their subsequent evolution led them into the Communist Party of Iran which was formed on counter-revolutionary principles. Our critique of that organisation is to be found in Communist Review No. 1 .
5. The Communist Bulletin Group was not solely made up of ex-CWO members as all your articles try to maintain. They included those who had never been in the CWO including one founder-member of World Revolution (who had been, like all the other founders, in the Cardanite group Solidarity). It may also have escaped your readers notice but the CBG no longer exists except in the pages of WR.
6. The CWO has no regroupment, formal or informal with the ex-CBG or any of its individual members. In fact, apart from receipt of the announcement of their demise we have had no direct contact with the CBG since we sent them a text on organisation in June 1993. This seems to have precipitated their final crisis.
7. Members of the CWO did take part in the Sheffield Study Group which initially included anarchists, left communists of no affiliation, Subversion and one ex-CBG member. However as ICC members from London also attended (after requesting invitations from the anarchists rather than us!) we were not too worried about being swamped by parasites. This ended in the spring of 1995 when it was clear that only the CWO was interested in further study work. The Sheffield Study Group has since been superseded by a CWO Education Meeting which is open to all those who are sympathetic to the politics of the communist left and are prepared to study on the themes for each meeting. So far noone from any other organisation has attended.
8. We have never excluded the ICC from any one of our initiatives. When we invited them to take part in joint meetings of all groups of the communist left they refused on the grounds that they "would not share a platform with parasites" (but attended the meeting nonetheless). Far from fearing political confrontation with the ICC we were the ones to initiate the series of debates held in London in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the past we have attended dozens of ICC meetings in London and Manchester despite the geographical problems. The ICC has only once ever attended one of our Sheffield public meetings (and then only to sell WR) in fifteen years.
9. As a matter of fact there were no CWO members at the Manchester meeting around which your whole tawdry attack is based. A CWO sympathiser was the entire public until the other two individuals arrived. Nearly every word about the meeting is a gross exaggeration. Our sympathiser acted absolutely correctly in the meeting. He specifically dissociated himself from any criticism of the ICC as "Stalinist" but waited until the rest of the "public" had gone before criticising the behaviour of the Praesidium - the same FS who has woven the tissue of untruths we are now responding to.
1O. We have not liquidated our paper but adopted a new publications strategy which we think will allow us to reach more potential communists. The CWO has not abandoned any organisational existence "seemingly" or otherwise. On the contrary 1996 has opened with our organisational strengthening. With the present condition of World Revolution, as evidenced by this unprecedented sectarian polemic, it is clearly more necessary than ever that we continue our work for the emancipation of our class. This naturally includes serious debate amongst revolutionaries.
To respond to the CWO's letter and to make our mutual disagreements intelligible to the proletarian political milieu, we have to go beyond a blow by blow answer to the above rectifications. We don't believe that our polemic was based on factual errors, as we shall show. We think that the CWO's factual rebuttals only obscure the very contentious issues. Their reply tends to give the impression that the debates between revolutionary organisations are simply pointless squabbles, and thus plays into the hands of the parasites who say that an organised confrontation of divergences is pointless.
We argued in our polemic that the weakness of the CWO towards parasitism was based on a fundamental difficulty in defining the proletarian political milieu, the process of regroupment that must take place within it and even the basis of their own existence as a separate group within this milieu. These organisational confusions are confirmed in the events of the CWO's birth and in its political behaviour with Battaglia Comunista at the Conferences of Groups of the Communist Left (1977-1980). Unfortunately the CWO doesn't take up these arguments - which are not new and have been developed in the International Review over the last twenty years - in its letter, preferring to hide behind the smokescreen of accusing us of factual errors.
The CWO was formed on the basis of programmatic positions, and the theoretical framework developed by the Communist Left, and therefore it is a real expression of the development of class consciousness and organisation in the period since the end of the counter-revolution. But the CWO was formed in 1975, at the same time that another organisation - with whom it had been in close discussion hitherto - was created on the basis of the same class positions and framework: the International Communist Current. Why was a separate organisation created with the same politics? How could such a duplication of revolutionary forces be justified when their unity and regroupment are of paramount importance for their vanguard role in the working class? For the ICC the process of regroupment had to be continued whatever the difficulties. For the CWO a policy of separate development was necessary because of certain important but secondary differences with the ICC. The CWO had a different interpretation to the ICC of when the degeneration of the Russian Revolution was completed. The comrades considered, as a result, that the ICC was not a communist group at all, but a counter-revolutionary one.
Such a confusion about the basis on which a separate revolutionary organisation should be created, and how to relate to other organisations, inevitably reinforced the pressure of the chapel spirit that has been so pervasive during the re-emergence of communist forces since 1968.
One of the illustrations of this sectarian spirit was the request for federal rights within the ICC by the CWO-to-be.
In their letter the CWO comrades assert their belief in international centralisation and rejection of federalism. This is of course very commendable but doesn't answer the issue: was such a request (which the comrades don't deny having made) an expression of the sectarian mentality? Wasn't it an attempt to artificially preserve the identity of the group in spite of its fundamental agreement on the main principles of revolutionary marxism with the ICC? The real mistake of the letter was not in its concessions to federalism as such but in the attempt to keep the shop-keeper mentality alive.
We can see that such a sectarian spirit can lead to the weakening of certain principles that the organisation may otherwise be striving to uphold. Despite its firm belief in internationally centralised organisation the CWO's regroupment with Battaglia Communista in 1984 leading to the formation of the IBRP (i.e. at least 9 years after the issue of federal rights had been settled) allowed the CWO to keep a separate platform both from Battaglia and the IBRP, to keep its own name and determine its own national activity.
The issue here is not that the CWO don't believe in the spirit of international centralisation but that confusion on the organisational problems of regroupment makes the flesh weak.
It's true that this proposal of federal rights was probably not the most important sign of confusion on problems of regroupment. But we think the CWO are wrong to dismiss its significance altogether.
If the ICC had not firmly rejected this proposal, then it seems quite possible, judging by the federalist nature of the regroupment with Battaglia Comunista, that this request for federal rights would not have remained ink on paper.
It is silly of the comrades to complain that the letter was written before either the CWO or the ICC existed and is therefore hardly relevant. Such a letter could not have been written after the formation of the CWO since one of the bases of the latter was that the ICC had crossed into the camp of capital!
In another tangential rectification of our original polemic the CWO comrades insist that the recognition of the proletarian nature of the October Revolution of 1917 was a condition of membership of the CWO since September 1975.
We were aware of this comrades, and we did not argue the opposite in our polemic. The ICC well remembers the lengthy discussions it had to have from 1972-4 to convince the elements who were to found the CWO of the proletarian nature of October.[1] [514] We mentioned, in our polemic, that the Workers' Voice group of Liverpool with whom Revolutionary Perspectives joined in 1975 to form the CWO was not homogenous on this vital question, to further illustrate that this new regroupment was at best contradictory. This seemed to be confirmed when the CWO split into its two constituent parts a year later, and then split again in two not long after. Not only did the CWO elevate secondary questions to class frontiers, but also minimised fundamental questions.
The problems of understanding what the proletarian political milieu is, and how it can be unified was also found at the International Conferences. The calling for such a forum by Battaglia Comunista and the positive responses given to it by the ICC, the CWO and others undoubtedly expressed the desire for the elimination of false divisions in the revolutionary movement. Unfortunately the attempt eventually ran aground after three of the conferences.
The principal reason for this was serious political errors concerning the conditions and process of the regroupment of revolutionaries.
The criteria of invitation by BC to the first conference was not clear since leftist grouplets of the time like Combat Communiste and Union Ouvrière were included in the list. Organisations that are part of the revolutionary camp like Programma Comunista were not included. Neither was it clear what the function of the gathering of communist groups was to be. In its original document of invitation BC proposed the turn of the European CPs toward social democracy as the theme.
From the beginning the ICC campaigned for a clear delimitation of who was eligible to attend such conferences. At this time the ICC (International Review no11) published a Resolution on Proletarian Political Groups from the second congress of the ICC. In International Review no17 the ICC published a Resolution on the Process of Regroupment that it submitted to the 2nd Conference. A clear idea of who was in the revolutionary milieu was necessary to pursue the process of regroupment. The ICC also insisted that the conference discussions should be devoted to examining the fundamental political differences which existed between the groups, and the progressive elimination of false divisions, particularly those created by sectarianism.
A measure of the different conceptions of what the conferences should be can be seen from an opening discussion at the 2nd Conference (November 1978). The ICC proposed a resolution that would include a criticism of the groups like Programma and the FOR that refused in a sectarian manner to participate. This resolution was rejected by both BC and the CWO, who said:
"We may regret that certain of these groups judged it not worthwhile to attend. However, it would be counter-productive to spend our time in condemning them. Possibly certain of these groups will change their mind in the future. In addition, the CWO is discussing with certain of these groups, and it would hardly be diplomatic to make such a resolution" (2nd Conference of groups of the Communist Left, Vol. 2, p3).
Here was the problem of the Conferences. For the ICC they had to continue according to clear organisational principles at the heart of the regroupment process. For the CWO and BC the latter was a question of... diplomacy, even if only the CWO was clumsy enough to spell this out.[2] [515]
Initially the CWO and BC were unclear who should be at the Conferences. Later they veered towards a sharp increase in the criteria, which they insisted on suddenly at the end of the 3rd Conference. The debate on the role of the party, which remained a major area of debate between the different groups, was closed. The ICC, which did not agree with the position adopted by BC and the CWO, was excluded.
The error of this manoeuvre was compounded when, at the 4th Conference, the CWO and BC again relaxed the criteria and the place of the ICC was taken by the Supporters of the Unity of Communist Militants, whose break with Iranian leftism was merely a matter of appearance.
However, according to the CWO letter, the SUCM were not Maoists because the ICC had already discussed with them secretly and because they accepted the criteria for participation in the conferences.
The CWO seem to be adopting an unfortunate argument here - our mistakes were your mistakes - that is hardly an appropriate method for getting to the facts. We will return to this argument later.
"11. The domination of revisionism over the Communist Party of Russia has resulted in the defeat and retreat of the world working class from one of its important bulwarks".[3] [516]
By revisionism these Iranian Maoists, as they explain elsewhere in their program, meant the Krushchevite revision of Marxism-Leninism, i.e. of Stalinism. According to them the proletariat was finally defeated not when Stalin announced the building of socialism in one country, but on the contrary after Stalin had died: after the crushing of the Russian working class in the gulags and on the imperialist battlefields, the destruction of the Bolshevik Party, the smashing of the German, Spanish, and Chinese working class, after throwing twenty million human beings into the abattoir of the 2nd World War...
At its inception the CWO deemed the ICC to be counter-revolutionary, because it considered that the degeneration of the Russian Revolution was not completed by 1921. Seven years later, the CWO held comradely discussions to form the future party with an organisation that considered the revolution had ended in... 1956!
According to the SUCM it was not socialist revolution that was on the historical agenda in Iran, as everywhere else, but the democratic revolution as a supposed stage toward it.
Denying the imperialist nature of the Iran/Iraq war, the SUCM offered the most sophisticated arguments for the proletariat to be sacrificed on the altar of national defence. The SUCM seemed to agree with BC/CWO on the role of the party. But the organising role it had in mind for the party was to mobilise the masses behind its bid for bourgeois power.
At the 4th Conference the CWO nevertheless had some insights into their real nature:
"Our real objection is however to the theory of the aristocracy of labour. We think this is the last germ of populism in UCM and its origin is in Maoism".[4] [517]
"The theory of revolutionary peasantry [of the SUCM] is reminiscent of Maoism, something we totally reject".[5] [518]
So much for an organisation that the CWO now says could not have been Maoists.
The great interest and pseudo-fraternity the SUCM showed toward the proletarian political milieu in Britain, and its disguise of its Stalinism behind a screen of verbal radicalism, certainly begins to explain how the CWO and BC could be taken in by such an organisation. Indeed the ICC section in Britain, World Revolution, initially believed the SUCM, considering it to be a possible expression of the workers' upsurge in Iran at the time (1980) before realising the SUCM's counter-revolutionary nature. But this alone does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the CWO's self-deception, particularly since WR warned the CWO what the SUCM was and criticised its own initially open-minded assessment. It also tried to denounce this organisation at a CWO Conference, but was shouted down by the CWO before it could finish.[6] [519]
Debate between revolutionaries cannot be based on the philistine morality of shared blame. There are mistakes and mistakes. World Revolution managed not to fall into any major errors, and drew the lessons. The CWO/BC made a tragic blunder, whose negative effects on the proletarian political milieu are still felt today. The grotesque farce of the 4th Conference finished the Conferences off as a point of reference for emerging revolutionary forces. And still the CWO refuses to recognise the disaster and the origins of it. We believe the origins of this disaster lie in a blindness to the nature of the proletarian political milieu that has led to a policy of regroupment based on diplomacy.
In the WR polemic we argue that the regroupment between the CWO and the IBRP suffered from similar weaknesses as the International Conferences.
In particular this regroupment did not occur as a result of a clear resolution of the differences that separated the groups of the communist left, nor those between BC and the CWO.
On the one hand the IBRP affirmed that it was not a unified organisation since each group had its own platform. The IBRP has quite a few platforms: that of BC, of the CWO, and that of the IBRP that is the aggregate of the first two minus their disagreements. In addition the CWO has a Platform of Unemployed Workers Groups and a Platform of Factory Groups. It was also in the process of writing a "popular platform" with the Communist Bulletin Group as we shall see below.
The IBRP is for the party but already contains an organisation, BC, which claims to be the Party: Partito Comunista Internazionalista.
On the other hand, we have never seen in the press of these organisations or in the common press the least debate on their disagreements. And important differences remain on the possibility of revolutionary parliamentarism, and on the trade union and national questions.
In this respect the IBRP is in marked contrast to the ICC, which is a unified, centralised international organisation, and, following the tradition of the workers' movement, opens its internal debates toward the outside.
On the problem of their link-up with BC, the CWO letter asserts that the regroupment of the IBRP did not take place overnight and therefore cannot be seen as a quick opportunist fix.
Our polemic however doesn't mention the speed with which this regroupment took place, but criticises the solidity of its political and organisational basis.
The IBRP was based on a self-appointed selection of "leading forces" for the party of the future. Yet in the 12 years between its formation and today the IBRP has not even managed to unify its two founding organisations.
The CWO's policy on regroupment - characterised by the lack of serious criteria for defining the proletarian political milieu and its enemies - again led to potentially catastrophic difficulties at the beginning of the 1990s. The lessons of its unhappy adventure with the Iranian leftists had not been drawn.
The CWO let itself be drawn into a rapprochement with the parasitic groups, the CBG and the EFICC (the so-called "External Fraction" of the ICC), announcing a possible New Beginning within the revolutionary milieu in Britain.
The CWO letter tells us however that it has no regroupment with the CBG, and has had no direct contact with this group since 1993. We are glad to hear it. But when the polemic in World Revolution no190 was written this information had not been made public and we therefore based ourselves on the most recent information from Workers' Voice on the subject:
"Given the recent practical cooperation between members of the CWO and CBG in the pit closure campaign the two groups met in Edinburgh in December to discuss the implications of this cooperation. Politically the CBG accepted that the Platform of the IBRP did not stand as a barrier to political work whilst the CWO clarified what it meant to be a centralised organisation in the present period. A number of misunderstandings were cleared up on both sides. It was therefore decided to make the practical cooperation more formal. An agreement was drawn up which the CWO as a whole will have to ratify in January (after which a more complete report will be issued) and included the following points:
1 The CBG were to make regular agreed contributions to Workers' Voice and receive all editor's reports (the same went for leaflets etc).
2 CWO quarterly meetings to be opened to CBG members after January.
3 The two groups to discuss a popular platform being drafted by a CWO comrade as an instrument of intervention. CBG to give a written response before a meeting in June 1993 to monitor progress in joint work.
4 The Leeds comrades of both organisations to prepare this meeting.
5 Joint public meetings to continue with all other groups of the Communist Left based in the UK welcome to join in.
6 This agreement to be at least briefly reported in the next WV".[7] [520]
Since no agreement (or disagreement) was reported in the next Workers' Voice, brief or otherwise, or any subsequent issue, and since a common activity was already taking place, it was surely valid to assume that some sort of regroupment had taken place between the CWO/CBG. The CWO rectification wrongly gives the impression that this regroupment was a pure invention on our part.
Just as the CWO believed it was possible to turn a Maoist organisation into the proletarian vanguard, so it thought it could turn parasites into militant communists. Just as it took the SUCM's acceptance of basic proletarian criteria at face value, so it believed the CBG when it accepted the IBRP platform, even though most of the members of this group, led by an element known as Ingram, split the CWO in 1978, and then attempted to destroy the British section of the ICC in 1981.
The CWO believed that it had clarified centralised organisation with a group that helped form a secret tendency within the ICC, with the aim of turning its central organs into a letter box (just as Bakunin's Alliance had tried to do with the General Council of the 1st International). It thought it could trust a group that had stolen material from the ICC and then threatened the latter with the police if it was recovered!
The CWO's initiative with the parasites, clearly enemies of revolutionary organisation, had the effect of dignifying the parasitic groups as authentic members of the Communist Left and of legitimising their slanders against the organisations of this milieu. The damage done by the CWO's attempted regroupment with the CBG thus includes that done to its own organisation. We are particularly convinced of this for the following reasons.
Firstly parasitism is not a political current in the proletarian sense. It doesn't define itself as a coherent organisation around a political program. On the contrary its very objective is to undermine such coherence in the name of anti-sectarianism and freedom of thought. Their work of denigrating revolutionary organisations and promoting disorganisation and confusion can be continued informally by ex-members even after they have dropped the pretence - as in the case of the CBG - of a formal existence.
Secondly parasitism, insofar as it is accepted as part of the revolutionary milieu, softens the vertebrae of the existing organisations, reducing their capacity to define themselves and others in a rigorous way. The results of this can be catastrophic, even if it might lead temporarily to numerical growth.
Even if the regroupment with the CBG was aborted serious questions nevertheless remain for the CWO. Why it did develop relations with such a group, when this group had no other reason to exist than to denigrate organisations of the proletarian political milieu? Why, instead of keeping quiet, did it not put forward seriously and openly the weaknesses and incomprehensions that had led it to such a political error?
The polemic in World Revolution with the CWO was written in direct and immediate response to try and explain two recent worrying events: the failure to defend a WR public meeting from sabotage by the parasitic group Subversion and the liquidation of its newspaper Workers' Voice.
This indicated in our view a dangerous blindness to the enemies of the proletarian political milieu and even a tendency to take on some of the activity of political parasitism in place of communist militancy.
Unfortunately, the CWO letter doesn't consider the arguments of the polemic on this question as on the others.
As far as the public meeting was concerned there is nothing to answer according to the CWO because the ICC account of it is a gross exaggeration.
The fundamental question that the CWO avoids answering is: was the meeting sabotaged by parasites or not? The ICC has provided evidence in two issues of its monthly paper in Britain, World Revolution, of this sabotage. It consisted of: interrupting the meeting, repeated verbal and physical provocations against ICC militants, including all the typical parasitic slanders of Stalinism, authoritarianism etc, creating a climate where discussion was impossible and finally bringing the meeting itself to a premature halt. The CWO sympathiser failed to fight this sabotage at the meeting, and instead reserved his criticism for the ICC defence of it. The CWO would have done the same. They refuse to admit or deny that such sabotage took place let alone denounce it - and admonish the ICC for its unspecified gross exaggerations.
Likewise on Workers' Voice. The letter tells us that the CWO has not liquidated its paper but adopted a new publications strategy with Revolutionary Perspectives.
But the CWO has stopped publishing its newspaper Workers' Voice and replaced it with a theoretical magazine, Revolutionary Perspectives.
The letter doesn't respond to our argument that behind this new strategy is a serious concession to political parasitism. The CWO declared that Revolutionary Perspectives was for the reconstitution of the proletariat. Equally it suggested, without going into details, that the collapse of the USSR has created a whole new set of theoretical tasks.
This last point is certainly correct. But does it justify abandoning the paper?
Just when it is important to insist that revolutionary theory can only develop in the context of militant intervention in the class struggle, the CWO makes concessions to the ideas being peddled by certain academically inclined parasitic groups, which dress up their impotence and absence of militant conviction with the pretence of devoting themselves to new theoretical questions. Certainly, the CWO has not gone that far, but precisely because it is a group of the proletarian political movement, its weaknesses can serve as a figleaf for those groups that live parasitically off the movement. Moreover, we should note that the CWO's great preoccupation with the reconstitution of the proletariat bears a certain resemblance to the EFICC's hobby horse - a hobby horse that the latter got from doctors in sociology like Alain Bihr, the subtle spokesman (and well paid by the bourgeois media) for the idea that the proletariat no longer exists, or is no longer the revolutionary class.[8] [521] The purpose of such questioning by the parasites is of course not to arrive at a definite orientation for the working class, but to denigrate the militant organisational approach of Marxist theory and undermine its foundations. This is not what the CWO wants, but abandoning its paper and restricting its intervention to the publication of a theoretical review is hardly coherent with the crying need for the revolutionary newspaper as a collective propagandist, collective agitator, and collective organiser.
In its new publication the CWO, until the third issue failed to print its basic principles or give any idea of itself as an organisation. This is not accidental - it represents a serious weakening of its militant presence in the working class.
The CWO's difficulty with the question of the proletarian political milieu has led to a dangerous openness to the enemies of this milieu, both leftists and parasites. On the other hand it has ended up in an equally harmful policy of sectarian hostility toward the ICC.
In Britain it has tried to avoid any systematic confrontation of political differences with World Revolution, and tried to pursue a tactic of separate development particularly through discussion groups whose criterion for participation is extremely unclear except on the question of the exclusion of the ICC.
The CWO, according to their letter, participated in the Sheffield Study Group with anarchists, left communists, parasites like Subversion and an ex-member of the CBG. Recently this study group has been superseded by a CWO Education Meeting.
No, the CWO organised this Sheffield Study Group as a club without any clear political criteria as to participation or purpose, and seems to have killed it in a similarly confused way.
The CWO Education Meeting doesn't seem to have changed much: does it now exclude anarchists, parasites, or only those who don't want to study? By contrast the ICC's non-attendance continues to be a condition of its existence. At its last meeting, apparently on the Russian Left, the ICC as an organisation was specifically uninvited, even though a member of the ICC was invited - but only on the basis that she was the companion of one of the privileged participants! Naturally, since ICC militants are responsible to the organisation and not freelancers, this gracious invitation was turned down.
The ICC still hasn't been informed of any subsequent Education Meetings, despite what it says in the CWO letter, and until we are we can assume that they are intended, not as a reference point of political/theoretical confrontation within the proletarian political milieu, but as a sectarian get-together, where discussion is fuelled by the needs of diplomacy rather than clear principles.
It is quite true that the CWO has never admitted its policy of separate development as far as political meetings are concerned and claims, against all the evidence, that it has maintained an openness to the ICC restricted only by geographic or other contingent difficulties.
In over two decades since the formation of a communist left trend in Britain, the CWO may have attended dozens of ICC public meetings. But over this period, the number of the latter has run into the hundreds.
Since the CWO wrote their letter to us, the ICC has held a public meeting on Ireland in London and one in Manchester on the strikes in France at the end of last year, both subjects on which the CWO has written short polemics in its press. But they failed to attend the meetings to defend their point of view! Nor did the CWO attend an ICC meeting in London in January on the defence of revolutionary organisations. In the same period the CWO has held one open meeting in Sheffield on Racism, Sexism and Communism advertised in Revolutionary Perspectives no3, which hit the bookshops and the WR post box a week or so after the meeting had taken place.
The sectarian attitude of the CWO toward the ICC is hardly explained by geographic difficulties, unless we are to believe that internationalists like the CWO are incapable of overcoming the geographic problems of travelling the 37 miles from Sheffield to Manchester, or the 169 miles to London on a regular basis.
Here is the real reason. According to the CWO: "Debate is impossible with the ICC, as the CWO found out at a recent Manchester public meeting because the comrades cannot understand any fact, argument or theoretical idea which cannot be twisted into their framework. But this framework is an idealist one and, as one of our comrades stated at that same meeting, consists of the four walls of a madhouse".
So, debate is impossible with the ICC - but possible with leftists, anarchists, the SPGB, and parasites? It is time the CWO reconsidered its rudderless policy toward the regroupment of revolutionaries.
According to the CWO letter, the ICC polemic is unprecedentedly sectarian. But profound and serious criticism by one revolutionary organisation of another, which even puts into question its very foundations, is not sectarian. Revolutionary organisations have a duty to confront their differences, to eventually eliminate the confusion and dispersal in the revolutionary camp and hasten the unification of revolutionary forces in the future single world party of the proletariat.
Sectarianism is rather characterised by an avoidance of such confrontation, whether by isolation or through opportunist manoeuvring to preserve the existence of one's separate group at any price.
Michael
[1] [522] It is true that during the same period, the comrades who were to publish World Revolution, and who formed the ICCs section in Britain (and who, like the Revolutionary Perspectives group, came in large part from the councilist group Solidarity) were not yet clear on the nature of the Russian Revolution. But the other founding groups of the ICC, notably Révolution Internationale, defended its proletarian nature very clearly throughout the conferences which took place at the time.
[2] [523] The CWO letter gives the impression that the ICC has made things up to attack them. But it would be completely unnecessary to fuel our criticisms of the CWO with lies, even if we wanted to, because over the years it has expressed its organisational and political confusions so transparently.
[3] [524] Programme of the Communist Party, adopted by the Unity of Communist Militants. The Programme of the Communist Party, which the UCM adopted with Komala (a guerrilla organisation linked to the Kurdish Democratic Party) came out in May 1982, 5 months before the 4th Conference. This programme was in turn based on that of the UCM published in March 1981, and was presented as a contribution for discussion at the 4th Conference.
[4] [525] 4th International Conference of groups of the communist left, September 1982, p18
[5] [526] (Ibid, p22)
[6] [527] World Revolution no60, May 1983
[7] [528] Workers' Voice no64 , January/February 1993, p6.
[8] [529] Workers' Voice no59 Winter 1991/2
On 26th May 1996, the New York Stock Exchange feted the 100th anniversary of its oldest economic indicator: the Dow Jones Index. With a 620% rise over the last fourteen years, the Dow Jones has beaten all its previous records: that of the 1920s (+ 468%), which preceded the Great Crash of October 1929 that led to the terrible crisis of the 30s; and that of the years of post-war "prosperity" (+487 % between 1949 and 1966), which preceded sixteen years of stagnation and "Keynesian management of the economy". "The longer this speculative madness lasts, the higher will be the price to pay later" warned the analyst B.M. Biggs: "the share prices of American companies no longer bear any relation to their real value" (Le Monde, 27th May 1996). Scarcely one month later. Wall Street fell abruptly for the third time in eight days, dragging all the European stock exchanges down in its wake. These new financial tremors have put all the talk about the "American recovery" and "the coming prosperity of Europe thanks to the single currency in its place: along with all the other baubles designed to deceive "the people" as to the real gravity of capitalism's crisis, and what is at stake in it. At regular intervals, these tremors return to confirm the currency of the marxist analysis of the capitalist system's historic crisis, and especially highlight the explosive nature of its accumulating tensions. And with good reason! Since the open reappearance, at the end of 1960s, of its inescapable crisis of overproduction, capitalism has survived essentially thanks to a colossal injection of credit. It is this huge indebtedness which explains the growing instability of the economic and financial system, and which engenders frantic speculation and repeated financial scandals: when the profits to be made from productive activity are too meagre, then "easy financial profits" take over.
For marxists, this new financial tremor was thus inevitable, given the situation. In our resolution on the international situation of April 1996, we wrote: "The 11th Congress emphasized that one of the main sources of this "recovery" - which we described at the time as a "jobless recovery" - was a headlong flight into debt, which could only lead to new convulsions in the financial world, and a new dive into open recession" (International Review no 86). Exhaustion of growth, plunge into recession, headlong flight into growing debt, financial destabilisation and speculation, development of pauperisation, a massive and worldwide attack on the living conditions of the proletariat: these are tile well-known ingredients of a crisis situation which is reaching explosive proportions.
Increasing deterioration of the economy
In the industrialised countries, annual growth rates are with difficulty stagnating at about 2%, in sharp contrast to the average 5% of the post-war years (1950-70). This represents a decline that has continued since the end of the 60s: 3.6% during the 1970s, and 2.9% between 1980-93. With the exception of some South-East Asian countries, whose economic overheating heralds new crashes of the Mexican variety, this tendency for growth rates to decline is both continuous and worldwide. This reality has been masked by massive debt, which has regularly boosted the illusory hopes of a "light at the end of the tunnel": the "recoveries" at the end of the 70s and 80s in the industrialised countries, the "development of the third world and the Eastern bloc" during the second half of the 70s, and more recently the illusions as to me opening up and "reconstruction" of the ex-Soviet bloc countries. Today, the last remnants of this fiction are collapsing. The "Third World" countries are bankrupt, and the East European countries are plunged in depression. Now, it is the turn of the last two "model countries": Germany and Japan. Long presented as models of economic virtue, for the former, and of dynamism for the latter, they have finally been caught by recession. Although the German economy was doped for a while by reunification, the illusion of a return to growth thanks to East German reconstruction has not lasted long. The myth of recovery thanks to a take-off of the ruined East European economies has thus been definitively laid to rest (see International Review nos 73 and 86).
As we have already said many times, the "cures" being applied to the capitalist economy, in the long run can only make its sickness worse.
The Japanese caste is significant in this respect. The economy of the world's second economic power represents 17% of global product. With a foreign trade surplus, Japan has become the world's banker, with foreign assets greater than $1000 billion. Japanese methods of organisation in the workplace have been taken as an example the world over, and according to the new theoreticians have become a new means of regulation which is supposed to allow an emergence from the crisis thanks to a "formidable increase in labour productivity". In fact, the Japanese recipes have served everywhere to justify a series of austerity measures such as increased labour flexibility ("just in time" manufacturing, "total quality", etc), and of pernicious ideological poisons like company corporatism, economic nationalism and the like.
Indeed, until recently Japan seemed to be miraculously spared the effects of economic crisis. After the heady 60s, with growth rates around 10 %, growth remained at 5% during me 70s and 3.5 % during the 80s. However, since 1992 growth has failed to exceed 1%. Like Germany, Japan has returned to the feeble growth rates of the other main developed countries. Only idiots or the worst ideological lackeys of the capitalist system could believe or pretend to believe in a Japanese "special case". Its performance is easily explained. Certainly, some special domestic factors may have played a part, but fundamentally Japan benefited from a singularly favourable situation at the end of World War II. Above all, and even more than other countries, it has long used and abused its credit. As a central element in the US opposition to Russian expansionism in Asia. Japan enjoyed exceptional economic and political support from the United States (institutional reforms overseen by the American, cheap credit, opening the US market to Japanese goods, etc). Another factor which is not emphasized often enough is the fact that Japan is certainly one of the most indebted countries on the planet. Today, me accumulated debt of all non-financial agents (households, companies, and the state) represents 260% of GNP; in a decade, it is expected to reach 400%) (see table). In other words, Japanese capital has advanced itself two and a half - soon to be four - years of production in order to stay afloat.
This mountain of debt is a real powder-keg, whose fuse is already burning slowly. The danger is all the greater, not just for the country itself but for the rest of the world economy as well, because Japan is the world's savings bank, providing 50% of the OECD countries' financing needs. All this puts into proportion the recent Japanese announcement of a slight upward movement in growth figures, after four years of stagnation. The bourgeois media represented this as a piece of encouraging news, whereas in reality it only illustrates the gravity of the crisis since the result was only achieved with difficulty, after massive cash injections by five separate recovery plans. This expansion of the budget - in the purest Keynesian tradition - bore fruit at last...but only at the cost of debts still more gigantic than those which lay behind the original recession. The "recovery" is thus extremely fragile, and in the end is doomed to collapse like an overcooked soufflé. At 60% of GDP, Japan's public debt is now larger than the USA's. Given the credits already committed, and the snowball effect, in ten years this figure will rise to 200% of GDP, or two year's average salary for every Japanese citizen. In 1995, the budget deficit was already 7.6% of GDP, which is well above Europe's Maastricht criteria, and the USA's 2.8%. Nor do these figures take into account the consequences of the bursting of the bubble of property speculation at the end of the 80s, whose effects are yet to be felt in an extremely fragile banking system. The latter is still struggling to absorb its enormous losses; many financial institutions have gone bankrupt or are about to do so. In this domain alone, the Japanese economy is confronting a mountain of $460 billion of bad debt. One sign of the sector's extreme fragility is the country's classification by the specialist in risk analysis, Moody's: Japan is the only OECD country with a "D" classification, which puts it at the same level as China, Mexico, or Brazil. Of the eleven merchant banks classified by Moody's, only five have assets greater than their bad debts. Twenty-nine of the world's 100 largest banks are Japanese (including the top 10), whereas the USA only has nine, and starts at the 29th position. If we add the debts of these financial organisms to those of other economic agents (see above), we have a monster alongside which Tyrannosaurus Rex is no more menacing than a domestic cat.
Doped capitalism creates a casino economy
Contrary to myth - a myth carefully maintained to justify a succession of austerity plans - capitalism's health is not improving. The bourgeoisie would like us to believe that we must pay today for the follies of the 70s, in order to make a new start on a healthy basis. Nothing could be further from the truth. Debt is still capitalism's only means of retarding the explosion of its own contradictions, and it has no choice but to use it. In fact, the increase in debt is the means of mitigating the effects of a level of demand which has been historically inadequate ever since World War I. The conquest of the entire planet at the turn of the century represents the moment from which the capitalist system has been constantly confronted with a shortfall of solvent outlets necessary for it to function "well". Unable to sell all that it produces on the market, capitalism cannibalises itself at regular intervals in a growing and infernal spiral of crises (1912-1914, 1929-39, 1968-today), wars (1914-1918, 1939-1945), and reconstructions (1920-1928, 1946-1968).
Today, the falling rate of profit and the frantic competition between the main economic powers are driving an ever-increasing productivity, which only increases the mass of products to be realised on the market. However, these cannot be considered as commodities representing a certain value unless they are sold. The problem is that capitalism does not create its own markets spontaneously: it is not enough that a commodity should be produced for it to be sold. As long as a product has not been sold, labour remains incorporated within it; only once production has been recognised as socially useful through sale, can products be considered as commodities, and tile labour incorporated within them converted into value.
Debt is thus not a choice, an economic policy that the world's leaders can decide to use, or not. It is a constraint, a necessity forced on them by the very functioning and contradictions of the capitalist system (see our pamphlet on The Decadence of Capitalism). This is why the debt of all the economic actors has grown continuously, and especially during the last few years.
This gigantic indebtedness of the capitalist system, which has reached levels, and ratios, unknown in its entire history, is the real source of the world financial system's growing instability. It is also significant that for some time now, the stock exchange seems to have integrated into its own functioning the irreversible decline of the capitalist economy; this gives some idea of the capitalist class' confidence in the future of its own system! Whereas under normal circumstance, share values rise when the health and prospects of quoted companies are good, and fall when they are poor, today shares rise when news is bad, and fall it is good. Thus we saw the Dow Jones index rise 70 points in one day when the USA's unemployment figures showed a rise for July 1996. Similarly, ATT's shares shot upwards at the announcement of 40,000 redundancies, while those of Moulin ex in France rose by 20 % the day it was decided to lay off 2,600 workers, etc. Conversely, when official figures show unemployment in decline, the same is true of share values! It's a sign of the times, that profits are no longer expected from capitalism's growth, but from its "rationalisation".
George Soros, who made some £600 million by speculating against sterling in 1992, recently declared that "There is something perverse in the system, if a man like me can break a currency". But this perversion of the system is not due, as the media like to tell us, to the greed or "lack of civic spirit" of a few speculators, nor to capital's new international freedom of circulation, nor to progress in computing and telecommunications. Patchy growth, and a general difficulty to sell, creates an excess of capital which can no longer find productive investments. The crisis is thus also expressed in the fact that profits made from production no longer find enough outlets in profitable investment to increase productive capacity. "Crisis management" thus means finding other outlets for this excess of floating capital, to avoid their abrupt devalorisation. States and international institutions are thus working to create the conditions which would make this possible. Hence the new financial policies being put in place, and the new "freedom" of capital.
"outlets" in speculation, financial operations and dubious international loans. Today, annual world trade is worth some $3,000 billion, while international capital movements are estimated at $100,000 billion (30 times more!). Had there been no removal of exchange controls, or floating currency, this dead weight of capital would have made the crisis still worse.
Capitalism in a dead-end
C.Mcl
Sources
* The data concerning company and household debt is taken from Michel Aglietta's book Macroeconomic financiere, Ed La Decouverte, collection Reperes no 166. His source is the OECD's calculations on the basis of national accounts.
* The data on state debt is drawn from the annual L'etat du monde 1996, Ed La Decouverte.
* The data cited in the text comes from the papers Le Monde and Le Monde Diplomatique.
Since the events in South Lebanon last spring, inter-imperialist tensions have gone on accumulating in the Middle East. Thus, once again, the bourgeoisie's speechifying about the advent of a new "era of peace" in this region, one of the main imperialist powder-kegs on the planet, has been given the lie. This zone, which for forty years was a major stake in the conflict between the two blocs, is now at the centre of the bitter struggle between the great imperialist powers that used to make up the western bloc. Behind this hotting up of imperialist tensions, there is a major challenge being mounted to the world's leading power in what has been one of its principal hunting grounds, and this challenge has even involved its closest allies and lieutenants.
The world's leading power challenged in its Middle East hunting ground
But without doubt one of the most spectacular symptoms of the new imperialist reality emerging in the region is the evolution of the policies of the Saudi state (which served as the main base for the US army during the Gulf war) towards its American tutor. Whoever was actually behind it, the terrorist attack on US troops in Dahran was a direct strike at the American military presence and already expressed a clear weakening of the USA's grip over what has been one of its Middle East strongholds. But if we add to that the particularly warm greeting given the visit of Chirac, head of a country which is spearheading the challenge to US leadership, we can get some idea of the deterioration of American positions in what was up till very recently a state totally submissive to Washington's diktats. It is evident that the domination of "Uncle Sam" is less and less tolerable to certain fractions of the Saudi ruling class, who are trying to squirm away from the US by moving towards certain European countries. The fact that prince Abdallah, the heir to the throne, is at the head of these fractions shows the strength of the anti-American tendency which is emerging.
The fact that once docile allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia can show such a reticence to obey the commands of Uncle Sam, that they are not hesitating to tighten their links with the main challengers to the American "order" such as France, Britain and Germany[2] clearly signifies that we are seeing an important modification in the imperialist balance of forces in an area which not long ago was the USA's exclusive hunting ground. In 1995, while the Americans were faced with a difficult situation in ex-Yugoslavia, they still reigned as absolute masters in the Middle East. After the Gulf war, they had managed to boot the European powers right out of the region. France had seen its presence in Lebanon reduced to zero, and at the same time it had lost its influence in Iraq. Britain had been given no reward for its loyalty and very active participation in the Gulf war; Washington merely tossed it a few crumbs in the reconstruction of Kuwait. During the Israel-Palestinian peace talks, Europe had a miserable walk-on part while the USA was conductor of the orchestra. This situation more or less lasted until the Clinton show at the Sharm EI Sheikh summit. But since then, Europe has made a new thrust into the region, at first discretely but then more openly and powerfully, taking advantage of the fiasco of the Israeli operation in South Lebanon, skilfully exploiting the difficulties this posed to the USA.
The latter has found it harder and harder not only to put pressure on traditional mavericks like Syria but also on some of its most solid allies, as the example of Saudi Arabia shows. The fact that this is happening in the Middle East, which is so key to the upkeep of American global leadership, is in itself a clear symptom of the serious difficulties confronting the US superpower. The fact that Europe has managed to re-insert itself into the Middle East arena, to defy the US in one of the regions of the world which it controlled the most tightly, undoubtedly expresses a weakening of the world's leading power.
US leadership runs into trouble on the world arena
The reverse suffered in the Middle East by the US world cop is all the more significant in that it has taken place only a few months after the victorious US counter-offensive in ex-Yugoslavia. This offensive had as its principal aim that of disciplining America's European ex -allies who had gone over to open rebellion. In no. 85 of this Review, while we stressed the set -back this meant for tile Franco-British tandem in particular, we also noted the limits of the USA's success by showing that if the European bourgeoisies had been forced to retreat in ex-Yugoslavia, they would look for another terrain on which to reply to American imperialism. This prognosis has been clearly verified by recent developments in the Middle East. While the US maintains an overall control of the situation in ex-Yugoslavia - which doesn't mean no longer has to deal with the underhand manoeuvres of the European powers there - we can see that in the Middle East, which the US used to run without any real challenge, its domination is more and more being put into question.
But the world's leading power is not only confronted with this challenge to its leadership in the Middle East, and its difficulties aren't limited to this part of the world. We could say that in the terrible free for all between the great powers - which is the main expression of the moribund nature of the system - the US is faced with more and more open challenges to its leadership all over the planet.
In North Africa, the USA's efforts to chase out, or at least seriously reduce the influence of French imperialism have met with considerable difficulties and at the moment is more or less a failure. In Algeria, the Islamic movement which has been used by the USA to destabilise the existing regime and its backer, French imperialism, is in open crisis. The recent actions by the CIA should be seen more as the despairing acts of a movement that are cracking up than tile expression of a real force. The fact that the main source of supplies to the Islamic fractions, Saudi Arabia, is more and more reluctant to go on financing them is weakening the USA's capacity to keep up the pressure. While the situation in Algeria is far from stable, the fraction which holds power with the support of the army and of France has clearly strengthened its positions with the re-election of the sinister Zaroual. At the same time, France has managed to restore its links with Tunisia and Morocco, which in recent years had become increasingly open to the siren-songs of the USA.
In black Africa, after the success it enjoyed in Rwanda when it kicked out the clique linked to France, the USA now faces a much more difficult situation. While French imperialism has reinforced its credibility through its muscular intervention in the Central African Republic, American imperialism has suffered a setback in Liberia where it has had to abandon its protégés. The USA tried to regain the initiative in Burundi by repeating what it did in Rwanda, but here again it has been met by a vigorous riposte from France. The latter, with Belgian support, has fomented the Bouyaya coup d'état, which has pulled the carpet from under tile feet of the "African Intervention Force" which the US was trying to set up under its own control. We should underline that these successes for French imperialism - which not long ago was pinned up against the wall by American pressure - are to a large extent due to Its tight collaboration with that other former colonial power in Africa,· Great Britain. The Americans have not only lost the latter's support but now find it standing against them.
In Asia, US leadership is also being contested. China doesn't miss any opportunity to strike out for its own imperialist interests even if they are antagonistic to those of the USA, while Japan has also shown a will to win greater autonomy from Washington. New demonstrations against US military bases take place at regular intervals and the Japanese government has declared that it wants closer political ties with Europe. Even a country like Thailand which was once a veritable bastion of American imperialism is also taking its distance by stopping support for the Khmer Rouge, who were the USA's mercenaries, thus assisting France's efforts to recover its influence in Cambodia.
Europe and Japan rushed to take advantage of the tensions stirred up by the harsh penalties imposed on several Latin American countries for flouting this law. The warm welcome reserved for the Colombian president Samper when he visited Europe, at a time when the US is trying hard to get rid of him, was a new illustration of where things stand. The French paper Le Monde wrote on 4.9.96: Whereas up till now, the USA has studiously ignored the Group of Rio (an association regrouping nearly all the South American countries), the presence in Cochabamba (the place where this group meets) of M Albright, tile US ambassador to the UN, has been widely noted. According to certain observers, it's the political dialogue taking place between the Group of Rio and the European Union and Japan which explains the USA's change of attitude.
The disappearance of imperialist blocs and the triumph of "every man for himself"
How are we to explain this weakening of the US superpower and the challenge to its global leadership, even though it remains the greatest economic power on the planet, and above all has an absolute military superiority over all Its European rivals? Unlike the USSR, the USA did not collapse with the disappearance of the blocs which had ruled over the planet since Yalta. But this new situation nevertheless profoundly affected the only remaining superpower. We gave the reasons for this in the resolution on the international situation from the 12th Congress of Revolution Internationale, published in International Review no 86: "This threat (...) springs essentially from the fact that today there no longer exists the essential precondition for any real solidity and stability in alliances between bourgeois states in the imperialist arena: the existence of a common enemy threatening their security. The powers of the ex-western bloc may be forced, at one time or another, to submit to Washington's diktats, but it is out of the question for them to remain faithful on a durable basis. On the contrary, they will seize any opportunity to sabotage the orientations and dispositions imposed by the USA".
All the blows struck against US leadership in the past few months have to be seen in this context: the absence of any common enemy means that American displays of force become less and less effective. Thus, Desert Storm, despite the very considerable political, diplomatic and military means deployed by the US to impose its "New World Order" did not even hold back its "allies" strivings towards independence for one year. The outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia in the summer of 92 meant, in effect, the failure of this "US world order". Even the USA's success in ex -Yugoslavia at the end of 95 was not able to prevent die rebellion that took place in the spring of 96! To a certain extent, the more the US resorts to displays of strength, die more it reinforces die determination of its rivals to step up their challenge and the more it draws others into their wake, including some of the USA's once most docile clients. Thus, when Clinton tried to pull Europe into a crusade against Iran in the name of anti-terrorism, France, Britain and Germany gave him the cold shoulder. Similarly, the attempt to punish states trading with Cuba, Iran or Libya has only served to provoke a wall of shields against the USA, as we have seen in die case of Latin America. This aggressive attitude has also had its effects on a country as important as Italy which is in the balance between the USA and Europe. The sanctions imposed by Washington on some big Italian enterprises for their dealings with Libya have merely strengthened the pro-European forces in Italy.
This situation expresses the impasse facing the world's leading power:
- either it does nothing, renounces the use of force (which is its only way of exerting pressure today), which would give a free hand to its rivals;
- or it asserts its superiority through an aggressive policy (which it is tending to do more and more), and this quickly rebounds against it, further isolating it and stirring up the anti-American reactions which are spreading all over the world. However, in conformity with the utter irrationality of inter -imperialist relations in the period of capitalism's decadence, a characteristic which has been exacerbated in the current phase of accelerating decomposition, the USA can only make use of force to try to preserve its status on the imperialist arena. We are thus seeing it resort more and more to the methods of trade war, which are not simply the expression of the ferocious economic competition which is tearing through a capitalist world deep in the pits of the crisis but are also a weapon for the defence of imperialist prerogatives against all those who challenge US leadership. But faced with a challenge on such a scale trade war is not enough and the USA is increasingly forced to let die guns speak, as we saw recently with its intervention in Iraq.
By launching 44 cruise missiles against Iraq, in reply to the incursions into Kurdistan by Saddam Hussein's army, the USA has shown its determination to defend its positions in the Middle East, and more generally to remind everyone that it intends to maintain its role as world leader. But the limits of this new demonstration of force appeared straight away:
- at the level of the means deployed, which were a pale replica of Desert Storm;
- but also via the fact that tins new "punishment" which the USA was attempting to inflict on Iraq had very little support in the region. The Turkish government refused to allow the Americans to use the forces based on its territory, while Saudi Arabia didn't allow US planes to take off from its territory to go and bomb Iraq; it even called on Washington to stop the operation. The majority of Arab countries openly criticised this military intervention. Moscow and Peking clearly condemned the American initiative, while France, followed by Spain and Italy, overtly disapproved of it. All this shows how far we have come from tile unanimity the US was able to impose during die Gulf war. Such a situation reveals lie degree to which US leadership was been weakened since then. The US bourgeoisie would have liked no doubt to have made a much more striking show of force, and not only in Iraq but also, for example, against the regime in Iran. But given the lack of support, including in the region itself, they were forced to let the guns speak at a much lower level.
However, while this operation in Iraq had a limited impact, we should not underestimate the benefits it has brought to the US. Apart from being a low-cost demonstration of their absolute superiority at the military level, notably in the Middle East, they have above all succeeded in sowing divisions among their main European rivals. The latter have often been able to mount a united front against Clinton and his diktats about Iran, Libya or Cuba. The fact that Britain has rallied loyally to the intervention in Iraq, to the point where Major has "saluted the courage of the USA", that Germany seems to share this position while France, supported by Rome and Madrid, has been questioning the whole reason for these bombings, is evidence of a spanner thrown in the works of the European union! The fact that Bonn and Paris are yet again not on the same wave-length is not new. The divergences between the two sides of the Rhine have been accumulating since 1995. The same cannot be said about the wedge placed between French and British imperialism on this occasion. Since the war in ex-Yugoslavia, France and Britain have continually strengthened their cooperation (recently they signed a very important military agreement, to which Germany was associated, involving the joint construction of cruise missiles), and their "friendship", to the point where British planes took part in the last 14 July parade in Paris. Through this project London was clearly expressing its will to break with a long tradition of military cooperation with and dependence on Washington. Does the support given by London to the US intervention in Iraq signify that "perfidious Albion" is finally bowing to the sustained pressure the US has been bringing to bear on it, with the aim of pulling it back under its control? Is Britain about to become the faithful lieutenant of the USA once again? No, because this support is not an act of allegiance to the American Big Boss but the defence of the particular interests of British imperialism in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. This country was once a British colony but under the reign of Saddam Hussein London has lost all influence. France, on the other hand, had gained a solid footing there; following the Gulf war it lost many of its positions but had been about to recover some of them thanks to the weakening of US hegemony over the Middle East. In these conditions Britain's only hope of regaining any influence in this region lies in the overthrow of tile Butcher of Baghdad. This is also the reason why London has always taken the same hard line as Washington over the UN resolutions about Iraq, whereas Paris has always pleaded for the US-imposed embargo on Iraq to be lightened.
While "every man for himself" is a general tendency which undermines American leadership, it also manifests itself amongst the USA's rivals and makes all imperialist alliances highly fragile; even when they have a relative solidity, like the one between London and Paris, they are much more variable than the ones which prevailed during the period when the existence of a common enemy made it possible for blocs to exist. And while the USA is the main victim of this new historical situation engendered by the decomposition of the system, it can only try to exploit the reigning tendency towards "every man for himself for its own ends. The Americans already did this in ex-Yugoslavia when they didn't hesitate to make a tactical alliance with their most dangerous rival, Germany, and they are now trying the same manoeuvre vis-a-vis the Anglo-French tandem. Despite its limitations, the blow struck against Anglo-French unity represents an undeniable success for Clinton, and the American political class had no hesitation in giving its unanimous support to the Iraqi operation.
However, this American success will have very limited effects and will not put an end to the development of "every man for himself", which is profoundly undermining the hegemony of the world's first power; nor will it free the USA from its current impasse. In some ways, even if the USA, thanks to its economic and financial power, has a strength which the leader of the eastern bloc never had, it is possible to draw a parallel between the current situation of the USA and that of the USSR in the days of the eastern bloc. At root, it too can only resort to brute force to preserve its domination, and this always expresses a historic weakness. This exacerbation of "every man for himself" and the impasse facing the world cop actually express the historic impasse of the capitalist mode of production. In this context, imperialist tensions between the great powers can only move towards a crescendo, bringing death and destruction to more and more regions of the planet and aggravating the frightful chaos which is already the lot of entire continents. There is only one force that can stand against this sinister extension of barbarism, by developing its struggles and calling the whole world capitalist system into question: the proletariat.
RN, 9.9.96
[1] Relations between France and Egypt are particularly warm and Germany's Kohl was received there with much ceremony. As for the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, who the Americans want to replace at all costs. Throughout the war in ex- Yugoslavia he continuously blocked American action and defended a pro-French orientation.
[2] The fact that a meeting between emissaries of the Israeli and Egyptian governments took place in Paris is no accident; it sanctions the reintroduction of France into the Middle East, but also the will of the Israelis to address a message to the USA: if the Americans put too much pressure on the new government, Israel will not hesitate to look for support from among its European rivals.
[3] While Germany is compelled to be prudent about the danger of exacerbating the incredible chaos in Russia, the fact that Poland and ex-Czechoslovakia are more "stable" means that there is a kind of buffer zone between themselves and this danger. This gives it more leeway to pursue its historic goal of gaining access to the Middle East With the help of Iran and Turkey. It also allows it to put pressure on Russia with the aim of weakening its ties with the USA. Thus oh-so-democratic Germany is feeding on the chaos in Russia in order to defend its imperialist interests.
In the first two parts of this series, we have shown the origins and development of Bakunin's Alliance, and how the bourgeoisie supported and manipulated this sect as a war machine against the First International. We have seen the absolute priority which Marx and Engels, and all the healthy proletarian elements in the International, gave to the defence of working class principles of functioning in the struggle against organizational anarchism. In this article; we will draw the lessons of the Hague Congress, one of the most important moments in the struggle of marxism against political parasitism. Socialist sects, which no longer had any place in a still young, but developing working class movement, began to devote their main activity to fighting, not the bourgeoisie, but the revolutionary organisations themselves. All these parasitic elements, despite their own political divergences, rallied around Bakunin's attempts to destroy the International.
The lessons of this struggle against parasitism at the Hague Congress are particularly relevant today. Due to the break in organic continuity with the past workers' movement, there are many parallels between the development of the revolutionary milieu after 1968 and that at the beginning of the workers movement. In particular, there is, if not an identity. a strong parallel between the role of political parasitism at the time of Bakunin and today.
The tasks of revolutionaries after the Paris Commune
The Hague Congress of the First International in 1872 is one of the most famous congresses in the history of the workers' movement. At this congress the historic "showdown" between Marxism and Anarchism took place. This congress marked a decisive step in overcoming the sectarian phase which had marked the early days of the workers' movement. At the Hague the groundwork was laid for overcoming the separation between the socialist organisations on the one hand and the mass movements of proletarian class struggle on the other. The congress firmly condemned the petty bourgeois anarchist "rejection of politics", as well as its aloofness from the daily defensive struggles of the class. Above all, it declared that the emancipation of the proletariat required its organisation into an autonomous political class party in opposition to all the parties of the propertied classes. (Resolution on the statutes, Hague Congress).
In fact, by the time of the Hague Congress the best representatives of the workers' movement were realising that the weight of the Proudhonists, Blanquists, Bakuninists and other sectarians within the leadership of the insurrection had been the principle political weakness of the Commune. This was linked to the incapacity of the International to influence the events in Paris in the centralized and coordinated manner of a class party.
Thus, after the fall of the Paris Commune, the absolute priority for the workers' movement became to shake off the weight of its own sectarian past, to overcome the influence of petty bourgeois socialism.
Thus, the delegates came to The Hague, not only to repel the international repression and slanders against the Association, but also and above all to defeat the attack against the organisation from within. These internal attacks were led by Bakunin, who was now openly calling for the abolition of organizational centralization, for the non-respect of the statutes. The non-payment of membership dues to the General Council, and the rejection of the political struggle. Above all, he opposed all the decisions of the London Conference of 1871, which, drawing the lessons from the Paris Commune, defended the need for the International to play the role of the class party. At the organizational level, this conference had called on the General Council to assume without hesitation its role of centralization, embodying the unity of the International between congresses. And it condemned the existence of secret societies within the International, ordering the preparation of a report on the scandalous activities of Bakunin and Nechayev in the name of the International in Russia.
Bakunin's arrogance was partly an attempt to brazen out the discovery of his activities against the International. But it was above all a strategic calculation. The Alliance reckoned to exploit the weakening and disorientation of many parts of the organisation after the defeat of the Paris Commune, with the aim of wrecking the International at the Hague Congress itself, under the watching eyes of the whole world. Bakunin's attack against the "dictatorship of the General Council" was contained in the Sonvilliers Circular of November 1871, sent to all the sections, and skilfully aimed at rallying all the petty bourgeois elements who felt threatened by the thorough proletarianisation of the organizational methods of the International advocated by the central organs. Long extracts of the Sonvilliers circular were republished in the bourgeois press under the title "The International monster is devouring itself". "In France, where everything in any way connected with the International was wildly persecuted, it was posted up on the houses" (Nicolaievsky: Karl Marx P.380).
The alliance between parasitism and the ruling classes
More generally speaking, not only the Paris Commune, but the foundation of the International itself, were both expressions of one and the same historical process. The essence of this process was the maturation of the emancipation struggle of the proletariat. Since the mid-1860s, the workers' movement had begun to overcome its own "childhood disorders". Drawing the lessons of the revolutions of 1848, the proletariat, no longer accepted the leadership of the radical wing of the bourgeoisie, and was now fighting to establish its own class autonomy. But this autonomy required that the proletariat overcome the domination, within its own organisations, of the theories and organizational concepts of the petty bourgeoisie, Bohemian and declassed elements etc.
Thus, the struggle to impose the proletarian approach within its organisations, which after the Paris Commune reached a new stage, had to be waged not only towards tile outside, against tile attacks of the bourgeoisie, but within the International itself. Within its ranks, the petty bourgeois and declassed elements waged a ferocious struggle against the imposition of these proletarian political and organizational principles, since this meant the elimination of their own influence over the workers organisation.
In this way, these sects, "at the beginning levers of the movement, become a hindrance, as soon as they are rendered obsolete by it; they then become reactionary" (Marx/Engels: The Alleged Splits in the International).
The Hague Congress thus set itself the goal of eliminating the sabotage of the maturation and autonomy of tile proletariat by the sectarians. A month before the congress, the General Council declared in a circular to all members of the International that it was high time to finish once and for all with the internal struggles caused by "the presence of this parasitic body". And it declared: "By paralyzing the activity of the International against the enemies of the working crus, the Alliance magnificently serves the bourgeoisie and its governments".
The Hague Congress revealed that the sectarians, who were no longer a lever of the movement, but had become parasites living off the back of proletarian organisations, had organized internationally to coordinate their war against the International. They preferred to destroy the workers' party rather than accept that the proletariat emancipate itself from their influence. It was revealed that political parasitism, in order to prevent itself landing on the famous "rubbish dump of history" where it belonged, was prepared to form an alliance with the bourgeoisie. The basis of this alliance was a common hatred of tile proletariat, even if this hatred was not for the same reason. One of the great achievements of The Hague was its capacity to show the essence of this political parasitism, that of doing the job of the bourgeoisie, participating in the war of the propertied classes against communist organisations.
The delegates prepare to confront Bakuninism
The written declarations sent to The Hague by different sections, especially in France where the Association worked in clandestinity and many delegates could not attend the congress, show the mood within the International on the eve of the Congress. The main points to be dealt with were the proposed extension of the powers of the General Council, the orientation towards a political class party, and the confrontation with Bakunin's Alliance and other blatant violations of tile statutes.
Marx's decision to attend the congress in person was only one of many signs of tile determination within the ranks of the organisation to uncover and destroy the different plots being developed within the Association, all of which were centred around Bakunin's Alliance. This Alliance, a hidden organisation within the organisation, was a secret society set up according to the bourgeois model of freemasonry. The delegates were well aware that behind these sectarian manoeuvres around Bakunin stood the ruling class.
"Citizens, never was a congress more solemn and more important than the one whose sittings bring you together in The Hague. What indeed will be discussed will not be this or that insignificant question of form, this or that trite article of the Regulations, but the very life of the Association.
Impure hands stained with Republican blood have been trying for a long time to sow among us a discord which would be profitable only to the" most criminal of monsters, Louis Bonaparte; intriguers expelled with shame from our midst - the Bakunin's, Malons, Gaspard Blancs and Richards - are trying to found we know not what kind of ridiculous federation intended in their ambitious projects to crush the Association. Well, citizens, it is this germ of discord, grotesque in its arrogant designs, but dangerous in its daring manoeuvres, which must be annihilated at all costs. Its life is incompatible with ours and we rely on your pitiless energy to achieve a decisive and brilliant success. Be without pity, strike without hesitation, for should you retreat, should you weaken, you would be responsible not only for the disaster suffered by the Association, but moreover for the terrible consequences which this would lead to for the cause of the proletariat" (Paris Ferre section to the Hague Delegates: Minutes and Documents (M+D) of Hague Congress P. 238).
Against the Bakuninist demand for the autonomisation of the sections and the virtual abolition of the General Council, the central organ representing the unity of the International, the Paris sections declared:
"If you claim that the Council is a useless body, that the federations could do without it by corresponding among themselves (...) then the International Association is dislocated. The proletariat goes back to the period of the corporations (...) Well, we Parisians declare that we have not shed our blood in floods at every generation for the satisfaction of parochial interests. We declare that you have understood nothing at all about the character and the mission of the International Association" (Paris Sections: M + D P. 235). The sections went on "We do not want to be transformed into a secret society, neither do we want to sink into the bog of purely economic evolution. Because a secret society leads to adventures in which the people is always the victim" (P.232).
The question of mandates
Thus, Serrailler, the correspondent for France of the General Council, had never heard of the Marseilles sections which mandated an Alliance member.
Nor had he ever received membership dues from them. "Moreover he has been informed that sections have recently been formed for the purpose of sending delegates to the Congress" (M+D P.124). The congress had to vote on whether these sections existed or not!
Finding itself in a minority at the Congress, the supporters of Bakunin tried in turn to contest different mandates, and thereby also waste time.
The Alliance member Alerini claimed that the authors of the "Pretended Splits" - i.e. the General Council - should be excluded. Their crime: defending the statutes of the organisation. The Alliance also wanted to violate the existing voting rules by forbidding General Council members from voting as delegates mandated by the sections.
Another enemy of the central organs, Mottershead "asks why Barry, who is not one of the leaders in England and carries no weight, has nevertheless been delegated to the Congress by a German section". Marx declared in reply that "it does credit to Barry that he is not one of the so-called leaders of the English workers, since these men are more or less bribed by the bourgeoisie and the government; attacks are made on Barry only because he refuses to be a tool in the hands of Hales" (M+D P.124). Hales and Mottershead supported the anti-organizational tendency in Britain.
Having no majority, the Alliance tried to make a putsch against the rules of the International in the middle of the congress - corresponding to their vision that rules were only there for others, not for the Bakuninist elite.
In proposal Number 4 to the congress, the Spanish Alliance put forward that only the votes of those delegates would count at the congress, which had an "imperative mandate" from their sections. The votes of the other delegates would only count after their sections had discussed and voted on the congress motions. As a result, the resolutions adopted would only come into force two months after the congress. (M+D P. 180).
This proposal was aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the Congress as the highest instance of the organisation.
Morago then announced" that the delegates from Spain have received definite instructions to abstain from voting until voting is carried out according to the number of electors represented by each delegate".
The reply of Lafargue was recorded in the minutes - "Lafargue states that although he is a delegate from Spain, he has not received such instructions". This reveals the essence of the functioning of the Alliance. Delegates of different sections, some of them claiming to have an "imperative" mandate from their sections, were in reality obeying the secret instructions of the Alliance, a hidden alternative leadership opposed to the General Council and to the statutes.
To enforce their strategy, the Alliance members proceeded to blackmail the Congress. Bakunin's right hand man, Guillaume, in face of the refusal of the congress to break its own rules to please the Spanish Bakuninists, "announces that from now on the Jura Federation will no longer take part in the voting" (M+D P.143).
Not stopping there, threats were also made to leave the congress.
In reply to this blackmail, "The Chairman explains that the Rules were made not by the General Council or by individual persons but by the IWA and its congresses, and that therefore anyone who attacks the Rules is attacking the IWA and its existence!".
As Engels pointed out "It is not our fault that the Spaniards are in the sad position of not being able to vote, nor is it the fault of the Spanish workers but of the Spanish Federal Council, which is composed of members of the Alliance" (M + D P. 142, 143).
Confronting the sabotage of the Alliance, Engels formulated the decision facing the Congress.
"We must decide whether the IWA is to continue to be managed on a democratic basis or ruled by a clique (cries and protests at the word "clique") organized secretly and in violation of the Rules" (M+D P.122)
"Ranvier protests against the threat made by Splingard, Guillaume and others to leave the hall, which only proves that it is they and not we who have pronounced in advance on the question under discussion; he wishes all the police agents in the world would thus take their departure" (M+D P. 129).
"If Morago says so much about possible despotism on the part of the General Council, he must realize that his and his comrades' way of speaking is most tyrannical since they want to force us to yield to them under the threat of their breaking away" (Intervention of Lafargue, M+D P.153).
The Congress also replied on the question of imperative mandates, which means turning the congress into a simple ballot box, where the delegations present the votes already taken. It would be cheaper not to hold the congress and send the votes by post. The congress is no longer the highest instance of the unity of the organisation, which reaches its decisions sovereignly, as a body.
"Serrailler says that he is not tied down here like Guillaume and his comrades, who have already made up their minds about everything in advance since they have accepted imperative mandates which oblige them to vote in a certain way or withdraw".
The true function of the "imperative mandate" in the Alliance strategy is revealed in Engels article "The Imperative Mandate and the Hague Congress".
mandate. The mandate of their allies will all be identical. Those of the sections, which are not under the influence of the Alliance, or which rebel against it, will contradict each other, so that often the absolute majority, and always the relative majority will belong to the secret society; whereas at a congress without an imperative mandate, the common sense of the independent delegates will soon unite them to a common party against the party of the secret society. The imperative mandate is an extremely effective means of domination, and that is why the Alliance, despite all its Anarchism, supports its authority" .
The question of finances: the "sinews of war"
Since the finances, as the material basis of political work, are vital for the construction and defence of revolutionary organisation, it was inevitable that attacking these finances would be one of the main ways of undermining the International through political parasitism.
On the "rebel" Second Section in New York:
"Ranvier is of the opinion that the Regulations are being made into a toy. Section No. 2 has separated from the Federal Council, has fallen into lethargy, and, at the approach of the world congress, has wished to be represented at it and to protest against those who have been active. How, by the way, has this section regularized its position with the General Council? It only paid its subscriptions on August 26. Such conduct borders on comedy and is intolerable. These petty coteries, these sects, these groups independent of one another and having no common ties, resemble freemasonry and cannot be tolerated in the International" (M + D P.45)
The congress rightly insisted that only delegations of sections which had paid their dues could participate at the Congress.
Here is how Farga Pellicier "explained" the absence of the dues of the Spanish Alliancists. "As for the subscriptions, he will explain: the situation was difficult, they had to fight the bourgeoisie, and almost all the workers belong to trade unions. They aim at uniting all the workers against capital. The International is making great progress in Spain, but the struggle is costly. They have not paid their subscriptions, but they will do it".
In other words they are keeping the money of the organisation for themselves. Here is the reply of the treasurer of the International.
"Engels, secretary for Spain, finds it strange that the delegates arrive with money in their pockets and have not yet paid. At the London Conference all the delegates settled up immediately, and the Spaniards should have done the same here, for this was indispensable for the validation of their mandates" (M + D P. 128). Two pages on, we read in the minutes "Farga Pellicer finally rises and hands to the Chairman the treasury accounts and the subscriptions from the Spanish Federation except for the last quarter" i.e. the money they allegedly did not have.
Hardly surprising that the Alliance and its supporters, to weaken the organisation, then proposed the reduction of membership subscriptions. The proposal of the Congress was to increase them.
"Brismee is in favour of diminishing the subscriptions because the workers have to pay to their sections, to the federal council and it is very burdensome for them to give ten centimes a year to the General Council".
To this, Frankel replied in defence of the organisation.
"Frankel himself is a wage-worker and precisely he thinks that in the interest of the International the subscriptions absolutely must be increased. There are federations which only pay at the last minute and as little as possible. The council has not a sou in the treasury (...) Frankel is of the opinion that with the means of propaganda which an increase of subscriptions will allow, the divisions in the International would cease, and they would not exist today if the General Council had been able to send its emissaries to the different countries where these dissentions occurred" (M+D P. 95)
On this question the Alliance obtained a partial victory: the dues were left at the old rate.
Finally, the Congress firmly rejected the slanders of the Alliance and the bourgeois press on this question.
"Marx observed that whereas the members of the Council have been advancing their own money to pay the expenses of the International, calumniators have accused those members of living on the Council (...) of living on the pennies of the workers". "Lafargue says that the Jura Federation has been one of the mouthpieces of those calumnies" (M+D P.98, 169).
The defence of the General Council: at the heart of the defence of the International
"The General Council (...) places on the order of the day, as the most important questions to be discussed by the Congress of The Hague, the revision of the General Rules and Regulations" (General Councils resolution on the Agenda of the Hague Congress, M+D P. 23-24).
At the level of functioning, the central issue was the following modification of the general Rules:
"Article 2. The General Council is bound to execute the Congress Resolutions, and to take care that in every country the principles and the General Rules and Regulations of the International are strictly observed (...)
Article 6. The General Council has also the right to suspend Branches, Sections, Federal Councils or committees, and federations of the International, till the meeting of the next Congress" (Resolution Relative to the Administrative Regulations P. 283).
"Brismee wants the rules to be discussed first, because it is possible that there might not be a General Council anymore and therefore no powers would be needed for it. The Belgians want no extension of the General Councils powers, on the contrary, they carne here to take away from it the crown which it usurped" (M+D P.141).
Sauva, USA: "His mandatories want the Council to be preserved, but first of all they want it to have no rights and that this sovereign should not have the right to give orders to its servants (laughter)".
The Congress rejected these attempts to destroy the unity of the organisation, adopting the enforcement of the General Council, thus giving a signal which marxists have followed to this day. As Hepner declared during the debate:
"Yesterday evening two great ideas were mentioned: centralization and federation. The latter expressed itself in abstentionism, but this abstention from all political activity leads to the police station" (Statutes P. 160)
And Marx: "Sauva has changed his opinion since London. As regards authority, at London he was for the authority of the General Council (...) here he has defended the opposite" (M+D P.89)
"Marx says that in discussing the powers of the Council it is not us, but the institution. Marx has stated that he would rather vote for the abolition of the Council than for a council which would be only a letterbox" (M+D P.73).
Against the stirring up of the petty bourgeois fears of "dictatorship" by the Bakuninists, Marx argued.
"But whether we grant the General Council the rights of a Negro prince or of the Russian tsar, its power is illusory as soon as the General Council ceases to express the will of the majority of the IWA. The General Council has no army, no budget, it is only a moral force, and it will always be powerless if it has not the support of the whole Association" (P. 154)
The Congress also made the link between the other major change in the statutes which it adopted, that on the need for a political class party, and the question of proletarian principles of functioning. This link is the struggle against "anti-authoritarianism" as a weapon both against the party and against party discipline.
"Here we have talk against authority: we also are against excesses of any kind, but a certain authority, a certain prestige will always be necessary to provide cohesion in the party. It is logical that such anti-authoritarians have to abolish also the federal councils, the federations, the committees and even the sections, because authority is exercised to a greater or lesser degree by all of them; they must establish absolute anarchy everywhere, that is, they must turn the militant International into a petty bourgeois party in a dressing gown and slippers. How can one object to authority after the Commune? We German workers at least are convinced that the Commune fell largely because it did not exercise enough authority!" (M+D P. 161).
The inquiry into the Alliance
On the last day of the Congress, the report of the commission to investigate the Alliance was presented and discussed.
Cuno declares: "It is absolutely indisputable that there have been intrigues inside the Association; lies, calumnies and treachery have been proved, the commission has carried out a superhuman job, having sat for 13 hours running today. Now it seeks a vote of confidence by the acceptance of the demands set forth in the report".
In fact the work of the investigation Commission appointed was enormous throughout the Congress. A mountain of documents had been examined. A series of witnesses were called to give evidence on different aspects of the question. Engels read out the General Council's report on the Alliance. Significantly one of the documents presented by the General Council to the Commission was the "General Rules of the International Working Men's Association after the Geneva Congress, 1866". This fact illustrates that the problem menacing the International was not the existence of political divergences, which can be dealt with normally in the framework laid down by the statutes, but systematic violations of the statutes themselves. Trampling on die organizational class principles of the proletariat always constitutes a mortal danger for the existence and reputation of communist organisations. The presentation of the secret statutes of the Alliance by the General Council was proof enough that this was the case here.
The commission elected by the Congress did not take its job lightly. The documentation of its work is as lengthy as all the other documents of the Congress put together. The longest of these documents. Utin's report, commissioned by the London Conference the previous year, contains almost 100 pages. At the end, the Hague Congress commissioned the publication of an even longer report the famous "Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men's Association". Revolutionary organisations, having nothing to hide from the proletariat have always wanted to inform the proletariat on such questions to the extent that the security of the organisation permits.
The Commission established without doubt that Bakunin had dissolved and refounded the Alliance at least three times in order to deceive the International, that it was a secret organisation within the Association working against the statutes behind the back of the organisation, aiming at taking over or destroying that body.
The Commission also recognised the irrational, esoteric character of this formation.
"It is obvious from the whole organisation that there are three different grades, some of which lead the others by the nose. The whole affair seems to be so exalted and eccentric that the whole Commission is constantly rolling with mirth. This kind of mysticism is generally considered as insanity. The greatest absolutism is manifested in the whole organisation" ("Minutes of the Commission to Investigate the Alliance". M+D P. 339).
The work of the Commission was hampered by different factors. One was the absence of Bakunin himself from the Congress. After declaring beforehand in his loud-mouth manner that he would come to the Congress to defend his honour, he preferred to leave his defence to his disciples. But he gave then a strategy to follow, aimed at sabotaging the investigations. Firstly, his followers refused to divulge anything about the Alliance or secret societies in general "for security reasons", as if their activities had been aimed against the bourgeoisie and not against the Alliance, Guillaume repeated what he had already defended at the Swiss Romance congress of April 1970: "Every member of the International has the full and complete right to join any secret society, even the Freemasons. Any inquiry into a secret society would simply be equivalent to a denunciation to the police" (Nicolaievsky: Karl Marx, P.387)
Secondly, the written imperative mandate to the Jura delegates for the Congress stipulated that "the Jura delegates will eliminate all personal questions and will hold discussions in that field only when they are forced to do so, proposing to the congress oblivion of the past and for the future the election of courts of honour, which will have to take a decision every time an accusation is levelled against a member of the International" (M + D P. 325).
This is a document of political evasion. The clarification of the role of Bakunin as the leader of a plot against the International is dismissed as a personal question, not a political one. Investigations should be reserved "for the future" and take the form of a permanent institution to settle squabbles in the way of a bourgeois court. A proletarian investigation commission or court of honour are completely emasculated.
Thirdly, the Alliance poses as the "victim" of the organisation. Guillaume contests the "General Council's power to establish an Inquisition over the International" (M+D P. 84). He affirms "the whole process is to kill the so-called minority, in reality the majority (...) it is the federalist principle which is being condemned here" (p. I72).
"Alerini is of the opinion that the commission has only moral convictions and no material proofs; he was a member of the Alliance and proud of it (...) But you are a holy Inquisition; we demand a public investigation and conclusive, tangible proofs" (P. 170).
The Congress appointed a sympathizer of Bakunin, Splingard, as member of the commission. This Splingard had to admit that the Alliance had existed as a secret society within the International, even if he did not understand the function of the commission. He saw his role as a kind of "lawyer defending Bakunin" (who however should have been old enough to defend himself), rather than part of a collective body of investigation.
"Marx says that Splingard behaved in the Commission like an advocate of the Alliance, not as an impartial judge".
Marx and Lucain replied to the other accusation that there are "no proof".
Splingard "knows quite well that Marx gave all those documents to Engels. The Spanish Federal Council itself provided proofs and he (Marx) adduced others from Russia but cannot divulge the name of the sender; in this matter in general the commission has given its word of honour not to divulge anything of what is dealt with, in particular any names; its decision on this question is unshakable".
Lucain "asks whether they must wait until the Alliance has disrupted and disorganized the International and then come forward with proofs. But we refuse to wait so long, we attack evil where we see it because such is our duty" (P. 171).
The Congress strongly supported the conclusions of its Commission, except for the Bakuninist minority. In reality, the commission demanded only 3 expulsions, Bakunin, Guillaume and Schwitzguebel. Only the first two were accepted by the Congress. So much for the legend about the International wanting to eliminate an uncomfortable minority by disciplinary means! As opposed to what anarchists and councilists claim, proletarian organisations have no necessity of such measures; they have no fear of, but a complete interest in total political clarification through debate. And they expel members only in very exceptional cases of grave indiscipline and disloyalty. As Johannard said at The Hague "expulsion from the IWA is the worst and most dishonourable sentence that can be passed on a man; such a man could never belong to an honourable society again" (P. 171).
The parasitic front against the International
We will not deal here with the other dramatic decision of the Congress, the transfer of the General Council from London to New York. The motive behind the proposition was the fact that although the Bakuninists had been defeated, the General Council in London would have fallen into the hands of another sect, the Blanquists. The latter, refusing to recognize the international reflux of the class struggle which the defeat of the Paris Commune had caused, risked destroying the workers' movement in a series of pointless barricade confrontations. In fact, whereas Marx and Engels hoped at that time to bring the General Council back to Europe later, the defeat in Paris marked the beginning of the end of the First International (see part 2 of our series).
Instead, we will conclude this article with one of the great historic achievements of the Hague Congress. This achievement, which posterity mostly ignored or completely misunderstood (e.g. by Franz Mehring in his biography of Marx), was the identification of the role of political parasitism against workers' organisations.
The Hague Congress showed that Bakunin's Alliance did not act alone, but was the coordinating centre of a parasitic opposition to the workers' movement supported by the bourgeoisie.
One of the main allies of the Alliance in its fight against the International was the group around Woodhull and West in America, who were hardly "anarchists".
"West's mandate is signed by Victoria Woodhull, who has been intriguing for years already to become president of the United States, is president of the spiritualists, preaches free love, has a banking business etc". It "issued the notorious appeal to the English speaking citizens of the United States in which all kinds of nonsense were ascribed to the IWA and on the basis of which various similar sections were formed in the country. Among other things the appeal mentioned personal freedom, social freedom (free love), manner of dressing, women's franchise, a world language etc (...) They place the women's question before the workers question and refuse to recognize that the IWA is a workers organisation" (Intervention of Marx P. 133).
The connection of these elements to international parasitism was revealed by Sorge.
"Section No.12 received the correspondence of the Jura Federation and the Universal Federalist Council in London with the greatest pleasure. Section No.12 was always carrying on intrigues furtively and importuning to obtain the supreme leadership of the IWA, it even published and interpreted to its own benefit the General Council's decisions which were not in its favour. Later it excommunicated the French Communists and German atheists. Here we demand discipline and submission not to persons, but to the principle, to the organisation; to win over America we absolutely need the Irish and they will never be on our side if we do not break off all connections with Section No. 12 and the 'free lovers '" (P. 136).
This international coordination of attacks against the International, with the Bakuninists at the centre, was further clarified in the discussion.
"Le Moussu reads from the Bulletin de la Federation Jurassienne a reproduction of a letter addressed to him by the Spring Street Council in reply to the order suspending Section No.12" concluding "in favour of the formation of a new Association by uniting dissident elements in Spain, Switzerland, and London. Thus, not content with disregarding the authority which the General Council holds from Congress and instead of deferring their grievances, as the Rules lay down, until today, these individuals, intending to form a new society, openly break with the International".
"Le Moussu draws the attention of the Congress to the coincidence between the attacks on the General Council and its members made by the Jura Federation's bulletin and those made by its sister federation published by Messrs. Vesinier and Landeck, the latter paper having been exposed as a mouthpiece of the police and its editors expelled as police agents from the Refugees' Society of the Commune in London. The aim of this falsification is to represent the Commune members on the General Council as admirers of the Bonapartist regime, while the other members, these wretches keep on insinuating, are Bismarckists, as if the real Bonapartists and Bismarckians were not those who, like all these hack-writers of all the various federations, trail along behind the bloodhounds of all governments to insult the true champions of the proletariat. That is why I say to these vile insulters: You are worthy henchmen of the Bismarck, Bonapartist and Thierist police" (P. 50, 51).
On the link between the Alliance and Landeck: "Dereure informs the Congress that hardly an hour earlier Alerini told him that he (Alerini) was an intimate friend of Landeck, who was known as a police spy in London" (P. 472).
German parasitism, in the form of Lassalleans expelled from the German Workers' Educational Association in London, were also linked to this intemational parasitic network via the above mentioned Universal Federalist Council in London, where they collaborated with other enemies of the workers' movement such as French radical Freemasons and Italian Mazzinists.
"The Bakuninist Party in Germany was the General Association of German Workers under Schweitzer, and the latter was finally unmasked as a police agent" (Intervention of Hepner P. 160).
The congress also showed the collaboration between the Swiss Bakuninists and the British reformists of the British Federation under Hales.
In reality, apart from infiltrating and manipulating degenerated sects which had once belonged to the working class, the bourgeoisie also set up organisations of its own to oppose the International. The Philadelphians, and Mazzinians, located in London, attempted to take over the General Council directly, but were defeated when their members were removed from the General Council subcommittee in September 1865.
"The principle enemy of the Philadelphians, the man who prevented the First International from becoming a front for their activities, was Karl Marx" (Nicolaevsky: Secret Societies and the First International P. 52). The direct link claimed by Nicolaevsky between this milieu and the Bakuninists, is more than probable, given their open identification with the methods and organisations of Freemasonry.
The destructive activity of this milieu was continued by the terrorist provocations of the secret society of Felix Pyat, the "Republican Revolutionary Commune". This group, having been excluded and publicly condemned by the International, continued to operate in its name, constantly attacking the General Council.
In Italy, for instance, the bourgeoisie set up a Societa Universale dei Razionalisti under Stefanoni to combat the International in that country. Its paper published the lies of Vogt and the German Lassalleans against Marx, and ardently defended Bakunin's Alliance.
The goal of this network of pseudo-revolutionaries was to "calumniate members of the International in a way which made the bourgeois papers, whose vile inspirers they are, blush with shame, that is what they call appealing to the workers to unite" (Intervention of Duval P. 99).
This was why the vital necessity to defend the organisation against all these attacks was at the heart of the interventions of Marx at this congress, whose vigilance and determination must guide us today in face of similar attacks.
"Anyone who smiles sceptically at the mention of police sections must know that such sections were formed in France, Austria and elsewhere, and the General Council received a request from Austria not to recognize any section which was not founded by delegates of the General Council or the organisation there. Vesinier and his comrades, whom the French refugees recently expelled, are naturally for the Jura Federation (...) Individuals like Vesinier, Landeck and others, in my opinion, form first a federal council, and then a federation and sections; agents of Bismarck could do the same, therefore the General Council must have the right to dissolve or suspend a federal council or a federation (...) In Austria, brawlers, Ultramontanes, Radicals and provocateurs form sections in order to discredit the IWA; in France a police commissary formed a section" (P.154-154).
"There was a case for suspending a federal council in New York; it may be that in other countries secret societies wish to get influence over federal councils, they must be suspended. As for the facility to form federations freely, as Vesinier, Landeck and a German police informer did, it cannot exist. Monsieur Thiers makes himself the lackey of all governments against the International, and the Council must have the power to remove all corrosive elements (...) Your expressions of anxiety are only tricks, because you belong to those societies which act in secret and are the most authoritarian" (P. 47-45).
***
In the fourth and last part of this series, we will deal with Bakunin the political adventurer, drawing general lessons from the history of the workers' movement.
Kr
With the following article on the struggle of Marxism against Freemasonry, the ICC is firmly placing itself in the best traditions of Marxism and the workers' movement. As opposed to anarchist political indifferentism, Marxist has always insisted that the proletariat, in order to fulfil its revolutionary mission, must understand all the essential aspects of the functioning of its class enemy. As exploiting classes, these enemies of the proletariat necessarily employ secrecy and deception both against each other and against the working class. This is why Marx and Engels, in a series of important writings, exposed to the working class the secret structures and activities of the ruling classes.
In his Revelations of the diplomatic history of the 18th century, based on an exhaustive study of diplomatic manuscripts in the British Museum, Marx exposed the secret collaboration of the British and Russian cabinets since the time of Peter the Great. In his writings against Lord Palmerston, Marx revealed that the continuation of this secret alliance was directed essentially against revolutionary movements throughout Europe. In fact, during the first sixty years of the 19th century, Russian diplomacy, the bastion of counter-revolution at that time, was involved in "all the conspiracies and uprisings" of the day, including the insurrectional secret societies such as the Carbonari, trying to manipulate them to its own ends (Engels: The Foreign Policy of Czarist Russia).
In his pamphlet against Herr Vogt Marx laid bare the way in which Bismarck, Palmerston and the Czar supported the agents of Bonapartism under Louis Napoleon in France in infiltrating and denigrating the workers' movement. The outstanding moments of the combat of the workers' movement against these hidden manoeuvres were the struggle of the Marxists against Bakunin in the First International, and of the "Eisenachers" against the Bismark's use ofLassalleanism in Germany.
Combating the bourgeoisie's fascination for the hidden and mysterious, Marx and Engels showed that the proletariat is the enemy of every kind of policy of secrecy and mystification. As opposed to the British Tory Urquhart, whose Struggle over 50 years against Russia's secret policies degenerated into a "secret esoteric doctrine" of an "almighty" Russian diplomacy as the "only active factor in modern history" (Engels), the work of the founders of Marxism on this question was always based on a scientific, historical materialist approach. This method revealed the hidden "Jesuitic order" of Russian and western diplomacy and the secret societies of me exploiting classes as me product of the absolutism and enlightenment of the 18m century, during which me crown imposed a collaboration between me declining nobility and the rising bourgeoisie. This "aristocratic-bourgeois International of Enlightenment" referred to by Engels articles on Czarist foreign policy, also provided the social basis for freemasonry, which arose in Britain, me classical country of compromise between aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Whereas the bourgeois aspect of freemasonry attracted many bourgeois revolutionaries in the 18th and early 19th century, especially in France and the United States, its profoundly reactionary character was soon to make it a weapon above all against the working class. This was the case after the rise of the working class socialist movement, prompting the bourgeoisie to abandon me materialistic atheism of its own revolutionary youth. In the second half of the 19th century, European freemasonry, which until then had been above all an amusement of a bored aristocracy which had lost its social function, increasingly became a bastion of the new anti-materialistic "religiosity" of the bourgeoisie, directed essentially against the workers' movement. Within this masonic movement, there developed a whole series of anti- marxist ideologies, which were later to become the common property of 20th century counter-revolutionary movements. According to one of these ideologies, Marxism itself was a creation of the "illuminati" wing of German freemasonry, against which the "true" freemasons had to mobilise. Bakunin, himself an active freemason, was one of the fathers of another of these allegations, that Marxism was a Jewish conspiracy: "This whole Jewish world, comprising a single exploiting sect, a kind of blood sucking people, a kind of organic destructive collective parasite, going beyond not only the frontiers of states but of political opinion, this world is now, at Least for the most part, at the disposal of Marx on the one hand, and of Rothchild on the other. (...) This may seem strange. What can there be in common between socialism and a leading bank? The point is that authoritarian socialism, Marxist communism, demands a strong centralisation of the state. And where there is centralisation of the state, there must necessarily be a central bank, and where such a bank exists, the parasitic Jewish nation, speculating with the Labour of the people, will be found." (Bakunin, quoted by R. Huch : Bakunin und die Anarchie).
This weakness is all the more dangerous, since the employment in this century of mystical sects and ideologies has reached dimensions going far beyond the simple question of freemasonry posed in the ascendant phase of capitalism. Thus, the majority of anti-communist secret societies which were created between 1918-1923 against the German revolution, did not originate in freemasonry at all, but were set up directly by the army, under the control of demobilised officers. As direct instruments of the capitalist state against the communist revolution, they were disbanded as soon as the proletariat had been defeated. Equally, since the end of the counter-revolution in the late 1960s, classical freemasonry has been only one aspect of a whole apparatus of religious, esoteric and racist sects and ideologies developed by the state against the proletariat. Today, in the framework of capitalist decomposition, such anti-marxist sects and ideologies, declaring war on materialism and the concept of progress in history and with a considerable influence in the industrial countries, constitute an additional weapon of the bourgeoisie against the working class.
The First International against secret societies
Already the First International was the target of furious attacks mounted by occultism. The supporters of the Carbonari's Catholic mysticism and of Mazzinism were the declared opponents of the International. In New York, the occultist supporters of Virginia Woodhull tried to introduce feminism, "free love" and "para-psychological experiments" into the International's American sections. In Britain and France, left wing masonic lodges, supported by Bonapartist agents, organised a series of provocations aimed at discrediting the International and justifying the arrest of its members, obliging the General Council to exclude and publicly denounce Pyat and his supporters. Most dangerous of all was Bakunin's Alliance, a secret organisation within the International, which with its different levels of "initiation" of members into its "secrets" and its methods of manipulation (Bakunin's "revolutionary catechism") exactly copied the example of freemasonry (see International Reviews nos. 84 and 85 for the struggle against Bakuninism in the First International).
Marx and Engel's enormous personal commitment in repelling these attacks, in uncovering Pyat and his Bonapartist supporters, combatting Mazzini, excluding Woodhull's American sections, and above all in revealing the plot by Bakunin's Alliance against the International, are well known. Their full awareness of the occultist menace is documented by the resolution proposed by Marx himself, and adopted by the General Council, on the necessity to combat the secret societies.
At the London Conference of the International Workingmen's Association (IWA) , September 1871, Marx insisted that "this kind of organisation stands in contradiction to the development of the proletarian movement, since these societies, instead of educating the workers, submit them to authoritarian and mystical laws, which hinder their independence and direct their consciousness in a wrong direction" (Marx-Engels Werke Vol. 17, p655).
The bourgeoisie also tried to discredit the proletariat through media allegations that both the International and the Paris Commune were "organised" by a secret Freemason-type leadership. In an interview with the newspaper The New York World which suggested that the workers were the instruments of a "conclave" of "daring conspirators" present inside the Paris Commune, Marx declared: "Dear sir, there is no secret to be cleared up (...) unless it's the secret of the human stupidity of those who stubbornly ignore the fact that our Association acts in public, and that extensive reports on its activities are published for all who want to read them". The Paris Commune, according to The World's logic, "could equally have been a conspiracy of the freemasons, since their individual share was not small. I would really not be amazed if the Pope were to put the whole insurrection down to them. But let us look for another explanation. The insurrection in Paris was made by the Paris workers" (MEW Vol. 17, S.639-370).
The fight against mysticism in the Second International
With the defeat of the Paris Commune and the death of the International, Marx and Engels supported the fight to shake off the grip of freemasonry over workers' organisations in countries like Italy, Spain or the USA (eg the Knights of Labour). The Second International, founded in 1889, was at first less vulnerable to occultist infiltration than its predecessor, since it excluded the anarchists. The "very scope" of the programme of the First International had allowed "the declassed elements to worm their way in and establish, at its very heart, secret organisations whose efforts, instead of being directed against the bourgeoisie and the existing governments, would be directed against the International itself" (Report to the Hague Congress on the Alliance, 1872).
The Third International against Freemasonry
Determined to overcome the organisational weaknesses of the Second International which facilitated its collapse in 1914, the Comintern fought for the complete elimination of "esoteric" elements within its ranks.
In 1922, in response to the French Communist Party's infiltration by elements belonging to freemasonry, who had gangrened the party since its foundation at the Tours Congress, the 4th Congress of the Communist International, in its "Resolution on the French question", reaffirmed class principles in the following terms:
"The incompatibility between freemasonry and socialism was considered to be evident in most of the parties of the Second International (...) If the Second Congress of the Communist International, in its conditions for joining the International, did not formulate a special point on the incompatibility between communism and freemasonry, it was because this principle found its place in a separate resolution unanimously voted by the Congress."
The fact, unexpectedly revealed at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, that a considerable number of French communists belong to masonic lodges is, in the eyes of the Communist International, the most clear and at the same time the most pitiful proof that our French Party has conserved not only the psychological heritage of the epoch of reformism, of parliamentarism and patriotism, but also liaisons that are very concrete, very compromising for the leadership of the party, with the secret, political and careerist organisations of the radical bourgeoisie ...
The International considers that it is indispensable to put an end, once and for all, to these compromising and demoralising liaisons between the leadership of the Communist Party and the political organisations of the bourgeoisie. The honour of the proletariat of France demands that it purifies all its organisations of elements who want to belong to both camps in the class struggle.
"The Congress charges the Central Committee of the French Communist Party to liquidate, before 1st January 1923, all liaisons between the Party, in the person of certain of its members and groups, and freemasonry. Those who, before 1st January, have not declared openly to their organisation and in public through the Party press, their complete break with freemasonry, will be automatically excluded from the Communist Party without any right to join it again at any time. Anyone who hides their membership of freemasonry will be considered to be an agent of the enemy who has penetrated the party and the individual in question will be treated with ignominy before the proletariat".
Similarly, the KPD's delegate at the 3rd Congress of the Italian CP in Rome, referring to the Theses on Communist Tactics submitted by Bordiga and Terracini, could report: "The evident irreconcilability of belonging at the same time to the communist party and to another party, applies, not only to political parties but also to those movements which, despite their political character, do not have the name and the organisation of a party (...) here in particular freemasonry" ("Die ltalienische Thesen", by Paul Butcher in Die Internationale 1922.)
Capitalism's entry into its decadent phase since World War I has led to a gigantic development of state capitalism, in particular of the military and repressive apparatus (espionage, secret police etc). Does this mean the bourgeois need for its "traditional" secret societies disappears? This is partly the case. Where decadent state capitalist totalitarianism has taken a brutal, undisguised form as in Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, or Stalin's Russia, masonic and other "lodges" or secret groupings were always forbidden.
However, even these brutally open forms of state capitalism cannot completely dispense with a secret or illegal, officially non-existent apparatus. State capitalist totalitarianism implies the dictatorial control of the bourgeois state, not only over the entire economy, but over every aspect of life. Thus, in Stalinist regimes the "mafia" is an indispensable part of the state, since it controls the only part of the distribution apparatus which really works, but which officially is not supposed to exist: the black market. In western countries, organised criminality is a no less indispensable part of the state capitalist regime.
But under the so-called "democratic" form of state capitalism, the unofficial as well as the official repression and infiltration apparatus expands tremendously.
Under this dictatorial fake democracy, the state imposes its politics on the members of its own class, and combats the organisations of its imperialist rivals and of its proletarian class enemy in a no less totalitarian manner then under the Nazis or Stalinists. Its official political police and spy apparatus is just as omnipresent as that of any other state. But since the ideology of democracy does not allow this apparatus to proceed as openly as the Gestapo or the GPU in Russia, the western bourgeoisie redevelops its old traditions of freemasonry and the "polit-mafia", but this time under the direct control of the state. The western bourgeoisie with whatever it cannot do legally and openly, illegally and in secret.
Thus, when the US army invaded Mussolini's Italy in 1943, they did not bring back with them the mafia alone.
"In the wake of the motorised American divisions pushing north, masonic lodges appeared out of the ground like mushrooms after rain. This was not only the result of the fact that Mussolini banned them and persecuted their members. The mighty American masonic groupings had their share in this development, immediately taking their Italian brothers under their wing"[1].
Here lies the origin of one of the most famous of the many illegal organisations of the western, American led imperialist bloc, the "Propaganda 2" Lodge in Italy. These unofficial structures coordinated the struggle of the different national bourgeoisies of the American block against the influence of the rival Soviet bloc. The membership of such lodges includes leaders of the "left wing" of the capitalist state: stalinist and leftist parties, trade unions.
Through a series of scandals and revelations (linked to the break-up of the western block after 1989) we know quite a lot about tile workings of such groupings against the imperialist enemy. But a much more carefully kept secret of the bourgeoisie is tile fact that in decadence, its old tradition of masonic infiltration of workers organisations has also become part of the repertoire of tile democratic totalitarian state apparatus. This has been the case whenever the proletariat has seriously menaced the bourgeoisie: above all during the revolutionary wave 1917-23, but also since 1968 with the resurgence of workers' struggles.
An illegal counter revolutionary apparatus
As Lenin pointed out, the proletarian revolution in Western Europe at the end of World War I was confronted with a much more powerful and intelligent ruling class than in Russia. As in Russia, the western bourgeoisie, in face of the revolution, immediately played the democratic card, bringing left wing, former workers' parties to power, announcing elections and plans for "industrial democracy" and for "integrating" the workers' councils into constitution and state.
But unlike Russia after February 1917, the western bourgeoisie immediately began to construct a gigantic, illegal counter-revolutionary apparatus.
To this end they made use of the political and organisational experience of the masonic lodges and right wing volkish orders which had specialised in combatting the socialist movement before the World War, completing their integration into the state. One such pre-war organisation was the "Germanic Order" and the "Hammer League" founded in 1912 in response to the looming war and to the electoral victory of the Socialist Party, declaring in its paper its goal of "organising the counter-revolution". "The holy vendetta shall liquidate the revolutionary leaders at the very beginning of the insurrection, not hesitating to strike the mass criminals with their own weapons"[2].
Victor Serge refers to the intelligence services of Action Francaise and of the Cahiers de l'Antifrance which spied on the vanguard movements in France already during the war; the espionage and provocateur service of the Fascist party in Italy; and the private detective agencies in the USA who "provide the capitalists with discreet informers, expert provocateurs, riflemen, guards, foremen and also totally corrupt trade union militants", "supposedly employing 135,000 people".
"In Germany, since the official disarming of the country, the essential forces of reaction have been concentrated in extremely secretive organisations. The reaction has understood that, even in parties supported by the State, clandestinity is a precious asset. Naturally all these organisations take on the functions of virtual undercover police forces against the proletariat"[3].
In order to preserve tile myth of democracy, the counter-revolutionary organisations in Germany and other countries were officially not part of the state, were financed privately, often declared illegal, and presented themselves as the enemies of democracy. With their assassinations of "democratic" bourgeois leaders like Rathenau and Erzberger, and their right-wing putsches (Kapp Putsch 1920, Hitler Putsch 1923) they played a vital role in luring the proletariat towards the terrain of defence of the counter-revolutionary Weimar "democracy".
The network against the proletarian revolution
It is in Germany, the main centre of the revolutionary wave 1917-23 outside of Russia, that we can best grasp the vast scale of counter -revolutionary operations, once the bourgeoisie feels its class rule threatened. A gigantic network was set up in defence of the bourgeois state. This network employed provocation, infiltration and political murder in order to supplement tile counter-revolutionary policies of the SPD and the trade unions, as well as the Reichswehr and the privately financed unofficial "white army" of the Freikorps.
Even more famous is of course the NSDAP, founded in Munich against the revolution in 1919 as the "German Workers' Party". Hitler, Goering, Rohm and other Nazi leaders began their political careers as informers and agents against the Bavarian Workers' Council.
These illegal coordinating centres of the counter-revolution were in reality part of the state. Whenever their assassination specialists, such as the murderers of Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and hundreds of other Communist leaders, were put on trial, they were found not guilty, given token sentences, or allowed to escape[4]. Whenever their secret arms caches were discovered by the police, the army intervened to claim back these weapons, which had allegedly been stolen.
The "Teno", allegedly a technical service in case of public catastrophes, was in reality an armed troop, 170,000 strong, mainly used as strike breakers.
The Anti-Bolshevik League, founded on 1st December 1918 by industrialists, aimed its propaganda mainly at workers. "It followed the development of the KPD [German Communist Party] very closely and tried to infiltrate it with its informers. It was above all to this end that it maintained an intelligence and spy network camouflaged as a 4th department. It had links to the political police and to army units"[6].
In Munich, the occult Thule Society, linked to the above mentioned pre-war Germanic Order, set up the White Army of the Bavarian bourgeoisie, the Freikorps Oberland, and coordinated the struggle against the 1919 council republic, including the murder of the USPD leader Eisner, in order to provoke a premature insurrection. "Its second department was its intelligence service, which organised an extensive activity of infiltration, espionage and sabotage. According to Sebottendorff every member of the combat league soon had a membership card of the Spartakus Group under a different name. The spies of the combat league also sat in the committees of the council government and the Red Army and reported every evening to the centre of the Thule Society about the planning of the enemy"[7].
The main weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletarian revolution is not repression and subversion, but the presence of the ideology and the organisational influence of lie "left" organs of the bourgeoisie within the ranks of the proletariat. This was essentially the job of social democracy and the trade unions. But the importance of the assistance which infiltration and provocation can lend to lie efforts of the left of capital against the workers struggle is underlined by the example of "National-Bolshevism" during the German revolution. Under the influence of the pseudo anti-capitalism, the extreme nationalism, anti-semitism and "anti-liberalism" of the illegal secret organisations of the bourgeoisie, with whom they held secret meetings, the Hamburg so-called "Left" around Laufenberg and Wollfheim developed a counter-revolutionary version of "left communism" which contributed decisively to splitting the young KPD in1919, and to discrediting the KAPD in 1920[8].
The work of bourgeois infiltration of the Hamburg section of the KPD began to be uncovered by the party already in 1919, including over 20 police agents directly connected to the GKSD, a counter-revolutionary regiment in Berlin. "From here it was repeatedly attempted to get Hamburg workers to launch armed assaults on prisons and other adventurist actions"[9].
The organiser of this undermining of the Communists in Hamburg, Von Killinger, was a leader of the Organisation Consul, a secret terror and murder organisation financed by the Junkers and aimed at infiltrating and uniting the struggle of all the other right wing groups against communism.
The defence of the revolutionary organisation
In the first part of this article, we saw how the Communist International drew the lessons of the collapse of the 2nd International at the organisational level by opening a much more rigorous struggle against freemasonry and secret societies.
As we have seen, the Second World Congress in 1920, had adopted a motion of the Italian party against the freemasons, officially not part of the "21 conditions" for membership of the Comintern, but unofficially known as the "22 condition"[10].
In fact, the famous 21 conditions of August 1920 obliged all sections of the International to organise clandestine structures, to protect the organisation against infiltration, to investigate the activities of the illegal counter-revolutionary apparatus of the bourgeoisie, and to support the internationally centralised work against capitalist repression.
The KPD, for example, regularly published lists of agents provocateurs and police spies excluded from its ranks, complete with their photos and descriptions of their methods. "From August 1921 to August 1922, the Information department uncovered 124 informers, agents provocateurs and swindlers. These were either sent into the KPD by the police or right wing organisations, or had hoped to exploit the KPD financially on their own account"[11]. Pamphlets were prepared on this question. The KPD also found out who had murdered Liebknecht and Luxemburg and published their photos, asking for the help of the population in hunting them down. A special organisation was established to defend the party against the secret societies and para-military organisations of the bourgeoisie. This work included spectacular actions. Thus, in 1921, KPD members, disguised as policemen, searched the premises and confiscated papers of a Russian White Army office in Berlin. Undercover raids were undertaken against secret offices of the criminal "Organisation Consul".
Above all, the Comintern regularly supplied all workers' organisations with concrete warnings and information about lie attempts of the occult arm of the bourgeoisie to destroy them.
After 1968: the revival of occult manipulation against the proletariat
With the defeat of the communist revolution after 1923, the elements of the bourgeoisie's secret anti-proletarian network were either dissolved, or given other tasks by the state. In Germany, many of these elements were later integrated into the Nazi movement.
But when the massive workers' struggles of 1968 in France put an end to the counter-revolution and opened a period of rising class struggle, the bourgeoisie began to revive its hidden anti-proletarian apparatus. In May 1968 in France, the masonic Grand Orient greeted with enthusiasm the "magnificent movement of the students and workers" and sent food and medication to the occupied Sorbonne[12].
This "greeting" was lip-service. In France, already after 1968, the bourgeoisie was using its "neo- Templar", "Rosicrucian" and "Martinist" sects in order to infiltrate leftist and other groups, in collaboration with the SAC services. For example, Luc Jeuret, the guru of the "Sun Temple" began his career by infiltrating Maoist groups (L 'Ordre du Temple Solaire, from page 145 on).
In fact, the following years saw the appearance of organisations of the type used against the proletarian revolution in the 20s. On the extreme right, the Front Europeen de Liberation has revived the "National-bolshevik" tradition. In Germany, the Sozialrevolutionare Arbeiterfront (Social Revolutionary Workers' Front), following its motto "the frontier is not between left and right but between above and below" is specialised in infiltrating different "left wing" movements. The Thule Society has also been refounded as a counter revolutionary secret society[13].
To the modem right wing private political intelligence services belong the World Anti-Communist League, as well as the National Caucus of Labour and the European Labour Party, whose leader La Rouche is described by a member of the US National Security Council as having "the best private intelligence organisation in the world"[14].
Left-wing versions of such counter-revolutionary organisations are no less active. In France, for instance, new sects have been established in the tradition of "Martinism", a variant of freemasonry historically specialised in the infiltration and subversion of workers' organisations. Such groups put forward the idea that communism can best be achieved by the manipulations of an enlightened minority. Like other sects, they are specialised in the art of manipulating people.
More generally, the development of occult sects and esoteric groupings in the past years is not only an expression of the petty bourgeoisie's hopelessness and hysteria at the historic situation, but is encouraged and organised by the state. The role of these sects in inter-imperialist rivalries is known (e.g the use of Scientology by the US bourgeoisie against Germany). But this whole "esoteric" movement is equally part of the bourgeois ideological onslaught against marxism, especially after 1989 with the alleged "death of communism". Historically, it was in face of the rising socialist movement that the European bourgeoisie began to identify with the mystical ideology of freemasonry, especially after the 1848 revolutions. Today, the unbridled hatred of esotericism for materialism and marxism, as well as for the proletarian masses considered "materialistic" and "stupid", is nothing else but the concentrated hatred of the bourgeoisie and parts of the petty bourgeoisie for an undefeated proletariat. Unable itself to offer any historical alternative, the bourgeoisie opposes marxism with the lie that stalinism was communist, but also with the mystical vision that the world can only be "saved" when consciousness and rationality have been replaced by ritual, intuition and hocus-pocus.
In the face of today's decomposition of capitalist society, it is the task of revolutionaries to draw the lessons of the experience of the workers movement against what Lenin called "mysticism as a cloak for counter-revolutionary moods". And it is our task to reappropriate the vigilance of the workers' movement of the past against the manipulations and infiltration of the occult apparatus of the bourgeoisie.
Kr
[1] Kowaljow/Malyschew: Terror, Drahizieher und Attentater, ("Terror Manipulators and Assassinators"). The East German edition of this Soviet book was issued by the military publishers of the GDR).
[2] Rose: Die Thule-Gesellschaft ; P.19/20
[3] Serge: What Everyone Should Know About State Repression, P.49/50.
[4] Beyer: Von der Novemberrevolution zur Ruterepublik ill Munchen, P.130/131. See also Frohlich: Bayerische Ruterepublik.
[5] Nachrichtendienst, P.43. (See also the books of the expert on questions of political murder during the Weimar Republic, Emil Gumbel).
[6] Der Nachrichten dienst der KPD ("The Intelligence Service of the KPD") published in 1993 by ex-historians of the East German secret police, the "Stasi".
[7] Thule-Gesellschaft. P.55.
[8] Bock: Syndlkalismus und Linkskommunismus 1918- 23 ("S ynd icalism and Left Communism 1918-23").
[9] Nachrichtendienst, P. 21 and 52/54.
[10] See Zinoviev's report to the CI's Third Congress.
[11]Nachrichterdienst
[12] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Supplement (18.05.96).
[13] Konkret: Drahtzieher imbraunen Netz ("String pullers in the brown network")
[14] Quoted in Roth/Ender: Geschafte und Verbrechen der Politmafia P.85 ("Business and Crimes of the Political Mafia").
In our article "The proletariat must not underestimate its class enemy" in International Review 86, we said in our conclusion:
"Thus, it is indeed on a world scale that the bourgeoisie is carrying out its strategy against the working class. History has taught us that all the conflicts of interest between national bourgeoisies - commercial rivalries, imperialist antagonisms -fade away when it comes to confronting the only force in society that represents a mortal danger to the ruling class, the proletariat. The bourgeoisie elaborates its plans against the latter in a coordinated and concerted manner.
Today, faced with the workers' struggles that are brewing, the ruling class has to resort to a thousand traps in order to try to sabotage them, exhaust them, and defeat them, to prevent them leading to a growth of consciousness in the working class about the ultimate perspective of its struggle: the communist revolution".
The bourgeoisie's strategy against the revival of the struggle
In order to face up to this menacing reality, full of peril for its system, the bourgeoisie, particularly in the main European countries, has come up with all kinds of manoeuvres in order both to sabotage the struggle and to strengthen its main anti-working class weapons.
This revival of struggles has alerted the bourgeoisie all the more because in its first stages it brought back to life the demons that it thought it had buried after 1989. Thus in 1992, the workers of Italy forcefully expressed, in mass demonstrations, their continuing suspicion of the unions. This was a reminder to the rest of their class of something that it had become increasingly conscious of during the 1980s - the fact that the unions are not workers' organisations, and that behind their proletarian masks and language, they are ardent defenders of the interests of capital. Furthermore, in the strikes in the mines that shook the Ruhr in 1993, the German workers not only ignored and even rejected the proposals of the unions (which had not been their usual attitude up until then) but also sought, through street demonstrations, to express their class unity beyond sectors and workplaces, linking up as well with their unemployed class comrades.
Thus, two fundamental tendencies that had appeared and developed during the struggles of the 80s:
- growing distrust of the unions, a tendency to break out of their grip more and more;
- a dynamic towards a wider unity, expressing the proletariat's self-confidence and its growing ability to take charge of its own struggles; appeared once again as soon as the working class returned to the path of struggle, and this in spite of the major reflux it had been through.
This is why, since then; the bourgeoisie has, on an international level, been developing a whole strategy whose central objective has been to restore the credibility of the unions. The spearhead of this strategy was the vast manoeuvre it carried out in France at the end of 1995, through the strikes in the public sector.
Through this manoeuvre the ruling class has responded both to what had appeared violently in Italy (the workers' overflowing and rejection of the bourgeoisie's organs of control), and to what the working class had expressed in the miners'· struggle in the Ruhr (the tendency towards unification, which is key to the workers' capacity to see themselves as a class, to wage an autonomous struggle, and to develop their self-confidence). The year 1995 thus ended with an indisputable victory for the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, a victory which allowed it to erase momentarily the main lessons of the struggles of the 80s.
The bourgeoisie then did everything it could to extend this victory to other countries, to other fractions of the proletariat. Initially and almost simultaneously, it reproduced exactly the same manoeuvre in Belgium: on the one hand, a government which adopted the Juppe method, acting with arrogance and brutality to inflict particularly violent, indeed provocative, attacks on working class living conditions; on the other hand, unions which rediscovered their militancy and called for a massive, united response, pulling in a number of branches within the public sector. As in France, a pseudo-retreat by the government completed the manoeuvre and sanctioned the victory of the bourgeoisie, with the unions as the main beneficiaries.
In the spring of 1996, it was the turn of the German ruling class, using virtually the same methods to attack the workers and reinforce the unions. The difference with what had gone on in France and Belgium was mainly situated at the level of the problem that needed resolving. In Germany, the bourgeoisie's aim was not so much to restore to the unions their lost credit, but to improve their image: faced with the inevitable perspective of a development of workers' struggles, the traditional image of the unions as organs of consensus, specialists in ordered negotiations, was no longer sufficient. New paint was needed to portray them as unions of struggle. This is what they began to do when their main leaders declared their sympathy with the French strikers in December 1995. They then took this further with the struggles and demonstrations which they called and organised in the spring of1996. Now they were intransigent in the defence of workers interests. They have also tried to refine this image in the different mobilisations they have orchestrated since then.
During the greater part of this year, in most European countries, the bourgeoisie has been doing everything it could to prepare for the unavoidable class confrontations of the future. It has been organising all kinds of mobilisations in order to strengthen its unions and to enlarge the influence of trade unionism within the working class. The return in force of the big union federations has been accompanied, especially in France and Italy, by a development of rank-and-file unionist organisations like the SUD (Syndicat Unitaire Democratique) and the FSI (Federation des Syndicats Independents), the COBAS (rank-and-file committees), etc. These organisations, animated by the leftists, have the role of providing critical but indispensable support to the union federations, in order to make sure that the whole of the workers' terrain is covered, to keep control of workers who are beginning to go outside the classical union structures, and, in the final analysis, to draw them back towards these same unions. In the 1980s, the working class had already confronted organisations of this type: the coordinations. Then, however, the latter presented themselves as being anti-union and their job was to do the dirty work that the unions were finding harder and harder to do because they had been so deeply discredited. Today the rank-and-file or fighting unions, which are direct emanations of the big federations (often through splits) have the essential aim of reinforcing and widening the influence of trade unionism and not of feigning opposition to the latter (this is not required in the present situation).
Despite proliferating obstacles, the revival of workers' struggle goes on
For over a year, parallel to all these manoeuvres, the bourgeoisie has been deploying a whole series of ideological campaigns against the working class. Attacking the consciousness of the proletariat is a primary and constant objective of the ruling class.
In the last few years, it has spared no effort at this level. We have dealt with this at length in our press, in particular the massive ideological campaigns that present the collapse of Stalinism as the death of communism and even as the end of the class struggle. At the same time the bourgeoisie has trumpeted the historic victory of capitalism, even if this second lie has been a bit harder to market, given the difficulty of hiding the daily barbarity of its system. It is in this framework that, for over a year now, the bourgeoisie has been increasing its campaigns around the theme of defending democracy.
This is what it has been doing when, with a great fanfare from the media, it tries to mobilise people against the rise of fascism in Europe. This is also what it has been doing, in the last few months, through its crusade against revisionism. Through the latter, it is trying, on the one hand, to whitewash the democratic camp of the monstrous massacres which it, along with the fascist camp, perpetrated during the World War II; at the same time, it is attacking the only real defenders of proletarian internationalism, the revolutionary groups who come out of the communist left, trying to present them as secret accomplices of the extreme right of capital. Finally, it has also been doing this by organising big mobilisations aimed at improving the democratic system, at making it more humane, at overcoming its weaknesses. The workers of Belgium have just been through this via the deafening campaign around the Dutroux affair, in which they were pushed into demanding a cleaner judiciary, a judiciary for the people in monster demonstrations (300,000 at the Brussels demo of 20th October), side by side with bourgeois democrats of all stripes. For several years the workers of Italy have had a similar treatment with the mani politi ("clean hands") campaign.
By stepping up its ideological barrages in this way, the bourgeoisie is obviously trying to derail the process of reflection going on in the working class, to turn it away from its class concerns. This was illustrated very clearly in Belgium, where the campaign around Dutroux made it possible to a great extent to distract the workers from the draconian austerity measures announced by the government for 1997. This was of great benefit to the bourgeoisie, which managed to push through its anti-working class attacks, put off a confrontation with the working class, and thus gain time in order to set up new obstacles and traps.
But this manoeuvre by the ruling class in Belgium, which involved strikes and walk -outs in a number of workplaces - instigated by the unions and the leftists - in which workers' demands were effaced by calls for a cleaner judiciary, had another objective: that of taking the proletariat onto a bourgeois terrain. The bourgeoisie is not only trying to derail the workers' consciousness, but also their rising combativity.
This evolution in the attitude of the bourgeoisie is rich with lessons and enables us to understand:
- first, that workers' combativity is on the rise and is spreading, in contrast to the situation at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996. In fact it was the workers' weakness at this level which the bourgeoisie exploited in launching its preventive manoeuvre. It was this weakness which allowed the unions to return in force and to organise big unitary struggles without fear of being overrun;
- secondly, that the manoeuvre initiated in France and taken up in several European countries, despite its success on certain levels (notably in strengthening the unions) is revealing its own limits. If it led to a certain exhaustion amongst the workers, particularly in France where it was carried out on a bigger scale, it has not put things off for very long, it has not prevented the deepening of discontent, which is now beginning to express itself again. Similarly the famous retreats by the Juppe and other governments are now being shown up for what they were: mystifications. To all intents and purposes, the anti-working class measures which the workers were called out to oppose have gone through. As for the much-vaunted victory obtained thanks to the unions, this is more and more felt as a painful memory by the workers who have a bad taste in their mouths, a feeling that they have been had.
Because it is conscious of this situation, the bourgeoisie has somewhat modified its strategy:
On the one hand, the unions are tending more and more to limit the breadth of their mobilisations when they are based around class demands, as we saw in France on 17th October and even more so during the week of action from 12th to 16th November; and as for the trade union unity which the big federations were glorifying yesterday, this is now giving way to a policy of division between the different unions, in order to disperse the anger and militancy which are ripening in a dangerous manner.
In the case of Spain, to take another example, the divisive tactic of the unions is not for the moment taking the form of quarrels between the different federations. Here, nearly all the unions, with the exception of the radical CNT, called for a campaign of mobilisation (march on Madrid on 23rd November, general strike in the public sector on 11th November) against the wage freeze for state employees announced for 1997 by the right wing government (the same unions did nothing when this policy was regularly carried out by the Socialist party). In this episode, the unity proclaimed by the unions, which was a necessity if they were to have any credibility, was really a cover for the division between the workers in the public sector and those in the private sector, a division completed by the use of partial walk-outs, on different days, and separated into different provinces and regions in order to reinforce regionalist mystifications.
At the same time, the bourgeoisie is not just using its permanent ideological campaigns to muddy the workers consciousness. Through these campaigns it is trying to derail the proletariat from its class terrain, to divert its rising combativity (which it has not managed to smother)into bourgeois demands and interclassist mobilisations. This is what it did in Belgium and Italy with the call to clean up the judiciary. This is also what it did in Spain by calling on the workers to mobilise against the terrorist actions of the ETA.
*****
Contrary to what certain resentful and more or less ill-disposed elements claim, the ICC is not at all underestimating the present efforts of the working class to develop its resistance against the repeated and increasingly violent and massive attacks being mounted by the ruling class. Still less do we have an attitude of disdain towards these efforts. On the contrary: our insistence on exposing the various traps that the bourgeoisie is laying, apart from being a fundamental responsibility of revolutionaries worthy of their names, is above all based on an analysis of the present period, which since 1992 has been characterised by the revival of workers' struggles. For us, the manoeuvre of 1995-6, orchestrated at an international level, was nothing but an attempt by the ruling class to respond to this revival. And its present policy of multiplying obstacles is proof that it knows that the proletarian danger is still present and indeed is on the rise. When we point to this reality, we do so without giving in to euphoria (to do so would be to disarm ourselves in the most stupid manner), without underestimating the enemy, and without denying the difficulties and even the partial retreats and defeats of our class.
Elfe, 16 December 1996
In the first three parts of this series of articles, we have seen how Bakuninism, supported and manipulated by the ruling classes, and by a whole network of political parasites, conducted a hidden struggle against the First International, In particular, this struggle was directed against the establishment of truly proletarian principles and rules of functioning within the International. Whereas the statutes of the International Workers' Association, defending a unitary, collective, centralised, transparent, disciplined mode of functioning, represented a qualitative leap beyond the previous sectarian, hierarchical, conspirational phase of the workers' movement, Bakunin's Alliance mobilised all the non-proletarian elements who did not want to accept this great step forward. With the defeat of the Paris Commune and the international reflux of the class struggle after 1871, the bourgeoisie redoubled its efforts to destroy the International, and above all to discredit the Marxist vision of a workers' party and its organisational principles which was increasingly establishing itself. Thus, before disbanding, the International staged an open and decisive confrontation with Bakuninism at its Hague Congress in 1872. Realising that an International cannot continue to exist in the face of a major defeat of the world proletariat, the major concern of the Marxists at the Hague Congress was that the political and organisational principles it had defended against Bakuninism could be passed on to future generations of revolutionaries, and serve as the basis for future Internationals. This was also why the revelations of the Hague Congress about Bakunin's conspiracy inside and against the International were published and thus made available to the whole working class.
Perhaps the most important single lesson of the struggle against Bakunin's Alliance which the First International has passed on to us, is on the danger which declassed elements in general, and political adventurism in particular, represent for communist organisations. At the same time, it is precisely this lesson which has been most completely ignored or underestimated by many groups of the present revolutionary milieu. This is why the last part of our series on the struggle against Bakuninism is devoted to this question.
The historic importance of the First International's analysis of Bakunin
Why did the First International not decide to treat its struggle against Bakuninism as a purely internal affair, of no concern to those outside the organisation? Why did it insist so much on the lessons of this struggle being passed on for the future? At the basis of the Marxist organisational concept is the conviction that revolutionary communist organisations are a product of the proletariat. Historically speaking, they have been given a mandate by the working class. As such, they have a responsibility to justify their actions to the class as a whole, in particular to other political organisations and expressions of the class: to the proletarian milieu. This is a mandate not only for the present, but towards history itself. In the same way, it is the responsibility of future generations of revolutionaries to accept the mandate passed on by history, to learn from and judge the struggles of their predecessors.
This is why the last great struggle of the First International was devoted to revealing to the world proletariat and to history the plot organised by Bakunin and his followers against the workers' party. And this is why it is the responsibility of Marxist organisations today to draw these lessons of the past, in order to be armed in the struggle against present day Bakuninism, present day political adventurism.
Understanding the historical danger which the lessons drawn by the First International represented for its own class interests, the bourgeoisie, in reply to the revelations of the Hague Congress, did everything in its power to discredit this effort. The bourgeois press, and bourgeois politicians declared that the fight against Bakuninism was not a struggle of principle, but a sordid power struggle within the International. Thus, Marx was alleged to have eliminated his rival Bakunin through a campaign of lies. In other words, the bourgeoisie tried to convince the working class that its organisations function in exactly the same way, and are thus no better than those of the exploiters. The fact that the vast majority of the International supported Marx was put down to the "triumph of the spirit of authoritarianism" within its ranks, and to the alleged tendency of its members to see the enemies of the Association lurking everywhere. The Bakuninists and the Lassalleans spread rumours that Marx himself was an agent of Bismarck.
As we know, these are exactly the same accusations which are raised by the bourgeoisie, by political parasitism against the ICC today.
Such denigrations on the part of the bourgeoisie, spread by political parasitism, inevitably accompany every proletarian organisational fight. Much more serious and dangerous is when such denigrations find a certain echo within the revolutionary camp itself. This was the case with Franz Mehring's biography of Marx. In this book Mehring, who belonged to the determined left wing of the Second International, declared that the pamphlet of the Hague Congress on the Alliance was "inexcusable" and "unworthy of the International". In his book, Mehring defended not only Bakunin, but also Lassalle and Schweitzer against the accusations made by Marx and the Marxists. The main accusation made by Mehring against Marx was that he had abandoned the Marxist method in his writings against Bakunin. Whereas in all his other works, Marx had always departed from a materialist class analysis of events, in his analysis of Bakunin's Alliance he tried, according to Mehring, to explain the problem through the personality and actions of a small number of individuals, the leaders of the Alliance. In other words, instead of a class analysis, he accused Marx of falling into a personalised, conspirational vision. Trapped within this vision, Marx was, still according to Mehring, obliged to greatly exaggerate the faults and the sabotage of Bakunin, but also of the leaders of Lassalleanism in Germany[1].
In fact, by refusing "on principle" to examine the material which Marx and Engels presented on Bakunin, Mehring declared:
"What has lent their other polemical writings their peculiar attraction and lasting value, the desire for new insights brought to light by the negative critique, is completely missing in this work" (Mehring: Karl Marx).
Here again, it is the same critique which has been made inside the revolutionary milieu today against the ICC. In answering these critiques, we will now demonstrate that the position of Marx against Bakunin was indeed based on a materialist class analysis. This was the analysis of political adventurism and the role of the declassed. It is this crucially important "new insight" of "lasting value" which Mehring[2], and with him the majority of present day revolutionary groups, have completely overseen or misunderstood.
The declassed: enemies of proletarian organisations
Contrary to what Mehring believed, the First International did indeed provide a class analysis of the origins and social basis of Bakunin's Alliance.
"Its founders and the representatives of the workers' organisations of the Old and New Worlds who at International Congresses sanctioned the General Rules of the Association, forgot that the very scope of its programme would allow the declassed elements to worm their way in and establish, at its very heart, secret organisations whose efforts, instead of being directed against the bourgeoisie and the existing governments, would be turned against the International itself. Such has been the case with the Alliance of Socialist Democracy" ("Report on the Alliance published by the Hague Congress, Introduction". Quoted from Minutes and Documents of the Hague Congress P. 505).
The conclusion to the same document summarises the main aspects of Bakunin's political programme in four points, two of which again emphasise the decisive role of the declassed.
"1. All the depravities in which the life of declassed persons ejected from the upper strata of society must inevitably become involved are proclaimed to be so many ultra-revolutionary virtues" (...)
"4. The economic and political struggle of the workers for their emancipation is replaced by the universal pan-destructive acts of heroes of the underworld - this latest incarnation of revolution. In a word, one must let loose the street hooligans suppressed by the workers themselves in "the revolutions on the Western classical model" and thus place gratuitously at the disposal of the reactionaries a well-disciplined gang of agents provocateurs" (Minutes and Documents p611).
And the conclusion adds:
"The resolutions adopted by the Hague Congress against the Alliance were therefore merely a matter of duty; the Congress could not allow the International, that great creation of the proletariat, to fall into nets spread by the riff-raff of the ruling classes" (p611-612). The report is signed by the members of the Congress Commission investigating the Alliance: Dupont, Engels, Frankel, Le Moussu, Marx, Seraillier.
In other words, the social basis of the Alliance consisted of the riff-raff of the ruling classes, the declasses, attempting to mobilise the riff-raff of the working class, the lumpen-proletariat, for its intrigues against communist organisations.
Bakunin himself was the embodiment of the declassed aristocrat.
"...having acquired in his youth all the vices of the imperial officers of the past (he was an officer), he applied to the revolution all the evil instincts of his tartar and lordly origin. This type of Tartar lord is well known. It was a true unfettering of evil passions: beating, thrashing and torturing their serfs, raping women, being drunk from one morning to the next, inventing with a barbaric refinement all the forms of the most abject profanation of human nature and dignity - such was the life, agitated and revolutionary, of those lords. Well, did not the Tartar Horostratus lord apply to the revolution, for want of feudal serfs, all his base instincts, all the evil passions of his brethren" (Report of Utin to the Hague Congress. M + D, p 448).
It is this attraction of the scum of the upper and of the lower classes for each other which explains the fascination of Bakunin, the declassed aristocrat, for the criminal milieu and the lumpen-proletariat. The "theoretician" Bakunin needs the criminal energies of the underworld, of the lumpen-proletariat, to carry out his programme. This role was assumed by Nechayev in Russia, who put into practice what Bakunin preached, manipulating and blackmailing the members of his Committee and executing those who tried to leave it. Bakunin did not hesitate to theorise this alliance of the declassed "great man" and the criminal.
"Brigandage is one of the most honourable forms of the Russian people's life. The brigand is a hero, a protector, a people's avenger, the irreconcilable enemy of the state, and of all social and civil order established by the state, a fighter to the death against the whole civilisation of the civil servants, the nobles, the priests and the crown ... He who fails to understand brigandage understands nothing of Russian popular history. He who is not in sympathy with it, cannot be in sympathy with Russian popular life, and has no heart for the measureless, ago-long sufferings of the people; he belongs to the enemy camp, among the supporters of the state (Bakunin: The Setting of the Revolutionary Question, quoted in the Report on the Alliance, M+D p573).
The declassed in politics: a breeding ground for provocation
The main motive for such declassed elements to enter politics is not identification with the cause of the working class or a passion for its goal of communism, but a burning hatred and spirit of revenge of the uprooted against society. In his "Revolutionary Catechism" Bakunin thus declares.
"He is not a revolutionary if he holds on to anything whatever in this world. He must not hesitate before the destruction of any position, tie or man belonging to this world. He must hate everything and everybody equally" (From the Documents of the Hague Congress P.601).
Lacking any ties of loyalty to any class of society, and believing in no social perspective except their own advancement, the declassed pseudo-revolutionary is not animated by the goal of a future, more progressive form of society, but by a nihilistic wish to destroy.
"While not recognising any other activity but that of destruction, we acknowledge that the forms in which it manifests itself may be extremely varied: poison, dagger, noose, etc. The revolution sanctifies all without distinction" (Bakunin: The Principles of Revolution. M + D p 575).
It should go without saying that such a mentality, such a social environment is a veritable breeding ground for political provocation. If the provocateurs, police informers and political adventurers, these most dangerous enemies of proletarian organisations, are employed by the ruling classes, they are nevertheless spontaneously produced by the process of declassment constantly going on above all under capitalism. A few brief extracts from Bakunin's "Revolutionary Catechism" will suffice to illustrate this point.
§10 advises the "true militant" to exploit his comrades.
"Each comrade should have at hand several revolutionaries from the second and third rank, that is, from those who have not been fully initiated. He must consider them as part of the general revolutionary capital placed at his disposal. He must expand his share of the capital economically and try to extract from it as much profit as possible".
§ 18 puts forward how to live off the rich.
"We must exploit them in every way possible, outwit them, confuse them, and, whenever possible, by possessing ourselves of their filthy secrets, make them our slaves. In this way, their power, connections, influence and wealth will become an inexhaustible treasure and an invaluable help in various enterprises."
§19 proposes the infiltration of the liberals and other parties.
"We can conspire with these on their own programme, putting up an appearance of following them blindly. We must get them into our hands, seize their secrets, compromise them completely, so that retreat becomes impossible for them, and make use of them to cause trouble within the state".
§20 certainly speaks for itself.
"The fifth category consists of doctrinaires, conspirators, revolutionaries, all those who babble at meetings and on paper. They must be constantly encouraged and inveigled into practical and dangerous demonstrations which will have the effect of eliminating the majority, while making true revolutionaries out of some ".
§21 "The sixth category is very important - the women, who must be divided into three classes: first useless women without spirit or heart, who must be exploited in the same way as the third and fourth categories of men; second, fervent, devoted and capable women, who are nevertheless not with us because they have not yet arrived at a practical and phrase less revolutionary awareness; they must be used like the fifth category of men; finally, women who are entirely with us, that is to say, who have been fully initiated and who have accepted our programme in its entirety. We must treat them as the most valuable of our treasures, for without their help we can do nothing" (M+D p600-602).
What is striking is the similarity between the methods expounded by Bakunin, and those employed by present day religious sects, which in general, although dominated by the state, are usually founded around declassed adventurers. As we have seen in the previous articles, Bakunin's organisational model was freemasonry, the precursor of the modem phenomenon of religious sects.
A terrible weapon against the workers' movement
The activities of declassed political adventurers are particularly dangerous for the workers' movement. Proletarian revolutionary organisations can only exist and function properly on the base of a profound mutual trust between the militants and between the groups of the communist milieu. The success of political parasitism in general, and of adventurers in particular, depends on the contrary precisely on the capacity to undermine mutual trust, destroying the political principles of behaviour upon which they are based.
In a letter to Nechayev, dated June 1870, Bakunin clearly reveals his intentions regarding the International.
"Those societies whose goals are close to our own, will have to be made to unite with us or at least submit to us, without even noticing this. In doing this, the unreliable elements have to be removed from their midst. Those societies hostile or harmful to us must be destroyed. Finally, the government has to be removed. All of this cannot be achieved by the truth alone. It won't work without tricks, cleverness and lies".
One has to recognise that the struggle which has broken out in the midst of the International is none other than between two secret societies". In the German language edition there is a footnote of the anarchist historian Max Nettlau, a passionate admirer of Bakunin, admitting that these accusations against Marx are completely untrue (Bakunin: Gott und der Staat ... p216-218). See also Bakunin's anti-semitic Rapports personnels avec Marx, where Marxism is presented as part of a Jewish conspiracy allegedly linked to the Rothschild family, and which we refer to in our article "Marxism against Freemasonry", International Review 87.
The project of Bakuninism is Bakunin
The methods employed by Bakunin were those of the declassed rabble. But what goal did they serve?
The sole political concern of Bakunin was: Bakunin. He entered the workers' movement in pursuit of his own personal project.
The International was very clear about this. The first major text of the General Council on the Alliance, the internal circular on the Alleged Splits in the International already declares Bakunin's goal to be that of "replacing the General Council with his own personal dictatorship". The Congress report on the Alliance develops on this theme.
"The International was already firmly established when Mikhail Bakunin took it into his head to play the part of the proletariats emancipator (...) In order to win recognition for himself as head of the International, he had to present himself as head of another army whose absolute devotion to him was to be insured by a secret organisation. And having openly planted his society in the International, he counted on extending its ramifications into all sections and on taking over absolute control by this means" (M + D pp509, 511).
This personal project existed long before Bakunin thought of joining the International. When Bakunin escaped from Siberia and came to London in 1861, he drew a negative balance sheet of his first attempt to establish himself in western European revolutionary circles - during the revolutions of 1848-49.
"It is bad to be active in a foreign land. I experienced this in the revolutionary years: neither in France nor in Germany was I able to gain a foothold. And so, while preserving all my ardent sympathy of former years for the progressive movement of the whole world, in order not to waste the rest of my life I must henceforth limit my direct activity to Russia, Poland and the Slavs" (Bakunin: To the Russian Polish and All Slav Friends, M+D p615):
Here, Bakunin's motive for his change of orientation is clearly not the good of the cause, but the question of "gaining a foothold": the first characteristic of political adventurers.
Bakunin seeks to win the ruling classes for his personal ambitions
This text is also known as Bakunin's Pan-Slavic Manifesto.
"They say that Emperor Nicholas himself, not long before his death, when preparing to declare war on Austria, wanted to call all the Austrian and Turkish Slavs, Magyars and Italians to a general uprising. He had stirred up against himself an eastern storm and, to defend himself against it; he wanted to transform himself from a despotic emperor into a revolutionary emperor" (M+D p616).
In his pamphlet The People's Cause from 1862, on the role of the contemporary tsar Alexander II of Russia, Bakunin declares that it is "he alone who could accomplish in Russia the most serious and most beneficial revolution without shedding a drop of blood. He can still do so now. (...) To stop the movement of the people who are wakening up after a thousand years of sleep is impossible. But if the tsar were to put himself firmly and boldly at the head of the movement, his power for the good and the glory of Russia would be unlimited" (M+D pp619-620).
Continuing in this vein, Bakunin calls on the tsar to invade Western Europe.
"It is time for the Germans to go to Germany. If the tsar had realised that henceforth he must be the head not of an enforced centralisation but of a free federation of free peoples, then, relying on a solid and regenerated force, allying himself with Poland and the Ukraine, breaking all the detested German alliances, and boldly raising the pan-Slav banner, he would become the saviour of the Slav world" (M+D p622).
The International comments on this as follows.
"Pan-Slavism is an invention of the St. Petersburg cabinet and has no other goal but to extend Russia's frontiers further west and south. But since one dare not announce to the Austrian, Prussian and Turkish Slavs that their destiny is to be absorbed into the great Russian Empire, one represents Russia to them as the power which will deliver them from the foreign yoke and which will reunite them in a great free federation" (M+D p616).
Bakunin hoped to persuade the tsar to give his internal policy a revolutionary-democratic tinge by convoking a national assembly, thus allowing Bakunin to organise the Polish and other radical and émigré movements in the west as Russia's ultra-left Trojan horse in Western Europe.
"Unfortunately, the tsar did not deem it appropriate to convoke the national assembly for which Bakunin, in this pamphlet, was already proposing his candidature. He gained nothing out of his electoral manifesto and his genuflexions before Romanov. Humiliatingly deceived in his frank confidence, he had no alternative but to throw himself into pan-destructive anarchy" (The Alliance and the IWA p625).
Having been disappointed by tsarism, but unwavering in pursuit of his personal leadership over the European revolutionary movements, Bakunin gravitated towards freemasonry in the mid-1860s in Italy, himself founding various secret societies (see part 1 of this series). Using these methods, Bakunin infiltrated first the bourgeois League of Peace and Freedom, which he tried to unite with the International "on equal terms" under his own leadership (see part 2). When this also failed, he infiltrated and attempted to take over the International itself, above all via his secret Alliance. For this project, entailing the destruction of the world wide political organisation of the working class, Bakunin finally won the whole-hearted support of the ruling classes:
"The whole of the liberal and police press openly sided with them [the Alliance]; in their personal defamation of the General Council they were backed by self-styled reformers from all countries" (The Alliance and the IWA. M + D P.535).
Disloyalty towards all classes, hatred of society
Although seeking their support, Bakunin was never simply an agent of tsarism, freemasonry, the Peace League, or the western police press. As a true declasse Bakunin felt no more sense of loyalty to the ruling than to the exploited classes of society. On the contrary, his ambition was to manipulate and deceive the working and the ruling classes alike, in order to realise his personal ambitions and take revenge on society as a whole. This is why the ruling classes, perfectly aware of this fact, used Bakunin whenever it suited them, but never trusted him, and were delighted to abandon him to his fate as soon as his usefulness had expired. Thus, as soon as Bakunin had been publicly exposed by the International, his political career was finished.
Bakunin felt a genuine, burning hatred against the ruling feudal and capitalist classes. But since he hated the working class even more, and generally despised the exploited, he saw revolution or social change as the task of a small but determined elite of unscrupulous declasses under his own personal leadership. This vision of social transformation was necessarily a fantastic, mystical absurdity, since it did not emanate from any class soundly rooted in social reality, but from the vengeful fantasy of an outsider.
Above all, Bakunin like all political adventurers believed in changing society, not via the class struggle, but via the manipulative skills of the revolutionary brotherhood.
"A real revolution does not need individuals standing at the head of the crowd and commanding it, but men hidden invisibly among the crowd and forming an invisible link between one crowd and another, and thus invisibly giving one and the same direction, one spirit and character to the movement. This is the sole purpose of bringing in a secret preparatory organisation and only to this extent is it necessary" (Bakunin: Principles of Revolution, M+D p574).
Such a vision was not new, but was cultivated inside the "Illuminati" wing of freemasonry since the time of the French Revolution, and which later became specialised in infiltrating the workers' movement. Bakunin shared the same adventurist idea of political, and above all of total, anarchic personal "liberation" through a machiavellian policy of infiltration, in which the different classes of society are played off against each other.
This is why the political project of the Alliance was to infiltrate and take over not only the International, but also the organisations of the ruling class.
Thus, 14 of Bakunin's revolutionary catechism tells us: "A revolutionary must penetrate everywhere, into the upper and the middle classes alike, into the merchant's shop, into the church, into the aristocratic palace, into the bureaucratic, military and literary world, into the Third Department [secret police] and even into the imperial palace" (M+D p601).
The secret statutes of the Alliance declare:
"All the international brethren know one another. No political secret must ever exist among them. None may take part in any secret society whatsoever without the definite consent of his committee, and in case of need, should the latter demand it, without that of the Central Committee. And he may take part only on condition that he discloses to them all secrets that could interest them, directly or indirectly" .
The Hague Congress Commission report comments on this passage as follows:
"The Pietris and the Stiebers only use inferior or lost people as informers; but by sending their false brethren into secret societies to betray secrets of the latter, the Alliance imposes the role of spy on the very men who, according to its plan, should take control of the ‘world revolution'":
The essence of political adventurism
Whereas the revolutionary joins the workers' movement in order to help it fulfil its historic mission, the adventurist joins it in order to make the workers' movement serve his own "historic" mission. This is what sharply distinguishes the adventurer from the proletarian revolutionary. The adventurer is no more a revolutionary than the careerist or the petty bourgeois reformer. The difference is that the adventurer has an insight into the historic importance of the workers' movement. But he relates to this in a completely parasitic manner.
The adventurer is in general a declasse. There are many such people within bourgeois society, with great ambitions, and with an extremely high estimation of their own abilities, but who are unable to fulfil their high flying ambitions within the ruling class. Full of bitterness and cynicism, such people often slide towards the lumpen-proletariat, living a bohemian or criminal existence. Others prove an ideal work force for the state as informers and agents provocateurs. But among this declassed magma, there are a few exceptional individuals with the political talent to recognise that the workers' movement can give them a second chance. They can try to use it as a springboard to fame and importance, and thus take revenge on the ruling class, which in reality is the object of their efforts and ambitions. Such people are constantly resentful of the failure of society at large to recognise their alleged genius. At the same time they are fascinated, not by marxism or the workers' movement, but by the power of the ruling class and its methods of manipulation.
The behaviour of the adventurer is conditioned by the fact that he does not share the goal of the movement he has joined. Evidently he must hide his real, personal project from the movement as a whole. Only his closest disciples can be allowed even an idea of his real attitude towards the movement.
As we have seen in the case of Bakunin, there is an inherent tendency for political adventurers to collaborate in secret with the ruling classes. In reality, such collaboration belongs to the very essence of adventurism. How else is the adventurer supposed to achieve his "historic role"? How else is he to prove himself to the class from whom he feels rejected or ignored? In fact, it is only the bourgeoisie which can bestow the admiration and recognition which the adventurer seeks, and which the workers are not going to give him.
But as Marx and Engels realised, the political adventurer is not less, but more dangerous to proletarian organisations than common police agents. This is why agents uncovered within the International were quickly expelled and denounced, without any major disruptions to its work, whereas the uncovering of Bakunin's activities cost several years and threatened the very existence of the organisation. It is not difficult for communists to understand that a police informer is their enemy. The adventurer, on the contrary, to the extent that he has been working on his own account, will always be defended by petty bourgeois sentimentalism, as in the sad case of Mehring.
History shows how dangerous this sentimentalism is. Whereas the likes of Bakunin and Lassalle, or the "National Bolsheviks" around Laufenberg and Wolltheim at the end of World War I in Hamburg, made secret deals with the ruling class against the workers' movement, many other "great" adventurists joined the bourgeoisie: Parvus, Mussolini, Pilsudski, Stalin and others.
Adventurism and the marxist movement
Long before the foundation of the First International, the marxist movement had developed a full scale analysis of political adventurism as a phenomenon inside the ruling class. This analysis was made above all in relation to Louis Bonaparte, the "emperor" of France in the 1850s/60s. In the struggle against Bakunin, marxism developed all the essential elements of such a phenomenon within the workers' movement, without however using that terminology. In the German workers' movement, the concept of adventurism was developed in the struggle against the Lassallean leader Schweitzer, who in collaboration with Bismarck worked towards maintaining the split within the workers' party. In the 1880s, Engels and other marxists denounced the political adventurism of the leadership of the Social Democratic Federation in Britain, and compared their behaviour to that of the Bakuninists. From that time on, this conception began to be appropriated by the workers' movement as a whole, despite the existence of an opportunist resistance to it. In the Trotskyist movement before the Second World War it still remained an important tool of the defence of the organisation, being correctly applied to the case of Molinier and others.
Today, in the phase of capitalism's decomposition, and the unprecedented acceleration of the process of declassment and lumpenisation, and in face of the offensive of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary milieu, particularly via parasitism, its a matter of life and death to restore and defend the marxist conception of adventurism, and to renew the struggle against it.
Kr
[1] Mehring's discrediting of the Marxists struggle against Bakuninism and Lassalleanism was to have devastating effects on the workers' movement for decades to come. Not only did it lead to a partial rehabilitation of political adventurers such as Bakunin or Lassalle. Above all, it allowed the opportunist wing of social democracy before 1914 to banish into oblivion the lessons of the great struggles for the defence of the revolutionary organisations fought in the 1860s and 1870s. This was a decisive element in the opportunist strategy to isolate the Bolsheviks within the Second International, whose struggle against Menshevism stood in this great tradition. The Third International also suffered from this legacy of Mehring. Thus, in 1921, an article by Stoecker "Concerning Bakuninism" bases itself on Mehring's critique of Marx in order to justify the most dangerous and adventurist aspects of the March 1921 action of the KPD in Germany.
[2] In the last years of his life, during World War I, Mehring became one of the most passionate defenders of the Bolsheviks within the German Left, thus revising, at least implicitly, his previous critique of Marx on organisational questions.
As the Stalinist regimes collapsed, the bourgeoisie conducted a vast ideological campaign against the working class on the "superiority of capitalism" and the "impossibility of communism". It announced the arrival of a "New World Order": the end of armed blocs, falling arms spending, and the opening of new markets in Eastern Europe were going to lead to an era of peace and prosperity. Since then, the famous "peace dividend" has become massacres and ever-bloodier conflicts, while the hope of "prosperity" has been transformed into a deepening crisis and a severer austerity than ever. As for the "new markets" in the East, here too reality has revealed the truth: during the 1990s, these countries' economic and social collapse has given the lie to the bourgeoisie's campaign.
The collapse of Stalinism: an expression of capitalism's historical bankruptcy
Democrats and Stalinists always agreed in identifying Stalinism with communism, in order to make the working class believe that the Eastern regimes were communist. This made it possible for the bourgeoisie to identify the collapse of Stalinism with the death of communism, and the bankruptcy of marxism. In reality, communism means the end of the exploitation of man by man, the end of wage labour and the division of society into opposing classes; it is the realm of abundance, where "the government of men is replaced by the administration of things" , and it is only possible on a world scale. The totalitarian state, generalised scarcity, the rule of the commodity and wage labour and the consequent workers' revolts, all bore witness to the utterly capitalist and exploitative nature of these countries' regimes. In fact, the Stalinist form of state capitalism was the heir, not of the October revolution, but of the counter-revolution that drowned it in blood. It foundered in the complete ruin of forms of capitalist economy that it had built in the so-called "socialist" countries. It was not communism that collapsed in the East, but a particularly fragile and militarized variety of state capitalism.
The internal collapse of an imperialist bloc, under the weight of the crisis and its own contradictions, without firing a shot, is a situation without precedent in the history of capitalism. The disappearance of an imperialist bloc as a result of the crisis, rather than of military defeat or revolution, is due to capitalism's entry into its terminal phase: the phase of decomposition. This phase is characterised by a situation where the two fundamental classes in society are confronting each other, without either being able to impose its own response to capitalism's insuperable contradictions: all-out war for the bourgeoisie, the development of a dynamic leading to revolution for the proletariat. The contradictions of a crisis-ridden capitalism are only getting worse, and meanwhile the bourgeoisie's inability to offer society the least perspective for society, and the proletariat's difficulty in openly asserting its own, can only lead to phenomenon of general decomposition, where society is rotting on its feet. These new and unprecedented historic conditions - society's temporary blockage - explain why the effects of the capitalist crisis have been (and will be) have been so extensive and devastating.
The fall in production since 1989 in the East European countries has been the worst ever recorded in capitalism's history, far worse than the great crisis of the 1930s, or the beginning of the second world imperialist conflict. In most of these countries, production fell more than the 30 % experienced by the USA between 1929 and 1933. After 1989, production fell by 40 % in Russia, and by almost 60% in ex-Soviet Republics like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Lithuania, far worse than during the USSR's rout following the German invasion in 1942 (-25%). In Romania, production fell by 30 %, in Poland and Hungary by 20 %. This gigantic destruction of productive forces, the brutal and sudden decline in the living conditions of whole sectors of the world population, is above all the product of the capitalist system's world historic crisis. Such phenomena, whose importance and extent are analogous with the decadence of previous social forms, are unparalleled in their violence. They give us the measure of what a social system in its last throes can do: reduce tens, even hundreds of millions of human beings into utter poverty from one day to the next.
Towards a radiant future, or Third World status?
After such a drop in production, such a decline in living conditions for a large part of the planet, it is somewhat indecent to talk about positive growth. When you start from zero, growth is mathematically infinite! In fact, the lower the starting point, the higher the growth rate: an increase of one from a starting point of two (building one extra truck, for example) corresponds to a growth rate of 50 %, whereas an increase of 10 from a base of 100 gives a weaker growth rate of 10%. Keeping things in proportion, in this context the positive growth rates do not mean much.
Any talk of a "radiant future" is a sinister swindle. Whether at the level of the evolution of production, income, or the capitalist system's general dynamic, everything indicates that all these regions are moving towards Third World status. The massive use of credit and budget deficits, as in the case of German reunification, or the brutal and widespread impoverishment in other countries, provide no solid basis for any improvement in the economic and social situation.
The example of German reunification is significant in many respects. The German bourgeoisie had to assume a reunification that was forced on it politically, and to have recourse to exceptional methods to avoid being submerged by an exodus of the East German population, and a powerful wave of social discontent. In fact, this reunification was only possible thanks to a massive transfer of capital from West to East to finance investment and social programmes: about DM200 billion per year, the equivalent of 7% of West German GDP - but 60% of East Germany's. The reintegration of the GDR into the great German family is presented to us as an example of successful transition: in 1994, growth rates in the ex-GDR had risen to almost 20 %!
which has grown from 43 % of GDP in 1989, to 55 % in 1994: an increase of 12 percentage points in five years. This strategy of increasing the national debt in order to support the economy has only succeeded in putting the problem off for later: a certain economic activity has been maintained in the East, the infrastructure has been modernized, the transfer of revenue has allowed consumer goods to be purchased from Western manufacturers. However, this support for the Eastern economy has been concentrated above all on the building and public works sector in order to renew the infrastructure, which is an essential strategic objective for the German bourgeoisie. But in reality, this sector is unable to fuel a lasting take-off for the East German economy. Hardly were the torches extinguished after the celebration of the 7th anniversary of Reunification, than a sombre perspective presented itself: the source of activity in the building industry is running out with the progressive reduction in the massive transfers of funds from West to East under the pressure of financial austerity, while the faltering new industries will have difficulty surviving in a period of general recession and worldwide market saturation. In fact, since 1993 the German state has presented the working class with the bill for reunification, first with a heavy increase in taxes, followed by an implacable austerity programme: increased working hours in the public sector, closures, brutal increases in the prices of public services, massive reductions in civil service personnel.
Given the strategic importance for Germany of stabilising the ex-GDR, the situation there can still keep up appearances. However, if we look a little further afield, and ignore all the mystifying speeches, the economic and social situation in all the other East European countries remains catastrophic. With the exception of Croatia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, the countries whose growth rates have returned to the black - and we have seen just how much importance we should attach to such figures - are once again stagnating or in decline. Growth in Albania has fallen to 6 % in 1995 from 11 % in 1993, in Bulgaria (3 %) and Armenia (7 %) it has flattened out since last year, growth has fallen in Hungary from 2.5% in 1994 to 2% in 1996, in Poland from 7% in 1995 to 6% in 1996, in Slovakia from 7 % in 1995 to 6 % in 1996, , in Romania from 7% in 1995 to 4% in 1996, in the Baltic countries from 5 % in 1994 to 3.2% in 1996. Other economic indicators are no better. True, hyper-inflation has been throttled, but only thanks to prescriptions worthy of Third World countries. Drastic austerity plans, redundancies, and swathes cut through the state's social budget have reduced inflation to levels considered "acceptable", though still very higher, and for most countries still higher than they were five years previously.
Inflation (%)
Country | 1990 | 1995 |
Bulgaria | 22 | 62 |
Czech Republic | 11 | 9 |
Hungary | 29 | 28 |
Poland | 586 | 28 |
Romania | 5 | 32 |
Slovakia | 11 | 10 |
Russia | 6 | 190 |
Ukraine | 4 | 375 |
More and more economic behaviour in these regions reveals features characteristic of the Third World. Almost all economic activity is orientated towards short-term profit, capital is either placed abroad or engaged in mainly speculative enterprises, with only a marginal involvement in the productive sector. When the situation is so bad that "legal" profit no longer suffices, criminal income grows. Despite being widely underestimated, they are thought to represent 5% of Russia's GDP, which is a large increase on the 1 % of 1993, and are well above the world average of 2 %.
Towards absolute pauperisation
Equally typical of under-developed countries is the spectacular growth of the informal economy and private consumption, to make up somewhat for the drastic decline in official income. This can be observed in the gap between the enormous fall in wage income, and the lesser fall in consumption. The latter is kept up on the one hand by the 5-15 % of the population which has benefited from the "transition", and on the other, increasingly, by non-monetary goods (private agricultural activity). Thus in Bulgaria, where real wages fell by 42 % in 1991 and by 15% in 1993, we can see that the proportion of official income as part of family income has fallen by 10 % in 2 years (from 44.8% in 1990 to 35.3% in 1992), while the proportion of non-monetary agricultural revenue has increased by 16% (from 21.3 % t037.3 %). To survive, workers in these countries must find extra income to supplement more and more meagre wages, paid for work which is more and more difficult, and in worsening conditions. The result is an explosion in the pauperisation of the vast majority of the population. UNICEF has established a poverty line corresponding to a level 40-50 % below the real average wage of 1989 (before the "reforms"). The data needs no comment! The number of households living in poverty has been multiplied by 2 to 6 times. More than half Bulgaria's households live below the poverty line, 44 % in Romania, and a third in Slovakia and Poland.
Percentage of households living below the poverty line (estimate)
Country | 1989 | 1990 | 1992 | 1995 |
Bulgaria | - | 13.8 |
| 57.0 |
Czech | 4.2 |
| 25.3 |
|
Republic |
|
|
|
|
Hungary* | 14.5 |
| 19.4 |
|
Poland | 22.9 |
| 35.7 |
|
Romania | 30.0 |
| 44.3 |
|
Slovakia | 5.7 |
|
| 34.5 |
The table on the following page illustrates how East European countries have plummeted to the level of the Third World, and makes it possible to evaluate the decline in their populations' living conditions: the figures in the second column indicate the average purchasing power relative to that of the USA ( = 100) in 1994, while the third column expresses the 1994 figure as a percentage of that for 1987. The calculation still under -estimates the real deterioration in working-class living conditions, since it measures the evolution of average purchasing power. However, it gives an idea of how far the decline has gone - a decline which has been all the more painful in that the starting point was already very low: in many of the ex-USSR's republics, living standards were already three times lower than in the USA; in Russia, they were almost two times lower, and 30% lower in the other countries. When we compare the present levels of Eastern European countries with others, we can see that they really are part of the Third World: Russia (17.8) has been reduced to the rank of a country like Tunisia (19.4) or Algeria, even below that of Brazil (21). Most of the ex -Soviet Republics are at the same level as Bolivia (9.3), or at best, of Mexico (27.2). How vain is all the talk of the perspective of development and the "radiant future"!
As the reality becomes better known, the last hopes and theories for a possible improvement in the situation are falling to pieces. The facts speak for themselves: it is impossible for these countries' economies to recover. There is no more hope for the countries of the ex-Eastern bloc than there has been during the last 100 years for the countries of the Third World. Neither a reform of the old order, nor the "liberal" variant of Western capitalism, which is nothing less than a much more sophisticated version of state capitalism, can offer a solution. It is the whole capitalist system worldwide which is in crisis. The lack of markets, austerity, etc is not unique to a ruined Eastern Europe, or an agonizing Third World. These mechanisms lie at the heart of the most developed capitalism, and strike at every country in the world.
Estimate of GNP per inhabitant, expressed in equivalent purchasing power (USA = 100)
|
|
| 87 as |
Country | 1987 | 1994 | %94 |
Tajikistan | 12.1 | 3.7 | 31% |
Azerbaidjan | 21.7 | 5.8 | 27% |
Kirgiz Republic | 13.5 | 6.7 | 50% |
Armenia | 26.5 | 8.3 | 31% |
Uzbekistan | 12.5 | 9.2 | 74% |
Bolivia |
| 9.3 |
|
Ukraine | 20.4 | 10.1 | 50% |
Kazakhstan | 24.2 | 10.9 | 45% |
Latvia | 24.1 | 12.4 | 51% |
Lithuania | 33.8 | 12.7 | 38% |
Romania | 22.7 | 15.8 | 70% |
Belarus | 25.1 | 16.7 | 67% |
Bulgaria | 23.5 | 16.9 | 72% |
Estonia | 29.9 | 17.4 | 58% |
Russia | 30.6 | 17.8 | 58% |
Tunisia |
| 19.4 |
|
Hungary | 28.9 | 23.5 | 81% |
Slovenia | 33.3 | 24.1 | 72% |
Mexico |
| 27.2 |
|
Czech Republic | 44.1 | 34.4 | 78% |
C.Mcl
Sources:
- L 'economie mondiale en 1997, CEPII, Editions La Decouverte, collection Reperes no 200.
- "Transition economique a l'Est", La documentation francaise no 5023
- Rapport sur le developpement dans le monde 1996: "De l'economie planifiee a l'economie de marche", World Bank
From the endless civil war between Afghan factions sponsored by the various imperialist powers, to the lowering tensions that are intensifying in ex-Yugoslavia despite the pax Americana of the Dayton accords, recent events fully confirm the validity of this framework.
Here, we will deal more specifically with the situation in the Middle East and around the Great Lakes, inasmuch as they are a particularly striking illustration of how these rivalries are spreading chaos and decomposition to ever greater areas of the planet.
The Middle East: "Every man for himself" and the crisis of American leadership
The election of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was already a serious upset for the USA, in a region of immense strategic importance which for years has been an exclusively American sphere of influence. It showed, even in a country as dependent as Israel on the US, how centrifugal forces and the desire for political independence are gaining the upper hand over any policy of regional stabilisation, even one enforced by the world gendarme.
Since then, repeated provocation by the Netanyahu government has led to armed confrontations between Jewish settlers and the police forces of the new Palestinian Authority, as well as dozens of deaths in Gaza and the West Bank. The Israeli government has been given the pretext for hardening its position in all the negotiations to the point where, in the name of the threat to national security, it has even called into question the meagre accords signed by Peres and Arafat in Oslo. Meanwhile, the same tendency to "every man for himself' triumphed in the Arab capitals. Israel's "hereditary enemies", starting with Syria and the Palestinians, reached a reconciliation, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia, solid US allies until then, increased their open contestation of American imperialism. That Egypt, the partner of the historic Camp David agreement, should refuse to take part in Clinton's damage-limitation summit in Washington speaks volumes for the USA's increasing loss of control over the situation in the Middle East. These events threaten to destroy a grip on the region which the US has carefully nurtured during the last 20 years.
The decline of American influence can only be mirrored by a rise of its imperialist rivals, whose ambitions grow in inverse proportion to the US' difficulties. The great beneficiary of recent events in the Middle East is undoubtedly France, which has immediately undertaken to gather together all the region's malcontents by posing as the spokesman for anti-American and anti-Israeli feeling, as we saw from Chirac's spectacular tour in October. Everywhere he went, he promoted the idea of a "partnership in the peace process", clearly indicating France's intention to stoke the flames and to sabotage Washington's policy by every means possible. Far from encouraging "peace", this is an open call for the holy alliance of Arab states against the common enemy, both Israeli and ... American - in other words an encouragement of war and chaos.
Its leadership shaken on the international scene, the world's greatest power must counter-attack: and it is less and less able to do so "peacefully", as the warning shot represented by the missile attacks on Iraq has shown (see International Review no.87). In fact, the US intends both to show its determination to keep its position as the world's military master, and to sow discord among the European powers by playing on their divergent interests. It is thus no surprise that today its blows are aimed first and foremost at French imperialism, which has the pretention to lead an anti-American crusade[1].
Zaire: America's offensive against French imperialism
Having helped the pro-American Rwandan Popular Front to power in 1994, the USA has continued to advance its pawns throughout the Great Lakes region. First, they have consolidated the RPF's power through increased economic and military aid. Then, they continued their tactic of encircling the French positions by putting maximum pressure on Burundi after Buyoya's pro-French coup d'Etat, through the embargo imposed by all the surrounding pro-American anglophone countries. This tactic has born fruit, since the Buyoya regime had no qualms about joining Rwanda and Uganda in the anti-French alliance as soon as the first confrontations began in Kivu. Finally, the US used the pretext of skirmishes provoked by the regroupment of one-time (Hutu) Rwandan Army forces under French auspices in the refugee camps on the frontier between Rwanda and Zaire, to carry the war into Zaire itself by fomenting the "revolt" of the Kivu Banyamulenge, with the success we have seen.
Washington's offensive has effectively succeeded in isolating French imperialism, and weakening more and more its position. France is forced to rely on Mobutu's Zaire, which is in a ruinous condition politically, economically, and militarily. During the confrontation between Eastern and Western blocs, Zaire was a key link in the Western bloc's anti-Soviet defence. Today, it is one of the world's most fragile strategic regions, and a prey to the most advanced decomposition. And the USA has exploited Zaire's reigning chaos, aggravated by Mobutu's illness and the resulting internecine struggles, and the disintegration of its army, to strengthen its strategic operations in the region. French imperialism, which had intended to use the Franco-African summit of Ouagadougou - where Uganda and Tanzania had been invited for the first time - to put pressure on Rwanda through its proposal of a conference on the Great Lakes region, has thus been caught out.
Rejected and denounced by Rwanda and the Zairean rebels, who had been the victims of its imperialist activity, France had to give in and call for an American intervention, within which it hoped to find a place. The American bourgeoisie was quick to exploit its situation of strength, and oblige the French to surrender completely. It delayed intentionally, declaring its willingness to intervene provided that this was a "humanitarian" not a military operation, that there should be no interference in a "local conflict" (all the more happy to avoid interference, since its own henchmen had the upper hand!), and cynically pointing out the "the United States are not the Salvation Army"! The White House even gave itself the pleasure of blaming French imperialism for the chaos engulfing the Great Lakes region. A campaign was developed on the arms sales by several countries to Rwanda during the genocide of 1994, which implicated above all the French state, and turned the spotlight on its sordid role there. The Big Boss was thus able to highlight the shabby greed of a French government which" has supported decadent regimes" and "is no longer able to impose itself" on Africa (declarations by Daniel Simpson, the US ambassador in Kinshasa), and which only calls the "international community" to the rescue to defend its own private imperialist interests.
French imperialism has thus had to abandon its positions, in the face of an offensive minutely planned by the strategists of the Pentagon. It has been pushed out of East Africa, and reduced to a seriously weakened position in the West. This situation can only sharpen existing rivalries: the French will try to react, as we have already seen in their attempt to recuperate Burundi during the Franco-African summit by calling for a raising of the embargo directed against the latter, while the chaos around the Great Lakes is already spreading to Zaire, already seriously gangrened by its general social decomposition. Zaire's strategic position in the heart of Africa, its immense size, and its mineral wealth, all make it a choice target for imperialist appetites. The perspective of its collapse as a result of the military conflict that has spread into the country, brings with it the threat of a new explosion of chaos, not just in Zaire itself but also among its neighbours, especially to the North (Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan), and in nearby countries like Gabon and the Cameroons, which all belong to the French sphere of influence. All this gives us some idea of the alarm that afflicts the French bourgeoisie as to the durability of its African profits. And this new advance of imperialist chaos cannot but aggravate and spread still further the dreadful misery and barbarism that already reigns over most of the African continent.
It is thus strikingly clear that all the imperialist sharks' hypocritical calls for "humanitarian help" and "peace" only serve as a cover for new military expeditions, and so the worsening of chaos and barbarism. With monstrous cynicism, all the national bourgeoisies cry crocodile tears over the tragic fate of the local populations and refugees, while the latter are reduced to the state of impotent hostages used as weapons in the imperialist rivalries between the great powers. This whole enormous spectacle is laid before us with the complicity - whether conscious or not - of the "non-governmental organisations", the humanitarian associations like. Oxfam and Medecins sans Frontieres, which have themselves pleaded for military intervention.
for starting the massacres of 1994. Behind the alibi of a military intervention to "stop the genocide", they provoked a mass exodus of populations, and encouraged the creation of the precarious refugee camps. Since then they have profited from the degeneration of the situation, which is presented today as inevitable, to hatch new and bloody intrigues.
Far from "rebuilding order and peace", all these imperialist gangsters are only increasing chaos, as they escalate their rivalries and carry out their underhand tricks. They are an expression of a moribund capitalism, which can only hurl into barbarism ever vaster areas of the planet, and drag more and more of the world's population into massacres, forced migration, famine, and the epidemics that feed on the slaughter.
Jos, 12/12/96
[1] We have pointed out in many texts that in the final instance, Germany is the USA's main imperialist rival, and the only power which might eventually lead a bloc opposed to that of the world's greatest power. However, and this is one of the characteristics of today's chaos, we are still far from such an "organisation" of imperialist antagonisms. This leaves room for all sorts of situations where "second fiddles" like France can try to play their own game.
In our last article, we saw how the KPD was founded in Germany, at the end of December 1918, in the heat of the struggle. Although the Spartakists had conducted a magnificent work of propaganda against the war, and had intervened determinedly and' with great clarity in the revolutionary movement itself, the KPD was not yet a solid party. The organisation had just begun to be built, its warp and weft was still very loose. At its founding congress, the party was still marked by a great heterogeneity. Different positions confronted each other, not just on the questions of work within the unions and participation in parliament, but also, worse still, on the organisational question. And on this question, the marxist wing around Luxemburg and Jogisches was in a minority.
The experience of this "incomplete" party shows that it is not enough to proclaim the party for it to exist and act as one. A party worthy of the name must possess a solid organisational structure, based on a single conception of organisational unity in both its function and its functioning.
The KPD's immaturity at this level made it unable truly to fulfil its role towards the working class.
For the German working class - and consequently for the world proletariat - it was a tragedy that during this decisive post-war period, it could not rely in its struggle on the effective support of a party.
1919: After the repression, the KPD absent from the scene
While the bourgeoisie put into operation its provocation against the workers, as anger and a desire to "have it out" with the enemy spread within the working class, one of the KPD' s most prominent figures, Karl Liebknecht, plunged into the struggle alongside the "revolutionary men of confidence" , against the decisions and warnings of his own party.
Not only did the working class as a whole suffer a tragic defeat, the blows of repression hit the revolutionary militants especially hard. Not only Liebknecht and Luxemburg, but many others with them were murdered, like Leo Jogisches assassinated in March 1919. The KPD was thus decapitated.
It is no accident that it was precisely the marxist wing around Luxemburg and Jogisches which found itself the target for repression. This wing had always watched over the party's cohesion, and could be seen to be most resolute in defence of the organisation.
For months afterwards, with brief interruptions, the KPD was then forced to go underground. From February to March, and then again from May to December, it proved impossible to publish Die Rote Fahne. In the wave of strikes between February and April (see International Review no 83), it was thus unable to play the determining role that it should have done. Its voice was all but stifled by Capital.
If the KPD had been sufficiently strong, disciplined and influential to unmask the bourgeoisie's provocation during the week in January, and to prevent the workers from falling into the trap, the movement would surely have ended very differently.
The working class thus paid a heavy price for the weaknesses of a party, which then became the target for the most brutal repression. Everywhere, the communists were hunted down. Communications were lost several times between what was left of the Zentrale and the party districts. It was noted, during the national conference of 29th March 1919 that "the local organisations are submerged with agents provocateurs".
"As far as the union question is concerned, the conference thinks that the slogan "Out of the unions!" is for the moment misplaced (...) Unionist agitation which spreads confusion must be fought not be measures of coercion but by the systematic clarification of differences of conception and tactics" (KPD Zentrale, national conference of 29/03/1919). It was important, on programmatic questions, to start by getting to the bottom of disagreements through discussion.
During a national conference held on 14th/15th June in Berlin, the KPD adopted statutes which asserted the necessity for a strictly centralised party. And although the party took position clearly against unionism, it recommended that no measures be taken against party members who belonged to unions.
During the conference of August 1919, it was decided to appoint a delegate for each of the 22 party districts, without taking account of their size. By contrast, each member of the Zentrale had one vote. No way of nominating delegates had been settled on at the founding congress in January 1918, nor had the question of centralisation been clarified. In August 1919, the Zentrale was over-represented in votes, while the influence and opinion of the local sections was limited. There was thus a danger that the ZentraIe would tend to become autonomous, which increased the suspicions that already existed towards it. However, position of both the Zentrale and of Levi (who had meanwhile been elected to lead it) in favour of work in the unions and parliament, failed to gain the upper hand, since most of the delegates inclined towards the positions of the Left.
As we have shown (see International Review no 83), the numerous waves of struggle which shook the whole of Germany during the first half of 1919, and where the KPD's voice was barely heard, caused large numbers of workers to abandon the unions. The workers felt that the unions, as the classic organs for defence of economic demands, could no longer fulfil their function of defending workers' interests, since they had imposed national unity with the bourgeoisie during the war, and now in this revolutionary situation, once again stood alongside the latter. At the same time, there was no longer the same effervescence as there had been in November and December 1918, when the workers had united in the workers' councils and put in question the bourgeois state. In this situation, many workers created "factory organisations", which were supposed to regroup all the combative workers in "Unionen" (we use the German expression here, to distinguish these new organisations from the traditional trades unions). Like political parties, the "Unionen" adopted platforms aimed at the overthrow of the capitalist system. Many workers came to the conclusion that the "Unionen" should be the sole place of regroupment for proletarian forces, and that the party should dissolve itself within them. During this period, anarcho-syndicalist and council communist ideas gained a wide audience. More than 100,000 workers joined the "Unionen". In August 1919, the General Workers' Union (Allgemeine Arbeiters Union, or AAU) was founded in Essen.
At the same time, the end of the war brought with it a rapid deterioration in working class living conditions. During the war, the workers had been subjected to famine and slaughter; the winter of 1918-19 had completely exhausted them; now they had to pay the price of German imperialism's defeat in the war. The signature of the Versailles Treaty in the summer of 1919 imposed on German capital - but above all on the country's workers - the payment of war reparations.
October 1919 and the 2nd Congress of the KPD: from political confusion to organisational dispersal
The KPD's 2nd Congress took place in Heidelberg, within this context of a reflux in the workers' struggles after the defeats of the first half of 1919. The first points on the agenda were the political situation and the report on administration. The analysis of the political situation dealt mainly with the economic and imperialist questions, and especially with the position of Germany. Almost nothing was said about the balance of class forces at the international level. The weakening of the party, to the point of crisis, seemed to have supplanted the analysis of the state of the class struggle internationally. Moreover, when the priority should have been given to the regroupment of all revolutionary forces, the Zentrale began by putting forward its "Theses on communist principles and tactics" - some of which were to have serious consequences for the party and open the way to numerous splits - and trying to impose them on the Congress.
The Theses stressed that "the revolution is a political struggle by the proletarian masses for political power. This struggle is conducted using every available political and economic means (...) The KPD cannot renounce by principle any political method, in the service of the preparation of these great struggles. Participation in elections must be taken into account as one of these means". Later on, they deal with the question of communists' work in the unions, so as "not to isolate ourselves from the masses".
This work in the unions and in parliament was posed as a question, not of principle but of tactics.
On the organisational level, the Theses rightly rejected federalism, and emphasised the necessity for the most rigorous centralisation.
But the last point closed the door on any discussion, by declaring that "the members of the party who do not share these conceptions of the party's nature, organisation and action, must leave the party".
But it was on the organisational question that the KPD was most deeply divided. At its founding Congress, it was no more than a gathering to the left of the USPD, divided into several wings, especially on the organisation question. The marxist wing around Luxemburg and Jogisches, which defended the organisation's unity and centralisation most determinedly, had to confront all those who either underestimated the organisation's necessity, or else viewed it with suspicion, even outright hostility.
This is why the first challenge for the party's 2nd Congress was to get to grips with the defence and construction of the organisation.
However, conditions were already not very favourable:
- The life of the organisation was under severe attack from the activity of the bourgeoisie. Repression and the conditions of illegality made it impossible to conduct a widespread discussion throughout the local sections on programmatic and organisational questions. The discussion at the Congress was thus not as well-prepared as it should have been.
- The Zentrale elected at the founding Congress had been decimated: three of its original nine members (Luxemburg, Liebknecht, Jogisches) had been assassinated; Mehring was dead, and three others were on the run and so unable to take part. Only Levi, Pieck, Thalheimer and Lange were left.
At the same time, councilist and anarcho-syndicalist ideas were gaining strength. Supporters of the Unionen called for the party to dissolve itself into the Unionen, others wanted it to stand back from struggles for economic demands. Ideas like "the party of leaders" or "the dictatorship of the leaders" began to spread, showing that anti-organisational tendencies were gaining ground.
From the outset, the attitude of the Zentrale sharpened divisions and prepared the exclusion of the real majority.
Moreover, the Zentrale should have followed the example of the debates going on in almost all the communist parties on the parliamentary and union questions, and presented its Theses as a contribution to the discussion, as a means to continued clarification, not as a way of stifling and expelling from the party all those who held a different position. The final point in the Theses, requiring the exclusion of all those with disagreements, reflects and incorrect, monolithic, organisational conception, in contradiction with that of the marxist wing which had regrouped around Luxemburg and Jogisches, and which had always called for the widest possible discussion throughout the organisation.
Whereas the Zentrale elected at the founding Congress adopted a correct political viewpoint, where existing disagreements, even on such fundamental questions as the unions and participation in the elections, were not seen as reasons for splits or exclusions, the one elected at the 2nd Congress contributed, on the basis of a false conception of the organisation, to a fatal disintegration of the party.
The delegates who represented the majority position from the founding Congress were aware of this danger, and asked to be able to consult their respective sections, and "not to take the decision to split in haste".
But the Zentrale demanded an immediate decision. Thirty-one delegates voted in favour of the Theses, eighteen against. The latter, who mostly represented the party's biggest districts numerically, and who were almost all members of the old ISD/IKD, were henceforth considered as excluded.
A split can only take place on the clearest possible basis
To deal responsibly with a discussion on divergent positions, it is necessary that each position should be presented and debated widely and without restrictions. Moreover, in his attack against the marxist wing, Levi amalgamated all the differences, and used the weapon of deformation pure and simple.
In fact, the most diverse positions were present in the Congress. Otto Ruhle, for example, took position the most openly against work in parliament and the unions, but on the basis of a councilist argument. He violently opposed the so-called "politics of the leaders".
The Bremen delegates were also resolutely opposed to any work in the unions or parliament, but did not reject the party, quite the reverse. At the Congress however, they failed to defend their positions either clearly or energetically, thus leaving the terrain free for the destructive manoeuvring of adventurers like Wolftheim and Laufenberg, as well as to the federalists and supporters of the Unionen.
General confusion reigned. The different viewpoints did not appear clearly. Especially on the organisational question, where there should have been a clear break between partisans and opponents of the party, everything was mixed up.
The rejection of the unions and parliamentary activity cannot be put on the same level as the position that rejects the party as a matter of principle. Sadly, Levi did the opposite, when he described all those opposed to work in the unions or parliament as enemies of the party. He managed to deform completely their positions, and to falsify what was really at stake in the situation.
There were differing reactions to this way of proceeding by the Zentrale. Only Laufenberg, Wolffheim, and two other delegates, considered a split inevitable, and accepted it that very evening by declaring the foundation of a new party. Earlier, Laufenberg and Wolffheim had sown suspicion towards the Zentrale on the pretext of gaps in the financial report. This dubious manoeuvre was aimed at avoiding any open debate on the organisation question.
The attitude of the Bremen delegates, by contrast, was a responsible one. They did not want to let themselves be excluded. They returned the following morning to continue their work as delegates. But the Zentrale had moved the meeting to a secret location, in order to keep out the minority. It thus got rid of a large part of the organisation, not only by fiddling the election of delegates, but by forcibly excluding them from the Congress.
The Congress was shot through with false views on organisation. Levi's Zentrale had a monolithic conception, which left no room for minority positions in the party. With the exception of the Bremen delegates, who despite their disagreements fought to remain in the organisation the opposition shared this monolithic conception, inasmuch as it would have excluded the Zentrale had it been able to. Both sides rushed into the split on the most confused basis possible. That wing of the party which represented marxism on organisational issues did not succeed in imposing its viewpoint.
There was thus created amongst German communists a tradition which was to be constantly repeated: each divergence led to a split.
False programmatic positions open the door to opportunism
As we have already shown above, the Theses, which still only considered work within parliament or the unions from an essentially tactical standpoint, expressed a difficulty that was widespread throughout the communist movement: how to draw the lessons of capitalism's decadence, and to recognise that it had created new conditions, which made the old means of struggle inadequate.
Parliament and the unions had become cogs in the state apparatus. The Left had perceived this process, rather than understanding it theoretically.
By contrast, the tactical orientation adopted by the KPD leadership, based on a confused view of these questions, became a part of the opportunist slope down which the party slid, and on the pretext of "not cutting itself off from the masses" pushed it into more and more concessions towards those who had betrayed the proletariat. This slippery slope also led to the attempt to reach an understanding with the centrist USPD in order to become a "mass party". Unfortunately, by excluding en masse all those who disagreed with the leadership's orientation, the KPD drove from its ranks many faithful party militants, and so deprived itself of the antiseptic of criticism which alone could have stopped the opportunist gangrene.
At the bottom of this tragedy lay a failure to understand the organisational question and its importance. One essential lesson that we must draw from this today is that any split or exclusion is something whose consequences are too heavy for it to be undertaken lightly. Such a decision can only be reached after a profound and conclusive clarification. That is why this fundamental political understanding must figure clearly in the statutes of any organisation.
The Communist International itself, although it supported Levi on the union and parliamentary questions, insisted that the debate should be continued, and refused to accept any splits caused by these disagreements. During the Heidelberg Congress, the KPD leadership had acted on its own authority, without taking account of the International's opinion.
The Bremen militants reacted to their exclusion by creating an "Information Bureau" for the whole opposition, in order to maintain contacts between left communist militants in Germany. They correctly understood the work of a fraction. To avoid the break-up of the party, they tried to reach a compromise on the most important litigious points of the organisation's policy (the union and parliamentary questions), and struggled to maintain the unity of the KPD. With this aim in mind, the Information Bureau issued the following appeal, on 23rd December 1919:
"1) Convocation of a new national conference at the end of January.
2) Admission of all districts that belonged to the KPD before the 3rd National Conference, whether or not they recognise the Theses.
3) The Theses, and other proposals, to be submitted for discussion immediately with the National Conference in view.
4) Until the convocation of the new Conference, the Zentrale is required to refrain from any splitting activity" (Kommunistische Arbeiter Zeitung no 197).
By proposing amendments to the Theses for the 3rd Congress, and by demanding their reintegration into the party, the Bremen militants worked as a true fraction. On the organisational level, their proposed amendments aimed at strengthening the position of the party's local groups vis-a-vis the Zentrale, while on the union and parliamentary questions they made concessions to the Zentrale's Theses. The Zentrale, by contrast, continued to work for a split by setting up new local groups in those districts whose delegates had been excluded (Hamburg, Bremen, Hanover, Berlin and Dresden).
During the 3rd Congress (25th/26th February 1920), the bloodletting that had taken place was clearly apparent. In October 1919, the KPD still had more than 100,000 members; now it only had about 40,000. Moreover, the decision of the October 1919 Congress had created such confusion that it was still unclear whether or not the Bremen militants still belonged to the KPD. The exclusion was made definitive only at the 3rd Congress, although it had already taken effect in October 1919.
The bourgeoisie encouraged the breakup of the party
After the Kapp putsch, which had just broken out, during a national conference of the opposition held on 14th March 1920, the Bremen Information Bureau declared that it could not take the responsibility of forming a new communist party, and dissolved itself. At the end of March, after the 3rd Congress, the Bremen militants returned to the KPD.
By contrast, immediately after their exclusion, the Hamburg delegates Wolftheim and Laufenberg announced the formation of a new party. This approach had nothing in common with marxism on the organisational question. Their whole attitude, after their exclusion, revealed their deliberately destructive behaviour towards revolutionary organisations. From that moment on, they developed openly and frenetically their "national-Bolshevik" position. During the war, they had already carried out propaganda for a "revolutionary people's war". Unlike the Spartakists, they did not adopt an internationalist position, but called for the working class' subordination to the army "in order to put an end to the domination of Anglo-American capital". They even accused the Spartakists of having encouraged the army's disintegration, and thus of "stabbing it in the back". These attacks were in perfect unison with those of the extreme right after the Treaty of Versailles. Whereas during 1919, Wolffheim and Laufenberg had adopted a radical cover by agitating against the unions, after their exclusion from the KPD they brought their "national-Bolshevik" attitude to the fore. Their politics encountered no great echo among the Hamburg workers. But these two individuals manoeuvred adroitly, and published their views as a supplement to the Kommunistische Arbeiter Zeitung, without the party's agreement. The more isolated they became from the KPD, the more openly they launched anti-Semitic attacks on Levi, as a "Jew" and "a British agent". It emerged later that Wolffheim was the secretary of the officer Lettow-Vorbeck, and he was denounced as a police agent-provocateur. He was thus not acting on his own initiative, and his activity was consciously and systematically aimed at the destruction of the party, with the support of "circles" working in the shadows.
For the opposition, the tragedy was its failure to differentiate itself from these individuals either in time, or with enough determination. As a result, more and more militants no longer attended party meetings, and withdrew from militant life, disgusted by the activity of Laufenberg and Wolffheim (see the proceedings of the KPD 3rd Congress, p.23).
Moreover, the bourgeoisie sought to make the most of the defeats it had inflicted on the proletariat during 1919, by developing an offensive in the spring of 1920. On 13th March, troops led by Kapp and Luttwitz launched a military attack to "restore order". Although the SPD government was the apparent target, the putsch was clearly aimed against the working class. Faced with the choice of counter-attacking, or being subjected to a bloody repression, workers in almost every town rose up in resistance. They had no other alternative but to defend themselves. The movement was strongest in the Ruhr, where a "Red Army" was created.
The army's action completely disorientated the Zentrale. Although at first it supported the workers' counter-attack, when the forces of Capital proposed an SPDIUSPD coalition government to "save democracy", it viewed this as a "lesser evil", even to the point of offering its "loyal opposition".
The effervescence in the working class, and this attitude of the KPD, provided those who had been excluded the pretext for founding a new party.
Dv
[1] "Above all, as far as the question of non-participation in elections is concerned, you enormously overestimate the implications of this decision. Our defeat [ie the future Zentrale's defeat on this question in the voting at the Congress] was nothing but the victory of a rather puerile extremism, in fermentation, and without nuances (...) Do not forget that a good number of Spartakists belong to a new generation, on which the stultifying traditions of the "old" party do not weigh, and we have to accept this with its light and its shade. We all unanimously decided not to make a big fuss about this and not to rake it as a tragedy" (Rosa Luxemburg, Letter to Clara Zetkin, 11th January 1919).
At the end of the last article in this series, we looked at the principle danger posed to the social democratic parties operating at the zenith of capitalism’s historical development: the divorce between the fight for immediate reforms and the overall goal of communism. The growing success of these parties both in winning ever increasing numbers of workers to their cause, and in extracting concessions from the bourgeoisie through the parliamentary and trade union struggles, was accompanied, and indeed partly contributed to, the development of the ideologies of reformism - the limitation of the workers’ party to the immediate defence and improvement of proletarian living conditions - and of gradualism, the notion that capitalism could be abolished through an entirely peaceful process of social evolution. On the other hand, the reaction against this reformist threat by certain revolutionary currents was a retreat into sectarian or utopian misconceptions which saw little or no connection between the defensive struggle of the working class and its ultimate revolutionary aims.
The following article, which completes a first volume of studies dealing with the development of the communist programme in the period of capitalism’s ascendancy, looks in more detail at how the perspective of the communist revolution became obscured during this period, focusing on the key issue of the conquest of power by the proletariat, and on the key country of Germany, which boasted the largest social democratic party in the world.
On a number of occasions in this series, we have shown that the fight against that form of opportunism known as reformism was a constant element in the marxist struggle for a revolutionary programme and for an organisation to defend it. This was particularly the case with the German party, formed in 1875 as the result of a fusion between the Lassallean and marxist fractions of the workers’ movement. In that same year, Marx had written The Critique of the Gotha Programme (see International Review 79) to combat the concessions made by the marxists to the Lassalleans. A central theme of the Critique was the defence of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat against the Lassallean idea of a People’s State, which actually covered this tendency’s penchant to accommodate itself to the existing Bismarkian state.
In writing the Critique, Marx had the benefit of the experience of the Paris Commune, which had shone a bright light on the problem of how the proletariat would assume political power: not by the peaceful conquest of the old state, but through its destruction, and the establishment of new organs of power directly controlled by the workers in arms.
This did not mean that from 1871 onwards, the marxist current had attained some finished clarity on this question. Since the inception of this current, the struggle for universal suffrage, for working class representation in parliament, had been a key focus of the organised workers’ movement - this after all had been the goal of what Marx termed the first working class political party, the Chartists in Britain. And having fought for universal suffrage against the resistance of the bourgeoisie, who at that time saw it as a threat to their rule, it was only too understandable that revolutionaries themselves should entertain the notion that the working class, being the majority of the population, could come to power via parliamentary institutions. Thus, at the Hague Congress of the International in 1872, Marx made a speech in which he was still prepared to consider the possibility that in countries with more democratic constitutions, such as Britain, America and Holland, the working class “may attain their goal by peaceful means”.
Nevertheless, Marx quickly added that “in most continental countries the lever of revolution will have to be force; a resort to force will be necessary one day in order to set up the rule of labour”. Furthermore, as Engels argued in his introduction to Volume One of Capital, even if the workers did come to power via parliament, they would almost certainly have to deal with a slaveholders’ rebellion which would again require the lever of force. In Germany during the period of the Anti-Socialist Laws introduced by Bismark in 1878, a revolutionary view of the conquest of power prevailed over the seductions of social pacifism. We have already demonstrated at length the radical conception of socialism contained in Bebel’s book Woman and Socialism (see International Reviews 83, 85 and 86). In 1881, in an article in Der Sozialdemokrat (6th April 1881), Karl Kautsky was defending the need “to demolish the bourgeois state and to create the state anew” (cited in Massimo Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938, London 1979, p 22). Ten years later, in 1891, Engels wrote his introduction to The Civil War in France, which ends with an unambiguous message to all the non-revolutionary elements who had begun to infiltrate the party:
“Of late the Social Democratic philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat”. In that same year, he caused a rumpus in the SPD by finally publishing the Critique of the Gotha Programme, which Marx and Engels had decided not to publish in 1875. The party was about to adopt a new programme (which was to be known as the Erfurt Programme), and Engels wanted to make sure that the new document would finally be free of any lingering Lassallean influences [1].
Engels’ concerns in 1891 show that an opportunist, philistine wing was already taking root in the party (indeed had been there from the beginning). But if the revolutionary current, and the conditions of illegality imposed by the Anti-Socialist laws, kept this wing at bay during the 1880s, it was to grow increasingly influential and brazen in the ensuing decade. The first major expression of this was the campaign in the early 1890s led by Vollmar and the Bavarian branch of the SPD, demanding a practical policy on the agricultural question which amounted to a policy of state socialism - that is, an appeal to the Junker state to introduce legislation on behalf of the peasantry. The state socialists were in favour of voting for credits in state legislatures when these appeared to benefit the peasantry, and in general their appeal to the peasantry compromised the proletarian class character of the party. This rebellion from the right was defeated, not least through the vigorous polemics of Karl Kautsky. But by 1896 Edward Bernstein had published his revisionist theses, openly rejecting the marxist theory of crisis and calling on the party to abandon its pretensions and declare itself as a “democratic party of social reform”. His articles were first published in Die Neue Zeit, the party’s theoretical review; later on they were published in a book whose English title is Evolutionary Socialism. For Bernstein, capitalist society could grow peacefully and gradually towards socialism, so what need was there either for the violent disruptions of revolution, or for a party advocating the intensification of the class struggle?
Shortly after this came the Millerand case in France: for the first time, a socialist deputy entered a capitalist cabinet.
This is not the place for a profound analysis of the reasons for the growth of reformism during this period. There were a number of factors acting at the same time: the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Laws enabled the SPD to enter the legal arena, and it grew rapidly in numbers and influence - but working within the norms of bourgeois legality also nourished illusions in the degree to which the working class could use these norms to its advantage. This period also saw an influx into the party of petty bourgeois intellectuals who had a certain natural inclination towards ideas about reconciling the warring classes of capitalist society. We could also talk about the national limitations of a movement which, while founded on the principles of proletarian internationalism, was still largely federated into national parties - an open door to opportunist adaptation to the needs of the nation state. Finally, the death of Engels in 1895 also emboldened those - including Bernstein, who had been one of Engels’ closest associates - who wanted to dilute the revolutionary essence of marxism. All these factors played their part. But fundamentally, reformism was the product of the pressures emanating from bourgeois society in a period of impressive economic growth and prosperity in which the perspective of capitalist collapse and the proletarian revolution seemed to be receding into a remote horizon. In sum the social democracy was gradually being transformed from an organ geared essentially towards a revolutionary future to one fixed on the present, on the gaining of immediate improvements in working class living standards. The fact that such improvements were still possible could make it seem increasingly reasonable that socialism could come about almost by stealth, through the accumulation of improvements and the gradual democratisation of bourgeois society. Bernstein was not altogether wrong when he said that his ideas were just an acknowledgement of what the party really was.
But he was wrong in arguing that this was all the party was or could be. This was proved by the fact that his attempts to overthrow marxism were vigorously opposed by the revolutionary currents who had the temerity to insist that a proletarian party, however much it had to fight for the immediate defence of working class interests, could only retain its proletarian character if it actively pursued the revolutionary destiny of that class. Luxemburg’s reply to Bernstein (Social Reform or Revolution) is justly recognised as the best of all the polemics aroused by Bernstein’s assault on marxism. But at this stage she was by no means alone: all the major figures in the party, not least Kautsky and Bebel, made their own contributions to the fight to preserve the party from the revisionist danger.
On the surface, these responses put the revisionists to flight: the rejection of Bernstein’s theses was confirmed by the whole party at the 1903 Dresden conference. But as history would show so tragically in 1914, the forces acting on social democracy were stronger than the clearest congress resolutions. And one measure of their strength was the fact that the revolutionaries themselves, even the clearest of them, were not immune to the democratic illusions being peddled by the reformists. In their replies to the latter, the marxists made many errors which constituted so many chinks in the armour of the proletarian party, chinks through which opportunism could spread its insidious influence.
In 1895, Engels published in the SPD paper Vorwarts an introduction to Marx’s The Class Struggles In France, the latter’s celebrated analysis of the events of 1848. In this article, Engels quite correctly argues that the days when revolutions could be made by minorities of the exploited class, using only the methods of the street fight and the barricade, were over, and that the future conquest of power could only be the work of a conscious, massively organised working class. This did not mean that Engels considered streetfighting and barricades would be ruled out as part of a wider revolutionary strategy, but these precisions were suppressed by the editors of Vorwarts, as Engels angrily protested in a letter to Kautsky: “To my astonishment I see today in Vorwarts an extract from my Introduction, printed without my knowledge and trimmed in such a way as to make me appear a peace-loving worshipper of legality at any price” (Engels, Selected Correspondence, p461).
The trick played on Engels worked well: his letter of protest was not published until 1924, and by that time the opportunists had made full use of the Introduction to present Engels as their political mentor. Others, usually elements who like to think of themselves as rabid revolutionaries, have used the same article to justify their theory that Engels became an old reformist in later life, and that there is a real gulf between the views of Marx and Engels on this as on many other points.
But leaving aside the opportunists’ doctoring of the text, a problem remains. This was recognised by no less a revolutionary than Rosa Luxemburg in the last speech of her life, a passionate intervention at the founding congress of the KPD in 1918. It is true that at this stage Luxemburg did not know that the opportunists had distorted Engels’ words. But still, she found certain important weaknesses in the articles which, in her characteristic style, she did not hesitate to subject to a detailed marxist critique.
The problem posed to Rosa Luxemburg was this: the new Communist Party was being founded at a moment of immediate revolutionary possibility. The revolution was on the streets; the army was disintegrating; workers and soldiers councils were mushrooming throughout the country; and the official marxism of the social democratic party, which still had enormous influence within the class despite the role that its opportunist leadership had played during the war, was calling on the authority of Engels to justify the counter-revolutionary use of parliamentary democracy as an antidote to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
As we have said, Engels had not been wrong to argue that the old 48 tactics of the more or less disorganised street fight could no longer be the proletariat’s road to power. He showed that it was impossible for a determined minority of proletarians to take on the modern armies of the ruling class; indeed, the bourgeoisie was only too willing to provoke such skirmishes in order to justify massive repression against the whole working class (in fact this was precisely the tactic it used against the German revolution a few weeks after the KPD Congress, pushing the workers of Berlin into a premature uprising that led to the decapitation of the revolutionary forces, including Luxemburg herself). Consequently, he insisted “a future street fight can therefore only be victorious when this unfavourable situation is compensated by other factors. Accordingly, it will occur more seldom in the beginning of a great revolution than in its further progress, and will have to be undertaken with greater forces. These however, may then well prefer, as in the whole Great French Revolution on 4th September and 31st October 1870, in Paris, the open attack to the passive barricade tactics” (Introduction to The Class Struggles in France). In a sense, this is precisely what the Russian revolution did achieve: by building itself up as an irresistible, organised force, the proletariat was able to topple the bourgeois state with a well timed and relatively bloodless insurrection in October 1917.
The real problem is the manner in which Engels envisaged this process. Rosa Luxemburg had in front of her eyes the living example of the Russian revolution and its counter-part in Germany, where the proletariat had developed its self-organisation through the process of the mass strike and the formation of soviets. These were forms of action and organisation that not only corresponded to the new epoch of wars and revolutions, but also, in a deeper sense, expressed the underlying nature of the proletariat as a class which can only assert its revolutionary power by bursting asunder the routines and institutions of class society. The fatal flaw in Engels’ argument in 1895 was the emphasis he placed on the proletariat building up its forces through the use of parliamentary institutions - ie, through organisms specific to the very bourgeois society it had to destroy. Here Luxemburg points to what Engels did say and was quite aware of its inadequacies.
“After summing up the changes which had occurred in the intervening period, Engels turned to consider the immediate tasks of the German Social Democratic Party. As Marx had predicted, he wrote, the war of 1870-71 and the fall of the Commune shifted the center of gravity of the European labour movement from France to Germany. Many years had naturally to elapse before France could recover from the bloodletting of May 1871. In Germany, on the other hand, manufacturing industry was developing by leaps and bounds, in the forcing-house atmosphere produced by the influx of French billions. Even more rapid and more enduring was the growth of social democracy. Thanks to the agreement in virtue of which the German workers have been able to avail themselves of the universal (male) suffrage introduced in 1866, the astounding growth of the party has been demonstrated to all the world by the testimony of figures whose significance no one can deny.
Thereupon followed the famous enumeration, showing the growth of the party vote in election after election until the figures swelled to millions. From this progress Engels drew the following conclusion: The successful employment of the parliamentary vote entailed the acceptance of an entirely new tactic by the proletariat, and this new method has undergone rapid development. It has been realised that the political institutions in which the dominion of the bourgeoisie is incorporated offer a fulcrum whereby the proletariat can work for the overthrow of these very political institutions. The social democrats have participated in the elections to the various diets, to municipal councils, and to industrial courts. Wherever the proletariat could secure an effective voice, the occupation of these electoral strongholds by the bourgeoisie has been contested. Consequently, the bourgeoisie and the government have become much more alarmed at the constitutional than at the unconstitutional activities of the workers, dreading the results of elections far more than they dread the results of rebellion.”
Luxemburg, while understanding Engels’ rejection of the old streetfighting tactics, makes no bones about the dangers inherent in this approach.
“Two important conclusions were drawn from this reasoning. In the first place, the parliamentary struggle was counterposed to direct revolutionary action by the proletariat, and the former was indicated as the only practical way of carrying on the class struggle. Parliamentarism, and nothing but parliamentarism, was the logical sequel of this criticism. Secondly, the whole military machine, the most powerful organisation of the class state, the entire body of proletarians in uniform, was declared on a priori grounds to be absolutely inaccessible to socialist influences. When Engels’ preface declares that, owing to the modern development of gigantic armies, it is positively insane to suppose that proletarians can ever stand up against soldiers armed with machine guns and equipped with all the other latest technical devices, the assertion is obviously based upon the assumption that anyone who becomes a soldier, becomes thereby once and for all one of the props of the ruling class”.
The experience of the revolutionary wave had quite definitively refuted Engels’ scenario: far from being alarmed at the use of constitutional action by the proletariat, the bourgeoisie had understood that parliamentary democracy was their most reliable bulwark against the power of the workers councils; all the activities of the social democratic traitors (led by the eminent parliamentarians who had been among the most susceptible to bourgeois influences) had been geared towards persuading the workers to subordinate their own class organs, the councils, to the supposedly more representative national assembly. And both the Russian and German revolutions had clearly demonstrated the capacity of the working class, through its determined revolutionary action and propaganda, to disintegrate the armies of the bourgeoisie and win the mass of soldiers over to the side of the revolution.
Thus Luxemburg had no hesitation in describing Engels’ approach as a blunder. But she did not therefore conclude that Engels had ceased to be a revolutionary. She was convinced that he would have recognised his error in the light of later experience: “Those who know the works of Marx and Engels, those who are familiarly acquainted with the genuinely revolutionary spirit that inspired all their teachings and all their writings, will feel positively certain that Engels would have been one of the first to protest against the debauch of parliamentarism, against the frittering away of the energies of the labour movement, which was characteristic of Germany during the decades before the war.
Luxemburg goes on to offer a framework for understanding the mistake that Engels had made: Seventy years ago, to those who reviewed the errors and illusions of 1848, it seemed as if the proletariat still had an interminable distance to traverse before it could hope to realise socialism... such a belief, too, can be read in every line of the preface which Engels wrote in 1895". In other words, Engels was writing in a period when the direct struggle for revolution was not yet on the agenda; the collapse of capitalist society had not yet become the tangible reality it was in 1918. In such circumstances, it was not possible for the workers’ movement to develop a totally lucid view of its road to power. In particular, the necessary division, enshrined in the Erfurt Programme, between the minimum programme of economic and political reforms, and the maximum programme of socialism, contained within it the danger that the latter would be subordinated to the former; likewise that the use of parliament, which had been a viable tactic in the struggle for reforms, would become an end in itself.
Luxemburg shows that even Engels had not been immune from confusion on this point. But she also recognised that the real problem lay with the political currents who actively embodied the dangers facing the social democratic parties in this period - with the opportunists and those who covered for them in the party leadership. It was the latter in particular that had consciously manipulated Engels to achieve a result very far from his intentions: “I must remind you of the well-known fact the preface in question was written by Engels under strong pressure on the part of the parliamentary group. At that date in Germany, during the early nineties after the Anti-Socialist law had been annulled, there was a strong movement towards the left, the movement of those who wished to save the party from becoming completely absorbed in the parliamentary struggle. Bebel and his associates wished for convincing arguments, backed up by Engels’ great authority; they wished for an utterance which would help them to keep a tight hand upon the revolutionary elements”. As we said at the beginning: the fight for a revolutionary programme is always a fight against opportunism within the ranks of the proletariat; by the same token, opportunism is always ready to pounce on the least lapse in vigilance and concentration by the revolutionaries, and to use their errors for their own purposes.
“After Engels’ death in 1895, in the theoretical field the leadership of the party passed into the hands of Kautsky. The upshot of this change was that at every annual congress the energetic protests of the left wing against a purely parliamentarist policy, its urgent warnings against the sterility and the danger of such a policy, were stigmatised as anarchism, anarchising socialism, or at least anti-marxism. What passed officially for marxism became a cloak for all possible kinds of opportunism, for persistent shirking of the revolutionary class struggle, for every conceivable half-measure. Thus the German social democracy, and the labour movement, the trade union movement as well, were condemned to pine away within the framework of capitalist society. No longer did German socialists and trade unionists make any serious attempt to overthrow capitalist institutions or put the capitalist machine out of gear” (Luxemburg, speech to the founding congress of the KPD).
We are not of that modernist school of thought which likes to present Karl Kautsky as the source of everything that was wrong with the social democratic parties. It is certainly true that his name is often associated with profound theoretical falsities - such as his theory of socialist consciousness as the product of the intellectuals, or his concept of ultra-imperialism. And indeed, to use Lenin’s own term, Kautsky finally became a renegade from marxism, above all because of his repudiation of the October revolution. Such associations sometimes make it hard to remember that Kautsky was indeed a marxist before he became a renegade. Like Bebel, he had defended the continuity of marxism at a number of crucial moments in the life of the party. But like Bebel, like so many others of his generation, his understanding of marxism was later revealed as suffering from a number of significant weaknesses, which in turn reflected more widespread weaknesses in the movement as a whole. In Kautsky’s case, it was above all his fate to become the champion of an approach which, instead of subjecting the contingent errors of the past revolutionary movement to a searching critique in the light of changing material conditions, froze these errors into an unchallengable orthodoxy.
As we have seen, Kautsky often took up swords against the revisionist right in the party: hence, his reputation as a stalwart of orthodox marxism. But if we look a little deeper into the manner in which he waged the battle against revisionism, we will also see why this orthodoxy was in reality a form of centrism - a manner of conciliating with opportunism; and this was the case long before Kautsky openly avowed the label of centrist as a description of his half way house between what he saw as the excesses of right and left. Kautsky’s hesitations in taking up an intransigent fight against revisionism were initially exposed at the very beginning of the furore over Bernstein’s articles, when his personal friendship with the latter made him dither for some time before answering him politically. But Kautsky’s tendency to conciliate with reformism went deeper than this, as Lenin noted in The State and Revolution:
“Of immeasurably greater significance [than Kautsky’s hesitations about taking up the fight against Bernstein], however, is the fact that, in his very controversy with the opportunists, in his formulation of the question and his manner of treating it, we can now see, as we study the history of Kautsky’s latest betrayal of marxism, his systematic deviation towards opportunism precisely on the question of the state” (Chapter VI, 2: “Kautsky’s controversy with the opportunists”). One of the works that Lenin chose to illustrate these deviations was one whose form is that of a thorough-going rebuttal of revisionism, but whose real content reveals his increasing tendency to accommodate himself with it. This is his book The Social Revolution, published in 1902.
In this book, Kautsky offers some very sound marxist arguments against the main revisions put forward by Bernstein and his followers. Against their argument (which has such a familiar ring these days) that the growth of the middle classes was leading towards a softening of class antagonisms, so that the conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat could be sorted out inside the framework of capitalist society, Kautsky responded by insisting, as Marx had done, that the exploitation of the working class was growing in intensity, that the capitalist state was becoming more and not less oppressive, and that this was exacerbating rather than attenuating class antagonisms: “the more that the ruling classes support themselves with the state machinery and misuse this for the purposes of exploitation and oppression, just so more must the bitterness of the proletariat against them increase, class hatred grow, and the efforts to conquer the machinery of state increase in intensity” (The Social Revolution, Chicago, 1916, p 36-7).
Likewise, Kautsky refuted the argument that the growth of democratic institutions was making the social revolution unnecessary, that “by the exercise of democratic rights upon existing grounds the capitalist society is gradually and without any shock growing into socialism. Consequently the revolutionary conquest of political power by the proletariat is unnecessary, and the efforts towards it is directly hurtful, since they can operate in no other way than to disturb this slowly but surely advancing process” (ibid, p66). Kautsky argues that this was an illusion because while it was true that the number of socialist representatives in parliament was increasing, “simultaneously therewith the bourgeois democracy falls to pieces” (p75); “the Parliament which was formerly the means of pressing the government forward upon the road to progress becomes ever more and more the means to nullify the little progress that conditions compel the government to make. In the degree that the class which rules through parliamentarism is rendered superfluous and indeed injurious, the Parliamentary machinery loses its significance” (p78-9). Here was a real insight into the conditions that would more and more develop as capitalism moved into its epoch of decadence: the decline of parliament even as a forum of intra-bourgeois conflict (which the workers’ party could sometimes exploit to its own advantage), its conversion into a mere fig-leaf covering an increasingly bureaucratic and militaristic state machine. Kautsky even recognised that, given the stultification of the bourgeoisie’s democratic bodies, the strike weapon - up to and including the mass political strike, whose outline had already been glimpsed in France and Belgium - “will play a great role in the revolutionary battles of the future” (p 90).
And yet Kautsky was never able to take these arguments to their logical conclusion. If bourgeois parliamentarism was in decline, if the workers were developing new forms of action such as the mass strike, these were all signs of the approach of a new revolutionary epoch in which the focus of the class struggle was moving decisively away from the parliamentary arena and back to the specific class terrain of the proletariat - to the factories and the streets. Indeed, far from seeing the revolutionary implications of the decline of parliamentarism, Kautsky drew from it the most conservative of conclusions: that the proletariat’s mission was to salvage and revive this dying bourgeois democracy: “Parliamentarism becomes ever more senile and helpless, and can only be reawakened to new youth and strength when it, together with the total governmental power, is conquered by the rising proletariat and turned to serve its purpose. Parliamentarism, far from making a revolution useless and superfluous, is itself in need of a revolution in order to vivify it” (p 79-80).
These views were not - as in the case of Engels - in contradiction with numerous other, and far clearer statements. They express a consistent thread in Kautsky’s thought, going back at least to his comments on the Erfurt Programme in the early 90s and going forward to his well-known work The Road to Power in 1910. This latter work scandalised the open reformists with its bold affirmation that “the revolutionary era is beginning”, but it maintained the same conservative view on the seizure of power. Commenting on both these works in his State and Revolution, Lenin was especially struck by the fact that nowhere in these books does Kautsky defend the classic marxist affirmation about the need to demolish the bourgeois state machine and replace it with a Commune state:
“Throughout the pamphlet [The Social Revolution] the author speaks of the winning of state power - and no more; that is, he has chosen a formula which makes a concession to the opportunists, inasmuch as it admits the possibility of seizing power without destroying the state machine. The very thing which Marx in 1872 declared to be obsolete in the programme of the Communist Manifesto, is revived by Kautsky in 1902” (ibid).
With Kautsky, and thus with the official marxism of the Second International, parliamentarism had become an immutable dogma.
The increasing tendency for the social democratic party to present itself as a candidate for government office, for taking over the reins of the bourgeois state, was to have profound implications for its economic programme as well; logically, the latter appeared more and more not as a programme for the destruction of capital, for uprooting the foundations of capitalist production, but as a series of realistic proposals for taking over the bourgeois economy and managing it on behalf of the proletariat. It was no accident that the growth of this vision, which contrasts quite sharply with the ideas of socialist transformation defended in previous decades by the likes of Engels, Bebel and Morris (see the articles in this series in International Reviews 83, 85 and 86), coincided with the first expressions of state capitalism, which accompanied the rise of imperialism and militarism. It is true that Kautsky criticised the state socialist deviation advocated by the likes of Vollmar, but his criticisms did not go to the root of the matter. Kautsky’s polemic opposed programmes which called on the existing bourgeois or absolutist governments to introduce socialist measures such as the nationalisation of the land. But it failed to see that a programme of statification introduced by a social democratic government would also remain inside the boundaries of capitalism.
Thus, in The Social Revolution, we are told that “the political domination of the proletariat and the continuation of the capitalist system of production are irreconcileable” (p113). But the passages that follow this bold statement give a truer flavour of Kautsky’s vision of the socialist transformation: “The question then arises as to what purchasers are at the command of capitalists when they wish to sell their undertakings. A portion of the factories, mines, etc could be sold directly to the labourers who are working them, and could be henceforth operated co-operatively; another portion could be sold to co-operatives of distribution, and still another to the communities or to the states. It is clear, however, that capital would find its most extensive and generous purchaser in the States or municipalities, and for this very reason the majority of industries would pass into the possession of the States and municipalities. That the Social Democrats when they came into control would strive consciously for this solution is well recognised” (ibid, p 113-114). Kautsky then goes on to explain that the industries most ripe for nationalisation are those where trustification is the most highly developed, and that “the socialisation (as one may designate for short the transference to national, municipal and co-operative possession) will carry with it the socialisation of the great part of the money capital. When a factory or piece of landed property is nationalised, its debts will also be nationalised, and private debts will become public debts. In the case of a corporation, the stockholders will become holders of government bonds” (p116-117).
From passages like these we can see that in Kautsky’s socialist transformation all the essential categories of capital remain: the means of production are sold to the workers or the state, money capital is centralised in government hands, the private trusts give way to national and municipal trusts, and so on. Elsewhere in the same work, Kautsky argues explicitly for the retention of the wage labour relationship by a proletarian regime:
“I speak here of the wages of labour. What, it will be said, will there be wages in the new society? Shall we not have abolished wage labour and money? How then can one speak of the wages of labour? These objections would be sound if the social revolution proposed to immediately abolish money. I maintain that this would be impossible. Money is the simplest means known up to the present time which makes it possible in as complicated a mechanism a that of the modern productive process, with its tremendous far-reaching division of labour, to secure the circulation of products and their distribution to the individual members of society. It is the means which makes it possible for each one to satisfy his necessities according to his individual inclination. As a means to such circulation money will be found indispensable until something better is found” (p 129).
It is of course true that wage labour cannot be abolished overnight. But it is equally false to argue, as Kautsky does in this and related passages, that wages and money are neutral forms that can be retained under socialism until such time as the increase in production leads to abundance for all. On the basis of wage labour and commodity production, increasing production will be a euphemism for the accumulation of capital, and the accumulation of capital, whether directed by the state or private hands, necessarily means the deprivation and exploitation of the producers. This is why Marx, in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, argued that the proletarian dictatorship would have to make immediate inroads into the whole logic of accumulation, replacing wages and money with the system of labour time vouchers.
Elsewhere Kautsky insists that these socialist wages are fundamentally different from capitalist wages because under the new system labour power is no longer a commodity - the assumption being that once the means of production have become state property, there is no longer any market for labour power. This argument - which was often used by the various apologists of the Stalinist model to prove that the USSR and its offspring could not be capitalist - has a fundamental flaw: it ignores the reality of the world market, which makes each national economy a competing capitalist unit irrespective of the degree to which market mechanisms have been suppressed internally.
It is true, as we have noted before in this series, that Marx himself made statements which imply that socialist production could exist inside the boundaries of a nation state. The problem is that the ideas developed by official social democracy in the early part of the 20th century - in contrast to the resolutely internationalist approach assumed by Marx - were more and more seen as part of a practical programme for each nation taken separately. This national vision of socialism even began to be enshrined programmatically. We thus find the following formulation in another work by Kautsky from the same period, The Socialist Republic [2]:
“a community able to satisfy its wants and embracing all industries requisite thereto must have dimensions very different from those of the Socialist colonies that were planned at the commencement of our century. Among the social organisations in existence today, there is but one that has the requisite dimensions, that can be used as the requisite field, for the establishment and development of the Socialist or Co-operative Commonwealth, and that is: the Nation” (p11).
But perhaps the most significant thing about Kautsky’s vision of the socialist transformation is the degree to which everything takes place in a legal, orderly fashion. He spends several pages of The Social Revolution arguing that it will be far better to compensate the capitalists, to buy them out, than simply to confiscate their property. Although his writings about the revolutionary process allow for the use of strikes and other actions by the workers themselves, his overriding concern seems to be that the revolution should not frighten the capitalists too much. One of Kautsky’s reformist opponents at the 1903 Dresden congress, Kollo, put his finger on the problem quite astutely, when he observed that Kautsky wanted a social revolution without violence. But neither the overthrow of the political power of the capitalist class, nor the economic expropriation of the expropriators, can take place without the unruly, violent, but uniquely creative irruption of the masses onto the stage of history.
***
We repeat, it is not a question of demonising Kautsky. He was the expression of a deeper process - the opportunist gangrene of the social democratic parties, their gradual incorporation into bourgeois society, and the difficulties that the marxists had in understanding and combating this danger. Certainly, on the problem of parliamentarism, perfect clarity was nowhere to be found in the period we have studied. In Reform or Revolution, for example, Luxemburg makes a very telling attack on Bernstein’s parliamentary illusions, but even she leaves open certain loopholes on the question (in particular, when she fails to recognise the very blunder in Engels’ Introduction to the Class Struggles in France which she castigated in 1918). Another instructive case is that of William Morris. In the 1880s, Morris made a number of insightful warnings against the corrupting power of parliament; but these perceptions were undermined by his tendency towards purism, an inability to understand the necessity for socialists to intervene in the daily struggle of the class and - in that epoch - to use elections and parliament as one focus for this struggle. Like many of the left wing critics of parliamentarism at this time, Morris was thus highly susceptible to the timeless anti-parliamentary attitudes of the anarchists. And, towards the end of his life, in reaction to the havoc that anarchism had wrought on his efforts to build a revolutionary organisation, Morris himself tended towards the growing infatuation with the parliamentary road to power.
What was missing during those years was the real movement of the class. It was above all the earthquake of 1905 in Russia which enabled the best elements in the workers’ movement to discern the true contours of the proletarian revolution and move beyond the outmoded and erroneous conceptions that had hitherto clouded their vision. Kautsky’s real crime would then be to fight tooth and nail against these clarifications, presenting himself more and more openly as a centrist whose real bete noir was not the revisionist right but the revolutionary left, as embodied in figures like Luxemburg and Pannekoek. But that is another part of the story.
CDW
[1] It has to be said that Engels’ efforts to counter the weaknesses in the Erfurt Programme were not altogether successful. Engels clearly recognised that the opportunist danger had been codified within it: his critique of the draft programme (letter to Kautsky, June 29, 1891) contains the clearest definition of opportunism to be found in the writings of Engels and Marx, and his central concern was the fact that the programme, while containing a good general marxist introduction about the inevitable crisis of capitalism and the necessity for socialism, remains completely vague about how the proletariat will come to power. He is particularly critical of the implication that the German workers could use the Prussian version of parliament (“a fig-leaf for absolutism”) to gain power pacifically. On the other hand, in the same text Engels repeats the view that in more democratic countries, the proletariat could come to power through the electoral process, and he does not make a sufficiently clear distinction between the democratic republic and the Commune state. In the end, the Erfurt document, rather than showing the connection between the minimum and the maximum programmes, creates a gulf between the two. This is why Luxemburg, in her speech to the founding congress of the KPD in 1918, talks of the Spartacus Programme as “deliberately opposing” the Erfurt Programme, rather than merely superceding it.
[2] This passage is taken from an English version “translated and adapted to America” by Daniel De Leon (New York, 1900), so we are not sure what elements are original to Kautsky. Nevertheless the quote gives us a taste of conceptions developing in the international movement at that time.
The ideological campaign which is trying to identify the political positions adopted by the Communist Left against World War II, with those of "negationism" (ie the calling into question of the Nazi extermination of the Jews: see "Anti-fascism justifies barbarism" in International Review 88) has two aims in view. The first is to discredit the Communist Left in the eyes of the working class, as the only political current which refused to succumb to the "Sacred Union" during the Second World War. Only the Communist Left denounced the war as an inter-imperialist war like that of 1914-18 - just as Lenin, Trotsky, and Rosa Luxemburg had done with World War I - by showing that the war's supposed specificity as a conflict between the two systems of fascism and democracy was nothing but a shameless lie designed to enrol the workers in a gigantic bloodbath. The second objective belongs to the ideological offensive aimed at making the workers believe that despite its imperfections, bourgeois democracy is the only system possible, and that they should therefore mobilise to defend it, as they are asked to through a whole series of political-media campaigns, from the "mani politi" operation in Italy and the "Dutroux affair" in Belgium, through all the row over Le Pen and his electoral success in France. In this offensive, the role of the denunciation of negationism is to present fascism as "absolute evil", and thus absolve capitalism as a whole from responsibility for the Holocaust.
Once again, we declare vigorously that the Communist Left has nothing whatever to do with the "negationist" movement, which brings together the traditional far right and the "ultra-left" (a term which is completely foreign to the Communist Left: see International Review no.88). For us, there has never been any question of denying or minimising the terrifying reality of the Nazi extermination camp. As we said in the previous issue of this Review: "Understating the barbarity of the Nazi regime, even under the pretext of denouncing the anti-fascist mystification, comes down in the end to diminishing the barbarism of the decadent capitalist system, of which Nazism was merely one expression". The denunciation of anti-fascism as an instrument for enrolling the proletariat in history's most terrible inter-imperialist carnage, and as a means to hide the real culprit responsible for all these horrors - capitalism as a whole - has never meant the slightest concession in denouncing fascism, whose first victims were proletarian militants. The essence of proletarian internationalism - which the Communist Left has always intransigently defended, in direct line from the true marxist tradition, and so against all those who have betrayed it and trampled it underfoot, the Trotskyists to the fore - has always been to denounce all camps, and to show that they are all equally responsible for the abominable suffering inflicted on humanity by all imperialist wars.
In previous issues of this Review we have shown that the barbarity of the "democratic camp" during World War II was fully equal to that of fascism, both in its horror and in the cynicism with which its crimes against humanity were perpetrated: crimes like the fire-storm bombardment of Dresden and Hamburg, or the nuclear destruction unleashed on an already defeated Japan. In this article, we will demonstrate the Allies' conscious complicity in the Nazi regime's genocide by remaining silent about the concentration camps, despite the fact that they were perfectly aware of their existence and their function.
Fascism was desired and supported by the bourgeoisie
Before demonstrating the Allies' complicity in the crimes perpetrated by the Nazis in the concentration camps, it is worth recalling that fascism's appearance - which has always been presented by all wings of capital, from the "classical" right to the extreme left, as a monstrous historical accident, the product of the deranged minds of Hitler or Mussolini - is indeed the organic product of capitalism in its decadent phase, and of the defeat suffered by the proletariat in the revolutionary wave that followed World War I.
The idea that the ruling class did not know of the Nazi Party's real intentions, that in some sense it was taken for a ride, does not hold up for an instant in the face of historical facts. The Nazi Party has its roots in two factors which determined the whole history of the 1930s: on the one hand, the crushing of the German revolution, which opened the way to the triumph of the counter-revolution world-wide, and on the other the defeat of German imperialism in World War I. From the outset, the objectives of the Nazi Party were to complete the crushing of the proletariat, on the basis of the terrible bloodletting already carried out by the social-democratic SPD of Noske and Scheidemann, in order to rebuild the military strength of German imperialism. These objectives were shared by the whole German bourgeoisie, whatever their real disagreements as to the methods to use, or the best moment to set them in motion. The SA militia which Hitler used during his rise to power were the direct descendants of the Freikorps which assassinated Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and thousands of communists and working class militants. Most of the SA leaders began their careers in these same Freikorps, which were the "white guard" used by the SPD to crush the revolution in blood, with the support of the thoroughly democratic victorious powers, which disarmed the German army, but nonetheless made sure that the counter-revolutionary militia always had enough weapons to do their dirty work. Fascism was only able to develop and prosper on the basis of the physical and ideological defeat inflicted on the proletariat by the left of capital, which had been the only force capable of holding back and then vanquishing the revolutionary wave which swept over Germany in 1918-19. This was perfectly understood by the German General Staff, which gave the SPD carte blanche to deal a decisive blow against the developing revolutionary movement, in January 1919. And if Hitler's attempted Munich putsch in 1925 did not meet with support, this was because the most lucid sectors of the ruling classes did not yet consider the time appropriate. It was necessary first to complete the defeat of the proletariat, by using the democratic mystification to the hilt via the Weimar Republic, which despite having the junker Hindenburg as president still kept a radical veneer thanks to the participation in successive governments of ministers from the so-called "Socialist" Party.
But as soon as the proletarian threat had been removed definitively, the ruling class - in its most "classical" form let us remember, through the ruling groups of German capitalism: the Krupps, Thyssen, AG Farben - supported the Nazi Party with all its strength in its march towards power. Henceforth, Hitler's desire to reunite all the forces necessary for the restoration of German imperialism's military power corresponded perfectly to the needs of German capital. Defeated and despoiled by its imperialist rivals after World War I, Germany had no choice but to try to recover lost ground in a new war. Its determination to do so, far from being the product of any supposed German aggressivity, some kind of congenital deformation which found its means of expression in fascism, was nothing other than the strict expression of the unbending laws of imperialism in capitalist decadence. In a world market entirely shared out between the great powers, those that arrived late at the imperialist table lost out in the division of the imperialist cake, and had no option but to try to carve themselves a bigger slice by war. The German proletariat's physical defeat on the one hand, Germany's status as a defeated and despoiled imperialist power on the other, made fascism the most adequate means for Germany to prepare for the next world slaughter, contrary to those countries which had been victorious in war, and whose proletariat had not been physically crushed. State capitalism was being strengthened everywhere, including in the "democratic" countries. Fascism, as a particularly brutal form of state capitalism, made it possible to centralise and concentrate all capital in the hands of the state, and to orientate the entire economy towards preparation for war. Hitler this came to power as democratically as you please, that is to say with the complete support of the German bourgeoisie. In effect, once the proletarian menace had been thrust aside for good, the ruling class no longer needed to worry about maintaining the whole democratic arsenal, thus following in Italy's footsteps.
Racism and anti-Semitism: products of the whole of decadent capitalism
"Yes perhaps" we will be told, "but aren't you ignoring fascism's visceral anti-Semitism, which distinguishes it from all the other fractions and parties of the bourgeoisie, and the fact that it is precisely this particular characteristic which provoked the holocaust?". This idea is defended by the Trotskyists in particular. While formally they recognise the responsibility of capitalism and the bourgeoisie in general in the birth of fascism, it is only to add that fascism is nonetheless worse than bourgeois democracy - as the Holocaust proves, and that faced with this ideology of genocide we cannot hesitate for a moment: we must choose our camp, the camp of democracy and the Allies. Along with their defence of the USSR it is this argument which served to justify their betrayal of proletarian internationalism and their passage into the bourgeois camp during World War II. It is thus perfectly logical that in France today, we find the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire and its leader Alain Krivine, with the discreet but real support of Lutte Ouvriere, at the head of the anti-fascist and "anti-negationist" crusade, defending the notion of fascism as the "absolute evil", and so qualitatively different from all the other expressions of capitalist barbarism that the working class should take the lead in fighting for the defence and even the revitalisation of democracy.
Because the proletariat - the only force capable of opposing the nationalism that oozes from every pore of rotting bourgeois society - had been beaten both physically and ideologically, Nazism was able, with the consent of the ruling class, to use the racism endemic within the petty bourgeoisie to make racism and anti-Semitism the official ideology of the regime. However monstrous and irrational the anti-Semitism professed and practised by the Nazi regime cannot be explained merely by the madness and perversity - however real - of its leaders. As the PCI pamphlet Auschwitz, or the Great Alibi very correctly emphasises, the extermination of the Jews "did not take place at just any time, but in the midst of a crisis and imperialist war. It must thus be explained from within this gigantic enterprise of destruction. This fact clarifies the problem: we no longer have to explain the "destructive nihilism" of the Nazis, but why this destruction was concentrated in part on the Jews". To explain why the Jewish population, although not alone, was first singled out as the object of general hatred, and then exterminated en masse by Nazism, we have to take account of two factors: the demands of the German war effort; and the role of the petty bourgeoisie during this sinister period. The latter had been reduced to ruin by the violence of the economic crisis in Germany, and was falling massively into the lumpen-proletariat. Without the proletariat to act as an antidote, the desperate petty bourgeoisie gave free rein to all its most reactionary prejudices, characteristic of a class with no future, and plunged, like a mad dog, into the racism and anti-Semitism propagated by the fascist formations. These pointed to the Jew as par excellence the nationless cosmopolitan "sucking the blood of the people", and the scapegoat for the poverty of the petty-bourgeoisie, in order to rally this class to it. Most of fascism's first shock troops did indeed come from a petty bourgeoisie sinking into declassed status. But this designation of the Jew as enemy number one had another function: it allowed German capitalism, thanks to the expropriation of the often important funds held by Jewish families; to gather discreetly the funds needed to rearm German imperialism, especially in the beginning, without attracting the attention of the victors of the First World War. At first, the concentration camps had the same function: the provision of a free labour force, entirely dedicated to the preparation of the war.
The Allies' silence during the war
Is this silence to be explained by the latent anti -Semitism of certain Allied leaders, as some post-war Jewish historians have maintained? Anti-Semitism is certainly not restricted to fascist regimes - we may recall Patton's declaration quoted above, or again Stalin's well-known anti-Semitism - but this is not the real reason behind the silence of the Allies, some of whose leaders were either Jews themselves, or close to Jewish organisations (Roosevelt for example). No, the real reason behind this remarkable discretion lies in the laws that regulate the capitalist system, whether its rule be covered by the banner of democracy or of totalitarianism. As in the enemy camp, all the Allies' resources were mobilised for the war. No useless mouths, everybody must be occupied, either at the front or in the production of armaments. The arrival en masse of populations from the camps, of children and old people who could not be sent to the front or the factory, of sick and exhausted men and women who could not be immediately integrated into the war effort, would only have disorganised the latter. So the frontiers were closed, and such immigration prevented by every means possible. In 1943 - in other words at a time when the Anglo-Saxon bourgeoisie was perfectly aware of the reality of the camps - Anthony Eden, minister of His Most Gracious and Democratic Britannic Majesty decided at Churchill's request that "no ship of the United Nations can be affected to transfer the refugees to Europe", while Roosevelt added that "transporting so many people would disorganise the war effort" (Churchill, Memoirs, Vol 10). These are the real and sordid reasons that led these accredited anti-fascists and democrats to remain silent about what was happening in Dachau, Buchenwald, and others of sinister memory! The humanitarian considerations that were supposed to drive the anti-fascist camp, united against fascist barbarism, had no place in their sordid capitalist interests and the demands of the war machine.
The direct complicity of the "democratic camp" in the Holocaust
The Allies did not merely remain silent during the war about the genocide perpetrated in the camps. Their abject cynicism went much further than that. First, while they never hesitated an instant to deluge German cities with bombs, they refused to make the slightest military effort against the camps. By the beginning of 1944, the railways leading to Auschwitz were within easy range of Allied aviation, but although two escapees from the camp provided a detailed description of its functioning and topography, the Allies did nothing. Then, "Hungarian and Slovak Jewish leaders begged the Allies to act when the deportation of Hungarian Jews began. They all proposed the same target: the railway junction of Kosice-Pressow. It is true that the Germans could have repaired the tracks fairly quickly. But this argument does not hold good for the destruction of the Birkenau ovens, which would undoubtedly have slowed the extermination machine. Nothing was done. In the end, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that not even the minimum was tried, that it was drowned in the bad faith of the generals and diplomats" (Le Monde, 27th September 1996).
However, contrary to the laments of this bourgeois paper, the "democratic camp" was not an accomplice to Holocaust merely out of "bad faith" or bureaucratic sloth. As we will see, this complicity was wholly conscious. At first, the deportation camps were essentially labour camps, where the German bourgeoisie could benefit from a cheap labour force entirely at its mercy, directed entirely to the war effort. Although the extermination camps existed already, at the time they were more the exception than the rule. But after its first serious military reversals, especially against the terrible war machine set in motion by the USA, German imperialism could no longer properly feed its own troops and population. The Nazi regime thus decided to rid itself of the excess population in the camps, and from then on the gas-ovens spread their sinister shadow everywhere. The abomination of the executioners carefully gathering their victims' teeth, hair, and finger-nails to feed the German war machine, was the fruit of an imperialism at bay, retreating on every front, and plumbing the depths of the irrationality of imperialist war. But although the Nazi regime and its underlings perpetrated the Holocaust without a qualm, it brought little benefit to German capital, desperately trying to gather together the wherewithal to resist the Allies' inexorable advance. In this context, there were several attempts - in general conducted directly by the SS - to make some profit out of these hundreds of thousands, even millions of prisoners, by selling them to, or exchanging them with the Allies.
The most famous episode of this sinister bargaining was the approach made to Joel Brand, the leader of a semi-clandestine organisation of Hungarian Jews, whose story has been told in the book by A. Weissberg, cited in the pamphlet on Auschwitz, the Great Alibi. He was taken to Budapest to meet the SS officer in charge of the Jewish question, Adolf Eichmann, who instructed him to negotiate with the British and American governments for the liberation of a million Jews, in exchange for 10,000 trucks, but making it clear that he was ready to accept less, or even different goods. To demonstrate their good faith, and the seriousness of their proposal, the SS even proposed to release 100,000 Jews as soon as Brand obtained an agreement in principle, without asking anything in exchange. During his journey, Brand made the acquaintance of British prisons in the Middle East, and after many delays which, far from being accidents were deliberately put in his way by the Allied governments to avoid an official meeting, he was finally able to discuss the proposal with Lord Moyne, the British government's representative in the Middle East. There was nothing personal in the latter's utter refusal of Eichmann's proposal: he was merely following the instructions of the British cabinet. Nor was it a moral refusal to bow to a revolting blackmail. There is no room left for doubt when we read Brand's own account of the discussion: "I begged him to give me at least a written agreement, even if he failed to keep to it, which would at least save 100,000 lives. Moyne then asked what would be the total number. I replied that Eichmann had spoken of a million. "But how can you imagine such a thing Mr Brand? What would I do with a million Jews? Where would I put them? Who would take them in?". In desperation, I said that if the earth no longer had room for us, there was nothing left for us but to let ourselves be exterminated", As Auschwitz or the Great Alibi so rightly says of this glorious episode of World War II, "unfortunately, while the supply was there, the demand was not! Not just the Jews, but even the SS had been taken in by the Allies' humanitarian propaganda! The Allies did not want these million Jews! Not for 10,000 trucks, not for 5,000, not even for nothing".
Some recent historiography has tried to show that this refusal was due above all to Stalin's veto. This is just another attempt to hide the direct complicity of the "great democracies" in the Holocaust, revealed in the misadventure of the naive Brand, whose veracity nobody seriously contests. Suffice to say in reply that during the war, neither Churchill nor Roosevelt were in the habit of being dictated to by Stalin, while on this particular point they were on the same wave-length as the "little father of the peoples , demonstrating the same brutality and cynicism throughout the war. The thoroughly democratic Roosevelt refused other, similar attempts by the Nazis for example when at the end of 1944 they tried to sell Jews to the "Organisation of American Jews", demonstrating their good faith by deporting 2000 Jews to Switzerland, as is detailed by Y. Bauer in his book Jews for Sale (published by Liana Levi).
RN, 4/3/97
No recent event has more dramatically illustrated the world wide sharpening of imperialist tensions than the arrival of 3000 German combat troops in Bosnia. Under the guise of helping to maintain the "peace settlement" for Bosnia imposed by the USA· at Dayton, the German army, like that of its French, British or American rivals, is being sent into the crisis zone in order to defend the imperialist interests of its own national bourgeoisie.
No other event more clearly confirms the rise of German imperialism since its national reunification. For the first: time since World War II, the German bourgeoisie is sending its armed forces abroad with a mandate to wage war. In so doing, it is demonstratively throwing aside the shackles which were imposed on it after its defeat in two world wars. For half a century, the bourgeoisie of the two German states which emerged after 1945 were not granted the right of military intervention abroad in pursuit of their own imperialist interests. Any exception to this general rule imposed by NATO in the west and the Warsaw Pact in the east would be decided, not in Bonn or East Berlin, but in Washington or Moscow. In reality, the only involvement of German troops in military action abroad in the entire post-1945 period was that of East Germany in the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in 1968.
Today Germany is united and emerging as Europe's leading power. The eastern and western blocs no longer exist. In a world racked, not only by growing military tensions, but by global chaos and the struggle of each against all, German imperialism no longer needs permission in order to back up its foreign policy with force of arms. Today, the German government is able to impose its military presence in the Balkans, whether the other great powers like it or not. This growing capacity underlines above all the decline of the hegemony of the only remaining world superpower, the USA. Since the USA's capacity to lay down the law to the government in Bonn was the lynchpin of its domination over two thirds of the globe after World War II, the very presence of the Bundeswehr in Bosnia today demonstrates to the world the extent to which this American domination has been undermined.
Germany undermines Dayton and challenges the USA
But the participation of Bonn in the NATO IFOR2 mission in Bosnia, where it jointly controls one of the three implementation zones along with France, is a challenge to the USA and the European powers nor only at the global historical level. It is also an indispensable move in the concrete defence of crucial German imperialist interests in the region itself. The most important of these German interests is the long term acquisition of a Mediterranean naval base via the harbours of its historical ally Croatia. It was the Kohl government which triggered off the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the whole chain reaction of bloody conflicts in that country, by aggressively pushing for the independence of Croatia and Slovenia at the beginning of the 1990s. Although Bonn, not least through massive arms supplies to Croatia, was able to achieve this goal, one third of the territory of its Croatian ally remained occupied by Serb forces, practically cutting off the north of the country from the strategic Dalmatian ports in the south. At the beginning of the Balkan wars, Germany was still able to advance strongly through background support for Croatia, without having to engage its own troops. But when war broke out in neighbouring Bosnia, the main European rivals of Germany, especially Britain and France under the disguise of the UN, and then the USA under the umbrella of NATO, proceeded to pursue their interests in the region through a direct military presence. This presence could be all the more effective since Germany itself was militarily and politically not yet prepared to follow suit. It was above all the military engagement of the USA which in the past two years began to weaken the position of Germany. The military victories of Croatia against the pro-British and pro-French Serbs in the Krajina and in Bosnia, which overcame the division of that country linking the Dalmatian ports to the capital Zagreb, were gained thanks to the support, not of Germany but of America. The Dayton agreement, imposed by the US in the wake of its military strikes in Bosnia, thus confirmed the imperious necessity for Germany in turn to defend its interests in the region hrough its own armed forces. The stationing of German sanitary and logistic forces in Croatia last year, outside the battle zone and without a combat mandate, was a first step towards the present "peace- keeping" force in Bosnia itself. Upon their arrival in Bosnia, these German units, heavily armed and equipped with a combat mandate, were openly greeted as allies by the Bosnian Croats, who immediately adopted a more aggressive attitude towards the Bosnian Muslims, making life difficult for the French and Spanish troops in the divided city of Mostar. And the Croatian government in Zagreb rewarded the arrival of the Bundeswehr by deciding to replace the old Boeings of Croatian Airlines with new Airbus planes mainly built in Germany. Justifying this decision, the Croatian foreign ministry declared: "we owe our national independence to America, but our future lies in Europe, on the basis of our friendship to the German and the Bavarian governments."
The German Balkan Offensive
We are presently witnessing a German counter-offensive in ex-Yugoslavia and the Balkans aimed at reversing the German losses through the Dayton process, and at profiting from the American difficulties in the Middle East to extend German influence in south-eastern Europe and central Asia. The arrival of German troops in Bosnia, far from being an isolated "peace-keeping" event, is part of an extremely aggressive imperialist expansion towards the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus. The central pivot of this policy is the collaboration with Turkey. The defeat of Russian imperialism in Chechnya, and the weakening of its position in the whole of the Caucasus, is not least the fruit of this German-Turkish collaboration. Today, Germany is strongly supporting the rapprochement policy of the Erbakan government in Ankara towards Iran, another traditional German ally. And it has clearly taken the side of Turkey in its conflict with Greece. Foreign Minister Kinkel told the press December 7 in Bonn: "Turkey is for Germany the key country for our relations to the Islamic world ... How can you blame Turkey for orienting itself more strongly towards its Islamic neighbours, since Turkey hasn't gained even a penny from the customs union with the EU due to the blocking policy of Greece?" It is in response to this German-Turkish alignment that Russia could promise to deliver rockets to the Greek Cypriots, without encountering strong disapproval from Washington. Here, there is a massive build-up of arms and tensions at the junction between Europe and Asia.
What is at stake strategically in these conflicts?
In the same year Friedrich Naumann, another famous theoretician of German imperialism, wrote. "Germany must throw its whole weight behind securing this route, upon which depends its link to Turkey. We have experienced in war the damage which can be caused when the Serbs acquire part of this route. This was the reason for Mackensen's army crossing the Danube. Everything which lies on the Bagdad railway line, lies on the route Hamburg-Suer, which we cannot permit to be blocked by anyone. What is the good of the Bagdad or the Anatolian railway, if we cannot use them without English permission?"
German-American rivalry in Eastern Europe
Although the United States and Germany, via their Bosnian and Croatian pawns in Yugoslavia, recently made a tactical alliance to push back the Serbs, and although Washington and Bonn have worked together to limit the development of chaos in Russia, they have become the main rivals in the fight for domination of Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian imperialism has rapidly lost even the last remnants of its previous influence over the former Warsaw Pact countries. Although the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union are justified by the western bourgeois media with the need to protect Eastern Europe from a possible Russian aggression, in reality they are part of the race between Germany via the EU and the US via NATO to replace the Muscovite with their own imperialist domination. During the first half of the 1990s Germany was able to build up a more or less strong influence in all ex-Warsaw Pact countries except the Czech Republic. At the centre of this German expansion was its alliance with Poland, which has a strong military component. In fact, under the guise of helping to seal off the Polish eastern frontier from illegal migrants heading for Germany, Bonn has begun to equip and even finance important parts of the Polish military apparatus. Indeed the Polish government has warmly greeted the deployment of German troops in Bosnia, and has promised to participate with the Bundeswehr in future operations abroad. The fact that a country like Poland allies itself with the economic giant Germany rather than the US military superpower reveals how little Warsaw fears a Russian military invasion. In reality, the Polish bourgeoisie, far from being on the defensive, hopes to share the spoils of the German expansion at the expense of Russia.
It's precisely because the US lost so much ground to Germany in Eastern Europe over recent years, that it is now pressing so impatiently for the eastern expansion of NATO. But in doing this, it is jeopardising its privileged relations with Russia, which are so important for Washington precisely because the exhausted Russian bear is the only other country to possess a gigantic nuclear arsenal. Presently, German diplomacy is doing all in its power to widen the Russian-American breach, by offering a series of concessions to Moscow at Washington's expense. One of these proposed concessions was that no NATO (i.e. U.S.) troops or nuclear weapons should be stationed in the new NATO member countries. The German defence minister Ruhe even proposed including the territory of ex-East Germany in this category. This would amount to creating, for the first time since 1945, a no-go area for American troops in the German Federal Republic: a possible first step to making U.S. forces eventually leave altogether. One understands the rage of the political establishment in Washington, which has started producing human rights reports placing Germany on the same level as Iran or North Korea because of its treatment of the American Scientology sect.
The rise of Germany and the crisis of French European policy
There are several reasons for the recent distancing between Paris and London, one being the punishment handed out by the United States especially to Britain. But from the French point of view, the alliance with Britain has failed in one of its most important goals: preventing the rise of Germany. German troops in the Balkans, and the German entente with Poland, traditionally an ally of France, are the best proofs of this. In response, France is not realigning itself with Germany, but changing its tactics in combatting it. The new tactic, that of embracing ones enemy in order to hold it back, is demonstrated in Bosnia, where the German forces, if they cannot be excluded, are at least under French leadership. This tactic may work for a time, since Germany is not yet able to play a more independent military role. But in the long term it is also doomed to failure.
Sharpening of military tensions
This whole development reveals the bloody logic of militarism in this century, in the decadent phase of capitalism. Through the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Germany, thanks to its economic and political strength, and its geographical situation, became Europe's leading power almost overnight. But even such a power can only effectively defend its interests if it is able to enforce them militarily. Since capitalism can no longer conquer sufficient markets for a real expansion of the system, each imperialist power can only assert itself at the expense of others. In this framework, which in this century has already led to two world wars, it is brute force which in the final instance decides the status of bourgeois states. The events in Yugoslavia have confirmed this lesson. Unless it has its troops in the region, German imperialism will lose out there, despite all its other strengths. It is this compulsion of a declining system which today is heating up military tensions around the world, dictating the militarist course of the German and all other bourgeois states.
But this bloody course, with all the impoverishment and suffering it imposes on the working class, and the light it will shed on the reality of the system, will in the long term sharpen the class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. At the historic level, the development of German imperialist expansions can be a considerable factor in the return of the German proletariat to the head of the revolutionary class struggle of the international proletariat.
[1] All the quotations from the geostrategists of the "Alldeutsche Verein" have been taken from the documentation "Europastrategien des deutschen Kapitals 1900-1945".
The recent strikes and economic difficulties in South Korea have overturned one of the bourgeoisies arguments in its ideological campaign to refute marxism. Disappointed by the end of the Japanese “miracle”, the bourgeoisie seized on the considerable growth rates of the “Asian dragons” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) and the rise of new “tigers” (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia). Wasnt their prosperity the “proof” that underdeveloped countries can quickly emerge out of poverty, and that the credit for these successes lies with capitalism and its market laws? And how many times have we been shown striking workers who carry on with their work while wearing an armband to mark their discontent? The “devotion to the interests of the company”, the “legendary discipline” of the south east Asian workers has been presented to us by the bourgeoisie and its media as one of the secrets of the economic success of these countries and as the living proof of the emptiness of the marxist theory that class conflict is inevitable.
With the collapse of the eastern bloc and the demise of Stalinism, which has been falsely presented as the end of communism, the whole bourgeoisie announced the triumph of the “market economy” and promised a new era of prosperity. But the brutal realities of the crisis, austerity measures and mass redundancies on a scale not seen for 25 years, are there to contradict these triumphant speeches and to disperse the ideological fog of these phony promises about a future of “prosperity”. More than ever, the bourgeoisie urgently needs models of success in order to keep its myths alive and hide the historic bankruptcy of its system. It has to do all it can to prevent the proletariat, its mortal enemy, from becoming aware of the real roots of the crisis, from understanding that capitalism has no other future than one which drags humanity into growing impoverishment and into increasingly murderous military conflicts. This is why, after the more and more evident exposure of its German and Japanese models, the ideological pimps of the bourgeoisie have been promoting the south east Asian examples as new poles of growth. This is one of the new mystifications in vogue today.
Only
a global analysis of the decadence of capitalism can enable us to
understand the place and significance of the relative economic
development of the south east Asian dragons and how they constitute
an exception to the rule of massive deindustrialisation in the third
world and to the general incapacity of the capitalist mode of
production to develop the productive forces. The figures are very
eloquent here: the third world only returned to the level of
industrialisation per inhabitant it had in 1750 two centuries later,
in 1960. Despite all the bourgeoisies triumphant talk about the
dynamism of south east Asia and third world development, during the
period of decadence the gap between the industrialised countries and
the rest of the world has grown bigger and bigger: it has more than
doubled, going from 1 to 3.4 in 1913 to 1 to 8.2 in 1990. Whereas
during the ascendant phase of capitalism the population integrated
into the productive process grew more rapidly than the population
itself, today we are seeing a growing mass of workers being ejected
from the system. The end of capitalisms progressive role can be
measured, among other things, by its inability to develop one of its
main productive forces: labour power. The small burst of
industrialisation in the third world during the years 1960-70, which
was vigorous enough in terms of growth rates, in no way overturned
the overall situation. It was limited in time and space, it depended
entirely on the mode of accumulation in the developed countries, and
in the end proved very costly and pernicious for the third world
itself. But apart from a few exceptions, mostly localised in south
east Asia, most of the attempts to create a real industrial base
failed. And no wonder, since the established industrial powers hardly
wanted to see the generalisation of new competitors.[1] [544]
Without
developing here on a question which we will have to return to on
another occasion, we want to recall that the brunt of
industrialisation in the third world has been concentrated in only
five countries: Brazil and the four dragons.[2] [545]
Together, these five countries supply nearly 80% of exports of
manufactured goods from the third world, even though they make up
only 6% of the latters population. Looking at the four dragons alone,
the imbalance is even greater: in 1990 they supplied two thirds of
exports of manufactured goods from the whole of the third world, but
represent only 3% of its population. Limited in space, this
development was also limited in time. The brief reversal of the
general dynamic in the years 1967-77 (cf the table below) has again
given way to an increase in the relative gap: the growth of
production in the third world went back to a rate lower than that of
the industrialised countries. Entire zones even stopped growing,
since production per capita simply went into decline. The 1980s, real
lost years for the third world, put a definite end to the illusions.
The few exceptions which escaped this general evolution did not
refute the overall tendency. The 1980s saw a quasi-stagnation in per
capita production (0.7%) in the countries of the southern hemisphere
Its only in the general context described above that we can pose the question of the cause, scale and nature of the growth that took place in south east Asia. First of all, we must exclude Japan from the growth figures in this region: Japan was the only country in the region which went through an industrial revolution in the 19th century and freed itself from any major direct or even indirect colonial domination. This country, which went through its capitalist transformation via the Meiji revolution of 1867, has to be seen as one of the economic powers that emerged during the ascendant period of capitalism.
The south east Asian exception can only be understood in the context of the deadly struggle between the two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) which came out of the second imperialist world war. Contained in Europe in the immediate post-war period, the expansion of the eastern bloc was displaced towards Asia. The USSRs support for the Maoist bourgeois faction which came to power in 1949, plus the war in Korea, led the USA to develop a policy aimed at blocking the expansion of its imperialist rival in this part of the globe. Aware that economic and social poverty was one of the main arguments used by the pro-Soviet nationalist factions who came to power in certain Asian countries, the USA created zones on the very borders of China (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan) which could serve as outposts of western prosperity. The priority for the USA was to establish a cordon sanitaire against the advances of the Soviet bloc in Asia. Contrary to its policies in the rest of the world, the USA was to use an impressive arsenal of measures to sap the objective bases of social discontent in these countries. Thus, whereas almost everywhere in the world America had violently opposed agrarian and institutional reforms and had supported the most retrograde factions of the ruling bourgeoisies, it promoted revolutionary economic and social policies in the four Asian countries we have mentioned. These policies were completely determined by its geostrategic interests in the region. South Korea, for example, did not have any particular economic strong points. Lacking in raw materials, and with most of its industrial base limited to the north, the country was drained dry at the end of the war: production had fallen by 44% and employment by 59%. Sources of fresh capital, intermediate means of production, technical competence and managerial capacities were virtually non-existent. Only the imperatives of the cold war pushed the USA to support South Korea to the hilt. Against the stupid assertions about the formidable self-development of south east Asia, the growth of the ‘dragons’ was the pure product of American imperialist interests in the context of the cold war. There is no doubt that without the massive aid of the US from the beginning and for long years afterwards, these countries, and particularly South Korea and Taiwan, would not have survived as national states.
Contrary to the great claims of bourgeois propaganda about the dynamism of capitalism and the possibility for new arrivals on the world market to industrialise and compete with the older powers, the development of south east Asia is no mystery. Japan and the four dragons were chosen by the USA to revitalise eastern Asia and to form a barrier against its Chinese and Russian rivals. These military or one party states enjoyed a breathing space after the second world war that was available to very few others. This development, bracketed in time and space, confirms the thesis that the decadence of the capitalist mode of production is characterised by inter-imperialist conflicts, by a deadly economic struggle over a saturated world market and thus by the overwhelming weight of militarism and the war economy.
Certainly, this bracket has marked a kind of success, which no doubt went beyond America’s post-war predictions; to some extent it has even backfired against its instigator at the economic level. But this situation can only be temporary. Despite the delay, just like Japan, these islands of prosperity in south east Asia are set on a course towards recession. The present difficulties in these countries shows that this region of the world is no exception. They are gradually entering into a zone of economic turbulence. The recent economic problems and social conflicts are trebly illustrative. To begin with, they show that the crisis of capitalism is indeed world-wide and that, even if has to some extent spared certain geographical areas for a while, it is now hitting every country in the world, though still to varying degrees. Exceptions are becoming increasingly rare and the crisis is making all situations more and more homogeneous. This is a first blow struck against the myth of the so-called south east Asian model. Secondly, the strikes in Korea are a striking refutation of all the claims about the integration of the Korean workers, which aim to divide the world proletariat. They show the international unity of interests of the working class, against the myths of an Asian working class that is entirely subservient to a higher national interest. Finally, the crisis and the social conflicts are undermining another myth, the myth of an economic solution inside of capitalism.
Today, with the saturation of the world market and the economic difficulties of the US itself, the period in which the dragons could profit from the opening up of the US market is now over. The tolerated conquest of the American market by the dragons after the war had as its corollary a growing dependence on American policies. Thus, South Korea - and the situation is analogous for Taiwan - is a very outgoing country and thus highly dependent on the world market (in 1987, its exports accounted for 40% of GNP), and above all on the American market (in the same year the US market absorbed 40% of South Koreas exports). Overnight, the South Korean economy could enter violently into recession as a result of a slow-down in world trade, a major shift in exchange rates or protectionist measures. This dependence is all the greater, and all the more threatening of economic failure, in that it is the falling trade surplus with the US that has to finance the growing trade deficit in equipment and technology with Japan - goods that are needed to ensure the competivity of Korean capital. Here a new obstacle appears: since the success of the dragons is based on technology which has proven its worth but which is produced at low cost, these countries, in their efforts to negotiate the turn-around to a higher value production, have to pile up their debts and thus fall into technological dependence on Japan which is more and more controlling the economy of the whole region.
Furthermore, the continuation of the success of the two decades after the war was to a large extent possible thanks to the old recipes of public deficits and debts (see tables above) which have strongly fueled inflation.
As with other third world success stories, growth since the onset of the crisis is a balloon puffed up by debt and could burst at any moment. The big investors are well aware of this: Among the reasons the richest industrial countries have been so anxious to double the IMFs emergency credit lines to 850 billions is that a new Mexico-style crisis is feared, this time in the Far East. The upsurge in the Pacific economies has stimulated enormous private sector capital flows, which have been substituted for domestic saving, leading to an unstable financial situation. The question has been which Asian tiger would be the first to fall (Guardian, 16.10.96). Every time the crumbling of one myth threatens to expose the failure of the whole capitalist system, the bourgeoisie conjures up new ones. A few years ago it was the German and Japanese miracles; then, after the collapse of the eastern bloc, the bright new tomorrow offered by the new markets in eastern Europe and Russia. Today the dragons are in vogue. But the recent and future difficulties in the region show and will show to the working class that these little emperors are also naked, tearing a little bit more of the veil behind which the bourgeoisie tries to hide the bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production.
C Mel
Sources: Aseniero Georges, Le contexte transnational du developpment de la Coree du Sud et du Taiwan, an article published in Mondialisation et Accumulation. LHarmattan, 1993; Bairoch Paul, Le Tiers-Monde dans limpasse, Gallimard 1992; Myths et paradoxes de lhistoire economique, La Decouverte, 1994; Banque Mondiale, annual Rapport sur le developpment dans le monde; Coutros and Husson; Le Destin du Tiers Monde, Nathan, 1993; Chung H Lee, La Transformation economic de la Coree du Sud, OECD, 1995; Dumont and Paquet, Taiwan, le Prix de la Reussite, La Decouverte, 1987; Lorot and Schwob, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Coree du Sud, les Nouveaux Conquerants?, Hatier 1987; PNUD Rapport mondial sur le developpment humain, Economica, 1992
1 [549] Thus, if the whole of the third world had exported per inhabitant as many manufactured articles as the middle ranker of the four dragons, this would have almost been the equivalent of the total consumption of the developed western countries!
2 [550] While South Korea and Taiwan are two countries that regroup respectively 44.5.and 19 million people, Hong Kong and Singapore are both island city-states founded by the British colonialists and only have 6.1. and 2.9 million inhabitants.
3 [551] It is estimated in fact that on average, the income of the 80% made up by the poorest farmers increased by 20 to 30%, while the income of the 4% made up by the richest went down by about 80%.
4 [552] Other ambitious changes were initiated under US guidance, such as the great education programmes aimed at producing a well-trained work force.
5 [553] The first and most important source of finance was the acquisition by the chaebols of assigned goods at prices well under their value. Just after the war this made up 30% of what South Korea inherited from the Japanese. Initially placed under the control of the American office of assigned goods, they were distributed by the office itself and by the Korean government.
IR89, 2nd Quarter 1997
Inn°5 of Revolutionary Perspectives, the organ of the Communist Workers’Organisation (CWO), we find an article entitled “Sects, Lies, and the LostPerspective of the ICC”, which is intended as a response to our article “ARudderless Policy of Regroupment”, published in the International Reviewn°87 (this text itself being a reply to a letter from the CWO published in thesame issue of the Review). The CWO’s article deals with many questions,notably the method by which communist organisations should be built, to whichwe will return in a later issue of this Review. In this article we willlargely limit ourselves to one aspect of the CWO’s polemic: the idea that theICC is in crisis because of its mistakes in analysing the historic course.
We have already given an account, inseveral texts published in both the International Review and ourterritorial press [1] [555],of the crisis our organisation has recently had to confront, and which has beenexpressed, as the CWO’s article points out, by a number of resignations in oursection in France. The ICC has identified the causes of its organisationaldifficulties: the persistence within the organisation of the weight of thecircle spirit which resulted from the historical conditions within which ourorganisation was formed, after the longest and most profound period ofcounter-revolution in the history of the workers’ movement. The survival ofthis circle spirit led, in particular, to the formation of clans within theICC, which seriously undermined its organisational tissue. From the autumn of1993 onwards, the whole ICC undertook the struggle against its weaknesses, andin the spring of 1995, its 11th Congress was able to conclude thatthese had been largely overcome [2] [556].
The CWO gives a different explanationfor the ICC’s organisational difficulties:
“(...)the current crisis of the ICC is (...) the result (...) of politicaldemoralisation. The real reason for this is that the perspectives on which theICC was founded have now finally collapsed in the face of a reality which theICC has spent years trying to ignore. In fact what we said about the earliersplit in 1981 applies to the current crisis:
“The causes of the present crisishave been building up for a number of years and can be found in the group’sbasic positions. The ICC argues that the economic crisis is “here” in all itscontradictions and has been so for over twelve years. They see revolutionaryconsciousness as springing directly and spontaneously from workers in struggleagainst the effects of this crisis. It is not therefore surprising, that evenwhen the crisis has not produced the level of class struggle predicted by theICC, that this should lead to splits in the organisation” (Workers’ Voice n°5).
“Since then the situation of theworking class has worsened and it has been thrown on the defensive. Instead ofrecognising this, throughout the 1980s the ICC proclaimed that we were goingthrough the “years of truth” leading to ever greater class confrontations (...)The obvious contradiction between the ICC perspectives and capitalist realitywould have provoked the current crisis even earlier if it had not been for thecollapse of Stalinism. This unique historical phenomenon has completely shiftedthe debate about the course of history since the pause following such a majorupheaval has postponed the bourgeoisie’sdrive to war and equally allows the working class greater time to regroupitself before the further attacks of capital make large-scale social conflicton an international scale once again necessary. It also allowed the ICC achance to wriggle out of the consequences of the “years of truth” perspectives.However, it has not solved the problem posed by their origins. For them, May1968 ended the counter-revolution and opened up the period when the workingclass would play out its historic role. Almost thirty years later (ie more thanone generation!) where has that class confrontation gone? “This was thequestion we posed to the ICC in 1981, and this is still one of the albatrossesaround its neck.
“The ICC knows this, so in order toprevent further demoralisation it has had to turn to that age-old device -scapegoating. The ICC is not content to deal with its current crisis as onestemming from its own political failures. Instead it has tried, not for thefirst time, to turn reality on its head and is insisting that the problems itfaces are due to outside “parasitical” elements who are undermining themorganisationally” (Revolutionary Perspectives n°5).
Obviously, anyone who has read ourpress will be aware that the ICC has never attributed its internalorganisational difficulties to the action of parasitic elements. Either the CWOis deliberately lying (in which case we would ask them to tell us why), or elsethey have made a very mistaken reading of what we have written (in which casewe suggest they buy new glasses for their militants). At all events, such anaffirmation reveals a lamentable frivolity which is utterly regrettable inpolitical debate. This is why we will leave this kind of thing to one side,since we prefer to go to the heart of the disagreements between the ICC and theCWO (and the IBRP - the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party - ofwhich it is a component). More particularly, in this article we intend to takeup the idea that the ICC’s perspectives for the class struggle have beenrevealed to be bankrupt [3] [557].
Tojudge whether or not the perspective that we traced for the 1980s was correct,we need to go back to what we wrote on the eve of the new decade.
“As long as it seemed as thoughthe crisis could have a solution the bourgeoisie lulled the exploited withillusory promises: accept austerity today and everything will be bettertomorrow (...) But today this language does not work anymore (...) Since thepromise of a “better tomorrow” does not fool anyone anymore, the ruling classhas changed its tune. The opposite is starting to be trumpeted now: the worstis ahead of us and there is nothing we can do, “the others are to blame”, thereis no way out (...)
“As the bourgeoisie loses its ownillusions it is increasingly forced to speak clearly to the working class aboutthe future(...)
“If the bourgeoisie has nothing butgeneralised war to give humanity as its future, the class struggles developingtoday prove that the proletariat is not ready to give the bourgeoisie free rein.The working class has another future to propose, a future of communism, wherethere will be no wars, no exploitation.
“In the decade beginning today, thehistorical alternative will be decided: either the proletariat will continueits offensive, continue to paralyse the murderous arm of capitalism and gatherits forces to destroy the system, or else it will let itself be trapped, wornout, demoralised by speeches and repression and then the way will be open for anew holocaust which risks the elimination of all human society.
“If the 70s were years of illusionboth for the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; because the reality of the worldwill be revealed in its true colours, because the future of humanity will be inlarge part decided, the 80s will be the years of truth” (InternationalReview n°20, “The 80s, Years of Truth”).
As the CWO says, we maintained thisanalysis throughout the 1980s, and each Congress that we held during thisperiod was an occasion for the ICC to reaffirm its validity.
“On the eve of the 1980s, weanalysed the decade that was beginning as “the years of truth” (...)After the first third of this period, we can say that this analysis has beenfully confirmed: never since the 1930s has the impasse of the capitalisteconomy stood revealed so clearly; never, since the last World War, has thebourgeoisie deployed such military arsenals, or mobilised such resources forthe production of the means of destruction; never since the 1920s has theproletariat undertaken struggles of the extent of those which shook Poland andthe whole ruling class in 1980-81" (“Resolution on the InternationalSituation” from the ICC’s Vth Congress, 2nd July 1983, International Reviewn°35).
However, during this Congress, wepointed out that the proletariat had just suffered a serious defeat,concretised in particular by the state of emergency in Poland:
“Whereas the years 1978-80 weremarked by a worldwide recovery in workers’ struggles (American miners’ strike,Rotterdam dockers, British steelworkers, engineering workers in Germany andBrazil, the confrontations of Longwy-Denain in France, mass strikes in Poland),1981 and 1982 were marked by a clear reflux in these struggles; this phenomenonwas particularly evident in the most “classic” of capitalist countries, GreatBritain, where the year 1981 saw the lowest number of strikes since World WarII, whereas in 1979 they had reached the highest quantitative level in history,with 29 million strike days lost. The declaration of the state of emergency inPoland, and the violent repression which has fallen on the workers in thiscountry did not come like lightning out of a blue sky. The coup d’étatof December 1981, the most striking point of the workers’ defeat after theformidable struggles of summer 1980, were part of a defeat of the entireproletariat (...)
However serious the defeat sufferedduring these last years by the working class, it does not call into questionthe historic course, inasmuch as:
- it is not thedecisive battalions of the world proletariat which were in the front line ofthe confrontation;
- the crisiswhich is now in full swing in the capitalist metropoles will force theproletariat in these metropoles to express reserves of combativity which havenot been drawn on decisively up till now”.
Thisprediction was confirmed only three months later. In Belgium in September 1983,followed shortly afterwards by Holland, the workers of the public sectorentered massively into struggle [4] [558].These movements were not isolated events. In fact, within a few months, socialmovements affected most of the advanced countries: Germany, Britain, France,USA, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Japan [5] [559].Rarely has there been seen such international simultaneity of classconfrontations, at the same time as the bourgeoisie in all these countriesorganised an almost complete blackout on these movements. Obviously, thebourgeoisie did not just sit and watch, but organised a whole series ofcampaigns and manoeuvres, mostly underrtaken by the trades unions, designed to discouragethe workers, to disperse their struggles, and to imprison them in corporatistdead-ends. During 1985, this lead to a certain calming of workers’ struggles inthe main European countries, especially where the struggle had been at itshighest during the preceding years. At the same time, these manoeuvres couldnot help increasing still further the discredit affecting the unions in most ofthe advance countries, which was an important element in the development ofworking class consciousness, since the unions are its main enemies, with thefunction of sabotaging the struggle from the inside.
“For all these reasons, thepresent development of distrust for the unions is an essential element in thebalance of forces between the classes and thus of the whole historic situation.However, this distrust is itself partly responsible for the reduction in thenumber of struggles in different countries, particularly where the unions havebeen most discredited (as in France following the accidental arrival in powerof the Left in 1981). When the workers have for decades clung to the illusionthat they can only wage the struggle in the framework of the trade unions andwith their support, the loss of confidence in these organs leads them to resortto passivity in answer to the so-called “calls for struggle” coming from theunions” (“Resolution on the International Situation” adopted by the ICC’sVIth Congress, in International Review n°44). The large-scale strikesthat took place in two major countries marked by a low level of combativity in1985, France (especially the rail workers’ strike in December 1986) and Italy(notably in the education sector, but also on the railways), were proof thatthe wave of struggles begun in Belgium 1983 was continuing. This reality wasdemonstrated powerfully in Belgium by a six-week movement of struggles(April-May 1986), the biggest since World War II, involving both public andprivate sectors, as well as the unemployed, paralysing the country’s economiclife and forcing the government to retreat on a whole series of attacks it hadprepared. During the same period (1986-87), there were important movements inthe Scandinavian countries (Finland and Norway at the beginning of 1986, Swedenin the autumn), in the United States (summer 1986), in Brazil (1.5 millionstrikers en October 1986, massive strikes during April-May 1987), in Greece (2million on strike in January 1987), in Yugoslavia (spring 1987), in Spain(spring 1987), in Mexico, in South Africa, etc. It is also worth noting thespontaneous strike, outside the trades unions, by 140,000 British Telecomworkers at the end of January 1987.
Obviously, the bourgeoisie reacted tothis combativity by setting in motion new manoeuvres. The aim was to creatediversions through widely publicised ideological campaigns on “Islamicterrorism”, on the “peace” between the great powers (signature of the SALTagreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons), on the aspiration of thepeoples to “freedom” and “democracy” (the international spectacle ofGorbachev’s “glasnost”), on ecology, on “humanitarian” interventions in theThird World, etc [6] [560].Above all, there were campaigns to overcome the growing discredit affecting theclassical unions by promoting new forms of unionism (“rank and file” or“fighting” unionism, etc). The most striking illustration of this bourgeoismanoeuvre (often undertaken by the leftist organisations, but also bytraditional unions and left-wing parties, whether Stalinist orsocial-democratic), was the formation of “coordinations” in twocountries where classical unionism was the most discredited: Italy (especiallyin the transport sector), and France (most of all in the important hospitalstrike of autumn 1988) [7] [561].One function of these organisations, which presented themselves as “coming fromthe rank-and-file” and “anti-union”, was to introduce the corporatist poisoninto the proletarian ranks, with the argument that the unions did not defendworkers’ interests because they were organised by branch of industry not bytrade.
These manoeuvres had a certainimpact, which we pointed out at the time: “This capacity of the bourgeoisieto manoeuvre has up till now held back the tendencies towards extension andunification contained in the present wave of struggle” (“Resolution on theInternational Situation”, adopted at the ICC’s VIIIth Congress and published inInternational Review n°59). Amongst the causes of the difficultiesencountered by the working class, we pointed out: “the weight of thesurrounding ideological decomposition upon which, more and more, thebourgeoisie will base its manoeuvres to reinforce atomisation, “every man forhimself”, to undermine the growing confidence of the working class in its ownstrength and in the future its combat implies” (ibid.).
Nonetheless, we also noted that while“the phenomenon of decomposition is a real weight in the present period andwill continue to be so for some time to come” and “that it constitutes avery serious danger that the class will have to face up to (...) thisobservation should in no way be a source of demoralisation or scepticism”since “Throughout the 80s, despite this negative weight of decomposition,which has been systematically exploited by the bourgeoisie, the proletariat hasstill been able to push forward its struggles in response to the aggravation ofthe crisis” (“Presentation of the Resolution on the InternationalSituation”, in International Review n°59).
Here then is the analysis that wemade of the state of the class struggle, a few months before one of the biggestevents of the post-war period: the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Europeand the USSR.
The ICC had not foreseen this event(any more than the other organisations of the proletarian milieu, or thebourgeoisie’s “experts”). Nonetheless, by September 1989, two months before thefall of the Berlin Wall, it was one of the first to identify it [8] [562].Already, we described the collapse of the Eastern bloc as the biggestexpression to date of the decomposition of capitalist society, and in thissense we immediately declared that this event would create “Greaterdifficulties for the proletariat” [9] [563].In line with our previous analyses, we wrote: “The identification which issystematically established between Stalinism and communism, the lie repeated athousand times, and today being wielded more than ever, according to which theproletarian revolution can only end in disaster, will for a whole period gainan added impact within the ranks of the working class. We thus have to expect amomentary retreat in the consciousness of the proletariat (...) In particular,reformist ideology will weigh very heavily on the struggle in the period ahead,greatly facilitating the action of the unions.
Given the historic importance of theevents that are determining it, the present retreat of the proletariat -although it doesn’t call into question the historic course, the generalperspective of class confrontations - is going to be much deeper than the onewhich accompanied the defeat of 1981 in Poland” [10] [564].
It is really frivolous for the CWO toassert that the collapse of Stalinism “allowed the ICC a chance to wriggleout of the consequences of the “years of truth” perspectives”. We did notdeclare that the events of 1989 would cause a retreat for the working classmerely to try to hide the supposed collapse of our perspective on thedevelopment of the class struggle during the 1980s. As we have shown above, wedid not produce this idea like a rabbit out of a hat, but in perfect coherencewith our analytical framework. While the 1980s thus drew to a close with aserious defeat for the working class, this did not mean that the ICC’s analysisof the historic period was incorrect, as the CWO claims.
In the first place, one can hardlyput forward such an idea on the basis of an event foreseen by nobody (although,once it had happened, marxism makes it possible to explain it). After all, hadrevolutionaries in the 19th century foreseen one of its most important events,the Paris Commune of 1870? Did Lenin foresee what would happen a few weekslater in the revolution of February 1917 - which was to be the prelude to theOctober Revolution - when he said to young Swiss workers: “We older people,may not see the decisive struggles of the imminent revolution” (“Report onthe 1905 Revolution”, January 1917)?. At all events, it is up to marxists toreact rapidly to unforeseen events, and immediately to draw out their lessonsand consequences. This is what Marx did even before the Commune’s defeat (in TheCivil War in France). It was what Lenin did as soon as news arrived of theFebruary revolution (Letters from Afar, and the April Theses).For ourselves, we set out the upheavals that events in the East would provoke,from the standpoint both of imperialist tensions and the class struggle, in thesummer of 1989.
This being said, even the unforeseenupheavals of 1989 did not call into question our analysis at the end of 1979: “becausethe future of humanity will be in large part decided, the 80s will be the yearsof truth”.
It was indeed during this period thata good part of the historic perspective was played out. At the beginning of the1980s, the bourgeoisie - especially in the West - at the same time as itsmassive development of arms production, had undertaken enormous campaigns aimedat subjecting the proletarians to the capitalist boot in order to enrol them inworld war. To do so, it tried to profit from the crushing defeat of the Polishworkers in 1981 which apart from creating a great disorientation amongstworkers in the West, provided the pretext for accusing the “Evil Empire”(according to Reagan’s expression). The wave of struggles which began in 1983foiled this objective. The working class was no more ready than in the 1970s tolet itself be enrolled in a new World War.
Moreover, the bourgeoisie’s inabilityto give its own response to the crisis of its own system - imperialist war - atthe same time as the proletariat’s inability to put forward its ownrevolutionary perspective, tipped society into its phase of decomposition [11] [565],one of whose major expressions was precisely the collapse of the Stalinistregimes, which put off the possibility of a new World War.
Finally, the 1980s ended, with the collapseof the Eastern bloc and all its consequences, with an unexpected andunprecedented demonstration of the truth of decadent capitalism: anindescribable chaos, and a nameless barbarism which can only get worse witheach passing day.
Aswe can see, the CWO’s idea of the “bankruptcy of the ICC’s perspectives”does not stand up to a reminder of the facts and of our own analyses. And ifthere is one organisation which was really blind to what was going on duringthe 1980s, it is not the ICC but the CWO (and the IBRP) itself: an organisationwhich described the struggles of this period in the following terms:
“... by 1976 the ruling class, atfirst using the unions and social-democracy was able once again to restoresocial peace. It was a social peace punctuated by great struggles of theworking class (Poland 1980-81, the Belgian dockers in 1983 and the Britishminers’ strike in 1984-85). However, there was no international wave of strikeslike that of 1968-74, and all of these movements ended with the working classretreating still further in the face of the capitalist onslaught”(“Perspectives of the CWO”, adopted by the organisation’s AGM in December 1996and published in Revolutionary Perspectives n°5).
This is a staggering assertion. Togive just a few examples, the CWO only remembers the dockers’ strike in Belgium1983, forgetting that which involved the entire public sector. For the CWO, thestruggles of spring 1986 in the same country (which were even more important,involving a million workers mobilised for more than a month, in a country withless than 10 million inhabitants) simply do not exist. The strikes in the Dutchpublic sector in the autumn of 1983, the biggest since 1903, have also passedthem completely by. One might suppose that the CWO’s blindness springs from thefact that neither it, nor Battaglia Comunista, the other organisation in theIBRP, has any presence in these countries, and that they were, like the vastmajority of the world proletariat, victims of the international black-outorganised by the bourgeois media to hide the social movements taking place. Buteven if this is the case, it is no excuse: a revolutionary organisation cannotbe satisfied, to analyse the situation of the class struggle, with reading thepapers in the country where it is present. It can use information reported bythe press of other revolutionary organisations, for example our own, which gaveample coverage to these events. But this is precisely the problem: it is notthe ICC which is confronted with “The obvious contradiction between the[its] perspectives and capitalist reality”; it is not the ICC which “hasspent years trying to ignore” reality, to mask the mistakes in itsperspective, as the CWO claims: it is the CWO itself. The best proof: when theCWO talks about the “great struggles of the working class” which “punctuatedsocial peace” in Britain, it only refers to the miners’ strike of 1984-85,completely ignoring the formidable mobilisation of 1979, which were the biggestfor more than half a century. Similarly, it makes no reference to the importantmovement of 1987 in Italy, in the education sector, despite the fact thatBattaglia Comunista, the CWO’s sister organisation, found itself in the frontline there. How are we to explain the CWO’s inability to see, or even to try tosee this reality? The CWO gives the answer itself (attributing the problem tothe ICC): because this reality disproves its own perspectives. And inparticular, neither the CWO nor the IBRP have ever understood the question ofthe course of history.
TheICC, and the International Review in particular, has already devoted anumber of polemics with the IBRP to the question of the historic course [12] [566].We will not go back here over everything we have written on these occasions tocriticise the IBRP’s lack of method in dealing with the question of thehistoric phase within which the workers’ struggles of our time are unfolding.Let us only say, in brief, that the IBRP rejects the very notion of a historiccourse, as it was developed during the 1930s notably by the Left Fraction ofthe Italian Communist Party. It is because the Fraction understood that thecourse towards war, and that towards class confrontations, are not parallel butmutually exclusive, that it was able to foresee, in a period of profoundcounter-revolution, the inevitability of World War II as soon as capitalismentered a new open economic crisis in 1929.
For the IBRP, “the cycle ofaccumulation which began with World War II is approaching its end. The post-warboom has long since given way to the global economic crisis. Once again, thequestion of proletarian revolution or imperialist war is placed on the historicagenda” (IBRP Platform, 1994, our translation). At the same time, itrecognises today (though this was not the case at the time), that therewas “a massive international workers’response to the onset of the capitalist crisis at the end of the 60s and thebeginning of the 70s” (“Perspectives of the CWO, RevolutionaryPerspectives n°5). However, the IBRP has always refused to accept that ifcapitalism did not plunge into a new imperialist war at the end of the 1960s,this was essentially due to the fact that the response of the working class tothe first attacks of the crisis showed that unlike the 1930s, it was not readyto let itself be enrolled in a new holocaust. So, in answer to the question: “whyhas world war not yet broken out?”, despite the fact that “at theobjective level, all the conditions are present for the outbreak of a newgeneralised war”, Battaglia Communista’s theoretical review Prometeon°11 (December 1987) begins by asserting that “it is clear that no war couldever be undertaken without the proletariat and all the labouring classes beingready both for combat and for war production. It is obvious that, without aconsenting and controlled proletariat, no war would be possible. It is equallyobvious that a proletariat in the midst of a recovery in the class strugglewould demonstrate the emergence of a clear counter-tendency: that of theantithesis of war; that of the march towards the socialist revolution”.This is exactly how the ICC poses the problem. But it is precisely this methodthat is criticised in another article published in Battaglia Comunistan°83 (March 1987), and reprinted in the IBRP’s English Communist Review n°5under the title “The ICC and the “Historic Course”: a Mistaken Method”.In this article, we read, amongst other things, that “the form of the war,its technical means, its tempo, its characteristics in relation to thepopulation as a whole, has greatly changed since 1939. More precisely, wartoday has less need for consensus or working class passivity than the wars ofyesterday (...) involvement in the actions of war is possible without theagreement of the proletariat”. Understand who can. Or rather, we understandthat the IBRP doesn’t know what it’s talking about. At al events, coherence isnot its prime concern.
Moreover, we find a demonstration ofthis incoherence in the way that the IBRP reacted to the crisis that was tolead to the Gulf War in 1991. In the English version of an appeal adopted onthis occasion by the IBRP (the Italian version is different!), we can read: “Wehave to fight [our “own” state’s] war plans and preparations (...)All attempts to send further forces must be opposed by strikes at ports andairports for example (...) we call on the British North Sea oil workers to stepup their struggle and prevent the bosses from increasing production. Thisstrike must be extended to include all oil workers, and extended to otherworkers” (Workers’ Voice n°53). If “(...) involvement in theactions of war is possible without the agreement of the proletariat”, thenwhat is the point of this kind of appeal? Could the CWO explain it to us?
To return to the article in Prometeon°11, which begins by posing the question in the same terms as the ICC, wecan read: “The tendency towards war is advancing rapidly, but by contrastthe level of class confrontations is far below that necessary to repulse theheavy attacks launched against the international proletariat”. For the IBRPthen, it is not the class struggle which provides the answer to the questionthat it has itself posed: “why has world war not yet broken out?” Theanswer it gives is twofold:
- the militaryalliances are not yet sufficiently stable;
- nuclearweapons are a dissuading factor for the bourgeoisie, because of the threat theyrepresent for humanity’s survival [13] [567].
Weanswered these “arguments” at length in International Review n°54. Wewill restrict ourselves here to recalling that the second of them is anincredible concession for marxists to make to the bourgeoisie’s campaignsaround nuclear weapons as the guarantors of world peace. As for the first, itwas refuted by the IBRP itself, when it wrote, at the outbreak of the Gulf War,that “the Third World War began on 17th January” (Battaglia Comunista,January 1991), just as the military alliances that had dominated the planet formore than half a century disappeared. It should also be pointed out that theIBRP later went back on this analysis of the imminence of war. For example,today the CWO’s “Perspectives” tell us that “a full-scale war between theleading imperialist powers has been postponed”. The problem is that theIBRP has the unfortunate habit of producing contradictory analyses. Of course,this makes them immune to the criticism they have made of the ICC: that ofmaintaining the same analysis throughout the 1980s. But it is surely not a signof the IBRP’s superior method or perspectives.
The CWO will probably accuse us oftelling lies again, as they do liberally throughout their polemical article.Perhaps they will open up their great “dialectical” umbrella, to tell us thatnothing they (or the IBRP) has said is contradictory. The “dialectic” puts upwith a lot from the IBRP: in the marxist method, it has never meant saying onething and its opposite at the same time.
“Falsification!” the CWO willcry. Let us then give a second example, not on a secondary or circumstantialquestion (where contradictions are more easily pardonable), but on a vital one:has the counter-revolution which struck the working class after the defeat ofthe first revolutionary wave come to an end?
One might suppose that even if theIBRP is incapable of giving a clear and coherent answer to the question of thehistoric course - since the question is apparently beyond its understanding [14] [568]- it can answer the one we have just posed.
Such a response, which is vital, isto be found neither in the IBRP’s 1994 Platform, nor in the CWO’s 1996“Perspectives”, where it should certainly have had a place. This being said, wecan find answers in other texts:
- in thearticle in Revolutionary Perspectives n°5, quoted above, the CWO seemsto say that the counter-revolution is not yet ended, since they reject theICC’s idea that “May 1968 ended the counter-revolution”;
- thisassertion seems to be in continuity with the Theses adopted by BattagliaCommunista’s 5th Congress in 1982 (see Prometeo n°7), even if things arenot said so clearly: “if the proletariat today, confronted with the gravityof the crisis and subjected to the repeated blows of bourgeois attacks, has notyet shown itself capable of responding, this simply means that the long work ofthe world counter-revolution is still active in workers’ minds”.
Ifwe stick to these two texts, then we could say that the IBRP’s thinking has acertain consistency: the proletariat has not emerged from thecounter-revolution. The problem is, that in 1987 we could read in the articleon the “Historic Course” from Communist Review n°5 that “thecounter-revolutionary period following the defeat from within of the OctoberRevolution has ended” and that “there are no lack of signs of a revivalof class struggle and we do not fail to point them out”.
Thus, even on so simple a question,the IBRP has not one but several positions. If we try to summarisewhat comes out of the different texts published by the IBRP’s memberorganisations, we can formulate its analysis as follows:
- “themovements which developed in France in 1968, in Italy in 1969, then in a numberof other countries, are essentially revolts of the petty-bourgeoisie”(Battaglia Communista’s position at the time), but they are nonetheless “amassive international workers’ response to the onset of the capitalist crisis”(the CWO in December 1996);
- “that thelong work of the world counter-revolution is still active in workers’ minds”(Battaglia Comunista in 1982), however “the counter-revolutionary periodfollowing the defeat from within of the October Revolution has ended”(Battaglia in 1987), which does not alter the fact that the present period isundoubtedly “a continuation of the capitalist domination which has reigned,only sporadically contested, since the end of the revolutionary wave whichfollowed the First World War” (the CWO in 1988, in a letter to the CBG andpublished in the latter’s Bulletin n°13);
- “by 1976 [andto this day] the ruling class (...) were once again able to restore socialpeace” (the CWO, December 1996), whereas “these struggles [the 1987Cobas movement in the Italian education sector and the strikes in Britain ofthe same year] confirm the beginning of a period marked by the accentuationof class conflicts” (Battaglia Comunista n°3, March 1988).
Obviously,we might consider that these different contradictory positions correspond todivergences between the CWO and Battaglia Comunista. But we can absolutely notsay such a thing since this is a “slander” of the ICC, which is invitedto “shut up” when it puts forward such an idea (see “Sects, Lies and theLost Perspective of the ICC”). Since there is no disagreement between the twoorganisations, then we can only conclude that these contradictory positionscohabit in the heads of each IBRP militant. We thought as much, but it is kindof the CWO to confirm it.
Seriously though, don’t all thesecontradictions give the IBRP comrades some pause for thought? In other matters,the comrades are capable of thinking clearly. How do they end up in such a messwhen they try to develop their analyses of the period? Is it not because theirframework is inadequate, and because in the name of the “dialectic” it leavesbehind marxist rigour to founder in empiricism and immediatism, as we havealready shown in previous polemics?
There is another cause behind theIBRP’s difficulties in grasping clearly and coherently the present state of theclass struggle: a confused analysis of the union question, which for exampleleaves it unable to understand the importance of the phenomenon of theincreasing discredit of the unions, that continued throughout the 1980s.
For the moment, we can already answerthe CWO: the ICC did not go through the crisis of which we have spoken in ourpress because of our analyses on the present historic period and on the levelof class struggle. Contrary to what the CWO - who has given us the samediagnostic since 1981 - may think, there are other factors in a crisis in arevolutionary organisation, and especially organisational questions. This wasdemonstrated, amongst many other examples, by the crisis of the RSDLP after its2nd Congress in 1903. However, we permit ourselves to give the CWO (and theIBRP) a fraternal warning: if an incorrect analysis of the historic situationis for them the only, or even the main, factor of crisis (perhaps this is thecase in their own experience), then they need to be particularly careful, sincewith the mountain of incoherence contained in the own analyses, they are inserious danger.
This is certainly not our wish. Oursincerest wish would be for the CWO and the IBRP to break once and for all withtheir empiricism and immediatism, and take up the best traditions of theCommunist Left and Marxism.
Fabienne.
[1] [569] See in particular ourarticle on the ICC’s XIth Congress, published in International Reviewn°82.
[2] [570] ibid.
[3] [571] We should nonethelesspoint out to the CWO that if they want to treat the question of thedifficulties encountered by the ICC, then it would be preferable for them tobegin by examining seriously the analysis that our organisation has made, andnot take its own suppositions as a point of departure. The ICC has published ananalysis of its organisational crisis in its press, and if the CWO think thatthey know more about this crisis than the ICC itself, then they should at leastdemonstrate it (if they can).
[4] [572] See our article “Belgiumand Holland, crisis and class struggle”, in International Review, n°38.
[5] [573] For an idea of the extentand characteristics of these struggles, see our article “Simultaneity ofworkers’ strikes: what perspectives?”, in International Review, n°38.
[6] [574] See our article “Bourgeoismanoeuvres against the unification of the class struggle”, in InternationalReview, n°58.
[7] [575] See our article “France:the “coordinations” in the vanguard of the sabotage of the struggle”, inInternational Review, n°56.
[8] [576] See the “Theses on theeconomic and political crisis in the USSR and Eastern Europe”, in InternationalReview, n°60.
[9] [577] Title of an article fromNovember 1989, in International Review, n°60.
[10] [578] From “Theses”,point 22. Although we forecast in the autumn of 1989 the retreat the classconsciousness would suffer, something which has been amply confirmed since andwhich we have regular underlined in our press, the CWO still writes, in replyto a reader’s letter that “[The ICC] still believe, against all theevidence, that this is a period of high class consciousness. All thatrevolutionaries need to do is demystify the workers about the unions, and theroad to revolution will be open”. Obviously, when you falsify or caricatureyour detractor’s arguments, then it is easier to refute them. But it does nottake the debate much further forward.
[11] [579] For a presentation of ouranalysis of decomposition, see “Decomposition, final phase of capitalistdecadence” in International Review, n°62.
[12] [580] See InternationalReview n°36, 41, 50, 54, 55, 59, 72.
[13] [581] To emphasise the point,Battaglia even goes so far as to add that “we have a saying has become aclassic amongst us, and that has all the ring of truth, that war will bedeclared the day after the signature of the agreement not to use nuclearweapons” (Battaglia Comunista n°4, April 1986). As if thebourgeoisie had such a sense of “fair play” that it respects its commitmentsand the scraps of paper it signs!
[14] [582] The IBRP says as much inthe article “The ICC and the “Historic Course” - a Mistaken Method”, when itrejects any possibility of defining a course of history: “In relation to theproblem the ICC has set us of being precise prophets of the future thedifficulty lies in the fact that subjectivity does not mechanically followobjective movements (_) No-one can believe that the maturation of consciousness(_) can be rigidly determined from observable, rationally correlated data”.We obviously don’t expect revolutionaries to be “precise prophets of thefuture”, nor to determine class consciousness “rigidly from observable,rationally correlated data”; we simply ask that they answer the question: “Arethe struggles which have developed since 1968 a sign that the proletariat isunprepared to let itself be drawn into a Third World War, or are they not?”.By altering the terms of the question, the IBRP shows either that it has notunderstood, or that it cannot answer.
In the previous article, we saw how the KPD, its best elements assassinated and the whole party subject to repression, was unable to play the role it should have done, and how incorrect organisational conceptions were to lead to disaster, including the exclusion of the majority of the Party! So it was in an atmosphere of political confusion, and a seething general situation that the KAPD was born.
On the 4th and 5th April 1920, three weeks after the beginning of the Kapp putsch, and the wave of struggles that it provoked in response throughout Germany, opposition delegates met to bring a new party into the world: the Workers' Communist Party of Germany (the Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, or KAPD).
Their intention was to found, at last, a "party of revolutionary action", with enough strength to oppose the opportunist direction taken by the KPD.
The KPD's mistakes during the Kapp putsch had serious consequences. Nonetheless, they did not, at the time, justify the formation of a new party. The KAPD's founders were far from having exhausted all the possibilities of fraction work open to them, and so a new party was created in haste, partly out of "frustration", partly almost from a fit of anger.
Most of the delegates came from Berlin, and a few other towns. They represented about 20,000 members.
Just like the KPD at its foundation, the new KAPD's membership was very mixed. It was more like a gathering of opposition and excluded members from the KPD[1].
The party was made up of:
- the Berlin tendency, led by intellectuals like Schroder, Schwab, and Reichenbach, all from the milieu of the Socialist Students, and by workers like Emil Sachs, Adam Scharrer, and Jan Appel, all excellent organisers. They considered the Unionen as no more than a dependent branch of the Party; they rejected all forms of revolutionary syndicalism or anarchistic federalism. This tendency represented the marxist wing within the KAPD;
- the national-Bolshevik tendency around Wolffheim and Laufenberg, mainly centred on Hamburg. Although Wolffheim and Laufenberg did not take part in the KAPD's formation, they joined in order to infiltrate it.
Weaknesses on the organisational question lead to the disappearance of the organisation
This article does not intend to examine closely the KAPD's political positions (see our book on the Dutch Left for a detailed examination of this subject). Despite its theoretical weaknesses, the KAPD provided a historically precious contribution on the parliamentary and union questions. It was a pioneer in understanding the reasons which make it impossible to work in any way within the trades unions in the period of capitalist decadence; which have transformed the unions themselves into organs of the bourgeois state. It did the same in explaining the impossibility of using parliament in the workers' interests, since it had become nothing more than a weapon against the working class.
On the role of the party, the KAPD was the first to develop a clear viewpoint on the question of substitutionism. Unlike the majority of the Communist International, it recognised that in this new period, mass parties are no longer possible:
"7. The historic form for regrouping those proletarians who are the most conscious, the clearest, and the most ready for action, is the Party. (...) The Communist Party must be a programmatic, organised and disciplined whole with a unified will. It must be the head and the arm of the revolution. (...)
9. (...) In particular, it should never allow its membership to grow faster than it can be integrated by the solid communist core" (the KAPD's "Theses on the Role of the Party in the Proletarian Revolution", published in Proletarier no. 7, July 1921).
If we highlight first these programmatic contributions from the KAPD, it is because despite its fatal weaknesses, which we will consider here, it belongs to the heritage of the Communist Left. But the history of the KAPD was to show that programmatic clarity on key questions is not enough. Without a sufficiently clear understanding of the organisational question, programmatic clarity alone is no guarantee of an organisation's survival. The determining factor is not just the ability to adopt a solid programmatic basis, but above all the ability to build the organisation, to defend it, and to give it the strength to fulfil its historic role. Otherwise, it runs the risk of being torn apart by the action of false organisational conceptions, and of failing to stand up to the vicissitudes of the class struggle.
At the KAPD's founding congress, one of the first points on the agenda was the party's declaration of its immediate adherence to the Communist International, without having first asked for admission. Although its aim, right from the start, was to join the international movement, the central concern expressed in the discussion was to conduct "the struggle against the Spartakusbund within the Illrd International". In a discussion with representatives of the KPD, it declared: "We consider the Spartakusbund's reformist tactic to be in contradiction with the principles of the lllrd International, and we will work for the Spartakusbund's exclusion from the International" (from the Proceedings of the founding congress, quoted by Bock, p207). During this discussion, the same idea appeared again and again, like a leitmotiv: "We refuse to merge with the Spartakusbund, and we will fight against it to the bitter end (...) Our position towards the Spartakusbund is clear and simple: we think that those leaders who have been compromised should be excluded from the front of the proletarian struggle, to leave the way open for the masses to march together following the maxima list programme. It is decided that a delegation of two comrades will be formed to present an oral report to the Executive Committee of the IIIrd International" (ibid).
The political struggle against the Spartakusbund's opportunist positions was certainly vital, but this hostile attitude towards the KPD was a complete distortion of priorities. Instead of pushing towards a clarification within the KPD, with the aim of creating the conditions for unification, the predominant attitude was sectarian, irresponsible, and destructive for both organisations. This attitude was pushed especially by the national-Bolshevik tendency from Hamburg.
The KAPD's acceptance of the national-Bolshevik tendency within its ranks, right from the outset, was a disaster. This current was anti-proletarian. Its presence within the KAPD alone, was enough to reduce the latter's credibility severely in the eyes of the CI[2].
Jan Appel and Franz Jung were named as delegates to the CI's Second Congress, which met in July 1920[3].
In the discussions with the CI's Executive Committee (ECCI), where they put forward the KAPD viewpoint, they assured the Committee that both the national- Bolshevik current around Wolftheim and Laufenberg, and Ruhle's "anti-party" tendency would be excluded from the KAPD. There was a violent confrontation between viewpoints of the ECCI and the KAPD on the parliamentary and union questions. Lenin had just completed his pamphlet on Leftism, an Infantile Disorder of Communism. In Germany, the party had received no news of its delegates because of the blockade, and decided to send a second delegation made up of Otto Ruhle and Merges. They could not have done worse.
Ruhle, in fact, represented a federalist minority which wanted to dissolve the communist party into the system of Unionen. This minority refused any kind of centralisation; implicitly, it also rejected the very existence of the International. After their journey through Russia, where they were shocked by the consequences of the civil war (Russia had been attacked by 21 armies) and could see nothing but "a regime in a state of siege", they decided, without referring to the party, to return, convinced that "the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party is the springboard for the appearance of a new soviet bourgeoisie". Despite the pressing requests of Lenin, Zinoviev, Radek, and Bukharin, who gave them a consultative voice and urged them to take part in the Congress, they refused. The ECCI went so far as to offer them voting seats in the Congress: "When we were already in Petrograd on the way back, the Executive sent us another invitation to the Congress, with the declaration that the KAPD would be accorded voting seats, even though it fulfilled none of the draconian conditions in the Open Letter to the KAPD, and had not promised to do so".
As a result, the CI's second Congress took place without hearing the critical voice of the KAPD delegates. The damaging influence of opportunism within the CI could thus make itself felt all the more easily. Work within the unions was made one of the 21 conditions for admission to the CI, as an imperative, without the KAPD's resistance to this opportunist turn being felt at the Congress.
Moreover, those critical of this evolution by the CI were unable to unite during the Congress. Because of this damaging behaviour by the KAPD delegates, there was no international unity or common action. The opportunity for fruitful international fraction work was lost.
On the delegates' return, the current grouped around Ruhle was expelled for its conceptions and behaviour hostile to the organisation. Not only did the councilists reject the proletariat s political organisation, denying the particular role that the party must play in the process of the development of the proletariat's class consciousness (see the KAPD's "Theses on the Party"), they also joined the bourgeois chorus slandering the Russian revolution. Instead of drawing the lessons of the Russian revolution's difficulties, they rejected it, describing it as a double revolution (both proletarian and bourgeois, or even petty-bourgeois). In doing so, they signed their own political death warrant. The councilists not only did damage by denying the party's role in the development of class consciousness, they also hastened the dissolution of the revolutionary camp, and strengthened the general hostility to organisation. After their disintegration and dispersal, they were unable to make any political contribution. This current exists to this day, surviving mainly in Holland (although its ideology has spread widely beyond the Netherlands) .
During the KAPD's first ordinary Congress in August 1920, its Central Committee decided that the party should aim, not to combat the IIIrd International, but to fight for the triumph of the KAPD's views within it. This attitude was almost identical to that of the Italian Left, but was to change later. But the vision of an "opposition" within the CI, rather than an international fraction made it impossible to develop an international platform of the Communist Left.
In November 1920, after the KAPD's 2nd Congress, a third delegation (including Gorter, Schroder, and Rasch) left for Moscow. The CI reproached the KAPD with being responsible for the existence of two communist organisations (the KAPD and the KPD) within the same country, and demanded that it put an end to this anomaly. For the CI, the exclusion of Ruhle and the national-Bolsheviks around Wolffheim and Laufenberg opened the way for the reunification of the two currents and allowed a regroupment with the left wing of the USPD. While the KPD and the KAPD both vehemently rejected the merger of their two parties, the KAPD rejected on principle any regroupment with the left wing of the USPD. Despite this refusal to adopt the CI's position, the KAPD was given the status of a party sympathising with the IIIrd International, with a consultative vote (1).
Nonetheless, at the CI's 3rd Congress (26th July to 13th August 1921), the KAPD delegation once again criticised the CI's positions. In numerous interventions, it confronted the CI's opportunist turn with courage and determination. But the attempt to build a left fraction during the Congress failed, because none of those - from Mexico, Britain, Belgium, Italy and the USA - who criticised the CI were ready to carry out the tasks of an international fraction. Only the Dutch KAP and the militants from Bulgaria supported the KAPD's position. In the end, the CI confronted the KAPD with an ultimatum: either merge with the VKPD within three months, or face exclusion from the International.
Like the KPD, which a year before had silenced the critical voices within its own ranks, the CI's error was to have serious consequences. Opportunism within the CI had one less obstacle in its path.
The KAPD delegation refused to take an immediate decision, without referring back to the Party.
The KAPD found itself confronted with a difficult and painful decision (which it shared with the whole left communist current):
- it could merge with the VKPD, and so aided the development of opportunism;
- or it could form an external fraction of the International, with a view to reconquering the CI and even the German VKPD, hoping that other important fractions would form simultaneously;
- or it could work in the perspective that the conditions would ripen for the formation of a new International;
- or finally, it could proclaim, completely artificially, the formation of a IVth International.
From 21st July onwards, the KAPD leadership allowed itself to be drawn into a series of hasty decisions. Despite the opposition of delegates from Eastern Saxony and Hanover, and despite the abstention of the largest district (Greater Berlin), the party leadership pushed through the adoption of a resolution breaking with the IIIrd International. This decision was taken outside the framework of a Party Congress: even more serious was the decision to work towards "the construction of a workers' communist International".
The KAPD's extraordinary congress (11th -14th September 1921) unanimously proclaimed the immediate departure from the CI as a sympathising party.
At the same time, it considered all the CI's sections as being definitively lost: the emergence of revolutionary fractions from within the International was no longer considered a possibility. It deformed reality by considering the CI's different parties as nothing but "political auxiliaries" in the service of "Russian capital". In its haste, not only did the KAPD underestimate the potential international opposition to the development of opportunism within the CI, it also undermined the principles governing relations between revolutionary parties. This sectarian attitude was a foretaste of that adopted later by other proletarian organisations. The enemy seemed to be, not Capital, but the other groups, whose revolutionary nature was denied.
The drama of self-mutilation
Once excluded from the CI, another weakness was to weigh heavily on the KAPD. During its conferences, not only had it failed to evaluate the balance of class forces internationally, it had more or less restricted itself to the analysis of the situation in Germany, and to underlining the particular responsibility of the German working class. Nobody was ready to acknowledge that the international revolutionary tide was ebbing. Instead of drawing the lessons of the reflux, and redefining new tasks for the period, it declared that the "the situation is more than ripe for revolution". This did not stop a majority of its members, especially the young militants who had joined the movement after the war, from drifting away from the party. As we will show in another article, the party reacted by confronting the situation artificially by developing a tendency towards putschism, and individual actions.
Instead of recognising the ebb of the class struggle and working patiently as a fraction outside the International, the KAPD aspired to found a Communist Workers' International (KAI). The Berlin and Bremerhaven sections opposed the project, but remained in the minority.
At the same time, during the winter of 1921-22, the wing grouped around Schroder began to reject the necessity of economic struggle. In the period of "capitalism's mortal crisis", these were seen as opportunist; only political struggles posing the question of power should be supported. In other words, the party could only fulfil its function in revolutionary periods. This was a new variant on the councilist conception!
In March 1922, by manipulating the voting procedures, Schroder succeeded in winning a majority for his tendency which did not in fact reflect the real balance of forces within the party. The Greater Berlin district - numerically the largest - responded by excluding Sachs, Schroder, and Goldstein from the party for their "damaging behaviour towards the party and their unbridled personal ambition". Schroder, who belonged to the "official" majority, replied by excluding the Berlin district, and moved to Essen, where he formed the "Essen tendency". Henceforth, there were two KAPDs and two newspapers with the same name. A period of personal accusations and slanders began. Instead of trying to draw the lessons of the break with the KPD during the 1919 Heidelberg Congress, and of the exclusion from the CI, it was as if a continuity in the fiascos was being sought after! The concept of the party became no more than a label adopted by each of the splits, none of which could boast more than a few hundred militants at best.
The height of organisational suicide was reached by the Essen tendency's formation between 2nd and 6th April 1922, of the Communist Workers' International (KAI).
The birth of the KAPD itself in April 1920 had been over-hasty, without the possibilities of fraction work outside the KPD being exhausted. Now it was decided, just after leaving the CI and after an irresponsible split had caused the appearance of two tendencies, one in Essen and one in Berlin, to found, in haste and from nothing, a new International! This was a purely artificial creation, as if founding an organisation were merely a matter of will. It was a completely irresponsible attitude, which led to a new fiasco.
The Essen tendency split in its turn, to produce the Kommunistischer Ratebund (Council Communist League). In 1925, part of this tendency (Schroder, Reichenbach) returned to the SPD, while the rest left politics altogether.
As for the Berlin tendency, it survived a little longer. In 1926, it turned towards the left wing of the KPD. At this point, it had between 1500 and 2000 members, and most of the local groups (especially in the Ruhr) had disappeared. However, it grew again (to about 6000 members) by regrouping with the Entschiedene Linke (the "Determined Left", excluded from the KPD).
Following another split in 1928, the KAPD became less and less important.
What this whole trajectory shows us, is that the German Left Communists had incorrect organisational conceptions which were to prove fatal to them. Their organisational approach was a disaster for the working class.
After their exclusion from the CI and the farce of the creation of the KAI, they were incapable of carrying out any worthwhile fraction work. This fundamental task was taken in hand by the Italian Left. It was to prove impossible to draw the lessons of the revolutionary wave, and to defend them, unless the organisation could be kept alive. And it was precisely the German Left's deeply mistaken ideas on the organisational question which led them to failure and eventually to disappearance: True, bourgeois repression did everything it could (first with the social-democracy, then the stalinists and fascists) to exterminate the Left Communists. But it was their inability to defend and build the organisation, which contributed fundamentally to their destruction and political death. The counter-revolution triumphed utterly. This is why it is vital for revolutionaries today to draw the lessons of the German Left's organisational experience, and to assimilate them, to prevent the same fiasco from every being repeated.
The KPD's wrong organisational notions accelerate its decline into opportunism
After 1919, the KPD had excluded all its opposition, and found itself caught in the devastating downward spiral of opportunism.
In particular, it began to work within the trades unions and within parliament. Presented as purely "tactical" during the second Congress in October 1919, this task rapidly became "strategic".
Finding that the revolutionary wave was no longer spreading, and was even on the retreat, the KPD tried to "go to" those "backward" workers, "full of illusions" , who were still in the unions, by building "united fronts" in the factories. In December 1920, the party merged with the centrist USPD, in the hope of gaining greater influence by creating a mass party. Thanks to a few successes in the parliamentary elections, the KPD came to believe more and more in its own illusions, imagining that "the more votes we win in the elections, the greater our influence in the working class". It ended up by requiring Party militants to become union members.
This opportunist decline accelerated still further when the Party opened the door to nationalism. While it rightly booted the national-Bolsheviks out the door in 1919, from 1920-21 onwards, it let nationalist elements back in through the window.
Its attitude to the KAPD was adamant. When the International admitted the latter with a consultative vote in November 1920, the KPD on the contrary urged its exclusion.
After the struggles of 1923, with the rise of Stalinism in Russia, the process which was to make the KPD a spokesman for the Russian state accelerated. During the 1920s, the KPD became one of Moscow's most faithful disciples. While on the one hand, the majority of the KAPD rejected the entire Russian experience, on the other the KPD completely lost any critical sense! Its false notions of organisation had definitively weakened its internal forces of opposition to the development of opportunism.
"The German Revolution": a history of the party's weakness
It is clear that the German working class lacked a sufficiently strong party at its side. It is understandable that during the first phase of struggle (November/December 1918), the influence of the Spartakists was relatively weak, and the newly founded KPD's inability to prevent the provocation by the bourgeoisie was a serious setback. Throughout 1919, the working class paid the price of the party's weaknesses. In the wave of struggles that unfolded in different parts of the country after 1919, the KPD still did not have a determining influence. Its influence was further reduced by the splits in the party after October 1919. In March 1920, when the working class reacted massively against the Kapp putsch, once again the KPD failed to live up to the occasion.
Once we have emphasised the tragedy for the working class of the party's weakness, we might be tempted to say that we had finally found the cause of the revolution's defeat in Germany.
It is certainly true that we must not repeat the mistakes made by revolutionaries at the time, especially on the organisational level. However, these are not enough in themselves to explain the failure of the revolution in Germany.
It has often been said that the Bolshevik Party around Lenin provides the example of how a revolution can be led to victory, whereas Germany provides the counter-example of revolutionaries' weakness. But this does not explain everything, as Lenin was indeed the first to insist: "While it was easy to overcome the degenerate clique of Rasputins and Romanovs, it is infinitely more difficult to struggle against the powerful and organised gang of German imperialists, whether crowned or not" (Lenin, Speech to the First Russian Navy Congress, 22 November 1917).
"For us, it was easier to begin the revolution, but it is extremely difficult to continue and complete it. And the revolution confronts enormous difficulties in a country as industrialised as Germany, in a country with such a well organised bourgeoisie" (Lenin, Speech at the Conference of Moscow Factory Committees, 23rd July 1918).
In particular, by bringing the war to an end, under the pressure of the working class, the bourgeoisie removed an important factor in the radicalisation of the struggle. Once the war was over, despite their magnificent combativity, their growing pressure in the factories, their initiative and organisation within the workers' councils, the workers came up against highly elaborate sabotage on the part of the counter-revolutionary forces, with at their centre the SPD and the unions.
The lesson for today is obvious: faced with a bourgeoisie as skilful as the German one - and we can be sure that in the next revolution, the entire ruling class will demonstrate at least the same capacities, and will unite to combat the working class threat by every means possible - revolutionary organisations will be unable to fulfil their duty unless they are themselves solid and organised internationally.
The precondition for the construction of the party is a long-term programmatic clarification, and above all the elaboration of solid organisational principles. The German experience is clear: lack of clarity on the marxist way of functioning inevitably condemns the organisation to disappear.
The failure of German revolutionaries to build a real party during World War I had disastrous consequences. Not only did the party itself disintegrate and collapse, but during the counter-revolution, and even by the end of the 1920s, there were hardly any organised revolutionaries left to make their voices heard. The silence of the graveyard reigned over Germany for more than 40 years. When the proletariat raised its head again in 1968, it was lacking this revolutionary voice. One of the most important tasks in preparing the future proletarian revolution is to build up the organisation. If this is not done, the defeat of the revolution is already certain.
This is why the struggle for the construction of the organisation lies at the heart of the preparation for the revolution of tomorrow.
Dv
[1] The whole question of the KAPD and its evolution is dealt with in detail in our book on the Dutch Left.
[2] They were not excluded from the KAPD until after the return of their delegation at the end of the summer of 1920. Their membership of the KAPD shows just how disparate it really was at the moment of its formation, and that it was more a gathering than a party built on a solid organisational and programmatic basis.
[3] At the time, it was impossible to reach Moscow by land, because of the blockade imposed by the armies of the "democratic" powers, and the civil war. Only by taking a ship, and persuading the sailors to mutiny against their captain, did Franz Jung and Jan Appel succeed, after many adventures, in making their way through the blockade imposed by the counter-revolutionary armies, and reaching the port of Murmansk at the end of April, whence they made their way to Moscow.
Nothing enrages an exploiting class more than an uprising of the exploited. The revolts of the slaves under the Roman Empire, of the peasants under feudalism, were always repressed with the most disgusting cruelty. The rebellion of the working class against capitalism, however, is an even greater affront to the ruling class of thus system, since it clearly and rationally holds aloft the banner of a new, communist, society, a society that actually corresponds to historical possibility and necessity. For the capitalist class, therefore, it is not enough merely to repress the revolutionary attempts of the working class, to drown them in blood - although the capitalist counter-revolution is certainly the bloodiest in history. It is also necessary to ridicule the idea that the working class is the bearer of a new social order, to show the utter futility of the communist project. For this, an arsenal of lies and distortions is required alongside the arsenal of material weapons. Hence, the necessity, for capital, of maintaining for most of the twentieth century, the greatest lie in history: the lie that Stalinism equals communism.
The collapse of the eastern bloc in 1989, and of the USSR two years later, while depriving the bourgeoisie of a living "example" of this lie, in fact greatly reinforced its effects, making it possible to unleash a gigantic campaign about the definite failure of communism, of marxism, and even the obsolescence of the very idea of the class struggle. The profoundly damaging effects of this campaign on the consciousness of the world proletariat have been examined many times in the columns of this Review, and we will not elaborate on this point any further here. What is important to emphasise is that, even though the impact of these campaigns has diminished over the past few years - especially because the bourgeoisie's promises about the new world order of peace and prosperity that was supposed to follow the demise of Stalinism have proved to be no more than hot air - they are so fundamental to the bourgeoisie's apparatus of ideological control that it will not neglect any opportunity to give them new life and influence. We have now entered the year of the 80th anniversary of the Russian revolution, and there is no doubt that we are going to see many new twists to this theme. But one thing that is certain: the bourgeoisie's hatred and contempt for the proletarian revolution that began in Russia in 1917, its efforts to deform and denature its memory, will be focused above all on the political organisation that embodied the spirit of that vast insurrectionary movement: the Bolshevik party. This should not surprise us: from the days of the Communist League and the First International, the bourgeoisie has always been willing to "forgive" the majority of the poor workers duped by the plots and schemes of the revolutionary minorities. But the latter are invariably seen as the very incarnation of evil. And for capital, none have been so evil as the Bolsheviks, who after all managed to "mislead" the simple workers longer and further than any other revolutionary party in history.
This is not the place to look at all the latest books, articles and documentaries which are currently being devoted to the Russian revolution. Suffice it to say that the most publicised - for example Pipes The Unknown Lenin: from the Soviet Archives, and the work of the former KGB archivist Volkogonov, who claims access to hitherto inaccessible files dating back to 1917 - have had a very precise theme: to show that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were a gang of power hungry fanatics who did all they needed to do to usurp the democratic gains of the February revolution, and plunge Russia and the world into one of the most disastrously failed experiments in history. Naturally, these gentlemen have proved with minute attention to detail how the Stalinist terror was merely the continuation and fulfilment of the Leninist terror. The subtitle of the German edition of Volkogonov's work on Lenin, Utopia and Terror, sums up the bourgeoisie's approach very well: the revolution degenerated into terror precisely because it tried to impose a utopian ideal, communism, which is really antithetical to human nature.
An important element in this anti-Bolshevik inquisition is the idea that Bolshevism, for all its talk of marxism and world revolution, was above all an expression of Russian backwardness. This motif is not new: it was one of the favourite tunes of the "renegade Kautsky" in the aftermath of the October insurrection. But it has subsequently acquired considerable academic respectability. One of the best researched studies of the leaders of the Russian revolution - Bertram Wolfe's Three Who Made a Revolution, written during the 1950s - develops this idea with particular regard to Lenin. In this view, Lenin's view of the proletarian political organisation as a "narrow" body made up of convinced revolutionaries owes more to the conspiratorial and secretive conceptions of the Narodniks and of Bakunin than to Marx. Such historians often contrast this with the more "sophisticated", "European” and "democratic" conceptions of the Mensheviks. And of course, since the form of the revolutionary organisation is closely connected to the form of the revolution itself, the democratic Menshevik organisation could have given us a democratic Russia, while the dictatorial Bolshevik form gave us a dictatorial Russia.
It is not only the official spokesmen of the bourgeoisie who peddle such ideas. They are also sold, in a slightly different wrapping, by anarchists of every stripe, who specialise in the "we told you so" approach to the Russian revolution. We knew all along that Bolshevism was nasty and would end in tears - all that talk about the party, the transitional state and the dictatorship of the proletariat, where else could it lead? But anarchism has a habit of perpetually renewing itself and can be a lot more subtle than that. A good example of this is the kind of stuff being put about by a parasitic breed of anarchism that calls itself (among other things) the London Psychogeographical Society. The LPA have heartily endorsed the ICC's argument that Bakuninism, for all its talk of liberty and equality, its criticisms of marxist "authoritarianism", was in fact based on a profoundly hierarchical and even esoteric vision closely allied to freemasonry. For the LPA, however, this is only the hors d'oeuvres: the main dish is that the Bolshevik conception of organisation is the true continuator of Bakuninism and thus of freemasonry. The circle is complete: the "communists" of the LPA regurgitate the leftovers of cold war professors.
The challenge posed by all these slanders against Bolshevism is considerable, and could not be answered in the context of a single article. For example, to make a critical appraisal of the "Leninist" conception of organisation, to refute the prejudice that the latter was no more than a new version of Narodnikism or Bakuninism, would require a series of articles in itself. Our aim in this article is rather more precise. It is to examine a particular episode in the events of the Russian revolution - the April Theses announced by Lenin on his return to Russia in 1917. Not simply because 80 years ago to the month is a timely moment to do so, but above all because this short, sharp document provides us with an excellent starting point for refuting all the lies about the Bolshevik party, and for reaffirming the most essential thing about it: that this party was not a product of Russian barbarism, of a distorted anarcho-terrorism, or of the unmitigated lust for power of its leaders. Bolshevism was a product first and foremost of the world proletariat. Inseparably bound to the entire marxist tradition, it was not the seed of a new form of exploitation and oppression, but the vanguard of a movement to do away with all exploitation and oppression.
Towards the end of February 1917, the workers of Petrograd launched massive strikes against the intolerable living conditions inflicted by the imperialist war. The slogans of the movement rapidly became political, with workers calling for an end to the war and the overthrow of the autocracy. In days the strike had spread to other towns and cities, and as the workers took up arms and fraternised with the soldiers, the mass strike assumed the character of an uprising.
Repeating the experience of 1905, the workers centralised the struggle through soviets of workers' deputies, elected by factory assemblies and revocable at any moment. In contrast to 1905, the soldiers and peasants began to follow this example on a broad scale.
The ruling class, recognising that the days of the autocracy were numbered, rid themselves of the Czar, and called upon the parties of liberalism and the "left", in particular those once-proletarian elements who had recently passed into the bourgeois camp by supporting the war, to form a Provisional Government with the avowed aim of steering Russia towards a system of parliamentary democracy. In reality, a situation of dual power had arisen, since the workers and soldiers only really trusted the soviets, and the bourgeois Provisional Government was not yet in a strong enough position to ignore them, and still less to disband them. But this profound class divide was partially obscured by the fog of democratic euphoria which descended on the country after the February revolt. With the Czar out of the way and people enjoying unheard-of liberty, everyone seemed to be in favour of the "Revolution" - including Russia's democratic allies who hoped that it would enable Russia to participate more effectively in the war effort. Thus the Provisional Government presented itself as the guardian of the revolution; the soviets were politically dominated by the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, who were doing all they could to reduce them to mere ciphers of the newly installed bourgeois regime. In short, the whole impetus of the mass strike and the uprising - which in truth was a manifestation of a more universal revolutionary movement brewing in all the main capitalist countries as a result of the war - was being diverted towards capitalist ends.
Where were the Bolsheviks in this situation, so full of danger and promise? They were in almost complete disarray:
"For Bolshevism the first months of the revolution had been a period of bewilderment and vacillation. In the "manifesto" of the Bolshevik Central Committee, drawn up just after the victory of the insurrection, we read that "the workers of the shops and factories, and likewise the mutinied troops, must immediately elect their representatives to the Provisional Revolutionary Government" (...) They behaved not like representatives of a proletarian party preparing an independent struggle for power, but like the left wing of a democracy, which, having announced its principles, intended for an indefinite time to play the part of loyal opposition" (Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, vol 1, chapter 15 [586] ).
When Stalin and Kamenev took the helm of the party in March, they moved it even further to the right. Stalin developed a theory about the complementary roles of the Provisional Government and the Soviets. Worse, the party's official organ, Pravda, openly adopted a "defencist" position on the war: "Our slogan is not the meaningless "down with war". Our slogan is pressure upon the Provisional Government with the aim of compelling it (...) to make an attempt to induce all the warring countries to open immediate negotiations (...) and until then every man remains at his fighting post" (quoted in Trotsky, p 275).
Trotsky recounts how many elements in the party felt deep disquiet and even anger over this opportunist drift in the party, but were not armed programmatically to answer the leadership's position, since it appeared to be based on a perspective that had been developed by Lenin himself and which had been the official view of the party for over a decade: the perspective, that is, of the "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants". The essence of this theory had been that although economically speaking the nature of the revolution developing in Russia was bourgeois, the Russian bourgeoisie itself was too weak to carry out its own revolution, and so the capitalist modernisation of Russia would have to be assumed by the proletariat and poorer sections of the peasantry. This position stood half way between that of the Mensheviks - who claimed to be "orthodox" marxists and thus argued that the task of the proletariat was to give critical support to the bourgeoisie against absolutism until such time as Russia was ripe for socialism - and that of Trotsky, whose theory of "permanent revolution", developed after the events of 1905, had insisted that the working class would be propelled to power in the coming revolution, and would be forced to push beyond the bourgeois stage of the revolution to the socialist stage, but could only do this if the Russian revolution coincided with, or sparked off, a socialist revolution in the industrialised countries.
In truth, Lenin's theory had at best been a product if an ambiguous period, in which it was increasingly obvious that the Russian bourgeoisie was not a revolutionary force, but in which it was not yet clear that the period of international socialist revolution had arrived. Nevertheless, the superiority of Trotsky's thesis was precisely based on the fact that it departed from an international, rather than a purely Russian framework; and Lenin himself, despite his many acute disagreements with Trotsky at that time, had on several occasions after the 1905 events veered towards the notion of permanent revolution.
In practise, the idea of the "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants" proved to be without substance; the "orthodox Leninists" who went on repeating the formula in 1917 used it as a cover for sliding towards Menshevism pure and simple. Kamenev argued forcefully that since the bourgeois democratic phase of the revolution was not yet completed, it was necessary to give critical support to the Provisional Government: this hardly conformed to Lenin's original conception, which insisted that the bourgeoisie would inevitably compromise with the autocracy. There were even serious moves towards the reunification of the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks.
Thus, the Bolshevik party, disarmed programmatically, was being drawn towards compromise and betrayal. The future of the revolution hung in the balance when Lenin returned from exile.
In his History of the Russian Revolution (Vol. 1, Ch. 15), Trotsky gives us a graphic description of Lenin's arrival at the Finland Station in Petrograd, April 3, 1917. The Petrograd Soviet, still dominated by the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, organised a huge welcoming party and festooned Lenin with flowers. In the name of the Soviet, Chkeidze greeted Lenin with these words:
"Comrade Lenin (...) we welcome you Russia (...) but we consider that the chief task of the revolutionary democracy at present is to defend our revolution against every kind of attack both from within and from without (...) We hope that you will join us in striving towards this goal".
Lenin's reply was not addressed to the leaders of the welcoming committee, but to the hundreds of workers and soldiers who had thronged the station:
"Dear comrades, soldiers, sailors and workers. I am happy to greet in you the victorious Russian revolution, to greet you as the advance guard of the international proletarian army.. The hour is not far when, at the summons of our comrade Karl Liebknecht, the people will turn their weapons against their capitalist exploiters (...) The Russian revolution achieved by you has opened a new epoch. Long live the worldwide socialist revolution!" (op cit, p 280-281).
Thus did the spoilsport Lenin pour cold water on the democratic carnival from the very moment of his arrival. That night Lenin elaborated his position in a two hour speech which further dismayed all the good democrats and sentimental socialists who wanted the revolution to go no further than it had done in February, who had applauded the workers' mass strikes when they had chased away the Czar and allowed the Provisional Government to assume power, but dreaded any further class polarisation. The next day, at a joint meeting of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin expounded what became known as his April Theses, which are short enough to reproduce in full here:
“1) In our attitude towards the war, which under the new government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia's part a predatory imperial war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession to "revolutionary defencism" is permissible.
The class-conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: a) that the power pass to the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants aligned with the proletariat; b) that all annexations be renounced in deed and in word; c) that a complete break be effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests.
In view of the undoubted honesty of those broad sections of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity, and not as a means of conquest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with particular thoroughness, persistence and patience to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection existing between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that without overthrowing capital it is impossible to end the war by a truly democratic peace, a peace not imposed by violence.
The most widespread campaign for this view must be organised in the army at the front.
2) The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution - which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie - to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants.
This transition is characterised, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognised rights (Russia is now the freest of all belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence towards the masses, and, finally, by their unreasoning trust in the government of capitalists, those worst enemies of peace and socialism.
This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the special conditions of Party work among unprecedented large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life.
3) No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion-breeding "demand" that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be an imperialist government.
4) Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies our Party is in a minority, so far a small minority, as against a bloc of all the petty bourgeois opportunist elements, from the Popular Socialists and the Socialist Revolutionaries down to the Organising Committee (Chkeidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, etc.), who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and spread that influence among the proletariat.
The masses must be made to see that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the only possible form of revolutionary government and that therefore our task is, as long as this government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic and persistent explanation of the errors of their tactics, an explanation especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.
As long as we are in a minority we carry on the work of criticising and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the people may overcome their mistakes by experience.
5) Not a parliamentary republic - to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step - but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.
Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy.
The salaries of all officials, all of whom are elective and displaceable at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker.
6) The weight of emphasis in the agrarian programme to be shifted to the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies.
Confiscation of all landed estates.
Nationalisation of all lands in the country, the land to be disposed of by the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. The organisation of separate Soviets of Deputies of Poor Peasants. The setting up of a model farm on each of the large estates (ranging in size from 100 to 300 dessiatines, according to local and other conditions, and to the decisions of the local bodies) under the control of the Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' Deputies and for the public account.
7) The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies
8) It is not our immediate task to "introduce" socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.
9) Party tasks:
a) Immediate convocation of a Party congress;
b) alteration of the Party programme, mainly
(1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war
(2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a "commune state";
(3) Amendment of our out-of-date minimum programme
c) Change of the Party's name
(10) A new International
We must take the initiative in creating a revolutionary International, an International against the social chauvinists and against the "Center"."
Zalezhski, a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee at the time, summed up the reaction to Lenin's theses both inside the party and throughout the movement: "Lenin's theses produced the effect of an exploding bomb" (Trotsky, p 295). The initial reaction was disbelief and a rain of anathemas on Lenin's head: Lenin had been too long in exile, had lost touch with Russian reality. His perspectives on the nature of the revolution had fallen into "Trotskyism". As for his idea about the soviets taking power, he had reverted to Blanquism, adventurism, anarchism. A former member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, at that time outside the party, Goldernberg, put it thus: "For many years the place of Bakunin has remained vacant in the Russian revolution, now it is occupied by Lenin” (Trotsky, p 294). For Kamenev, Lenin's approach would prevent the Bolsheviks from acting as a party of the masses, reducing its role to that of a "group of communist propagandists".
This was not the first time that "old Bolsheviks" had clung on to outworn formulae in the name of Leninism. In 1905, the initial Bolshevik reaction to the appearance of the soviets had been based on a mechanical interpretation of Lenin's criticisms of spontaneism in What is To be Done; the leadership had thus called on the Petrograd Soviet either to subordinate itself to the party or dissolve. Lenin himself roundly rejected this attitude, being one of the first to grasp the revolutionary significance of the soviet as an organ of proletarian political power, and insisted that the question wasn't "soviet or party" but both the soviets and the party, since their roles were complementary. Now, once again, Lenin had to give these "Leninists" a lesson in the marxist method, to demonstrate that marxism is the very opposite of a dead dogma; it is a living scientific theory which must constantly be verified in the laboratory of social movements. The April Theses were the epitome of marxism's capacity to discard, adapt, modify or enrich previous positions in the light of the experience of the class struggle: "For the present, it is essential to grasp the incontestable truth that a marxist must take cognisance of real life, of the true facts of reality, and not cling to a theory of yesterday, which, like all theories, at best only outlines the main and the general, only comes near to embracing life in all its complexity. "Theory, my friend is grey, but green is the eternal tree of life"" (Lenin, Letters on Tactics, April 8-13, 1917 - the quotation is from Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust). And in the same letter Lenin berates "those "old Bolsheviks who more than once already have played a regrettable role in the history of our Party by reiterating formulas senselessly learned by rote instead of studying the specific features of the new and living reality".
For Lenin, the "democratic dictatorship" had already been realised in the soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies and as such it had already become an antiquated formula. The essential task for the Bolsheviks was now to push forward the proletarian dynamic within this broader social movement, which was oriented towards the formation of a Commune-state in Russia as the first outpost of the world socialist revolution. One might take issue with Lenin's effort to save the honour of the old formula, but the essential element in his approach is that he was able to see the future of the movement, and thus the need to break the mould of outworn theories.
The marxist method is not only dialectical and dynamic; it is also global, ie it places every particular question within an international and historical framework. And this is what above all enabled Lenin to grasp the real direction of events. From 1914 onwards, the Bolsheviks, with Lenin to the fore, had defended the most consistent internationalist position against the imperialist war, seeing it as the proof of the decay of world capitalism and thus of the opening of the epoch of world proletarian revolution. This was the foundation-stone of the slogan "turn the imperialist war into a civil war", which Lenin had defended against all varieties of chauvinism and pacifism. Holding fast to this analysis, Lenin was not for a moment taken in by the idea that the accession to power of the Provisional Government changed the imperialist character of the war, and he spared no barbs on the Bolsheviks who had fallen into this error: "Pravda demands of the government that it renounces annexations. To demand from the government of capitalists that it renounces anexations is nonsense, flagrant mockery" (cited by Trotsky, p 290).
The intransigent reaffirmation of the internationalist position on the war was in the first place a necessity if the opportunist slide in the party was to be halted. But it was also the starting point for theoretically liquidating the formula of democratic dictatorship and all the Menshevik apologies for supporting the bourgeoisie. To the argument that backward Russia was not yet ripe for socialism, Lenin argued as a true internationalist, acknowledging in Thesis 8 that "it is not our immediate task to "introduce" socialism". Russia, in itself, was not ripe for socialism but the imperialist war had demonstrated that world capitalism as a whole was indeed overripe. Hence Lenin's greeting to the workers at the Finland station: the Russian workers, by taking power, would be acting as the advance guard of the international proletarian army. Hence also the call for a new International at the end of the theses. And for Lenin, as for all the authentic internationalists of the day, the world revolution was not a pious hope but a concrete perspective growing out of the international proletarian revolt against the war - strikes in Britain and Germany, political demonstrations, mutinies and fraternisation in the armed forces of several countries, and of course the mounting revolutionary tide in Russia itself. This perspective, embryonic at that moment, was to be fully confirmed after the October insurrection by the extension of the revolutionary wave to Italy, Hungary, Austria and above all Germany.
The defenders of marxist "orthodoxy" accused Lenin of Blanquism and Bakuninism on the question of the seizure of power and on the nature of the post-revolutionary state. Blanquism because he was supposedly in favour of a coup d'Etat by a minority - either by the Bolsheviks acting alone, or even by the industrial working class as whole, acting without regard to the peasant majority. Bakuninism because the theses' rejection of a parliamentary republic was a concession to the anti-political prejudices of the anarchists and syndicalists.
In his Letters on Tactics [587], Lenin defended his theses from the first accusation as follows: "In my theses, I absolutely ensured myself against skipping over the peasant movement, which has not outlived itself, or the petty-bourgeois movement in general, against any playing at "seizure of power" by a workers' government, against any kind of Blanquist adventurism; for I pointedly referred to the experience of the Paris Commune. And this experience, as we know, and as Marx proved at length in 1871 and Engels in 1891, absolutely excludes Blanquism, absolutely ensures the direct, immediate and unquestionable rule of the majority and the activity of the masses only to the extent that the majority itself acts consciously.
In the theses, I very definitely reduced the question to one of a struggle for influence within the Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. To leave no shadow of doubt on this score, I twice emphasised in the theses the need for patient and persistent "explanatory" work "adapted to the practical needs of the masses"."
As for reverting to an anarchist position on the state, Lenin pointed out in April, as he was to do in greater depth in his State and Revolution, that the "orthodox" marxists, with figures like Kautsky and Plekhanov at their head, had buried the real teachings of Marx and Engels on the state under a dung-heap of parliamentarism. The experience of the Commune had shown that the task of the proletariat in the revolution was not to take over the old state but to demolish it from top to bottom; that the new instrument of proletarian rule, the Commune-state, would be based not on the principle of parliamentary representation, which in the end was only a facade hiding the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but on direct delegation and revocability from below, on the armed and self-organised masses. By throwing up the soviets, the experience of 1905, and of the newly emerging revolution of 1917, not only confirmed this perspective, but took it a stage further. Whereas the Commune had been a "popular" body in which all the oppressed classes of society were equally represented, the soviets were a higher form, because they made it possible for the proletariat to organise autonomously within the movement of the masses in general. The soviets, taken as a whole, would thus constitute a new state: one qualitatively different from the old bourgeois state but a state all the same - and here Lenin carefully distinguishes himself from the anarchists:
"Anarchism denies the need for a state and state power in the period of transition from the rule of the bourgeoisie to the rule of the proletariat, whereas I, with a precision that precludes any possibility of misinterpretation, advocate the need for a state in this period, although in accordance with Marx, and the lessons of the Paris Commune, I advocate not the usual parliamentary bourgeois state, but a state without a standing army, without police opposed to the people, without any officialdom placed above the people.
“When Mr Plekhanov, in his newspaper Yedinstvo, shouts with all his might that this is anarchism, he is merely giving further proof of his break with marxism" (Lenin, Letters on Tactics)
The charge that Lenin was planning a Blanquist coup is inseparable from the idea that he was seeking power for his party alone. This was to become a central theme of all subsequent bourgeois propaganda about the October revolution: that it was no more than a coup d'Etat carried out by the Bolsheviks. We cannot deal here with all the varieties and nuances of this thesis here. Trotsky provides one of the best answers in his History of the Russian Revolution, when he shows that it was not the party, but the soviets which took the power in October (see also our articles on the Russian revolution in IRs 71 and 72). But one of the guiding threads of this notion is the argument that Lenin's view of the party as a tightly-knit and highly centralised organisation led inexorably to this minority putsch in 1917 and, by extension, to the Red Terror and finally to Stalinism.
Again, this is a story that goes back to the original split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks and this isn't the place to go over this key episode in any detail. Suffice it to say that ever since that time, Lenin's conception of the revolutionary organisation has been described as Jacobin, elitist, militaristic, even terroristic. Marxist authorities as respected as Luxemburg and Trotsky have been cited in support of this view. For our part, we don't deny that Lenin's views on the organisation question, both in that period and in subsequent ones, contain much that is erroneous (for example his adoption in 1902 of Kautsky's thesis about class consciousness coming from the outside, although he later repudiated this; certain of his conceptions about the internal regime of the party, about the relationship between the party and the state, etc). But unlike the Mensheviks of that time, and their numerous anarchist, social democrat, and councilist successors, we don't take these errors as our starting point, any more than we begin an analysis of the Paris Commune or the Russian revolution by insisting on the mistakes - even the fatal ones - that they made. The real starting point is that Lenin's lifelong struggle to construct a revolutionary organisation is a historic acquisition of the workers' movement, and has left revolutionaries today with an indispensable basis for understanding both how a revolutionary organisation should function internally, and what its role within the class as a whole must be.
With regard to the latter point, and against many superficial analyses, the "narrow" Bolshevik conception of organisation, which Lenin counter-posed to the "broader" Menshevik conception, was not simply the reflection of the conditions imposed by Czarist repression. Just as the mass strikes and revolutionary uprisings of 1905 were not the last echoes of the bourgeois revolutions of the 19th century, but showed the near future of the international class struggle in the dawning epoch of capitalist decadence, so the Bolshevik conception of a party of committed revolutionaries, crystal clear in its programme and functioning on a centralised basis, was an anticipation of the role and structure required for the party by the conditions of capitalist decadence, of the epoch of proletarian revolution. It may be the case, as many anti-Bolsheviks have claimed, that the Mensheviks were looking to the west for their model of organisation, but they were also looking backwards, back to the old social democratic model of a mass party which embodies the class, organises the class, and represents the class, particularly through the electoral process. And against all the claims that it was the Bolsheviks who were stuck in archaic Russian conditions, harking back to the model of the conspiratorial society, they in reality were the ones who were looking forward, forward to a period of massive revolutionary turbulence which could not be organised, planned or encapsulated by the party but which nevertheless made the party's role more vital than ever. "If we now leave the pedantic scheme of demonstrative mass strikes artificially brought about by order of the parties and trade unions, and turn to the living picture of a peoples" movement arising with elemental energy (...) .it becomes obvious that the task of social democracy does not consist in the technical preparation and direction of mass strikes, but first and foremost in the political leadership of the whole movement"
Thus wrote Rosa Luxemburg in her masterly analysis of the mass strike and the new conditions of the international class struggle (The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions [588]). And thus did Luxemburg, who had been one of Lenin's fiercest critics at the time of the 1903 split, converge with the most fundamental elements in the Bolshevik conception of the revolutionary party.
These elements are set out with the utmost clarity in the April Theses, which as we have already seen reject any notion of "imposing" the revolution from above: "As long as we are in a minority we carry on the work of criticising and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire state power to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies so that the people may overcome their mistakes by experience". This work of "patient, systematic and persistent explanation" was precisely what was meant by giving political leadership in a revolutionary period. There could be no question of passing to the phase of insurrection until the revolutionary positions of the Bolsheviks had won over the soviets - and indeed, before that could happen, the revolutionary positions of Lenin had to win over the Bolshevik party, and this required a hard and uncompromising struggle from the moment Lenin arrived in Russia.
"We are not charlatans. We must base ourselves only on the consciousness of the masses" (Lenin's second speech on his arrival in Petrograd, cited in Trotsky, p 293). In the initial phase of the revolution, the working class was surrendering power to the bourgeoisie, a fact which should not surprise any marxist "for we have always known and repeatedly pointed out that the bourgeoisie maintains itself in power not only by force but also by virtue of the lack of class consciousness and organisation, the routinism and downtrodden state of the masses" (Letters on Tactics). Thus the foremost task of the Bolsheviks was to push forward the class consciousness and organisation of the working masses.
This role did not satisfy the "old Bolsheviks", who had more "practical" plans. They wanted to take part in the existing "bourgeois revolution" and they wanted the Bolshevik party to have massive influence in the movement as it then was. In Kamenev's words, they were horrified at the thought of the party standing on the sidelines with its "pure" positions, reduced to the role of a "group of communist propagandists".
Lenin had no difficulty exposing this trick - had not the chauvinists thrown the same arguments at the internationalists at the start of the war, that they were staying in touch with the consciousness of the masses, while the Bolsheviks and Spartacists were no more than marginal sects? It must have been particularly galling to hear the same arguments from a Bolshevik comrade. But this did not blunt the sharpness of Lenin's reply:
"Comrade Kamenev counter poses to a "party of the masses" a "group of propagandists". But the "masses" have now succumbed to the craze of "revolutionary" defencism. Is it not more becoming for internationalists at this moment to show that they can resist "mass" intoxication rather than "wish to remain" with the masses, i.e. to succumb to the general epidemic? Have we not seen how in all the belligerent countries of Europe the chauvinists tried to justify themselves on the grounds that they wished to "remain with the masses"? Must we not be able to remain for a time in a minority against the "mass" intoxication? Is it not the work of the propagandists at the present moment that forms the key point for disentangling the proletarian line from the defencist and petty bourgeois "mass" intoxication? It was this fusion of the masses, proletarian and non-proletarian, regardless of class difference, that formed one of the conditions for the defencist epidemic. To speak contemptuously of a "group of propagandists" advocating a proletarian line does not seem to be very becoming" (Letters on Tactics).
This approach, this willingness to go against the tide and be in a minority defending clear and definite class principles, had nothing to do with purism or sectarianism. On the contrary it was based on an understanding of the real movement going on in the class there and then, on a capacity to give voice and direction to the most radical elements within the proletariat.
Trotsky shows how, both in winning the party round to his positions, and then in fighting for the "proletarian line" within the class as a whole, Lenin looked for support from these elements: "against the old Bolsheviks Lenin found support in another layer of the party, already tempered, but more fresh and more closely united with the masses. In the February revolution, as we know, the worker-Bolsheviks played the decisive role. They thought it self-evident that the class which had won the victory should seize the power. These same workers protested stormily against the course of Kamenev and Stalin, and the Vyborg district even threatened the "leaders" with expulsion from the party. The same thing was to be observed in the provinces. Almost everywhere there were left Bolsheviks accused of maximalism, even anarchism. These worker-Bolsheviks only lacked the theoretical resources to defend their position. But they were ready to respond to the first clear call. It was on this stratum of workers, decisively risen to their feet during the upward years of 1912-14, that Lenin was now banking" (op cit, Chapter XVI, p 306).
This too was an expression of Lenin's grasp of the marxist method, which by looking beyond surface appearances is able to discern the real dynamic of a social movement. A contrario, in the early twenties, when Lenin himself reverted to the argument about "remaining with the masses" in order to justify the United Front and organisational fusion with centrist parties, it was a sign that the party was losing its grip on the marxist method and sliding into opportunism. But this in turn was a result of the isolation of the revolution and the Bolsheviks' fusion with the Soviet state. In the high tide of the revolution in Russia, the Lenin of the April Theses was neither an isolated prophet nor a demiurge standing above the vulgar masses, but the clearest voice of the most revolutionary trend within the proletariat; a voice which was, with unerring accuracy, indicating the path that led to the October insurrection.
Amos, Spring 1997.
From the beginning of the first series of these articles, we argued against the cliché that 'communism is a nice idea, but it could never work' by affirming, with Marx, that communism is not at all reducible to a 'nice idea', but is organically contained in the class struggle of the proletariat. Communism is not an abstract utopia dreamed up by a few well-intentioned visionaries; it is a movement given birth by the very conditions of present day society. And yet, that first series was very much a study of the 'ideas' of communists during the ascendant period of capitalism - an examination of how their conception of the future society and the way to achieve it developed during the course of the 19th century, before the communist revolution was on the immediate historical agenda.
We make no apology for this. Communism is the movement of the whole proletariat, of the working class as a historic and international social force. But the history of the proletariat is also the history of its organisations; and the clarification of the goals of the movement is the specific task of the proletariat's political minorities, its parties and fractions. Contrary to the fantasies of councilism and anarchism, there is no communist movement without communist organisations. Neither is there any conflict of interest between the two. Throughout the first series we showed how the work of clarifying the means and goals of the movement was carried out by the marxists of the Communist League and the First and Second Internationals; but this work was always done in the closest connection to the movement of the masses, by participating in, and drawing the lessons from, such epochal historical events as the revolutions of 1848 or the Paris Commune of 1871 in this second series we will be looking at the evolution of the communist project in the period of capitalism's decadence: that is to say, the period when communism has become more than the overall perspective of the workers' struggle - when it has become a veritable necessity since capitalist relations of production have entered into definitive and permanent conflict with the productive forces they have set in motion. Put more simply, the decadence of capitalism has faced humanity with the choice between communism or a relapse into barbarism. We will have occasion to look more deeply into the meaning of this phrase as this series progresses. For the moment we simply want to say that, no less than in the first series, the articles that will deal with capitalism's decadent period cannot pretend to provide a 'history' of all the momentous events of the 20th century that have served to elucidate the means and goals of communism. Perhaps even more so than in the first series, we will have to restrict ourselves to the way that the communists analysed and understood these events.
We only have to look at the 1917 Russian revolution to realise why this has to be: to write a new history even of the first few months of this event would be entirely beyond our means. But this should in no way diminish the importance of our study: on the contrary, we will find that nearly all the advances that the revolutionary movement of the 20th century has made in its understanding of the road to communism derive from its interaction with this irreplaceable experience of the working class. Even if the ICC's International Review has already devoted many of its pages to the lessons of the Russian revolution and the international revolutionary wave that it instigated, there is still much to be said about the way these lessons were drawn out and elaborated by the communist organisations of this era.
Marxists generally reckon that the onset of the epoch of capitalist decadence was marked by the outbreak of the first imperialist world war in 1914. Nevertheless, we ended the first series and begin the second, with the 'first' Russian revolution - with the events of 1905, which occurred during a kind of watershed between the two epochs. As we shall see, the ambiguous nature of this period led to many ambiguities in the workers' movement about the significance of these events. But what emerged most clearly, in the clearest fractions of the movement, was that 1905 in Russia marked the emergence of new forms of struggle and organisation that corresponded to the needs of the onrushing period of capitalist decline. If, as we showed in the last article of the first series, the previous decade had witnessed a strong tendency in the workers' movement to lose sight of the road to revolution - particularly through the growth of reformist and parliamentary illusions in the movement - 1905 was the lightning flash which illuminated the road for all those who wanted to see it.
At first sight, the 1905 revolution in Russia was indeed a bolt from the blue. Reformist ideas had seized hold of the workers' movement because capitalism appeared to be enjoying a halcyon period in which things could only get better and better for the workers, so long as they stuck with the legal methods of trade unionism and parliamentarism. The days of revolutionary heroism, of street fighting and barricades, had seemed to be a thing of the past, and even those who professed marxist 'orthodoxy', such as Karl Kautsky, insisted that the best way for the workers to make the revolution was through winning a parliamentary majority. Suddenly, in January 1905, the bloody repression of a peaceful demonstration led by a priest and police agent, Father Gapon, ignited a massive wave of strikes throughout the Tsar's immense empire, and opened up a whole year of ferment, culminating in new mass strikes in October, which saw the formation of the St Petersburg Soviet, and the armed uprising of December.
In truth, these events had not sprung from nowhere. The wretched living and working conditions of the Russian workers, which had been the subject of their humble petition to the Tsar on that first 'Bloody Sunday', had been made even more intolerable by Russia's war with Japan in 1904 - a war which fully expressed the sharpening of global inter-imperialist tensions that was to reach its paroxysm in 1914. Furthermore, the magnificent combativity of the Russian workers was also no isolated phenomenon, either historically or geographically: the strike movement in Russia had been gathering pace since the 1890s, while the spectre of the mass strike had already raised its head in advanced Europe itself: in Belgium and Sweden in 1902, Holland in 1903, and Italy in 1904.
Even before 1905, therefore, the workers' movement had been traversed by an animated debate about the 'general strike' in the Second international, the marxists had fought against the anarchist and syndicalist mythology which had portrayed the general strike as an apocalyptic event that could be ushered in at any moment, and which could get rid of capitalism without any need for the working class to battle for political power. But as the practical experience of the class turned the debate away from such abstractions to the concrete question of the mass strike, i.e. to a real, evolving strike movement as opposed to a once and for all, universal work stoppage decreed in advance, the protagonists in the debate changed. From now on, the question of the mass strike was to be one of the main bones of contention between the reformist right and the revolutionary left within the workers' movement and the social democratic parties in particular. As with the previous round of this debate (over Bernstein's 'revisionist' theories in the late 1890s), the movement in Germany was to be at the centre of the controversy.
The reformists, and above all the trade union leaders, could only see the mass strike as a force for anarchy, one which threatened to undermine the years of patient labour which had built up the membership and funds of the trade unions, and a substantial parliamentary presence for the party. The trade union bureaucrats, specialists in negotiation with the bourgeoisie, feared that the kind of massive and spontaneous outbursts that had occurred in Russia would only end in massive repression and the loss of all the painfully acquired gains of the previous decades. To be sure, they took care not to openly denounce the movement in Russia. Instead they sought to limit its field of application. They granted that the mass strike was an understandable product of Russia's backward and despotic regime. But it was hardly necessary in a country like Germany, where trade unions and workers' parties had a recognised legal existence. If some kind of general strike became necessary in western Europe, it would only be as a limited, defensive exercise designed to safeguard existing democratic rights from a reactionary onslaught. And above all, any such operation had to be prepared in advance and tightly controlled by the existing workers' organisations, in order to curb any threat of 'anarchy'.
Officially, the leadership of the SDP distanced itself from these conservative reactions. At the 1905 Jena congress, Bebel put forward a resolution which appeared to mark a victory for the left against the reformists, since it hailed the importance of the mass strike. In fact, Bebel's resolution was a classic manifestation of centrism, since it reduced the mass strike to the purely defensive sphere. The duplicity of the leadership was proved a few months later, in February 1906, when it made a secret deal with the unions to block any effective propaganda for the mass strike in Germany.
For the left, on the other hand, the movement in Russia had a universal and historical significance, bringing a breath of fresh air to the musty atmosphere of trade unionism and 'nothing but' parliamentarism which had dominated the party for so long. The left's efforts to understand the implications of the mass strikes in Russia were crystallised above all in the writings of Rosa Luxemburg, who had already led the combat against Bernstein' s revisionism, and who had been directly involved in the 1905 events through her membership of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland, then part of the Russian empire. In her justly famous pamphlet The Mass Strike, the Party and the Trade Unions, she displayed a profound mastery of the marxist method, which, being armed with a historical and global theoretical framework, is able to discern the flowers of the future in the seeds of the present. Just as Marx had been able to predict the general future of world capitalism by studying its pioneering forms in Britain, or proclaim the revolutionary potential of the proletariat by looking at a movement as seemingly ineffectual as that of the Silesian weavers, so Luxemburg was able to show that the proletarian movement in 'backward' Russia in 1905 exhibited the essential characteristics of the class struggle in a historic period that was only just beginning to open up - the period of world capitalism's decline.
The opportunists entrenched in the union bureaucracy, and their more or less open supporters in the party, were swift to brand those marxists who sought to draw out the real implications of the mass strike movement in Russia as being "revolutionary romanticists", and above all as anarchists reviving the old millennial vision of the general strike. It was true that there were semi-anarchist elements in the SDP - in particular the so-called 'lokalisten' who called for a 'social general strike' - and, as Luxemburg herself wrote, the mass strikes in Russia appeared at first sight "to have become the experimental field for the heroic deeds of anarchism" (Mass Strike, part I). But in reality, Luxemburg showed, not only had the anarchists been almost completely absent from the movement: the latter's methods and aims actually constituted "the historical liquidation of anarchism ". Not merely because the Russian workers had proved, contrary to the apoliticism advocated by the anarchists, that the mass strike could be an instrument in the struggle for democratic political gains (this, after all, was nearing its end as a realisable component of the workers' movement). But first and foremost because the actual form and motion of the mass strike had dealt a decisive blow both to the anarchists and the union bureaucrats, who, for all their differences, had in common the false notion that the general strike was something that could be turned on or off at will, regardless of historic conditions and the real evolution of the class struggle. Against this, Luxemburg insisted that the mass strike was a "historical and not an artificial product”, that it is not "artificially made, not 'decided' at random, not 'propagated', but it is a historical phenomenon which, at a given moment, results from actual conditions with historical inevitability. It is not therefore by abstract speculations on the possibility or impossibility, the utility or the injuriousness of the mass strike, but only by an examination of those factors and social conditions out of which the mass strike grows in the present phase of the class struggle - in other words, it is not by subjective criticism of the mass strike from the standpoint of what is desirable, but only by objective investigation of the sources of the mass strike from the standpoint of what is historically inevitable, that the problem can be grasped or even discussed" (ibid., part II).
And when Luxemburg talks about the "present phase of the class struggle", she is not referring to a passing moment, but to a new historical epoch. With striking foresight, she argues that "the present Russian revolution stands at a point of the historical path which is already over the summit, which is on the other side of the culminating point of capitalist society" (ibid., part VII). In other words, the mass strike in Russia presaged the conditions that would become universal in the approaching epoch of capitalist decline. The fact that it had appeared with such sharpness in 'backward' Russia strengthened rather than weakened this thesis, since the delayed but very rapid development of capitalism in Russia had given birth to a highly concentrated proletariat confronting an omnipresent police apparatus that virtually forbade it to organise, and thus gave it no choice but to organise in and through the struggle - a reality that would be imposed on all workers in the decadent epoch, in which the state capitalist bourgeoisie cannot tolerate any permanent mass workers' organisations and systematically destroys or recuperates all previous efforts to organise on such a scale.
The period of capitalist decadence is the period of the proletarian revolution: consequently, the 1905 revolution in Russia "appears not so much as the last successor of the old bourgeois revolutions as the forerunner of the new series of proletarian revolutions of the west. The most backward country of all, just because it has been so unpardonably late with its bourgeois revolution, shows ways and methods of further class struggle to the proletariat of Germany and the most advanced capitalist countries" (ibid.). These "ways and methods" are precisely those of the mass strike, which as Luxemburg says, is "the method of motion of the proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the proletarian struggle in the revolution" (ibid., part IV). In sum, the movement in Russia showed workers everywhere how their revolution could become a reality.
What precisely was this "method of motion" of the class struggle in the new period?
First, the tendency of the struggle to break out spontaneously, without pre-planning, without prior collection of funds to sustain a long siege against the bosses. Luxemburg recalls the "trivial" issues at the Putilov works which sparked off the January strike; in his 1905, Trotsky says that the October strike wave began as a dispute over pay for punctuation marks amongst the typesetters of Moscow. Such developments are possible because the immediate causes of the mass strike are entirely secondary in comparison to what lies behind them: the profound accumulation of discontent in the proletariat faced with a capitalist regime less and less able to grant any concessions and compelled to make increasing inroads on whatever acquisitions they may have previously won.
The trade union bureaucrats, of course, could hardly imagine any large-scale workers' struggle not planned and controlled from the safety of their offices; and if spontaneous movements did flare up in front of their eyes, they could only see them as being ineffectual because disorganised. But Luxemburg replied that in the newly-emerging conditions of the class struggle, spontaneity was not the negation of organisation, but its most viable premise: "The rigid, mechanical-bureaucratic conception cannot conceive of the struggle save as the product of organisation at a certain stage of its strength. On the contrary the living, dialectical explanation makes the organisation arise as a product of the struggle. We have already seen a grandiose example of this phenomenon in Russia, where a proletariat almost wholly unorganised created a comprehensive network of organisational appendages in a year and a half of stormy revolutionary struggle" (ibid., part VI).
Contrary to many of Luxemburg' s critics, such a view is not 'spontaneist', since the organisations referred to here are the immediate and general organs of the workers, not the political party or fraction whose existence and programme, rather than being tied to the immediate movement of the class, correspond above all to its historical, depth dimension. As we shall see, Luxemburg in no way denied the necessity for the proletarian political party to intervene in the mass strike. But what this view of organisation does lucidly express is the end of a whole era in which the unitary organisations of the class could exist on a permanent basis outside phases of open combat against capital.
The explosive, spontaneous nature of the struggle in the new conditions is directly connected to the very essence of the mass strike - the tendency of struggles to extend very rapidly, to wider and wider layers of workers. Describing the spread of the January strikes, she writes "there was no predetermined plan, no organised action, because the appeals of the parties could scarcely keep pace with the spontaneous risings of the masses; the leaders had scarcely time to formulate the watchwords of the onrushing crowd of the proletariat" (ibid., part III). Since the discontent within the class is already general, it becomes eminently possible for the movement to extend through the direct action of the striking workers, calling out their comrades in other factories and sectors around demands that reflect their common grievances.
Finally, against those in the unions and the party who insisted on the "purely political mass strike", on the mass strike being no more than a defensive weapon of protest against infringements on the workers' democratic rights, Luxemburg demonstrated the living inter-action between the economic and political aspects of the mass strike:
" ... the movement as a whole does not proceed from the economic to the political struggle, nor even the reverse. Every great political mass action, after it has attained its political highest point, breaks up into a mass of economic strikes. And that applies not only to each of the great mass strikes, but also to the revolution as a whole. With the spreading, clarifying and involution of the political struggle, the economic struggle not only does not recede, but extends, organises and becomes involved in equal measure. Between the two there is the most complete reciprocal action ....
... In a word: the economic struggle is the transmitter from one political centre to another; the political struggle is the periodic fertilisation of the soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change places; and thus the economic and the political factor in the period of the mass strike, now widely removed, completely separated or even mutually exclusive, as the theoretical plan would have them, merely form the two interlacing sides of the proletarian class struggle in Russia. And their unity is precisely the mass strike" (ibid., part IV). And here "political" does not simply mean for Luxemburg the defence of democratic freedoms, but above all the offensive struggle for power, for as she adds in the very next passage, "the mass strike is inseparable from revolution". Capitalism in decline is a system unable to offer and long-term improvements in the workers' living conditions; indeed, all it can offer is repression and impoverishment. Thus the very conditions that give rise to the mass strike also compel the workers to pose the question of revolution. And more than this: since it forms the basis for the polarisation of bourgeois society into two great camps, since it inevitably brings the workers up against the full force of the capitalist state, the mass strike cannot help but raise the necessity to overthrow the old state power:
"Today, when the working classes are being enlightened in the course of the revolutionary struggle, when they must marshal their forces and lead themselves, and when the revolution is directed as much against the old state power as against capitalist exploitation, the mass strike appears as the natural means of recruiting the widest proletarian layers for the struggle, as well as being at the same time a means of undermining and overthrowing the old state power and of stemming capitalist exploitation" (ibid., part VII).
Here Luxemburg addresses the problem posed by the opportunists in the party, who based their 'nothing but' parliamentarism on the correct observation that a modem state power could no longer be overthrown by the old tactics of barricades and street fighting alone (and, in the last article in this series, we saw how even Engels had given succor to the opportunists on this point). The opportunists believed that the result of this would be that "the class struggle would shrink to an exclusively parliamentary contest and that street fighting would simply be done away with". But, as Luxemburg goes on to argue, "history has found the solution in a deeper and finer fashion: in the advent of revolutionary mass strikes, which, of course, in no way replace brutal street fights or render them unnecessary, but which reduce them to a moment in the long period of political struggle ... " (ibid.). Thus, armed insurrection is affirmed as the culmination of the organising, educating work of the mass strike - a perspective richly confirmed by the events of February to October 1917.
In this passage, Luxemburg mentions David and Bemstein as the spokesmen for the opportunist trend in the party. But Luxemburg's insistence that the revolution would not only be a violent act of overthrow, but that it would be the crowning point of a mass movement on the specific terrain of the proletariat - the point of production and the streets - was in essence also a total rejection of the 'orthodox' conceptions defended by Kautsky, who at that stage was seen as being on the left of the party, but whose notion of revolution, as we showed in the article in this series in International Review (IR) 88, was also completely caught up in the parliamentary maze. As we shall see later on, Kautsky's real opposition to Luxemburg's revolutionary analysis of the mass strike was to become clearer after her pamphlet was written. But Luxemburg had already pointed the way out of the parliamentary maze by showing that the mass strike was the embryo of the proletarian revolution.
We have said that Luxemburg's work on the mass strike in no way eliminated the need for the proletarian party. In fact, in the epoch of revolution, a revolutionary party becomes all the more crucial, as the Bolsheviks were to show in Russia. But to the development of new conditions and new methods of the class struggle, there corresponds a new role for the revolutionary vanguard, and Luxemburg was one of the first to affirm this. The conception of the party as a mass organisation which regroups, encompasses and commands the class, which had increasingly dominated the social democracy, was historically laid to rest by the mass strike. The experience of the latter had shown that the party cannot regroup the majority of the class, nor can it take in hand the organisational details of a movement as enormous and fluid as a mass strike. Hence Luxemburg's conclusion:
"In this way we arrive at the same conclusions in Germany in relation to the peculiar tasks of direction, in relation to the role of social democracy in mass strikes, as in our analysis of events in Russia. If we now leave the pedantic scheme of demonstrative mass strikes artificially brought about by order of parties and trade unions, and turn to the living picture of a people's movement arising with elementary energy from the culmination of class antagonisms and the political situation ... it becomes obvious that the task of social democracy does not consist in the technical preparation and direction of mass strikes, but, first and foremost, in the political leadership of the whole movement" (ibid., part VI).
The depth of Luxemburg's analysis of the mass strike in Russia provided a comprehensive rebuttal of all those who sought to deny its historical and international significance. As a true revolutionary, Luxemburg had shown that that the storms from the east completely overturned not only the old conceptions of the class struggle in general, but even demanded a radical reappraisal of the role of the party itself Little wonder that she disturbed the sleep of the conservatives who dominated the union and party bureaucracies!
The Bordigist idea that the revolutionary programme has been 'invariant' since 1848 is clearly refuted by the events of 1905. The methods and organisational forms of the mass strike - in particular the soviets or workers' councils - were not the result of some pre-established schema but sprang from the creative capacities of the class in movement. The soviets were not exnihilo creations, for such things do not exist in nature. They were the natural successor to previous forms of working class organisation, in particular the Paris Commune. But they also represented a higher form of organisation corresponding to the needs of the struggle in the new epoch.
Equally contradicted by the reality of 1905 is another strand of the 'invariance' thesis: that the 'red thread' of revolutionary clarity in the twentieth century runs through a single current of the workers' movement (i.e., the Italian left). As we shall see, the clarity that did emerge amongst revolutionaries concerning the events of 1905 was unmistakably a synthesis of the different contributions made by the revolutionaries of the time. Thus, while Luxemburg's insight into the dynamics of the mass strike, into the general characteristics of the class struggle in the new period, was second to none, The Mass Strike text contains a surprisingly limited understanding of the real organisational acquisitions of the movement. She had certainly uncovered a profound truth in showing that the organisations of the mass strike were the product rather than the producer of the movement, but the organ that was more than anything else the emanation of the mass strike, the Soviet, gets no more than a passing mention; when she talks about the new organisations born out of the struggle, she is referring first and foremost to the trade unions: " ... while the guardians of the German trade unions for the most part fear that the organisations will fall in pieces in a revolutionary whirlwind like rare porcelain, the Russian revolution shows us the exactly opposite picture; from the whirlwind and the storm, out of the fire and glow of the mass strike and the street fighting rise again, like Venus from the foam, fresh, young, powerful, buoyant trade unions" (ibid., part III).
It is true that, in this twilight period, the trade unions had not yet been fully integrated into the bourgeois order, even if the bureaucratisation against which Luxemburg was polemicising was already an expression of this tendency. But the fact remains that the emergence of the soviets pointed to the historical demise of the trade union form of organisation. As a method of workers' defence, the latter was entirely bound up with the preceding epoch when it had indeed been possible for workers' struggles to be planned in advance and waged on a sector by sector basis, since the bosses had not yet unified themselves through the state, and workers' pressure on one enterprise or sector did not automatically provoke the class wide solidarity of the ruling class against their struggle. But now the conditions for "fresh, young, powerful, buoyant trade unions" were fast disappearing, since new conditions demanded new forms of class organisation.
The revolutionary significance of the soviets was understood most clearly by the revolutionaries in Russia, and by none more clearly than Trotsky, who had played such a central role in the St Petersburg Soviet. In his book 1905, written soon after the events, Trotsky provides a classic definition of the soviet which clearly links its form to its function in the revolutionary struggle:
"What was the Soviet of Workers' Deputies? The Soviet came into being as a response to an objective need - a need born of the course of events. It was an organisation which was authoritative and yet had no traditions, which could immediately involve a scattered mass of hundreds of thousands of people while having virtually no organisational machinery; which united the revolutionary currents within the proletariat, which was capable of initiative and spontaneous self-control - and most important of all, which could be brought out from underground within twenty-four hours ... In order to have authority in the eyes of the masses on the very day it came into being, such an organisation had to be based on the broadest representation. How was this to be achieved? The answer came of its own accord. Since the production process was the sole link between the proletarian masses who, in the organisational sense, were still quite inexperienced, representation had to be adapted to the factories and plants" (Chapter 8, 'The Soviet of Workers' Deputies', p 104-5, London 1971).
Here Trotsky fills in the gap left by Luxemburg by showing that it was the Soviet, not the unions, which was the organisational form appropriate to the mass strike, to the essence of the proletarian struggle in the new revolutionary period. Born spontaneously, out the creative initiative of the workers in movement, it embodied the necessary passage from spontaneity to self-organisation. The permanent existence and sectional form of the trade unions were suited only to the methods of struggle of the preceding period. The soviet form of organisation, by contrast, expressed perfectly the needs of a situation where the struggle "tends to develop no longer on a vertical level (by trade and industrial branches) but on a horizontal level (geographically), uniting all its different aspects (economic and political, local and general) ... (thus) the form of organisation which it engenders can only have the function of unifying the proletariat beyond professional sectors" ('1905 Revolution: Fundamental Lessons for the Proletariat', IR 43, autumn 1985).
As we have already seen, the political dimension of the mass strike is not restricted to the defensive level, but inevitably implies the offensive - the proletarian struggle for power. Here again, Trotsky saw more clearly than anyone that the Soviet's ultimate destiny was to be a direct organ of revolutionary power. As the mass movement became more organised and unified, it was inevitably obliged to go beyond the 'negative' tasks of paralysing the productive apparatus and assume the more 'positive' ones of ensuring the production and distribution of essential supplies, of disseminating information and propaganda, of guaranteeing a new revolutionary order - all of which uncovered the real nature of the Soviet as an organ capable of reorganising society:
"The Soviet organised the working masses, directed the political strikes and demonstrations, armed the workers, and protected the population against pogroms. Similar work was done by other revolutionary organisations before the Soviet came into existence, concurrently with it, and after it. Yet this did not endow them with the influence that was concentrated in the hands of the Soviet. The secret of this influence lay in the fact that the Soviet grew as the natural organ of the proletariat in its immediate struggle for power as determined by the actual course of events. The name of 'workers' government' which the workers themselves on the one hand, and the reactionary press on the other, gave to the Soviet was an expression of the fact that the Soviet really was a workers' government in embryo" (ibid., chap 22, p 251, 'Summing Up'), This conception of the real meaning of the soviets was, as we shall see, intimately linked to Trotsky's view that it was essentially the proletarian revolution that was on the historical agenda in Russia.
Lenin, though forced to observe the initial phases of the movement from exile, also grasped the key role of the soviets. Only three years beforehand, in writing What Is To Be Done?, a book whose whole heart is to stress the indispensable role of the revolutionary party, he had warned against the way that the economist current had made a fetish out of the immediate spontaneity of the struggle. But now, in the turmoil of the mass strike, Lenin found himself having to correct those 'super-Leninists' who were turning this polemic into a rigid dogma. Distrusting the Soviet as a non-party organ that had indeed emerged spontaneously out of the struggle, these Bolsheviks delivered it with an absurd ultimatum: adopt the Bolshevik programme or dissolve. Marx had warned against this kind of attitude - 'here is the truth, down on your knees' - even before the Communist Manifesto had been written, and Lenin saw straight away that if the Bolsheviks persisted in this line they would be completely marginalised from the real movement. This was Lenin's response:
"It seems to me that Comrade Radin is wrong in raising the question ... : the Soviet of Workers' Deputies or the Party? I think that it is wrong to put the question this way and that the decision must certainly be: both the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Party. The only question - and a highly important one - is how to divide, and how to combine, the tasks of the Soviet and those of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. I think it would be inadvisable for the Soviet to adhere wholly to one party ..
The Soviet of Workers' Deputies came into being through the general strike, in connection with the strike, and for its aims. Who led the strike and brought it to a victorious close? The whole proletariat, which includes non-Social Democrats ... Should this struggle be conducted only by the Social Democrats or only under the Social Democratic banner? I do not think so.. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies, as an organisation representing all occupations, should strive to include deputies from all industrial, professional and office workers, domestic servants, farm labourers, etc. .... As for the Social Democrats, we shall do our best ... to use the struggle we are waging jointly with our fellow proletarians, irrespective of their views, for the tireless, steadfast advocacy of the consistent, the only truly proletarian world outlook, marxism. To propagate it, to carry on this propaganda and agitation work, we shall by all means preserve, strengthen and expand our completely independent, consistently principled class party of the class conscious proletariat ... " ('Our Task and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies', Complete Works Vol. 10. p 19-21).
Along with Trotsky, who also stressed this distinction between the party as an organisation "within the proletariat" and the Soviet as the organisation "of the proletariat" (1905, p251), Lenin was able to see that the party did not have the task of regrouping or organising the whole proletariat, but of intervening in the class and its unitary organs to provide a clear political leadership - a view which actually tends to converge with Luxemburg's conception adumbrated earlier on. Moreover, in the light of the experience of 1905, which bore such eloquent witness to the revolutionary capacities of the working class, Lenin was to 'bend the stick back' and correct some of the exaggerations contained in What Is To be Done", in particular the notion, first developed by Kautsky, that socialist consciousness has to be 'imported' into the proletariat by the party, or rather by the socialist intellectuals. But this reaffirmation of Marx's thesis that communist consciousness necessarily emanates from the communist class, the proletariat, in no way diminished Lenin's conviction in the indispensable role of the party. Since the working class as a whole, even when it is moving in a revolutionary direction, still has to confront the enormous power of bourgeois ideology, the organisation of the most class conscious proletarians has to be present in the workers' ranks, combating all hesitations and illusions and clarifying the immediate and long term goals of the movement.
We cannot go much further into this issue here. It would take a whole series of articles to expound the Bolshevik theory of organisation, and in particular to defend it from the widespread slander, common to Mensheviks, anarchists, councilists and innumerable parasites, that Lenin's 'narrow' conception of the party was a product of Russian backwardness, a throw-back to Narodnik or Bakuninist conceptions. What we will say here is this: just as the 1905 revolution itself was not the last in a series of bourgeois revolutions, but the forerunner of the proletarian revolutions gestating in the womb of world capitalism, so the '1903', Bolshevik conception of the party was not rooted in the past. It was in fact a break with the past, with the legalistic, parliamentarian conception of the 'mass party' that had come to dominate the social democratic movement. The events of 1917 were to confirm in the most concrete manner possible that Lenin's 'party of a new type' was precisely the type of party that corresponded to the needs of the class struggle in the epoch ofthe proletarian revolution.
If there were weaknesses in Lenin's grasp of the 1905 movement, they lay essentially in his approach to the problem of perspectives. We shall develop on this shortly, but Lenin's view that the 1905 revolution was at 'root a bourgeois revolution in which the leading role had fallen to the proletariat prevented him from reaching the same degree of clarity as Trotsky concerning the historical significance of the soviets. Certainly he was able to see that they should not remain as purely defensive organs, that they should see themselves as organs of revolutionary power: "I think that politically the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should be regarded as the embryo of a provisional revolutionary government. I think the Soviet should proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government of the whole of Russia" (Lenin, op cit). But in Lenin's conception of the 'democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry', this government was not the dictatorship of the proletariat carrying out the socialist revolution. It was carrying out a bourgeois revolution and therefore had to incorporate all those classes and strata who were involved in the fight against Tsarism. Trotsky saw the strength of the Soviet precisely in the fact that "it did not allow its class nature to be dissolved in revolutionary democracy: it was and remained the organised expression of the class will of the proletariat' (Trotsky, op cit., p 251). Lenin on the other hand, called for the Soviet to dilute its class composition by broadening its representation to the soldiers, the peasants and the "revolutionary bourgeois intelligentsia" ('Our Tasks ... ')., and by assuming the tasks of a 'democratic' revolution. In order to understand these differences, it is necessary to look a little deeper into the question that lay behind them: the nature of the revolution in Russia.
The 1903 split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was focused on the question of organisation. But the 1905 revolution revealed that the differences on organisation were also connected to other, more general programmatic issues: in this case, above all, the nature of and perspectives for the revolution in Russia.
The Mensheviks, claiming to be the 'orthodox' interpreters of Marx on this question, argued that Russia was still awaiting its 1789. In this belated bourgeois revolution, inevitable if Russian capitalism was to break its absolutist fetters and build the material bases for socialism, the task of the proletariat and its party was to act as a force of independent opposition, supporting the bourgeoisie against Tsarism but refusing to participate in government in order to be free to criticise it from the left. In this view, the leading class of the bourgeois revolution could only be the bourgeoisie, albeit its most forward looking and liberal fractions.
The Bolsheviks, with Lenin to the fore agreed that the nature of the revolution could only be bourgeois, and rejected as anarchist the idea that it could immediately assume a socialist character. But their analysis of the way that capitalism was developing in Russia (especially its dependence on foreign capital and the Russian state bureaucracy) convinced them that the Russian bourgeoisie was too submissive to the Tsarist apparatus, too flabby and indecisive to carry through its own revolution. In addition, the historical experience of the 1848 revolutions in Europe taught that this indecisiveness would be even more marked given that any revolutionary upheaval would unleash the 'threat from below', i.e. the movement of the proletariat. In these circumstances, the Bolsheviks insisted that the bourgeoisie would betray the struggle against absolutism, which could only be taken to a successful conclusion through an armed popular uprising in which the leading role would be played by the working class. This uprising would install a 'democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry'; and, much to the scandal of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks declared that they would be willing to participate in the provisional revolutionary government that would be the instrument of this 'democratic dictatorship', returning to opposition once the main acquisitions of the bourgeois revolution had been pushed through.
The third position was that of Trotsky - the 'revolution in permanence', a phrase adopted from Marx's writings about the revolutions of 1848. Trotsky agreed with the Bolsheviks that revolution still had bourgeois-democratic tasks to complete, and that the bourgeoisie would be incapable of achieving such tasks as these. But he rejected the idea that the proletariat, once embarked upon the revolutionary road, would or could impose a "self-limitation" on its struggle. The class interests of the proletariat would compel it not only to take power into its own hands, but also to 'telescope' bourgeois-democratic into proletarian tasks - to inaugurate socialist political and economic measures. But such an evolution could not be limited to the national arena alone:
"Self-limitation' by a workers' government would mean nothing other than the betrayal of the interests of the unemployed and strikers - more, of the whole proletariat - in the name of the establishment of a republic. The revolutionary authorities will be confronted with the objective problems of socialism, but the solution of these problems will, at a certain stage, be prevented by the country's economic backwardness. There is no way out from this contradiction within the framework of a national revolution.
The workers' government will from the start be faced with the task of uniting its forces with those of the socialist proletariat of Western Europe. Only in this way will its temporary revolutionary hegemony become the prologue to a socialist dictatorship. Thus permanent revolution will become, for the Russia proletariat, a matter of class self-preservation" (Trotsky, 1905, p317 'Our Differences').
The notion of the 'permanent revolution', as we have noted before in this series, is not without its own ambiguities, and these have been duly exploited by those who have forged Trotsky's copyright, the latter-day Trotskyists. But at the time it was put forward, as an attempt to understand the transition to a new period in capitalism's history, Trotsky's position had an immense advantage over the two previously mentioned theories: it approached the problem from the international, rather than the Russian context. In this Trotsky rather than the Mensheviks was really the heir of Marx, since the latter, in reflecting on the possibility of Russia 'by-passing' the capitalist stage had also insisted that this would only be possible in the context of an international socialist revolution (see IR 81. 'Past and Future Communism'). Subsequent developments had shown that Russia could not escape the ordeal of capitalism. But contrary to the schematic dogma of the Mensheviks, who ponderously argued that each country had to patiently 'build the foundations of socialism in its own national confines, the internationalist Trotsky was moving towards the view that the conditions for the realisation of socialism - capitalism's 'rotten ripeness' or decadence - emerged as a global reality long before each country could go through the full gamut of capitalist development. The events of 1905 had amply demonstrated that the highly concentrated and combative urban proletariat was already the only truly revolutionary force in Russian society; and the events of 1917 were soon to confirm that a revolutionary proletariat could only embark upon a proletarian revolution.
The Lenin of 1917, as shown in the article on the April Theses in IR 89, was himself able to jettison the luggage of the 'democratic dictatorship' even when many 'Old Bolsheviks' were clinging to it for dear life. In this respect, it is certainly no accident that in the period around 1905 Lenin himself had also veered towards the 'permanent revolution' thesis, declaring in an article written in September 1905:
"From the democratic revolution we shall at once , according to the degree of our strength, the strength of the class conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand for permanent revolution. We shall not stop half-way" (Complete Works, Vol. 8, p236-7, 'Social democracy's attitude towards the peasant movement'. Later Stalinist translations changed the word 'permanent to 'uninterrupted' in order to protect Lenin from any Trotskyist virus, but the meaning is clear). If Lenin continued to have hesitations about Trotsky's position, this was a result of the ambiguities of the period: until the war of 1914, it was not yet clear that the system as a whole had entered its epoch of decay, thus defmitively placing the world communist revolution on the agenda of history. The war, and the gigantic movement of the proletariat that began in February 1917, removed his last doubts.
The Menshevik position also revealed its inner secrets in 1917: in an epoch of proletarian revolution, 'critical opposition' to the bourgeoisie becomes first capitulation to the bourgeoisie, then enrolment in its counter-revolutionary forces. And indeed, in 1917 even the Bolshevik position of 'democratic dictatorship' was threatening to lead the party in the same direction, until Lenin's return from exile and the victorious fight to rearm the party. But Trotsky's reflections on the 1905 revolution also played a crucial part in that fight. Without them. Lenin may not have been able to forge the theoretical weapons he needed to elaborate the April Theses and point the way to the October insurrection.
The 1905 revolution ended in a defeat for the working class. The armed uprising of December, isolated and crushed, led neither to a proletarian dictatorship nor a democratic republic, but to a decade of Tsarist reaction which caused the temporary dispersal and disorientation of the workers movement. But this was not a defeat of world-historic proportions. By the second decade of the new century, there were clear signs of a proletarian resurgence, even in Russia. But the focus of the mass strike debate had shifted back to Germany. Indeed, it took on a new urgency and directness here, because the deteriorating economic situation had provoked massive strike movements among the German workers themselves - sometimes around economic demands as such, but also, in Prussia, around the question of suffrage reform. There was also the growing threat of war, which prompted the workers' movement to consider the mass strike as a form of action against militarism. These developments gave rise to a bitter polemic within the German party, pitting Kautsky, the Pope of marxist orthodoxy (in fact, the leader of the centrist current in the party), against the principal theoreticians of the left, fust Luxemburg, then Pannekoek.
With the social democratic right increasingly revealing its outright opposition to any mass action by the working class, Kautsky's argument was that mass strikes in the advanced countries should at best be restricted to the defensive level, that the best strategy for the working class was that of the gradual, essentially legalistic "war of attrition" with parliament and elections as the key instruments .for the transfer of power to the proletariat. But this merely proved that his self-professed "centrist" position was in reality a cover for the openly opportunist wing of the party. Replying in two articles published in Neue Zeit in 1910, 'Attrition or Struggle?' and 'Theory and Practice', Luxemburg reaffirmed the arguments that she had defended in The Mass Strike, rebutting Kautsky's view that the mass strike in Russia was a product of Russian backwardness and opposing the "attrition" strategy by showing the intimate and inevitable connection between the mass strike and the revolution.
But as our book The Dutch Left points out, there was an important weakness in Luxemburg's argument. "In reality, very often in this debate, Rosa Luxemburg remained on the terrain chosen by Kautsky and the SPD leadership. She called for mass strikes as a means to achieve universal suffrage and put forward the 'transitional' mobilising slogan of the struggle for the Republic. On this level, Kautsky was able to reply that 'to want to inaugurate an electoral struggle
through a mass strike is absurd'” (p67, French edition). And as the book goes on to show, it was the Dutch marxist Anton Pannekoek, who was living in Germany during this period, who was able to take this debate a vital step forward.
Already, in 1909, in his text on the 'Tactical Divergences in the Workers Movement', which was directed at the revisionist and anarchist deviations in the movement, Pannekoek had shown a profound grasp of the marxist method, defending positions on parliament and trade unionism which, while clearly rejecting any timeless anarchist moralising, can be seen in hindsight to contain the seeds of the principled rejection of parliamentarism and trade unionism elaborated by the German and Dutch communist left after the war. In his polemic with Kautsky, conducted in Neue Zeit in 1912 with the texts 'Mass Action and Revolution' and Marxist Theory and Revolutionary Tactics , Pannekoek took these insights further. Among the most important contributions contained in these texts are Pannekoek's diagnosis of Kautsky s centrism,(referred to as "passive radicalism in the second text); his defence of the mass strike as the form of class struggle appropriate to the newly emerging imperialist epoch; his insistence on the capacity of the proletariat to develop new forms of unitary self-organisation in the course of the struggle1 and his view of the party as an active minority whose task was to provide political programmatic leadership to the movement rather than to organise or control it from above. But most important of all was his argument about the ultimate direction the mass strike would have to assume, which led him to reassert, against Kautsky's legalism and parliamentary fetishism, the fundamental marxist thesis on the attitude of the proletariat towards the bourgeois state in the revolutionary confrontation. In a passage quoted approvingly by Lenin in State and Revolution, Pannekoek wrote:
"The struggle of the proletariat is not merely a struggle against the bourgeoisie for state power, but a struggle against state power ... The content of this revolution is the destruction and dissolution of the instruments of power of the bourgeoisie. The struggle will cease only when, as a result of it, the state organisation is completely destroyed. The organisation of the majority will then have demonstrated its superiority by destroying the organisation of the ruling minority"(Collected Works, Vol. 25, p 488. The passage is from 'Mass Action and Revolution').
And Lenin, despite seeing certain defects in Pannekoek's formulation, ardently defends them as being founded on marxism, contrary to Kautsky's charge that they represent a reversion to anarchism.: "in this controversy, it is not Kautsky but Pannekoek who represents marxism, for it was Marx who taught that the proletariat cannot simply win state power in the sense that the old state apparatus passes into new hands, but must smash this apparatus, must break it and replace it by a new one" (State and Revolution, Collected Works, p 489).
For us, the defects in Pannekoek's presentation lie at two levels: first, that he did not sufficiently ground his argument in the writings of Marx and Engels on the question of the state, particularly their conclusions about the Paris Commune. This made it easier for Kautsky to smear his position with the accusation of anarchism. And second, that Pannekoek remains vague about the form of the new organs of proletarian power: like Luxemburg, he had not yet grasped the historic significance of the soviet form - something he would certainly make up for in the period following the Russian revolution! But this merely provides further proof that the clarification of the communist programme is a process which integrates and synthesises the best contributions of the international proletarian movement. Luxemburg's analysis of the mass strike was 'crowned' by Trotsky's appreciation of the soviets and the proletarian revolutionary perspective he drew out of the events of 1905; Pannekoek's insights into the question of the state were taken up by Lenin in 1917, who was able to show not only that the proletarian revolution must indeed destroy the existing capitalist state, but that the specific organs for the accomplishment of this task, the "finally discovered form of the dictatorship of the proletariat' were the soviets or workers' councils. Lenin's achievement in this field, largely summarised in his book The State and Revolution, will be the axis of the next chapter in this series.
CDW
1 Pannekoek remained at the level of generalities in describing such forms of organisation. But the real movement began to bring its own concretisation: in 1913, anti-union strikes broke out in the shipyards of northern Germany, giving birth to autonomous strike committees. Pannekoek did not hesitate to defend these new forms of struggle and organisation against the bureaucratic unions, which were soon to complete their final integration into the capitalist state. See Bricianer, Pannekoek et les Conseils Ouvriers, , Paris 1969. p 115.
In the previous issue of this Review, we answered the polemic in Revolutionary Perspectives no.5 (publication of the Communist Workers' Organisation, CWO) entitled "Sects, Lies, and the Lost Perspectives of the ICC". We were unable, for lack of space, to deal with every question opened up by the CWO, and so limited ourselves to answering one of them: the idea that the ICC's perspective for the present historic period has completely collapsed. We pointed out that the CWO's assertions were based essentially on a profound incomprehens ion of our actual positions, and above all on their own utter lack of any analytical framework for the present period. Moreover, this lack of framework is proudly upheld by the CWO and the IBRP (International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party) to which it is affiliated, because they consider it impossible for revolutionary organisations to identify the dominant tendency in the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat: either a course towards increasing confrontations between the two classes, or towards imperialist war. In fact, the IBRP's refusal to acknowledge both the possibility and the necessity for revolutionaries to identify the nature of the historic course, springs from the conditions in which the other organisation of the IBRP - the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (PCInt, also known as Battaglia Comunista, BC) - was formed at the end of World War II. And in no.15 of the their English-language theoretical review (Internationalist Communist), the IBRP publish a polemic titled "The political roots of the ICC's organisational malaise", where they return to the question of the origins of both ICC and PCInt. This is the main issue we will take up in this response to their polemic.
The IBRP's polemic deals with the same subject as the article in RP no.5: the causes of the organisational difficulties that the ICC has confronted recently. The great weakness of both texts, is that nowhere do they mention the analysis that the ICC itself has made of these difficulties1: for the IBRP, they can spring only from weaknesses either in our programme, or in our understanding of the present world situation. These questions can certainly be a source of problems for a communist organisation. But the whole history of the workers' movement demonstrates that questions to do with the organisation's structure and functioning are political questions in their own right, and that weaknesses in this domain have consequences still more serious - even dramatic - on the life of revolutionary groups. Need we remind the comrades of the IBRP - who after all claim to uphold the positions of Lenin - of the example of the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1903, when the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks took place precisely on the organisation question (and not at all on programmatic issues, or the analysis of the situation). In fact, when we look more closely, the IBRP's present inability to give an analysis of the nature of the historic course derives in large part from its political mistakes on the organisation question, more particularly on the relationship between class and party. We can see this again in the article published in IC. Lest the comrades of the IBRP accuse us of falsifying their positions, let us quote at length from their article:
"The ICC was formed in 1975 but its history goes back to the Gauche Communiste de France (GCF) a tiny group formed during the Second World War by the same individual ("Marc '') who would found the ICC in the Seventies. The GCF was fundamentally based on the rejection of the formation of the Internationalist Communist Party in Italy by the IBRP's ancestors in the period after 1942.
The GCF argued that the Internationalist Communist Party was not an advance on the old Fraction of the Communist Left which had gone into exile in France during the Mussolini dictatorship. The GCF called on the members of the fraction not to join the new Party that was being formed by revolutionaries like Onorato Damen, released from jail with the collapse of Mussolini's regime. It argued that the counter-revolution which had faced the workers since their defeats in the 1920s still continued, and that therefore there was no possibility of creating a revolutionary party in the 1940s. After Italian fascism collapsed in 1943 and the Italian state became a battleground between the two imperialist fronts, the vast majority of the exiled Italian fraction rallied to join the Internationalist Communist Party (pClnt) with the expectation that workers' unrest would not only be limited to Northern Italy as the war drew to a close. The GCF's opposition was of no significance at the time but it was the first example of the consequences of the abstract reasoning which is one of the methodological hallmarks of the ICC today. Today the 1CC will say that no revolution came out of World War ll, ergo the GCF were right. But this ignores the fact that the PCInt was the most successful creation of the revolutionary working class since the Russian Revolution and that, despite the half a century of further capitalist domination, it continues to exist and is growing today.
The GCF, on the other hand, took their "logical" abstractions a stage further. They argued that since the counter-revolution was still dominant then proletarian revolution was not on the agenda. If this was the case then a further imperialist war must be coming! The result was that the leadership took itself off to South America and the GCF collapsed during the Korean War. The ICC have always been somewhat embarrassed by this revelation of their ancestors' powers of understanding "the course of history ". However, their response has always been to brazen it out. Instead of admitting that the PCInt got both their perspectives and their conception of organisation right all along, when the ex-GCF returned to a remarkably unscathed Europe in the mid-1960s, they sought to denigrate the PCInt as "sclerotic ", "opportunist ", and told the world that they were "Bordigist " (a charge which they could only sustain on the basis of the ignorance of the new young generation of revolutionaries. It was a charge they were subsequently forced publicly to retract). However, even after this admission was forced out of them they had not finished with their policy of denigrating possible "rivals" (to quote the ICC themselves) and now they tried to maintain that the PCInt had "worked in the partisans" (ie supported the bourgeois forces seeking to establish a democratic Italian state). This was a disgusting and cowardly slander. In fact PCInt militants had been murdered directly on the orders of Palmiro Togliatti (General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party) for attempting to undermine that Stalinist control of the working class by winning support away from the partisans".
This passage on the respective histories of the ICC and the IDRP deserves an answer in depth, notably through historical fact. However, to clarify the debate, we have to start by correcting some of these accusations, which indicate either bad faith, or an alarming ignorance on the part of the article's author.
First, let us take the question of the partisans which provokes such indignation amongst the comrades of the IBRP, to the point where they even accuse us of "slander" and "cowardice". We have indeed said that the PCInt "worked in the partisan movement". But this is hardly a slander - it is simply the truth. Did the PCInt send some of its cadres and militants into the partisans' ranks, yes or no? This is not something that can be hidden. Moreover, the PCInt claims this policy as its own, unless it has changed position since comrade Damen wrote in autumn 1976, in the name of the PCInt's Executive, that "the Party has nothing to be ashamed of”, and recalling "those revolutionary militants who worked to penetrate the ranks of the partisans in order to spread the principles and the tactics of the revolutionary movement, and who paid for this commitment with their lives"2. By contrast, we have never pretended that this policy consisted of "supporting the bourgeois forces seeking to establish a democratic Italian state". We have dealt with this question several times in our press3 and we will return to it in the second part of this article, but although we have been pitiless in our critique of the errors committed by the PCInt at its formation, we have never treated it in the same way as the Trotskyists, still less the Stalinists. The comrades would do better to quote the passages that make them so angry. In the meantime, we think it better that they should keep their indignation to themselves. Their insults likewise.
Another point that we should correct, concerns the GCF's analysis of the historic period at the beginning of the 1950s, which led to the departure of some of its members from Europe. The IBRP is wrong to think that the ICC is embarrassed by the question, and that it replies by "brazening it out". In the obituary article on comrade Marc (International Review no.66), we wrote: "We can find this analysis in the article on "The Evolution of Capitalism and the New Perspective ", published in Internationalisme no.45 (and reprinted in the International Review no.21). The text was drawn up by Marc in 1952, and constituted, in a sense, the GCF's political testament.
In June 1952, Marc left France for Venezuela. This departure followed a political decision by the GCF: the Korean War had convinced them that a Third World War between the Russian and American blocs was both inevitable and imminent (as the text in question says). Such a war would ravage Europe, and was likely to destroy completely the few communist groups which had survived World War II. The GCF's decision to send some of its militants to "safety" outside Europe had nothing to do with their personal security (...) but with a concern for the survival of the organisation itself However, the departure of its most experienced militant was to prove fatal for the GCF; despite their constant correspondence with Marc, the 'elements who had remained in France were unable to keep the organisation alive in a period of profound counter-revolution. For reasons which we have not space to deal with here, World War III did not happen. It is clear that this error of analysis cost the life of the GCF (and of all the mistakes Marc made during his life as a militant, it was probably this one which had the most serious consequences)".
Moreover, when we first republished the text mentioned above (in 1974, in Revolution Internationale's Bulletin d'Etude et de Discussion no.8, the predecessor to the International Review), we clearly stated:
"Internationalisme was right to analyse the period following World War II as a continuation of the period of reaction and reflux in the proletarian class struggle (...) It was right, too, to declare that the end of the war did not mean the end of capitalism's decadence, that all the contradictions that had pushed capitalism to war continued, and would push the world inexorably towards new wars. But Internationalisme did not see, or did not pay enough attention to, the possible phase of "reconstruction" in the cycle of crisis-war-reconstruction-crisis. It was for this reason, and in this context of the Cold War between the USA and the USSR of the time, that Internationalisme thought that the resurgence of the proletariat would be possible only in and following a Third War”.
As we can see, the ICC has never tried to "brazen out" this question, nor has it been too "embarrassed" to talk about the mistakes of the GCF (even when the IBRP was not yet there to remind us). That said, the IBRP demonstrates once again that it has not understood our analysis of the historic course. The GCF's mistake lay not in an incorrect evaluation of the balance of class forces, but in an under-estimation of the respite that reconstruction would give to the capitalist economy, and which would allow it for two decades to escape the open crisis, and so to attenuate somewhat the tensions between the two blocs. These tensions remained contained within the framework of local wars (Korea, Middle East, Vietnam, etc.). If the World War did not break out at the beginning of the 50s, it was not thanks to the proletariat (which was paralysed and controlled by the left wing of capital), but because the war was not yet a necessity for capitalism.
Having made these corrections, we have to return to an "argument" which seems dear to the IBRP (since it has already been used in the polemic in RP no.5): the "tiny" size of the GCF. In reality, the reference to the GCF's "tiny" size is a reference back to "the most successful creation of the revolutionary working class since the Russian Revolution", in other words the PCInt, which at the time had several thousand members. Is this supposed to be the IBRP's proof that the reason for the PCInt's "greater success" was that its own positions were more correct than those of the GCF?
If that is the case, then the argument is thin indeed. However, leaving aside the poverty of the argument, the IBRP's approach brings up some fundamental questions, which are precisely where some of the most profound disagreements between our organisations lie. To deal with them, we need to return to the history of the Italian communist left. For the GCF was not just a "tiny" group, it was also the real political continuity with the same political current where the PCInt and the IBRP have their origins.
In our book The Italian Communist Left, the ICC has put forward a history of this current. Here, we can only sketch a few important aspects of this history.
The Italian Left emerged around Amadeo Bordiga and the Naples Federation as the "Abstentionist" Fraction within the Italian Socialist Party. The Left was responsible for founding the Italian Communist Party at the Livorno Congress of 1921, and held the leadership of the Party until 1925. At the same time as other left currents within the Communist International (such as the Dutch and German lefts), and well before Trotsky.'s Left Opposition, it fought the opportunist direction that the International was taking. In particular, unlike Trotskyism which claims complete adherence to the Cl's first four Congresses, the Italian Left rejected certain positions adopted by the 3rd and 4th Congress, especially the tactic of the "United Front". On some aspects, notably on the state capitalist nature of the USSR or the definitively bourgeois nature of the trades unions, the positions of the Dutch and German Lefts were at first much more correct than those of the Italians. However the Italian Left's contribution to the workers' movement was to prove much more fruitful thanks to its better understanding on two essential questions:
the ebb and defeat of the revolutionary wave;
the nature of the tasks of revolutionary organisations in such a situation.
In particular, while they were aware of the need to call into question political positions which had been contradicted by historical experience, the Italian Left moved forward with great caution, which allowed them to avoid "throwing the baby out with the bath water", unlike the Dutch Left which finally concluded that October 1917 had been a bourgeois revolution, and by rejecting the necessity of the revolutionary party. This did not prevent the Italian Left from adopting some of the positions which the German and Dutch Lefts had worked out previously. Increasing repression by the Mussolini regime, especially after the emergency laws of 1926, forced most of the militants of the Italian Communist Left into exile. It was thus abroad, mainly in France and Belgium, that the current continued an organised activity. In February 1928, in the Parisian suburb of Pantin, there was founded the Left Fraction of the Italian Communist Party. It tried to take part in the efforts at discussion and regroupment of various Left currents that had been excluded from a degenerating International, and whose best-known member was Trotsky. The Fraction hoped especially to publish a common discussion review with the different currents. But after being excluded from Trotsky's International Left Opposition, the Fraction determined in 1933 to publish its own review Bilan in French, at the same time as it continued to publish Prometeo in Italian.
This is not the place to look at the whole evolution of the Fraction's positions. We will limit ourselves to one, which lay at its foundations: the relationship between party and fraction.
This position had been worked out little by little during the 1920s and the beginning of the 30s, when the Fraction had to decide what should be its policy towards the degenerating Communist Parties.
We can summarise the main lines of this position as follows. The Left Fraction is formed as the proletarian party is degenerating under the influence of opportunism, in other words its penetration by bourgeois ideology. It is the responsibility of the minority, which upholds the revolutionary programme, to conduct an organised struggle for its victory within the party. Either the Fraction succeeds, its principles triumph, and the party is saved, or the party continues to degenerate and ends up passing arms and baggage into the bourgeois camp. The moment where the proletarian party passes into the bourgeois camp is not easy to determine. However, one of the most important signs of this passage is the fact that no proletarian political life any longer appears within the party. It is the responsibility of the Left Fraction to continue the fight within the party as long as there remains any hope of redressing it: this is why, during the late 1920s and early '30s, the left currents did not leave the parties of the IC, but were excluded, often by means of sordid manoeuvres. That being said, once a proletanan party has passed over to the bourgeois camp, no return is possible. The proletariat must then produce a new party, to return to the road towards revolution, and the role of the Fraction is to be a "bridge" between the old party gone over to the enemy and the future party, for which it must build a programmatic foundation, and whose skeleton it must become. The fact that once the party has passed over into the bourgeois camp, there can no longer exist any proletarian life within it means that it is both useless and dangerous for revolutionaries to undertake "entryism", which has always been one of Trotskyism's "tactics", and which the Fraction always rejected. Attempts to maintain a proletarian life within a bourgeois party, in other words one which is sterile as far as class positions are concerned, has never had any result other than to accelerate the opportunist degeneration of those organisations which have attempted it, without redressing the party in the slightest. As for any "recruitment" gained by such methods, it has always been particularly confused, and gangrened by opportunism, and has never been able to form a vanguard for the working class.
In fact, one of the fundamental differences between the Italian Fraction and Trotskyism was that when it came to regrouping revolutionary forces, the Fraction always put forward the need for the greatest clarity and programmatic rigour, although being open to discussion with all the other currents that had committed themselves to struggle against the degeneration of the Cl. The Trotskyist current, by contrast, tried to form organisations in haste, without any serious discussion or decantation of political positions beforehand, relying essentially on agreements between "personalities" and the authority of Trotsky as one of the most important leaders of the 1917 revolution, and of the early Cl.
Another question where the Fraction and Trotskyism disagreed, was the right moment for the formation of a new party. For Trotsky and his comrades, the question of founding a new party was put on the agenda as soon as the old parties had been lost for the proletariat. For the Fraction, the question was very clear:
"The transformation of the Fraction into a party is conditioned by two elements, that are closely linked4:
1) The elaboration, by the Fraction, of the new political positions which will be able to give a solid framework to the proletariat's struggle for the revolution, in its new and more advanced phase (...).
2) The overthrow of the present system of class relationships (...) with the outbreak of revolutionary movements which will allow the Fraction to regain the leadership of the struggle with a view to insurrection" (“Towards the 2-3/4 International?" in Bilan no. 1, 1933).
For revolutionaries to determine correctly their responsibilities at a given moment, it is vital for them to identify clearly the balance of class forces, and the direction in which it is moving. One of the Fraction's great merits was precisely its ability to identify the nature of the historic course during the 1930s: because the counter-revolution weighed heavily on the whole working class, the general crisis of capitalism could only lead to a new world war.
The full importance of this analysis became clear with the outbreak of the war in Spain. Whereas most of the organisations that belonged to the left of the Communist Parties saw in the Spanish events a revolutionary recovery of the world proletariat, the Fraction understood that despite the combativity and courage of the Spanish proletariat, it had been trapped by the anti-fascist ideology promoted by all the organisations with any influence within it (the anarchist CGT, the socialist UGT, as well as the Communist and Socialist parties, and the POUM, a left socialist party which took part in the bourgeois government of the Barcelona "Generalitat"), and was destined to serve as cannon-fodder in a confrontation between the "democratic' and "fascist" sections of the bourgeoisie which would be a prelude to the inevitable world war. At the time, a minority formed within the Fraction, which considered that the situation in Spain remained "objectively revolutionary". Defying all organisational discipline, and refusing the debate proposed by the majority, this minority joined up in the POUM's anti-fascist brigades5 and even wrote in the POUM's press. The Fraction was obliged to recognise that the minority had split. The latter, on their return from Spain at the end of 19366, joined Union Communiste, a left split from Trotskyism in the early 1930s, which was to rejoin the latter describing the events in Spain as "revolutionary", and calling for "critical anti-fascism".
Along with a number of communists from the Dutch Left, the Italian Fraction was thus the only organisation to maintain an intransigent class position against the imperialist war developing in Spain7. Unfortunately, at the end of 1937 Vercesi. who was the Fraction's leading figure and theoretician, began to develop a new theory that the various military confrontations of the latter half of the 1930s were not preparations for a new generalised imperialist slaughter, but "local wars" aimed at keeping the growing proletarian menace at bay by massacring workers. According to this theory, the world was thus on the eve of a new revolutionary wave, and world war was no longer a possibility, since the war economy was supposed to overcome the capitalist crisis of itself Only a minority of the Fraction - our comrade Marc among them - managed to avoid being dragged down this slippery slope, which turned out to be a sort of posthumous revenge for the minority of 1936. The majority decided to stop publishing Bilan and the replace it with October (whose name matched the "new perspective"), which was to be the organ of the International Bureau of Left Fractions (Belgian and Italian) and published in three languages. In fact, instead of "doing more" as the "new perspective" demanded, the Fraction proved unable to maintain its previous rhythm: unlike Bilan, October appeared irregularly, and in French only; many militants, confused by this calling into question of the Fractions positions, became demoralised or resigned.
When World War II broke out, the Fraction was disjointed. Its rout was less the result of repression, first by the democratic police and then by the Gestapo (several militants, including Mitchell, the leading figure of the Belgian Fraction, died in the camps), as of political disorientation and lack of preparation for a world war which had been supposed not to happen. Vercesi proclaimed that with the war, the proletariat had become "socially non-existent", that any Fraction work was therefore a waste of time, and that the Fractions should be dissolved (the decision that was taken by the international Bureau), which helped to paralyse the Fraction still further. Notwithstanding, the Marseille nucleus, made up of militants who had opposed Vercesi's revisionist ideas before the war, went on working patiently to rebuild the Fraction - a task that was made all the more difficult by repression and straitened circumstances. Sections were reestablished in Lyon, Toulon, and Paris. Contact was renewed with Belgium. By 1941, the "reconstituted" Italian Fraction was able to hold annual Conferences, to elect an Executive Commission, and publish an international Discussion Bulletin. In parallel, in 1942 the French nucleus of the Communist Left was formed on the basis of the Italian Fraction's positions, and with a view to building a French Fraction. Marc, now a member of the Italian Fraction's EC, joined the French group8. When in 1942-43 the great workers' strikes began, that were to lead to the fall of Mussolini and his replacement by the pro-Allied Admiral Badoglio (strikes which were to have an echo among Italian workers in Germany, supported by strikes of German workers), the Fraction considered, in line with the position it had always held, that "the course towards the transformation of the Fraction into the Party is open in Italy". The Conference of August 1943 decided to renew contact with Italy, and asked its militants to prepare to return as soon as possible. However, the return proved impossible, partly for material reasons and partly because Vercesi and a part of the Belgian Fraction remained hostile to the move, on the grounds that events in Italy did not call into question "the social non-existence of the proletariat". At its May 1944 Conference, the Fraction condemned Vercesi's theories. Vercesi had further to fall, however. In September 1944, he took part, in the name of the Fraction and in company with Pieri, another of its members, in the Brussels "Coalizione antifascista", alongside the Christian Democrat, "Communist", Republican, Socialist and Liberal parties. This unholy alliance published the newspaper L'Italia di Domani, in whose columns are to be found appeals for financial subscriptions to help the Allied war effort. When the Fraction became aware of these facts, its EC expelled Vercesi on 20th January 1945. This did not prevent the latter from continuing his work both in the Coalizione and as president of the Croce Rossa9.
The Fraction continued to work, in difficult conditions, to propagandise against the anti-fascist hysteria and to denounce the imperialist war. Now, it had at its side the French Nucleus, which held its first congress as the French Fraction of the Communist Left - December 1944. The two Fractions distributed leaflets and flyposted calls for fraternisation between the proletarians in uniform of the two imperialist camps. However, when they learnt at the Conference of May 1945 of the formation in Italy of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista, including prestigious figures as Amadeo Bordiga and Onorato Damen, the majority of the Fraction decided that it should dissolve, and in its members enter the PCInt on an individual basis. This called into question the very basis of the Fraction's whole approach since its formation in 1928. Marc, who was a member of the Fraction's EC and had been the leading figure in its work during the war, opposed the decision. His approach was not formalist, but political: he considered that the Fraction be maintained until they had ascertained the positions of the new party which were not known in detail, and determined whether they conformed to those of the Fraction10. Rather than be an accomplice to the suicide of the Fraction, he resigned from the EC and left the Congress, after making a declaration to explain his attitude. The Fraction (despite no longer being supposed to exist) excluded him as "politically unworthy", and refused to recognise the FFGC, whose leading figure Marc was. A few months later, two members of the FFGC met Vercesi - who had declared for the formation of the PCInt - and split, to form a "FFGC no. 2", with the support of the latter. To avoid any confusion, the FFGC took the name of Gauche Communiste de France (GCF), while still claiming to represent the political continuity of the Fraction. The "FFGC no. 2" found itself "strengthened" by the entry of the members of the minority excluded from the Fraction in 1936, and of Chaze - the leading figure of Union Communiste. This did not stop the PCInt and the Belgian Fraction from recognising it as "the only representative in France of the Communist Left".
In 1946, the "tiny" GCF stopped publication of its agitational press L'Etincelle ("The Spark '), considering that the perspective of a historic recovery in class struggle which had been put forward in 1943 had proven invalid. By contrast, between 1945 and 1952 it published 46 issues of its theoretical review Internationalisme, that dealt with all the questions confronting the workers' movement at the end of World War II, and clarifying the programmatic foundations for e formation of Internacionalismo in 1964 in Venezuela, Revolution Internationale in 1968 in France, and the International Communist Current in 1975.
In the second part of this article, we will return to the formation of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista, the inspiration for the IBRP and according to its own words “the most successful creation of the revolutionary working class since the Russian revolution”.
Fabieane
1 See the article en the ICC's 12th Congress in this issue.
2 Letter published in International Review no.8, with our response: "The ambiguities on the partisans in the formation of the Internationalist Communist Party in Italy".
3 See the article in International Review no.8.
4 In our press, we have often deal with the distinction worked out by the Italian Left between the party and fraction forms (in particular, see our study on "The relation between Fraction and Party in the marxist tradition", in International Review nos. 59, 61, 64). For clarity's sake, we can just recall the main lines of the issue here. The communist minority exists permanently, as an expression of the proletariat's revolutionary destiny. However, its impact on the class' immediate struggles is closely conditioned by their level, and the extent of the consciousness of the working masses. Only in periods of open and increasingly conscious proletarian struggle can the minority hope to have an impact. Only in these conditions can the minority be described as a party. By contrast. in periods where the proletarian struggle is ebbing historically, and the counter-revolution triumphs, it is vain to hope that revolutionary positions can have a significant and determining impact on the class as a whole. In such periods, the only possible - but vital - work is that of the fraction: preparing the political conditions for the formation of the future party when the balance of class forces once again makes it possible for communist positions to have an impact throughout the proletariat.
5 One member of the minority, Candiani, even took command of the POUM "Lenin Column" on the Aragon front.
6 Contrary to the fable kept up by the minority of the Fraction and other groups. the majority did not simply observe the events in Spain from afar. Its representatives remained in Spain until May 1937, not to join the anti-fascist front, but to continue their propaganda in the hope of snatching a few militants from the spiral of imperialist war. They did so clandestinely, pursued by Stalinist assassins who came within an inch of killing them.
7 It is worth noting that the events in Spain caused splits in other organisations (Union Communiste in France, the Ligue des Communistes in Belgium, the Revolutionary Workers' League in the USA, the Liga Comunista in Mexico), which adopted the same positions as the Italian Fraction and either joined its ranks, or, as in Belgium, formed new fractions of the International Communist Left. It was at this time that our comrade Marc left Union Communiste to join the Fraction, with which he had been in contact for several years.
8 During this period, the Fraction published numerous issues of its Discussion Bulletin, which allowed it to develop a whole series of analyses, notably on the nature of the USSR, on the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and the question of the state in the period of transition, on Vercesi' s theory of the war economy, and on the economic causes of the imperialist war.
9 In this capacity, he even stooped to thanking "His Excellency the Papal Nuncio" for his “support to his work of solidarity and humanity”, while declaring that "no Italian would so cover himself With shame as to remain deaf to our pressing appeal” (L'Italia di Domani no. 11, March 1945).
10 Internationalist Communist is thus mistaken in the reason it gives for Marc's opposition to the Fraction's decision in May 1945: it was not "that the counter-revolution which had faced the workers since their defeats in the 1920s still continued and that therefore there was no possibility of creating a revolutionary party in the 1940s". Since at the time, while he emphasised the growing difficulties encountered by the proletariat due to the Allies' systematic policy of diverting its combativity onto a bourgeois terrain, Marc had not explicitly called into question the position adopted in 1943 on the possibility of forming the Party.
In International Review 83 we showed how in 1919 the working class, following the failure of the January uprising, went through a series of heavy defeats owing to the fragmentation of its struggles. The ruling class in Germany unleashed the most violent repression against the workers.
1919 was the zenith of the world revolutionary wave. While the working class m Russia remained isolated in the face of an assault organised by the democratic states, the German bourgeoisie went onto the offensive with the aim of finishing off a proletariat which had been terribly weakened by its recent defeats.
After the disaster of the war, even though the economy was in ruins, the ruling class tried to exploit the situation by piling the weight of its defeat on the shoulders of the working class. Between 1913 and 1920, agricultural and industrial production in Germany had fallen by more than 50%. On top of this, a third of the production that remained had to be delivered to the victorious powers. In many branches of the economy, production continued to collapse. Prices rose dizzily and the cost of living index went from 100 in 1913 to 1,100 in 1920. After the hardships suffered by the working class during the war, "peacetime" famine was on the agenda. Malnutrition continued to spread. The anarchy and chaos of capitalist production, impoverishment and hunger reigned over the workers everywhere.
Simultaneously, the victorious powers of the West extracted a heavy price from the defeated German bourgeoisie. However there were considerable differences of interest between the victors. While the USA had an interest in Germany acting as a counter-weight to Britain, and thus opposed any attempt to tear Germany to pieces, France wanted Germany to be weakened for as long as possible on the territorial, military and economic level, and even favoured the dismemberment of the country. The Treaty of Versailles of 28th June 1919 stipulated that the German army would be reduced in stages from 400,000 on 10th April 1920, then to 200,000 on 20th July 1920. The new Republican army, the Reichswehr, was only allowed to keep 4,000 of its 24,000 officers. The Reichswehr saw these decisions as a deadly threat and opposed them by all means possible. All the bourgeois parties - from the SPD to the centre and the extreme right - were united, in the interests of the national capital, in rejecting the Treaty of Versailles. They only yielded to it under the constraint of the victorious powers. However, the world bourgeoisie profited from the Versailles Treaty in that it deepened the divisions which had already existed during the war between the workers of the victorious powers and those of the defeated powers.
Meanwhile, an important faction of the army, feeling directly threatened by the Treaty, immediately began to organise resistance against its application. This faction aimed at stirring up a new conflict with the victorious powers. This perspective demanded that the bourgeoisie very quickly impose a new and decisive defeat on the working class.
But for the moment there was no question of the army coming to power as far as the main forces of German capital were concerned. At the head of the bourgeois state, the SPD had already given proof of its considerable capacities. Since 1914, it had succeeded in muzzling the proletariat And in the winter of 1918-19, it had very efficiently organised the sabotage and repression of the revolutionary struggle. German capital did not need the army to maintain its rule. It could still rely on the dictatorship of the Weimar Republic. Police troops under the orders of the SPD had fired on a massive demonstration in front of the Reichstag on 13th January 1920, where 42 demonstrators were killed. During the strikes in the Ruhr at the end of February, the "democratic government” threatened revolutionaries with the death penalty.
This is why, when in February 1920 parts of the army put their putschist aspirations into practice, they were only supported by a few factions of capital.These were above all from the agrarian east, since they had a particular interest in reconquering the eastern regions lost during the war.
The preparations for this putsch were an open secret within the bourgeoisie. But initially the government did nothing about the putschists, On 13th March 1920, a marine brigade under the command of General von Luttwitz entered Berlin, surrounded the seat of the Ebert government and proclaimed its overthrow. When Ebert rallied generals von Seekt and Schleicher to his side in reply to the putsch, the army hesitated, because, as the Supreme Commander of the General Staff declared: "the Reichswehr cannot accept any fratricidal war'of Reichswehr against Reichswehr".
The government then fled, first to Dresden, then to Stuttgart. Kapp then declared that the Social Democratic government was out of office but made no arrests. Before its flight to Stuttgart, the government, supported by the trade unions, launched an appeal for a strike and once again showed the duplicity it was capable of in acting against the working class:
"Fight by all means at your disposal for the maintenance of the Republic. Forget all your differences. There is only one way to oppose the dictatorship of Wilhelm II:
the total paralysis of the whole economy;
all arms must be given up;
no proletarian must cooperate with the military dictatorship;
general strike all along the line. Proletarians unite. Down with the counter-revolution.
The Social Democratic members of the government: Ebert, Bauer, Noske The Directing Committee of the SPD"
The unions and the SPD thus intervened immediately to protect the bourgeois Republic - even if on this occasion they used pro-worker language1.
Kapp proclaimed the dissolution of the National Assembly, announced the holding of elections and threatened any striking worker with the death penalty.
The indignation of the workers was gigantic. They understood immediately and clearly that this was a direct attack on their class. Everywhere a violent response developed. Naturally, it was not a question of defending the Scheidemann government From Wasserkante in eastern Prussia, through to central Germany, Berlin, BadWurtemburg, Bavaria and the Ruhr, in all the big towns, there were demonstrations; in all the industrial centres the workers went on strike and raided police stations in order to arm themselves; in the factories they held general assemblies to decide on the struggle to be waged. In most of the big cities putschist troops opened fire on demonstrating workers. On 13th and 14th March 1920, dozens of workers were shot down.
In the industrial centres, workers formed action committees, workers' councils and executive councils. The proletarian masses descended onto the streets. Not since November 1918 had there been such a massive mobilisation of the working class. Everywhere their anger against militarism exploded.
On the 13 March, the day the Kapp troops entered Berlin, the KDP Zentrale took a wait-and-see attitude. In its first statement of position, it was not in favour of a general strike:
“The proletariat will not lift a finger for the democratic republic ... The working class, which only yesterday was disarmed and repressed by the Eberts and Noskes ... is for the moment incapable of acting. The working class will take on the struggle against the military dictatorship in the circumstances and with the means that seem suitable to it. These circumstances are not yet present"
However, the KPD Zentrale was mistaken. The workers themselves did not want to wait, on the contrary, in the space of a few days more and more of them were joining the movement. Everywhere the slogans were: "Arm the workers! Down with the putschistsl".
Whereas in 1919, throughout Germany, the working class had struggled in a fragmented way, the putsch provoked a simultaneous mobilisation in many places. However, apart from in the Ruhr, there was hardly any contact made between the different centres of struggle. Throughout the country, there was a spontaneous response but without any real centralised organisation.
The Ruhr, the most important concentration of the working class, was the "Kappists" main target. This is why it was the centre of the workers' response. Starting with Munster, the Kappists attempted to encircle the workers of the Ruhr. The latter were the only ones to unify their struggle at the level of several towns, to give the strike a centralised leadership. Strike committees were formed everywhere.
Armed units, numbering up to 80,000 workers, were set up. This was the most important military mobilisation in the history of the workers' movement, apart from Russia. Although this resistance was not centralised on the military level, the armed workers managed to stop the advance of Kapp's troops. In town after town the putschists were defeated. The working class had not achieved such a success in 1919, during the various revolutionary uprisings. On 20 March 1920, the army was forced to retreat completely from the Ruhr. Already on 17th March, Kapp had been compelled to resign unconditionally. His putsch had hardly lasted for 100 hours. As in the events of the previous year, the main foci of the workers' resistance were Saxony, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Munich2. But the most powerful reaction was in the Ruhr.
Whereas in Germany as a whole the movement ebbed considerably after Kapp's resignation and the failure of the putsch, in the Ruhr this did not put an end to the movement. Many workers saw this as an opportunity to take the struggle forward.
Although a very broad workers' front had developed with the speed of lightening against the bloody putschists, it was obvious that the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie was not yet on the agenda. For the majority of workers the issue was one of thwarting an armed aggression. At this point, it was not clear how to follow up the workers' initial success.
Apart from the workers of the Ruhr, those in other regions advanced hardly any demands that could have given the class movement a further dimension. As long as the workers' energy was directed against the putsch, there was a homogeneous orientation among the workers. But once the putschist troops had been defeated, the movement began to mark time and lacked a clear objective. Repelling a military attack in one region, which was the immediate issue facing the workers, does not necessarily create the conditions for overthrowing the capitalist class.
In various places, the anarcho-syndicalists tried to carry out the socialisation of production. This expressed the illusion that kicking out the extreme right was enough to open the door to socialism. A whole series of "commissions" were created by the workers with the aim of putting their demands to the bourgeois state. All this was presented as the first measures on the road to socialism, as the first steps towards dual power. In reality, these conceptions were signs of an impatience which was distracting the workers from the most urgent tasks. The illusion that it is enough to establish a favourable balance of forces in one region is a grave danger to the working class, because the question of power can only be posed, first of all, at the level of a whole country, and in reality only at an international level. This is why it is so important to combat petty bourgeois impatience and the demands for "everything, now".
While the workers mobilised themselves immediately on the military level against the putsch, the impulse and force of their movement did not come fundamentally from the factories. Without this - i.e. without the initiative from the masses exercising their pressure in the streets but also expressing themselves in general assemblies where they can discuss the situation and take decisions collectively - the movement cannot really go forward. This process demands that the workers take direct control of the extension and direction of the movement, but it also requires a development of consciousness in depth, since this alone makes it possible to unmask the enemies of the proletariat.
This is why the arming of the workers and a determined military response are not sufficient. The working class has to set in motion its principal strength: the development of its consciousness and its organisation. In this perspective, the workers' councils occupy a central place. However, the workers' councils and action committees which reappeared spontaneously in this movement were too weakly developed to serve as a rallying point and spearhead of the combat.
Moreover, from the beginning, the SPD undertook a whole series of manoeuvres to sabotage the councils. While the KPD focused its whole intervention on the need to re-elect the workers' councils, in order to reinforce the workers' initiative, the SPD managed to block these efforts.
In the Ruhr many representatives of the SPD sat in the action committees and the central strike committee. As in the period from November 1918 to the end of 1919, this party sabotaged the movement both from the inside and the outside, and once the workers had been decisively weakened, it brought to bear all the means of repression at its disposal.
Following Kapp's resignation on March 17, the withdrawal of the troops from the Ruhr on 20 March and the Ebert-Bauer government's return from "exile", the latter, alongside the army, was able to reorganise all the bourgeois forces.
Once again the SPD and the unions came to the aid of capital. Using the worst kind of demagogy and scarcely veiled threats, Ebert and Scheidemann immediately called for a return to work:
"Kapp and Luttwitz have been put out of business, but the sedition of the Junkers continues to threaten the German popular state. The combat against them must continue until they submit unconditionally. In this great aim, we must all the more solidly and deeply strengthen the Republican front. The general strike, if it goes on any longer, will not only threaten those who have been guilty of high treason, but also our own front. We need coal and bread to carry on the fight against the former powers. This is why we must halt the peoples' strike, but remain in a permanent state of alert".
At the same time, the SPD made a show of granting political concessions, in order to isolate the most combative and conscious elements from the rest of the movement. Thus it promised "more democracy" in the factories, in order to give the workers "a decisive influence in the elaboration of the new regime and the social and economic constitution"; it also promised the purging from the administration of all those who had sympathised with the putschists. But above all, the unions did everything to ensure that an agreement would be signed. The Bielefeld agreement promised concessions which in reality were aimed at holding back the movement so that the repression could then be organised.
At the same time the threat of "foreign intervention" was once again raised: the workers were told that spreading their struggles would result in an attack on Germany by foreign troops, especially those of the USA, and in the blocking of desperately needed food supplies from Holland.
Thus the unions and the SPD prepared the conditions and put in place all the means necessary for the repression of the working class. The same SPD whose ministers had a few days before, on 13th March, been calling for a general strike against the putschists, now took back the reins and carried out the repression. Although negotiations for a cease-fire were underway and the government appeared to be making "concessions" to the working class, the general mobilisation of the Reichswehr was already taking place. A large number of workers had the fatal illusion that the government troops sent by the "democratic" Weimar Republic would not carry out any action against the workers. This is what the Berlin-Kopenick defence committee promised when it called on the workers' militias to cease the struggle. But as soon as troops loyal to the government entered Berlin, councils of war were set up whose ferocity easily matched that of the Freikorps the year before. Anyone found in possession of a weapon was immediately executed. Thousands of workers were tortured and shot, innumerable women were raped. In the Ruhr alone it is estimated that 1000 workers were murdered. What Kapp's thugs had failed, the butchers of the democratic state succeeded admirably.
Since the capitalist system entered its period of decadence, the proletariat has had to constantly relearn the fact that there are no factions of the ruling class less reactionary than any others, or less hostile to the working class. On the contrary, the forces of the left of capital, as proved by the example of the SPD, are all the more devious and dangerous in their attacks on the working class. In decadent capitalism there are no progressive factions of the bourgeoisie that the working class can support.
The proletariat paid a heavy price for its illusions in Social Democracy. In crushing the workers' response to the Kapp putsch, the SPD showed all its duplicity and proved that it was acting in the service of capital.
It began by presenting itself as the most radical representative of the workers. In doing so it succeeded in mystifying not only the workers in general, but also their political parties. Although at a general level the KPD warned the working class loudly and clearly about the SPD, denouncing the bourgeois character of its politics, at the local level it often fell victim to its tricks. Thus, in various towns, the KPD signed joint appeals for the general strike with the SPD.
For example, in Frankfurt, the SPD, the USPD and the KPD declared jointly that "We must enter into struggle now not to protect the bourgeois Republic, but to establish the power of the proletariat. Leave the factories and offices right away!".
In Wuppertal, the district leaderships of the three parties published this appeal:
"The unified struggle must be waged with the/oil owing aims:
The conquest of political power by the dictatorship of the proletariat, up until the consolidation of socialism by the council system.
The immediate socialisation of the economic enterprises sufficiently large to serve this end.
To attain these aims, the signatory parties (USPD, KPD, SPD) call (or a determined general strike on Monday 15 March".
The fact that the KPD and the USPD did not denounce the real role of the SPD, but lent their support to the illusion that you could form a united front with a party that had betrayed the working class and had its hands covered in workers' blood was to have disastrous consequences.
Once again the SPD was pulling all the strings and was preparing to repress the working class. After the defeat of the putschists, with Ebert at the head of the government, it appointed a new Commander to the Reichswehr - von Seekt, a general who had already acquired a solid reputation as a butcher of the working class. Right away, the army stirred up hatred against the workers: "although the right wing putschists have left the stage in defeat, left wing putschism is again raising its head. We will use our weapons against putsches of all kinds". Thus the workers who had fought the putschists were denounced as the real putschists. "Don't be led astray by Bolshevik and Spartacist lies. Stay united and strong. Form a front against Bolshevism which wants to destroy everything".
Under the orders of the SPD, the Reichswehr carried out a real bloodbath. It was the "democratic" army which marched against the working class, long after the "Kappists" had been put to flight!
While the working class was heroically fighting the attacks of the army and was trying to find a direction for its struggles, the revolutionaries were lagging behind the movement. The absence of a strong communist party was one of the decisive reasons for this new reverse for the proletarian revolution in Germany.
As we showed in the article in IRs 88 and 89, the KPD found itself gravely weakened by the exclusion of the opposition at the Heidelberg Congress. In March 1920, the KPD only had a few hundred militants in Berlin, the majority of its members having been excluded. On top of this, the party was traumatised by its weaknesses during the bloody week of January 1919, when it had proved unable to act in a unified way to expose the trap set by the bourgeoisie and to prevent the working class from falling into it.
This is why on the 13 March 1920, the KPD developed a false analysis of the balance of forces between the classes, thinking that it was too soon for a fightback. It was clear that the working class was facing an offensive by the bourgeoisie and could not choose the moment to struggle. But its determination to resist was extremely important. In this situation, the party was perfectly correct to put forward the following orientation:
"Immediate assemblies in all factories to elect workers' councils. Immediate meeting of councils in higher assemblies which must take charge of the direction of the struggles and the next measures to carry out. Immediate meeting of the councils in a Central Congress of councils. Within the workers' councils, the communists fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the Republic of councils" (15th March 1920).
But after the SPD regained control of the reins of government, the KPD Zentrale declared, on 21st March 1920:
"For the ultimate conquest of the proletarian masses to the cause of communism, a state of affairs in which political liberty can be used without any limits and in which bourgeois democracy does not appear as the dictatorship of capital is of the highest importance for things to go in the direction of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The KPD sees the formation of a socialist government that excludes any capitalist bourgeois party as a favourable basis for the action of the proletarian masses and the process of maturation necessary for exerting the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Towards the government it adopts an attitude of loyal opposition as long as it does not threaten the guarantees that ensure the working class its freedom of political action, and as long as it combats the bourgeois counter-revolution by all the means at its disposal and does not prevent the social and organisational strengthening of the working class".
What was the KPD hoping for in promising to be a "loyal opposition" to the SPD? Was this not the same SPD which during the war and at the beginning of the revolutionary wave had done everything it could to mystify the working class, to tie it to the state? Was this not the same SPD which had coldly organised the repression of the workers?
By adopting this attitude the KPD Zentrale left itself wide open to the manoeuvres of the SPD.
When the vanguard of the working class falls into an error of this scale, it is not surprising that the masses' illusions in the SPD should have been reinforced. The catastrophic policy of the "United Front from below" as applied in March 1920 by the KPD Zentrale would unfortunately be taken up straight away by the whole Communist International. The KPD had taken a first tragic step.
For the militants excluded from the KPD, thIS new error by the Centrale was the motive for pushing them to found the KAPD in Berlin shortly afterwards, at the beginning of April 1920.
Once again the working class in Germany had fought heroically against capital. And this despite the fact that the international wave of struggles was well in retreat. But once again it was deprived of decisive action by the party. The errors and hesitations of the revolutionaries in Germany were a very clear demonstration of the grim consequences of a lack of clarity on the part of the political organisation of the proletariat.
The. confrontation provoked by the bourgeoisie through the Kapp putsch ended in a new and grave reverse for the proletariat in Germany. Despite the formidable courage and determination with which the workers hurled themselves into the fray, they once again paid heavily for their persistent illusions.in the SPD and bourgeois democracy. Handicapped politically by the chronic weaknesses of its political organisations, abused by the underhand policies and speeches of Social Democracy, they were. defeated and finally exposed to the bullets not so much of the extreme right but of the very "democratic" Reichswehr under the orders of the SPD government.
But above all this new defeat of the proletariat in Germany was a crucial blow against the worldwide revolutionary wave, leaving Soviet Russia more and more isolated.
DV
1 To this day it is still not clear whether this was a provocation with a precise goal, set up between the army and the government We can in any case not exclude the hypothesis that the ruling class had a plan which used the putschists as a factor of provocation: the extreme right would first draw the workers into the trap, then the democratic dictatorship would strike with all its strength.
2 In Central Germany Max Holz made his appearance for the first time. By organising combat groups of armed workers, he engaged in numerous conflicts with the police and the army. Seizing hold of goods from the shops, he distributed them to the unemployed. We will come back to him in another article.
The 12th Congress of the ICC, which was held in April 1997, marked a fundamental step in the life of our international organisation. This congress concluded a period of nearly four years of debate on the question of the way the organisation functions, four years of struggle to recover its unity and cohesion. The perspectives adopted by the congress put it thus: "The ICC has completed its convalescence and at this 12th International Congress it is able to give itself the perspective of returning to a balance between all its activities, of assuming all the tasks for which the proletariat has engendered it as part of the proletarian political milieu". (Resolution on activities from the 12th Congress).
Since the end of 1993, while maintaining its regular activities of analysing the international situation and intervening through its press, the priority of the ICC has been the task of defending the organisation against the attacks on its organizational integrity, both from the inside, and the outside via an unprecedented offensive of political parasitism.
This combat, which has nothing to do with a sudden relapse into 'paranoia' by the ICC, contrary to the complacent insinuations of political parasitism, but also of certain groups and elements of the proletarian political milieu, has gone through several phases.
First of all there was a critical examination, done without any concessions, of all aspects of our organisational life that revealed an insufficient grasp of the marxist conception of the revolutionary organisation, and a penetration of behaviour alien to this conception. During this phase the ICC was obliged to uncover the pernicious role of 'clans' within the organisation. A vestige of the conditions in which the ICC was formed and grew up, the phase of circles and small groups, these informal groupings of militants based around friendship and other ties, instead of being subsumed into the organisation as an international, centralised unity, persisted to the point where they represented an insidious, parallel form of functioning within the organisation. In the general framework of an understanding of the necessity for a permanent struggle against the circle spirit and for the party spirit, the 11th International Congress, in 1995, highlighted the devastating role of one clan in particular, which had extended its influence into several territorial sections and the international central organ. After a long internal inquiry, the congress unmasked the main animator of this clan, the individual JJ who had carried out a systematic policy of sabotage, through all kinds of secret manoeuvres, including the formation of a network of 'initiates' into esotericism within the organisation. The delegations and participants at the 11th Congress unanimously pronounced the exclusion of this individual.
The 11th International Congress enabled us to throw light on the internal malfunctioning of the organisation. By systematically discussing all the mechanisms of this malfunctioning, by exposing the different kinds of anti-organisational behaviour, by critically re-examining the history of the ICC, but also by reappropriating the lessons of the history of the workers' movement in organisational matters, the ICC was able to conclude that it had overcome the main danger to its existence and had restored marxist principles on the organisation question.
However it was not yet time to end the debate and the fight on the organisation question. This is why the activities report for the 12th International Congress presented the organisation with a balance sheet of its "convalescence". After the 11th congress, the ICC was the target of a whole series of attacks. On the one hand, the individual JJ, immediately after the 11th Congress, went onto a new offensive, by exerting a considerable amount of pressure on his 'friends' who had remained inside the organisation and on . militants who were still undecided about the validity of the ICC's orientation. On the other hand, and in conjunction with this, "this new offensive was immediately relayed onto the outside through the redoubled attacks on the ICC by parasitism on an international scale" (ibid). The ICC thus faced a second phase of its struggle on the organisation question: it was no longer just a matter of resolving problems of internal functioning, but of "going from the fight for the defence of the organisation internally to defending it on the outside ... by responding to all the aspects of a concerted attack by the bourgeoisie aimed at the ICC and the communist left as a whole" (ibid).
The 12th Congress drew a positive balance-sheet of this phase. Contrary to the rumours and denigrations about the 'crisis' and 'haemorrhaging of militants' going on in the ICC, this policy not only made it possible to consolidate the return to a solid and collective internal functioning, and to integrate new militants on this basis, but was also a considerable factor in tightening the organisation's links with elements looking for revolutionary positions, with our contacts and sympathisers.
It might seem surprising that an international revolutionary organisation which has already been around for 20 years should have been obliged to devote so much time to the defence of the organisation. But this is only astonishing for those who believe that this question is secondary or derives mechanically from programmatic political positions. In reality, the question of organisation is not only a political question in its own right, but is the one that, more than any other, conditions the very existence of the organisation in the accomplishment of all its daily tasks. It demands from revolutionaries a permanent vigilance towards, and combat against, all aspects of the power of the bourgeoisie, whether we are talking about direct repression or indirect ideological pressure. This combat for the defence of the revolutionary organisation against the bourgeoisie has been a constant feature of the history of the workers' movement It was waged by Marx and Engels within the First International against the petty bourgeois influences conveyed by anarchism and against the intrigues of Bakuninism; by Rosa Luxemburg against the influence of the bourgeoisie on German social democracy and against reformism within the IInd International; by Lenin against the circle spirit within the Russian, Social Democratic Labour Party and for a centralised, organised, disciplined party; by the communist left against the degeneration of the Illrd International, in particular the defence of fraction work by the Italian communist left.
This is a combat the ICC itself has waged since it was formed in the 1970s, by fighting for the regroupment of revolutionaries, by defending the concept of a unified and centralised international organisation, against all the anti-organizational conceptions which held sway over the movement which arose out of the resurgence of the class struggle and the rediscovery of revolutionary positions at the time. In the 1980s, the ICC still had to struggle against academic conceptions and the influence of 'councilism'. In the period we are going through today, the whole ideology of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in decomposition sustains an atmosphere of denigration of the very idea of communism, of revolutionary organisation and of militant commitment Through its incessant ideological campaigns the bourgeoisie continues to proclaim the 'death of communism', and is now even directly attacking the heritage of the communist left by presenting this current as an example of fascist-type 'extremism' or as a constellation of tiny fanatical sects. This is why the defence of the marxist conception of the communist organisation has to be a constant preoccupation of the groups of the communist left.
"The ICC has won a battle. It has won not without hardships, the battle against the danger of the destruction of the organisation from within. However, it has not won the war. Because our war is the class war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, a fight to the death which can leave no respite to the weak communist vanguard of which the ICC is the main component. In this sense, in drawing out the perspectives (or our activity, while they have to be considered in the light of what the organisation has been able to accomplish in these last two years - and more generally, since its formation - we can only measure the acquisitions of our combat and the real state of our forces in relation to what is at stake in the general struggle of the working class, and within that, in relation to the necessity to construct the world party, indispensable weapon of the revolutionary struggle" (ibid).
The 12th Congress thus reaffirmed the ICC's insistence that there exists a 'proletarian political milieu'. Contrary to conceptions which exist within this milieu, mainly among the 'Bordigist' heirs of the Italian communist left, the ICC does not consider itself to be the only communist organisation, still less to be 'the party'. But the ICC does defend the absolute necessity for the construction of a world party, which is indispensable to the revolutionary struggle as the most advanced expression of, and most active factor in, the proletariat's coming to consciousness. For the ICC, the long term task of building the party must have as its starting point the organisations of the present histories I period, the organisations which have survived from the left currents of the IIIrd International and the new groups which arise on class positions out of the heat of the proletarian struggle. The formation of the party will not be the spontaneous product of a class movement that will automatically line up with the 'historic party', by recognising its 'invariant programme', as in the Bordigist conception. Neither will it be the result of an unprincipled agglomeration based on mutual concessions and the opportunism of organisations who are ready to make deals about their positions. It will be the result of a conscious activity by revolutionary organisations, carried out today on the basis of the conception that the proletarian political milieu (or what the Internationalist Communist Party - Battaglia Comunista -calls the "internationalist camp") "is an expression of the life of the class, of the process through which it becomes conscious of itself (Resolution on the proletarian political milieu, the swamp and parasitism from the 12th ICC Congress). The 12th Congress thus reaffirmed that the ICC's policy of systematic confrontation with the positions of other organisations of the proletarian milieu must never lose sight of the fact that the aim is not in itself the denunciation of errors but clarification in front of the working class:
"Our ultimate goal is to move towards the political unification of our class and of the revolutionaries, a unification expressed in the construction of the party and the development of consciousness within the class. In this process, political clarification is the essential element and this has always guided the ICC's policy towards the proletarian political milieu. Even when a split in a group of the proletarian milieu becomes inevitable owing to the invasion of bourgeois currents, it is important that such a split is the fruit of a process of clarification, so that it can serve the interests of the working class and not of the bourgeoisie" (ibid).
The 12th Congress also went back over the notion of 'parasitism' which it has deepened ID the past few years. It insisted on the necessity to make a clear demarcation between the proletarian political milieu and this nebula of groups, publications and individuals which, while more or less claiming to be part of the revolutionary milieu, show by their political positions or their activity towards this milieu that their real function is to spread confusion, and in the final analysis to do the bourgeoisie's work against the proletarian political milieu.
"Parasitism is not part of the proletarian political milieu. The notion of parasitism is not an ICC innovation. It belongs to the history of the workers' movement. In no sense does parasitism express the efforts of the class to become conscious. On the contrary it constitutes an attempt to abort these efforts. In this sense its activity completes the work of the bourgeois forces whose role is to sabotage the intervention of revolutionary organisations within the class.
What animates the activity and determines the existence of parasitic groups or individuals is not the defence of the class principles of the proletariat, the clarification of political positions, but, at best, the spirit of the sect, of the 'circle of friends', the assertion of individualism and of individuality towards the proletarian political milieu. In this sense what characterises modern parasitism is not the defence of a programmatic platform but essentially a political attitude towards the revolutionary organisations" (ibid).
In this sense the 12th congress concluded that one of the priorities for our activities is "the defence of the proletarian political milieu (which includes our sympathisers and contacts) against the destructive offensive of the bourgeoisie and the activities of parasitism" (ibid).
The 12th congress also spent a long time discussing the international situation - the acceleration of the economic crisis, the aggravation of imperialist tensions and the development of the class struggle. This discussion was particularly important given the development of chaos in all domains today, the result of the decomposition of capitalist society, and given the confusions spread by the bourgeoisie in order to hide the bankruptcy of its system. This confusion has even made it difficult for revolutionary groups to adhere to a marxist analytical framework and to draw out the perspectives for the development of the class struggle.
At the level of the economic crisis, the 12th Congress reaffirmed the necessity to base itself on the fundamental insights of marxism in order to deal with all the mystifying discourse of the bourgeoisie. We cannot limit ourselves to an empirical observation of the 'economic figures' which are being more and more falsified by the 'specialists' in bourgeois economy. We have to situate our examination of the crisis in the framework of the marxist theory of the collapse of capitalism. "Revolutionary marxists cannot predict the precise form or the rhythm of the growing collapse of the capitalist mode of production. but it is their task to proclaim and demonstrate that the system has reached an absolute impasse, to denounce all the lies and myths about the 'light at the end of the tunnel''' (Resolution on the international situation, 12th ICC Congress).
At the level of imperialist tensions, the 12th Congress took up the task of analysing the characteristics of today's chaos, of the freefor-all between the great imperialist powers that is being disguised behind the pretext of 'humanitarian' and 'peacekeeping' interventions, and which is dragging more and more regions of the planet into military barbarism. "... The tendency towards 'every man for himself predominated over the tendency towards the reconstitution of stable alliances that could prefigure future imperialist blocs, and this was to multiply and aggravate military confrontations" (ibid).
Finally, it was the perspectives for the class struggle which was the object of the most important discussion during this congress. The working class today is in a difficult situation, where it is being subjected to the full force of extremely brutal attacks on its living conditions, and this in the context of a situation of ideological disarray which it has not left behind and which the bourgeoisie tries to reinforce through its media campaigns and all sorts of manoeuvres. "For the ruling class, which is fully aware that its growing attacks on the working class. will provoke widescale reactions, it is vital to get in the first blow at a time when combativity is still at an embryonic stage and where the echoes of the collapse of the 'socialist' regimes still weigh very heavily on the workers' consciousness. The aim is to 'wet the powder' and to reinforce to the maximum its arsenal of trade unionist and democratic mystifications" (ibid).
This situation has important implications for the intervention of the organisation. It is important not to deceive ourselves when we consider the situation. The serious obstacles that the bourgeoisie has mounted against the development of the class struggle does not mean that the proletariat is in a state of defeat similar to the one it was in during the 1930s.
"The campaigns of the 30s:
- were situated in a context of a historic defeat for the proletariat, of an undisputed victory for the counter-revolution;
- had as their main object the mobilisation of the proletariat for the coming world war
- had a real trump card at their disposal - the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany - and were thus very real, massive and clearly aimed.
By contrast, today's campaigns:
- are situated in a context in which the proletariat has overcome the counter-revolution, has not been through a massive defeat which has put into question the historic course towards class confrontations;
- have as their main aim that of sabotaging a rising tide of consciousness and combativity within the working class;
- do not have a single target but are obliged to call on disparate and sometimes circumstantial themes (terrorism, the 'fascist danger', paedophile networks, corruption of the legal system, etc) , which tends to limit their impact both in time and place" (ibid).
Neither IS It a question of falling into euphoria, of the kind encouraged in response to the 'strike movement' in France in December 1995. This preventative manoeuvre by the bourgeoisie led quite a few to believe that the road to major working class mobilisations was open and to seriously underestunate the current difficulties of the working class. "Only a significant advance in the consciousness of the working class would enable the latter to push away such mystifications. And this advance could only be the result of a massive development of workers' struggles which put into question, as had begun to be the case in the mid-80s, the most important instruments of the bourgeoisie within the workers' ranks, the trade unions and trade unionism" (ibid).
In this context, the 12th Congress made one of its priorities for the activities of the organisation "intervention in the development of the class struggle ...
The perspective for our intervention will in general not be one of active, direct participation in a situation where the class struggle is on the rise and is clearly escaping the grip of the unions and affirming itself on its own terrain; of agitation aimed at pushing forward the workers' efforts to extend the struggle and take it into their own hands.
In general our intervention in the class struggle, while continuing to put forward the historical perspective of the proletariat (the defence of communism against the campaigns of the bourgeoisie) will have as its main task the patient and obstinate work of explaining and denouncing the manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie, of the unions and rank and file unionism, against the growing discontent and militancy of the working class. Such an intervention will as often as not have to be undertaken 'against the stream', against the tendency to fall into the traps posed by the divisive and corporatist 'radicalism' of the trade unions" ("Resolution on Activities").
In tracing the perspectives for the years ahead, this congress carried out important work of which this account has only given a brief sketch. Our readers and sympathisers will be able to find a more developed account in International Review 90, while their implications will be developed in future interventions and issues of our press.
ICC
1) The widespread lies disseminated when the Stalinist regimes collapsed at the turning point of the 80s and 90s, lies about the "definite failure of marxism", are not new. Exactly one century ago, the left of the Second International, with Rosa Luxemburg at its head, had to fight against the revisionist theses which claimed that Marx was completely wrong when he announced that capitalism was doomed to failure. The decades that followed, with the first world war and then the great depression of the 30s which came after a brief period of reconstruction, gave the bourgeoisie little opportunity to hammer home that message. On the other hand, the two decades of "prosperity" after the second world war allowed a new blossoming of "theories" which "once and for all" buried marxism and its prediction of the collapse of capitalism: such theories were also common in various "radical" milieu. These songs of self-satisfaction went rather quiet with the return of the open crisis at the end of the 1960s, but the slow pace of the latter, punctuated by periods of "recovery" like the one that American and British capitalism have been going through, has enabled the propaganda of the bourgeoisie to hide from the great majority of workers the reality and scope of the impasse facing the capitalist mode of production today. This is why it is so important for revolutionaries, for marxists, to permanently denounce all the bourgeois lies about capitalism's ability to "come out of the crisis", and in particular to expose all the "arguments" used to "demonstrate" this ability.
In the mid-70s, faced with the obviousness of the crisis, the "experts" began to look into all the possible explanations that would allow the bourgeoisie to reassure itself about the rosy prospects of Its system. Incapable of envisioning its ultimate demise, the ruling class needed, not only to mystify the exploited, but for its own use as well to explain the growing difficulties of the world economy by pointing to circumstantial causes, and so avoid confronting the real causes. One after another the following explanations had their moment of glory:
the "oil crisis", following the Yom Kippur war of 73 (an explanation which "forgets" that the open crisis went back six years earlier, and that the oil price nses merely accentuated a deterioration which had already expressed itself in the recessions of 67 and 71);
the excesses of the neo-Keynsian policies carried out since the end of the war, and which have led to to galloping inflation. Conclusion: we need "less state";
the excesses of "Reaganomics" in the 80s which provoked an unprecedented rise in unemployment in the main countries.
Fundamentally, the bourgeoisie had to cling to the idea that there was a way out, that with proper management the world economy could return to the splendour of the post-war boom. It was simply a question of finding the lost secret of "prosperity".
2) For a long time, the economic performances of Japan and Germany, at a time when other countries were getting stuck in the mud, were supposed to demonstrate capitalism's ability to "overcome its crisis": "if every country was as virtuous as the two main losers of the second world war, everything would be fine" - this was the credo of many of capitalism's appointed apologists. Today, Japan and Germany have become "sick men". Having found it extremely difficult to return to the fabulous growth rates it had enjoyed in the past, Japan has recently been placed alongside Brazil and Mexico in category D in the index of countries most at risk because of the accumulation of debt by the state, by companies and by individuals (amounting to more than two and a half years of national production). As for Germany, it now has the highest rates of unemployment in the European Union and is at present unable to fulfil1 the "Maastricht criteria" indispensable for setting up the "single currency". It has finally become clear that the alleged "virtue" of these countries in the past simply hid the same head-long flight into debt which has characterised capitalism for decades. In reality, the present difficulties of the two countries which were "top of the form" in the 70s and 80s are an illustration of the impossibility of capitalism continuing indefinitely this cheating of Its own laws, which was the main basis for the reconstruction after the second world war and which has allowed it up till now to avoid a collapse similar to that of the 1930s: in short, the systematic resort to credit.
3) At the time she was denouncing the revisionists' "theories", Rosa Luxemburg was already obliged to demolish their idea that credit would allow capitalism to overcome its crises. While credit was undoubtedly a stimulant to the development of this system, from the point of view both of the circulation and the concentration of capital, it was never able to substitute itself for a real market as the soil for capitalist expansion. Borrowing for the future makes it possible to accelerate the production and sale of commodities but sooner or later it has to be repaid. And this repayment is only possible if exchange takes place on the market - something which does not flow automatically from production, as Marx systematically demonstrated against the bourgeois economists. At the end of the day, far from enabling capitalism to overcome its crises, credit merely extends their force and graviity, as Rosa Luxemburg showed by applying marxism. Today the theses of the marxist left against revisionism at the end of the last century remain fundamentally valid. No more than before can credit enlarge solvent markets. However, faced with the definitive saturation of the latter (whereas last century there was still the possibility of conquering new markets), credit has become the indispensable condition for absorbing commodities, substituting itself for the real market.
4) This reality was already illustrated in the aftermath of the second world war when the Marshall Plan, apart from its strategic function in the constitution of the American bloc, allowed the USA to create an outlet for its industries. The resulting reconstruction of the European and Japanese economies had by the 1960s made the latter rivals of the American economy, signaling the return of the open crisis of world capitalism. Since then, it has been mainly through the use of credit, of growing debt, that the world economy has managed to avoid a brutal depression like the one m the 30s. In this way the recession of 1974 was put off until the beginning of the 80s thanks to the enormous debts run up by the third world, leading to the debt cnsis of the early 80s which coincided with a new recession even more serious than the one in 74. This new world recession was in turn only overcome by the dizzying trade deficit of the USA whose mounting external debt vied with that of the third world. Parallel to this, the budget deficits of the advanced countries exploded, stimulating demand but plunging states into veritable bankruptcy (these state debts represented between 50 and 130% according to the country). Furthermore it is for this reason that open recession, which is expressed by negative. growth rates for the country's production, IS by no means the only indicator of the gravity of the crisis. In nearly all countries the annual budget deficit of the state (not counting that of local administrations) is higher than the growth of production. This means that if the budget was balanced (which would be the only way to stabilise the accumulated state debts) all these countries would be in open recession. The largest part of these debts will obviously never get repaid, and have thus been accompanied by periodic and increasingly serious financial crashes, veritable earthquakes for the world economy (1980, 1987), which are more than ever on the agenda today.
5) When we recall these facts it makes it possible to put paid to the speeches about the current "health" of the British and American economies which are contrasted with the poor performance of their competitors. In the first place, we have to insist on the relative nature of these "successes". Thus, the very notable fall in the rate of unemployment in the UK owes a great deal, according to none other than the Bank of England itself, to the statistical suppression of those unemployed who have given up looking for a job (the way of calculating the unemployment figures has changed 33 times since 1979). Having said this, these successes are to a large extent based on an improvement in the competivity of these economies on the international arena, which in turn is largely based on the weakness of their currencies: keeping the pound Stirling out of the European Monetary Snake has up till now proved to be a good move. In other words, this "success" is based on the deterioration of competing economies. This is a fact that has been partly hidden by the worldwide synchronisation of periods of recession and of "recovery" which we have experienced up till now: the relative improvement of the economy of one country does not take place thanks to the improvement of its "partners" but basically through their deterioration, since "partners" are essentially competitors. With the disappearance of the American bloc resulting from the collapse of its Russian rival at the end of the 80s, the previous coordination (eg through the G7) of their economic policies - a by no means negligible factor in slowing down the crisis - has given way to an increasingly frantic "every man for himself'. In such a situation, the world's leading power has the privilege of being able to impose its diktats in the sphere of commerce to the benefit of its own national economy. This to a considerable extent is what explains the current "success" of American capital.
This said, not only does the current performance of the Anglo-Saxon economies not point to a possible improvement for the world economy as a whole, it itself is not going to last very long. As tributaries of the world market, which cannot overcome its total saturation, these economies will inevitably come up against this saturation. Above all, no country has been able to resolve the problem of generalised debt (even if the budget deficits of the USA have been slightly reduced in the last period). The best proof of this is the fear haunting the principal economic authorities (such as the president of the US Federal Bank) that the present "growth" will lead to an "overheating" of the economy and a return of inflation. In reality, behind this fear of overheating is the recognition that today's "growth" is based on exorbitant debts which will inevitably resuit in a catastrophic swing of the pendulum. The extremely fragile basis of the current success of the American economy has been demonstrated once again by the panic on Wall Street and other stock exchanges when the Fed announced, at the end of March 97, a minimal increase in interest rates.
6) Among the lies which have been spread far and wide by the ruling class to buttress belief in the viability of its system, a special place has been given to the example of the South East Asian countries, the "dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and the "tigers" (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia) whose current growth rates (sometimes in double figures) are the envy of the western bourgeoisies. These examples are supposed to demonstrate that capitalism today can both develop the backward countries and escape the fall or stagnation of growth. In reality, the "economic miracle" of the majority of these countries (particularly South Korea and Taiwan) is by no means fortuitous: it is the consequence of the equivalent of the Marshall Plan set up during the cold war by the USA in order to contain the advance of the Russian bloc in the region (massive injection of capital amounting to as much as 15% of GNP, directly taking charge of the national economy, notably by relying on the military apparatus to make up for the quasi-absence of a national bourgeoisie and to overcome the resistance of financial sectors, etc). As such, these examples can in no way be generalised across the whole third world, the greater part of which continues to slide into a nameless catastrophe. Furthermore, the debts of most of these countries, both external and at state level, has reached considerable levels, which subjects them to the same dangers as all the other countries. Finally, while the very low cost of labour power in these countries has been highly attractive to many western enterprises, the fact that they are now becoming commercial rivals to the advanced countries exposes them to the risk that the latter will put up barriers to their exports. Though they have up till now represented an exception, like their big Japanese neighbour, these countries cannot indefinitely escape the contradictions of the world economy which have transformed other "success stories" into a nightmare, as in the case of Mexico. It is for all these reasons that, alongside the eulogies about these countries, the international experts and the financial institutions are already taking measures to limit the financial risks they represent. And the measures aimed at making the work force more "flexible", which were at the origin of the recent strikes in Korea, show that the native bourgeoisie is itself conscious that the best of the meal has already been eaten. As The Guardian wrote on 16.10.96: "The question has been which Asian tiger would be the first to fall".
7) The case of China, which some portray as the world power of the next century, is also no exception to the rule. The bourgeoisie of this country has up till now made a successful transition towards the classic forms of capitalism, unlike those of eastern Europe which with a few exceptions are in a total mess, utterly refuting all the blather about the "great prospects" for these countries following the downfall of Stalinism. This said, the country remains considerably underdeveloped, with the greater part of the economy, as in all Stalinist regimes, being smothered under the weight of the bureaucracy and military expenditure. On the authorities' own admission, the public sector is overall in deficit and hundreds of thousands of workers are owed months of wages. And even if the private sector is more dynamic, it cannot overcome the weight of the state sector and in any case remains particularly dependent on the fluctuations of the world market. Finally, the "formidable dynamism" of the Chinese economy cannot hide the fact that, even if it were to maintain its current growth rates, it envisages having 250 million unemployed by the end of the century.
8) Whichever way you look at it, so long as you can resist the siren-songs of the apologists for the capitalist mode of production and rely on the teachings of marxism, the perspective for the world economy can only be one of increasing catastrophe. The so-called "success" of certain economies at the moment (the Anglo-Saxon and South East Asian countries) in no way represents the future for capitalism as a whole. It is no more than an optical illusion which cannot hide the catastrophe for very long. By the same token, all the talk of "globalisation", which is supposed to open up an era of free, expanding trade, is just a cover for the unprecedented intensification of the trade war. In this context, conglomerations of countries like the European Union represent no more than a fortress against competition from other countries. Thus the world economy, balancing precariously on a mountain of debts which will never be repaid, will more and more be subjected to the convulsions of "every man for himself” which has always characterised capitalism but which in the period of decomposition has assumed a new quality. Revolutionary marxists cannot predict the precise forms or the rhythm of the growing collapse of the capitalist mode of production. But it is their task to proclaim and demonstrate that the system has reached an absolute impasse, to denounce all the lies and myths about the "light at the end of the tunnel".
9) Even more than in the economic sphere, the chaos that characterises the period of decomposition exerts its effects on the political relations between states. At the time when the eastern bloc collapsed, ending the system of alliances that emerged from the second world war, the ICC pointed out:
that, even if this was not realisable in the immediate, this situation put on the agenda the formation of new blocs, one led by the USA, the other by Germany;
that, in the immediate, it would unleash all the conflicts which the "Yalta order" had kept in a framework "acceptable" to the world's two gendarmes.
Initially, the tendency towards the constitution of a new bloc around Germany, which was in the dynamic of reunification, took some significant steps forward. But very soon the tendency towards "every man for himself” predominated over the tendency towards the reconstitution of stable alliances that could prefigure future imperialist blocs, and this was to multiply and aggravate military confrontations. The most significant example of this was Yugoslavia, whose break-up was facilitated by the antagonistic imperialist interests of the big European states, Germany, Britain and France. The conflict in Yugoslavia created a gulf between the two great allies of the European Community, Germany and France and resulted in a spectacular rapprochement between France and Britain and the end of the alliance between Britain and the US, which had been the most solid and durable of the 20th century. Since then, this tendency towards "every man for himself", towards chaos in the relations between states, with its succession of circumstantial and ephemeral alliances, has not been called into question. Quite the contrary.
10) Thus, in the recent period we have seen a number of changes in the alliances formed previously:
significant loosening of ties between France and Britain, illustrated in particular by the latter's refusal to support France's demands, such as the reelection of Boutros-Ghali to the head of the UN or the appointment of a European to the command of the southern branch of NATO forces in Europe;
a new rapprochement of the links between France and Germany, concretised in particular by the latter's support for these same demands by France;
shelving of the conflicts between the US and Britain, which among other things was expressed in Britain's support for Uncle Sam on the same questions.
In fact. one of the characteristics of this evolution of alliances is linked to the fact that only the US and Germany have, and can have, a coherent long term policy: the first, one of preserving its leadership, the second, one of developing its own leadership in a part of the world. The other powers are obliged to follow a more circumstantial policy aimed largely at countering the policies of the first two. In particular, since the end of the division of the world into two blocs, the USA has been faced with a permanent challenge to its authority by its former allies.
11) The most spectacular expression of this crisis of authority for the world's gendarme has been the break in its historic alliance with Britain, on the latter's initiative, from 94 onwards. It was also concretised by the long-standing powerlessness of the USA on one of the major terrains of imperialist confrontation, ex- Yugoslavia, which lasted until .the summer of 95. More recently, in September 96, it was expressed by the almost unanimously hostile reaction towards the US cruise missile attack on Iraq, whereas the US had succeeded in obtaining the support of the same countries for Operation Desert Storm. Among other examples of this contesting of American leadership we can mention:
the general protest against the Helms Burton Law which reinforces the embargo against Cuba, whose "great leader" was then received by the Vatican with pomp and ceremony, and for the first time ever;
more generally, the loss of a monopoly of control over the situation in the Middle East, a crucial zone if ever there was one. This has been illustrated in particular by the return in force of France, which imposed itself as the joint supervisor in settling the conflict between Israel and Lebanon at the end of 95, and which has confirmed its success in the region with the warm welcome Saudi Arabia gave Chirac;
the recent invitation to several European leaders (including, once again, Chirac, who launched an appeal for independence from the USA) by a number of South American states, which confirms that the US no longer has undisputed control of this region.
12) This said, the recent period has been marked, as noted a year ago by the 12th congress ofthe ICC's section in France, by a massive counter-offensive from the US. This counter-offensive has been concretised in particular by America's return in force in ex-Yugoslavia in the summer of 95 under the cover of IFOR, which took the place of UNPROFOR, the latter having for several years been the instrument for the intervention of the French-British tandem. The best proof of America's success was the signing of the Dayton accord in the US, the "peace treaty" over Bosnia. Since then, the new advance of US power has made further gains. In particular, it has managed to inflict on the country which has defied it most openly, France, a very serious reverse in its own "hunting ground" of Africa. After eliminating French influence in Rwanda, it is now France's main bastion on the continent, Zaire, which is about to slip out of its hands with the collapse of the Mobutu regime under the blows of the Kabila "rebellion" which has received massive support from Rwanda and Uganda, ie the US. This is a particularly severe punishment for France (aimed at crowning other set-backs the USA has inflicted on issues like the succession to Boutros-Ghali and the command of NATO's southern flank), and it is intended to serve as an example for all other countries tempted to imitate the latter's stance of permanent defiance.
13) It is to a large extent because it understands the risk it was running by following in the footsteps of the adventurist policies of France (which regularly pursues objectives that are beyond its real capacities), that the British bourgeoisie has recently taken a certain distance from its French consort. This rift has been greatly facilitated by the action of the USA and Germany both of whom can only look askance at the alliance contracted between Britain and France over the Yugoslav question. Thus the American bombing of Iraq in September 96 had the immense advantage of driving a wedge between French and British diplomacy, with the first supporting Saddam Hussein as best it could, and the second counting, like the US, on the downfall of his regime. Similarly, Germany has not missed any chance to undermine Angle-French solidarity by playing on points of disagreement between them, in particular that of the European Union and the single currency (there were three Franco-German summits on this question in December 96). It is thus in this framework that we can understand the new evolution of alliances in the recent period. In fact, the attitude of Germany and the US confirms what we said at the last ICC congress: "In such a situation of instability, it is easier for each power to create difficulties for its rivals, to sabotage alliances which run counter to its interests, than to develop its own solid alliances and ensure a stable control of its own spheres" (Resolution on the international situation, point 11). However, it is necessary to show that there are important differences both in the methods used and the results obtained by these two powers.
14) The result of Germany's international policy is very far from being limited to detaching France from Britain and getting it to renew its previous alliance, though these efforts have been concretised in the recent period by important military agreements, both on the ground, through the formation of a joint corps in Bosnia, and through the signing of military cooperation agreements (accord of9 December for a "common concept in the area of security and defence"). In reality we are seeing at the present time a significant advance of German imperialism, which can be seen notably through:
the fact that within the new alliance between France and Germany, the latter finds itself in a much more favourable rapport de force than in the 1990-1994 period (France having to a large extent been forced to go back to its old love affair owing to Britain's infidelity).
an extension of its traditional sphere of influence in eastern Europe, in particular through the development of an alliance with Poland;
the strengthening of its influence in Turkey (whose new government led by the Islamist Erkaban is more favourable to the German alliance than the previous one), which provides a bridge into the Caucasus (where it supports the nationalist movements pitted against Russia) and into Iran, with whom Turkey has signed important agreements;
the deployment for the first time since the second world war of combat units outside its frontiers, and this in a zone as critical as the Balkans, with the expeditionary corps in Bosnia in the framework of IFOR (which has allowed its minister of defence to declare that "Germany will play an important role in the new society”).
15) At the same time, in company with France, Germany is exerting a lot of diplomatic pressure in Russia, whose main creditor is Germany and which has not drawn any decisive advantages from its alliance with the US.
Thus Germany is clearly establishing itself as the main imperialist rival of the US. However, it must be noted that up till now it has succeeded in advancing its pawns without exposing itself to reprisals from the American mammoth, in particular by systematically avoiding defying it openly in the manner of France. The policy of the German eagle (which for the moment has managed to keep its talons hidden) is showing itself to be much more effective than that of the French cock. This is the consequence both of the limitations still imposed on it by its status as a defeated power in the second world war (even though its present policies are obviously aimed at leaving this status behind) and of its confidence as the only power which has the possibility of eventually heading a new imperialist bloc. This is also a result of the fact that up till now Germany has been able to advance its positions without the direct use of military force (even if it provided significant military aid to its Croat ally in the war against Serbia). But the historic first represented by the presence of its expeditionary corps in Bosnia has not only broken a taboo but also indicates the direction in which it will go more and more in order to maintain and develop its positions. Thus, in the longer term, Germany will be making its contribution to the bloody conflicts and massacres ravaging the world today not only by delegation (as was the case with Croatia, and to a lesser extent in the Caucasus) but in a much more direct manner.
16) As regards the international policy of the USA, the widespread use of armed force has not only been one of its methods for a long time, but is now the main instrument in the defence of its imperialist interests, as the ICC has shown since 1990, even before the Gulf war. The USA is faced with a world dominated by "every man for himself”, where its former vassals are trying to withdraw as much as possible from the tight grip of the world cop, which they had to put up with as long as the threat from the rival bloc existed. In this situation, the only decisive way the US can impose its authority is to resort to the area in which they have a crushing superiority over all other states: military force. But in doing so, the US is caught in a contradiction:
on the one hand, if it gives up using or extending the use of its military superiority, this will only encourage the countries contesting its authority to contest even more;
on the other hand, when it does use brute force, even, and especially when this momentarily obliges its opponents to rein in their ambitions towards independence, this only pushes the latter to seize on the least occasion to get their revenge and squirm away from America's grasp.
The assertion of its military superiority by a superpower works in a very different way depending on whether the world is divided into blocs, as before 1989, or whether there are no blocs. In the first place, the assertion of this superiority tends to reinforce the vassals' confidence in their leader, in its ability to defend them, and is thus an element of cohesion around the leader. In the second case, the display of force by the only remaining superpower has the opposite ultimate result of aggravating "every man for himself' even more as long as there is no other power that can compete with it at the same level. This is why the success of the present US counter-offensive cannot be considered to be definitive, to have overcome its crisis of leadership. Brute force, manoeuvres aimed at destabilising its rivals (as in Zaire today), with their procession of tragic consequences, will thus continue to be used by this power, serving to accentuate the bloody chaos into which capitalism is sinking.
17) This chaos has still relatively spared the Far East and South East Asia. But it is important to stress the accumulation of explosive material in this part of the world:
the intensified efforts to arm themselves by the two main powers, China and Japan;
the latter's intention to break out of the American control inherited from the second world war;
the more openly "contestationist" policy of China (the latter somewhat playing the role that France plays in the west, whereas Japan's diplomacy is much more similar to that of Germany's);
the threat of political destabilisation, particularly after the death of Deng; the existence of a multitude of "disputes" between states (Taiwan and China the two Koreas, China and Vietnam, India and Pakistan, etc).
Just as it cannot escape the economic crisis, there is no way that this region can escape the imperialist convulsions that assail the world today accentuating the world-wide chaos into which capitalist society is plunging.
18) This generalised chaos, with its train of bloody conflicts, massacres famines, and more generally, the decomposition which invades all areas of society and which in the long run threatens to destroy it, is the result of the total impasse which capitalist society has reached. But at the same time, this impasse, with the permanent and increasingly brutal attacks that it provokes against the class that produces the essentials of social wealth, obliges the latter to react and thus raises the perspective of a revolutionary upsurge. Since the end of the 1960s, the world proletariat has proved that it has not been willing to submit passively to the attacks of capital, and the struggles it has waged since the first effects of the crisis have shown that it has emerged from the terrible counter-revolution which descended on it after the revolutionary wave of 1917-23. However, it has not developed its struggles in a continuous manner, but in an uneven way, with advances and retreats. Between 1968 and 1989, the class struggle went through three successive waves of combats (1968-74, 1978-81, 1983-89), in the course of which the working masses, despite defeats, hesitations, regressions, acquired a growing experience which led them in particular to more and more reject the trade union prison. However, this progressive advance of the working class towards becoming aware of the means and goals of its combat was brutally interrupted at the end of the 80s:
"This struggle, which revived with great power at the end of the 1960s, putting an end to the most terrible counter-revolution the working class has ever known, went into a major retreat with the collapse of the Stalinist regimes, the ideological campaigns which accompanied them, and all the events which followed (Gulf war, war in Yugoslavia). The working class suffered this reflux at the level both of its combativity and its consciousness, without this putting the historic course towards class confrontations into question, as the ICC already affirmed at the time" (Resolution on the international situation, XIth Congress of the ICC).
19) From autumn 1992, with the big workers' mobilisations in Italy, the proletariat has been back on the path of struggle. But this is a path sown with obstacles and difficulties. At the time of the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in the autumn of 89, when it announced that this event would result in a reflux in consciousness, the ICC made it clear that "reformist ideology will weigh very heavily on struggles in the period ahead, greatly favouring the action of the trade unions" (Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the eastern countries, IR 60). And indeed in the past period we have seen the unions make a powerful comeback, the result of a very elaborate strategy on the part of the whole bourgeoisie. The first aim of this strategy has been to take advantage of the disarray provoked in the class by the events of 89-91, in order to restore as much credit as possible to the union machines, whose image had taken such a battering in the 80s. The clearest illustration of this political offensive by the bourgeoisie was the maneouvre carried out by the different sectors of the bourgeoisie in the autumn of 95 in France. Thanks to a skillful division of labour between the right in power, which launched a whole avalanche of provocative attacks on workers' living conditions, and the trade unions, who presented themselves as the best defenders of the working class, putting forward proletarian methods of struggle such as extension across sectors and the running of the movement by general assemblies, the entire bourgeois class restored to the unions a degree of popularity they had not enjoyed for over a decade. The premeditated, systematic, and international character of this manoeuvre was revealed by the huge publicity given to the strikes at the end of 95 in all countries, whereas most of the movements in the 80s had been subject to an almost total black-out. It was further confirmed by the manoeuvre developed in Belgium during the same period, which was virtually a copy of the first one. Similarly, the reference to the strikes in France in the autumn of 95 was widely used during the manoeuvre set up in Germany in the spring of 96, which culminated with the immense march on Bonn on June 10. The latter manoeuvre was aimed at providing the unions, who were seen mainly as specialists in negotiations and deals with the bosses, with a much more militant image, so that in the future they would be better placed to control the social struggles which could not fail to arise in response to an unprecedented intensification of economic attacks on the working class. Thus the analysis that the ICC put forward at its 11th Congress was clearly confirmed: “...the present manoeuvres of the unions have also, and above all, a preventative aim: that of strengthening their hold on the workers before the latter display much more militancy, which will necessarily result from their growing anger faced with the increasingly brutal attacks demanded by the crisis" (Resolution on the international situation, point 17). And the result of these manoeuvres, which have supplemented the disarray provoked by the events of 89-91, enabled us to say at the 12th Congress of our section in France: "... in the main capitalist countries, the working class has been brought back to a situation which is comparable to that of the 1970s as far as its relation to unions and unionism is concerned: a situation where the class, in general, struggled within the unions, followed their instructions and their slogans, and in the final analysis, left things up to them. In this sense, the bourgeoisie has temporarily succeeded in wiping out from working class consciousness the lessons learned during the 80s, following the repeated experience of confrontation with the unions" (Resolution on the international situation, point 12, lR 86).
20)The political offensive of the bourgeoisie against the working class is very far from being restricted to restoring credibility to the union machinery. The ruling class uses the different manifestations of the decomposition of society (the rise of xenophobia, conflicts between bourgeois cliques, etc) in order to turn them back against the working class. We have thus seen in several European countries the use of campaigns aimed at diverting the workers or even derailing their anger and discontent onto a terrain completely alien to the proletariat:
the use made of the xenophobic feelings exploited by the extreme right (Le Pen in France, Heider in Austria) in order to mount campaigns about the 'danger of fascism';
in Spain, campaigns against ETA terrorism in which workers are asked to solidarise with their bosses;
the use of in-fighting between the police and judicial apparatuses in order to mount campaigns in favour of a 'clean' state and judiciary in countries like Italy ('clean hands' operation) and particularly in Belgium (the Dutroux affair).
The latter country has in the past period served as a kind of laboratory for a whole gamut of mystifications against the working class. This could be seen in a series of steps;
the carbon-copy of the manoeuvre by the French bourgeoisie in the autumn of 95;
then, the development of a manoeuvre very similar to that of the German bourgeoisie in spring 96;
from the summer of 96, the stageing of the Dutroux affair which was opportunely 'discovered' at a very good moment (even though all the elements were already known to the judiciary long before this), in order to create, with the help of an unprecedented media barrage, a veritable psychosis among working class families, at a time when economic attacks were raining down on them: at the same time, this strategem helped to divert the workers' anger onto the interclassist terrain of fighting for a judiciary 'at the people's service', especially at the time of the 'White March' of20 October;
via the 'Multicoloured March' of 2 February organised on the occasion of the closure of the Clabecq foundry, a new boost was given to the interclassist mystification of a 'popular justice', of an 'economy in the service of the citizens', a mystification reinforced by the promotion of a 'fighting', 'rank and file' unionism around the very media-friendly figure of D'Orazio;
finally, a new layer of democratic lies following the announcement at the beginning of March of the closure of Renault at Vilvorde (a closure which had been condemned by the courts), pitting a 'social Europe' against the 'Europe of the capitalists'.
The immense international media coverage of all these manoeuvres once again proves that they were not just for domestic
consumption but were part of a concerted plan by the bourgeoisie in all countries. For the ruling class, which is fully aware that its growing attacks on the working class will provoke widescale reactions, it is vital to get in the first blow at a time when combativity is still at an embryonic stage and where the echoes of the collapse of the 'socialist' regimes still weigh very heavy on the workers' consciousness. The aim is to 'wet the powder' and to reinforce to the maximum its arsenal of trade unionist and democratic mystifications.
21) The undeniable disarray in which the working class presently finds itself has given the bourgeoisie a certain margin of manoeuvre as regards its internal political strategems. As the ICC already noted at the beginning of 1990: "This is why, in particular, we have to update the lCC's analysis of the 'left in opposition '. This was a necessary card for the bourgeoisie at the end of 70s and throughout the 80s due to the class' general dynamic towards increasingly determined and conscious combats, and its growing rejection of democratic, electoral, and trade union mystifications. The difficulties some countries encountered in setting it up (in France for example) in no way alter the fact that this was the lynchpin of the bourgeoisie's strategy against the working class, illustrated by the right-wing governments in the USA, Germany, and Britain. By contrast, the class' present reflux means that for a while this strategy will no longer be a priority for the bourgeoisie. This does not necessarily mean that these countries will see the left return to government: as we have said on several occasions ... this is only absolutely necessary in periods of war or revolution. By contrast, we should not be surprised if it does happen, nor should we put it down to 'accident' or to a 'specific weakness' of the bourgeoisie in these countries' (IR 61). This is why the Italian bourgeoisie was able, largely due to reasons of international policy, to call on a centre-left team in spring 96, one dominated by the old Communist Party (the PSD) and for quite some time supported on the extreme left by 'Rifondazione Comunista'. For the same reason, the probable victory of the British Labour Party in May 97 should not be seen as a source of difficulties for the bourgeoisie in this country (which in any case has taken care to put an end to the organic link between the party and the union apparatus so that the latter can oppose a Labour government if necessary). Having said this, it is important to underline the fact that the ruling class is not going to return to the themes of the 70s when the 'left alternative' with its programme of 'social' measures, even of nationalisations, was put forward in order to break the elan of the wave of struggles which had begun in 1968, by derailing discontent and militancy onto the election dead-end. If left parties (whose economic prgramme in any case is increasingly hard to distinguish from that of the right) get into government, this will essentially be 'by default', the result of difficulties experienced by the right, and not as a way of
mobilising the workers, whose illusions in the 'health of capitalism', which they might have had in the 70s, have been undermined by the crisis.
In this context, it is also necessary to mark the very sharp difference between the ideological campaigns being used today, and those used against the working class in the 1930s. There is a point shared by these two kinds of campaigns: they are all based around the theme of the 'defence of democracy'. However, the campaigns of the 30s:
were situated in a context of a historic defeat for the proletariat, of an undisputed victory for the counter-revolution;
had as their main object the mobilisation of the proletariat for the coming world war;
had a real trump card at their disposal, the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany, and were thus very real, massive and clearly aimed.
By contrast, today's campaigns:
are situated in a context in which the proletariat has overcome the counter-revolution, has not been through a massive defeat which has put into question the historic course towards class confrontations;
have as their main aim that of sabotaging a rising tide of consciousness and combativity within the working class;
do not have a single target but are obliged to call on disparate and sometimes circumstantial themes (terrorism, the 'fascist danger', paedophile networks, corruption of the legal system, etc), which tends to limit their impact both in time and place.
It is for these reasons that while the campaigns at the end of the 30s succeeded in mobilising the working masses behind them in a permanent way, those of today:
either succeed in mobilising workers on a massive scale (the case of the 'White March' in Bruxelles on 20 October), but only for a limited period (this is why the Belgian bourgeoisie resorted to other manoeuvres afterwards);
or, if they are deployed in a permanent way (the case of the anti-Front National campaigns in France), they don't manage to mobilise the workers and serve mainly as a diversion.
This said, it is important not to underestimate the danger of these kinds of campaigns to the extent that the effects of the general and growing decomposition of bourgeois society permanently provide the ruling class with new themes. Only a significant advance in the consciousness of the working class would enable the latter to push away such mystifications. And this advance could only be the result of a massive development of workers' struggles which put into question, as had begun to be the case in the mid-80s, the most important instruments of the bourgeoisie within the workers' ranks: the trade unions and trade unionism.
22) This questioning of the unions, which will be accompanied by the tendency for workers to take direct control of their struggles and of their extension through general assemblies and elected and revocable strike committees, will necessarily come about through a whole process of confrontation with the sabotage of the unions. This is a process that will inevitably develop in the future because of the growth of workers' militancy in response to the increasingly brutal attacks unleashed by capitalism. Already, the tendency for this militancy to develop means that the bourgeoisie, for fear of being outflanked, cannot launch huge manoeuvres 'a la francaise' of 95-96 aimed at restoring union credibility on a massive scale. However, the latter have still not really been unmasked even if, during the last period, they have started to make more frequent use of their 'classic' methods of action such as the division between public and private sectors (as in the demonstrations on 11 December 96 in Spain), or the advocacy of corporatism. The most spectacular example of the latter tactic was the strike launched on the announcement of the closure of the Renault factory at Vilvorder, where we saw the unions of the different countries where this company's factories are located promoting a 'Eurostrike' of Renault workers. But the fact that this rotten manoeuvre by the unions was not seen through, and even allowed the unions to increase their prestige somewhat, while at the same time propagating the mystification of a 'social Europe', proves that we are today in a kind of transition period between the one in which the unions were regaining their credibility, and one in which they will be exposed and discredited more and more. One of the characteristics of this period is the revival of the themes of 'fighting' trade unionism, in which the 'rank and file' are supposed to be able to push the union leaderships to be more radical (example of the Clabecq foundry, or the miners last March in Germany), or where there is supposed to be a 'union base' which can 'really' defend the workers' interests despite the 'sell-out of the leaders' (a notable example being the dockers' strike in the UK).
23)Thus, the working class still has a long way to go on the road towards its emancipation, a road that the bourgeoisie will try systematically to lay with all sorts of traps, as we have already seen in the last period. The breadth of the manoeuvres set up by the bourgeoisie shows just how conscious it is of the dangers posed to it by the present situation of world capitalism. Engels once wrote that the working class wages its struggle on three levels - economic, political, and ideological. The present strategy of the bourgeoisie; which is also aimed against revolutionary organisations (the campaigns on the so-called 'revisionism' of the communist left) is proof that it also is quite aware of this. It is up to revolutionaries not only to identify and denounce all the traps laid by the ruling class and its organs, notably the trade unions, but also, against all the falsifications which have been bred in the past period, to point out the real perspective of the communist revolution as the ultimate goal of the present combats of the proletariat. It is only if its communist minority fully assumes its role that the working class will be able to develop the strength and the consciousness to attain this goal.
Some of our readers may have come across a text which has been circulating for a few weeks entitled "Prise de position sur l'evolution recente du CCI”. This text, by Raoul Victor (RV), a long-standing militant who broke with the ICC just over a year ago, is a charge-sheet against our organisation. It is prompted by the following considerations: "(...) it is impossible to remain silent in the face of the ICC's extremely serious accusations against one of its long-standing militants, and of the dangerous degeneration of one of the main organisations of the proletarian political milieu".
Given the gravity of such accusations, whose lengthy "proof” is full of lies and distortions while at the same time pretending to give a coherent theoretical and political explanation for the ICC's "degeneration", we have decided to publish this text in full, with our reply, in the form of a pamphlet. We therefore refer our readers to this pamphlet for a detailed response to what we consider a veritable declaration of war on the ICC. It is all the more important that we respond in detail and at length to such a "manifesto", inasmuch as its accusations have an appearance of legitimacy, coming as they do from an experienced militant who claims to explain what has led him to "take his distance from an organisation to whose construction he has devoted more than 30 years of his life". RV is obviously trying to lend some credibility to his thesis of the ICC's "degeneration" by suggesting that there is an analogy between Stalinism and the "persecution" that he has suffered in the organisation. In this brief notice, we simply want to make a few remarks on this text, which is a striking contribution to the present campaign by groups and elements of the parasitic milieu to denounce the ICC1, and more generally to an offensive aimed at discrediting the proletarian political milieu and distorting the heritage of the internationalist Left Communist current2.
As RV says himself, when he "broke with the ICC”, he put forward "ONE essential reason": the fact that during the period preceding this "break", the organisation considered that his positions in the debate within the organisation were dictated by an attitude that made him the "spokesman" for JJ3. On reading his text, we would say the same - in spades. JJ has, with good reason, carefully avoided trying to defend himself against the ICC's supposedly slanderous and false accusations against him, he has succeeded in delegating his ''friends'', RV foremost amongst them, to "shed light" on the "affair", and to denounce the ICC in public. JJ could have no better advocate than RV, a "founding member" of the ICC, a comrade whose reputation for honesty, probity, and militant commitment has spread far beyond the ICC. Having taken him under his influence for years, JJ knew full well that RV would move heaven and earth to formulate the "theoretical and political" reasons to whitewash him. Whether he likes it or not, our ex-comrade RV has proven with his text that he has become JJ's "parrot". His text is essentially an unconditional defence of JJ. RV serves up the "arguments" of JJ and those close to him on the justification for his anti-organisational behaviour, his passion and proselytising for esotericism, the supposed "abandonment by the ICC of one of its fundamental conceptions in favour of a "Lenintst" conception better adapted to the spirit of the sect".
To justify JJ's efforts to spread esoteric ideas, for example, RV adopts the "argument" of JJ (who has always refused to take position clearly on the incompatibility between marxism and any esoteric theory), that "marxism claims neither to have explained everything, nor to exclude all other forms of knowledge". He maintains a complete silence on the mysticism implied by such enthusiasm, which is completely foreign to marxism, not to mention the total condemnation of such "theories" by the workers' movement, especially the left, throughout its history. And once RV has brushed aside the antagonism between marxism and esoteric theory, he can reduce to mere "maladroitness" JJ's half-hidden proselytism within the organisation. He concludes that this is nothing but a "paranoid fable of the ICC”. We should nonetheless remember that during the ICC's 11th Congress, RV voted for the resolution excluding JJ, on the grounds that this element's behaviour had been "unworthy of a communist militant". RV today, under the pressure of JJ, is a turncoat who offers his approval to the behaviour that he himself condemned yesterday.
To defend JJ against the "ICC's very serious attacks against one of its long-standing militants", RV abruptly reveals, in introducing his text, the ICC's hypothesis that JJ may have been a state agent infiltrated into the organisation. We have published this hypothesis neither in the notice in our press on JJ's exclusion, nor in our external interventions on the question. Still less have we made any mention of the concrete facts which led us to such a grave hypothesis. For two years, we have urged JJ to appeal to a jury of honour made up from organisations of the proletarian political milieu, so that they could judge his case and pronounce on the accusations levelled against him; JJ himself has done his utmost to prevent any possibility that such a jury of honour might take place4 We have given our dossier on the JJ case to organisations and to certain individuals within the milieu, asking them for their opinion as to how the ICC had conducted its enquiry, and on some of its conclusions. We have offered to show the dossier to JJ himself - a proposal to which he has made no reply. RV gives not a jot for such precautions. He simply spreads out to public view the most serious aspect of the JJ dossier! Such an attitude says much about the dilapidated state of RV's "political reflection", but the lie that accompanies this attitude says still more. RV presents JJ's passion for esotericism as the basis for the ICC's "fabricating" this hypothesis. Certainly an adherence to and propaganda for Masonic ideology and behaviour do not belong in the workers' movement, and are part of the arsenal of the bourgeoisie. But this was not the only element in the case. We should also point out that within the ICC, JJ engaged in a whole series of manoeuvres, manipulations, and destructive behaviour. Above all, there is the known fact that a person in JJ's immediate entourage has worked, and may still work, for the state services that specialise in the political domain - a fact which JJ kept quiet about for 20 years. RV has nothing to say about this "detail". RV tried from the outset to throw the most disgusting suspicion on the ICC's attitude, by encouraging the rumour spread by some that "the ICC denounces state agents as soon as a disagreement appears"5. Faced with such irresponsibility, the ICC has no choice but to make the whole JJ dossier public, including its most delicate aspects. This we will do in the weeks to come, so that our readers may judge for themselves the validity of the ICC's behaviour in this affair.
RV has chosen to join the camp of those who denounce the ICC and its supposed "paranoia": "this adjective "paranoiac”, which the ICC has so methodically managed to have bestowed on it by all those who have been in contact with it and its press in recent times, and have not fallen for its diseased view of the world". Obviously, it never occurs to RV that not "all those who have been in contact" with the ICC have necessarily found that the ICC is "paranoiac". But perhaps they have "fallen for its diseased view of the world"? This theme of "paranoia", put forward by JJ, is one of the text's most developed aspects, and its recurrent theme, like a litany. A few samples: "a completely crazy conception of the organisation", "collective paranoia", "the wind of madness", "the diseased swelling of insane imaginations", "all this lunatic inquisition", etc. RV even delivers a lesson in psychiatry to puff up his "analysis" by describing very didactically all the attributes of "paranoia". As a worthy disciple of JJ, RV has perhaps become a subtle psychologist, and serves us up the lessons he has learned in the dictionary on the meaning of the words "paranoia" or "sect". At all events, he has become a wretched marxist. He makes a travesty of the facts; he sweeps aside with disdain the theoretical and political arguments of the ICC; he ignores the entire experience of the workers' movement on the organisation question, and takes his arguments from the most banal anti-Leninism; he redefines the proletarian political milieu; he revises the analysis of the present historical period, etc. We will refute RV's "theoretical arguments" in future issues of the International Review.
Where is the militant who defended in writing and in speech the proletarian nature of the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik party during the years when the ICC regrouped and formed in the 1970s at a time when so many groups still indulged one way or another in an infantile rejection of October 1917, Lenin, and the Bolshevik Party, in the name of the rejection of Stalinism? Disappeared. Where is the unshakeable militant, who declared - in his own terms - that "a crane wouldn't get him out of the organisation"? Gone away. RV has sold his soul to JJ, who has to all appearances become his mental inspiration.
ICC
1On parasitism, see "The political strengthening of the ICC" in this issue, as well as our articles in the territorial press.
2See International Review no.8, "Campaigns against "Negationism"".
3See also "The political strengthening of the ICC". The organisation was compelled to exclude JJ two years ago. The exclusion and its reasons were published in the organisation's press.
4See "The Jury of Honour: a weapon for the defence of revolutionary organisations", in World Revolution.
5A speciality of the late CBG in particular, and of its leader Ingram, who only awakes from slumber to pour poison on the ICC.
The July Days of 1917 are one of the most important moments, not only in the Russian Revolution, but in the whole history of the workers' movement. In the space of three days, from July 3rd to July 5th, one of the mightiest ever confrontations between bourgeoisie and proletariat, despite ending in a defeat for the working class, opened the road to the seizure of power four months later in October 1917. On July 3rd, the workers and soldiers of Petrograd rose massively and spontaneously, calling for all power to be transferred to the workers' councils, the soviets. On July 4th an armed demonstration with half a million participants besieged the leadership of the soviet, calling for it to take power, but returned home peacefully in the evening, following an appeal by the Bolsheviks. On July 5th, counter-revolutionary troops took over the Russian capital, and began to hunt down the Bolsheviks and repress the most advanced workers. But by avoiding a premature struggle for power, the proletariat maintained its revolutionary forces intact. As a result, the working class was able to draw all the lessons of these events, and in particular to understand the counter-revolutionary character of bourgeois democracy and of the new left wing of capital: the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries who had betrayed the cause of the workers and poor peasants and gone over to the counter-revolution. At no other moment of the Russian Revolution was the danger of a decisive defeat of the proletariat, and the decimation of the Bolshevik party, so acute as during those dramatic 72 hours. At no other moment did the profound confidence of the leading battalions of the proletariat in its class party, in the communist vanguard, prove more important.
80 years later, in face of the bourgeois lies about the "death of communism", and in particular its denigration of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism, the defence of the true lessons of the July Days and of the whole proletarian revolution is one of the main responsibilities of revolutionaries. According to the lies of the bourgeoisie, the Russian Revolution was a "popular" struggle for a bourgeois parliamentary republic, the "freest country in the world" until the Bolsheviks, "inventing" the "demagogic" slogan of "all power to the soviets" imposed through a "putsch" its "barbaric dictatorship" over the great majority of the working population. However, even the briefest objective look at the events of July 1917 will show as clear as daylight that the Bolsheviks were on the side of the working class, that it was bourgeois democracy which was on the side of barbarism, putschism, and the dictatorship of a tiny minority over the working people.
The July Days of 1917 were from the outset a provocation by the bourgeoisie, with the aim of decapitating the proletariat by crushing the revolution in Petrograd, and eliminating the Bolshevik party before the revolutionary process in Russia as a whole became ripe for the seizure of power by the workers.
The revolutionary upsurge of February 1917, leading to the replacement of the Tsar by a "bourgeois democratic" provisional government, and to the establishment of the workers' councils (soviets) as a rival, proletarian centre of power, was first and foremost the product of the struggle of the workers against the imperialist world war begun in 1914. But the provisional government, as well as the majority parties in the soviets, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries (SRs), against the will of the proletariat, committed themselves to continue the war, and to the imperialist robber programme of Russian capitalism. In this way, not only in Russia but in all countries comprising the Entente, the coalition against Germany, a new pseudo-revolutionary legitimacy had been lent to the war, to the greatest crime in human history. Between February and July 1917 several million soldiers, including the flower of the international working class, were killed or wounded to settle the question: which of the main capitalist imperialist gangsters should rule the world? Although many Russian workers initially fell for the lies of the new leaders that it was necessary to continue the war "in order to achieve a just peace without annexations once and for all", now coming as they did from the mouths of alleged "democrats" and "socialists", by June 1917 the proletariat had resumed the revolutionary struggle against the imperialist slaughter with redoubled energy. During the gigantic demonstration of June 18th in Petrograd, the internationalist slogans of the Bolsheviks won over a majority for the first time. By the beginning of July, the biggest and bloodiest Russian military offensive since the "triumph of democracy" was ending in a fiasco, the German army breaking through the front at several points. It was the most critical moment for Russian militarism since the beginning of the "Great War". But although the news of the offensive's failure had already reached the capital, fanning the revolutionary flames, it had not yet penetrated to the rest of the gigantic country. Out of this desperate situation the idea was born of provoking a premature revolt in Petrograd, crushing the workers and the Bolsheviks there, and then blaming the collapse of the military offensive on the "stab in the back" delivered from behind the front by the capital.
The objective situation was not unfavourable to such a plan. Although the main workers' sectors in Petrograd were already going over to the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and SRs still had a majority position in the soviets, and were still dominant in the provinces. Within the working class as a whole, even in Petrograd, there remained strong illusions about the capacity of the Mensheviks and SRs to serve in some way the cause of revolution. Despite the radicalisation of the soldiers, mostly peasants in uniform, a considerable number of important regiments were still loyal to the Provisional Government. The forces of counter-revolution, after a phase of disorientation and disorganisation after the "February Revolution", were now at the zenith of their reconstitution. And the bourgeoisie had a trick card up its sleeve: forged documents and testimonies claiming to prove that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were paid agents of the German Kaiser.
This plan represented above all a trap, a dilemma for the Bolshevik party. If the party put itself at the head of a premature insurrection in the capital, it would discredit itself in the eyes of the Russian proletariat, appearing as the representative of an irresponsibly adventurist policy, and to the backward sectors even as the helper of German imperialism. But if it disowned the mass movement it would dangerously isolate itself from the class, leaving the workers to their fate. The bourgeoisie hoped that however the party decided, its decision would spell its doom.
Were the anti-Bolshevik forces the fine democrats and defenders of the "freedom of the people" alleged by bourgeois propaganda? They were led by the Kadets ([1] [593]), the party of big industry and the great landlords; by the officers’ committee representing about 100,000 commanders preparing a military putsch; by the soviet of the counter-revolutionary Cossack troops; by the secret police; and by the anti-Semitic "Black Hundred" mob. "Those are the circles stirring up pogroms, shooting at demonstrators etc." as Lenin wrote. ([2] [594])
But the July provocation was a blow against the maturing world revolution, struck not only by the Russian, but by the world bourgeoisie in the form of the government of Russia's war allies. In this treacherous attempt at an early drowning of a still unripe revolution in blood, we can recognise the handwriting of the old democratic bourgeoisie: the French with its long and bloody tradition of such provocations (1791, 1848, 1870), and the British with its incomparable political experience and intelligence. In fact, in view of the Russian bourgeoisie's increasing difficulties in effectively combating the revolution and maintaining the war effort, Russia's Western allies had already become the main force, not only financing the Russian front, but advising and funding the counter-revolution. The Provisional Committee of the State Duma (parliament) "supplied a legal covering for the counter-revolutionary work, which was broadly financed by the banks and by the embassies of the Entente" as Trotsky recalled ([3] [595]).
"Petrograd was swarming with secret and semi-secret officer organisations enjoying lofty protection and generous support. In a confidential report made by the Menshevik, Lieber, almost a month before the July Days, it was asserted that the officer-conspirators were in touch with Buchanan. Yes, and how could the diplomats of the Entente help trying to promote the speedy establishment of a strong power in Russia?" ([4] [596]).
It was not the Bolsheviks, but the bourgeoisie which allied itself with foreign governments against the Russian proletariat.
At the beginning of July, three incidents arranged by the bourgeoisie were enough to trigger off a revolt in the capital
1. The Kadet party withdrew its four ministers from the Provisional government. Since the Mensheviks and SR's had until then justified their refusal of "all power to the soviets" with the need to collaborate, outside the workers' councils, with the Kadets as representatives of the "democratic bourgeoisie", this snubbing of the coalition was bound to provoke renewed demands for immediate soviet power among workers and soldiers.
"To imagine that the Kadets may not have foreseen the effect of this act of open sabotage of the Soviet would be decidedly to underestimate Miliukov. The leader of liberalism was obviously trying to drag the Compromisers into a difficult situation from which they could make a way out only with bayonets. In those days Miliukov firmly believed that the situation could only be saved with a bold blood-letting" ([5] [597]).
2. The humiliation of the Provisional Government by the Entente, aimed at obliging it to confront the revolution with arms or be dropped by its allies:
"Behind the scenes the threads of all this were in the hands of the embassies and governments of the Entente. At an inter-allied conference in London the western friends ‘forgot’ to invite the Russian ambassador (...) This mockery of the ambassador of the Provisional Government and the demonstrative exit of the Kadets from the government - both events happening on the 2nd of July - had the same purpose: to bring the Compromisers to their knees" ([6] [598]).
The Menshevik and SR parties, still in the process of joining the bourgeoisie, inexperienced in their role, full of hesitations and petty bourgeois vacillations, and still with small proletarian-internationalist oppositions within their ranks, were not initiated into the counter-revolutionary plot, but manoeuvred into the role designated to them by their senior bourgeois leaders.
3. The threat to immediately transfer combative revolutionary regiments from the capital straight to the front. In fact, the explosion of the class struggle in response to these provocations was initiated, not by the workers but the soldiers, and politically incited not by the Bolsheviks but by the anarchists.
"In general the soldiers were more impatient than the workers - both because they were directly threatened with a transfer to the front, and because it was much harder for them to understand considerations of political strategy. Moreover, each one had his own rifle; and ever since February the soldier had been inclined to over-estimate the independent power of a rifle" ([7] [599]).
The soldiers immediately undertook to win the workers for their action. At the Putilov Works, the biggest Russian workers’ concentration, they made their most decisive breakthrough.
"About ten thousand men assembled. To shouts of encouragement, the machine-gunners told how they had received an order to go to the front on the 4th of July, but they had decided ‘to go not to the German front, against the German proletariat, but against their own capitalist ministers’. Feeling ran high. ‘Come on, let’s get moving’ cried the workers" ([8] [600]).
Within hours, the proletariat of the whole city had risen, armed itself and come together around the slogan "all power to the soviets", the slogan of the masses themselves.
On the afternoon of July 3rd, delegates from the machine-gun regiments arrived to win the support of the city conference of the Bolsheviks, and were shocked to learn that the party was speaking out against the action. The arguments given by the party - that the bourgeoisie wanted to provoke Petrograd in order to blame it for the fiasco on the front, that the moment was not ripe for armed insurrection, and that the best moment for a more immediate major action would be when the collapse on the front was known to all - show that the Bolsheviks immediately grasped the meaning and danger of the events. In fact, already since the June 18th demonstration the Bolsheviks had been publicly warning against a premature action.
Bourgeois historians have recognised the remarkable political intelligence of the party at that moment. Indeed, the Bolshevik party was imbued with the conviction that it is imperative to study the nature, strategy and tactics of the class enemy to be able to respond and intervene correctly at each moment. It was steeped in the marxist understanding that the revolutionary seizure of power is a form of art or science, where an insurrection at an inopportune point and the failure to seize power at the correct moment are both equally fatal.
But as correct as the analysis of the party was, to have stopped here would have meant falling for the trap of the bourgeoisie. The first decisive turning point during the July Days came the same night, when the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the party decided to legitimise the movement and put itself at its head, but in order to assure its "peaceful and organised character". As opposed to the spontaneous and chaotic events of the previous day, the gigantic demonstrations of July 4th betrayed the "ordering hand of the party". The Bolsheviks knew that the goal the masses had set themselves, of obliging the Menshevik and SR leadership of the soviet to take power in the name of the workers’ councils, was an impossibility. The Mensheviks and SRs, presented today by the bourgeoisie as the real defenders of soviet democracy, were already integrating themselves into the counter-revolution and waiting for an opportunity to have done with the workers' councils. The dilemma of the situation, the still insufficient consciousness of the mass of the proletariat, was concretised in the famous story of an enraged worker waving his fist under the chin of one of the "revolutionary" ministers shouting "Take power, son of a bitch, when we give it to you". In reality, the ministers and soviet misleaders were playing for time until regiments loyal to the government arrived.
By now the workers were realising for themselves the difficulties of transferring all power to the soviets as long as the traitors and compromisers held the leading influence within it. Because the class had not yet found the method of transforming the soviets from within, it was trying vainly to impose its armed will upon them from without.
The second decisive turning point came with the address by Bolshevik speakers to tens of thousands of Putilov and other workers on July 4th, at the end of a day of mass demonstrations, which Zinoviev began with a joke to ease the tension, and which ended with an appeal to return home peacefully - an appeal that the workers followed. The moment of revolution had not yet arrived, but it was coming. Never was the truth of Lenin's old saying more dramatically proven: patience and humour are indispensable qualities for revolutionaries.
The Bolsheviks' ability to lead the proletariat around the trap of the bourgeoisie was not only due to their political intelligence. What was decisive was above all the profound confidence of the party in the proletariat and in marxism, allowing it to fully base itself on the force and method which represents the future of humanity, and thus avoid the impatience of the petty bourgeoisie. Decisive too was the profound confidence which the Russian proletariat had developed in its class party, allowing the party to remain with and even lead the class although all sides knew it shared neither its immediate goals nor its illusions. The bourgeoisie failed in its aim to drive a wedge between party and class, a wedge which would have meant the certain defeat of the Russian Revolution.
"It was the absolute duty of the proletarian party to remain with the masses, and to attempt to give the justified actions of these masses as much as possible a peaceful and organised character, not standing aloof, washing its hands in innocence like Pilate for the pedantic reason that the masses were not organised to the last man, and that excesses took place in its movement" ([9] [601]).
Early in the morning of July 5th, government troops began to arrive in the capital. The work began of hunting down the Bolsheviks, depriving them of their meagre publishing resources, disarming and terrorising workers, inciting pogroms against the Jews. The saviours of civilisation from "Bolshevik barbarism" resorted to two main provocations to mobilise troops against the workers.
1) The campaign of lies that the Bolsheviks were German agents.
"The soldiers sat gloomily in their barracks waiting. Only in the afternoon of July 4 did the authorities at last discover an effective means of influencing them. They showed (..) documents demonstrating as plain as 2+2=4 that Lenin was a German spy. That moved them. The news flew around the regiments. (...) The mood of the neutral battalions changed" ([10] [602]).
In particular a political parasite called Alexinski, a renegade Bolshevik who had once helped to form an "ultra-left" opposition against Lenin, but having failed to fulfil his ambitions had become a declared enemy of workers' parties, was an instrument in this campaign. As a result, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were obliged to go into hiding, while Trotsky and others were arrested. "The internationalists behind bars - that is what Mr. Kerensky and Co. need" declared Lenin ([11] [603]).
The bourgeoisie has not changed. 80 years after, they are conducting a similar campaign with the same "logic" against the communist left. Then: since the Bolsheviks refuse to support the Entente, they must be on the German side! Now: since the Communist Left refused to support the "antifascist" imperialist camp in World War II, they and their successors today must have been on the German side. "Democratic" state campaigns prepare future pogroms.
Revolutionaries today, who often underestimate the significance of such campaigns against them, still have much to learn from the example of the Bolsheviks after the July days, who moved heaven and earth in defence of their reputation within the working class. Trotsky later called July 1917 "the month of the most gigantic slander in human history", but even this pales in comparison with the present day slander that Communism equals Stalinism.
Another way of attacking the reputation of revolutionaries, as old as the method of public denigration, and normally used in combination with it, is the encouragement by the state of non-proletarian and anti-proletarian elements who like to present themselves as revolutionaries.
"Provocation undoubtedly played a certain role in the events at the front as well as on the streets of Petrograd. After the February revolution the government had thrown over into the active army a large number of former gendarmes and policemen. None of them of course wanted to fight. They were more afraid of the Russian soldiers than of the Germans. In order to get their past forgotten, they would stimulate the most extreme moods of the army, incite the soldiers against the officers, come out loudly against discipline, and often openly give themselves out for Bolsheviks. Bound naturally together as accomplices, they created a kind of special Brotherhood of Cowardice and Villainy. Through them would penetrate and quickly spread through the army the most fantastic rumours, in which ultra-revolutionism was combined with Black Hundredism. In critical hours these creatures would give the first signals for panic. The press more than once referred to this demoralising work of the police and gendarmes. No less frequent references of this kind are to be found in the secret documents of the army itself. But the high command remained silent, preferring to identify the Black Hundred provocateurs with the Bolsheviks" ([12] [604]).
2. Snipers fired at troops arriving in the city, who were then told the Bolsheviks were behind the shooting.
"The deliberate madness of this shooting clearly disturbed the workers. It was clear that experienced provocateurs were greeting the soldiers with lead with a view to anti-Bolshevik inoculation. The workers were eager to explain this to the arriving troops, but they were denied access to them. For the first time since the February days the junker or officer stood between the worker and soldier" ([13] [605]).
Being forced to work in semi-illegality after the July Days, the Bolsheviks also had to fight against the democratic illusions of those within their ranks who wanted their leaders to go up for trial before a counter-revolutionary court to answer charges of being German agents. Recognising another trap being laid for the party, Lenin wrote:
"A military dictatorship is at work. It is ridiculous to even speak of a court case. What we are dealing with here is not at all a "court case", but an episode of civil war" ([14] [606]).
If the Party survived the period of repression which followed the July Days, it was not least because of its tradition of constant vigilance in the defence of the organisation against all the attempts of the state to destroy it. It should be noted for instance, that the police agent Malinovsky, who before the war managed to become the member of the central committee of the party directly responsible for the security of the organisation, would probably have been the man in charge of hiding Lenin, Zinoviev etc. after the July Days, had he not been unmasked by the vigilance of the organisation beforehand (despite the blindness of Lenin himself!). Without such vigilance, the result would most probably have been the liquidation of the most experienced party leaders. In January-February 1919, when Luxemburg. Liebknecht, Jogisches and other veterans of the young KPD were murdered by the German bourgeoisie, it seems that the authorities may have been tipped off by a "high-ranking" police agent within the party.
The July Days revealed once again the gigantic revolutionary energy of the proletariat, its struggle against the fraud of bourgeois democracy, and the fact that the working class alone is a factor against imperialist war in the face of the decadence of capitalism. Not "democracy or dictatorship" but the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, socialism or barbarism, that is the alternative facing humanity which the July Days posed, without yet being able to answer. But what the July Days above all illustrated is the indispensable role of the proletarian class party. No wonder that the bourgeoisie is today "celebrating" the 80th anniversary of the Russian Revolution with renewed manoeuvres and slanders against the contemporary revolutionary milieu.
July 1917 also showed that overcoming illusions in the renegade ex-workers' parties on the left of capital is vital if the proletariat is to seize power. This was the central illusion of the class during the July Days. But this experience was in itself decisive. The July Days definitively clarified, not only for the working class and the Bolsheviks, but for the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries themselves, that the latter's organisations had irrevocably joined the counter-revolution. As Lenin wrote at the beginning of September:
"In Petrograd at the time we were not even physically in a position to take power, and had it been physically possible to take it, it would not have been possible to hold onto it politically, since Tsereteli and Co. had not yet sunk to supporting the hangmen. That's why, at the time, from the 3rd to the 5th of July in Petrograd, the slogan of taking power was wrong. At that time even the Bolsheviks still lacked the conscious determination - nor could that have been otherwise - to treat Tsereteli and Co. as counter-revolutionaries. At the time neither the soldiers nor the workers possessed the experience which the month of July gave them" ([15] [607]).
Already in mid-July Lenin had clearly drawn this lesson:
"After the 4th of July the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, hand in hand with the monarchists and Black Hundreds, engulfed the petty bourgeois Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, after having intimidated them, placing the real state power (...) in the hands of a military clique, who shot those who refused orders on the front, and struck down the Bolsheviks in Petrograd" ([16] [608]).
But the key lesson of July was the political leadership of the party. The bourgeoisie has often employed the tactic of provoking premature confrontations. Whether 1848 and 1870 in France, or 1919 and 1921 in Germany, in each case the result has been a bloody repression of the proletariat. If the Russian Revolution is the only major example where the working class has been able to avoid such a trap and bloody defeat, then this was above all because the Bolshevik class party was able to fulfil its decisive vanguard role. In steering the class away from such a defeat, the Bolsheviks saved from their perversion by opportunism the deeply revolutionary lessons of Engels' famous 1895 Introduction to Marx's Class Struggle in France, especially his warning:
"And there is only one means through which the continuous swelling of the ranks of the socialist armies in Germany can be set back for some time: a large scale confrontation with the military, a blood-letting like 1871 in Paris" ([17] [609]).
Trotsky summarised the balance sheet of the action of the party as follows:
"Had the Bolshevik Party, stubbornly clinging to a doctrinaire appraisal of the July movement as ‘untimely’ and turned its back on the masses, the semi-insurrection would inevitably have fallen under the scattered and uncoordinated leadership of anarchists, of adventurers, of accidental expressers of the indignation of the masses, and would have expired in bloody and fruitless convulsions. On the other hand, if the party, after taking its place at the head of the machine-gunners and Putilov men, had renounced its own appraisal of the situation as a whole, and glided down the road to a decisive fight, the insurrection would indubitably have taken a bold scope. The workers and soldiers under the leadership of the Bolsheviks would have conquered the power - but only to prepare the subsequent shipwreck of the revolution. The question of power on a national scale would not have been decided, as it was in February, by a victory in Petrograd. The provinces would not have caught up to the capital. The front would not have understood or accepted the revolution. The railroads and the telegraphs would have served the Compromisers against the Bolsheviks. Kerensky and headquarters would have created a government for the front and the provinces. Petrograd would have been blockaded. Disintegration would have begun within its walls. The government would have been able to send considerable masses of soldiers against Petrograd. The insurrection would have ended, in those circumstances, with the tragedy of a Petrograd Commune. At the July forking of historic roads, the interference of the Bolshevik Party eliminated both fatally dangerous variants - both that in the likeness of the July Days of 1848, and that of the Paris Commune of 1871. Thanks to the party's taking its place boldly at the head of the movement, it was able to stop the masses at the moment when the demonstration began to turn into an armed test of strength. The blow struck at the masses and the party in July was very considerable, but it was not a decisive blow (..) It fully preserved its fighting cadres, and these cadres had learned much" ([18] [610]).
History proved Lenin right when he wrote:
"A new phase begins. The victory of the counter-revolution sparks off disappointment among the masses concerning the parties of the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and clears the way for the transition of the masses to the politics of supporting the revolutionary proletariat" ([19] [611]).
Krespel
[1] [612] So-called from the initials - KD - of their party, the Constitutional Democrats.
[2] [613] Lenin: Where is the Power and where is the Counter-Revolution?
[3] [614] Trotsky: History of the Russian Revolution, Page 517.
[4] [615] Trotsky: History P.551. Buchanan was a British diplomat in Petrograd.
[5] [616] Trotsky: History P. 525.
[6] [617] Trotsky: History P. 624.
[7] [618] Trotsky: History P. 520.
[8] [619] Trotsky: History P. 528.
[9] [620] Lenin: On Constitutional Illusions.
[10] [621] Trotsky: History P.561.
[11] [622] Lenin: Should the Bolshevik leaders stand trial?
[12] [623] Trotsky: History P. 585. A very similar role was played by ex-gendarmes, criminal elements and other lumpen proletarians among the "Spartacus soldiers" and "revolutionary invalids" during the German revolution, particularly during the tragic "Spartacus Week" in Berlin, January 1919, and proved even more catastrophic.
[13] [624] Trotsky: History P. 568.
[14] [625] Lenin: Should the Bolshevik leaders stand trial?
[15] [626] Lenin: Rumours about a Conspiracy.
[16] [627] Lenin: On Slogans.
[17] [628] Engels: Introduction to the 1895 edition of Class Struggles in France.
[18] [629] Trotsky: History. P. 593-94.
[19] [630] Lenin: On Constitutional Illusions.
If there is one struggle that marxist revolutionaries worthy of the name have always fought to the bitter end, even in the most difficult conditions, it is to save their organisation - whether Party or International - from the grip of opportunism, and to prevent it from falling into degeneration, or worse still into betrayal.
This was the method of Marx and Engels in the First International. It was the method of the "lefts" in the Second International. We should remember that Rosa Luxembtirg, Karl Liebknecht and the Spartakists1 took rime to decide on their break with the old party, whether the German Social-Democracy or with the USPD. At best, they hoped to overthrow the opportunist leadership by winning over the majority in the party. At worst, once there was no longer any hope of reconquering the party, they hoped to take as many militants with them when they split. They went on fighting as long as the smallest spark of life remained in the party, and they could still win over the best elements. This has always been the method, the only method, of marxist revolutionaries. Moreover, historical experience has shown that the "lefts, rather than split, have usually resisted to the point where they were themselves excluded by the old party2. Trotsky, for example, spent more than six years of struggle within the Bolsehvik Party before eventually being excluded.
The combat of the "lefts" within the Third International is especially revealing, inasmuch as it was fought during the most terrible period of the workers' movement: that of the longest and most terrible counter-revolution in history, which began at the end of the 1920s. And yet, it was in the midst of this counter-revolutionary situation, this powerful ebb in the workers' movement, that the militants on the left of the Communist International were to undertake an unforgettable struggle. Some amongst them thought it lost from the outset, but this did not daunt them, or prevent them from going into combat3. And so, while there remained the slightest hope of redressing the party and the Cl, they considered it their duty to try to save what they could from the grip of a triumphant Stalinism. Today, this struggle is at best minimised and at worst completely forgotten by those elements who leave their organisation at the first disagreement, or because of their "wounded honour". This attitude is an offence to the working class, and clearly expresses the contempt of the petty bourgeois for the hard struggle of generations of workers and revolutionaries, sometimes at the cost of their lives, which these gentlemen consider perhaps to be beneath their notice.
The Italian Left not only put tins method into practice, it enriched it politically and theoretically. On the basis of this heritage, the ICC has developed the question on several occasions, and has shown when and how it can happen that the party betrays the class4. An organisation's positions on imperialist war and proletarian revolution allow us to determine whether or not it has irrevocably betrayed the class. As long as the organisation's treason is not yet evident, as long as the party has not passed, arms and baggage, into the enemy camp, the role of true revolutionaries is to fight, tooth and nail, to keep it within the proletarian camp. This is what the left did in the CI, in the most difficult conditions of utterly triumphant counter-revolution.
This policy is still valid today. It is all the easier to undertake today, in a course towards class confrontations, in an altogether easier situation for the struggle of the proletariat and of revolutionaries. In the present historic context, where neither revolution nor world war are on the agenda, it is much less likely that a proletarian organisation would betray5. Any conscious and consistent revolutionary should therefore apply the same method if he thinks his own organisation is degenerating: in other words, he should fight within the organisation to redress it. There should be no question of adopting a petty bourgeois attitude of trying to "save one's own soul", which is the tendency of some armchair revolutionaries whose individualist or contestationist tendencies readily attract them to the sirens of political parasitism. This is why, all those who leave their organisation, accusing it of all manner of faults, and without having fought the fight out to the bitter end - as in the case of RV for example6 - are irresponsible, and deserve to be treated like poor little unprincipled petty bourgeois.
The crisis in the communist movement emerged into the broad light of day during 1923. A few events demonstrated this: after the Third Congress of the Cl, will revealed the growing weight of opportunism, and after repression was unleashed in Russia on Kronstadt, while strikes developed notably in Petrograd and Moscow. At the same time, the Workers' Opposition was created within the Russian Communist Party.
Trotsky summed up the general feeling when he declared that "The fundamental reason for the crisis of the October Revolution lay in the delay of the world revolution"7. And indeed, the delay in the world revolution weighed heavily on the entire workers' movement. The latter was also disoriented by the state capitalist measures taken in Russia under the NEP (New Economic Policy). The latest defeats suffered by the proletariat in Germany put off still further any hope of an extension of the revolution in Europe. Revolutionaries, Lenin among them8, began to doubt the outcome. In I 923, the Russian revolution was being strangled economically by a capitalism that dominated the planet. On this level, the situation of the USSR was catastrophic, and the problem posed to the leadership was whether the NEP should be maintained in its entirety or corrected through help to industry.
Trotsky began his fight9 within the CPSU Politburo, where a majority wanted to maintain the status quo. He disagreed on the question of the economic situation in Russia, and on the CPSU's internal organisation. The divergence was kept within the Politburo, to avoid breaking party unity. It was only made public in the autumn of 1923, in Trotsky's book The New Course10.
Other expressions of opposition also appeared:
- A letter of 15th October 1923, addressed to the Politburo and signed by 46 well-known personalities, including left and opposition communists (Piatakov and Preobrazhensky, but also Ossinski, Sapronov, Smirnov, etc). They called for the convocation of a special conference to take the measures demanded by the situation, without waiting for the Congress;
- The creation of the Democratic Centralism group by Sapronov, Smirnov, and others;
- The reactivation of the Workers' Opposition with Shliapnikov;
- The creation of the Workers' Group of Miasnikov, Kuznezov and others (see the "Manifeste du groupe ouvrier du PCUS", February 1923, published in Invariance no.6, 1975).
At the same time, Bordiga, writing from prison, made his first serious criticism of the CI, in particular on the question of the "United Front", in his "Manifesto to all the comrades of the PCI". On the basis of this disagreement, he asked to be relieved of all his functions as a leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), so as not to have to defend positions with which he disagreed11.
Like Trotsky, Bordiga's attitude was cautious, with a view to developing a more effective political struggle. Two years later, he explained the key to his method in a letter to Korsch (26th October 1926): "Zinoviev and Trotsky are men with a great sense of realism; they have understood that we must still suffer the blows without going onto the offensive". This is how revolutionaries act: with patience. They are capable of conducting a long struggle to arrive at their goal. They know how to suffer blows, to advance cautiously, and above all to work, to draw tile lessons for the future struggles of the working class.
This attitude is a million miles removed from that of the "Sunday revolutionaries”, greedy for any immediate success, or of our "armchair revolutionaries", interested only in "saving their own souls", like an RV who has run away from his responsibilities while complaining all the time that the ICC during the latest internal debates in which he took part has subjected him to a fate worse than Stalin inflicted on the left opposition! Quite apart from its slanderous nature, such an accusation would be laughable were it not so serious. And nobody who knows anything about the left Opposition and its tragic end will believe such a fairytale for an instant.
The period that followed the CI's Fifth Congress was characterised by:
- The continued "Bolshevisation" of the CPs, and what has been called the "turn to the right" of the CI. The aim of Stalin and his henchmen was to eliminate the leadership of the French and German parties in particular, in other words those of Treint and Ruth Fischer, which had been Zinoviev's spearhead at the 5th Congress, and which were not prepared to make the turn to the right.
- The "stabilisation'' of capitalism, which for the CI's leadership meant that an "adaptation" was necessary. The report on political activity of the Central Committee to the 14th Congress of the CPSU (December 1925) states: "What we took at one time for a brief pause, has been transformed into a whole period".
Outside the debates of the Congress, the most important event for the workers' movement was the disintegration, at the end of 1925, of the triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, which had led the International and the CPSU since Lenin had been forced to give up political activity. Why did this happen? In fact, the triumvirate's existence was tied to the struggle against Trotsky. Once the latter, and the first opposition movement had been reduced to silence, Stalin no longer needed the "old Bolsheviks" around Zinoviev and Kamenev to take control of the Russian state and party, and of the International. The situation of "stabilisation" gave him the opportunity to change tack.
Although opposing Stalin internal Soviet policy, Zinoviev had expressed the same view on world policy: "The first difficulty lies in the adjournment of the world revolution. At the beginning of the October Revolution, we were convinced that the workers of other countries would come to our rescue in a matter of months, or at worst, of years. Today, sadly, the adjournment of the world revolution is an established fact, it is certain that the partial stabilisation of capitalism represents a whole epoch, and that this presents us with a new, much greater and more complex, series of difficulties".
However, while the leadership of the party and the Cl recognised this "stabilisation"; at the same tune they declared that the vision and policies of the Fifth Congress had been correct. They made a political turn-around without saying so openly.
While Trotsky remained silent, the "Italian Left" adopted a more political attitude by continuing the struggle openly. Bordiga raised the Russian question, and the "Trotsky question" in an article in L'Unita.
The left of the PCI created the "Entente Committee" in order to oppose the "Bolshevisation" of the party (March-April 1925). Bordiga did not join the committee immediately, in order to avoid being expelled from the party by the Gramsci leadership. Only in June did he come round to the views of Damen, Fortichiari, and Repossi. The committee, however, was only a means of organisation, not a real fraction. In the end, the "left" was' forced to dissolve the committee to avoid being excluded from the party, despite holding a majority within it.
In Russia, spring 1926 saw the creation of the Unified Opposition around the first opposition of Trotsky, joined by Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Krupskaya, with a view to preparing the 15th Congress of the CPSU.
Stalin's repression increased, striking tins time at the new opposition:
- Serebriakov and Preobrazhensky12 were expelled from the Party;
- others (like Miasnikov, of the Workers' Group) were imprisoned, or on the point of being imprisoned (eg Fichelev, director of the national printing works);
- some of the foremost combatants of the Civil War were thrown out of the army (such as Grunstein, the director of the aviation school, and the Ukrainian Okhotnikov):
- throughout the country, in the Urals, Moscow, Leningrad, the GPU had decapitated the Opposition's local organisation by expelling its leaders from the Party.
Then, in October 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Central Committee of the CPSU.
The capitulation of Zinoviev and his supporters did not prevent the Russian left from continuing the struggle. Neither insults, nor threats, nor expulsion from the Party, could stop these true militants of the working class.
"Exclusion from the Party deprives us of our rights as members of the Party, but it cannot relieve us of the obligations undertaken by each one of us when we entered the Communist Party. Although we have been excluded from the Party, we will nonetheless remain faithful to its programme, its traditions, its banner. We will continue to work to strengthen the Communist Party, and its influence in the working class"13.
Rakovsky gives us here a remarkable lesson in revolutionary politics. This is the marxist method, our method. Revolutionaries never leave their organisations unless they are excluded, and even then they continue the fight to redress the organisation.
During the years that followed, the members of the opposition did everything they could to return to the Party. They were in fact convinced that their exclusion would only be temporary.
In January 1928, however, the deportations began. These were extremely severe, since the deportees were guaranteed no means of subsistence in their assigned residence. Insults and worse descended on the families who remained in Moscow, often losing their right to an apartment. Trotsky left for Alma Ata, followed 48 hours later by Rakovsky's departure for Astrakhan. Still the struggle continued, as the Opposition organised in exile.
Despite a succession of new blows, the members of the opposition and their most notable representative, Rakovsky, continued an untiring struggle despite successive capitulations and Trotsky's expulsion from the USSR.
During this period, the GPU cunningly circulated rumours that Stalin would at last implement the policy of the Opposition. This immediately started to break up the Opposition, a process in which Radek seems to have played the part of provocateur14. The weakest gave up. The Stalinists in power were able to detect the waverers, and to determine the best moment either to strike them down or bring them to capitulate.
Faced with these new difficulties, in August 1929 Rakovsky drew up a declaration: "We appeal to the Central Committee (...) asking it to help us return to the Party by releasing the Bolshevik-Leninists (...) and by recalling Trotsky from exile (…) We are entirely ready to give up fraction methods of struggle and to submit to the statutes of the Party, which guarantee every member the right to defend his communist opinions".
This declaration had no chance of being accepted, firstly because it called for Trotsky's return from exile, but also because it was drawn up in such a way as to reveal Stalin's duplicity and responsibility in the whole business. It achieved its aim. and broke the wave of panic in the ranks of the Opposition. The capitulations stopped.
Despite traps, harassment, and assassinations, Rakovsky and the Opposition centre continued the organised struggle until 1934. Most of them continued their resistance in the camps15.
When Rakovsky abandoned the fight, it was not in the same shameful way as Zinoviev and his followers, for example. Bilan, for one, declared clearly: "Comrade Trotsky (...) has published a note where, after declaring that this is not an ideological and political surrender, he writes: "We have repeated many times that the only path to a restoration of the CP in the USSR is the international one. The case of Rakovsky confirms this in a negative, but striking manner". We express our solidarity with this evaluation (...) of the Rakovsky case, since his last act has nothing to do with the shameful surrender of Radek, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and others ...".
The struggle also unfolded at a world level, with the creation of an international left opposition following Trotsky's expulsion from the USSR in 1929.
The CI's 6th Plenum (February-March, 1926) saw Bordiga's last appearance at a meeting of the International. In his speech, he declared: "It is desirable that a left resistance should be formed internationally, against suck dangers from the right; but I must say quite openly that this healthy, useful, and necessary reaction cannot and must not appear in the form of manoeuvre and intrigue, or rumours spread in the corridors".
From 1927 onwards, the struggle of the Italian Left was to continue in exile, in France and Belgium, Those militants who had been unable to leave Italy were in prison, or like Bordiga assigned to residence in the islands. The Left fought on within the communist parties and the CI, despite the fact that many of its militants had been expelled. Its basic aim was to intervene within these organisations, in order to correct an avoidable course towards degeneration. "The communist parties are organs where we must struggle to combat opportunism. We are convinced that the situation will force the leadership to reintegrate us as an organised fraction, unless it should lead to the complete eclipse of the communist parties. We consider this extremely unlikely, but in this case also we will still be able to fulfil our duty as communists"16.
This vision reveals the difference between Trotsky and the Italian Left. In April 1928. the latter constituted a fraction, in response to the resolution of the 9th extended plenum of the CI (9th to 25th February, 1928), which decided that it was not possible to remain a member of the CI while supporting the positions of Trotsky. From that moment, the members of the Italian Left could no longer remain as members of the International, and found themselves obliged to form a fraction.
In its founding resolution, the Fraction assigned itself the following tasks:
"1) the reintegration of all those expelled from the International who support the Communist Manifesto and accept the Theses of the 2nd World Congress;
2) the convocation of the 6th World Congress under the chairmanship of Leon Trotsky;
3) putting on the agenda of the 6th World Congress the expulsion of all those elements who declare their solidarity with the resolutions of the 15th Congress of the CPSU17"18.
Thus, while the Russian Opposition hoped to be reintegrated into the Party, the Italian Left aimed above all to survive as a fraction within the CPs and the International, because it thought that their regeneration now depended on the work as a fraction. "By fraction, we understood the organism which develops the cadres who will ensure the continuity of the revolutionary struggle, and which is called to become the protagonist of the future proletarian victory (...) Against us, [the Opposition] declared that we should not have asserted the necessity of the formation of cadres: since the key to events is to be found in the hands of the centrists, and not of the fractions"19.
Today, this policy of repeated demands to reintegrate the CI (which the Italian Left only abandoned after 1928) might seem incorrect, since it failed to halt the degeneration of the communist parties and the International. But without it, the opposition would have been outside the Cl and its isolation even worse. The members of the opposition would have been cut off from the mass of communist militants, and would no longer have been able to influence their evolution20. It was this method, which the Italian Left was to theorise later, which made it possible to maintain the link with the workers' movement, and to transmit the Left's acquisitions to today's Communist Left, of which the ICC is a part.
By contrast, the isolationist policy of a group like Reveil Communiste21 for example, was to prove catastrophic, and the group did not survive it. It was unable to give birth to an organised current. Above all, it confirmed the classic method and principle of the workers' movement: you do not split lightly from a proletarian organisation; nor without having first exhausted all possibilities and used every means, to clarify tile political divergences, and to convince a maximum of healthy elements.
We have not sketched this broad historical tableau for the pleasure of playing the historian, but to draw the necessary lessons for the workers' movement and our class today. This lengthy exegesis teaches us that "the history of the workers' movement is the history of its organisations" as Lenin said. Today, it is the fashion to split, without any principles, from an organisation for trivial, and to create a new one on the same programmatic foundations. Without having subjected the organisation's programme and practice to a searching critique, it is declared to be degenerating. A brief reminder of the history of the Third International shows us what should be the true attitude of revolutionaries. Unless we have the pretension that revolutionary organisations are unnecessary, or that an individual can discover, all by himself, everything that the organisations of the past have bequeathed to us. We have no such pretension. Without the theoretical and political work of the Italian Left, neither the ICC nor the other groups of the Communist Left (the IBRP and the various PC Is) would exist today.
Obviously, if we identify with the attitude of the Opposition and the Italian Left, we do not do so entirely with the conceptions of the Opposition and of Trotsky.
By contrast, we agree with these ideas put forward by Bilan at the beginning of the 1930s:
"It is perfectly true that the role of the fractions is above all one of educating cadres through lived events, and thanks to a rigorous confrontation of the meaning of these events (...) Without the work of the fractions, the Russian Revolution would have been impossible. Without the fractions, Lenin himself would have remained a bookworm, and would not have become a revolutionary leader.
The fractions are thus the only historical places where the proletariat continues to work for its class organisation. From 1928 to this day, comrade Trotsky has completely neglected this work of construction of the fractions, and consequently has failed to contribute to creating the real conditions for the mass movement"22.
Similarly, we also agree with what the Italian Left had to say about the loss of political organisations during a period of historical reflux of the proletariat (in their case a course towards war during the 1930s), which is not, of course, the case today:
"The death of the Communist International springs from the extinction of its junction: the CI's death knell was rung by the victory of fascism in Germany; this event has historically exhausted its junction, and has demonstrated the ftrst positive result of the centrist policy.
The victory of fascism in Germany means that events are moving in the opposite direction to the revolution, towards world war.
All those who, today, declare their agreement with the positions and principles of the Italian Left, and who accuse an organisation of degeneration, have the duty and responsibility to do everything to halt this dynamic and stop it turning to betrayal, as the comrades of Bilan did before them.
But the Italian Left, in criticising Trotsky, also criticised all those unprincipled individuals (or those who did not want to recognise the course of history), who could only think of building new organisations outside those that existed already, or - as we see with the development of parasitism today - of destroying those that they had just left:
"Similarly, as far as the foundation of new parties is concerned [here the Italian Left was thinking of Trotsky, who in 1933 proposed the formation of new parties], the sportsmen of the "great action", instead of building the organisation for political action (...), have made a lot of noise on the necessity for losing not an instant in setting to work (...).
It is obvious that demagogy and ephemeral success are on the side of sport, and not of revolutionary work"24.
We would remind all these fine gentlemen, these new "sportsmen", these irresponsible founders of new sects, these righters of wrongs and of parties who thunder their denunciation of the existing proletarian organisations, of the patient revolutionary work of the Opposition, and above all of the Italian Left during the 1920s and 1930s, to save their organisations and prepare the cadres for the future party, rather than quitting their organisation to "save" themselves.
OR
Note: The following correction was omitted from the previous issue of the Review The IBRP has asked us to correct the following sentence in our article "A rudderless policy of regroupment" in International Review no.87: "at the 4th Conference [of groups of the international communist left] the CWO and BC again relaxed the criteria and the place of the ICC was taken by the Supporters of the Unity of Communist Militants" The IBRP has informed us that in fact, the 4th Conference met under the same criteria as those adopted at the end of the 3rd, since the SUCM had declared itself in agreement with these criteria. We note this fact. We have every interest that the polemics between the ICC and the IBRP, like all debates between revolutionaries, should deal with fundamental questions, and not misunderstandings or incorrect details. |
1 See the articles on the German Revolution in previous issues of the International Review.
2 The revolutionaries who were to found the KAPD did not split from the German Communist Party (KPD) but were excluded from it.
3 Pierre Naville has pointed out that Rakovsky, whom he met in Moscow in 1927, had no illusions in the period. He foresaw only years of suffering and repression, which, however, did not dampen the determination of this true fighter for the working class. See Rakovsky, ou la revolution dans tous les pays by Pierre Broue (Fayard), and Pierre Naville's Trotsky vivani.
4 See our texts on the Italian Left, and our hook on The Italian Communist Left.
5 Such a betrayal can never be completely excluded, for example if a proletarian organisation's confusion on the national liberation question allows it to be dragged onto the leftist, ie bourgeois, terrain by supporting one imperialist camp against another in the conflicts between the powers under the disguise of "national liberation ". This is what happened to some sections of the (Bordigist) International Communist Party at the beginning of the 1980s.
6 See our pamphlet The alleged paranoia of the ICC.
7 Trotsky. The Communist International after Lenin.
8 See Philippe Robrieux. Histoire interieure du Pani Communiste Francais, Vol l . pp 122 onwards.
9 At first, he fought alongside Lenin on the question of internal party organisation and the bureacracy. But Lenin suffered his second attack, and was never to return to work. See Rosmer's introduction to De la revolution, a collection of articles and texts by Trotsky, published by Editions de Minuit, pp 21-22.
10 Published in December 1923.
11 The left of the PCI still represented the majority of the party.
12 Party Secretaries before Stalin.
13 See Rakovsky, ou la revolution dans tous les pays by Pierre Broue (Fayard)
14 Ciliga. 10 ans au pays du mensonge deconcertant. Champ Libre, Paris, pp233 onwards.
15 Bilan no.5, March 1934.
16 Response of 8/7/1928 of the Italian Left to the Communist Opposition of Paz. See Contre le Courant. no. 13.
17 And in particular with the resolution excluding all those who declared their solidarity with Trotsky.
18 Prometeo no. 1. May 1928.
19 Bilan no. 1. November 1933.
20 H. Chaze, for example, remained within the French CP until 1931-32. as secretary of the Puteaux Rayon. See his book. Chronique de la revolution espagnole. Spartacus.
21 See our book on the Italian Communist Left.
22 Bilan no. 1 .November 1933, "Towards the 2-3/4 International?"
"Even more than in the economic sphere, the chaos that characterises the period of decomposition exerts its effects on the political relations between states. At the time when the eastern bloc collapsed, ending the system of alliances that emerged from the second world war, the ICC pointed out:
- that, even if this was not realisable in the immediate, this situation put on the agenda the formation of new blocs, one led by the USA, the other by Germany;
- that, in the immediate, it would unleash all the conflicts which the "Yalta order" had kept in a framework "acceptable" to the world's two gendarmes.
Since then, this tendency towards "every man for himself", towards chaos in the relations between states, with its succession of circumstantial and ephemeral alliances, has not been called into question. Quite the contrary. Very soon the tendency towards "every man for himself" predominated over the tendency towards the reconstitution of stable alliances that could prefigure future imperialist blocs, and this was to multiply and aggravate military confrontations" (Resolution on the International Situation from the 12th congress of the ICC, published in International Review no.90).
This is how the ICC, at its 12th congress, defined its vision of the world situation at the imperialist level, a vision which has been illustrated and confirmed on numerous occasions in recent months. The growing instability of the capitalist world has been expressed in particular through a multiplication of murderous conflicts all over the planet. This aggravation of capitalist barbarism is above all the work of the very same great powers who never stop promising us a world of "peace and prosperity" but whose increasingly acute and open rivalries are costing humanity more and more dearly in terms of death, poverty and terror.
Because" since the end of the division of the world into two blocs, the USA has been faced with a permanent challenge to its authority by its former allies" (ibid), it has had to wage a "massive counter-offensive" against the latter and against their imperialist interests in the past period, notably in ex-Yugoslavia and Africa. Despite this, its former allies continue to defy the US, even in its private hunting grounds like the Middle East and Latin America. We cannot deal here with all the parts of the world which are suffering the effects of the tendency towards "every man for himself” and the exacerbation of imperialist rivalries between the great powers. We will only look at a few situations which clearly illustrate this analysis and which have latterly seen some significant developments.
In the resolution quoted above, we asserted that the world's leading power "has managed to inflict on the country which has defied it most openly, France, a very serious reverse in its own "hunting ground" of Africa". This assertion was based on the evident fact that "after eliminating French influence in Rwanda, it is now France's main bastion on the continent, Zaire, which is about to slip from its grasp with the collapse of the Mobutu regime under the blows of the Kabila "rebellion ", which has received massive support from Rwanda and Uganda, ie from the US".
Since then, the Kabila's hordes have ejected the Mobutu clique and taken over in Kinshasa. In this victory, and in particular in the monstrous massacres of civilian populations which accompanied it, the direct and active role played by the American state, notably through the numerous "advisers" it put at Kabila's disposal, is today an open secret. Yesterday it was French imperialism which armed and advised the Hutu gangs who were responsible for the massacres in Rwanda, in order to destabilise the pro-US Kigali regime; today Washington is doing the same against French interests, through Kabila's Tutsi "rebels".
Zaire has thus passed exclusively into the hands of the US. France has lost an essential pawn, which signifies its complete eviction from the region of the "great lakes".
Moreover, this situation has rapidly led to a chain-reaction of instability in nearby countries which are still under French influence. The authority and credibility of France has suffered a major blow in the region and the US is trying to draw maximum profit from this. Thus, for several weeks, Congo-Brazzaville has been ravaged by the war between the last two presidents, even though both of them were creatures of France. The various efforts to mediate by Paris have met with no success. In the Central African Republic, a country which is now falling into a state of bloody chaos, this same impotence is being revealed. Thus, despite two very muscular military interventions and the creation of an "African Intervention Force" under its control, French imperialism still hasn't managed to impose order in the region. Even more serious is the fact that the Central African president Ange Patasse, another creature of France, is now threatening to run after American aid, an act of defiance towards his current patron. This loss of credit is now starting to spread throughout black Africa, including France's most faithful pawns. More generally, French influence is waning all over the continent, as can be seen for example by the recent annual summit of the Organisation of African Unity, where the two major French initiatives were rejected:
- one concerning the recognition of the new power in Kinshasa, which Paris wanted to delay and submit to various conditions. Under the pressure of the US and its African allies, Kabila has not only won immediate recognition but also economic support in order to "reconstruct the country";
- another concerning the nomination of a new leadership of the OAU: France's candidate was abandoned by his "friends" and had to withdraw his candidature before the vote.
French imperialism is currently suffering a series of reverses at the hands of the USA, and this is a decline of historic proportions in what was once its backyard. "This is a particularly severe punishment for France (...) and it is intended to serve as an example for all the other countries tempted to imitate the latter's stance of permanent defiance"(ibid).
However, despite its decline, French imperialism still has cards to play to defend its interests and reply to the American offensive. To this end it has begun a strategic redeployment of its military forces in Africa. If on this level, as on many others, France is a long way from equality with Washington, this in no way means that it will simply fold its arms. At the very least, it is certain that it will make a real nuisance of itself in order to create difficulties for American policy. The African populations have not sacrificed the last of their blood in the interests of rival capitalist gangsters.
Algeria is another country hit by the full force of world capitalism's decomposition, another battleground for the ferocious rivalries of the great powers. For over five years this country has been sinking into an ever more barbaric and bloody chaos. The endless reprisals and massacres of the civilian population, the innumerable outrages which have now reached the country's capital, keep Algeria in a daily state of horror. Since 1992, the beginning of what the media hypocritically call "the Algerian crisis", there is no doubt that the figure of 100,000 killed has been exceeded. If ever a population, and thus a proletariat, has been taken hostage in a war between bourgeois cliques, it's the population of Algeria. It is clear today that those who carry out the daily assassinations, those who are responsible for the death of all these thousands of men, women and children, are the armed bands in the pay of the different warring camps:
- on the one hand, the Islamists, whose hardest and most fanatical faction is the GIA, recruit their forces from a decomposed youth deprived of any future (owing to the dramatic economic situation in Algeria which has thrown the majority of the population into unemployment, poverty and hunger), and then pushes them into the most profound criminality. Al Wasat, the journal of the Saudi bourgeoisie which comes out in London, recognises that "this youth was at first a motor used by the FIS to scare all those who stood in the way of its march to power", but is now more and more escaping its control;
- the Algerian state itself, which is more and more clearly being exposed as being implicated in many of the massacres it attributes to the "Islamic terrorists". The testimonies gathered after the massacre in Rais, a suburb of Algiers (between 200 and 300 deaths) at the end of August are proof, if proof were needed, that the Zeroual regime is anything but innocent: "This lasted from 22.30 to 02.30. The butchers took all the time they needed (...) No help arrived. The security forces were, however, very close by. The first to arrive this morning were the firemen" (quoted in Le Monde). It is clear today that a good part of the carnage perpetrated in Algeria is the work either of the state security forces or the "self defence militias" armed and controlled by these forces. Contrary to what the regime would have us believe, these militias do not have the job of "ensuring the safety of the villages"; they are a means for the state to patrol the population, eliminate opponents and impose order through terror. Faced with this frightful situation, "world opinion", ie that of the big western powers, has begun to express its "emotion".
Thus, when the general secretary of the UN Kofi Annan tried to encourage "tolerance and dialogue" and called for "an urgent solution", Washington, which claimed to be "horrified" by the massacres, immediately gave him its support. The French state, while also manifesting its great compassion, stressed that it" could not interfere in Algeria's affairs". The hypocrisy exhibited by the great powers is staggering but it is less and less capable of masking their responsibility for the horror that has descended on this country. Through various bourgeois Algerian factions, France and the US have been waging a ruthless war since the disappearance of the great imperialist blocs. The stakes in this sordid game is for Paris to keep Algeria in its sphere and for Washington to take it over, or at least to undermine its rival's influence. In this battle, the first blood was scored by American imperialism which secretly supported the development of the Islamist FIS, to the point where, in 1992, it had reached the portals of power. And it was the veritable coup d'etat carried out by the Algiers regime, with the support of its French patron, which warded off this danger, since it went against the interests not only of the bourgeois factions in power but also of the French. Since then the measures taken by tile Algerian state, in particular the banning of the FIS, the hunting down and imprisonment of many of its militants and leaders has led to a reduction in the latter's influence. But while these measures were successful at this level, they are also responsible for the current chaos. They have pushed factions of tile FIS into illegality, guerrilla war and terrorist actions. Today, the frequent and abominable atrocities carried out by the Islamists have discredited them. We can therefore say that the Zeroual regime has achieved its aims and also that French imperialism has managed to resist tile offensive of tile world's leading power and maintain its interests in Algeria. The cost of this "success" is being paid for by the blood of the population. And there will be more to pay. When the US spoke recently about giving all their support to tile "personal efforts" of Kofi Annan, this was an announcement that they are not prepared to give up their interests; this is why Chirac immediately responded by denouncing in advance" any policy of interference in Algerian affairs", making it quite clear that he will defend his backyard tooth and nail.
While second-rank imperialisms like France have a hard time conserving their authority in their traditional spheres of influence, and are even suffering setbacks under the hammer blows of the USA, the latter are themselves not spared from problems in applying their policies, even in their own traditional hunting grounds like the Middle East. Since the Gulf War the Americans have maintained an almost exclusive control over this region, but it is now experiencing a growing instability which is calling the "Pax Americana" into question. In our resolution quoted above, we had already underlined a certain number of examples of the increasing challenge to American leadership by some of its vassals in this region, in particular "the almost unanimously hostile reaction towards the US cruise missile attack on Iraq" in the autumn of 1996, even from hitherto "loyal" states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Another significant example was "the coming to power in Israel of the right, which has since done everything it could to sabotage the peace process with the Palestinians, which had been one of the great successes of American diplomacy". The situation which has developed since then has strikingly confirmed this analysis. From last March onwards, the "peace process" has been going backwards, with the ending of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations due to the Netanyahu government's continued policy of colonising the occupied territories. Since then, tension has mounted more and more. In the summer it was raised by a number of murderous suicide bombings, in the center of Jerusalem. Attributed to Hamas, they gave the Israeli state the opportunity to reinforce its repression of the Palestinian population and to impose a blockade on the "autonomous territories". In addition, a series of raids by the Israeli army have been launched against Hizbollah in southern Lebanon, leading to more death and destruction. Faced with this rapid deterioration of the situation, the White House dispatched its two principal emissaries, Dennis Ross and Madeleine Albright, one after the other, but without great success. The latter even recognised that she had not found "the best method for keeping the peace process on the rails". And indeed, despite strong pressure from Washington, Netanyahu has remained deaf and is continuing his aggressive policy towards the Palestinians, which is putting into question Arafat's authority and thus his ability to control his own forces. As for the Arab countries, more and more of them have been expressing their displeasure at American policies, accusing the US of sacrificing their interests for Israel's benefit. Among those currently standing up to the US boss is Syria, which is beginning to develop economic and military relations with Tehran and has even re-opened its borders with Iraq. At the same time, what would have been inconceivable not long ago, is happening today; Saudi Arabia the Americans' "most faithful ally" but also the country which up till now has been most opposed to the "regime of tile Mullahs", is renewing its links with Iran. These new attitudes towards Iran and Iraq, two of the main targets of American policy in recent years, can only be seen as acts of defiance, even a slap in the face for Washington.
In this context of sharpening difficulties for their transatlantic rival, the European bourgeoisies are throwing oil on the fire. Our resolution already underlined this point by asserting that the challenge to US leadership is confirmed "more generally [by] the loss of a monopoly of control over the situation in the Middle East, a crucial zone if ever there was one. This has been illustrated in particular by the return in force of France, which imposed itself as the joint supervisor in settling the conflict between Israel and Lebanon ...”. Thus, during the summer, we have seen the European union shadowing Dennis Ross and creating difficulties for US diplomacy. Its "special envoy" proposed the setting up of a "permanent security committee" to enable Israel and the PLO to "collaborate in a permanent rather than intermittent way". More recently, the French minister of foreign affairs, H Vedrine, blew a little bit more on the flames by calling Netanyahu's policies "catastrophic", which was an irnplici t attack on US policy. He also declared loud and clear that "the peace process has been shattered" and "has no perspective". This is to say the least an encouragement to the Palestinians, and all the Arab countries, to turn away from the US and their Pax Americana.
"This is why the success of the present US counter-offensive cannot be considered to be definitive, to have overcome its crisis of leadership". And even if "brute force, manoeuvres aimed at destabilising its rivals (as in mire today), with their procession of tragic consequences, will thus continue to be used by this power" (ibid), its rivals have by no means exhausted their capacity to undermine the USA's hegemony.
Today, no imperialism, not even the strongest, is free from the destabilising actions of its rivals. The old exclusive hunting grounds are tending to disappear. There are no more "protected" zones on the planet. More than ever, the world is being subjected to unbridled competition and the rule of "every man for himself”. And this will only widen and deepen the bloody chaos into which capitalism is sinking.
Elfe 20. 9. 97
In the last issue of the International Review, we published the first part of an article replying to the polemic "Political roots of the ICC's organisational malaise" which appeared in Internationalist Communist Review no. 15, the English language review of the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, which comprises the Communist Workers Organisation (CWO) and the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (PCInt). In this first part, after rectifying a certain number of the IBRP's assertions which bore witness to a lack of acquaintance with our positions, we went back over the history of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left, the political current from which both the IBRP and the ICC claim descent. In particular, we showed that the ancestor of the ICC, the Gauche Communiste de France (GCF) was much more than a "tiny group" as the IBRP puts it: in reality, it was the real political heir of the Italian Fraction, having based its constitution on the latter's acquisitions. It was precisely these acquisitions which the PCInt left to one side or simply rejected when it was formed in 1943, and even more so at its first congress in 1945. This is what we aim to show in this second part of the article.
For communists, the study of the history of the workers' movement and its organisations has nothing in common with academic curiosity. On the contrary, it is an indispensable means for them to found their programme. on a solid basis, to orient themselves in the current situation and to trace clear perspectives for the future. In particular, examining the past experiences of the working class makes it possible to verify the validity of the positions defended by previous organisations of the class and to draw the lesson from them. Revolutionaries of one epoch do not sit in judgement on their forebears. But they must be capable of drawing out what is still valid in the positions they defended, and at the same time recognising their errors, just as they must be able to recognise the moment when a position which was correct in a certain historical context has become obsolete in changed historical conditions. Otherwise they will have great difficulty in assuming their responsibilities, condemned as they would be to repeating the errors of the past or holding on to anachronistic positions.
Such an approach is ABC for a revolutionary organisation. If we look at their article. the IBRP shares this approach and we consider it very positive that this organisation should, among other aspects, raise the question of its own historical origins (or rather the origins of the PCInt) and of the origins of the ICC. It seems to us that understanding the differences between our two organisations must begin by examining their respective histories. It is for this reason that our response to the IBRP's polemic will focus on this question. We began to do this in the first part of this article with regard to the Italian Fraction and the GCF. Now we will go into the history of the PCInt.
In fact, one of the important points to be established is the following: can we consider, as the IBRP puts it, that "the PCInt was the most successful creation of the revolutionary working class since the Russian revolution"1? If this were the case, we would have to see the actions of the PCInt as exemplary and as the main source of inspiration for communists today and tomorrow. The question posed is this: how do we measure the success of a revolutionary organisation? The response can only be: to the extent that it carries out the tasks that fall to it in the historical period in which it is operating. In this sense, the criteria of "success" to be selected are in themselves significant of the way in which you conceive the role and responsibility of the vanguard organisation of the proletariat.
A revolutionary organisation is the expression of, and an active factor in, the process by which the proletariat develops its class consciousness and so undertakes its historic mission of overthrowing capitalism and creating communism. In this sense, such an organisation is an indispensable instrument of the proletariat at that moment of historical leap represented by the communist revolution. When the revolutionary organisation is confronted with this particular situation as was the case with the Communist Parties between 1917 and the beginning of the I 920s, the decisive criterion for evaluating its activity is its capacity to rally around itself, and around the communist programme it defends, the great mass of the workers who are the subject of the revolution. In this sense, we can say that the Bolshevik party fully accomplished its task in 1917 (not only vis-a-vis the revolution in Russia but also the world revolution, since it was also the Bolshevik party that was the main inspiration behind the formation of the Communist International in 1919). From February to October 1917, its ability to link up with the masses in the midst of the revolutionary ferment. to put forward, at each moment in the maturation of the revolution, the most suitable slogans, to act with the greatest intransigence against all the sirens of opportunism - all these were undoubtedly vital factors in its "success".
This said, the role of the communist organisation is not limited to revolutionary periods. If this were the case, such organisations would only have existed in the 1917-23 period, and we would have to question the meaning of the existence of the IBRP and the ICC today. It is clear that outside directly revolutionary periods, communist organisations have the role of preparing the revolution. i.e. contributing in the best possible way to the development of the essential precondition for the revolution: the coming to consciousness of the whole proletariat about its historic goals and the means to attain them. This means, in the first place, that the permanent function of communist organisations (which is thus also their function in revolutionary periods) is to define the proletarian programme in the clearest and most coherent manner. In the second place, and directly connected to the first function, it means politically and organisationally preparing the party will eh will have to be at the head of the proletariat at the moment of revolution. Finally. it means a permanent intervention in the class, according to the means at the organisation's disposal in order to win to communist positions those elements who are trying to break with the ideology and organisations of the bourgeoisie.
To return to "the most successful creation of the working class since the Russian revolution", i.e., according to the IBRP, the PCInt, the question has to be posed: what kind of "success" are we talking about here?
Did it play a decisive role in the action of the proletariat during a revolutionary period, or at least a period of intense proletarian activity?
Did it make vital contributions to the elaboration of the communist programme, in the manner, for example, of the Italian Fraction of the Communist left, from which it claims descent?
Did it lay the solid organisational bases for the formation of the future world communist party, the vanguard of the proletarian revolution to come?
We will begin by responding to this last question. In a letter from the ICC to the PCInt dated 9.6.80, just after the failure of the third conference of the communist left, we wrote:
"How do you explain (...) that your organisation, which was already in existence prior to the revival of the class in 1968, was unable to profit from this revival and extend itself on the international level, whereas ours, practically non-existent in 1968, has since then greatly increased its forces and implanted itself in ten countries?"
The question we posed then remains valid today. Since then, the PCIint has managed to extend itself internationally by forming the IBRP in company with the CWO (which has taken up its essential positions and analyses)2. But we have to recognise that the balance sheet of the PCInt, after more than half a century of existence, is very modest. The ICC has always pointed out and deplored the extreme numerical weakness and limited impact of communist organisations in the present period, and this includes our own. We are not among those who bluff their way around claiming to be the real "general staff” of the proletariat. We leave it to other groups to play at being the "real Napoleon". But having said this, if we base ourselves on the criterion of "success" under examination here, the "tiny GCF", even if it ceased to exist in 1952, comes off far better than the PCInt. With sections or nuclei in 13 countries, 11 regular territorial publications in 7 different languages (including the ones most widely used in the industrialised countries: English, German, Spanish and French), a quarterly theoretical journal in three languages, the ICC, which was formed around the positions and political analyses of the GCF, is today without doubt not only the largest and most extensive political organisation of the Communist Left, but also and above all the one which has known the most positive dynamic of development in the last quarter of a century. The IBRP may well consider that the "success" of the heirs of the GCF, if we compare it with those of the PCInt, is proof of the weakness of the working class. When the combats and consciousness of the latter are more developed, it will surely recognise the positions and slogans of the PCInt and regroup much more massively around it than today. At any rate it's a comforting thought.
In reality, when the IBRP evokes the fabulous "success" of the PCInt, it can't be talking about its capacity to lay down the future organisational bases of the world party (except by taking refuge in speculation about what the IBRP could be in the future). We are thus led to examine another criterion: did the PCInt in 1945-6 (ie, when it adopted its first platform) make a vital contribution to the elaboration of the communist programme?
Here we will not survey all the positions contained in this platform, which certainly contains some excellent things. We will only look at a few programmatic points, already extremely important at that time, on which we do not find a great deal of clarity in the platform. We refer to the nature of the USSR, of so-called "national and colonial liberation struggles", and the union question.
The present platform of the IBRP is clear on the capitalist nature of the society that existed in Russia up till 1990, on the role of the unions as instruments for the preservation of bourgeois order that can in no way be "reconquered" by the proletariat, and on the counter-revolutionary nature of national struggles. However, this clarity is not to be found in the platform of 1945 where the USSR is still defined as a "proletarian state", where the working class is called on to support certain national and colonial struggles and where the unions are still seen as organisations which the proletariat can "reconquer", notably through the creation, under the guidance of the PCInt, of minorities under their leadership3.
During that same period, the GCF had already put into question the old analysis of the Italian Left on the proletarian nature of the unions and had understood that the working class could no longer reconquer these organs. Similarly, the analysis of the capitalist nature of the USSR had already been elaborated during the war by the Italian Fraction reconstituted around the nucleus in Marseilles. Finally, the counter-revolutionary nature of national struggles, the fact that they were no more than moments in the imperialist conflict between the great powers, had already been established by the Fraction during the 1930s. This is why we maintain today what the GCF said to the PCInt in 1946, and which so angers the IBRP. As the latter put it: "The GCF argued that the Internationalist Communist Party was not an advance on the old Fraction of the Communist Left, which had gone into exile in France during the Mussolini dictatorship" (ICR no. 15). On the level of programmatic clarity, the facts speak for themselves4.
Thus, we can't consider that the programmatic positions of the PCInt in 1945 were part of its "success" because a good part of them had to be revised later on, notably in 1952 at the time of the congress which saw the split with the Bordiga tendency, and even later than that. If the IBRP will allow us a little irony, we could say that some of its present positions are more inspired by the GCF than by the PCInt of 1945. So where does the "great success" of this organisation reside? All that remains is the numerical force and the impact it had at a certain moment in history.
It is quite true that between 1945 and 1947, the PCInt had nearly 3000 members and a significant number of workers identified with it. Does this mean that this organisation was able to play a significant role in historical events and direct them towards the proletarian revolution, even if this wasn't the final result? Obviously, we cannot reproach the PCInt with having failed in its responsibilities in the face of a revolutionary situation, because such a situation did not exist in 1945. But this is precisely where the shoe pinches. As the IBRP's article says, the PCInt had "the expectation that workers' unrest would not only be limited to northern Italy as the war drew to a close". In fact, the PCInt was constituted in 1943 on the basis of the resurgence of workers' militancy in the northern Italy, seeing these struggles as the first of a new revolutionary wave that would arise out of the war as had been the case at the end of the first world war. History has refuted this perspective. But in 1943, it was perfectly legitimate to put it forward5. After all, the Communist International and most of the Communist Parties, including the Italian party, had been formed when the revolutionary wave that had begun in 1917 was already on the decline following the tragic crushing of the German proletariat in January 1919. But the revolutionaries of the time were not yet aware of this (and one of the great merits of the Italian Left was precisely to have been among the first currents to have realised that the balance of forces between proletariat and bourgeoisie had been overturned). However, when the conference of late 1945 and early 1946 was being held, the war was already over and the proletarian reactions it had engendered after 1943 had been strangled at birth thanks to a systematic preventive policy on the part of the bourgeoisie6. Despite that, the PCInt did not call into question its previous policies (even if some voices were raised at the conference, noting that the bourgeoisie's grip on the working class had been strengthened). What had been a perfectly understandable error in 1943 was already much less excusable in 1945. However, the PCInt continued along the same path and never questioned the validity of its formation in 1943.
But the most serious thing for the PCInt was not in their error of appreciating the historic period and their difficulty in recognising this error. Much more catastrophic was the way the PCInt developed and the positions it was led to take up, above all because it was trying to "adapt" to the illusions of a working class in retreat.
When it was formed in 1943, the PCInt declared itself to be tile heir to tile political positions elaborated by the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left. Moreover, while its main animator, Onorato Damen, one of the leaders of the Left in the 1920s, had remained in Italy since 1924 (most of the time in Mussolini's prisons, from which he was freed during the events of 1942-43)7, it counted in its ranks a certain number of militants of the Fraction who had returned to Italy at the beginning of the war. And indeed, in the first clandestine issues of Prometeo (which had taken on the traditional name of the paper of the Left in the 1920s and of the Italian Fraction in the 30s), published from November 1943, we can find very clear denunciations of the imperialist war, of anti-fascism and of the "partisan" movements8. However, after 1944, the PCInt oriented itself towards agitation among the partisan groups; in June it published a manifesto which called for "the transformation of the partisan groups which are composed of proletarian elements with a healthy class consciousness into organs of proletarian self-defence, ready to intervene in the revolutionary struggle for power". In August 1944, Prometeo no. 15 went even further in such compromises: "The communist elements sincerely believe in the necessity to struggle against Nazi-fascism and think that once this object has been thrown down, they will be able to march towards the conquest of power and the overthrow of capitalism". This was a revival of me idea which had served as a basis for all those who, during the course of the war in Spain, such as the anarchists and Trotskyists, had called on the workers to "first win the victory against fascism, and then make the revolution". It was the argument of those who had betrayed the cause of the proletariat and lined up under the flags of one of the imperialist camps. This was not the case with the PCInt because it remained strongly impregnated by the tradition of the Left of the Communist Party which, faced with the rise of fascism at the beginning of the I 920s, had distinguished itself by its class intransigence. All the same, the appearance of such arguments in the PCInt press showed how far things had gone. Furthermore, following the example of the minority of the Fraction who in 1936 had joined the POUM's anti-fascist militias in Spain, a certain number of the PCInt's militants entered into the partisan groups. But if the minority in the Fraction had broken organisational discipline, this was not the case at all for the militants of the PCInt: they were simply applying the directives of the Party9.
By all the evidence, the will to regroup a maximum number of workers in and around the Party, at a time when the latter were succumbing en masse to "partisanism", led the PCInt to take its distance from the intransigence which it had originally displayed against anti-fascism and the partisans. This is not a "slander" by the ICC in continuity with the "slanders" of the GCF. This penchant for recruiting new militants without too much concern for the firmness of their internationalist convictions was noted by comrade Danielis, who held a post of responsibility in the Turin Federation in 1945 and who was an old member of the Fraction: "One thing must be clear for everyone: the Party has suffered gravely from a facile extension of its political influence - the result of an equally facile activism - on a purely superficial level. I must recount a personal experience which will serve as a warning against the danger of the Party exerting a facile influence on certain strata of the masses, which is an automatic consequence of the equally facile theoretical formation of its cadres (...) One might think that no member of the Party would have accepted the directions of the 'Committee of National Liberation '. Now, on the morning of 25 April (day of the 'Liberation' of Turin) the whole Turin Federation was in arms, insisting on participating in the crowning of six years of massacre, and some comrades from the provinces - still under military discipline - came to Turin to take part in the manhunt (...) The Party no longer existed; it had liquidated itself (Proceedings of the PCInt Congress in Florence, May 1948). By all the evidence, Danielis was also a "slanderer".
Seriously, if words have any meaning, the politics of the PCInt which allowed it to have such a big "success" in 1945 were nothing more than opportunist. Do we need other examples? We can cite this letter dated February 10, 1945 addressed by the PCIn's "Agitation Committee" "to the agitation committees of parties with a proletarian direction and union movements in the enterprises in order to give the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat a unity of directives and organisation (...) To this end, we propose a gathering qf these diverse committees to put forward a common plan" (Prometeo, April 1945)10. The "parties with a proletarian direction" mentioned here are, in particular, the Socialist and Stalinist parties. However surprising this may appear today, it is absolutely true. When we recalled these facts in International Review no. 32, the PCInt replied: "was the document 'Appeal of the Agitation Committee of the PCInt', published in the April 45 issue, an error? Agreed. It was the last attempt of the Italian left to apply the tactic of the "United Front from below" advocated by the CP of Italy in its polemic with the CI in 1921-23. As such, we put it in the category of 'venial sins' because our comrades were able to eliminate it both on the political and theoreticallevel with a clarity which today leaves us quite certain in front of anyone on this point" (Battaglia Comunista no. 3, February 1983).To which we replied: "We can only admire the delicacy and refinement with which BC fixes up its own self-image. If a proposal for a united front with the Stalinist and social democratic butchers is just a 'venial sin', what else could the PCInt have done in 1945 for it to fall into a really serious mistake (...) join the govemment?" (IR34)11). In any case it is clear that in 1944, the politics of the PCInt represented a real step backwards compared to those of the Fraction. And what a step! The Fraction had for some time made an in-depth critique of the tactic of the united front and since 1935 it had not been calling the Stalinist party a "party of proletarian direction", not to mention social democracy whose bourgeois nature had been recognised since the 1920s.
This opportunist policy of the PCInt can be found again in the "openness" and lack of rigour it showed at the end of the war in its efforts to expand. The ambiguities of the PCInt formed in the north of the country were nothing compared to those of the groups in the south who were admitted into the Party at the end of the war. For example, the "Frazione di sinistra dei comunisti e socialisti" formed in Naples around Bordiga and Pistone: right up to the beginning of 1945 this group practised entryism in the Stalinist PCI in the hope of redressing it. It was particularly vague on the question of the USSR. The PCInt also opened its doors to elements from the POC (Communist Workers' Party) which for a certain period had constituted the Italian section of the Trotskyist Fourth International.
We should also recall that Vercesi, who during the war had concluded that there was nothing to be done and who, at the end of the war, had participated in the 'Coalizione Antifascista' in Brussels12, also joined the new party without the latter demanding that he condemn his anti-fascist deviation. On this point O. Damen wrote to the ICC on behalf of the PCInt in autumn 1976: "The Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee, in the person of Vercesi who thought he had to join the PCInt when it was founded, held onto its own bastardised positions until the Party, making the sacrifices that clarity demanded, rid itself of the dead wood of Bordigism". To which we replied: "what an elegant way of putting it! He - Vercesi - thought he had to joint? And the Party - what did the Party think of this? Or is the Party a bridge club which anyone can join?" (IR no. 8). It should be noted that in this letter Damen was frank enough to recognise that in 1945 the Party had not yet made the "sacrifices that clarity demanded" since this was only done later, in 1952. We can only note this affirmation which contradicts all the fables about the "great clarity" which presided over the foundation of tile PCInt because this represented, according to the IBRP, a "step forward" from the Fraction13.
The PCInt was no more scrupulous about the members of the minority of the Fraction who, in 1936, had enrolled in the anti-fascist militias in Spain and who had then joined Union Communiste14. These elements were able to integrate into the Party without having to make the slightest criticism of their past errors. On this question, O. Damen wrote in the same letter:
"Concerning the comrades who, during the war in Spain, decided to abandon the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left and to throw themselves into an adventure which took them outside class positions: let us remember that the events in Spain, which simply confirmed the positions of the Fraction, taught a lesson to these comrades and allowed them to return to the revolutionary Left". To which we replied: "There was no question of these elements going back to the Communist Left until the Fraction was dissolved and its militants integrated into the PCInt (at the end of 1945). It was never a question of a 'lesson' being learned, or of these militants rejecting their old position and condemning their participation in the anti-fascist war in Spain" (ibid). If the IBRP considers that this is a new "slander" by the ICC, let them show us the documents which prove it. And as we continued: "It was simply that the euphoria and confusion of setting up the party 'with Bordiga' inspired these comrades (...) to join the Party ... The Party in Italy did not ask these comrades to account for their past activities. This was not because of ignorance (...) It was because it was a time to forget 'old quarrels': the reconstitution of the Party wiped the slate clean. A Party which was not very clear about the effect of the Partisan movement on its own militants wasn't likely to have a very rigorous attitude towards what the minority had been doing some years before. Thus it 'naturally' opened its doors to these comrades ... " (ibid).
In fact the only organisation which didn't find favour in tile PCInt's eyes, and with which it didn't want to have any relations, was the GCF, precisely because it continued to base itself on the same rigour and intransigence which had characterised the Fraction in the 1930s. And it's true that the Fraction of that period would only have condemned the mish-mash upon which the PCInt was formed. In fact it was quite similar to the practices of Trotskyism, for which the Fraction had the harshest words to say.
In the 1920s, the Communist Left had opposed tile opportunist orientation of the Communist International from its Third Congress, particularly tile aim of "going to the masses" at a time when tile revolutionary wave was in reflux. This had involved fusion with the centrist currents that had come out of tile Socialist Parties (the Independents in Germany, the "Terzini' in Italy, Cachin-Frossard in France, etc) and the policy of the "United Front" with the SPs. This method of "broad regroupment" employed by the CI to set up Communist Parties was opposed by Bordiga and the Left, who put forward the method of "selection" based on a rigourous and intransigent defence of principles. The CI's policies had tragic consequences, with the isolation and ultimate exclusion of the Left, and the invasion of the parties by opportunist elements who would be the best vectors of degeneration.
At the beginning of tile 1930s, the Italian Left, faithful to its policy of the 1920s, had fought within the International Left Opposition in order to impose the same rigour faced with the opportunist policies of Trotsky, for whom an acceptance of the first four congresses of the CI, and above all of his own manoeuvering tactics were much more important criteria for regroupment than the combats that had been fought within the CI against its degeneration. With such policies, the healthiest elements seeking to construct an international current of the Communist Left were either corrupted, or discouraged, or condemned to isolation. Based on such fragile foundations, the Trotskyist current went through crisis after crisis before passing wholesale into the bourgeois camp during the second world war. For its part, the Italian Left's intransigent position had resulted in its exclusion from the Left Opposition in 1933, with Trotsky betting on a phantom "New Italian Opposition" (NOI) , made up of elements who, at the head the PCI as late as 1930, had voted for the expulsion of Bordiga from the Party.
In 1945, anxious to beef up its membership as much as possible, the PCInt, which claimed to be the heir of the Left, was actually not taking up the politics of the latter towards the CI and Trotskyism, but the very politics that the Left had fought against: a "broad" assemblage based on programmatic ambiguities, regroupment - without asking for any "accounts" - on the basis of militants and "personalities"15 who had opposed the positions of the Fraction during the war in Spain and the world war, an opportunist policy which flattered the workers' illusions in the partisans and in parties which had gone over to the enemy, etc. And to make this assemblage as complete as possible, the GCF had to be excluded from the international left communist current, precisely because it was most loyal to the struggle of the Fraction. At the same time, the only group recognised as a representative of the Communist Left in France was the French Fraction of the Communist Left, mark II (FFGC). It should be recalled that this group was made up of three young elements who had split from the GCF in May 1945, members of the ex-minority of the Fraction excluded during the war in Spain, and members of the ex-Union Communiste which had fallen into anti-fascism at the same time16. Is there not a certain similarity between this and Trotsky's policy towards the Fraction and the NOI?
Marx wrote that "history always repeats itself, the ftrst time as tragedy, the second time as farce", There's a bit of this in the not very glorious episode of the formation of the PCInt. Unfortunately, the events that followed were to show that this repetition by the PCInt in 1945 of the policies fought by the Left in the 20s and 30s had rather dramatic consequences.
When we read the proceedings of the conference of the PCInt, end 1945-beginning 1946, we can only be struck by the heterogeneity which reigned there.
On the analysis of the historical period, which was an essential question, the main leaders were in conflict. Damen continued to defend the "official position" :
"The new course of the history of the proletarian struggle is open. Our Party has the task of orienting this struggle in the direction which will make it possible, during the next, inevitable crisis, for the war and its artisans to be destroyed in time and definitively, by the proletarian revolution" ("Report on the international situation and the perspectives", p 12).
But certain voices noted, without saying it openly, that tile conditions were not favourable for the formation of the party:
" ... what dominates today is the 'fightto-the-end' ideology of the CLN and the partisan movement, and this is why the conditions for the victorious affirmation of the proletarian class are not present. Consequently we can only qualify the present moment as reactionary" (Vercesi, The party and international problems", p 14).
"In concluding this political balance-sheet, it is necessary to ask ourselves if we have to go forward with a policy of enlarging our influence, or whether the situation above all imposes on us, in an atmosphere that is still poisoned, the need to safeguard the fundamental bases of our political and ideological delimitation, to strengthen the cadres ideologically, to immunise them against the bacilli one breathes in the current ambiance, and thus to prepare them for the new political positions that will present themselves tomorrow. In my opinion, it is in the second direction that the activity of the Party has to be oriented in all areas" (Maffi, "Political-organisational relations for northern Italy").
In other words, Maffi advocates the classic work of a fraction.
On the parliamentary question, we can see the same heterogeneity:
"This is why. under a democratic regime, we will use all the concessions we can, to the extent that this situation does not damage the interests (if the revolutionary struggle. We remain irreducibly anti-parliamentarian; but the sense of the concrete which animates our politics makes us reject any abstentionist position determined in advance" (O. Damen, ibid, p 12).
"Maffi, going over the conclusions arrived at by the Party. asked whether the problem of electoral abstentionism should be posed in its old form (participating or not in elections according to whether the situation was moving towards a revolutionary explosion), or whether, on the contrary, in an ambiance corrupted by electoral illusions, it would be better to take up a clearly anti-electoral position, even at the price of isolation. Not to hang on to the concessions made to us by the bourgeoisie (concessions which are not expressions of its weakness but of its strength) but to attach ourselves to the real process of the class struggle and of our Left tradition" (ibid, p 12).
Do we have to point out that Bordiga's left current in the Italian Socialist party during the first world war was known as the "Abstentionist Fraction"?
Again, on the union question, the reporter Luciano Stefanini argued, against the position that was finally adopted:
"The political line of the Party towards the union question is not yet sufficiently clear. On the one hand we recognise the unions' dependency on the capitalist state; on the other hand, we invite the workers to struggle within them and to conquer them from within in order to take them onto class positions. But this possibility is excluded by the capitalist evolution that we mentioned above, the present-day union cannot change its physiognomy as a state organ the slogan of new mass organisations is not valid today, but the Party has the duty of predicting the course of events and indicating to the workers what kind of organs, arising from the evolution of the situation, will be needed as the unitary guide for the proletariat under the direction of the Party. The pretension to obtaining positions of command in the present union organisms in order to transform them must be definitively liquidated". (p18-19).
After this conference, the GCF wrote:
"The new party is not a political unity but a conglomeration. an addition of currents and tendencies which cannot fail to appear and to confront each other. The present armistice can only be very provisional. The elimination of one or other current is inevitable. Sooner or later a political and organisational definition will impose itself" (lnternationalisme no. 7, February 1946).
After a period of intensive recruitment, the definition began to take place. From the end of 1946, the disquiet provoked in the PCInt by its participation in elections (many militants could not forget the abstentionist tradition of the Left) led the Party leadership to publish a statement in the press entitled "Our strength", which called for discipline. After the euphoria of the Turin Conference, many discouraged militants left the Party. A certain number of elements split in order to take part in the formation of the Trotskyist pal, proof that they had no place in an organisation of the Communist Left. Many militants were excluded without the divergences emerging clearly, at least in the public press. One of the main federations split to form the “Autonomous Turin Federation". In 1948, at the Florence Congress, the Party had already lost half its members and its press half its readers. As for the "armistice" of 1946, it was transformed into an "armed peace" which the leaders tried not to disturb, glossing over the main divergences. Thus Maffi said that he "abstained from raising such and such a problem because I knew that this discussion would poison the Party". This did not however prevent the Congress from radically questioning the position on the unions adopted two and a half years before (the position of 1945, which was supposed to represent such shining clarity!). This armed peace finally led to an open confrontation (especially after Bordiga joined the Parry in 1949), leading to the 1952 split between the Damen tendency and the one animated by Bordiga and Maffi which would be the origin of the Programma Comunista current.
As for the “sister organizations” which the PCInt was counting out to constitute an International Bureau of the Communist Left, their outcome is less enviable. The Belgian Fraction ceased publishing L'Intemationaliste in 1949 and disappeared soon afterwards; the French fraction Mark II went through a two-year eclipse, with most of its members leaving, before reappearing Group of the International Communist Left, which was attached to the Bordigist current17.
The "greatest success since Russian revolution" was thus short-lived. And when the IBRP, to support its arguments about this "success", tells us that the PCInt, "despite half a century of further capitalist domination, continues to exist and is growing today", it forgets to point out that the present-day PCInt, in terms of membership and audience within the working class, doesn't have a lot to do with what it was at the end of the last war. Without dwelling on comparisons, we can say that the size of this organisation today is roughly the same as the direct heir of the "tiny GCF", the French section of the ICC. And we do indeed want to believe that the PCInt is " growing today". The ICC has also found in the recent period that there is a greater interest in the positions of the Communist Left, which has expressed itself in particular by a certain number of new members. This said, we do not think that the present growth of the PCInt will allow it to go back quickly to the membership it had in 1945-6.
Thus this great "success" reached the not very glorious situation in which an organisation which went on calling itself a "Party" was actually compelled to play the role of a fraction. What's more serious is that today the IBRP does not draw the lessons from this experience, and above all does not put into question the opportunist method which is one of the reasons that the "glorious success" of 1945 prefigured the "unsuccess" that was to follow18.
This uncritical attitude towards the opportunist deviations of the PCInt at its origins makes us fear that the IBRP, when the class movement is more developed than this today, will be tempted to resort to the same opportunist expedients that we have pointed out. The fact that the IBRP's main "criterion of success" for a proletarian organisation is the number of members and the impact it has at a given moment, leaving aside programmatic rigour and the capacity to lay the bases for a long term work, reveals the immediatist approach it has on the organisation question. And we know that immediatism is the antechamber to opportunism. We can also point to some other, more immediate consequences of the PCInt's inability to criticise its origins.
In the first place, the fact that the PCInt after 1945-6 (when it had become evident that the counter-revolution was still in force) maintained the validity of founding the Party led it to revise radically the whole conception of the Italian Fraction about the relation between party and fraction. For the PCInt, from now on, the on of the party could take place at any moment, independent of the balance of forces between proletariat and bourgeoisie19. This is the position of the Trotskyists, not of the Italian Left, which always considered that the party could only be formed in the wake of a historic revival of the class. But at the same time, revision also meant questioning the idea that there can be determined and antagonistic historical courses: the course towards world war. For the IBRP these two courses can be in parallel rather than mutually exclusive, which results in an inability to analyse the present historical period, as we showed in our article “The CWO and the historic course, an accumulation of contradictions" in IR no.89. This is why we wrote in the first part of the present article: "when we look more closely, the IBRP's present inability to give an analysis of the nature of the historic course derives in large part from its political mistakes on the organisation question. More particularly on the relationship between fraction and party".
To the question why the heirs of the "tiny GCF" succeeded where those of the glorious Party of 1943-5 failed, i.e, in constituting a real international organisation, we propose to the IBRP that it think about the following: because the GCF, and in its wake the ICC, remained faithful to the approach which enabled the Fraction to become, at the time of the shipwreck of the CI, the largest and most fertile current of the Communist Left:
- programmatic rigour as the foundation of an organisation that rejected all opportunism, all precipitation, all policies of "recruitment" on shaky bases;
- a clear vision of the notion of the fraction and its links with the party;
- the capacity to correctly identify the nature of the historic course;
The greatest success since the death of the CI (and not since the Russian revolution) was not the PCInt but the Fraction. Not in numerical terms but in terms of its capacity to prepare the bases for the world party of the future, despite its own disappearance.
In principle the PCInt (and after it the IBRP) present themselves as the political heirs of the Italian Fraction. We have shown in this article how far the PCInt, when it was formed, had distanced itself from the tradition and positions of the Fraction. Since then, the PCInt has clarified a whole series of programmatic questions, which we consider to be extremely positive. Nevertheless it seems to us that the PCInt will only be able to make its full contribution to the constitution of the future world party if it brings its declarations and its actions into line, i.e, if it really reappropriates the political approach of the Italian Fraction. And that means in the first place that it shows itself capable of making a serious critique of the experience of the foundation of the PCInt in 1943-45 instead of eulogising it and taking it as an example to follow.
Fabienne
1We suppose that, carried away by his enthusiasm, the author of the article has been the victim of a slip of the pen and that he meant to write "since the end ofthe first revolutionary wave and of the Cornmunist International". If on the other hand he means what he wrote, we would have to ask some questions about his knowledge of history and his sense of reality: has he never heard. among other things. of the Communist Party of Italy which at the beginning of the 1920s had a far bigger impact than that of the PCInt in 1945 while at the same time being in the vanguard of the International on a whole series of political questions? In any case, for the rest of the article, we prefer to have ourselves on the first hypothesis. Polemecising against absurdities is of no interest.
2Let's note that during this same period, the ICC integrated three new territorial sections: in Switzerland and in two countries on the peripheries of capitalism, Mexico and India, areas which have been the object of particular interest by the IBRP (see in particular the adoption by the 6th Congress of the PCInt in 1977 the "Theses on communist tactics in the countries of the capitalist periphery")
3This is how the PClnt's policy towards the unions was formulated: "the substantial content of point 12 of the party platform call be concretised in the following points:
1. The party aspires to reconstruct the CGL through the direct struggle of the proletariat against the bosses in partial and general class movements;
2. the struggle of the party does not aim directly at splitting off the masses organised in the unions;
3. the process of re constructing the union, while it cannot be realised without conquering the union's leading organs, derives from a programme of organising class struggles under the leadership of the party".
4The PCInt of today is rather embarrassed by this platform of 1945. So. when it republished this document in 1974 along with the "Schema of a Programme" written in 1944 by the Damen group, did it take care to make a thorough critique of the platform by opposing it to the "Schema of a Programme" which it cannot praise too highly? In the presentation it says "in 1945, the Central Committee received a draft political platform from comrade Bordiga who, we stress, was not a member of the Party. The document, whose acceptance was asked for in terms of an ultimatum, was recognised as being incompatible with the firm positions that had by then been adopted by the Party on the most important problems and, despite the modifications made to it, the document was always seen as a contribution to the debate and not as a de facto platform (...) The ICC could not, as we have seen, accept this document except as a contribution of a personal nature to the debate at the future congress, which, when it took place in 1948 was to bring out the existence of very different positions.” It should have been made clearer who exactly it was that considered this document to be a "contribution to the debate". Probably comrade Damen and a few other militants. But they kept their impressions to themselves because the 1945-6 Conference. i.e. the representation of the whole Party took a very different position. The document was unanimously adopted as the platform of the PCInt, serving as a basis for joining and for the formation of an International Bureau of the Communist Left. And in fact it was the "Schema of a Programme" that was put off for discussion at the next congress. And if the comrades of the IBRP once again think that we are "lying", they should refer to the verbal proceedings of the Turin Conference at the end of 1945. If there is a lie, it's in the way the PCInt presented its "version" of things in 1974. In fact, the PCInt is so little proud of certain aspects of its own history that it finds it necessary to pretty them up a bit. This said, we can ask why the PCInt agreed to submit to an "ultimatum" of any kind, particularly from someone who wasn't even a party member.
5As we saw in the first part of this article, the Italian Fraction concluded at its August 1943 conference that "with the new course opened by the August events in Italy, the course towards the transformation of the Fraction into a Party is now open.” The GCF, at its foundation in 1944, took up the same analysis.
6On a number of occasions we have shown in our press what this systematic policy of the bourgeoisie consisted of – how this class, having drawn the lessons from the first war. systematically divided up the work, leaving it to the defeated countries to do the "dirty work" (anti-working class repression in the north of Italy, crushing of the Warsaw uprising, etc), while at the same time the victors systematically bombed the working class concentrations of Germany, occupying the beaten countries in order to police them and holding prisoners of war for several years alter the war had ended.
7The GCF and the ICC have often criticised the programmatic positions defended by Damen as well as his political method. This in no way alters the esteem we have for the depth of his communist convictions, his militant energy and great courage.
8"Workers! Against the slogan of national war, which arms the Italian workers against the German and English workers, put forward the slogan of the communist revolution, which unites the workers of the whole world against their common enemy: capitalism" (Prometeo no. I, I November 1943).
"Against the call by centrism [this is what the Italian Left called Stalinism] to join the partisan bands, we must reply by our presence in the factories, and it is from here that will come the class violence that will destroy the vital centers of the capitalist state" (Prometeo. 4 March 1944).
9For more on the PCInt's attitude towards the partisans see "The ambiguities of the Internationalist Communist Party over the 'partisans' in Italy in 1943, IR no.8.
10In IR no. 32 we published the complete text of this appeal as well as our commentary on it.
11We should point out that in the letter the PCInt sent the SP in response to the latter's reply to the appeal, the PCInt addressed these social democratic scoundrels by calling them "dear comrades". This was not the best way to unmask the crimes committed against the proletariat by these parties since the first world war and the revolutionary wave which followed it. On the other hand it was an excellent way of flattering the illusions of the workers who still followed them.
12See the first part of this article in IR no. 90.
13On this subject, it's worth citing other passages written by the PCInt: "the positions expressed by comrade Perrone (Vercesi) at the Turin Conference (1946) were free expressions of a very personal experience and a fantasy-based political perspective, which cannot be taken as reference points for formulating a critique of the formation of the PCInt" (Prometeo no. 18. I 972). The problem is that these positions were expressed in the report on "The party and international problems" presented to the Conference by the Central Committee of which Vercesi was a member. The judgment of the militants of 1972 is truly severe towards their Party in 1945-6, a Party whose central organ presents a report in which anything can be said. We suppose that after this article the author was seriously reprimanded for having "slandered" the PCInt of 1945 instead of repeating the conclusion which O. Damen made to the discussion on the report: "there were no divergences but particular sensibilities which allowed all organic clarification of the problems" (Proceedings. p16). It is true that the same Damen discovered later on that these "particular sensibilities" were "bastardised positions" and that "organic clarification" meant "separating from the dead wood". In any case, long live the clarity of 1945!
14On the minority in the Fraction in 1936. see the first part of this article in IR no. 90.
15It is clear that one of the reasons why the PCInt of 1945 agreed to integrate Vercesi without asking him to account for his past activities, and why it allowed itself to have its "hands forced" by Bordiga on the question of the platform is that it was counting on the prestige of these two "historic" leaders to attract a maximum number of workers and militants. Bordiga's hostility would have deprived the PCInt of the groups and elements in the south of Italy; Vercesi's, of the Belgian Fraction and the FFGC Mark II.
16On this episode, see the first part of this article.
17We can therefore affirm that the "tiny GCF", which had been treated with such disdain and carefully kept apart from the other groups, still survived longer than the Belgian Fraction and the FFGC Mark II. Until its disappearance in 1952, it published 46 issues of Internationalisme, inestimable heritage on which the ICC was built.
18It is true that the opportunist method is not the only explanation for the impact the PCInt could have in 1945. There are two fundamental causes for this:
- Italy was the only country which saw a real and powerful movement of the working class during the imperialist war and in opposition to it;
- the Communist left. because it had assumed the leadership of the Party until 1925, and because Bordiga had been the main founder of this Party, had a prestige among the workers of Italy which had no comparison to that of other countries.
On the other hand, one of the causes of the numerical weaknesses of the GCF is precisely the fact that there was no tradition of the Communist Left in the working class in France, and that the latter had not been able to rise up during the world war. There is also the fact that the GCF shunned any opportunist attitude with regard to the workers' illusions in the "Liberation" and the "partisans". Here it was following the example of the Fraction in 1936 faced with the war in Spain. which left in a state of isolation. as it itself noted in Bilan no. 36. 19) On this question, see in particular "The Fraction-Party Relationship in the Marxist Tradition". IR no. 59.
19On this question, see in particular “The Fraction-Party Relationship in the Marxist Tradition”, IR no. 59.
One of the arguments favoured by bourgeois professors in their endless battle with marxism is their charge that it is a "pseudo-science" somewhat akin to phrenology and similar quackeries. The most sophisticated presentation of this idea can be found in Karl Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies, a classic "philosophical" justification of liberalism and the Cold War. According to Popper, marxism's claim to be a science of society is false, because its propositions can be neither verified nor refuted by practical experiment - a sine qua non of any truly scientific investigation.
In fact, marxism does not claim to be "a" science, of the same type as the natural sciences. It recognises that human social relations cannot be subjected to the same precise, controlled examination as physical, chemical or biological processes. What it does affirm is that, as the world view of an exploited class which has no interest in mystifying or occulting social reality, marxism alone is able to apply the scientific method to the study of society and historical evolution. To be sure, history cannot be examined under laboratory conditions. The predictions of a revolutionary social critic cannot be tested by carefully controlled, repeated experimentation. But if we allow for this, it is still possible to extrapolate from the past and present movement of social, economic or historical processes and outline the broad shape of the movement to come. And what is so striking about the gigantic sequence of historical events inaugurated by the First World War is precisely the degree to which they validated the predictions of marxism in the living laboratory of social action.
A fundamental premise of historical materialism was that, like all previous class societies, capitalism would reach a phase in which its relations of production, from being conditions for the development of the productive forces, would become fetters, throwing the whole political and legal superstructure of society into crisis, and initiating an epoch of social revolution. The founders of marxism thus analysed in great depth the contradictions in capitalism's substructure, its economic base, that would impel the system into this historic crisis. This analysis was necessarily a general one and could not arrive at precise predictions about the date of the revolutionary crisis. Despite this, even Marx and Engels sometimes fell victim to revolutionary impatience and were too precipitous in announcing the general decline of the system and thus the imminence of the proletarian revolution. Nor was it always clear what shape this historic crisis would assume. Would the general crisis of the system simply take the form of the cyclical economic depressions that bad marked its ascendant period, only more widespread and without scope for a new revival? Here again, only a general perspective could be put forward. Nonetheless, as early on as the Communist Manifesto, the essential dilemma facing humanity was expressed: socialism or a relapse into barbarism, the emergence of a higher form of human association or the unleashing of all capitalism's inherent tendencies towards destruction - what the Manifesto calls "the mutual ruin of the contending classes".
Towards the end of the 19th century, however, as capitalism entered its phase of imperialism, of unbridled militarism and competition to conquer the remaining non-capitalist areas of the planet, it began to become clear that the disaster towards which capitalism was leading humanity was not merely an economic depression writ large, but a full scale military catastrophe: global warfare as economic competition by oilier means, but increasingly taking on its own insane dynamic, crushing the whole of civilisation under its juggernaut wheels. Hence, in 1887 this remarkable 'prophecy' by Engels:
"No war is any longer possible for Prussia-Germany except a world war and a world war indeed of an extent and violence hitherto undreamt-of. Eight to ten millions of soldiers will massacre one another and in doing so devour the whole of Europe until they have stripped it barer than any swarm of locusts has ever done. The devastation of the Thirty Years War compressed into three or four years, and spread over the whole Continent: famine, pestilence, general descent into barbarism, both of the armies and the mass of the people; hopeless confusion of our artificial system of trade, industry and credit, ending in general bankruptcy; collapse of the old states and their traditional elite wisdom to such an extent that crowns will roll by dozens on the pavement and there will be nobody to pick them up; absolute impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end and who will come out of the struggle as victor; only one result is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the establishment of the conditions for the final victory of the working class.
That is the prospect when the system of mutual one-upmanship in armaments, driven to extremes, at last bears its inevitable fruits. This, my lords, princes and statesmen, is where in your wisdom you have brought old Europe. And when nothing more remains to you but to open the last great war dance - that will suit us nicely. The war may perhaps push us temporarily into the background, may wrench from us many a position already conquered. But when you have unfettered forces which you will no longer be able to control, things may go as they will; at the end of the tragedy you will be ruined and the victory of the proletariat already achieved or at any rate inevitable" (15 December 1887, in Marx and Engels. Collected Works, Vol 26, p451).
The revolutionary fractions who, in 1914, maintained the principles of internationalism in the face of the war had good reason to recall these words of Engels. In the Junius Pamphlet, Rosa Luxemburg only has to bring them up to date:
"Friedrich Engels once said: 'Capitalist society faces a dilemma, either an advance to socialism or a reversion to barbarism '. What does a 'reversion to barbarism' mean at the present stage of European civilisation? We have read and repeated these words thoughtlessly without a conception of their terrible import. At this moment one glance about us will show us what a reversion to barbarism in capitalist society means. This world war means a reversion to barbarism. The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of culture, sporadically during a modern war. and forever. if the period of world wars that has just begun is allowed to take its damnable course to the last ultimate consequence. Thus we stand today, as Friedrich Engels prophesied more than a generation ago, before the awful proposition: either the triumph of imperialism and the destruction of all culture, and. as in ancient Rome. depopulation, desolation, degeneration. a vast cemetery; or. the victory of socialism, that is, the conscious struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism. Against its methods. against war. This is the dilemma of world history. its inevitable choice, whose scales are trembling in the balance awaiting the decision of the proletariat. Upon it depends the future of culture and humanity". Luxemburg, building on Engels' foresight, displays her own: if the proletariat did not do away with capitalism, the imperialist war would be only the first in a series of ever-more devastating global conflicts that would ultimately threaten the very survival of humanity. That indeed has been the drama of the 20th century, the most telling proof that, as Lenin put it, "capitalism has outlived itself. It has become the most reactionary brake on human progress" (Lenin, "Reply to questions put by an American correspondent", July 20, 1919).
But if the war of 1914 confirmed this side of the historic alternative - the decadence of the capitalist system, its plunge into regression - the Russian revolution and the international revolutionary wave that followed confirmed with no less clarity the other side: in the terms of the Manifesto of the First Congress of the Communist International in 1919, that the epoch of capitalism's inner disintegration is also the epoch of the communist revolution, and that the working class is the only social force that can put an end to capitalist barbarism and inaugurate the new society. The terrible deprivations of the imperialist war and the disintegration of the Tsarist regime threw the whole of Russian society into turmoil, but within the revolt of a huge population comprised in the majority by peasants and peasants in uniform, it was the working class in the urban centres who created new revolutionary organs of struggle - the soviets, factory committees, Red Guards - which served as a model for the rest of the population; which made the most rapid strides at the level of political consciousness, a development expressed in the spectacular growth in the influence of the Bolshevik party; and which, at each stage of the revolutionary process, took the lead in determining the course of events: in the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in February, in foiling the plots of the counter-revolution in September; in carrying out the insurrection in October. By the same token, it was the working class in Germany, Hungary, Italy and across the globe whose strikes and uprisings put an end to the war and threatened the very existence of world capital.
If the proletarian masses performed these revolutionary feats, it was not because they were intoxicated by some millenarian vision, nor because they had been duped by a handful of machiavellian schemers, but because, through their own practical struggle, their own debates and discussions, they came to see that the slogans and programme of the revolutionary marxists corresponded to their own class interests and needs.
Three years into the definitive opening up of the epoch of the proletarian revolution, the proletariat made a revolution - seized political power in one country and issued a challenge to the order of the bourgeoisie all over the world. The spectre of "Bolshevism", of soviet power, of mutiny against the imperialist war machine caused crowns to fall and haunted the ruling class everywhere. For three years or more it seemed that Engels' prediction would be confirmed in all respects: the barbarism of war would ensure the victory of the proletariat. Of course, as the bourgeois professors never cease to remind us, "it failed", and of course, they add, it was bound to fail because such a grandiose project of liquidating capitalism and creating a human society is simply contrary to "human nature" . But the ruling class of the day did not sit back and wait for "human nature" to take its course. To exorcise the spectre of the world revolution, it linked hands across the world to combine its counter-revolutionary forces, through military intervention against the soviet republic, through the provocation and massacre of the revolutionary workers from Berlin to Shanghai. And almost without exception, the forces of liberalism and social democracy - the Kerenskys, the Noskes and the Woodrow Wilsons, whom the majority of professors point to as the embodiment of a more rational, realisable alternative to the impossible dreams of marxism - were the key leaders and organisers of the counter-revolutionary forces.
Twentieth century quantum physics has found it necessary to recognise a fundamental premise of dialectics: that you cannot study reality from the outside. Observation influences the process you are observing. Marxism never claimed to be a neutral "science of society" because it took a partisan stance from within the process, and by doing so defined itself as a force for accelerating and changing the process. Bourgeois academics may lay claim to impartiality and neutrality but the moment they comment on social reality their partisan interests also become clear. The difference is that while the marxists are part of the movement towards a free society, the professors who criticise marxism never fail to end up apologising for the bloodiest forces of social and political reaction.
From being a general, historic perspective, as it had been during the previous century, the communist programme had become very precise. In 1917, the burning question of the day was the question of political power - of the proletarian dictatorship. And it fell to the Russian proletariat to solve this problem, in theory as well as in practise. Lenin's The State and Revolution, The marxist theory of the state and the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution, written in August -September I 917, has already been referred to many times in these articles, since we have tried not only to re-examine much of its subject matter, but above all to apply its method. If we repeat what we have said before, so be it: some things are well worth repeating. Since State and Revolution has such a crucial place in the evolution of the marxist theory of the state we make no apologies for now making it the essential subject of an article in itself.
As we showed in the previous article (International Review 90), the direct experience of the class and the analysis of that experience by the marxist minorities had already, prior to the war and the revolutionary wave, laid the essential groundwork for solving the problem of the state in the proletarian revolution. The Paris Commune of 1871 had already led Marx and Engels to the conclusion that the proletariat "could not simply lay hold" of the old bourgeois state but had to destroy it and replace it with new organs of power; the mass strikes of 1905 had demonstrated that the soviets of workers' deputies were the form of revolutionary power most appropriate to the new historical epoch then opening up; Pannekoek, in his polemic with Kautsky had reaffirmed that the proletarian revolution could only be the result of a mass movement which paralysed and disintegrated the state power of the bourgeoisie.
But the weight of opportunism in the workers' movement prior to the war was too great to be dispelled by even the sharpest polemic. What had been learned through events such as the Commune had been unlearned through decades of parliamentarism and legalism, of growing reforrnism in the party and the trade unions. Moreover, the abandonment of the revolutionary outlook of Marx and Engels was by no means restricted to the open revisionists like Bernstein: through the work of the current around Kautsky, the fetishism of parliament and the theorisation of a peaceful, "democratic" road to revolution had actually come to present themselves as the final word of" orthodox marxism" . In such a situation, it could not be until tile positions of the left fractions in the 2nd International fused with the vast movement of the masses that the proletariat's amnesia about its own acquisitions could be overcome. This did not diminish the importance of the "theoretical" intervention of revolutionaries on this question, on the contrary. When revolutionary theory seizes the masses and becomes a material force, both its elucidation and its dissemination become more urgent and decisive than ever.
In an article in International Review 89, tile ICC has recalled the vital importance of the political-theoretical intervention contained in Lenin's April Theses, which showed the party and the working class as a whole the way out of the fog of confusion created by the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and all the other forces of compromise and betrayal. At the core of Lenin's position in April was his insistence that the revolution in Russia could only be a part of the world socialist revolution; that consequently the proletariat could only continue its struggle against the parliamentary republic that the opportunists and the bourgeois left presented as the finest acquisition of the revolution; that the proletariat had to fight, not for a parliamentary republic, but for the transfer of power to the soviets - for the dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with the poor peasants.
For their part, Lenin's political opponents, above all those who claimed the mantle of marxist orthodoxy, immediately accused Lenin of anarchism, of seeking to ascend Bakunin's vacant throne. This ideological offensive of opportunism required a response, a reaffirmation of the marxist alphabet, but also a theoretical deepening in the light of recent historical experience. State and Revolution answered this need, providing at the same time one of the most remarkable demonstrations of the marxist method, of the profound inter-action between theory and practise. Lenin had written more than a decade earlier that "there can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory". Now, forced to go into hiding in the Finnish countryside by the repression that followed the July Days (see the article on these events in IR 90), Lenin recognised the necessity to delve deep into the classics of marxism, into the history of the workers' movement, in order to clarify the immediate goals of an immensely practical mass movement.
State and Revolution was a continuation and a clarification of marxist theory. But this has not prevented the bourgeoisie (often echoed by the anarchists, as usual) from claiming that the book, with its emphasis on soviet power and the destruction of all bureaucracy, is the product of a temporary conversion by Lenin to anarchism. This can be done from various angles. A sympathetic, leftish historian like Liebman (Leninism under Lenin, London, 1975), for example, talks about State and Revolution as the work of a "libertarian Lenin": the impression being that this expressed Lenin's short-lived enthusiasm for the creatiye potential of the masses in 1917-18, in contrast to the more "authoritarian" Lenin of 1902-3, the Lenin who allegedly distrusts the spontaneity of the masses and advocates a Jacobin style party to act as their general staff. But Lenin's ability to respond to the spontaneous movement, to the creativity of the masses - even to correct his own exaggerations and mistakes in their light - was not limited to 1917. It had already shown itself clearly in 1905 (see the article on 1905 in IR 90). In 1917, Lenin was convinced that proletarian revolution was on the historical agenda and was no longer constrained by the theory of a "democratic revolution" for Russia. This led him to count even more decisively on the autonomous struggle of the working class, but this was a development of his previous positions, not a sudden conversion to anarchism.
Others, more openly hostile approaches to State and Revolution see the book as being part of a machiavellian ruse to get the masses to line up behind his plans for a Bolshevik coup and a party dictatorship. Anarchists and councilists are well-versed in arguments of this ilk. We cannot refute them in detail here: this is part of our overall defence of the Russian revolution, and the October insurrection in particular, against the campaigns of the bourgeoisie (see the article on the October insurrection in this issue). What we can say is that Lenin's intransigent defence of marxist principles on the question of the state, from the moment he returned from exile in April, put him in an extreme minority and there was no guarantee at all that the position he put forward would eventually conquer the masses. Seen in this light, Lenin's machiavellianism becomes positively superhuman and we leave the world of social reality for the fantasies of conspiracy theory. Another approach - unfortunately contained in an article published by Internationalism, now the US publication of the ICC, over 20 years ago, when councilist ideology had a considerable weight on the re-emerging revolutionary groups - is to go through State and Revolution with a fine tooth comb and find "proof' that - unlike Marx's writings on the dictatorship of the proletariat - Lenin's book still expresses the standpoint of an authoritarian who carmot envisage the workers liberating themselves by their own efforts (see Internationalism 3, 'Proletarian dictatorship: Marx v Lenin').
We will not avoid dealing with the weaknesses that do indeed exist in State and Revolution. But we will get nowhere by creating a false dichotomy between Marx and Lenin, any more than by seeing State and Revolution as a point of connection between Lenin and Bakunin. Lenin's book is in complete continui ty with Marx , Engels and the whole marxist tradition before him; and the marxist tradition that followed him has in turn drawn immense strength and clarity from this indispensable work.
The first task of State and Revolution was to refute the opportunists' conceptions about the fundamental nature of the state. The opportunist trend in the workers' movement - particularly the Lassallean wing of the German social democracy - had long been founded on the idea that the state is essentially a neutral instrument which can be used as much for the benefit of the exploited class as to defend the privileges of the exploiters. Many of the theoretical combats waged by Marx and Engels towards the German party were aimed at demolishing the idea of a "people's state", at showing that the state, as a specific product of class society, is in, essence the instrument for the domination by one class over society, and over the exploited class in particular. But by 1917, as we have seen, tile ideology of the state as a neutral instrument which could be appropriated by the workers had assumed a "marxist" guise, particularly at the hands of the Kautskyites. This is why State and Revolution begins and ends with an attack on the opportunists' distortion of marxism: at tile end, with a long critique of Kautsky's main works on the state (and a defence of Pannekoek's polemic against Kautsky); at the beginning, with a justly celebrated passage about the way that the "bourgeoisie and the opportunists within the labour movement concur in this doctoring of marxism. They omit, obscure, or distort the revolutionary side of this theory, its revolutionary soul. They push to the foreground what is or seems acceptable to the bourgeoisie... In these circumstances, in view of the unprecedentedly widespread distortion of marxism, our prime task is to re-establish what Marx really taught on the subject of the state" (Lenin, S and R, in Collected Works, p 390-1).
To this end, Lenin proceeds to recall the work of the founders of marxism, Engels in particular, as regards the historical origins of the state. But although Lenin describes this as a work of "excavation" from beneath the rubble of opportunism, his inquiry is of more than archaeological interest. From Engels (Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State) we learn that the state arises as a product of irreconcilable class antagonisms, and serves to prevent these antagonisms from tearing the social fabric apart. But lest anyone conclude that this means that the state is some kind of social referee, Lenin, following Engels, is quick to add that when the state holds things together, it does so in the interests of the economically dominant class. It thus appears as an organ of repression and exploitation par excellence.
In the heat of the Russian revolution this "theoretical" question was of paramount importance. The Menshevik and SR opportunists, who were now increasingly operating as th left flank of the bourgeoisie, presented the state which succeeded the downfall of the Tsar in February 1917 as a kind of "people's state", an expression of tile "revolutionary democracy". The workers should thus subordinate their selfish class interests to the defence of this state, which, with a little persuasion, could surely be adapted to the needs of all the oppressed. By demolishing the foundations of the idea of a "neutral" state, Lenin was preparing tile ground for the practical overthrow of this state. To buttress his arguments against the so-called "revolutionary democrats", Lenin also recalls Engels' pointed words about the limitations of universal suffrage: "Engels is most explicit in calling universal suffrage an instrument of bourgeois rule. 'Universal suffrage', he says, obviously taking account of the long experience of German Social Democracy, is 'the gauge of the maturity of the working class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present day-state '. The petty bourgeois democrats, such as our Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks (…) expect just this 'more' from universal suffrage, and instil into the minds of the people, the false notion that universal suffrage 'in the present-day state' is really capable of revealing the will of the majority of the working people, and of securing its realisation" (CW, p 398-99).
This reminder about the bourgeois nature of the most "democratic" version of the "present day state" was vital in 1917 when Lenin was calling for a form of revolutionary power that could really express the needs of the working masses. But throughout this century revolutionaries have had to make the same reminder. The more direct heirs of the social democratic reformists, today's Labour and Socialist parties, have constructed their whole programme (for capital) on the idea of a benevolent, neutral state that, by taking over major industries and social services, takes on a "public" or even "socialist" character. But this fraud is also ardently peddled by those who claim to be Lenin's heirs, the Stalinists and Trotskyists, who never cease to defend the notion that nationalisations and state welfare provisions are workers' conquests and so many steps towards socialism, even under the "present-day state". These so-called "Leninists" are among the bitterest opponents of the "revolutionary substance" of Lenin's work.
Since the state is an instrument of class rule, an organ of violence directed against the exploited class, the proletariat could not count on it to defend its immediate interests, let alone wield it as a tool for the construction of socialism. Lenin shows how the marxist concept of the withering away of the state had been distorted by opportunism to justify their idea that the new society could come about gradually, harmoniously, through the existing state democratising itself and taking over the means of production, then "withering away" as the material bases of communism were laid down. Again returning to Engels, Lenin insists that what "withers away" is not the existing bourgeois state, but the state that emerges after the proletarian revolution, which by necessity is a violent revolution which has its task the "smashing" of the old bourgeois state. Of course Engels and Lenin both reject the anarchist idea that the state as such could be abolished overnight: as a product of lass society, the final disappearance of any state form could only come about after a more or less long period of transition. But the state of the transition period is not the old bourgeois state. That now lies in ruins and what takes its place is a new kind of state, a semi-state that enables the proletariat to exert its domination over society, but which is already in the process of "dying out". To strengthen and deepen this fundamental position of marxism, Lenin then goes on to examine the actual historical experience of "the state and revolution" and the development of marxist theory in connection with this experience (something that Pannekoek, for all his insight, had neglected to do, leaving himself more open to the opportunist charge of "anarchism").
Lenin's starting point is the beginnings of the marxist movement - the period just before the revolutions of 1848. Re-reading the Communist Manifesto and The Poverty of Philosophy, Lenin argues that in these works the key elements with regard to the state are:
Concerning the nature of this "violent overthrow", the exact relationship between the revolutionary proletariat and the existing bourgeois state, it was not of course possible to be precise, given the absence of concrete historical experience. But still Lenin points out that "since the proletariat needs the state as a special form of organisation. of violence against the bourgeoisie, the following conclusion suggests itself: is it conceivable that such an organisation can be created without first abolishing, destroying the state machine created by the bourgeoisie for themselves? The Communist Manifesto leads straight to this conclusion, and it is of this conclusion that Marx speaks when summing up the experience of the revolution of 1848-51" (CW, P 410-411). Consequently Lenin goes on to cite a key passage from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where Marx denounces the state as "an appalling parasitic body" and points out that prior to the proletarian revolution, "all revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it".
As we mentioned in our article in IR 73, tile 1848 revolutions, as well as for the first time posing the question of "smashing" the bourgeois state, also gave Marx some glimpses of how in tile course of the struggle, the proletariat forms its own independent committees, new organs of revolutionary authority. But the proletarian content of the movements of 1848 was too weak, too immature to answer tile question "with what is tile old bourgeois state machine to be replaced".
Lenin thus moves on to the only previous experience of the proletariat taking power, the Commune of 1871. In considerable detail, he traces the main lessons that Marx and Engels took from the Commune:
Lenin's historical survey was not able to go beyond the Commune experience. His original intention had been to write a seventh chapter of State and Revolution, demonstrating how "the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, indifferent circumstances and under different conditions, continue the work of the Commune and confirm Marx's brilliant historical analysis" (CW p 437). But the acceleration of history deprived him of the opportunity. "I had no time to write a single line of the chapter, I was 'interrupted' by a political crisis - the eve of the October revolution of 1917. Such an 'interruption' can only be welcomed; but the writing of the second part of the pamphlet (The experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917') will probably have to be put off for a long time. It is more pleasant and useful to go through the 'experience of revolution' than to write about it" (Postscript to the first edition, CW p 497).
In fact, the second part was never written. No doubt that seventh chapter would have been of incalculable value. But Lenin had achieved the essential. The reaffirmation of Marx and Engels' teachings on the question of the state was a sufficient basis for a revolutionary progranune to the extent that the primordial issue was the necessity to smash the bourgeois state and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. But in any case, Lenin's work, as we have already said, was never one of mere repetition. By returning to the past in depth, and with a militant purpose, marxists also take their theoretical insights forward. In this way, State and Revolution made two important clarifications for the communist programme. First, it identified the soviets as the natural successor to the Commune, even though these organs are only mentioned in passing. Lenin was not able to analyse in depth why the soviets were a higher form of revolutionary organisation than the Commune; perhaps he might have developed on Trotsky's insights in his writings about 1905, particularly when the latter points out that the soviets of workers' deputies, being based on workplace assemblies, are a form of organisation best adapted to ensuring the class autonomy of the proletariat (the Commune by contrast had been based on territorial rather than workplace units, reflecting a less mature phase of proletarian concentration). Indeed, later writings by Lenin indicate that this was precisely the understanding he was to acquire1. But even if Lenin was not able to examine the soviets in any detail in State and Revolution, there can be no doubt that he considered them the most appropriate organs for destroying the bourgeois state and forming the proletarian dictatorship: from the April Theses onwards, the slogan "all power to the soviets" was above all the slogan of Lenin and the reforged Bolshevik party.
Secondly, Lenin was able to make some definitive generalisations about the problem of the state and its revolutionary destruction. In the section of the work dealing with the revolutions of 1848, Lenin had posed the question: "is it correct to generalise the experience, observations and conclusions of Marx, to apply them to a field that is wider than the history of France during the three years 1848-51?" (CW, p414). Was the formula "concentration of all the forces" of the proletarian revolution on the "destruction" of the state machine valid in all countries? The question was still of extreme importance in 1917 because, despite the lessons Marx and Engels drew about the Paris Commune, even they had left considerable room for ambiguity about the possibility of the proletariat gaining power peacefully through the electoral process in certain countries, those with the most developed parliamentary institutions and the least swollen military apparatus. As Lenin points out Marx specifically mentioned Britain in this context, but also countries like the USA and Holland. But here Lenin was not the least bit afraid to correct and complete Marx's thinking. He did so by using Marx's method: placing the question in its proper historical context: "Imperialism - the era of bank capital, the era of gigantic capitalist monopolies, of the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism - has clearly shown an extraordinary strengthening of the 'state machine' and an unprecedented growth in its bureaucratic and military apparatus in connection with repressive measures against the proletariat both in the monarchical and in the freest, republican countries" (CW, p 415). As a result: "Today, in 1917, at the time of the first great imperialist war, this restriction made by Marx is no longer valid. Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives - in the whole world - of AngloSaxon 'liberty', in the sense that they had no militarist cliques and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to themselves, and suppress everything. Today, in Britain and America too, 'the precondition for every real people's revolution' is the smashing, the destruction of the 'ready made state machinery'''(CW, p 420-1). Henceforward, there were to be no more exceptions.
The principal target of State and Revolution was opportunism, which, as we have seen, did not hesitate to accuse Lenin of anarchism the moment he began to insist on the need to smash the state machine. But as Lenin retorted, "the usual criticism of anarchism by present-day Social Democrats has boiled down to the purest philistine banality: 'we recognise the state, whereas anarchists do not!'" (CW, p 443). But while demolishing such stupidities, Lenin also reiterated the real marxist critique of anarchism, basing himself in particular on what Engels had to say in reply to the absurdities of the "anti-authoritarians": a revolution is just about the most authoritarian thing there could possibly be. To reject all authority, all use of political power, is to renounce revolution. Lenin carefully distinguishes the marxist position, which offers a realisable, historical solution to the problem of subordination, to divisions between leaders and led, state and society, from that of anarchism, which offers only apocalyptic dreams of an immediate dissolution of all such problems - dreams which ultimately have a most conservative result: "We are not utopians, we do not 'dream' of dispensing at once with all administration, all subordination. These anarchist dreams, based upon incomprehension of the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship, are totally alien to marxism. And, as a matter of fact, they only serve to postpone the socialist revolution until people are different. No, we want the socialist revolution with people as they are now, with people who cannot dispense with subordination, control and 'foremen and accountants '. The subordination, however, must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and working people, ie. to the proletariat ..... (CW, p 430-1).
Unlike the anarchists, who wanted the state to vanish as the result of an act of revolutionary will, marxism recognises that a stateless society can only emerge when the economic and social roots of class divisions have been dug up, have given way to the flowering of a society of material abundance. In outlining the economic basis for the withering away of the state, Lenin once again goes back to the classics, in particular Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, from which he draws out the following points:
- the necessity of a transitional period in which the proletariat exercises its dictatorship while at the same time bringing the vast majority of the population into the political and economic management of society;
- economically speaking, this transitional phase can be described as "the lower stage of communism". It is communist society as it emerges from capitalism, still severely marked by many of the defects of the old order. The productive forces have become common property, but there is not yet a condition of material abundance. Consequently, there is still inequality of distribution. The system of labour vouchers advocated by Marx constitutes an inroad against the accumulation of capital, but they reflect a situation of inequality, since some can perform more work than others, some have certain skills which others lack, some have children while others do not, and so on. In sum, there exists what Marx calls "bourgeois right" in matters of distribution - and to protect bourgeois right, there must still exist vestiges of" bourgeois law";
- the development of the productive forces makes it possible to overcome the division of labour and institute a system of free distribution: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs". This is the higher phase of communism, a society of real freedom. The state no longer has any material underpinning and withers away; the radical extension of democracy leads to the ultimate extinction of democracy, since democracy itself is a form of state. The administration of people is replaced by the administration of things. It is not a utopia: even in such a stage, for an unspecifiable period, individual excesses may continue, and will need to be prevented; but "no special machine, no special apparatus of suppression, is needed for this; this will be done by the armed people themselves, as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, interfere to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted" (CW, p 469). In short, "the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of the community will become a habit" (CW, p 479).
When Lenin was writing State and Revolution, the world was poised on the brink of a communist revolution. The defence of Marx's positions on the economic transformation was no abstraction. It was seen as an imminent, programmatic necessity. The working class was being pushed towards a revolutionary confrontation by burning and immediate need - the need for bread, to end the imperialist slaughter, and so on. But the communist vanguard had no doubt that the revolution could not stop short at the solution of these immediate questions. It would have to go to its ultimate, historical conclusion: the inauguration of a new phase in the history of humanity.
We have already noted that State and Revolution is an incomplete work. In particular, Lenin was unable to develop on the role of the soviets as the "finally discovered form of the dictatorship of the proletariat" . But even if the work had not been "interrupted" by the October insurrection, it could still only express the highest point of clarity prior to the experience of the revolution. The Russian revolution itself - and above all its defeat - was to afford many lessons about the problems of the transition period, and we cannot reproach Lenin with failing to solve these questions in advance of the real experience of the proletariat. In future articles we will come back to these lessons from numerous angles but it will be useful to sketch in the three main areas in which subsequent experience was to reveal the inevitable weaknesses and lacunae in State and Revolution
1. State and economy
Although Lenin clearly defends the notion of a communist transformation of the economy - a notion which Marx developed in opposition to the "state socialist" trends in the workers' movement (see lR 79 'Communism versus State Socialism') - his work still suffers from certain ambiguities about the role of the state in the economic transition. We have seen that these ambiguities existed even in the work of Marx and Engels, but during the period of the Second International it was increasingly assumed that the first step on the road to communism was the statification of the national economy, that a fully nationalised economy can no longer be a capitalist one. In various of his writings of the time, while denouncing the "state capitalist trusts" that had become the form of capitalist organisation in the imperialist war, Lenin had a tendency to see these trusts as a neutral instrument, as a kind of stepping stone to socialism, a form of economic centralisation that the victorious proletariat could simply take over wholesale. In a work written in September 1917, Can the Bolsheviks retain state power?, Lenin is more explicit: "Capitalism has created an accounting apparatus in the shape of the banks, syndicates, postal services, consumers' societies, and office employees' unions. Without big banks socialism would be impossible. The big banks are the 'state apparatus , which we need to bring about socialism. and which we take ready-made from capitalism" (1961 Moscow edition, p 20). In State and Revolution a similar idea is expressed when Lenin says that "All citizens become employees and workers of a single country wide state syndicate" ( CW. p 478). It is of course true that the communist transformation does not start from scratch - its inevitable starting point is the existing productive forces, the existing networks of transport, distribution, and so on. But history has taught us to be extremely wary of the idea of simply taking over the economic organisms and institutions created by capital for its own specific needs, above all when they are such archetypal capitalist institutions as the big banks. Most importantly, the Russian revolution and in particular the Stalinist counter-revolution has shown that the simple transformation of the productive apparatus into state property does not do way with the exploitation of man by man - an error definitely present in State and Revolution when Lenin writes that in the first phase of communism "exploitation of man by man will have become impossible because it will be impossible to seize the means of production – the factories, machines, land, etc - and make them private property" (CW p 471). This weakness is compounded by Lenin's insistence that there is a "scientific distinction" to be made between socialism and communism (the former being defined as the lower stage of communism), In fact Marx and Engels did not really theorise such a distinction and it is not accidental that Marx in the Gotha Programme talks rather about lower and higher stages of communism, because he wanted to convey the idea of a dynamic movement between capitalism and communism, not of a fixed, 'third' mode of production which is characterised by "public ownership". Finally, and more significantly, Lenin's discussion on the economic transition in State and Revolution does not make explicit the fact that the dynamic towards communism can only get underway on an international scale, leaving room for the notion that at least certain stages of "socialist construction" can be achieved in one country alone.
The tragedy of the Russian revolution is adequate testimony to the fact that even if you statify the whole economy. even if you have a monopoly on foreign trade. the laws of global capital will still impose themselves on any isolated proletarian bastion. In the absence of the extension of the world revolution, these laws will defy any attempts to create the foundations of any “socialist construction", eventually transforming the proletariat's erstwhile bastion into a new and monstrous "state capitalist trust" competing on the world market. And such a mutation can only be accompanied by a political counter-revolution which will leave no trace of the proletariat's dictatorship.
2. Party and Power
It has been noted that Lenin does not say very much about the role of the party in State and Revolution. Is this further proof of Lenin's temporary conversion to anarchism in 1917? Foolish question: the theoretical clarification contained in State and Revolution is itself the preparation for the direct, leading role of the Bolshevik party in the October insurrection. In its' ruthless polemic against those who are injecting bourgeois ideology into the proletariat, it is above all a "party political" document, aiming to win the workers away from these influences and towards the positions of the revolutionary party.
The question, however, remains: on the eve of the worldwide revolutionary wave, how did the revolutionaries (and not just the Bolsheviks) understand the relationship between the party and the proletarian dictatorship? The one reference to the party in State and Revolution does not give us a clear answer to this, since it is phrased ambivalently: "By educating the workers' party, marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organising the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organising their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie" (CW, p 409). It is ambivalent because it is not clear whether it is the party as such which assumes power, or the proletariat, which Lenin often defines as the vanguard of all the oppressed population. A better guide to the prevailing level of comprehension of this question is the pamphlet Can the Bolsheviks retain State power? The main confusion is seen straight away in the title: the revolutionaries of the day, despite their commitment to the soviet system of delegation which had made the old system of parliamentary representation obsolete, were still held back by parliamentary ideology to the extent that they saw that the party which had a majority in the central soviets then formed the government and administered the state. In future articles we will look in more detail at how this conception led to the fatal entanglement of the party with the state, and created an unbearable situation which helped to empty the soviets of their proletarian life, to set the party against the class, and above all, to transform the party from the most radical fraction of the revolutionary class into an instrument of social conservation.
But these developments did not occur autonomously: they were above all determined by the isolation of the revolution and the material development of an internal counter-revolution. In 1917, the emphasis in all Lenin's writings, whether in the pamphlet just mentioned, or State and Revolution, is not on the party exercising the dictatorship, but on the whole proletariat, and increasingly the whole population, taking charge of their political and economic affairs, through their own practical experience, through their own debates, their own mass organisations. Thus when Lenin answers affirmatively that the Bolsheviks can retain state power, it is only on the understanding that the work of a couple of hundred thousand Bolsheviks will be part of a much vaster effort, the effort of millions of workers and poor peasants, who, from day one, are learning to run the state on their own behalf. The real power, therefore, is not in the hands of the party, but of the masses. If the early hopes of the revolution had been realised, if Russia had not been engulfed by civil war, famine, and international blockade, the evident contradictions in this position could have been resolved in the right direction, demonstrating that in a genuine system of elected and revocable delegation, it makes no sense to talk about any party holding onto power.
3. Class and state
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx had described the transitional state as "nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat". This identification between the power of the working class and the transitional state is continued by Lenin in State and Revolution when he talks about a "proletarian state" or a "state of armed workers", and when he theoretically underlines these formulae by defining the state as being essentially composed of "bodies of armed men". In short, in the transition period, the state is no more than the workers in arms, suppressing the bourgeoisie.
As we shall see in subsequent articles, this formulation was rapidly shown to be inadequate. Lenin himself had had said that the proletariat needs the state not only to suppress the resistance of the exploiters, but also to lead the rest of the non-exploiting population in the direction of socialism. And this latter function, the need to integrate a largely peasant population into the revolutionary process, gave birth to a state which was not only made up of soviets of workers' delegates but also of peasants' and soldiers' soviets. With the start of the civil war, the armed workers' militias, the Red Guards, were not an adequate force to combat the full force of a military counter-revolution. The principal armed force of the soviet state was henceforward the Red Army, again comprised in its majority of peasants. At the same time, the need to combat internal subversion and sabotage gave rise to the Cheka, a special police force which increasingly escaped the control of the soviets. Within weeks of the October insurrection the commune-state had become something rather more than the "armed workers". Above all, with the growing isolation of the revolution, the new state became more and more infested with the gangrene of bureaucracy, less and less responsive to the elected organs of the proletariat and poor peasants. Far from beginning to wither away, the new state was beginning to swallow society whole. Far from bending to the will of the revolutionary class, it became the focal point for a kind of internal degeneration and counter-revolution that had never been seen before.
In its balance sheet of the counter-revolution, the Italian communist left was to pay particular attention to the problem of the transitional state, and one of the principal conclusions reached by Bilan and Internationalisme was that, following the Russian revolution, it was no longer possible to identify the dictatorship of the proletariat with the transitional state. We will return to this question in future articles. For now, however, it is important to point out that, even if the formulations of the marxist movement prior to the Russian revolution suffered from serious weaknesses on this point, at the same time this idea of the non-identification between the proletariat and the transitional state did not come from nowhere. Lenin was fully aware of Engels' definition of the transitional state as no more than a "necessary evil", and throughout the book there is a powerful emphasis on the necessity for the workers to subject all state functionaries to constant supervision and control - particularly those elements of the state who most obviously embody a certain continuity with the old regime, such as the technical and military "experts" which the soviets would be forced to make use of.
Lenin also develops a theoretical foundation for this attitude of healthy proletarian distrust for the new state. In the section on the economic transformation. he explains that because its role will be to safeguard a situation of " bourgeois right", it is permissible to define the transitional state as "the bourgeois state, without the bourgeoisie!". Even if this formulation is useful more as a way of provoking thought than as a clear definition of the class nature of the transitional state, Lenin has grasped the essential: since its task is to safeguard a state of affairs which is not yet communist, the commune-state reveals its basically conservative nature, and it is this which makes it particularly vulnerable to the dynamic of the counter-revolution. And these theoretical perceptions about the nature of the state were to enable Lenin to develop some important insights into the nature of the degenerative process, even when he himself was partly caught up within it: for example, his position on the trade union debate in 1921, when he recognised the need for the workers to maintain organs of defence even against the transitional state, or his warnings about the growth of state bureaucracy towards the end of his life. The Bolshevik party may have succumbed to an insidious demise, and the torch of clarification had to be taken from their hands by the left communist fractions. But there is no doubt that the latters' most important theoretical developments were achieved by taking as their point of departure the gigantic contribution of the Lenin of State and Revolution.
CDW
The next articles in this series will examine the revolutionary programmes drawn up by the communist parties in the period of 1918-20 and the degree to which these programmes corresponded to the actual practise of the working class during the revolutionary wave.
1 See in particular the "Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". written by Lenin and adopted by the Communist International at its founding Congress in 1919. Among other points that will be examined in a future article. this text affirms that" Soviet power, ie the dictatorship of the proletariat (...) is so organised as to bring the working people close to the machinery of government. That, too, is the purpose of combining the legislative and executive authority under the soviet organisation and of replacing territorial constituencies by productive units - the factories" (Thesis 16).
The current year reminds us that history is not the affair of university professors, but a social, class question of vital importance for the proletariat. The main political goal the world bourgeoisie has set itself in 1997 is to impose on the working class its own reactionary, falsified version of the history of the 20th century. To this end it is highlighting the holocaust during World War II, and the October Revolution. These two moments, symbolising the two antagonistic forces whose conflict has mainly determined the evolution of this century, the barbarism of decadent capitalism and the progressive, revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, are presented by bourgeois propaganda as the common fruit of "totalitarian ideologies" and made jointly responsible for war, militarism and terror in the past 80 years. Whereas during the summer the "Nazi-Gold Affair" directed both against the current rivals of the USA, or those who contest their authority (such as Switzerland), and ideologically against the world proletariat (propagating militaristic, bourgeois democratic anti-fascism) remained in the foreground, the bourgeoisie profits from the 80th anniversary of the Russian Revolution this autumn to deliver the following message: if National Socialism led to Auschwitz, the socialism of Marx which inspired the workers' revolution of 1917 led just as surely to the Gulag, the great terror under Stalin, and the Cold War after 1945.
With its attack against the October Revolution, our exploiters aim to enforce the retreat in proletarian consciousness which they imposed after 1989, with their gigantic lie that the fall of the Stalinist counter-revolutionary regimes was the "end of marxism" and the "bankruptcy of Communism". But today the bourgeoisie wants to go a step further in discrediting the proletarian revolution and the marxist vanguard by linking it, not only to Stalinism, but also to fascism. This is why the year 1997 began, in such a central capitalist country as France, with the first mass media campaign for over half a century directly aimed at the internationalist Communist Left, who were represented as collaborators with fascism by deforming its internationalist position of opposition to all imperialist camps during World War II. Today, in the face of the bankruptcy of its own rotting system, it is the very programme, the historic memory and consciousness of the proletariat which the bourgeoisie wants to wipe off the face of the earth. Above all, it wants to wipe out the memory of proletarian October, the first seizure of power by an exploited class in the history of mankind.
As after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the present bourgeois campaign is not an undifferentiated broadside against everything which the Russian Revolution represented. On the contrary, the paid historians of capital are full of hypocritical praise for the "initiative" and even the "revolutionary élan" of the workers and their organs of mass struggle, the workers' councils. They are full of understanding for the desperation of the workers, soldiers and peasants in face of the trials of the "Great War". Above all: they present themselves as defenders of the "true Russian Revolution" against its alleged destruction by the Bolsheviks. In other words: at the heart of the bourgeois attack against the Russian Revolution is the opposing of February to October 1917, opposing the beginning to the conclusion of the struggle for power which is the essence of every great revolution. The bourgeoisie opposes the explosive, spontaneous mass character of the struggles beginning in February 1917, the mass strikes, the millions who took to the streets, the outbursts of public euphoria, and the fact that Lenin himself declared the Russia of this period to be the freest country on earth, to the events of October. Then there was little spontaneity, events were planned in advance, without any strikes, street demonstrations or mass assemblies during the rising, power was taken through the actions of a few thousand armed men in the capital under the command of a Military Revolutionary Committee directly inspired by the Bolshevik party. The bourgeoisie declares: "does this not prove that October was nothing but a Bolshevik putsch?" a putsch against the majority of the population, against the working class, against history, against human nature itself? And this, we are told, was in pursuit of a mad marxist utopia which could only survive through terror, leading directly to Stalinism.
According to the ruling class, the working class in 1917 wanted nothing more than what the February regime promised them: a "parliamentary democracy" pledged to "respecting human rights" and a government which, while continuing the war, declared itself in favour of a rapid peace "without annexations". In other words they want us to believe that the Russian proletariat was fighting for the very same misery which the modern proletariat suffers today! Had the February regime not been toppled in October, they assure us, Russia would today be a country as powerful and prosperous as the USA, and the development of 20th century capitalism would have been a peaceful one.
What this hypocritical defence of the "spontaneous" character of the February events really expresses is the hatred and fear of the October Revolution by the exploiters of all countries. The spontaneity of the mass strike, the coming together of the whole proletariat in the streets and at general assemblies, the formation of workers' councils in the heat of the struggle, are essential moments in the liberation struggle of the working class. "There is no doubt that the spontaneity of a movement is a sign that it has deep and strong roots in the masses and cannot be eliminated", as Lenin remarked (1). But as long as the bourgeoisie remains the ruling class, as long as the political and armed forces of the capitalist state remain intact, it is still possible for it to contain, neutralise and dissolve these weapons of its class enemy. The workers' councils, these mighty instruments of workers' struggle, which arise more or less spontaneously, are nevertheless neither the sole nor necessarily the highest expression of the proletarian revolution. They predominate in the first stages of the revolutionary process. The counter revolutionary bourgeoisie flatters them precisely in order to present the beginning of the revolution as its culmination, knowing well how easy it is to smash a revolution which stops half way. But the Russian Revolution did not stop half way. In going to the end, in completing what was begun in February, it confirmed the capacity of the working class, patiently, consciously, collectively, not only "spontaneously" but in a deliberate, planful, strategic manner to construct the instruments it requires to seize power: its marxist class party, its workers councils galvanised around a revolutionary programme and a real will to rule society, and the specific instruments and strategy of the proletarian insurrection. It is this unity between the mass political struggle and the military seizure of power, between the spontaneous and the planful, between the workers' councils and the class party, between the actions of millions of workers and those of audacious advanced minorities of the class, which constitutes the essence of the proletarian revolution. It is this unity which the bourgeoisie today intends to dissolve with its slanders against Bolshevism and the October insurrection. The smashing of the capitalist state, the toppling of bourgeois class rule, beginning the world revolution: that is the gigantic achievement of October 1917, the highest, most conscious, most daring chapter in the whole of human history to date. October shattered centuries of servility bred by class society, demonstrating that with the proletariat for the first time in history a class exists which is exploited and revolutionary at the same time. A class capable of ruling society, of abolishing class rule, of liberating humanity from its "prehistory" of bondage to blind social forces. That is the true reason why the ruling class to this day, and today more than ever, pours the filth of its lies and slanders on Red October, the "best hated" event of modern history, but the pride of the class conscious proletariat. We intend to demonstrate that the October insurrection, which the scribblers who have become the whores of capital call a "putsch", was the culminating point, not only of the Russian Revolution, but of the whole struggle of our class to date. As Lenin wrote in 1917, "That the bourgeoisie attacks us with such savage hatred is one of the clearest illustrations of the truth, that we are showing the people the correct ways and means to topple bourgeois rule" (2).
On October 10 1917, Lenin, the most wanted man in the country, hunted by the police in all parts of Russia, came to a Central Committee meeting of the Bolshevik Party in Petrograd disguised in wig and spectacles, and drafted the following resolution on a page of a child's notebook:
"The Central Committee recognises that both the international situation of the Russian Revolution (the insurrection in the German fleet is the extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of a world-wide socialist revolution, and also the threat of a peace between the imperialists with the aim of strangling the revolution in Russia) - and the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petersburg to the Germans) - all this in connection with the peasant insurrection and the swing of popular confidence to our party (the elections in Moscow), and finally the obvious preparation of a second Kornilov attack (the withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, the importation of Cossacks into Petersburg, the surrounding of Minsk with Cossacks, etc.) - all this places armed insurrection on the order of the day. Thus recognising that the armed insurrection is inevitable and fully ripe, the Central Committee recommends to all organisations of the party that they be guided by this, and from this point of view consider and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, the coming-out of Moscow and Minsk)." (3)
Exactly four months previously, the Bolshevik Party had deliberately restrained the fighting élan of the workers of Petrograd, who were being lured by the ruling classes into a premature, isolated show-down with the state. Such a situation would certainly have led to the decapitation of the Russian proletariat in the capital and the decimation of its class party (the "July Days" - see the previous issue of our Review). The party, overcoming its own internal hesitations, was firmly committing itself to "mobilise all forces in order to impress upon the workers and soldiers the unconditional necessity of a desperate, last, resolute struggle to overcome the government of Kerensky" as Lenin already formulated it in his famous article ‘The Crisis Is Ripe'. Already then (September 29) he declared: "The crisis is ripe. The honour of the Bolshevik Party is at stake. The whole future of the international workers' revolution for Socialism is at stake. The crisis is ripe".
The explanation for the completely different attitude of the party in October as opposed to July is given in the above resolution with brilliant marxist clarity and audacity. The point of departure, as always for marxism, is the analysis of the international situation and the evaluation of the balance of force between the classes. As opposed to July 1917, the resolution notes that the Russian proletariat is no longer alone; that the world revolution has begun in the central countries of capitalism: "The maturing of the world revolution cannot be denied. The explosion of anger of the Czech workers was put down with unbelievable brutality, bearing witness that the government is terribly frightened. In Italy too there has been a mass rising in Turin. But most important of all is the rising in the German fleet" (4). It is the responsibility of the Russian working class not only to seize the opportunity to break out of its international isolation imposed until then by the world war, but above all to fan in its turn the flames of insurrection in Western Europe by beginning the world revolution. Against the minority in his own party who still echoed the Menshevik, counter-revolutionary, pseudo-marxist argumentation that the revolution ought to begin in a more advanced country, Lenin showed that conditions in Germany were in fact much more difficult than in Russia, and that the real historic meaning of the Russian insurrection lay in helping the German Revolution unfold: "The Germans have, under woefully difficult conditions, with only one Liebknecht (who moreover is in prison), without press organs, without the right of assembly, without soviets, in face of a gigantic enmity of all classes of the population up until the last well-off peasant against the idea of internationalism, in face of the superb organisation of the imperialist big, middle and petty bourgeoisie, the Germans i.e. the German revolutionary internationalists, the workers in sailors' uniform, have begun a rising in the fleet - with odds of perhaps one to a hundred against them. But we who have dozens of papers, who have freedom of assembly, who have gained the majority within the soviets, we who in comparison to the proletarian internationalists of the whole world have the best conditions, we are going to renounce supporting the German revolutionaries through our insurrection. We are going to argue like Scheidemann and Renaudel: the most sensible thing is to make no insurrection, since when we get gunned down, the world will lose with us such marvellous, sensible, ideal internationalists. Let us adopt a resolution of sympathy for the German insurrectionists, and reject the insurrection in Russia. That will be a genuinely reasonable internationalism" (5).
This internationalist standpoint and method, the exact opposite of the bourgeois-nationalist stand of the Stalinism which developed out of the later counter-revolution, was not exclusive to the Bolshevik party at that time, but was the common property of the advanced Russian workers with their marxist political education. Thus, at the beginning of October, the revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet proclaimed through the radio stations of their ships to the four corners of the earth the following appeal: "In the hour when the waves of the Baltic are stained with the blood of our brothers, we raise our voice: oppressed people of the whole world! Lift the banner of revolt!"
But the world wide estimation of the balance of class forces by the Bolsheviks did not restrict itself to examining the state of the international proletariat, but expressed a clear vision of the global situation of the class enemy. Always basing themselves on a deeply rooted knowledge of the history of the workers' movement, the Bolsheviks knew perfectly well from the example of the Paris Commune 1971, that the imperialist bourgeoisie, even in the midst of its world war, would combine its forces against the revolution.
"Does the complete inactivity of the English fleet in general, and of the English submarines during the Occupation of Osel by the Germans not prove, in connection with the intention of the government to move its seat from Petrograd to Moscow, that between Kerensky and the English-French imperialists a conspiracy has been set up, with the goal of surrendering Petrograd to the Germans, and in this way to strangle the Russian Revolution" asks Lenin, and adds: "The resolution of the soldiers' section of the Petrograd Soviet against the transfer of the government out of Petrograd shows that among the soldiers too the conviction concerning the conspiracy of Kerensky has ripened" (6). In August under Kerensky and Kornilov, revolutionary Riga had already been delivered into the clutches of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The first rumours of a possible separate peace between Britain and Germany against the Russian Revolution alarmed Lenin. The goal of the Bolsheviks was not "peace" but revolution, knowing as true marxists that a capitalist ceasefire could only be an interlude between two world wars. It was this communist insight into the inevitable spiral of barbarism that bankrupt, decadent capitalism held in store for humanity, which now prompted Bolshevism into a race against time to end the war with revolutionary, proletarian means. At the same time, the capitalists began everywhere to systematically sabotage production in order to discredit the revolution. These developments however also contributed to finally destroying in the eyes of the workers the bourgeois patriotic myth of "national defence", according to which bourgeoisie and proletariat of the same nation have a common interest in repelling the foreign "aggressor". It also explains why in October the concern of the working class was no longer to unleash mass strikes, but to keep production going in the face of the bourgeoisie's disruption of its own factories.
Among the decisive factors that pushed the working class towards insurrection was the fact that the revolution was menaced by further counter-revolutionary attacks, and that the workers, in particular the main soviets, were now firmly behind the Bolsheviks - the direct fruit of the most important mass confrontation between bourgeoisie and proletariat between July and October 1917: the Kornilov putsch in August. The proletariat under Bolshevik leadership stopped Kornilov's march on the capital, mainly by winning over his troops and sabotaging his transport and logistics system via the railway, postal and other workers. In the course of this action, during which the soviets were revitalised as the revolutionary organisation of the whole class, the workers discovered that the Provisional Government in Petrograd under the leadership of the Socialist Revolutionary Kerensky and the Mensheviks was itself involved in the counter-revolutionary plot. From this moment on, the class conscious workers grasped that these parties had become a true "left wing of capital" and began to flock to the Bolsheviks.
"The whole tactical art consists in grasping the moment when the totality of conditions are most favourable for us. The Kornilov Rising created these conditions. The masses, which had lost confidence in the parties of the soviet majority, saw the concrete danger of the counter-revolution. They believed that the Bolsheviks were now called on to overcome this danger". (7)
The clearest proof of the revolutionary qualities of a workers' party is its capacity to pose the question of power. "The most gigantic adjustment is when the proletarian party goes over from preparation, propaganda, organisation, agitation, to the immediate struggle for power, to the armed insurrection against the bourgeoisie. All which exists in the party by way of undecided, sceptical, opportunistic, Menshevik elements, stands up against the insurrection". (8)
But the Bolshevik party overcame this crisis, firmly committing itself to the armed struggle for power, thus proving its unprecedented revolutionary qualities.
In February 1917 a so-called "dual power" situation arose. Alongside and opposed to the bourgeois state, the workers' councils appeared as a potential alternative government of the working class. Since in reality two opposing governments of two enemy classes cannot coexist, since the one must necessarily destroy the other in order to assert itself, such a period of "dual power" is necessarily extremely short and unstable. Such a phase is not characterised by "peaceful coexistence" and mutual toleration. Only in appearance does it represent a social equilibrium. In reality it is a decisive stage in the civil war between labour and capital. The bourgeois falsification of history is obliged to mask the life and death struggle of the classes which took place between February and October 1917 in order to present the October Revolution as a "Bolshevik putsch". An "unnatural" prolongation of this period of dual power necessarily spells the end of the revolution and its organs. The soviets are "real only as organs of insurrection, of revolutionary power. Outside of this task, the soviets are just a toy, inevitably leading to the apathy, indifference and disappointment of the masses, who have rightly got fed up of the endless repetition of resolutions and protests" (9). Although the proletarian insurrection is no more spontaneous than the counter-revolutionary military coup, in the months before October both classes repeatedly manifested their spontaneous tendency towards the struggle for power. The July Days and the Korrnilov Putsch were only the clearest manifestations. The October insurrection itself began in reality, not with a signal from the Bolshevik Party, but with the attempt of the bourgeois government to send the most revolutionary troops, two-thirds of the Petrograd garrison, to the front, and replace them in the capital with battalions more under counter-revolutionary influence. It began, in other words, with yet another attempt, only weeks after Kornilov, to crush the revolution, obliging the proletariat to take insurrectionary measures to save it. "Indeed the result of the rising of October 25 was three-quarters decided, if not more, from the moment when we resisted the moving out of the troops, formed the Military Revolutionary Committee (October 16), appointed our Commissars in all troop formations and organisations, and thus completely isolated not only the command of the Petrograd military district, but the government...From the moment that the battalions, under the orders of the Military Revolutionary Committee, refused to leave the city, and did not leave it, we had a victorious insurrection in the capital" (10). Moreover, this Military Revolutionary Committee, which was to lead the conclusive military actions of October 25, far from being an organ of the Bolshevik party, was originally proposed by the "left" counter-revolutionary parties as a means of imposing the removal of the revolutionary troops from the capital under the authority of the soviets; but it was immediately transformed by the soviet into an instrument not only to oppose this measure, but to organise the struggle for power. "No, the government of the soviets was not a chimera, an arbitrary construction, an invention of party theoreticians. It grew up irresistibly from below, from the breakdown of industry, the impotence of the possessors, the needs of the masses. The soviets had in actual fact become a government. For the workers, soldiers and peasants there remained no other road. No time left to argue and speculate about a soviet government: it had to be realised" (11).The legend about a Bolshevik putsch is one of the fattest lies in history. In fact the insurrection was announced publicly in advance, to the elected revolutionary delegates. Trotsky's speech to the Garrison Conference on October 18 illustrates this. "It is known to the bourgeoisie that the Petrograd Soviet is going to propose to the Congress of Soviets that they seize the power...And foreseeing an inevitable battle, the bourgeois classes are trying to disarm Petrograd... At the first attempt of the counter-revolution to break up the Congress, we will answer with a counter-attack which will be ruthless, and which we will carry through to the end". Point 3 of the resolution adopted by the Garrison Conference read: "The All-Russian Congress of Soviets must take power in its hands and guarantee to the people peace, land and bread" (12). To ensure that the whole proletariat supported the struggle for power, the Garrison Conference decided on a peaceful review of forces, held in Petrograd before the Soviet Congress, centred around mass assemblies and debates. "Tens of thousands brimmed that immense building known as the House of the People... From iron columns and upstairs windows human heads, legs and arms were hanging in garlands and clusters. There was that electric tension in the air which forebodes a coming discharge. Down with Kerensky! Down with the war! Power to the Soviets! None of the Compromisers any longer dared appear before these red hot crowds with arguments or warnings. The Bolsheviks had the floor" (13). Trotsky adds: "The experience of the revolution, the war, the heavy struggle of a whole bitter lifetime, rose from the depths of memory in each of these poverty-driven men and women, expressing itself in simple and imperious thoughts: this way we can go no further, we must break a road into the future". The party did not invent this "will to power" of the masses. But it inspired it and gave the class confidence in its capacity to rule. As Lenin wrote after the Kornilov Putsch: "Let those of little faith learn from this example. Shame on those who say, ‘We have no machine with which to replace that old one which gravitates inexorably to the defence of the bourgeoisie'. For we have a machine. And that is the soviets. Do not fear the initiative and independence of the masses. Trust the revolutionary organisations of the masses, and you will see in all spheres of the state life that same power, majesty and unconquerable will of the workers and peasants, which they have shown in their solidarity and enthusiasm against Kornilovism" (14).
Insurrection is one of the most crucial, complex and demanding problems which the proletariat must solve if it is to fulfil its historical mission. In the bourgeois revolution, this question is much less decisive, since the bourgeoisie could base its power struggle on its economic and political power already accumulated inside feudal society. During its revolution, the bourgeoisie let the petty bourgeoisie and the young working class do the fighting for it. When the dust of battle settled, it often preferred to place its newly won power in the hands of a now bourgeoisified, domesticated feudal class, since the latter has the authority of tradition on its side. Since the proletariat, on the contrary, has no property and no economic power within capitalist society, it can delegate neither the struggle for power, nor the defence of its class rule once acquired, to any other class or sector of society. It must take power in its own hands, drawing the other strata behind its own leadership, accept the full responsibility, the consequences and risks of its struggle. In the insurrection, the proletariat reveals, and discovers for itself, more clearly than every before, the secret of its own existence as the first and last exploited revolutionary class. No wonder the bourgeoisie is so attached to slandering the memory of October! The primordial task of the proletariat in the revolution, from February on, was to conquer the hearts and the minds of all those sectors who could be won over to its cause, but who might otherwise be used against the revolution: the soldiers, peasants, state functionaries, transport and communications employees, even the indispensable house servants of the bourgeoisie. By the eve of the insurrection, this task had been completed. The task of the insurrection was quite different: that of breaking the resistance of those state bodies and armed formations which cannot be won over, but whose continuing existence contains the nucleus of the most barbarous counter-revolution. To break this resistance, to demolish the bourgeois state, the proletariat must create an armed force and place it under its own class direction and iron discipline. Although led by the proletariat, the insurrectionary forces of October 25 were mainly composed of soldiers obeying its command. "The October revolution was a struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for power, but the outcome of the struggle was decided in the last analysis by the muzhik...What here gave the revolution the character of a brief blow with a minimum number of victims, was the combination of a revolutionary conspiracy, a proletarian insurrection, and the struggle of a peasant garrison for self-preservation. The party led the uprising; the armed detachments of workers were the fist of the insurrection; but the heavy-weight peasant garrison decided the outcome of the struggle" (15). In reality, the proletariat could seize power because it was able to mobilise the other non-exploiting strata behind its own class project: the exact opposite of a putsch. "Demonstrations, street fights, barricades - everything comprised in the usual idea of insurrection - were almost entirely absent. The revolution had no need of solving a problem already solved. The seizure of the governmental machine could be carried through according to plan with the help of comparatively small armed detachments guided from a single centre... The tranquillity of the October streets, the absence of crowds and battles, gave the enemy a pretext to talk of the conspiracy of an insignificant minority, of the adventure of a handful of Bolsheviks... But in reality the Bolsheviks could reduce the struggle for power at the last moment to a ‘conspiracy', not because they were a small minority, but for the opposite reason - because they had behind them in the workers' districts and the barracks an overwhelming majority, consolidated, organised, disciplined" (16).
Technically speaking, the Communist insurrection is a simple question of military organisation and strategy. Politically, it is the most demanding task imaginable. Most difficult and demanding of all is the task of choosing the right moment to struggle for power: neither too early nor too late. In July 1917, and even in August at the moment of the Kornilov Putsch, when the Bolsheviks still held the class back from a struggle for power, the main danger remained a premature insurrection. By September Lenin was already incessantly calling for immediate preparation of the armed struggle and declaring: now or never! "A revolutionary situation cannot be preserved at will. If the Bolsheviks had not seized power in October and November, in all probability they would not have seized it at all. Instead of firm leadership the masses would have found among the Bolsheviks that same disparity between word and deed which they were already sick of, and they would have ebbed away in the course of two or three months from this party which had deceived their hopes, just as they had recently ebbed away from the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks" (17). This is why Lenin, in combating the danger of delaying the struggle for power, not only exposed the counter-revolutionary preparations of the world bourgeoisie, but above all warned against the disastrous effects of hesitations on the workers themselves, who "are almost desperate". The "hungering" people might start "demolishing everything around them" in a "purely anarchist" manner "if the Bolsheviks are not able to lead them into the final battle. One cannot wait any longer without running the risk of favouring the conspiracy of Rodyanko with Wilhelm and experiencing complete decomposition with a mass flight of the soldiers, if they (who already are almost desperate) become completely desperate" (18). Choosing the right moment also requires an exact estimation not only of the balance of class forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat, but also of the dynamic of the intermediary strata. "A revolutionary situation is not long lived. The least stable of the premises of a revolution is the mood of the petty bourgeoisie. At a time of national crisis the petty bourgeoisie follows that class which inspires confidence not only in words but deeds. Although capable of impulsive enthusiasm and even of revolutionary fury, the petty bourgeoisie lacks endurance, easily loses heart under reverses, and passes from elated hope to discouragement. And these sharp and swift changes in the mood of the petty bourgeoisie lend their instability to every revolutionary situation. If the proletarian party is not decisive enough to convert the hopes and expectations of the popular masses into revolutionary action in good season, the flood tide is quickly followed by ebb: the intermediate strata turn away their eye from the revolution and seek a saviour in the opposing camp." (19).
In his struggle to persuade the party about the imperious necessity of an immediate insurrection, Lenin returned to the famous elaboration by Marx (in Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany) on the question of the insurrection as a "work of art" which as in the art of war "or other arts is subject to certain rules, the neglect of which lead to the doom of the culprit party". The most important of these rules, according to Marx, are: never stop half way once the insurrection has begun; always maintain the offensive, since "the defensive is the death of every armed rising"; surprise the enemy and demoralise it through daily successes, "even small ones", obliging it to retreat; "in short, according to the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary tactics known to date: de l'audace, de l'audace, encore de l'audace". And, as Lenin noted: "A vast superiority of forces must be concentrated at the decisive point at the decisive moment, since otherwise the enemy, being better trained and organised, will destroy the insurrectionists". Lenin added: "We will hope that when action is decided, the leaders will follow the great legacy of Danton and Marx. The success both of the Russian and of the world revolution depends on two, three days of fighting" (20). To this end the proletariat had to create the organs of its struggle for power, a military committee and armed detachments. "Just as a blacksmith cannot seize the red hot iron in his naked hand, so the proletariat cannot directly seize the power; it has to have an organisation accommodated to this task. The coordination of the mass insurrection with the conspiracy, the subordination of the conspiracy to the insurrection, the organisation of the insurrection through the conspiracy, constitutes that complex and responsible department of revolutionary politics which Marx and Engels called ‘the art of insurrection'". (Trotsky: History p.1019). It is this centralised, coordinated, premeditated approach which allows the proletariat to smash the last, armed resistance of the ruling class, thus striking a terrible blow which the world bourgeoisie has neither forgiven nor forgotten to this day. "Historians and politicians usually give the name of spontaneous insurrection to a movement of the masses united by a common hostility against the old regime, but not having a clear aim, deliberated methods of struggle, or a leadership consciously showing the way to victory. This spontaneous insurrection is condescendingly recognised by official historians... as a necessary evil the responsibility for which falls upon the old regime. The real reason for their attitude of indulgence is that ‘spontaneous' insurrection cannot transcend the framework of the bourgeois regime (...) What they do reject - calling it ‘Blanquism' or still worse, Bolshevism - is the conscious preparation of an overthrow, the plan, the conspiracy" (21). This is what still infuriates the bourgeoisie the most: the audacity with which the working class snatched power out of its hands. The bourgeoisie - everybody - knew an uprising was being prepared. But it did not know when and where the enemy would attack. In striking its decisive blow, the proletariat profited fully from the advantage of surprise, of itself choosing the moment and terrain of battle. The bourgeoisie hoped and believed its enemy would be naive and "democratic" enough to decide the question of insurrection publicly, in the presence of the ruling classes, at the All-Russian Soviet Congress which had been summoned to Petrograd. There it hoped to sabotage and forestall the decision and its execution. But when the Congress delegates arrived in the capital the insurrection was in full swing, the ruling class already reeling. The Petrograd proletariat, via its Military Revolutionary Committee, handed over power to the Soviet Congress, and the bourgeoisie could do nothing to prevent it. Putsch! Conspiracy! the bourgeoisie cried and still cries. Lenin's reply: No putsch; conspiracy yes, but a conspiracy subordinated to the will of the masses and the needs of the insurrection. And Trotsky added: "The higher the political level of a revolutionary movement and the more serious it's leadership, the greater will be the place occupied by conspiracy in a popular insurrection" (22). Bolshevism a form of Blanquism? This accusation is raised again today by the exploiting classes. "The Bolsheviks were compelled more than once, and long before the October revolution, to refute accusations of conspiratism and Blanquism directed against them by their enemies. Moreover, nobody waged a more implacable struggle against the system of pure conspiracy than Lenin. The opportunists of the international social democracy more than once defended the old Social Revolutionary tactic of individual terror directed against the agents of czarism, when this tactic was ruthlessly criticised by the Bolsheviks with their insistence upon mass insurrection as opposed to the individual adventurism of the intelligentsia. But in refuting all varieties of Blanquism and anarchism, Lenin did not for one moment bow down to any ‘sacred' spontaneity of the masses". To this Trotsky added: "Conspiracy does not take the place of insurrection. An active minority of the class, no matter how well organised, cannot seize the power regardless of the general conditions of the country. In this point history has condemned Blanquism. But only in this. His affirmative theorem retains all it's force. In order to conquer the power, the proletariat needs more than a spontaneous insurrection. It needs a suitable organisation, it needs a plan; it needs a conspiracy. Such is the Leninist view of this question" (23).
It is a well known fact that Lenin, the first to be completely clear about the necessity of the struggle for power in October, having put forward several different plans for insurrection, one centred on Finland and the Baltic Fleet, another on Moscow, at one moment advocated that the Bolshevik party, not a Soviet organ, should directly organise the insurrection. Events proved that the organisation and leadership of the rising by a Soviet organ such as the Military Revolutionary Committee, where of course the party had the dominant influence, is the best guarantee for the success of the whole uprising, since the whole class, not just the many sympathisers of the party, felt themselves represented by their unitary revolutionary organs. But Lenin's proposition, according to bourgeois historians, reveals that for him the revolution is not the task of the masses, but the private affair of the party. Why otherwise, they ask, was he so much against waiting for the Soviet Congress to decide the rising? In reality, Lenin's attitude was in complete accordance with marxism and its historically founded confidence in the proletariat masses. "It would be disastrous, or a purely formalistic approach, to want to wait for the uncertain voting of 25th of October. The people have the right and the duty to decide such questions, not through the ballot but through force; the people have the right and the duty, in critical moments of the revolution, to show its representatives, even its best representatives, the right direction, instead of waiting for them. This has been shown by the history of every revolution, and it would be a boundless crime of revolutionaries to let the moment slip away, although they know that the salvation of the revolution, the peace proposals, the saving of Petrograd, the salvation from hunger, the handing over of the soil to the peasants depend on this. The government is tottering. It has to be given the final push, at any price!" (24). In reality, all the Bolshevik leaders were agreed that, whoever carried out the rising, the power just conquered would be immediately handed over to the All Russian Soviet Congress. The party knew perfectly that the revolution was not the business either of the party alone, or of the Petrograd workers alone, but of the whole proletariat. But concerning the question of who should carry through the insurrection itself, Lenin was perfectly correct to argue that this should be done by the class organs best suited to the job, best able to assume the task of political and military planning, and political leadership of the struggle for power. Events proved that Trotsky was right in arguing that a specific organ of the soviets, specially created for the task, and standing directly under the influence of the party, was best suited. But the debate was not one of principle, but concerned the vital question of political efficiency. The underlying concern of Lenin, that the soviet apparatus as a whole could not be charged with the task, since this would fatally delay the insurrection and lead to divulging plans to the enemy, was completely valid. The painful experience of the whole Russian Revolution was necessary for the later clarification within the Communist Left that although the political leadership by the class party, both of the struggle for power and of the proletarian dictatorship is indispensable, it is not the task of the party itself to take power. On this question neither Lenin nor the other Bolsheviks (nor the Spartacists in Germany etc) were completely clear in 1917, nor could they be. But concerning the "art of insurrection" itself, concerning the revolutionary patience and even caution to avoid premature show-downs, concerning the revolutionary audacity necessary to take power, there is nobody today's revolutionaries can learn more from than Lenin. In particular on the role of the party in the insurrection. History proved Lenin right: it is the masses who take power, it is the soviet which provides the organisation, but the class party is the most indispensable weapon of the struggle for power. In July 1917 it was the party which steered the class away from a decisive defeat. In October 1917 it was the party which steered the class down the road to power. Without this indispensable leadership, there would have been no seizure of power.
But the October Revolution led to Stalinism!! cries the bourgeoisie, resorting to its "final" argument. In reality it was the bourgeois counter-revolution, the defeat of the world revolution in western Europe, the invasion and international isolation of the Soviet Republic, the support of the developing nationalist bureaucracy in Russia by the world bourgeoisie, against the proletariat and the Bolsheviks, which "led to Stalinism". It is important to recall that during the crucial weeks of October 1917, as during the previous months, a current manifested itself within the Bolshevik party reflecting the full weight of bourgeois ideology, opposing the insurrection, and that even then Stalin was its most dangerous representative. Already in March 1917 Stalin had been the main spokesman of those in the party who wanted to abandon its internationalist revolutionary position, support the Provisional Government and its policy of continuing the imperialist war, and merge with the social-patriotic Mensheviks. When Lenin came out publicly for insurrection in the weeks before the rising, Stalin as editor of the party organ printed his articles with intentional delays, whereas the contributions of Zinoviev and Kamenev against the rising, which were often in breach of party discipline, were published as if they represented the position of Bolshevism - so that Lenin threatened to resign from the Central Committee. Stalin continued pretending that Lenin, in favour of immediate insurrection, and with the party now behind him, and Kamenev and Zinoviev, openly sabotaging the party decisions, were of "the same opinion". During the insurrection itself Stalin the political adventurer "disappeared" - in reality in order to see which side would win before coming out with a position of his own. The struggle of Lenin and the party against "Stalinism" in 1917, against the manipulating, treacherous sabotage of the insurrection (unlike Zinoviev and Kamenev, who were at least open about their opposition) would be renewed within the Party in the last years of Lenin's life, but this time under infinitely more unfavourable historical conditions.
Far from being a banal coup d'Etat, as the ruling class lies, the October Revolution was the highest point attained by humanity in its history to date. For the first time ever, an exploited class had the courage and the capacity to seize power from the exploiters and inaugurate the world proletarian revolution. Although the revolution was soon to be defeated, in Berlin, Budapest and Turin, although the Russian and world proletariat had to pay a terrible price for its defeat - the horrors of counter-revolution, another world war, and all the barbarism which has followed until this day - the bourgeoisie has still not been able to completely wipe out the memory and the lessons of this exalting event. Today, when the decomposed ideology and mentality of the ruling classes, its unbridled individualism, nihilism and obscurantism, the flourishing of reactionary world views such as racism and nationalism, mysticism and ecologism, abandoning the last remnants of belief in human progress, it is the beacon illuminated by Red October which shows the way forward. The memory of October is there to remind the proletariat that the future of humanity lies in its hands, and that these hands are capable of accomplishing the task. The class struggle of the proletariat, the re-appropriation of its own history by the working class, the defence and development of the scientific method of marxism, that is the programme of October. That is today the programme for the future of humanity. As Trotsky wrote in the conclusion of his great History of the Russian Revolution: "The historic ascent of humanity, taken as a whole, may be summarised as a succession of victories of consciousness over blind force - in nature, in society, in man himself. Critical and creative thought can boast of its greatest victories up to now in the struggle with nature. The physico-chemical sciences have already reached a point where man is clearly about to become master of matter. But social relations are still formed in the manner of coral islands. Parliamentarism illuminated only the surface of society, and even that with a rather artificial light. In comparison with monarchy and other heirlooms from the cannibals and cave-dwellers, democracy is of course a great conquest, but it leaves the blind play of forces in the social relations of men untouched. It was against this deeper sphere of the unconscious that the October revolution was the first to raise its hand. The Soviet system wishes to bring aim and plan into the very basis of society, where up to now only accumulated consequences have reigned".
Kr. October 1997
1) Lenin: The Russian Revolution and the Civil War, Collected Works, vol 26.
2) Lenin: Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power? ibid
3) Lenin: Resolution on the Insurrection, ibid.
4) Lenin: Letter to the Bolshevik Comrades Participating at the Soviet Congress of the Northern Region, ibid.
5) Lenin: Letter to Comrades, ibid.
6) Lenin: Letter to the Petrograd City Conference, ibid.
7) Trotsky: The Lessons of October. Written 1924.
8) Trotsky: ibid.
9) Lenin: Theses for the October 8th Conference, CW, vol 26.
10) Trotsky: Lessons of October.
11) Trotsky: History of the Russian Revolution, p. 930.
12) Trotsky: History, p. 957.
13) Trotsky: History, p. 967.
14) See Lenin: Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?, and of course his State and Revolution.
15) Trotsky: History, p. 1136.
16) Trotsky: History, p. 1138-39.
17) Trotsky: History, p 1005.
18) Lenin: ‘Letter to Comrades'.
19) Trotsky: History. p. 1125.
20) Lenin: ‘Proposals of an Outsider', CW, vol 26.
21) Trotsky: History, p . 1019.
22) Trotsky: ibid.
23) Trotsky: History, p 1020.
24) Lenin: ‘Letter to the Central Committee', CW, vol 26.
Following eight years of the most gigantic propaganda campaign in human history, devoted to the alleged "death of Communism", the world bourgeoisie responded to the 80th anniversary of the October Revolution 1917 with a carefully prepared, internationally coordinated display of indifference. In most countries, including Russia itself, this question was only dealt with as the second or third item of the main evening TV news broadcasts. The commentaries in the bourgeois press the next morning declared that the question of the Russian Revolution, having lost all relevance for the world of today, remains of interest only for the historian. Commenting on workers' protests taking place at about the same moment (such as the 150,000 demonstration in Prague against the savage anti-proletarian attacks by the Klaus government which emerged from the Czech "velvet revolution" of 1989) the German media noted with demonstrative satisfaction that the class struggle itself had now been "freed from ideological clutter and the pursuit of dangerously utopian final goals".
In reality, this pretended dismissal of the proletarian revolution into the dispassionate hands of bourgeois "historical science" represents a new, qualitatively superior stage of the capitalist attack against Red October. Under the cover of reviewing the results of the research of its historians, the ruling class has organised a world-wide public debate about the "crimes of Communism". This "debate" not only blames the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism for the crimes of the Stalinist counter-revolution, but also, at least indirectly, for the crimes of Nazism, since "the degree and the techniques of mass violence were inaugurated by the communists and (...) the Nazis inspired themselves from this ..." (Stephane Courtois in Le Monde 09110.11. 97). For the bourgeois historians, the fundamental crime of the Russian Revolution was the replacement of "democracy" by a totalitarian ideology leading to the systematic extermination of the "class enemy". Nazism, we are told, appeared only in reaction to this undemocratic tradition of the Russian Revolution, replacing the "class war" of the former with the "race war" of the latter. The bourgeois lesson drawn from the barbarism of its own decadent system is that bourgeois democracy, precisely because it is not a "perfect system", but allows "room for individual freedom" is best suited to human nature, and that any attempt to challenge it can only end in Auschwitz and the Gulag.
Since 1989, the bourgeois attack against Communism and the Russian Revolution was mainly carried by the momentum of the impact of the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in the east, and the sheer scale of the propaganda making this the collapse of Communism. At that time, the bourgeoisie did not even have to pretend to advance any historical arguments in defence of these lies. But since then, the impact of these campaigns has been eroded by the failure of "western" style capitalism and bourgeois democracy to halt economic decline and mass pauperisation either in the east or in the west. Although the combativity, and above all the consciousness of the proletariat were hit badly by the events and propaganda which followed the- fall of the Berlin Wall, the working class remains undefeated. Its combativity is slowly recovering. Within politicised minorities of the class there is the beginning of a new interest in the history of the working class in general, and in the Russian Revolution and the Marxist struggle against its degeneration in particular. Although the bourgeoisie has the immediate social situation comfortably under control, its extreme anxiety in face of it's progressively collapsing economy and the still intact potential of its class enemy obliges it to constantly intensify its ideological attacks against tile proletariat. This is why the bourgeoisie for instance organises movements such as the French Autumn of 1995 or the UPS strike in the United States in1997 specifically to strengthen the authority of its trade union control apparatus.
""class" genocide joins up with "race" genocide: the death through famine of the child of a Ukrainian Kulak deliberately left to starve by the Stalinist regime is "equal" to the death of a Jewish child left to starve in the Warsaw Ghetto by the Nazi Regime". Some of his collaborators, on the other hand, but also the French Prime minister J ospin, consider that Courtois is going" too far" by putting in question the "uniqueness" of the crimes of Nazism. In parliament, Jospin "defended" the "honour of Communism" (which he identified with the honour of his ministerial colleagues from the Stalinist PCF) by arguing that although "Communism" had killed more people than Fascism, it was less evil since motivated by "good intentions". The international controversies provoked by this book - from the question whether its authors exaggerated the number of victims to have a "round figure" of 100 million, to the difficult ethical question whether or not Lenin was "as evil" as Hitler, all serve to discredit Red October, the most important milestone on the road to the liberation of the proletariat and humanity. The protests, across Europe, of the Stalinist veterans of the Resistance opposed to Germany in World War IT against being compared to the Fascists serve no other purpose today, than to consolidate the lie that the Russian Revolution is responsible for the crimes of its mortal Stalinist enemy. Both the "radical" Courtois and the "reasonable" Jospin, like the entire bourgeoisie, share the same capitalist lies at the heart of the whole "Black Book". These include the lie, constantly affirmed without the slightest proof, that Lenin was responsible for the Stalinist terror, and the lie that bourgeois democracy is the only "safeguard" against barbarism. In reality, this whole display of democratic pluralism of opinion and humanitarian indignation only serves to hide the historic truth that all the great crimes of this century share the same bourgeois class nature - not only those of fascism and Stalinism, but also those of democracy, from Hiroshima and Dresden to the starvation inflicted on a quarter of humanity by "liberal" decadent capitalism. In reality, the whole moralistic debate on which of these crimes of capitalism is more condemnable is itself as barbarous as it is hypocritical. In reality, all the participants in this fake bourgeois debate are out to demonstrate the same thing: that any attempt to abolish capitalism, to challenge bourgeois democracy, no matter how "idealistic" and "well intentioned" it may originally be, is bound to end up in bloody terror.
In fact, the roots of the "largest and longest reign of terror" in history, and the "paradoxical tragedy" of Communism lie, according to Jospin and the chancellor-historian Doktor Helmut Kohl, in the utopian vision of World Revolution of the Bolshevism of the original October Revolution period. The reviews of the French "Black Book" in the German bourgeois press defended the responsible anti-fascism of Stalinism against the "mad Marxist utopia" of October and the World Revolution. This madness consisted in surmounting the capitalist contradiction between internationally associated labour on a single world market and the deadly competition of the bourgeois nation states over the product of that labour, now identified as the "original sin" of Marxism, violating the "human nature" about which the bourgeoisie cares so much.
The bourgeoisie regurgitates the old Kautskyist lies
Whereas during the Cold War many western historians used to deny the continuity of Stalinism with the October Revolution, in order to prevent their eastern imperialist rival profiting from the prestige of that great event, today the target of their hatred is no longer Stalinism but Bolshevism. Whereas the threat of the imperialist rivalry of the USSR has disappeared, the threat of the proletarian revolution has not. It is against this threat that bourgeois historians are today warming up all the old lies produced by the panic-stricken bourgeoisie during the revolution itself, that the Bolsheviks were paid German agents, and October a Bolshevik Putsch etc. These lies, produced at the time by the likes of Kautsky[1] and used by the German bourgeoisie to justify the murder of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Leo Jogiches and thousands of revolutionary Communists, could exploit the bourgeois media black-out on what was really happening in Russia. Today, with more documentary evidence at their disposal than ever, the paid whores of the bourgeoisie pour out the same white-terror garbage.
These lies are reproduced today, not only by the open enemies of the Russian Revolution, but also by its alleged defenders. In the fifth Annual on Communism produced by the Stalinist historian Herman Weber, and devoted to the October Revolution (Jahrbuch fur Historische Kommunismusforschung 1997) the old Menshevik idea that the Revolution was premature is revamped by Moshe Lewin, who has discovered that Russia in 1917 was not ripe for socialism or even for bourgeois democracy due to the backwardness of Russian capitalism. This explanation for the alleged backwardness and barbarism of Bolshevism is also dished up in the new book, A People's Tragedy by the "historian" Orlando Figes, which has created a furore in Britain. He not only affirms that October was basically the work of one wicked man: a dictatorial act of a Bolshevik Party itself under the personal dictatorship of the "bully" Lenin and his henchman Trotsky ("The remarkable thing about the Bolshevik insurrection is that hardly any of the Bolshevik leaders had wanted it to happen until a few hours before it began", p.481). He above "discovers" that the social basis of this "coup d'état" was not the working class but the lump en proletariat. After preliminary remarks about the poor level of education of the Bolshevik soviet delegates (whose knowledge about revolution had admittedly not been acquired at Oxford or Cambridge), Figes concludes. "It was more the result of the degeneration of the urban revolution, and in particular of the workers' movement, as an organised and constructive force, with vandalism, crime, generalised violence and drunken looting as the main expressions of this social break-down. (...) The participants in this destructive violence were not the organised 'working class' but the victims of the breakdown of that class and of the devastation of the war years: the growing army of urban unemployed; the refugees from the occupied regions, soldiers and sailors, who congregated in the cities; bandits and criminals released from the jails; and the unskilled labourers from the countryside who had always been the most prone to outbursts of anarchic violence in the cities. These were the semi-peasant types whom Gorky had blamed for the urban violence in the spring and to whose support he had ascribed the rising fortunes of the Bolsheviks." (p495). This is how the bourgeoisie today "rehabilitates" the working class from the charge of having a revolutionary history. In its cold blooded ignoring of the overwhelming facts proving that October was the work of millions of revolutionary workers organised in workers councils, the famous soviets, it is the class struggle of today and tomorrow which the bourgeoisie is targeting.
More than ever before, the leaders of the October Revolution have become the object of the hatred of 'the ruling class denigrations. Most of the books and articles appearing recently are above all indictments of Lenin and Trotsky. The German historian Helmut Altrichter, for instance, begins his new book "Ruland 1917" with the following words: "At the beginning was not Lenin". His whole book, while pretending to show that the masses, not the leaders made history, poses as a "passionate defence" of the autonomous initiative of the Russian workers: until, alas, they fell for the "suggestive" slogans of Lenin and Trotsky, who tossed democracy onto what they scandalously called the "rubbish dump of history".
Thousands of pages have been filled to "prove" that Lenin, although the last great struggle of his life was directed against Stalin and the social layer of state bureaucrats supporting him, calling for his removal in his famous "testimony", designated Stalin as his "successor". Particularly striking is the insistence of the "anti-democratic" attitude of against Trotsky. Whereas the Trotskyist movement joined the bourgeois ranks during World War Il, the historical figure of Trotsky is particularly dangerous for the bourgeoisie. Trotsky symbolises at once the greatest "scandal" in human history - that an exploited class toppled it's rulers (October), attempted to extend its rule across the globe (foundation of the Communist International), and organised the military defence of that rule (The Red Army in the Civil War) - as well as the Marxist struggle against the bourgeois, Stalinist counter-revolution. These are the two facts which the exploiters curse most of all, which they at all costs must eradicate from the collective memory of the working class: the fact that the proletariat toppled the bourgeoisie and became the ruling class in October 1917, and the fact that Marxism was the spearhead of the proletarian fight against the Stalinist counter-revolution supported by the world bourgeoisie. It was through the combined efforts of the western and the Stalinist counter-revolutionaries that the British General Strike 1926, the Chinese working class 1926/27, the Spanish working class during the Civil War of the 30s were defeated, that-the German revolution was finally defeated 1923 and it's proletariat crushed in 1933 through the combined efforts of the western and Stalinist counter-revolutionaries. The world bourgeoisie supported the Stalinist destruction of the vestiges of proletarian rule in Russia, in its destruction of the Communist International. Today the bourgeoisie hides the fact that the 100 million victims of Stalinism, the horrific toll compiled in capitalist book keeping manner in its "Black Book of Communism" are crimes of the bourgeoisie, and that the real, internationalist Communists were its first victims.
The bourgeois democratic intellectuals who have now put themselves at the head of the attack against Red October, apart from advancing their careers and boosting their earnings, have a specific interest of their own in imposing an historical tabula rasa. It is their interest in hiding the contemptible grovelling of the bourgeois intelligence at the feet of Stalin from the 1930s on. Not only Stalinist writers like Gorky, Feuchtwanger, Brecht[2] but the whole wretched rabble of bourgeois democratic historians and moralists from the Webbs to the "pacifist" Romain Rolland deified Stalin, defended the Moscow show trials tooth and nail, and supported the witch-hunt against Trotsky[3].
The attack on the aims of an undefeated proletariat
The attack against the revolutionary history of the working class is in reality an attack against the contemporary class struggle. By attempting to demolish the historic goal of the class movement, the bourgeoisie declares war against that class movement itself. Already Bernstein's separation of goal and movement at the turn of the century was a first full scale attempt to liquidate the revolutionary character of the proletarian class struggle "... since the socialist final goal is the only decisive moment distinguishing the social democratic movement from bourgeois democracy and bourgeois radicalism, transforming the whole workers' movement from a futile repair work towards the salvation of capitalist order into a class struggle against this order, to abolish this order ..." (Rosa Luxemburg: Social Reform or Revolution).
In the history of the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat, periods of the upsurge of class struggle and development of class consciousness within the proletariat have always been periods of a difficult, uneven, heterogeneous, but real clarification concerning the final goal of the movement. Periods of defeat have always seen the abandonment of that goal by the broad masses. Although the working class displayed considerable combativity in the years before 1914, for instance, it was the replacement of the socialist revolutionary goal by reformist illusions, nourished by decades of economic expansion, in the heads of the majority of workers which made their mobilisation for World War possible. During the 1930s this is particularly clear: despite the combativity of the French, Spanish, Belgian, American proletariat, the acceptance by the masses of the bourgeois goals of defence of democracy or of Stalinist Russia against "fascism" was at the centre of their mobilisation for imperialist war. Similarly, the almost insurrectional movements of the Eastern European workers during the 1950s (East Germany 1953, Poland and Hungary 1956), taking place in the midst of the longest counter-revolution in history, failed to develop any long term perspective beyond bourgeois nationalism and democracy.
As opposed to this, periods of the massive development both of struggles and class consciousness, such as the revolutionary wave of 1917-23 opened up by the Russian Revolution, and the present epoch beginning in 1968, were characterised from the onset by the appearance of debates about the final goal of the proletarian struggle. The international wave of struggles opened up by May-June 1968 in France was characterised precisely by the confrontation of an undefeated generation of workers both with the left apparatus of capital (unions and "left" parties), and with the bourgeois definition of socialism given by this apparatus. This ending of 50 years of Stalinist counter-revolution was thus necessarily, inevitably marked by the appearance of a new generation of revolutionary minorities.
These historic examples of the extremely complicated, but inseparable link between the historic course of the class struggle (towards world war or towards decisive class confrontations) and the goal of communism, remind that the present bourgeois campaign against communism, against the October Revolution, far from being an academic question, is a central issue of the class struggle today. An issue requiring in particular the most determined response of revolutionary minorities, of Left Communism throughout the world. But this issue is all the more important today in view of the present period of capitalist decomposition. This period of decomposition is determined above all by the fact that since 1968, neither of the decisive classes of modern society has been able to take a decisive step towards its historic goal: the bourgeoisie towards world war, the proletariat towards revolution. The most important single result of this historic stalemate, opening a phase of horrific rotting of the capitalist system, has been the internal collapse of the Stalinist ruled eastern imperialist bloc. This event has in turn delivered the bourgeoisie unexpected ammunition with which to attack the communist revolution, slanderously identified with Stalinism. In 1980, in the context of an international development of combativity and consciousness spearheaded by the western proletariat, the mass strikes in Poland opened the perspective of the proletariat itself confronting and eventually defeating Stalinism, and thus removing this obstacle blurring the class perspective of communist revolution. Instead of this, the fall of the Stalinist regimes through decomposition has had the opposite effect: blurring the historic memory and perspective of the class, undermining its self-confidence, weakening its capacity to organise its own struggle towards real confrontations with the left control organs of capital, lessening the immediate impact of revolutionary intervention towards the struggles. Given the decisive importance of self-confidence for the first exploited revolutionary class in history, given the key role of the self-organised class confrontation with the bourgeois state and of the intervention of revolutionaries in demonstrating that the proletariat is a class capable of founding society anew, this set-back has made the road to revolution even longer and more difficult than it already was.
But this road towards revolution remains open. The bourgeoisie has not been able to mobilise its class enemy behind capitalist class goals as in the 1930s. The very fact that after eight years of celebrating the "death of communism" the bourgeoisie is obliged to intensify its ideological campaign, to more directly attack Red October, itself proves this. The flood of publications on the Russian Revolution, if they are first and foremost a mystification against the workers, is also intended as a warning of the bourgeois ideologists to their own class: a warning never again to underestimate the proletarian class enemy. One of the central messages of all these publications is that in moments of great social crisis, such as 1917 in Russia, a tiny minority of audacious, disciplined, consistent revolutionaries can "suddenly" win a majority and apparently fuse with the interests and aspirations of the mass workers organisations - can "easily mislead the masses" as the bourgeoisie prefers to put it. Indeed a timely warning, even if there is never anything "sudden" or easy about such processes, which can take decades to mature before reaching fruition. Capitalism is inexorably approaching the greatest economic and social crisis in its history - in the history of humanity in fact - and the working class remains undefeated. No wonder the learned bourgeois publications of today on the Russian Revolution are full of warnings! Never again must a "monster" like Lenin be allowed to travel to his meeting with revolutionary history! Never again should revolutionary leaders like Lenin and Trotsky be allowed to walk about freely (how this problem can be dealt with is shown by the fate of Liebknecht, Luxemburg and of Trotsky himself)! Never again must the working class be allowed to fall prey to dangerous "revolutionary utopias"!
The Perspective of October is still alive
The ideological blow being struck against the proletarian revolution is not decisive. After decades of a campaign of silence, the bourgeoisie is today obliged to attack the history of the Marxist movement, and thus to admit the existence of this history. Today it attacks not only Red October, not only Lenin and Trotsky, but also Bordiga, one of the founders of Left Communism. It is obliged to attack the internationalists who defended Lenin's revolutionary defeatism during World War II. Its accusation that these internationalists must have been apologists for fascism is a lie equally as monstrous as the ones produced against the Russian Revolution. The present day awakening of militant interest in Left Communism concerns only a tiny minority of the class. But was not Bolshevism itself, this spectre of Communism still haunting Europe and the world, for many years but a tiny minority of the class? The proletariat is an historical class, its consciousness is an historical consciousness. Its revolutionary character is not a passing whim, as that of the once revolutionary bourgeoisie, but flows from its decisive place in the capitalist mode of production.
The decades of struggle and proletarian reflection lying ahead, precisely because they will be so difficult, will be years of the torturous but real development of the political culture of the proletariat. If it is to advance in its fight against unheard of material attacks, growing layers of an undefeated class will eventually be obliged to confront the legacy of its own history, to consult the treasure chest of Marxist theory. Under the present historical conditions, it will be impossible for the future struggles to regain a scale and momentum comparable to France 1968 or Poland 1980 without the development of a political culture, without the re-acquisition of past lessons and traditions at least among the most advanced workers, at a superior scale to anything witnessed between 1968-1989. The bourgeois onslaught against Communist October makes this process longer and more difficult. But at the same time it makes this work of re-acquisition all the more important in fact obligatory for the advanced sectors of the class in the defence of its immediate material interests.
The glorious perspective opened in October 1917, that of the world proletarian revolution, is anything but dead. It is the recognition of this fact which motivates the present bourgeois campaign.
ICC
[1] The main arguments of Lenin ("Renegade Kautsky") and Trotsky ("Terrorism and Communism") against Kautsky are today, in face of the present bourgeois campaign, more timely and valid than ever.
[2] Brecht, who secretly sympathised with Trotsky at the time, wrote his Galileo Galilei in order to justify his own cowardice in not opposing Stalin. The martyrdom of Giordano Bruno, who as opposed to Galileo refused to retract in face of the inquisition, symbolises for Brecht the alleged futility of the resistance of Trotsky.
[3] The shamefulness of the bourgeois democratic intelligence is not removed, but made all the more wretched, by the lonely example of the American philosopher Dewey who presided over the tribunal to judge the case of Trotsky. By supporting the duty of a revolutionary to publicly defend his reputation, Dewey showed a greater respect and understanding for proletarian behaviour than the hysterical petty bourgeoisie today campaigning against the ICC's defence of this same principle of a "'jury of honour. Indeed, with its present "anti-Leninist" prostration at the feet of the present anti-communism of the "triumphant" western bourgeoisie today, the disgrace of the petty bourgeois intelligentsia has reached new depths.
In no.13 of Prometeo (June, 1997), the Partito Comunista Internazionahsta - Battaglia Comunista (PClnt) - has published the documents prepared from its 6th Congress.
This awareness of a "new phase" in the political life of the PCInt and the ommunist left has led the PCInt to replace its original, specific platform with an adhesion to the common platform of the IBRP. This in itself is a substantial advance: whereas previously the IBRP's two constituent organisations (PCInt and CWO) each maintained their own platform, as well as that of the IBRP, the IBRP platform alone now serves as a single political foundation. We welcome this as a contribution to the clarity and political cohesion of the revolutionary movement as a whole.
In a revised version of its platform published in 1994, the IBRP had already been led to modify certain elements and criteria for regroupment[1]. These changes already, at the time, represented a clarification for the whole revolutionary milieu. However, the fact that they are now adopted unambiguously by both the IBRP and its member groups, gives their publication in 1997 an added importance. This is why we consider that this Congress has reinforced the whole of the communist left in its struggle for its defence and its development.
Obviously, the fact that we welcome and support these positive aspects of the Congress does not mean that we intend to sweep under the carpet our disagreements with and criticisms of the Congress documents, where these exist. In this article, we will mention some of these disagreements, but our main aim is to set out what we consider to be a contribution to whole communist vanguard, and a strengthening of the common positions of the communist left. Only from this framework can we then go on to develop our divergences and criticisms.
Denunciation of the democratic mystification
The history of the workers' movement in the 20th century has shown clearly that so-called "democracy" is the bourgeoisie's main weapon against the proletariat. The democratic charade allows the capitalist state to deceive and divide the workers, to turn them away from their class terrain, and once this is done to organise an implacable repression which generally is no less brutal than the crudest forms of capitalist dictatorship (Stalinism or Nazism).
In the present situation, because of the disorientation of the working class (as a result of the collapse of the supposedly "communist" regimes and the anti-communist campaign organised by the world bourgeoisie), the democratic mystification is enjoying a revival. This is why the state is laying down a barrage of propaganda to derail workers onto the rotten ground of the defence of "democracy".
From this point of view, as far as the denunciation of the democratic mystification is concerned, the old IBRP platform of 1984[2] contains some ambiguities and omissions. The IBRP remained silent about the questions of elections and parliamentarism. Moreover, it declared that "the democratic revolution is no longer practicable. It should be considered (and this has been the case for a long time) as definitively closed in the imperialist citadels, and impossible to repeat elsewhere in the period of decadence". We agree entirely with that, but although the "democratic revolution" was denounced as "impossible" , the PClnt did not take position clearly on the possibility or otherwise of conducting a "tactical" struggle for "democracy"[3], since elsewhere it spoke of "the possibility of taking up demands for certain elementary freedoms in revolutionary political agitation" .
The new version of the platform contains an important clarification:
- on the one hand, the IBRP does not just denounce" democratic revolutions"; it attacks "the struggle for democracy": "The era of democratic struggles ended a long time ago and they cannot be repeated in the present imperialist epoch".
- Moreover, the IBRP has added a sentence which explicitly rejects elections: "communist party tactics aim for the overthrow of the state and the installation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Communists have no illusions that workers' freedom can be won through electing a majority in parliament".
- More concretely, the IBRP has added a paragraph where it declares that: "Parliamentary democracy is only the fig leaf to disguise the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The real organs of power in democratic capitalist society lie outside Parliament".
The IBRP has taken up the "Theses on Democracy" from the First Congress of the Communist International, and has gone over its analyses and perspectives in depth. In our opinion, however, there is still missing an explicit condemnation of the use of elections. For example, the IBRP does not denounce the CI's theory of revolutionary parliamentarism. This theory recognised that parliament is a fig leaf for bourgeois rule, and that it is not possible to take power by the electoral, parliamentary road. However, it was in favour of the "revolutionary" use of parliament as an agitational tribune and a means of denunciation. This position was clearly wrong at the time, and today is counter-revolutionary, being used by the Trotskyists to bring the workers back into the electoral game.
Moreover, the IBRP has retained the paragraph which refers to the "demand for certain elementary freedoms [as a part of] revolutionary agitation". To what is the IBRP referring? Does it support the idea - as the FOR[4] used to - that there are certain "elementary freedoms" of assembly, association, etc, that the working class should try to conquer legally as a first step in its struggle? Does it believe, as some radical Trotskyist groups claim to do, that these "minimal freedoms" are a tool for agitation, which even if they cannot be won under capitalism nonetheless serve to "advance consciousness". It would be good if the IBRP could clarify its position on this question.
The union question
The PCInt already defended a fairly clear position on the union question, in rejecting the traditional bourgeois position which sees the unions as somehow "neutral" organs whose orientation towards either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat depends on their leaders. This position was clearly condemned in the 1984 platform: "It is impossible to conquer or to change the unions: the proletarian revolution must necessarily pass over their corpse".
The positions adopted in 1997 contain modifications which might appear minimal at first sight. The IBRP has removed a paragraph which contradicted in practice the clarity in theory: "In the framework of these principles [ie the affirmation cited above rejecting any possibility of conquering or changing the unions], the possibility of different concrete actions as far as communist work in the unions is concerned, is a question for the tactical elaboration of the party" . It seems to us quite correct to have removed this paragraph, since its effect was to relegate the declarations of principle against the unions to the realm of "strategy", to leave the IBRP's hands free for the elastic "tactical" imperatives of "work in the unions".
In the same sense, the IBRP has modified the paragraph in the 1984 platform, which stated that "the union is not and cannot be the organ of the mass of the working class in struggle" by removing the term "in struggle", which suggested without saying so openly that the unions could be organs of the mass of the working class when it was not in struggle. This correction is strengthened in the document adopted by the 1997 congress entitled "The unions today and communist action", which states "It is impossible for the workers really to defend even their immediate interests other than outside and against the union line" (Thesis 7, in Prometeo no. 13). By including this precision, tile IBRP closes the door to the Trotskyist lie as to the "dual nature" of the unions, supposedly favourable to the workers during periods of social calm, and reactionary during moments of struggle and the rise of the revolution. This is a sophistry to justify the return to the union prison, of a kind used by the Bordigist current. We think that the removal of the term "in struggle" means that the IBRP condemns such a position, even if it might have been said more clearly.
In the same way, the IBRP in the same text makes a clear demarcation between itself and rank and file unionism, the radicalised variation on trades unionism which specialises in making virulent attacks on the union leadership and bureaucracy, the better to defend the supposedly "working class" nature of the union. In Thesis 8, the IBRP states that "the various attempts to build new trades unions have all come to grief in a motley array of rank and file unionist acronyms, many of which are now trying to get legal recognition as contractual partners, allowing in the footsteps of the official unions".
We also welcome the fact that the IBRP has replaced the paragraph stating that "the trades union is the organ for the mediation between capital and labour" with the much clearer: "Unions arose as negotiators of the terms of sale of workers' labour power". The old formulation was dangerous for two reasons:
- On the one hand, it ascribed to the unions a timeless character as organs of mediation between capital and labour, both in the ascendant and the decadent periods of capitalism, whereas now the platform states that they "arose as negotiators ... of labour power", which differentiates the IBRP's position from the typical Bordigist view of the unions as something unchanging.
On the other, the very idea of an "organ for the mediation between capital and labour" is erroneous, since it opens the door to a vision of the unions as organs situated between the two opposing social classes. In the ascendant period of capitalism, the unions were not organs of mediation between the classes but instruments of proletarian combat, created by the workers' struggle and violently persecuted by the bourgeoisie. It is thus clearer to speak of organs born as "negotiators of the terms of sale of workers' labour power", since this was one of their functions during this period of history, derived from the possibility of winning lasting reforms and improvements in workers' conditions. However, the IBRP forgets another dimension of the unions, emphasised by Marx, Engels and other revolutionaries: their role as "schools of communism", of instruments of organisation, and to an extent also of clarification, for large layers of the working class.
Finally, the IBRP has significantly altered the point on the intervention of communists in the class struggle, in the form of the "communist factory groups". The 1984 platform said that "the possibility of encouraging the development of struggles on the immediate level at which they are born to the broader level of the anti-capitalist political struggle, depends on the operational presence of communist factory groups", while the 1997 version states that "The possibility of the favourable development of struggles away from the immediate level from which they spring onto the wider arena of a political struggle against capital depends on the active presence of communists inside the workplaces" (the Italian version includes the phrase "to provide a stimulant to the workers, and to indicate the perspective to follow"). We fully share the IBRP's preoccupation with the development of means of revolutionary intervention within the concrete process of tile struggle and the politicisation of the struggle. But while the concern is correct, tile response seems to us to be limited.
On the one hand, the IBRP has rightly eliminated the notion that the politicisation of the workers' immediate struggle depends on the "operational presence of communist factory groups"[5], but on the other it continues to maintain that the anti-capitalist politicisation of the workers' struggle is "conditioned by the operational presence of communists within the workplace". Revolutionaries must develop a political presence in the struggles of the working crass through an intervention via their press, leaflets, speaking in meetings in strikes, demonstrations, and assemblies, in short wherever such intervention is possible, and not only in workplaces where a revolutionary presence exists already as the IBRP's formulation seems to imply.
According to the text "The unions today and communist action", communists should form around them "organisms for intervention in the class", which could be ''factory based" or "territorial".
Here again, the form seems to us somewhat vague. Different organisms can appear within the proletariat, depending on the different moments in the balance of forces between the classes:
- in moments when the struggle is developing, what we call struggle committees appear, which are organisms that regroup combative elements whose aim is to contribute to the extension of the struggle, and their control by the workers through mass meetings, and elected and revocable committees of delegates; rather than being factory based, they tend to regroup workers from different sectors;
- in less crucial moments, or during an ebb following a period of intense struggle, small minorities create workers' groups or discussion circles, tied more to the need to draw the lessons of the struggle, and oriented towards the more general problems of the working class.
Faced with these tendencies within the class, the revolutionary position rejects any "spontaneism" which "waits for the class to create them by itself, and in an isolated manner". Revolutionaries intervene in these organisms and do not hesitate to propose and encourage their creation if the conditions are ripe. However, that does not make these "organisms for the intervention of communists", they are organisations of the class and in the class, whose intervention is distinct from that of the communist political organisation. This is why we think that the IBRP's formulation remains ambiguous, and leaves the door open to the conception of intermediary organisations between the working class and communist organisations.
The role of the party and the struggle to build it
The world communist party is a vital tool of the proletariat. As the experience of October 1917 has shown, the proletariat cannot achieve victory in the revolutionary process, and seize power, without forming a party which intervenes, and gives a political leadership and impulse to the revolutionary action of the class.
With the defeat of the worldwide revolutionary wave of 1917-23 and the degeneration of the communist parties, the groups of the communist left tried to draw the concrete lessons of this experience, on the question of the party:
- Firstly, they concentrated on the programmatic question: the criticism of, and the going beyond the weak points in the programme of the Communist International which contributed to its degeneration, particularly on the union, parliamentary, and so-called "national liberation" questions.
- Then, they turned to a critique of the conception of the mass party linked to the proletariat's tasks in the ascendant period of capitalism (organisation and education of the class, given its origins in the peasant and artisan classes; participation in parliament, given the possibility of the struggle for reforms and improvements in the workers' condition).
This old conception led to a vision of the party representing, organising the class, and taking power in its name - an incorrect vision which was revealed as dangerous and damaging in the revolutionary period of1917-23. For the most advanced groups of the communist left, their critique led to the conclusion that the party is vital to the class, not as a mass organisation, but as a minority force with the job of concentrating on developing its consciousness and political determination[6]; not as an organ to exercise power on behalf of the class, but as the most dynamic and advanced factor which contributes, through its intervention and its clarity, to the class ability to exercise power collectively and massively through the workers' councils.
The position adopted by the IBRP in its 1984 platform, while it certainly demonstrates a clarification on the programmatic questions (which as we have seen above, has been further developed in the 1997 congress), also expressed an ambiguous position, full of general and vague affirmations, on the crucial question of the party, its relations with me class, its form of organisation and the process of its construction. By contrast the documents of the recent Congress are more precise on these questions, and reveal a much clearer conception of the process of the party's construction, and the concrete steps that must be taken by communist organisations in the present period.
In the 1984 platform, the IBRP said: "The class party is the specific and irreplaceable organ of the revolutionary struggle for it is the political organ of the class". We agree with the idea that the party is a specific organ (it cannot be confused with or dissolved into the class as a whole), and that it is indeed irreplaceable[7]. However, the formulation "it is the political organ of the class" can imply, without saying so openly as the Bordigists do, that the party is the organ which takes power in the name of the class.
The 1997 version provides an important precision, which moves towards the most coherent definitions of the communist left: "The class party - or the political organisations which precede it - comprises the most conscious part of the proletariat who are organised to defend the programme for the emancipation of the entire working class". On the one hand, even if this passage says so indirectly and implicitly[8], the IBRP rejects the Bordigist vision of a party self-proclaimed by a minority, independently of the historic situation and the balance of class forces, becoming the party for ever. Moreover, the IBRP has eliminated the formulation "the political organ of the class", to replace it with the much clearer "most conscious part of the proletariat which organises to defend the revolutionary programme".
Obviously, abandoning the 1984 formulation does not mean denying the political nature of the party. The proletarian party's role cannot be the same as that of bourgeois parties, whose function is to exercise political power in the name of those they represent. As an exploited class, deprived of all economic power, the proletariat cannot delegate to a minority, however faithful, the exercise of its political power.
On the other hand, the IBRP has introduced into its programmatic corpus the lessons of the Russian Revolution, which were completely missing in the 1984 version: "The lesson of the last revolutionary wave is not that the working class can do without organised leadership, or that the party is the class (a metaphysical abstraction of latter-day Bordigists) Rather, that leadership and its organisational form (the party) is the most important weapon that the revolutionary working class has. Its task will be to fight for a communist perspective in the mass organs of proletarian power (soviets). The party, however, will remain a minority of the working class and is not a substitute for the class in general. The task of establishing socialism is one for the working class as a whole. It is a task which cannot be delegated, not even to the class conscious vanguard".
The IBRP has introduced explicitly this essential lesson of the Russian Revolution (which in itself was no more than a confirmation of that motto of the Ist International, "The emancipation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves"). At the same time, it has gone on to reflect on the development of the relationship between revolutionaries and the class, the role of the party, and its links with the class.
In the 1997 platform we find the following: "the experience of the counter-revolution in Russia obliges revolutionaries to deepen their understanding of the relationship between the state, the party and the class. The role played by what started out as the revolutionary party has led many potential revolutionaries to reject the whole idea of the class party en bloc". Instead of avoiding the problem with declamatory phrases on the 'importance" of the party, the IBRP poses the question in historical terms: "During the revolution, the party will tend to conquer the political leadership of the movement by distributing and upholding its programme within the mass organs of the working class. Just as it is impossible to imagine a process of growing consciousness in the absence of a revolutionary party, it is equally impossible to imagine that the most conscious part of the proletariat could control events independently of the soviets. The soviets are the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and their decline and side lining from the Russian political scene contributed to the collapse of the soviet state and the victory of the counter-revolution. The Bolshevik Commissars, isolated from an exhausted and starving working class, found themselves forced to manage power within a capitalist state, and behaved like those that govern a capitalist state".
The IBRP draws a conclusion which we agree with: "In the future world revolution, the revolutionary party will have to try to lead the revolutionary movement solely through the mass organs of the class, which will give an impetus to its emergence. There is no recipe which guarantees victory, neither the party nor the soviets in themselves represent a certain defence against the counter-revolution, the only guarantee of victory is a living class consciousness within the working masses".
Debate and regroupment among revolutionaries
Continuing with this clarification, the IBRP has added a series of precisions, which were absent from the 1984 texts, concerning the relationship between today's revolutionary groups and the concrete manner of contributing in the present period to the process that will lead to the formation of the revolutionary party.
Confronted with the bourgeoisie's present campaign against the communist left - expressed, for example, in the "anti-negationist" campaign - revolutionaries must establish a common line of defence. On the other hand, the development in the four comers of the earth of little minorities of the class looking for contact with revolutionary positions demands that the communist groups abandon sectarianism and isolation, and on the contrary offer these elements a coherent framework for them to come to grips with both the common heritage of die communist left, and the divergences within it.
Rightly responding to these concerns, the IBRP has added a complement to the criteria for participating in the International Conferences (which are to be found in the 1984 platform), which states: "We consider the Bureau to be a force situated within the proletarian political camp, which includes those who struggle for the independence of the proletariat against capital, who have nothing to do with nationalism in any form whatever, who see nothing socialist in Stalinism or the ex-USSR, and who at the same time recognise October 1917 as the point of departure for a vaster European revolution".
The PClnt recognises that "among the organisations which belong to the said camp, there are still important political differences, among which is the nature and function of the revolutionary organisation", and that it is necessary to undertake a discussion on these differences. This is the right method, and undoubtedly represents an important change of attitude relative to the IBRP's position during the Third International Conference of the Communist Left, a position which was maintained in the texts of 1984. Let us recall that during the Conference's final session, with the support of the CWO, the PCInt proposed to introduce an additional criterion for participation, on the role of the party as a "political leadership". As we said afterwards[9], this criterion seemed to us to have no other purpose than to exclude the ICC from the International Conferences, since the PCInt refused to discuss the counter-proposal of the ICC. This counter-proposal put forward the party's role as a political leadership, but within the framework of the exercise of power by the workers' councils. It is this question which the IBRP has returned to with clarity in its 1997 platform. Moreover, and above all, at the Third Conference the PCInt rejected a draft resolution calling for an in-depth and enlarged discussion on the conception of the party, its function, its nature, and its relations with the class as a whole. With this complement, the IBRP is today proposing a systematic discussion of the question, which seems to us an unequivocal opening to programmatic clarification within the communist left. In the framework of this article, we cannot respond in depth to all the points put forward by the IBRP. However, we do want to emphasise particularly Point 2 (which we agree with wholeheartedly, like the Point 6 which we have just examined): "The IBRP tends towards the formation of the World Communist Party from the moment when there will exist sufficient strength and a political programme for its constitution. The Bureau is for the Party, but does not claim to be its sole originating nucleus. The future party will not be the fruit of the growth of just one organisation".
From this correct vision, the IBRP leads on to Point 3, which is also correct: "before the revolutionary party is formed, all the details of its political programme must be clarified through discussions and debates between its constituent parts to be"[10].
This declaration reveals the IBRP's commitment to a rigorous discussion among the revolutionary groups, with a view to clarification throughout the communist left, and the new generation of elements secreted by the class, and attracted by the former's positions. We welcome this commitment, we urge the IBRP to concretise it, and to develop it by concrete attitudes and forward steps. For our part, we will contribute to its development with all our strength.
Adalen. 16th November 1997
[1] IBRP: International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, composed of the PClnt and the Communist Workers' Organisation (UK). Note that the quotations from the 1984 IBRP platform are translated from the French version published in the first issue of the IBRP's Revue Communiste (no longer published in French, but still available in English), while quotations from the 1997 platform have been taken from the English version available on the Internet. In some cases (in particular on the trades union question, where the Internet version still contains the formulation "Trades unions are organs of mediation between labour and capital", which no longer appears in Italian), there appear to be differences between the English Internet and the Italian version. In this case, we have stuck to the Italian original published in Prometeo no.13.
[2] A delegation from the CWO also took part in this Congress.
[3] Such precision is all the more necessary in that the left of capital and especially the Trotskyists and other leftists recognise that the "struggle for democracy" is not" revolutionary", but consider it "vital" for "tactical" reasons, or as a first "step towards socialism".
[4] Fomento Obrero Revolucionario, a group of the proletarian political milieu, today sadly defunct, led by G. Munis, and whose origins lay in a break with Trotskyism in 1948.
[5] This position is similar to that of the KAPD in the 1920s which worked for the formation of "Unionen" - organisms which were half-way between the general organisation of the class and the political organisation, with platforms that included both political positions and contingent elements. In reality, the Unionen turned out to be a handicap for the class by their concessions to trades unionism.
[6] In his polemic in 1903 and throughout the Bolsheviks' struggle right up to 1917, Lenin defended the need for a clear break with the conception of the mass party, although he did not develop this idea in all its implications.
[7] See amongst other articles, "The function of the revolutionary organisation" in International Review no.29. "The party and its relations with the class" in International Review no. 35.
[8] The IBRP is much more precise in the explanation that it has added to the criteria for the International Conferences: "the proclamation of the revolutionary party, or its initial nucleus, solely on the base of the existence of little groups of activists, does nor represent much of a step forward for the revolutionary movement".
[9] See our position in the Proceedings of the Third International Conference, available from our address, and also our evaluation of the Conferences and the attitude of Battaglia Comunista, in the International Review no.22.
[10] Of course, this globally correct view should not lead 10 a schematic interpretation according to which the party cannot be formed until "all the details are clarified". For example, in March 1919 it was urgent to found the Third International (which was already late), and the founding Congress followed the advice of Lenin, rather than that of the German delegate who wanted to delay it on the (real) grounds that points remained to be clarified.
What was the nature of the system that existed in our country during the "soviet" period?
This is certainly one of the most important questions for history, and to an extent for the other social sciences. And it is not at all an academic question - it is very closely tied to the present epoch, for it is impossible to understand the reality of today without understanding that of yesterday.
And yet this question can be summed up as follows: what was the nature of the central actor of the "soviet" system, which determined the country's development, ie the ruling bureaucracy? What were its relations with other social groups? What motives and needs determined its activity?
It is impossible to study these problems seriously without knowing the works of Leon Trotsky, one of the first writers to try to understand and analyse the nature of the "soviet" system and its ruling strata. Trotsky devoted several works to this problem, but his most general and concentrated view of the bureaucracy is set out in his book The Revolution Betrayed, published 60 years ago[1].
Principal characteristics of the bureaucracy
Let us recall the main characteristics of the bureaucracy that Trotsky gives in his book:
1) The upper levels of the social pyramid of the USSR are occupied by "a ruling caste in the proper sense of the word" (p 117), and this caste "does not do any directly productive work, but directs, orders, commands, pardons and punishes". According to Trotsky, this stratum comprises between 5 and 6 million people.
2) This stratum which rules everything is removed from any control by the masses who produce social commodities. The bureaucracy reigns, the toiling masses "obey and are silent".
3) This stratum maintains relations of material inequality in society: "Limousines for the "activists", fine perfumes for "our women", margarine for the workers, stores "de luxe" for the gentry, a look at delicacies through the store windows for the plebs" (P120). In general, the living conditions of the ruling class are analogous to those of the bourgeoisie: "the ruling stratum comprises all gradations, from the petty bourgeoisie of the backwoods to the big bourgeoisie of the capitals" (P 140).
4) This stratum rules not only objectively, but subjectively, for it considers itself sole master of society: according to Trotsky it "possesses the specific consciousness of a ruling class" (p135).
5) The domination of this stratum is based on repression, and its prosperity on "the masked appropriation of the fruits of other's labour". "The privileged minority", notes Trotsky, "lives at the expense of the non-privileged majority".
6) There is a latent social struggle between this ruling caste and the oppressed majority of workers.
Trotsky in fact is describing the following picture: there exists a fairly numerous social stratum which controls production, and therefore its produce, in a monopolistic manner, and which appropriates a large part of production (in other words, exercises a function of exploitation), which is united around an
understanding of its common material interests, and is opposed to the producing class.
What do marxists call a social stratum that displays all these characteristics? There is only one answer: this is the ruling social class in every sense of the term.
Trotsky leads his reader to the same conclusion. But he does not come to it himself, even though he notes that in the USSR the bureaucracy "is something more than a bureaucracy" (P249). Something more ... but what? Trotsky does not say. Moreover, he devotes a whole chapter to refuting the notion of the bureaucracy's bourgeois class nature. Trotsky starts with "a", but after describing the exploiting ruling class, Trotsky hesitates at the last moment, and refuses to go on to "b".
Stalinism and capitalism
Trotsky demonstrates the same reticence when he compares the Stalinist bureaucratic system with the capitalist system.
"Mutatitis mutandis, the Soviet government occupies in relation to the whole economic system the same position as the capitalist does in relation to the single enterprise" (p43), says Trotsky in Chapter 2 of Revolution Betrayed. In Chapter 9, he says:
"The transfer of the factories to the state changed the situation of the worker only juridically [my emphasis - AG]. In reality he is compelled to live in want and work a definite number of hours for a definite wage (...) The workers lost all influence whatever in the management of the factory. With piecework payment, hard conditions of material existence, lack of free movement, with terrible police repression penetrating the life of every factory, it is hard indeed for the worker to feel himself a "free workman". In the bureaucracy he sees the manager, in the state the employer" (p241/2).
In the same chapter, Trotsky notes that the nationalisation of property does not liquidate the social difference between the ruling and subject strata: the former enjoy every possible luxury, while the latter live in poverty as before and sell their labour power. He says the same thing in Chapter 4: "state ownership of the means of production does not turn manure into gold, and does not surround with a halo of sanctity the sweat-shop system" (p82).
These theses seem to observe very clearly phenomena that are elementary from a marxist viewpoint. For Marx always emphasised that the principal characteristic of a social system was not its laws and "forms of property", whose analysis as things in themselves leads to a useless metaphysics[2]. The decisive
factor is the real social relations, and principally the position of social groups in relation to society's social product.
A mode of production can be based on different forms of property. The example of feudalism shows this well. During the Middle Ages, it was based on private feudal ownership of the land in the west, and on state feudal ownership in the east. Nonetheless, social relations were feudal in both cases, since they relied on the feudal exploitation of the class of peasant producers.
In Volume III of Capital, Marx defines the principal characteristic of any society as "the specific economic form in which free labour is directly extracted from the producers themselves". Consequently, what is decisive is the relationship between those who control the process and the fruits of production, and those who carry it out. The attitude of the owners of the means of production towards the producers themselves: "This is where we discover the most profound mystery, the hidden foundation, of every society"[3].
We have already shown how Trotsky described the relationship between the ruling stratum and the producers. On the one hand, the real "owners of the means of production" embodied in the state (ie the organised bureaucracy), on the other the de jure owners, in fact the workers deprived of any rights, the wage workers, from whom "free labour is extracted". We can only draw one logical conclusion: there is no fundamental difference in nature between the Stalinist bureaucratic system and "classical" capitalism.
Here again, Trotsky starts with "a" by demonstrating the essential identity between the two systems, but does not go on to "b". On the contrary, he sets himself firmly against any identification of Stalinist society with state capitalism, and puts forward the notion of the existence in the .USSR of a specific form of "workers' state", where the proletariat remains the ruling class from the economic viewpoint, and is not subjected to exploitation despite being "politically expropriated" .
Trotsky supports this thesis by referring to the nationalisation of the land, the means of production and exchange, and transport, and the monopoly of foreign trade. In other words, he uses the same "juridical" argumentation which he has already convincingly refuted (see the quotations above). On page 82 of Revolution Betrayed, he denies that state property can "turn manure into gold", while on page 248 on the contrary, he declares that the sole fact of nationalisation is enough to make the oppressed workers into the ruling class.
The schema that replaces reality
How is this to be explained? Why does Trotsky the publicist, the merciless critic of Stalinism who cites the facts proving that the bureaucracy is a ruling class and a collective exploiter, contradict Trotsky the theoretician when he tries to analyse these facts?
Obviously, we can name two major factors which prevented Trotsky from overcoming this contradiction, one theoretical and one political.
In Revolution Betrayed, Trotsky tries to refute theoretically the thesis of the bureaucracy's bourgeois class nature with arguments as weak as the fact that it "has neither stocks nor bonds" (p249). But why should the ruling class necessarily possess them? For it is obvious that the possession of stocks and bonds is of no importance in itself: the important thing is whether this or that appropriates to itself a surplus product of the direct producers. If yes, then the function of exploitation exists whether the distribution of the appropriated product is done via dividends on shares, or through a salary and privileges attached to a job. The author of Revolution Betrayed is just as unconvincing when he says that the representatives of the leading stratum cannot bequeath their privileged status (P249). It is highly unlikely that Trotsky thought that children of the elite could become workers or peasants.
In our opinion, it is not worth considering superficial explanations like this to determine a serious reason for Trotsky's refusal to consider the bureaucracy as a social ruling class. Instead, it is to be found in his firm conviction that the bureaucracy could not become the central element of a stable system, that it was only capable of "expressing" the interests of other classes, but by distorting them.
During the 1920s, this conviction had already become the basis for Trotsky's schema of the social antagonisms of "soviet" society. For him, the framework for all these antagonisms was reduced to the strict dichotomy between the proletariat and private capital. There was no place in this schema for a "third force". The rise of the bureaucracy was seen as the result of the pressure of the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie on the Party and the state. The bureaucracy was seen as balancing between the interests of the workers and those of the "new owners", unable to serve one or the other. Such a regime dominated by an unstable group "between the classes" could only fall, and the group itself split, at the first serious threat to its stability. This is what Trotsky predicted at the end of the 1920s[4].
And yet in reality, events developed quite differently. After the most violent conflict with the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy had neither fallen nor split. After easily obtaining the capitulation of an insignificant internal "right", it set about liquidating the NEP and "the kulaks as a class", and establishing a regime of forced collectivisation and industrialisation. All this came as a complete surprise to Trotsky and his supporters, convinced as they were that the "centrist" apparachiks would by nature are incapable of it! It is not surprising that the bankruptcy of the Trotskyist opposition's political calculations should be followed by its catastrophic capitulation in Russia, and its political bankruptcy at the international level[5].
Trying in vain to find a way out, Trotsky sent letters and articles from exile where he proved that the bureaucracy had only one option, and that it would "inevitably collapse long before achieving any serious results"[6]. Even when the leader of the opposition saw the practical incoherence of his idea of a role dependent on the "centrist" bureaucracy, he obstinately stuck to his bankrupt schema. At the time of the "great turn", his theoretical reflection is striking for its remoteness from reality. For example, at the end of 1928, he writes: "Centrism is an official line of the apparatus. The bearer of this centrism is the party functionary. The functionaries do not form a class. So what class line is represented by centrism?". Since Trotsky denied the possibility of the bureaucracy having its own line, he arrived at the following conclusion: "The rising owners of property find their expression, though a cowardly one, in the right fraction. The proletarian line is represented by the Opposition. What is left for centrism? When we remove the above social strata, all that is left is ... the middle peasant"[7]. And he writes all this at the same time as the Stalinist apparatus is conducting a violent campaign against the middle peasantry, and preparing its liquidation as an economic formation!
As time went on, Trotsky continued to expect an imminent split in the bureaucracy between the proletarian and bourgeois elements, and those "who would be left to one side". He predicted the "centrists ", fall from power, first after the failure of a "complete collectivisation", then as the result of an economic crisis at the end of the first Five Year Plan. In his Draft Platform for the International Left Opposition on the Russian Question written in 1931, he even envisaged the possibility of a civil war when the elements of the state and party apparatus would be divided "on the two sides of the barricades"[8].
Despite all these predictions, the Stalinist regime survived, the bureaucracy not only remained muted but even strengthened its totalitarian power. Trotsky nonetheless continued to consider the bureaucratic system in the USSR as extremely precarious. And during the 1930s, he thought that the bureaucracy’s power could collapse at any moment. In other words, it should not be considered as a class. Trotsky expressed this idea most clearly in his article The USSR at War (September 1939): "Would we not be mistaken to describe the Bonapartist oligarchy as a new ruling class a few years or even months before its shameful fall?"[9].
All Trotsky's predictions of the "Soviet" bureaucracy's imminent fall have been refuted, one after the other, by events themselves, Despite everything, he did not want to change his ideas. For him the attachment to a theoretical schema was worth more than anything else. But this is not the only reason, since Trotsky was more a politician than a theoretician, and generally preferred the "concrete political" approach to a problem than that of "abstract sociology". We will look here at another important reason for his obstinate refusal to call things by their real names.
Terminology and Politics
If we examine the history of the Trotskyist Opposition during the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s, we can see that his entire political strategy was based on the imminent disintegration of the USSR's governing apparatus. Trotsky thought that an alliance between a hypothetical "left tendency" and the Opposition would be necessary for the reform of the party and the state. At the end of 1928, he wrote: "A bloc with the centrists [ie the Stalinist apparatus] is admissible and possible in principle. Moreover, only such a regroupment in the party can save the revolution"[10]. Because they counted on such a bloc, the leaders of the Opposition tried not to put off the "progressive" bureaucrats. This tactic explains the highly equivocal attitude of the Opposition leaders towards workers' class struggle against the state, their refusal to create their own party, etc.
Even after his exile from the USSR, Trotsky continued to place his hopes in a rapprochement with the “centrists". His hope to gain the support of a part of the ruling bureaucracy was so great that he was prepared to compromise (under certain conditions) with the Secretary General of the CP's Central Committee. The story of the slogan "Stalin resign!" is a striking example. In March 1932, Trotsky published an open letter to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR where he launched an appeal: "It is necessary at last to carry out Lenin's final, insistent advice: make Stalin resign"[11]. However, a few months later he had already gone back on this, explaining: "What matters is not Stalin as an individual, but his fraction... The slogan "Down with Stalin!" could be (and inevitably would be) understood as a call for the overthrow of the fraction which is today in power, and more widely of the regime. We do not want to overthrow the system, but to reform it"[12]. Trotsky made the question of his attitude towards the Stalinists completely explicit in an unpublished article-interview written in December 1932: "Today, as before, we are ready for co-operation in many forms with the present ruling fraction. Question: Are you as a result ready to co-operate with Stalin? Answer: Without any doubt"[13].
During this period, Trotsky linked a possible turn of a part of the Stalinist bureaucracy towards a "multiform cooperation" with the opposition, to an imminent "catastrophe" for the regime, which as we have said above, he considered inevitable because of the "precariousness" of the bureaucracy's social position[14]. As a result of this catastrophe, the leaders of the Opposition were ready to consider an alliance with Stalin in order to save the party, nationalisation, and the "planned economy", from the bourgeois counter-revolution.
And yet, the catastrophe did not happen. The bureaucracy was much stronger and more firmly consolidated than Trotsky thought. The Politburo did not respond to his appeals to ensure "an honest cooperation between the historic fractions" in the CP[15]. Finally, in the autumn of 1933 and after many hesitations, Trotsky abandoned any hope - which was utopian anyway - in a reform of the bureaucratic system with the participation of the Stalinists, and called for a "political revolution" in the USSR.
However, this change to the Trotskyists' principal slogan did not mean any radical revision of their view of the nature of the bureaucracy, the Party, and state, any more than it meant a definitive rejection of their hoped-for alliance with its "progressive" wing. When Trotsky wrote Revolution Betrayed, and afterwards he still considered the bureaucracy theoretically as a precarious formation devoured by growing antagonisms. In the IVth International's TransitionaL Programme (1938), he declared that the state apparatus in the USSR comprised all political tendencies, including a "truly Bolshevik" one. Trotsky thought of the latter as a minority within the bureaucracy, but nonetheless a significant one: he was not talking of a few apparachiks, but of a fraction within a social stratum of 5-6 million people. According to Trotsky, this “truly Bolshevik" fraction was a potential reserve for the left opposition. Moreover, the leader of the IVth International still thought it admissible to form a "united front" with the Stalinist part of the apparatus, in the case of a capitalist counter-revolution, which he considered "imminent" in 1938.[16]
It is this political orientation, first towards co-operation and the bloc with the "centrists" - ie the majority of the ruling" Soviet" bureaucracy - (in the late 20s and early 30s), then towards an alliance with the "truly Bolshevik" fraction and a "united front" with the ruling Stalinist fraction (after 1933), that we must bear in mind when we examine Trotsky's ideas on the nature of the bureaucratic oligarchy and social relations in the USSR, expressed in their most complete form in Revolution Betrayed.
Let us suppose that Trotsky had recognised in the totalitarian "Soviet" bureaucracy the exploiting ruling class and bitter enemy of tile proletariat. What would have been the political consequences? In the first place, he would have had to reject the idea of uniting with a part of this class - the very idea of the existence of a "truly Bolshevik fraction" within the exploiting bureaucratic class would have been as absurd as its existence within the bourgeoisie, for example. Secondly, a supposed alliance with the Stalinists to fight the "capitalist counter-revolution" would have become a “popular front", a policy categorically rejected by the Trotskyists because it would have amounted to a bloc of enemy classes instead of a "united front" within the same class, an idea well within the Bolshevik-Leninist tradition. In short, understanding the class essence of the bureaucracy would have dealt a heavy blow to the foundations of Trotsky's political strategy. Naturally, he did not want to accept this.
Thus the problem of determining the nature of the bureaucracy was much more important than a mere matter of theory or terminology.
The destiny of the bureaucracy
To do Trotsky justice, towards the end of his life he began to revise his vision of the Stalinist bureaucracy. We can see this in his book on Stalin, the most mature of his works, although incomplete. Examining the decisive events at the turn of the 20s and 30s, when the bureaucracy completely monopolised power and property, Trotsky already considered the state and Party apparatus as one of the main social forces in struggle to "control the nation's surplus product". In declaring all-out war on the "petty bourgeois elements" they were not driven by the "pressure" of the proletariat, nor were they "pushed by the opposition" (as Trotsky had once claimed)[17]. Consequently, the bureaucracy did not "express" anyone else's interests, and was not "balancing" between two poles, but appeared as a social group conscious of its own interests. After beating all its competitors, it had won in the battle for power and profits. It alone disposed of surplus product (ie, the function of a real owner of the means of production). Admitting this, Trotsky could no longer neglect the question of tile bureaucracy's class nature. Indeed, speaking of the 1920s, he writes: "The essence of the [Soviet] Thermidor ... has crystallised new privileged strata, and has led to the birth of a new substratum of the ruling class in the economic sense [my emphasis]. There were two pretenders to this role: the petty-bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy itself”[18]. Thus this substratum nourished two pretenders to the role of ruling class. It only remained to see who would win - and the winner was the bureaucracy. The conclusion is very clear: it is the bureaucracy that has become the new ruling social class. In reality, although he prepared for this conclusion, Trotsky did not in fact reach it, preferring not to complete his reflections politically. But he had taken a great step forward.
In his article The USSR at war, published in 1939, Trotsky took one more step in this direction: he thought it possible in theory that "the Stalinist regime may be the first stage of a new society of exploitation". Certainly, as always he emphasised that there was another viewpoint: the "Soviet" system, and its ruling bureaucracy, were only an "episode" in the process of transformation of bourgeois into a socialist society. Nonetheless, he declared his willingness to revise his opinions in certain circumstances, notably should the bureaucratic government in the USSR enter the world war which had already begun, and should this spread to other countries[19].
We know what happened thereafter. According to Trotsky, the bureaucracy had no historic mission, was situated "between the classes", had no autonomy, was precarious, and so constituted an "episodic event". In reality, the bureaucracy did nothing less than radically alter the social structure of the USSR by proletarianising millions of peasants and petty-bourgeois, carry out an industrialisation based on the super-exploitation of the workers, transform the country into a great military power then subject it to a terrible war, and export its form of domination to Central and Eastern Europe and South-East Asia. After all that, would Trotsky have changed his view of the bureaucracy? It is hard to say: he did not survive World War II, and never saw the formation of a "socialist camp". But for decades after the war, his political adepts continued to repeat word for word the theoretical dogmas contained in Revolution Betrayed.
The march of history has obviously refuted all the main points of the Trotskyist analysis of the social system in the USSR. To understand this, only one fact is necessary: none of the "successes" of the bureaucracy fall within Trotsky's theoretical schema. And yet even today, some savants (not to mention the representatives of the Trotskyist movement) continue to claim that his conception of the ruling "caste", and forecasts as to its destiny, have been confirmed by the collapse of the CPSU regime and the events which followed in the USSR and the "Soviet bloc". Here they are talking about Trotsky's prediction that the power of the bureaucracy would inevitably fall, either as a result of a "political revolution" by the working masses, or after a social coup d’état by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie[20]. For example, V.Z. Rogovin[21], writes that the "counter-revolutionary variant" of Trotsky's predictions "has been carried out 50 years late, but with extreme precision"[22].
Where are we to find this precision, especially "extreme precision"?
The essence of the "counter-revolutionary variant" of Trotsky's forecasts lies above all in his predictions as to the bureaucracy's fall as a ruling stratum. "The bureaucracy is inseparably linked to the ruling class in the economic sense [he means the proletariat], is nourished by the same social roots, stands and falls with it [my emphasis)"[23]. Supposing that a social counter-revolution did take place in the countries of the ex-Soviet Union, and that the working class did lose its economic and social power, then according to Trotsky the ruling bureaucracy should have fallen with it.
In reality, did it fall, to give way to a bourgeoisie come from somewhere else? According to the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, more than 75 % of the Russian "political elite" and more than 61 % of the "business elite" have their origins in the Nomenklatura of the "Soviet" period[24]. Consequently, the same people are in the same ruling economic, social, and political positions in society. The origins of the other part of the elite can easily be explained. O. Krychtanovskaya writes: "Apart from direct privatisation ... whose principal beneficiaries were the technocratic part of the Nomenklatura (economists, professional bankers, etc.), we saw the quasi-spontaneous creation of commercial structures which appear to have no ties to the Nomenklatura. At the head of such structures are to be found young people, whose biographies reveal no links with the Nomenklatura. Their great financial success can only be explained in one way: although not part of the Nomenklatura, they were in its confidence, its "trusted agents", in other words its plenipotentiaries [emphasis in the original]"[25]. All this shows very clearly that it was not some "bourgeois party" (where could this have come from in the absence of a bourgeoisie under the totalitarian regime?) which took power and succeeded in using a few individuals from the previous ruling "caste" as its servants. It was the bureaucracy itself which organised the transformation of the economic and political forms of its rule, while remaining master of the system.
Thus, contrary to Trotsky's forecast, the bureaucracy did not fall. What about the other side of his predictions: the imminent split of the ruling social "stratum" between proletarian and bourgeois elements, and the formation within it of a "truly Bolshevik" fraction. Indeed, today the leaders of the "communist" parties formed from the debris of the CPSU claim to play the part of "true" Bolsheviks and to defend the interests of the working class. But it is unlikely that Trotsky would have recognised in a Zhuganov or an Ampilov[26] his "proletarian elements", since the aim of their "anti-capitalist" struggle is nothing other than the restoration of the old bureaucratic regime in its classic Stalinist, or "patriotic statist" form.
Finally, Trotsky saw the "counterrevolutionary" version of the bureaucracy's fall from power in almost apocalyptic terms: "In the unlikely event of capitalism being restored in Russia, this could only be done through a cruel counter-revolutionary coup d’état, which would claim ten times more victims than the October revolution and the civil war. Should the soviet regime fall, its place could only be taken by Russian fascism, compared to whose cruelty the regimes of Mussolini and Hitler would look like philanthropic institutions"[27]. This prediction should not be seen as a fortuitous exaggeration, for it springs inevitably from Trotsky's whole theoretical vision of the nature of the USSR, and above all from his firm conviction that the "soviet" bureaucratic system served the mass of the workers, in its own way, by guaranteeing their "social conquests". Such a vision naturally considered that a counter-revolutionary transition from Stalinism to capitalism would be accompanied by a rising of the proletarian masses to defend the "workers" state and their "own" nationalised property. And surely only a ferocious fascist regime could defeat and crush the workers' powerful resistance to a "capitalist restoration".
Obviously, Trotsky could not have known that in 1989-90 the working class would not only fail to defend nationalised property and the "communist" state apparatus, but would actively contribute to their abolition. Since the workers saw nothing in the old system to justify its defence, the transition to the market economy and the denationalisation of state property led to no bloody class struggle, and no fascist or semi-fascist regime proved necessary. Trotsky's predictions cannot be said to have been confirmed in this domain either.
If the "soviet" bureaucracy were not a ruling class, but as Trotsky put it only a "policeman" of the distribution process, the restoration of capitalism in the USSR would have required a primitive accumulation of capital. And indeed, contemporary Russian commentators often use the expression "initial capital accumulation". In doing so, they generally mean the enrichment of this or that person, the accumulation of money, the means of production, or other goods, in the hands of the "new Russians". However, this has nothing to do with scientific understanding of primitive capital accumulation uncovered by Marx in Capital. In analysing the genesis of capital, Marx emphasised that "so-called primitive accumulation is nothing but the historic process of separating the producer from the means of production"[28]. The formation of an army of wage workers by the confiscation of the producers' property is one of the main conditions for the formation of a ruling class. In the countries of the ex-USSR during the 1990s, did the "restorers of capitalism" need to form a class of wage workers by expropriating the producers? Obviously not: this class existed already, the producers had no control whatever over the means of production - there was nobody to expropriate. Consequently, the time for capital's initial accumulation had already passed.
Trotsky was doubtless right to link primitive accumulation with a cruel and bloody dictatorship. Marx also writes that "new-born capital sweats blood from every pore", and that in its first stages needs a "regime of blood"[29]. Trotsky's mistake was not in linking primitive accumulation to the counter-revolution, but in failing to see how that counter-revolution was taking place under his very eyes, with all its characteristics of massacres and monstrous political tyranny. The millions of despoiled peasants dying of poverty and hunger, the workers deprived of every right and forced to work beyond endurance, whose tombs were the foundations of the buildings constructed according to the Stalinist 5- Year Plans, the innumerable prisoners of the gulag: these are the real victims of primitive accumulation in the USSR. Today's property owners do not need to accumulate capital, they need only redistribute it amongst themselves by transforming state capital into private corporate capital[30]. But this operation did not mean a change in society, nor in the ruling classes, nor did it demand any great social cataclysm. If we do not understand this, then we will understand neither "soviet" history, nor Russia today.
To conclude. The conception of the bureaucracy contained in Trotsky's fundamental theoretical views and political perspectives is incapable of explaining the realities of Stalinism or its evolution. We can say the same of the other elements of the Trotskyist analysis of the social system in the USSR (the "workers" state, the "post-capitalist" nature of social relations, the "dual role" of Stalinism, etc.). Nonetheless, Trotsky did succeed in resolving one problem: this remarkable commentator directed a crushing critique against the claims of "socialist" construction in the USSR. And that was not too bad for his day.
AG
[1] All quotations from Revolution Betrayed are taken from the New Park edition of 1973.
[2] See Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Chap 2.
[3] Marx, Capital, Book III.
[4] See the article Towards the New Stage in the Russian Centre of Collections of Documents for New History (RCCDNH), drawer 325, list I, folder 369, p1-11.
[5] By about 1930, the Opposition had lost two thirds of its members, including almost all its "historical leadership" (ten out of the thirteen who had signed the Platform of the Bolshevik-Leninists).
[6] RCCDNH. drawer 325,1.1…folder 175, p4, 32-34.
[7] Bioulleten oppositsii (Bulletin of the Opposition), 1931, no.20, p.10.
[8] Bioulleten oppositsii (BO), 1931, no.20, p.10.
[9] ibid. 1939, no.79-89, p.6
[10] RCCDNH, drawer 325, 1.1, folder 499, p2.
[11] BO, 1932, no. 27, p.6.
[12] ibid., 1933, no.33, p9-10.
[13] See Broue, "Trotsky et Ie bloc des oppositions de 1932". Cahiers Leon Trotsky. 1980, no.5, p22.
[14] See Trotsky, Dnevniki i pisma, (Letters and Correspondence). Moscow. 1994. p54-55.
[15] ibid.
[16] BO, 1938, no.66-67. p.15
[17] Trotsky, Stalin, Vol. 2
[18] ibid.
[19] The USSR in the war, Trotsky, 1939.
[20] Trotsky, Revolution Betrayed, p290.
[21] During the "soviet" epoch, Vadim Rogovin, professor at the Russian Institute of Sociology , was one of the main official propagandists and commentators on the social policy of the CPSU. During Perestroika, he converted himself into an "anti-Stalinist" and an unconditional admirer of Trotsky. He is the author of several apologetics for Trotsky and his ideas.
[22] Rogovin, Stalinski neonep, (The Stalinist NeoNEP), Moscow, 1994, p.344.
[23] BO, 1933. no.36-37, p.7
[24] O. Krychtanovskaya, "Finansovaya oligarkhia v Rossii", (The Financial Oligarchy ill Russia), Izvestia, 10101/96.
[25] ibid.
[26] Zhuganov is the leader of the "renovated" Communist Party and Yeltsin's main rival in the last presidential elections. Victor Ampilov is the main leader of the hard-line Stalinist movement in Russia, and the founder of the "Russian Communist Workers' Party". He calls for the restoration of the "classical" totalitarian regime of the 1930s.
[27] BO, 1935, no.41, p3.
[28] Marx, Capital, Book I, p663.
[29] ibid.
[30] Arriving at a similar conclusion after concrete sociological studies, O. Krychtanovskaya writes: "If we analyse carefully the situation in Russia in the 1990s, we see that the only "primitive accumulation” was the work of unlucky doctors turned stock-broker, or engineers buying a kiosk. This stage of accumulation almost always ended in the purchase of shares in MMM [a failed financial "pyramid"] (the result is well-known), and was rarely transformed into "secondary accumulation?" (Izvestia, 10/01/1996)
We are publishing here the report on the crisis adopted by the 12th Congress of the ICC. This report was written in January 1997, and its discussion throughout our organisation was the basis for the adoption, at the same Congress, of the Resolution on the International Situation published in no.90 of this Review. Since these two texts were written, the development of capitalism economic crisis has been dramatically illustrated by the financial upheavals that have hit, first the now ex-dragons - of Asia from the summer of 1997, then the entire world's money markets, from Latin America to Eastern Europe, from Brazil to Russia, all the way to the great industrial powers: the USA, but first and foremost Japan.
Marxist theory against the lies and blindness of bourgeois economists
The point to which both texts were able both to forecast the open crisis in the Asian countries and above all to explain its underlying causes, is striking. However, we have no intention of bragging over the concretisation of our perspectives in so short a time. The fact that these forecasts were so quickly proved correct is not the most important thing. Had they been verified some time later, the validity of the analysis would not have been diminished by one iota. Similarly, we consider it a secondary matter that our forecasts were confirmed precisely in the Asian countries. In effect, these latter only express a general tendency, which appeared in Mexico in 1994-95, and which is appearing in Russia and Brazil as we write. What is important is the concretisation, sooner or later, of a tendency which only marxism is able to understand and to foresee. Whatever its pace or place, it confirms the validity, the seriousness, and the superiority of marxism over all the inept ideas, often incomprehensible, always incomplete and contradictory, never impartial, with which we are supplied by the economists, journalists, and politicians of the bourgeoisie.
Anyone who lifts their head for a while above the successive themes of media propaganda, designed either to hide the reality of the economic crisis or to give it a reassuring explanation, cannot but be staggered by the variety and contradictory nature of the explanations proposed by the bourgeoisie for the catastrophic development of the economy since the late 1960s and the end of the reconstruction period that followed World War II.
What is left of explanations that attributed the crisis to "excessive rigidity in the monetary system"[1], now that the anarchy of exchange rates has become a factor of world economic instability? What is left of all the talk of "oil shocks"[2] now that oil prices are drowning in overproduction? What is left of "liberalism" and the "miracles" of the "market economy"[3] now that economies are collapsing in a savage trade war for an ever more rapidly contracting world market? And what credibility can we give to today's explanations, based on the sudden discovery of the "dangers of debt" , but which ignore the fact that this suicidal level of debt has been the only way of prolonging the life of an economy in its death-throes[4]?
By comparison, marxism has continued to stand by the same explanation, developing it and improving its precision where necessary, through each new open expression of the crisis. This explanation is still there, in the report that follows. It has been taken up, defended, developed and made more precise many times in the revolutionary press, and in our publications in particular. A marxist understanding is historical; it has continuity and coherence.
"The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them". "In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of over-production (...) And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand, by the enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets and by the more thorough exploitation of old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented"[5].
These characteristics and tendencies revealed by Marx and Engels have been verified throughout capitalism's history. They have become stronger still in the period of decadence, which marks the end of "new" markets and the exhaustion of the old. The tendency to massive destruction of productive forces has become a permanent and dominant one during the 20th century, in particular during the world wars. We have seen "crises appear as a result of the contradiction between the capacity for expansion, the tendency of production to increase, and the restricted consumption capacity" and that "credit is precisely the means of making this contradiction break out as often as possible". But credit also "paves the way for [the] more extensive and destructive crises" forecast by the Manifesto: "After having (as a factor of the process of production) provoked over-production, credit (as a mediator of the process of exchange) destroys, during the crisis, the very productive forces it itself created"[6]).
The fall in shares and currencies, along with the bankruptcy of the Asian countries, illustrates both the historical dead-end that capitalism finds itself in - expressed in the over-production mentioned in the Manifesto, and in the unlimited use of credit - and an endless fall into social and economic catastrophe into which the whole planet is being dragged. It confirms what we have said about the incompetence, not to say the utter vacuity, of the bourgeoisie's propagandists and economists. It confirms what we have said about the clear-sightedness and profound validity of the marxist method for analysing and understanding social reality, and, in the case which concerns us here, the irreversible and insoluble crisis of the capitalist mode of production. A brief reminder will suffice to illustrate our condemnation, without right of appeal, of capitalism's zealous defenders.
Thailand? "An Eldorado (...) a bubbling market"[7]. Malaysia? "an insolent success"[8], "a real locomotive [which] will soon be one of the world's top fifteen economic powers"[9]; the country plans to become, "like Singapore, a high-tech paradise"[10]; "explosive Malaysia, which sees big, really big (...) the most fortunate Asian financial market"[11]. "The Asian miracle is not over", insisted an expert consultant in February 1997 ... [12].
We could have gone on, and doubtless found other "pearls" of the same variety. They are endless, and their purpose is always the same: to deny or hide the irreversible reality of the crisis. We might have hoped that there would be no more George Bush coming to promise the "era of peace and prosperity" that the collapse of the Eastern bloc was supposed to bring; no more Jacques Chirac predicting the "end of the tunnel" . .. in 1976! But they are still there, more numerous than ever, assuring us that "the fundamentals are good" (Bill Clinton), and that "the correction [ie the fall on the world's stock markets] was a healthy one" (Alan Greenspan, president of the US Federal Reserve), or that "the recent disturbances on the financial markets could bring benefits in the long term for the American economy", and that "this does not mean the end of the boom and of growth in Asia " (Greenspan again)[13]. Nonetheless, the latter began to correct his over-optimistic words two weeks later, faced with the evidence of multiple collapses and bankruptcies affecting Japan and South Korea in particular: "the consequences of the Asia crisis will be non-negligible". Certainly, the words spoken at the high point of the crisis on the stock exchange were designed to reassure the latter, and to avoid a generalised panic; even so, they reveal both the blindness and the impotence of their authors.
What a slap in the face the Asian collapse has given to all those triumphant pronouncements about the wonders of the capitalist mode of production! How it has shown up all those pompous declarations about the exemplary success of these "emerging countries"! How it has given the lie to the speeches about the submission, discipline, sense of sacrifice in the service of the national economy, low wages and "flexibility" of the working class in these countries, as a source of success and prosperity for all!
The bankruptcy of Asia is a product of the historic crisis of the capitalist mode of production
Since July, the Asian "tigers" and "dragons" have collapsed. By 27th October, in one week the stock exchange had lost 18 % of its value in Hong Kong, 12.9% in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), 11. 5 % in Singapore, 9.9 % in Manila (Philippines), 6 % in Bangkok (Thailand), 5.8% in Jakarta (Indonesia), 2.4% in Seoul (South Korea) and 0.6% in Tokyo. Over the last year, the same countries have recorded falls of respectively 22 %, 44%, 26.9%, 41.4%, 41 %, 23 %, 18.5%, and 12 %[14]. The fall has continued up to the time of writing this article.
In the wake of this collapse, and despite all the calming talk about its lack of effect on the world economy, Wall Street and the European stock markets have been hit by a serious crash. Only the intervention by governments and central banks, plus the regulations of the stock exchanges - which cut off trading automatically when prices fall too quickly - have halted the movement of panic. By contrast, in the Latin American countries stock markets and currencies have plunged. Most concern has been expressed over Brazil. Moreover, the same phenomenon is now appearing in the "emerging" countries of Eastern Europe: Budapest has fallen by 16%, Warsaw by 20%, Moscow by 40 %. The decline in the stock exchange has been accompanied by the depreciation of local currencies, as in Asia and Latin America.
"The experts fear that Eastern Europe will undergo a financial crisis similar to Asia's [which would be] one of the worst threats to the recovery of the economies of the European Union" (15). As if the recession had not been hitting the whole of capitalism for a decade: "If we leave aside the euphoria of globalisation, the situation in every region of the globe since 1987 can best be defined as stagnation".
As if the origins of capitalism's bankruptcy lay in the peripheral countries, and not in the capitalist mode of production itself. As if its epicentre did not lie at the centre of capitalism, in the industrialised countries. At the end of the post-war reconstruction period in the late 1960s, it was the world's great industrial centres that were hit by open crisis. The bourgeoisie in these countries used domestic and foreign debt to the hilt to create artificially the markets it lacked. Since the end of the 1970s, there has thus been an explosion of debt, which has led first to the bankruptcy of the Latin American countries, then to the collapse of the Stalinist state capitalisms in Eastern Europe. Now it is Asia's turn. At first, the central countries had succeeded in pushing bankruptcy and recession away onto the peripheral countries. Now they are returning with tenfold strength to the central countries, which have themselves used and abused the poisonous medicine of debt: the USA is heavily in debt, while none of the European countries is capable of meeting the criteria of the Maastricht agreement on the single currency.
Events have accelerated during this financial crisis. South Korea, the world's 11th economic power, is deeply affected. Its financial system is completely bankrupt. Bank and company closures are spreading, and tens of thousands of redundancies have already been announced. This is only the beginning. Japan, the world's second economic power, "has become the sick man of the world economy"[15]. Here too, company closures are announced and redundancies are growing. What a cruel end for all those triumphant and definitive declarations about the Korean and Japanese "models"!
And what a refutation also for the pitiful explanations given for the swathe of stock market falls since the summer! First of all, the bourgeoisie tried to explain the collapse in Thailand as a purely local phenomenon ... an explanation which was obviously refuted by the facts. Then it was supposed to be a crisis of growth in the Asian countries. Finally, it was supposed to be necessary cure for the speculative bubble, which would have no real effect on the real economy... a claim immediately refuted by the bankruptcy of hundreds of heavily indebted financial establishments, a wave of closures of equally indebted companies, and the announcement of drastic austerity plans that herald recession, redundancies by the thousand, and increased pauperisation for the local population.
Capitalism's generalised indebtedness
What are the mechanisms that underlie these events? The world economy, especially during the last two decades, has been running on debt, and even on "super-debt". In particular, the development of the so-called emerging economies of South-East Asia, like those of Latin America and Eastern Europe, has been built essentially on the investment of foreign capital. Korea, for example, has a debt of $160 billion, of which almost half must be repaid in the coming year - just as its currency has lost 20 % of its value. In other words, this gigantic debt will never be repaid. We do not have space here for an examination of the debt of other Asian states - colossal debts, like those of the world's other "emerging countries" , and whose size no longer has much meaning - whose currencies are all falling relative to the dollar. Most of these debts will never be repaid either. All these "bad debts" are lost to the industrialised countries, which will in turn aggravate their own level of debt[16].
What is the bourgeoisie's response to these enormous collapses, which threaten the entire world financial system with bankruptcy? More debt! The IMF, the World Bank, and the central banks of the richest countries have clubbed together to provide bail-outs of $57 billion to Korea, $17 billion to Thailand, and $23 billion to Indonesia. These new loans will be added to the old, and "the danger is already looming on the horizon of a collapse of the Japanese banking system, riddled with bad, and even irrecoverable debt, including $300 billion loaned to ten SE Asian countries, and to Hong Kong. And if Japan should fail, then the USA and Europe will find themselves in the heart of the storm"[17].
Japan is indeed at the centre of the financial crisis. Its bad debts are of roughly the same order of magnitude as its assets in US Treasury Bonds. At the same time, the increase in the government's budget deficit in recent years has added still further to its overall level of debt. It goes without saying that despite the 'Keynesian" policy of increasing the level of debt, there has been no recovery in the Japanese economy. By contrast, bankruptcies are proliferating amongst Japan's most heavily indebted financial institutions. In order to avoid a Korean-style collapse, the Japanese state is getting still further into deficit and debt. The possibility of Japan suffering a cash-flow crisis - which is what is happening - fills the world bourgeoisie with alarm: "Will the world's number one creditor, which for years has financed without counting the American balance of payments deficit, be able to go on playing the same role with a sick economy, eaten away by bad debt and a financial system drained of its resources? The worst case scenario would see Japan's financial institutions making massive withdrawals of their investments in US bonds"[18]. This would bring the financing of America's economy to an abrupt halt, in other words it would open up a brutal recession. The catastrophic consequences of the economic crisis exported to the capitalist periphery during the 1970s, by the massive use of credit, have returned to strike the central countries, and the worst of their effects are still to come.
It is difficult to say, today, whether these extra loans will succeed in calming the storm and putting off widespread bankruptcy for later, or whether the chips are finally down. As we write, it seems more and more unlikely that the $57 billion that the IMF has scraped together for Korea will be enough to stop the rout. There have been so many calls for help that the IMF's own funds, only recently increased by all the great powers, have already proved inadequate, so much so that the IMF is thinking of ... borrowing in its own right! But whatever the outcome of this particular financial crisis, the tendency is always the same, and can only get worse in the economic crisis. At best, the problem can only be put off till later, when its consequences will be still more profound and dramatic.
Capitalism's crisis is irreversible
This massive and growing use of debt illustrates the saturation of the market: when economic activity is based on debt, that means that the market has been created artificially. Today, the bubble of deception has burst. The saturation of the world market has prevented the "emerging countries" from selling as they need to. The present crisis will reduce sales further, and aggravate the trade war. We can already see an indication of this in the pressure the Americans are putting on Japan to maintain the value of the yen and open its domestic market, and in the conditions imposed by the IMF on Korea - and the other "assisted" countries. The Asian collapse, and their increased commercial aggressiveness, will affect all the developed countries, which are already calculating how much their growth rates will be reduced.
Once again, the bourgeoisie is at last forced to recognise the facts, and sometimes even to reveal a reality (in this case the saturation of the market) constantly affirmed by marxism:: "last August, the Wall Street Journal revealed that many industrial sectors were being confronted by a long-forgotten danger: too much productive capacity, and not enough customers", while "according to an article published on 1st October in the New York Times, over-production today threatens not just America, but the entire world. The global glut is even thought to be at the root of the Asian crisis"[19].
Recourse to credit to counter over-production and the saturation of the market only delays their effects, and in its turn becomes an aggravating factor in their development, as marxist theory has explained. Even if the IMF's new loans, which are out of all proportion to anything that has gone before (more than $100 billion to date), succeed in calming the situation, there is still a bill to be paid, to which these new loans must now be added. Capitalism is still in a dead-end. And the consequences are catastrophic for the whole of humanity. Even before this crisis, which will reduce millions more workers to misery and unemployment, and degrade the living conditions of billions of human beings, the International Labour Organisation revealed that "unemployment now affects almost a billion people throughout the world, almost a third of the working population"[20]. Before this crisis, UNICEF stated that 40,000 children die every day around the world from hunger. Every day, the economic, political, and social blockage of the capitalist mode of production imposes on billions of human beings a living hell of exploitation, hunger, poverty, wars and massacres, and generalised decomposition. And the most recent events will only accelerate this fall into barbarism on every continent and in every country, rich or poor.
These dramatic events herald a brutal decline in the living conditions of the whole world population. They mean a further deterioration of an already wretched situation for the working class, whether in work or unemployed, whether in the poorer countries of the periphery (Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia) or in the industrialised countries, including in the main bastions of the world proletariat in Japan, North America and Western Europe. The disaster taking place under our very eyes, and whose effects are beginning to appear in mass layoffs in Japan and Korea amongst others, demands a response from the proletariat. The world proletariat must throw back in the face of the ruling class and its states all the talk about the Japanese and Korean "models", cited as an example for more than a decade in order to justify attacks on workers' living and working conditions: sacrifices and submission do not bring prosperity, just more sacrifices and poverty. The capitalist world is plunging humanity into catastrophe. It is up to the proletariat to respond, with a massive and united struggle against sacrifices, and against the very existence of capitalism.
RL, 7th December 1997
[1] When Nixon decided to float the dollar in 1971.
[2] As a cause of the crisis in the 1970s.
[3] The fashionable theme during the 1980s under Reagan and Thatcher.
[4] International Review no.69, March 1992.
[5] Communist Manifesto, 1848 (Lawrence and Wishart, 1970).
[6] Rosa Luxemburg, Social Reform or Revolution, in Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, Monthly Review Press, 1971.
[7] Investir, 3rd February 1997.
[8] Les Echos, 14th April 1997.
[9] Usine Nouvelle, 2nd May 1997.
[10] Far Eastern Economic Review, 24th October 1996.
[11] Wall Street Journal, 12th July 1996.
[12] From Jardine Fleming Investment Management (Option Finance no.437). Quoted in Le Monde Diplomatique of December 1997.
[13] International Herald Tribune, 30th October 1997.
[14] Figures taken from Courier International of 30th October 1997.
[15] Le Monde, 14th November 1997.
[16] On the level of debt in the industrialised countries, see International Review nos.76, 77, and 87.
[17] Le Monde Diplomatique, December 1997.
[18] Le Monde, 26th November 1997.
[19] Le Monde, 11th November 1997.
[20] Le Monde Diplomatique, December 1995.
Ever since 1989, the bourgeoisie's clamour about the end of marxism has been deafening. Not only have we been told over and over again about how the collapse of the "Communist" regimes showed the impossibility of creating a higher form of society than capitalism; we have also been asked to believe that marxism's predictions about the inevitable disintegration of the capitalist economy have not only been proved wrong, but have been proved right only about itself. After all, history has witnessed the collapse not of capitalism, but of socialism!
Marxists have the duty to fight these ideological campaigns, it is worth recalling that such refrains are by no means new. Almost 100 years ago, the "revisionists" in the Second International, dazzled by the achievements of a bourgeois society that had just reached its pinnacle, tried to argue that the marxist theory of crisis was obsolete, thus obviating the necessity for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism.
The left wing of social democracy, with Rosa Luxemburg in the forefront, were not afraid to stand by the "old" principles of marxism and reply to the revisionists by reasserting that capitalism could not escape disaster; and the events of the first three decades of the twentieth century proved them right in spectacular fashion. The 1914-18 war proved the falsity of theories about the possibility of capitalism peacefully evolving towards socialism; the reconstruction period that followed the war was short-lived and mainly confined to the USA, giving little time for the ruling class to congratulate itself on the success of its system; while the crash of '29 and the profound world-wide depression that followed gave even less basis for the bourgeoisie to argue that Marx's economic predictions were wrong, or better still, valid only for the 19th century.
It was rather different in the reconstruction period that followed the Second World War. The unprecedented rates of growth during this period gave rise to a whole industry churning out theories about the "bourgeoisification" of the working class, the consumer society, the arrival of a new, "organised" capitalism and the final end of the system's tendency towards crisis. Once again the obsolescence of marxism was proclaimed with the utmost assurance.
The crisis that opened up at the end of the 60s revealed, once again, the emptiness of all this propaganda. But it did not reveal it in a self-evident manner, in a way that could be grasped very quickly by large numbers of proletarians. Capitalism since the mid-1930s, but above all since 1945, had indeed been an "organised" capitalism in the sense that the state power had taken the responsibility for staving off its tendencies towards collapse; and the formation of "permanent" imperialist blocs made it possible to extend this "management" of the system onto the global arena. If state capitalist forms of organisation facilitated the post-war reconstruction boom, they also made it possible to slow down the crisis, so that instead of the spectacular dive of the 1930s, we have now been through almost thirty years of irregular, uneven descent, punctuated by numerous "recoveries" and "recessions" which have served to mask the underlying trend of the economy towards a total impasse.
Throughout this period, the bourgeoisie has taken full advantage of the slow pace of the crisis to develop all kinds of "explanations" about the difficulties of the economy. In the seventies, inflationary pressures were first put down to the rise in oil prices, and to the excessive demands of the working class. At the beginning of the 80s, the triumph of "monetarism" and Reaganomics put the blame on the excessive state spending of the left wing governments that had preceded them. Meanwhile, the left could point to the explosion of unemployment that accompanied the new economic policies and blame them on bad management by the likes of Thatcher, Reagan and Co. Both arguments were based on a certain reality: that the modem capitalist system, in so far as it is managed at all, is managed by the state apparatus. What they all obscure is the fact that this "management" is essentially crisis management. Nevertheless, the fact is that practically all the economic "debates" offered to us by the ruling class turn around this issue of how to manage the economy; in other words, the reality of state capitalism has been used to hide the reality of the crisis, since the uncontrollable nature of the crisis is never admitted. And this ideological use of state capitalism was given a further twist in l 989, when the collapse of the Stalinist model of state capitalism was, as we have already mentioned, held up as proof that the main crisis of present day society was not the crisis of capitalism, but the crisis of .... communism.
The collapse of Stalinism and the campaigns about the end of marxism also gave rise to the most extravagant promises about the new age of peace and prosperity that would inevitably follow. The seven years which followed have punctured large holes in these promises, above all the ones about "peace". But although, on the economic level, marxists can offer masses of evidence to show that these have been lean years rather than fat ones, they should not underestimate the capacity of the bourgeoisie to hide the truly catastrophic nature of the crisis from the exploited class, and thus to hinder the development, within the latter, of an understanding of the necessity to overthrow it.
Thus, at the XIth Congress of the ICC, our resolution on the international situation was obliged to begin its section on the economic crisis by refuting the bourgeoisie's claims that we were seeing the beginnings of a new economic recovery, particularly in the "Anglo-Saxon" countries. Two years later the bourgeoisie still talks about the recovery, even if it admits to numerous falterings and exceptions. Here, we will try therefore to avoid the mistake - often made by revolutionaries, out of an understandable enthusiasm to see the advent of the revolutionary crisis - of lapsing into an immediatist assessment of the prospects of world capitalism. But at the same time we will seek to use the most trenchant tools of marxist theory to reveal the shallowness of the bourgeoisie's claims and to underline the significant deepening of tile historic crisis of its system.
The hollow recovery
The resolution on the international situation at the XIth ICC Congress (April 95) analysed the reasons for the increased growth rates in certain important countries as follows:
"The official speeches on the "recovery " make a big thing out of the evolution of the indicators for industrial production, or the improvement in company profits. While we have indeed, in particular in the Anglo-Saxon countries, seen such a phenomenon recently, the foundation on which these rest must be pointed out:
- the recovery of profits is very often, especially for the big companies, the result of speculative windfalls; its counterpart is a new upsurge of public debts; it also flows from the elimination of "dead wood" by the big companies, in other words of their less productive sectors;
- the progress of industrial production results to a large extent from a very substantial increase in the productivity of labour based on the massive utilisation of automation and information technology.
It is for these reasons that one of the major characteristics of the present "recovery" is that it has not been able to create employment, to significantly reduce unemployment or temporary employment, which, on the contrary, can only increase, since capital constantly wants to keep a free hand in order to be able to its throw its superfluous workforce onto the streets at any moment" (International Review no.82).
The resolution goes on to emphasise that "the dramatic indebtedness of states has reached a new crescendo" and that "if they were to be subjected to the same laws as private companies, they would already have been declared officially bankrupt". This recourse to debt is a measure of the real bankruptcy of the capitalist economy, and can only presage catastrophic convulsions of the whole financial apparatus. One indication of this was the crisis of the Mexican peso. Mexico had been considered one of the models of third world "growth", but when the peso began to collapse, it needed a massive £50 billion dollar rescue operation to prevent a real disaster on the world's money markets. This episode revealed not only the fragility of the much-vaunted growth in some of the third world economies (with the Asian "tigers" being the most vaunted of all), but also the fragility of the entire global economy.
One year later, the resolution on the international situation from the 12th RI Congress reviewed the perspectives for the world economy drawn out at the XIth ICC Congress. The latter had predicted new financial convulsions and a new dive into recession. The resolution from the RI congress pointed to the factors which confirned this overall analysis: dramatic problems in the banking sector and a spectacular fall in the dollar at the financial level; and, at the level of the tendency towards recession, the increasing difficulties of those former models of economic growth, Germany and Japan. These indications of the real depth of the capitalist crisis have become even more significant over the past year.
Debt and capitalist irrationality
In December 96, Alan Greenspan, head of America's central bank, got up at a posh diner party and began talking about the "irrational exuberance" of the stock markets. Taking this to be warning of a financial crash, investors around the world were caught up in a selling panic and billions were wiped off share prices around the world - £25 billion in Britain alone, resulting in one of the steepest drops in share prices since 1987. The world's stock markets quickly recovered from this mini -crash, but the episode is a telling reminder of the fragility of the whole financial system. And indeed Greenspan was not at all wrong to talk about irrationality. The capitalists themselves have noted the absurdity of a situation in which Wall Street prices now tend to take a tumble when the rate of unemployment falls too low, since this revives fears of an "overheating" of the economy and new inflationary pressures. Bourgeois commentators can even see that there is an increasing divorce between the massive speculative investments carried out through the world's stock markets and not only real productive activity, but even "real" buying and selling. As we pointed out in our article "The Casino Economy" (IR 87), written just before the December mini-crash, the New York Stock Exchange had recently celebrated its 100th anniversary by announcing that the Dow Jones Index, with a 620% increase over the past 14 years, had beaten all previous records, including the "irrational exuberance" that had preceded the 1929 crash. And several capitalist experts met this announcement with profound misgivings: "Share prices of American companies no longer bear any relation to their real value" said Le Monde; "the longer this speculative madness lasts, the higher will be the price to pay later" said the analyst B M Biggs (both cited in IR 87). The same article in the Review also pointed out that while annual world trade is worth some $3,000 billion, international capital movements are estimated at $100,000 - 30 times more. In sum, there is a growing divorce between stock market prices and real value, the bourgeoisie is aware of this, and so deeply worried about it that a few hints from a leading US economics guru can trigger a huge crisis of confidence around the world's money markets.
What the capitalists can never understand, of course, is that "speculative madness" is merely a symptom of the impasse facing the capitalist mode of production. The underlying instability of the capitalist financial apparatus is based on the fact that a vast proportion of all economic activity today is not "really" being paid for, but is maintained by an ever-increasing mountain of debt. The wheels of industry, indeed of all branches of the economy, are being turned by debts that can never be repaid. The resort to credit has been a fundamental mechanism not only of the post-war reconstruction, but also of the "management" of the economic crisis since the 1960s. It is a drug that has kept the capitalist patient alive for decades; but as we have said many times, the drug is also killing the patient.
Indeed, in her answer to the revisionists in 1898, Rosa Luxemburg explained with great clarity why the resort to credit, while appearing to ameliorate things for capital in the short term, could only exacerbate the crisis of the system in the long term. It is worthwhile quoting her at length on this point since it sheds a great deal of light on the situation facing world capitalism today.
"Credit, through share-holding, combines in one magnitude of capital a large number of individual capitals. It makes available to each capitalist the use of other capitalists' money - in the form of industrial credit. As commercial credit it accelerates the exchange a/commodities and therefore the return of capital into production, and thus aids the entire cycle of the process of production. The manner in which the two principal functions of credit influence the formation of crises is quite obvious. If it is true that crises appear as a result of the contradiction existing between the capacity of extension, the capacity of production to increase, and the restricted consumption capacity of the market, credit is precisely, in view of what was stated above, the specific means that makes the contradiction break out as often as possible. To begin with, it increases disproportionately the capacity of the extension of production and thus constitutes an inner motive force that is constantly pushing production to exceed the limits of the market. But credit strikes from two sides. After having (as a factor of the process of production) provoked overproduction, credit (as a factor of exchange) destroys, during the crisis, the very productive force it itself created. At the first symptom of the crisis, credit melts away. It abandons exchange where it would still be found indispensable, and appearing instead ineffective and useless, there where exchange still continues, it reduces to a minimum the consumption capacity of the market.
Besides having these two principal results, credit also influences the formation of crises in the following ways. It constitutes the technical means of making available to an entrepreneur the capital of other owners. It stimulates at the same time the bold and unscrupulous utilisation of the property of others. That is, it leads to speculation. Credit not only aggravates the crisis in its capacity as a dissembled means of exchange, it also helps to bring and extend the crisis by transforming all exchange into an extremely complex and artificial mechanism that, having a minimum of metallic money as a real base, is easily disarranged at the slightest occasion.
We see that credit, instead of being an instrument for the suppression or the attenuation of crises, is on the contrary a particularly mighty instrument for the formation of crises. It cannot be anything else. Credit eliminates the remaining rigidity of capitalist relationships. It introduces everywhere the greatest elasticity possible. It renders all capitalist forces extensible, relative, and mutually sensitive to the highest degree. Doing this, it facilitates and aggravates crises, which are nothing more or less than the periodic collision of the contradictory forces of capitalist economy" (Luxemburg, Social Reform or Revolution, Part One).
But now, in contrast to the days that Luxemburg was writing about, credit no longer disappeared in a crisis, eliminating the weakest capitals in good old Darwinian manner and adjusting prices downwards to reflect the fall in demand: on the contrary, credit became more and more the only mechanism for keeping capitalism afloat. So now we have the unprecedented situation whereby not only are the large capitals lending to the smaller capitals so that they can buy their goods from them: the world's main creditors have themselves been compelled to become debtors. TIle present situation of Japanese capital demonstrates this very succinctly. As we pointed out in "The Casino Economy", "with a foreign trade surplus, Japan has become the world's banker, with foreign assets greater than $1000 billion ", it is "the world's savings bank, providing 50% of the OECD countries financing needs" But the same article also points out that "Japan is certainly one of the most indebted countries on the planet. Today the accumulated debt of all non-financial agents (households, companies, the state), represents 260% of GNP; in a decade, it is expected to reach 400% ". Japan's budget deficit stood at 7.6% for 1995, compared to the USA's 2.8 %. As for the banking institutions themselves, "the Japanese economy is confronting a mountain of $460 billion of bad debts". All this has led to the specialists in risk analysis, Moody's, giving Japan a "D" classification, in other words, it is as big a financial risk as countries like China, Mexico and Brazil!
If Japan is the world's creditor, where does it get its credits from? Not even a Zen-trained Japanese businessman-samurai could unravel this koan. The same question could be asked about American capitalism, which is also simultaneously a global banker and a global debtor, even if its rulers have made a song and dance about tile reduction of the US deficit (in October 1996, government and opposition both rushed to claim credit for the fact that the US budget deficit was, at 1.9 percent of GDP, the lowest for 15 years).
The fact is that this absurd situation demonstrates that, for all the talk of sound economies and balancing the books that both governments and opposition like to indulge in, capitalism can no longer function according to its own rules. Against the bourgeois economists of his day, Marx went to great lengths to show that capitalism cannot create an unlimited market for its own commodities; the enlarged reproduction of capital depended on the capacity of the system to constantly extend the market beyond its own confines. Rosa Luxemburg demonstrated the concrete historical conditions in which this extension of the market would no longer be able to take place, thus plunging the system into irreversible decline. But capitalism in this epoch has learned to live with its own death agony, flouting its own rules in tile most shameful manner. No new markets you say? Then we'll create them even if it means that everyone, including the richest states on the planet, are, strictly speaking, bankrupt. In this manner, capitalism since the late sixties has avoided the kind of sudden deflationary crashes which it knew in the 19th century and which was still the form taken by tile crisis of 1929. In the current period, periodic recessions and financial splutterings have the function of letting off some of the steam that global debt is building up inside the capitalist pressure cooker. But they also presage the far more serious explosions that lie ahead. The collapse of the eastern bloc should serve as a warning to the bourgeoisie everywhere: you can only flout the law of value for so long. Sooner or later it will reassert itself, and the more you have flouted it, the more devastating will be its revenge. In this sense, as Rosa Luxemburg insisted, "credit is far from being a means of capitalist adaptation. It is on the contrary, a means of destruction of the most extreme revolutionary significance" (Social Reform or Revolution).
The limits to growth: the crisis in the US, Britain, Germany and Japan
It is all the more important to bear this in mind at the present juncture, where a number of apparently contradictory elements present themselves. The "recovery" centred in the "Anglo-Saxon" countries has faltered somewhat in the bourgeoisie's own terms, but most of the pundits are at least "quietly optimistic" about the prospects for growth. For example, The Sunday Times of 29/12/96 made a tour of the predictions US experts were making for the American economy in 1997, based on its performance in 96:
"Our tour of American prognosticators begins with the Business Week survey of the 50 top practitioners of that art. On average, those seers expect 1997 to be a repeat of 1996. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is forecast to grow steadily at a 2.1 % annual rate, and consumer prices to rise 3 %... The unemployment rate is expected to remain at a low 5.4 % and the interest rate on 30-year Treasuries to stay close to current levels at 6.43%". Indeed, the main debate among American economists at the moment seems to be whether continued growth will result in excessive inflation, a question we will come back to later on.
The British bourgeoisie, or at least its governing team (ie the Major government, when this report was written), has swapped styles with the Americans, and instead of being cautiously optimistic, is shooting its mouth off at every opportunity. According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the British economy is "in its best shape for a generation". Speaking on 20.12.96, he quoted figures from the Office for National Statistics which "prove" that real disposable income has risen by 4.6% over the year; consumer expenditure was up by 3.2 %; overall economic growth was put at 2.4 %, while the trade deficit has also fallen. In the same month, official unemployment, in general descent since 1992, fell below 2 million for the first time in five years. In January, various forecasting institutes, such as Cambridge Econometrics and Oxford Economic Forecasting predicted that 1997 would bring more of the same, with growth rates of around 3.3%. In Britain too the most talked about concern of the experts is that the economy will "overheat" and provoke a new surge of inflation.
As we have seen, the ICC has already analysed the reasons for the relatively strong performance of the Anglo-Saxon countries in recent years. Apart from the factors cited by the resolution from our Xlth Congress, we have also pointed, in the case of the US, to "unprecedentedly brutal attacks against the workers (many of whom are forced to hold down two jobs to survive), and to using the advantages conferred by its special status as world superpower; financial, monetary, diplomatic and military pressure all put to the service of the trade war it is waging against its competitors" (resolution on the international situation, 12th Congress of RI, published in International Review no.86). In the case of Britain, the report to the 12th WR Congress (see World Revolution no.200) confirmed the degree to which the "recovery" has been based on debt, speculation, the elimination of dead wood and the massive utilisation of automation and information technology. It also points to the specific advantages Britain obtained by withdrawing from the ERM in 1992 and the resulting devaluation of sterling, which greatly increased its exports. But the report also details the real impoverishment of the working class that this "recovery" has been based upon (increasing rates of exploitation, decline in social services, growth of homelessness and so on), while exposing the bourgeoisie's lies about falling unemployment: since 1979, the British bourgeoisie has altered the criteria for its unemployment statistics 33 times. Current definitions, for example, ignore all those who have become "economically inactive", ie those who have finally given up looking for employment. This fraud was even owned up to by the Bank of England:
"Almost the entire net improvement in unemployment performance in the 1990s compared with the 1980s was accounted for by the rise in inactivity" (Financial Times, 12.9.96). So much for the "highest living standards for a generation" claimed by Mr Clarke.
But while marxists are always obliged to show the real costs of capitalist growth to the working class, merely pointing to the misery of the workers does not in itself prove that the economy is in bad shape. If this were the case, then capitalism would never have had an ascendant phase, since the exploitation of the workers in the 19th century was, as everyone knows, absolutely ruthless. To show that the bourgeoisie's optimistic forecasts are based on sand, we need to look at the deeper trends of the world economy. And here we must examine those countries whose economic difficulties provide the clearest indications of where things are going. As the resolution of the 12th Congress of Revolution Internationale points out, the most significant developments at this level in the last few years has been the decline of those two "powerhouse" economies, Germany and Japan.
The recent territorial conference of Welt Revolution identified a number of elements confirming this decline as regards Germany. These include:
- the shrinking of the internal market: for decades, the Germany economy provided a big market for the European and world economy. With the growing impoverishment of the working class, this is ceasing to be the case. In 1994, for example, expenditure on food shrank by 6 % to 20%. More generally internal investments will be 8 % lower this year; investment in buildings and equipment are some 30 % below the peak of 1992. Real turnover fell by 2 % in 1995. But the most significant figure in this respect is certainly the fact that unemployment now stands at well over 4 million: according to Germany's Labour Office, it could reach 4.5 million over the next few months. This is the clearest evidence for the pauperisation of the German working class and its decreasing ability to serve as a market for German and world capital.
- the growing burden of debt: in 1995 the state deficit (federal, Lander and municipalities) reached 1,446 billion DM. When another 529 billion DM of "hidden" debt is included, the total sum amounts to about 2,000 billion DM, corresponding to 57.6 % of the GNP. Over the past ten years, public debt has risen by 162 % .
- the increasing cost of maintaining the working class: tile growth of unemployment further increases the insolvency of the state, which is confronted with an undefeated working class and cannot simply allow the unemployed to starve. Despite all the famous austerity measures introduced by the Kohl government this past year, tile state still has a massive bill for maintaining the unemployed, the old age pensioners and the sick. Some 150 billion out of a federal budget of 448 billion DM are spent on social payments to the working class. The Federal Unemployment Office has a budget of 104.9 billion DM, and is already bankrupt.
- the failure of the German bourgeoisie to build up an "industrial landscape" in the east: despite the gigantic amounts of money spent in the east after reunification, the economy there has not taken off. Much of the money has gone into infrastructure, telecommunications and housing, but little into new industries. Instead all of the former, obsolete plants have gone bankrupt; and if new, modernised plants have been set up, they have absorbed less than 10 % of the old workforce. The army of the unemployed remains, but now has the "benefit" of sophisticated telecommunications and smart new roads!
All these factors are severely hampering German competitiveness on the world market and are compelling the bourgeoisie to make savage attacks on all aspects of working class living conditions: on wages, social benefits and jobs. The end of the German" social state" is the end of many capitalist myths: tile myth that hard work and social passivity give workers higher living standard, the myth of the necessary and profitable collaboration between bosses and workers, the myth of a German model of prosperity that can show other countries the way forward. But it is also the end of a reality for world capital: Germany's ability to act as a locomotive for the European and indeed the world economy. Instead, the very overt decline of German capital, and not the superficial "recovery" boasted by the US and British bourgeoisie, shows the real prospects of the system as a whole.
Equally significant is the wearing out of the Japanese economic "miracle". This had already became apparent in the early 90s, when growth rates - which had soared up to 10% in the 1960s - slumped to no more than 1 %. Japan was now "officially" in recession. A slight improvement in 1995 and 96 led some commentators to wax enthusiastic about the prospects for the year ahead. An article published in The Observer in January 1996 pointed to Japan's "unstoppable" export performance (a 10 % increase on 1994 meaning that Japan had now overtaken the US as the world's biggest exporter of manufactured goods). It confidently announced that "Japan is back in the global economic driving seat".
Our recent article "The Casino Economy" poured cold water on such hopes. We have already mentioned the mountain of debt weighing down the Japanese economy. The article goes on to insist that "this puts into proportion the recent Japanese announcement of a slight upward movement in growth figures, after four years of stagnation. The bourgeois media represent this as a piece of really encouraging news, whereas in reality it only illustrates the gravity of the crisis since the result was only achieved with difficulty after massive cash injections by five separate recovery plans. This expansion of the budget - in the purest Keynesian tradition - bore fruit at last ... but only at the cost of debts still more gigantic than those which lay behind the original recession. The "recovery" is thus extremely fragile, and in the end is doomed to collapse like an overcooked souffle".
The latest OECD report on Japan (2.1.97) fully confirms this analysis. Although the report predicts increased growth rates for 1997 (around 1.7%), it places all its emphasis on the need to tackle the debt problem. "The report concludes that, while the fiscal stimulus of the past year and a half was crucial in offsetting the impact of the recession, in the medium term Japan must control its budget deficit to reduce accumulated government debt. That debt is 90% of the economy's yearly output ... " (The Guardian, 3.1. 97). The OECD calls for increased sales taxes but above all largescale public spending cuts. Its concern about Japan's longer term economic health is openly announced. In short, this leading bourgeois think-tank makes no attempt to disguise the fragile nature of any "recovery" in Japan, and is clearly worried about the economy borrowing its way into even bigger problems in the future.
When it comes to countries like Germany and Japan, the bourgeoisie's worries are well founded. It was above all the reconstruction of these two war-shattered economies that provided the stimulus of the great boom of the 50s and 60s; it was the completion of that reconstruction in these two countries that provoked the return to the open crisis of overproduction at the end of the 60s. Today, the increasingly evident failure of these two economies constitutes a qualitative shrinking of the world market and is the sign that the global economy is tottering towards a new stage in its historic decline.
The wounded "dragons"
Disillusioned by Japan's difficulties, the bourgeoisie and its media tried to generate new false hopes by pointing to the performance of the east Asian "tigers", economies like Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, whose staggering growth rates were heralded as the wave of the future. China too has been presented as being on the road to "economic superpower" status in place of Japan.
The fact is that, like previous third world "success stories" like Brazil and Mexico, the growth of the Asian tigers is a debt-fuelled bubble that could burst at any time. The big western investors, including the IMF, are already becoming aware of this:
"Among the reasons the richest industrial countries have been so anxious to double the IMP's emergency credit lines to 850 billion is that a new Mexico-style crisis is feared, this time in the Far East. The upsurge in the Pacific economies has stimulated enormous private sector capital flows, which have been substituted for domestic saving, lending to an unstable financial situation. The question has been which Asian tiger would be the first to fall.
Certainly the situation in Thailand is starting to look dicey. The finance minister, Bodi Chunnananda, has resigned amidst slumping investor confidence and shrinking demand in key sectors, including construction, property and finance - all symbols of a bubble economy. Similarly there has been a focus on recent uncertainty in Indonesia, as the stability and human rights record of the Suharto regime has become an issue" (Guardian, 16.10.96).
Most striking of all is the current social and economic situation in South Korea. The bourgeoisie here, learning from its European cohorts, has certainly drawn the workers into a large-scale manoeuvre: in December 96, tens of thousands of workers came out on strike against new labour laws which were presented above all as an attack on democracy and trade union rights, thus allowing the unions and opposition parties to take the workers off their own terrain. But behind the government's provocative attack is a real response to the crisis facing the South Korean economy: the central feature of the law is that it makes it far easier for businesses to lay-off workers and set working hours, and is clearly seen by the workers as a preparation for attacks on their living conditions.
As for China becoming the new powerhouse economy, this has never been more than a sinister farce. True, the capacity of the Stalinist regime there to adapt and survive when so many others have collapsed is remarkable in itself. But no amount of economic liberalisation, "opening up to the west", nor exploitation of tile new outlets that will be offered by the handing over of Hong Kong will transform the foundations of the Chinese economy, which remains desperately backward in industry, agriculture and transport, and, like all Stalinist regimes, chronically hampered by the weight of a bloated bureaucracy and military sector. As in the de-Stalinised regimes, liberalisation has indeed blessed China with western-style benefits... such as mass unemployment. On 14 October the state-run China Daily admitted that the number of unemployed could rise by more than half the present figure to 268 million in four years. With millions of rural migrants flooding the cities and bankrupt state enterprises desperate to shed "surplus" workers, tile Chinese bourgeoisie is deeply concerned about the danger of a social explosion. According to official figures, 43 % of state enterprises were losing money in 95, while in the first three months of 96, the entire state sector was running at a loss. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of state enterprise workers have been paid no wages for months (The Economist, 14-20 December 96). It is true that an increasing proportion of China's industrial output derives from private or mixed-ownership enterprises, but even if these sectors prove to be more dynamic, they could hardly compensate for the huge burden of bankruptcy in the directly state-owned sector.
Perspectives
1. A sharpening trade war
We have already pointed out that America's capacity to use its muscle internationally has been a big factor in the relative strength of the US economy in the past few years. But this also highlights another feature of the current situation: the growing intimacy between trade war and inter-imperialist competition.
Evidently, this intimacy is a product both of the general conditions of decadence, in which economic competition is increasingly subordinated to military and strategic rivalries, and of the specific conditions prevailing since the collapse of the old bloc system. The period of the blocs highlighted the subordination of economic rivalries to military ones, since the two main superpowers were not the main economic rivals. By contrast, the imperialist fissures that have opened up since 1989 correspond much more closely to direct economic rivalries. But this has not overthrown the domination of imperialist-strategic considerations; on the contrary, the trade war is more and more revealed as an instrument of the latter.
This is very clear with the Helms-Burton law passed by the US. This law makes unprecedented incursions into the "trading rights" of America's main economic and imperialist rivals, forbidding them to trade with Cuba on pain of sanctions. This is very clearly a provocative response by the US to the challenge to its global hegemony by the European powers, a challenge being mounted not only in "far away" regions like the Balkans and the Middle East, but also in America's "back yard", the Latin American countries, including Cuba itself.
The European powers have not remained passive in the face of this provocation. The European Union has taken the USA to the new World Trade Organisation court at Geneva, demanding the lifting of the Helms-Burton law. This confirms what we said in our article on globalisation - that the formation of regional trading conglomerations like the EU corresponds to "the necessity for groups of capitalist countries to create zones of protection from which to confront their most powerful rivals" (IR 86). The EU is thus an instrument of the global trade war, and the recent moves towards a single European currency have to be seen in this light. But it has more than purely "economic" functions: as we saw over the war in ex-Yugoslavia, it can also serve as a more direct instrument of inter-imperialist confrontation.
Of course, the EU is itself wracked by deep national-imperialist divisions, as illustrated recently by the disagreements between Germany and France on the one hand, and Britain on the other, over the single European currency. In the general context of "every man for himself", we can expect to see both trade and imperialist rivalries taking an increasingly chaotic form, aggravating the instability of the world economy; and, as each nation is forced to place barricades around its national capital, this will further accelerate the contraction of the global market.
2. Inflation and depression
Thus, whatever straws the bourgeoisie tries to cling to, world capitalism is inching towards the edge of vast economic convulsions, on a scale that will dwarf all those seen in the past thirty years. This is certain. What cannot be so clear to revolutionaries is not only the exact timescale of such convulsions (and we will not enter into the forecasting game here), but also tile precise form they will take.
After the experience of the 1970s, inflation has been presented by the bourgeoisie as the great dragon to be slain at all costs: the wholesale policies of deindustrialisation and cuts in public spending advocated by Thatcher, Reagan and the other monetarists were founded on the argument that inflation was the number one danger for the economy. By tile early 90s, inflation, at least in the main industrial countries, appeared to have been tamed to tile point that some economists began to talk about the historic conquest of inflation. One might ask whether we are not in fact seeing a partial return to the kind of deflationary crisis of the early 30s: a "classical" crisis of over-production in which prices tumbles with the sudden shrinking of demand.
Moreover, we should note that this tendency began to be reversed after 1936, when the state intervened -massively in the economy: the growth of the war economy, the boosting of demand by government spending- gave rise to inflationary pressures. This modification was even more apparent with the crisis that opened up in the late 60s. The first response of the bourgeoisie was to pursue the "Keynesian" policies of the previous decades. This had the effect of slowing down the pace of tile crisis but resulted in dangerous levels of inflation.
Monetarism presented itself as a radical alternative to Keynesianism; as a return to classical capitalist values of only spending money that had really been made, "living within our means" and so on. It claimed to be dismantling the bloated state apparatus and some revolutionaries were hoodwinked, talking about the "rolling back" of state capitalism. In reality, capitalism could not return to the forms and methods of its youth. Senile capitalism cannot keep going without the crutch of a hugely swollen state apparatus, and while the Thatcherites cut state spending in some sectors - especially those relating to tile social wage - they have hardly touched the war economy, the bureaucracy, or the machinery of repression. Furthermore, the trend towards deindustrialisation has increased the weight of unproductive sectors on the economy as a whole. In short, the "new" policies of the bourgeoisie could not remove the factors underlying the inflationary tendencies of decadent capitalism: the necessity to maintain a huge unproductive sector (see in this regard "Overproduction and inflation" in World Revolution no.2 and Revolution Internationale no.6, December 1973).
Another factor of the greatest importance in this equation is the system's growing dependence on credit, which we have already looked at. The huge extent of government borrowing shows how little the bourgeoisie has been able to break from the "Keynesian" policies of the past. In fact, it is the lack of solvent markets which makes it impossible for tile bourgeoisie, whatever the ideological varnish of its governing teams, to escape the necessity to create an artificial market. Today debt has become the principal artificial market for capitalism, but the original measures proposed by Keynes led straight in this direction.
If we want to find a model for the collapse of an economy which has turned the law of value inside out - the collapse, that is to say, of a state capitalist economy - we should look at what is happening in the former eastern bloc countries. What we are seeing here is not only a collapse of production on a far greater scale than in the crisis of 1929, but also a tendency towards uncontrollable inflation and the gangsterisation of the economy. Is this the shape of things to come in the west?
In no.28 of its review, dated May 1995, Internationalist Perspective (IP) offered us a panegyric on capitalism's strengths since the beginning of the century, and more particularly throughout the East Asian region. Not even the most ideological of World Bank reports has yet dared utter such paeans of praise: "capitalism has continued to develop the productive forces throughout the period of decadence - and moreover at an extremely rapid pace (...) the most prodigious rates of growth (sic!) in world industrial production have occurred since the end of the 1960s (...) the ICC also speaks of a geographically uneven development: according to its conception of decadence, no country newly arrived on the world market can industrialise and rival the old powers (...) And yet, since World War II Japan has become the world's second economic power; China is rapidly becoming a major economic power in its own right; South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc have recently joined the ranks of the industrialised countries (...) In 1962, the Western Pacific only accounted for 9% of world GNP; in 1982 the figure was 15 %; and by the end of the century it will probably be 25 % - greater than Europe or North America. This capitalisation of the Far East, the entry into the ranks of the industrialised world of a region which before World War II was totally marginal from the industrial viewpoint, simply cannot be explained by the ICC's concept of decadence". While IP was lauding the radiant future of capitalism, our diagnostic forecast increasingly frequent and serious financial tremors, as a result of the growing recourse to debt as a means of putting off the effects of the crisis[1]. At the same time, we analysed historically and in depth the supposed prosperity of South-East Asia, and while we were at it put paid to all the bourgeoisie's tired old refrains on the subject[2], refrains which have been adopted, broadcast, and amplified by IP.
We have not had to wait more than two years for the facts to pronounce their verdict: South-East Asia is in intensive care, the IMF has had to act with utmost energy in order to impose the most drastic measures ever taken to try to "recover" a terrible economic situation. To accompany these measures, which are likely to lead to a major economic collapse, it has had to make available the biggest loan in its history. As for the other end of the planet, damage has been limited in the Western economies only by high level manipulation by governments and the major financial institutions.
IP is clearly more concerned to oppose the ICC than the bourgeoisie... This is where the worst kind of parasitism leads: objectively to play the game of the class enemy, to spread about the most inept drivel produced by the bourgeoisie's propaganda machine.
IP is going the same way on many other political questions, and it would be tedious to go through them all. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile nailing one more of its "theoretical exploits" of the last decade.
Just as the bourgeois campaigns after the collapse of the Stalinist regimes were at their most deafening to identify Lenin with Stalin, the Russian Revolution with the Gulag and Nazism, IP brought its own contribution to the edifice. In the editorial of IP no.20 (summer 1991), illustrated with a head of Lenin from which emerged little heads of Stalin, we could read the following: "Revolutionaries (...) must destroy their own icons, the statues of "glorious leaders" (...) [they] must get rid of the tendency to consider the Bolshevik revolution as a model". Here is IP's fundamental theoretical contribution to help spring the traps of a bourgeois ideological campaign whose prime objective is to eradicate from the consciousness of the working class its entire history and historic perspective (see the article in this issue). IP's persistence in adopting ludicrous positions, damaging to the development of proletarian consciousness, its constant desire to elaborate "theories", as absurd as they are incoherent and pedantic, is to be explained entirely by the group's origins and nature: as one of the most concentrated expressions of political parasitism.
C.Mcl
[1] Article on the financial situation in International Review no. 81, "Resolution on the International Situation" in International Review no. 82, "A casino economy" in International Review no. 87, "Resolution on the International Situation" in International Review no. 90.
[2] "The Asian dragons run out of steam" in International Review no.89.
[3] The reader may find our position on IP (or "External Fraction of the ICC" as it used to be called) in International Review nos.45, 64, and 70.
[4] Logically, IP should have abandoned the position of the communist left, which it still officially holds, on the impossibility of real national liberation struggles in decadence.
In the wake of the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe, there arose in Russia a committee for the study of the legacy of Leon Trotsky. This committee held a number of conferences on different aspects of the work of that great marxist revolutionary. In the course of the study of the contribution of Trotsky, it became clear not only that Trotsky himself had not been the only nor the most radical and resolute representative of the "Trotskyist" Left Opposition, but that there had been other oppositional currents inside and outside Russia, situated much further to the left. More particularly, it emerged that another, alternative tradition existed within the proletarian struggle against Stalinism, that of Left Communism representatives of which still exist today. On the initiative of Russian members of the committee, our organisation, the International Communist Current, was invited to the 1996 Conference in Moscow, devoted to an appraisal of Trotsky's book The Revolution Betrayed. On the proposition of the ICC, other groups of the Communist Left were also invited to participate, but either failed to come, as in the case of the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, or refused out of a deep-seated sectarianism, as in the case of the "Bordigists". However, the intervention of the ICC was far from being the only expression of the life of the proletariat at that conference. The critique of Trotsky's refusal to recognise the state capitalist character of Stalinist Russia, which was presented to the conference by a Russian member of the organising committee, and which we are publishing in this issue of our International Review, is proof of that. A year later, moreover, the presence of groups of the Communist Left at the 1997 conference on Trotsky and the October Revolution was greatly reinforced by the participation, alongside the ICC, of another representative of the proletarian milieu: the Communist Workers Organisation, which alongside Battaglia Comunista forms the above mentioned International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (lBRP).
The legacy of Trotsky and the tasks of the present period
The conferences on the legacy of Trotsky took place in response to events of world historic importance: the collapse of the Stalinist regimes, the Eastern Bloc (and thus the whole post-World War II world order of Yalta) and of the USSR itself. The fact that Stalinism was not toppled by the class struggle of the proletariat, but decomposed under the weight of the historic crisis of world capitalism, and of its own specific weaknesses as an economically and politically backward fraction of the bourgeoisie, allowed the ruling lass to present these events as the bankruptcy not of Stalinism, but of Communism and in particular of marxism. As a result, by presenting its own historical decomposition as that of marxism, Stalinism, the mortal enemy of the proletariat, was able even in its foundering to render yet another great service to world capitalism. For these events were used to attack the consciousness of the workers of the world on a most crucial question: that of the historic goal of their struggle - communism itself. But if the world historic events of 1989-1992 thus resulted in a massive retreat in the level of class consciousness within the proletariat as a whole, they did not signify an historic defeat of the working class, whose combativity and capacity for collective reflection remained intact. Thus, while causing a retreat in the consciousness of the mass of proletarians, these events also contained the perspective of a quantitative development, and of a qualitative maturation of small revolutionary minorities of the class. By brazenly equating Stalinism with communism, the bourgeoisie obliges those searching proletarian minorities who reject this equation to pose the following questions: which political currents in the history of the working class opposed the Stalinist counter-revolution in the name of communism and of the proletariat, and which part of this heritage can serve as the basis for revolutionary activity today? Now, it is a central thesis of marxism that the class consciousness of the proletariat is above all an historic consciousness, and that therefore revolutionary minorities can only fulfil their tasks by making the assimilation and critical synthesis of all the contributions of past generations of marxists the point of departure of their struggle. In particular, the marxist conception of the role of a fraction, which in a period of defeat of the proletariat has the irreplaceable responsibility of drawing all the lessons of that defeat and passing them on to future revolutionary generations (Lenin and the Bolsheviks after the defeat of the 1905 revolution in Russia; Luxemburg and the Spartakists after the defeat represented by the Social Democratic support for World War I in 1914; the Italian Fraction around the publication Bilan after the defeat of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23 etc), is a central concretisation of this understanding. Of the many thousands of revolutionary elements who appeared internationally under the impulsion of the mass proletarian struggles of a new and undefeated generation of the class after 1968, impregnated as they were by impatience and a one-sided faith in the "spontaneity" of the class struggle to the detriment of long term theoretical and organisational work, most of them disappeared without trace, precisely because they failed to anchor themselves in the positions and traditions of the past workers' movement. Although the conditions for the development of revolutionary minorities in the phase after 1989 have in some ways become much more difficult, lacking in particular the immediate example of mass proletarian struggles which inspired the post-1968 generation, the fact that searching proletarian elements today feel obliged to seek and link themselves to past revolutionary traditions in order to withstand that bourgeois campaign about the "death of communism" opens the perspective of a broader and deeper rediscovery of the great marxist legacy of the Communist Left. In Russia itself, the very centre and the foremost victim of the Stalinist counter-revolution, it was only with the break -up of the rule and hegemony of Stalinism that a new generation of revolutionaries could begin to emerge - over 30 years after the same process began in the west: Moreover, the devastating world-wide effects of that half a century long counter-revolution - the destruction of the organic link to past revolutionary generations, the burial of the real history of that movement under mountains of corpses and lies - weighed particularly heavily in the country of the October Revolution. The emergence of questioning proletarian elements in Russia today confirms what the resurgence of class struggle at the end of the 60s, not only in the west, but also in Poland, Rumania, China, even Russia itself, already demonstrated: the end of the Stalinist counter-revolution. But if the conditions for re-discovering the true history of the proletarian movement are particularly difficult there, it was also inevitable that in a country in which there is hardly a working class family which did not lose at least one member in the Stalinist terror, uncovering the historical truth would constitute the point of departure. If, from the Perestroika on, the question of "rehabilitation" of the victims of Stalinism became the slogan of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois dissident opposition, for the representatives of the proletariat a very different task emerged: the restoration of the revolutionary tradition of the best of these victims, the sworn class enemies of Stalinism. It is therefore anything but a coincidence that the first faltering attempts of Russian revolutionaries to define and debate the interests of their class, and to establish contact with Left Communist organisations abroad, emerged in relation to the question of the heritage of the proletarian struggle against Stalinism in general, and the heritage of Trotsky in particular. Of all the leaders of the opposition against the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and the Communist International, Trotsky was far and away the most famous. His role in the foundation of the Third International, in the October Revolution itself, and in the ensuing Civil War, was so gigantic (comparable to that of Lenin himself) that even in the USSR the Stalinist bourgeoisie was never able to completely eradicate his name from the history books, or from the collective memory of the Russian proletariat. But just as inevitably, the heritage of Trotsky became the focal point of a political, a class struggle. This is because Trotsky, the courageous defender of Marxism, was the founder of a political current which, after a whole process of opportunist degeneration, finally betrayed the working class by abandoning the proletarian internationalism of Lenin, participating' actively in the second imperialist world war. The Trotskyist current which emerged from this betrayal had become a fraction of the bourgeoisie, with a clearly defined (statist) programme for national capital, with a bourgeois foreign policy (generally in support of "Soviet" imperialism and the Eastern bloc) and a specific task of "radically" sabotaging workers' struggles and the marxist reflection of emerging revolutionary elements. Behind Trotsky, there is therefore not one heritage but two: the proletarian heritage of Trotsky himself, and the bourgeois, "critically" Stalinist heritage of Trotskyism.
The antagonisms within the conferences over Trotsky's heritage
During Perestroika, the Stalinist CP began to allow access to the historical archives of the country. This measure, part of Gorbachev's policy of mobilising public opinion against the resistance to his "reform" policy within the state bureaucracy, soon revealed itself to be one expression of the loss of control and general decomposition of the Stalinist Regime. Once the Yeltsin regime established itself in power, it quickly restored a more restricted access to state archives, in particular regarding Left Communism and the opposition to the left of Trotsky. Although it was Yeltsin's government which re-introduced private capitalist ownership alongside the already existing state capitalist ownership in Russia, it understood much better than Gorbachev that any historical putting in question of its predecessors, from Stalin to Brezhnev, and any rehabilitation of the proletarian struggle against the USSR state, could only undermine its own authority.
As opposed to this, parts of the present day Russian bourgeoisie are sympathetic to the idea of exploiting an iconised, bourgeois falsification of Trotsky, presented as the "critical supporter" of a slightly "democratised" Nomenclatura, to brush up their own historical image. This concern was reflected in the presence at the conference of Stalinist Party dissidents, including an ex-member of Zhuganov's Central Committee.
The 1996 conference on The Revolution Betrayed
Against the bourgeois canonisation of the mistakes of Trotsky, the ICC quoted his declaration at the beginning of The Revolution Betrayed: "We need no longer argue with the gentlemen bourgeois economists: Socialism has proven its right to victory, not in the pages of Capital, but in an economic arena covering a sixth of the globe, proved it not in the language of the dialectic, but in the language of iron, cement and electricity." If this were true, the disintegration of the Stalinist economies would oblige us to admit the superiority of capitalism over "socialism" - a conclusion the world bourgeoisie is now happy to draw. Indeed, towards the end of his life, desperately trapped by his own incorrect definition of the USSR, the "historic failure of socialism" was a hypothesis which Trotsky himself began to take into consideration.
It is no coincidence that an important part of the argumentation of The Revolution Betrayed is devoted to "disproving" that Stalin's Russia is state capitalist - this position was constantly advanced, not only within Left Communism, but within the Left Opposition itself, both in Russia and abroad. The contribution of comrade AG from Moscow published here represents a fundamental refutation of Trotsky's position on the USSR from the standpoint of revolutionary marxism. This contribution not only demonstrates the state capitalist nature of Stalinist Russia. It uncovers the fundamental weakness of Trotsky's understanding of the degeneration of Red October. Whereas Trotsky expected the counter-revolution, if it did not triumph through an invasion from abroad, to come from the peasantry, which is why he saw the Bukharinists and not the Stalinists as the main danger in the 20s, and initially saw Stalin's break with Bukharin as a move towards revolutionary politics, he was blind to the main instrument of counter-revolution from within: the" Soviet" state which had wiped out the soviets. In fact, already his debate with Lenin on the trade union question, where Lenin defended and Trotsky denied the right of the workers to strike against "their own" state, revealed Trotsky's weakness on this question. As opposed to Trotsky's uncritical belief in the "workers' state", Lenin already pointed out in 1921 that the state also represented other classes antagonistic to the proletariat, and was "bureaucratically deformed". To this can be added another important incomprehension of Trotsky - his belief in "economic acquisitions" and the possibility of at least beginning the transformation to socialism in one country - which helped prepare the way for the betrayal of Trotskyism through support for Soviet imperialism in World War II.
This debate was not academic. During the Conference the Trotskyists, by calling for the defence of the " still remaining socialist acquisitions" in a struggle against "private capitalism" which they judged "still unresolved", were in fact calling on the Russian workers to spill their blood in defence of the interests of that part of the Stalinist Nomenclatura which had lost out through the collapse of their regime. Moreover, by presenting the wars in ex-Yugoslavia as a means of "restoring capitalism" in that country, they denied the imperialist nature of this conflict, calling on workers to support the so-called "anti-capitalist" side (in general the pro-Russian Serb fraction, which is also supported by British and French imperialism). During the open forum at the end of the conference, the ICC intervened to denounce the imperialist character of the USSR, of the wars in Yugoslavia and Chechnya, and of the left of capital. But ours was not the only voice raised in defence of proletarian internationalism. One of the young Russian anarchists also intervened, firstly to denounce the manoeuvring policy of collaboration with other left, but also right wing tendencies, on the part of the Russian branch of the Militant tendency within Trotskyism. But above all, the comrade denounced the imperialist character of World War II, and of Russia's participation in it - probably the first, and thus an historic internationalist public declaration of this kind by a new generation of revolutionaries in Russia.
The 1997 conference on Trotsky and the Russian Revolution
This conference was mainly dominated by a much more direct confrontation between Trotskyism and Left Communism. The impact of the latter was greatly enhanced by the presence and the courageous interventions of the Communist Workers Organisation, but also by another contribution of Comrade G. This contribution recalled not only the existence of Left Communist currents in Russia such as the Communist Workers' Group of Gabriel Miasnikov, which opposed the Stalinist degeneration much earlier and more resolutely than Trotsky. He also demonstrated, on the basis of historically researched documents, the existence within the Left Opposition of a massive dissatisfaction and even open hostility towards Trotsky's half-hearted policies, calling instead for a social revolution to topple the Stalinist bourgeoisie.
The CWO and the ICC recalled that the Communist International had essentially been founded by the Bolsheviks and the Communist Left to spread the world revolution. The best known members of Dutch Left Communism, Pannekoek and Gorter, were put in charge of the Western European bureau of the International (in Amsterdam) by Lenin and Trotsky. The main Communist Parties there were founded by the Left Communists: the KPD by the Spartakists and the Bremen Left, and the Italian Party by the comrades around Bordiga. Moreover, the Comintern was founded in 1919 on the positions of the Communist Left. The Manifesto of the founding congress, written by Trotsky, is the clearest expression of this, showing that in the epoch of decadent state capitalism the trade union and parliamentary struggle, national liberation and the defence of bourgeois democracy are no longer possible, and that Social Democracy has become the left wing of the bourgeoisie. If, as opposed to Left Communism, Lenin and Trotsky did not remain loyal to these positions, then it was mainly because they became entangled in the defence of the interests of the Russian transitional state after 1917. This is why Left Communism is the true defender of the great revolutionary heritage of Lenin and Trotsky from 1905 and 1917. This is proven by the fact that the Communist Left remained loyal to the internationalist position of Lenin during World War Il, when Trotskyism betrayed.
The CWO and the ICC defended the gigantic contribution of Rosa Luxemburg to Marxism against the British neo-Trotskyist Hillel Tiktin, who in order to prevent Russian militants from studying her works, claimed that she had died because she had "no conception of the Party", in other words it was her own fault that she was murdered by the Social Democratic counter -revolution.
This conference revealed above all to the Russian comrades that Trotskyism cannot tolerate the voice of the proletariat. During the conference itself they repeatedly tried to prevent the presentations and interventions of the CWO and the ICC. After the Conference they attempted to exclude the "enemies of Trotskyism" from future meetings, and to remove from the organisational bureau of the committee those Russian members who defend the participation of non-Trotskyist political currents at the conferences. Beforehand they had already sabotaged the publication in Russian of the ICC contributions to the 1996 conferences on the pretext that they were of "no scientific interest".
Perspectives
We need hardly develop on the international and historic importance of the slow and difficult development of proletarian positions in the country of the October Revolution. It is evident that the development of such a process of clarification is faced with enormous obstacles and dangers. As a result in particular of over half a century of Stalinist counter-revolution centred precisely in that country, and the extreme manifestation of the capitalist crisis there, the searching proletarian elements in Russia are still isolated and inexperienced, continue to be cut off from much of the real history of the proletariat and the marxist movement, and face enormous material difficulties and the great danger of impatience and demoralisation. To this we must add the certain fact that the left of capital will continue to sabotage this process for all they are worth.
The real task of revolutionaries in Russia today, after decades of the most terrible counter-revolution in history, which has not only wiped out two generations of proletarian revolutionaries, but "stolen" the real history of our class, is that of political clarification of positions. The development of a revolutionary perspective for the working class today can only be an extremely long term, difficult task. The proletariat does not need revolutionaries who disappear after a short time, but organisations able to develop an historic work and perspective. This is why above all a maximum of clarity and firmness on proletarian positions, and a capacity to defend the real traditions of the working class is required of revolutionaries.
The ICC pledges itself to continue supporting all efforts in this direction. In particular we encourage the Russian comrades to study the contributions of Left Communism, which they themselves recognise as a genuine and important expression of the historic struggle of our class.
In our opinion the kind of conferences which have taken place to date have been an important moment of debate and confrontation, but have given rise to a proess of decantation as a result of which it is no longer possible to continue clarification in the presence of the kind of sabotage and falsifications we have seen from the Trotskyists. But the clarification process itself can and must go on, and this is only possible in an international framework.
Not only the Russian revolutionaries, but the international proletariat will benefit from this process. The text published below gives a clear indication how rich this contribution can be.
ERRATUM
Due to an oversight, the following footnotes were left out of the article 'Moscow conferences, 1997: A proletarian debate begins in Russia' in International Review 92. The second note is particularly important because it serves as an introduction to the text 'The unidentified class: Soviet bureaucracy as seen by Leon Trotsky' written by a comrade from the emerging milieu in Russia.
1. The Trotskyist (and Stalinist) lie that the German revolution of 1918-23 failed because of Rosa Luxemburg's alleged underestimation of the party and her negligence in founding it in time was not shared by Trotsky who gave a marxist explanation for the lateness and weakness of the political vanguard in Germany at the time: "History once again exhibited to the world one of its dialectical contradictions; precisely because the German working class had expended most of its energy in the previous epoch upon self-sufficient organisational construction, occupying the first place in the Second International both in party as well as trade union apparatus - precisely because of this, in a new epoch, at the moment of its transition to open revolutionary struggle for power the German working class proved to be extremely defenceless organisationally" ('A creeping revolution' in The First Five Years of the Communist International, Vol 1, p45). In reality the fraction work undertaken by Luxemburg and the Spartacusbund within the Social Democratic Party against the treason of its leadership, and with the aim of preparing the future class party, is not only one of the most audacious and most resolute combats for the class party in history, but is located in the same excellent tradition of fraction work carried out by Lenin.
2. We are in general agreement with the analysis and the main arguments developed in this document. This said, we don't fully share all its formulations. Thus, the idea that "in 1989-90 the working class would not only fail to defend nationalised property and the 'Communist' state apparatus, but would actively contribute to their abolition" seems to us to be wrong. In no manner did the working class, as a class, appear as an actor in the convulsions which hit the so-called 'socialist' countries in this period. The fact that a majority of the workers, victims of democratic illusions, were pulled in behind the objectives of the "liberal" faction of the bourgeoisie against the Stalinist faction did not at all mean that it was the working class in action. The world imperialist wars mobilised tens of millions of workers, but this doesn't mean that the working class contributed actively to the massacres. When the working class did act as a class, for example in Russia in 1917 and Germany in 1918, it was to fight the war and put an end to it. But despite certain unfortunate formulations, this text seems to us to be excellent and we salute it.
[1] Thus, the French Trotskyist Krivine took a TV crew from the French-German Arte Channel to the conference, and only stayed for a few sessions to pose for the camera.
"A spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe has entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: the Pope and the Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police spies."
These opening lines of the Communist Manifesto, written exactly 150 years ago, are today more true than ever before. A century and a half after the Communist League adopted its famous declaration of war of the revolutionary proletariat against the capitalist system, the ruling class is still busy with the spectre of communism. The Pope, along with his Stalinist friend Fidel Castro, still crusades in defence of the God given right of the ruling class to live from the exploitation of wage labour. The Black Book of Communism, the latest monstrosity of the "French Radicals", falsely blaming marxism for the crimes of its Stalinist foe, is presently being translated into English, German and Italian[1]. As for the German police, mobilised as ever against revolutionary ideas, they are presently being officially granted, through an alteration of the bourgeois democratic constitution, the right to electronically survey and eavesdrop on the proletariat at anytime, anywhere[2].
1998, the year of the 150th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, represents in fact a new climax of the historical war of the propertied classes against communism. Still benefiting enormously from the collapse of the eastern European Stalinist regimes in 1989, which it presents as the "end of communism", and in the aftermath of the 80th anniversary of the October Revolution of 1917 last year, the bourgeoisie is attaining new production records for anti-communist propaganda. One might have imagined that the question of the Communist Manifesto would have offered a new opportunity to intensify this propaganda.
The opposite is true. Despite the evident historical significance of the date January 1998 - alongside the bible, the Communist Manifesto is worldwide the most frequently published book of the 20th century - the bourgeoisie has chosen to almost completely ignore the anniversary of the first truly revolutionary communist programme of its class enemy. What is the reason for this sudden deafening silence?
On January 10 1998, the German bourgeoisie published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung a statement on the Communist Manifesto. After claiming that the workers of the east had "shaken off their chains of communism", and that the "dynamic flexibility" of capitalism will continue to overcome all crises, thereby disproving Marx, the statement concludes "A hundred and fifty years after the appearance of the Manifesto, we no longer have to fear any ghosts."
This article, hidden away on page 13 in the economics and stock exchange supplement, is a not very successful attempt of the ruling class to reassure itself. Alongside it, on the same page, there is one article on the terrible economic crisis in Asia, and another on the new German official post-war unemployment record of almost 4.5 million. The pages of the bourgeois press themselves disprove daily the alleged refutation of Marxism by history. In reality there is no document existing today which troubles the bourgeoisie more profoundly than the Communist Manifesto - for two reasons. Firstly because its demonstration of the temporary historical character of the capitalist mode of production, of the insoluble nature of its own internal contradictions, confirmed by present day reality, continues to haunt a deeply anxious ruling class. Secondly because the Manifesto, already at that time, was specifically written to dispel working class confusions about the nature of communism. From a present day point of view, it can be read as a modern denunciation of the lie that Stalinism had anything to do with socialism. But this lie is today one of the principle ideological cards of the ruling class against the proletariat.
For these two reasons, the bourgeoisie has a vital interest in avoiding any kind of publicity which could draw too much attention to the Communist Manifesto and what is actually written in this famous document. In particular, it wants nothing to be said or done which might make workers curious enough to go and read it themselves. Basing itself on the historic impact of the collapse of stalinism, the bourgeoisie will go on claiming that history has refuted marxism. But it will be careful to avoid any close public examination of the communist goal identified by marxism, or of the historical materialist method employed to that end. Since Stalin's bourgeois "socialism in one country" is refuted in advance by the Communist Manifesto, and since its claims to overcome the capitalist crisis have worn thin, it will go on as long as possible ignoring the overpowering argumentation of this document. It will feel safer combating the "spectre" of Stalin's bourgeois "socialism in one country" presented as the horrible "fulfilment" of marxism and the October Revolution.
For the proletariat, on the contrary, the Communist Manifesto is the compass towards the future of humanity, showing the way out of the lethal dead end in which decadent capitalism has trapped humanity.
The bourgeois "spectre of communism"
The Communist Manifesto was written at a decisive moment in the history of the class struggle. The moment when the class representing the communist project, the proletariat, began to constitute itself as an independent class in society. To the extent that the proletariat developed its own struggle for its conditions of existence, communism ceased to be an abstract ideal elaborated by utopian currents, to become the practical social movement leading to the abolition of class society, and the creation of an authentic human community. As such, the principle task of the Manifesto was the elaboration of the real nature of the communist goal of the class struggle, as well as the principle means to achieve that goal. This also explains the gigantic importance of the Manifesto today in face of the bourgeois denigrations of communism and the class struggle. A relevance which the bourgeoisie today seeks to hide.
Thus, it is today not generally realised what is meant by the famous opening reference of the Manifesto to the "spectre of communism". It meant that at the time - as today - not the communism of the proletariat, but the false and reactionary "communism" of other social layers, including that invented by the ruling classes, dominated public attention. It meant that the bourgeoisie, not daring to openly combat, and thus publicly recognise, the communist tendencies already existing within the proletarian class struggle itself, benefited from this confusion in order to combat the development of an autonomous working class struggle. "Where is the opposition which has not been accused of communism by its opponents in power?" asks the Manifesto. "Where the opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?"
Already in 1848, to a certain extent, it was this fake "spectre of communism" at the centre of public controversy which made it particularly difficult for the young proletariat to realise that communism, far from being something separate from and opposed to its daily class struggle, is nothing but the very nature, the historic meaning, and the final goal of that struggle. That, as the Manifesto wrote: "The theoretical conceptions of communism ... are but the general expression of real conditions of an existing class struggle, of an historic movement unfolding before our very eyes."
Herein lies the dramatic actuality of the Communist Manifesto. One and a half centuries ago, just as today, it shows the way forward by cutting through the anti-proletarian distortions of the nature of communism. In face of entirely new historical phenomena - mass unemployment and mass pauperisation in industrialised Britain, the shaking of a still semi-feudal Europe by periodic trade crises, the international spread of mass revolutionary discontent on the eve of 1848 - the most conscious sectors of the working class were already groping towards a clearer understanding that, by creating a new class of dispossessed producers, internationally bound together in associated labour by modern industry, capitalism had created its own potential grave diggers. The first major collective workers' strikes in France and elsewhere, the appearance of a first proletarian political mass movement in Britain (Chartism), and the socialist programmatic efforts above all of German workers' organisations (from Weitling to the Communist League) expressed these advances. But to establish the proletarian movement on a solid class basis, it was above all necessary to throw light on the communist goal of that movement, and thus consciously combat the "socialism" of all other classes. The clarification of this question was urgent since Europe in 1848 stood on the verge of revolutionary movements which, in France, were to reach their summit with the first head on, mass confrontation between bourgeoisie and proletariat.
This is why the Communist Manifesto devotes a whole chapter to exposing the reactionary character of non-proletarian socialism. These included in particular the very expressions of dominant classes directly opposed to the working class:
- Feudal Socialism partly aimed at mobilising the workers behind the reactionary resistance of the nobility against the bourgeoisie;
- Bourgeois Socialism, the expression of a "part of the bourgeoisie in search of remedies for social anomalies, in order to consolidate bourgeois society ".
It was thus first and foremost in order to combat these "spectres of communism" that the Communist Manifesto was written. As the foreword declares: "It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself."
The essential elements of this exposition were the materialist conception of history, and the classless communist society destined to replace capitalism. It is the brilliant solution of this historic task which makes the Manifesto today the indispensable point of departure of the proletarian struggle against the bourgeois ideological rubbish left behind by the Stalinist counter-revolution. The Communist Manifesto, far from being the out dated product of a past age, was far ahead of its time in 1848. At the time of its publication, it mistakenly believed the demise of capitalism arid the victory of the proletarian revolution to be close at hand. It is not until the 20th century that the realisation of the revolutionary vision of marxism is placed on the agenda of history. Reading it today, one has the impression that it has only just been written: so precise are its formulations of the contradictions of present day bourgeois society, and of their necessary resolution through the proletarian class struggle. This almost overpowering actuality is the proof that it is the genuine emanation of a truly revolutionary class carrying the future of humanity in its hands, equipped with an at once gigantic and realistic long term vision of human history.
The Manifesto: an invaluable weapon against Stalinism
Of course it would be wrong to compare the naive feudal and bourgeois "socialism" of 1848 with the Stalinist counter-revolution of the 1930s, which in the name of marxism destroyed the first victorious proletarian revolution in history, physically liquidated the communist working class vanguard, and subjected the proletariat to the most barbarous capitalist exploitation. Nevertheless, the Communist Manifesto already uncovered the common denominator of the "socialism" of exploiting classes. What Marx and Engels wrote about "conservative or bourgeois socialism" at the time applies fully to 20th century Stalinism.
"Under transformation of the material conditions of life, this socialism does not at all understand the abolition of the bourgeois relations of production, which is only possible through revolutionary means, but only the realisation of administrative reforms on the basis of those very bourgeois productive relations, reforms which, consequently do not at all change the relation between wage labour and capital, but at best reduce for the bourgeoisie the price of its rule and simplify the state budget."
Stalinism proclaimed that despite the persistence of what it called "socialist" wage labour, the product of this labour belonged to the producing class, since the personal exploitation by individual capitalists had been replaced by state ownership. The Manifesto, as if in reply, asks "Does wage labour, the labour of the proletarian, create property for him?" and replies: "Certainly not. It creates capital, in other words the property which exploits wage labour, and which can only increase on condition that it produces still more wage labour, in order to exploit it anew. Property in its present form moves within the opposition between capital and wage labour ...To be a capitalist is to occupy not only a purely personal, but above all a social position in production. Capital is a collective product: it cannot be brought into motion except through the common activity of many members, and even in the last analysis of all the members of society. Capital is therefore not a personal power; it is a social power."
This fundamental understanding of the Manifesto, that the juridical replacement of individual capitalists by state ownership in no way - contrary to the Stalinist lies - alters the capitalist nature of the exploitation of wage labour, is formulated even more explicitly by Engels in Anti-Duhring:
"But the transformation, either into joint-stock companies, or into state ownership, does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces (...) The modem state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of the productive forces, the more it actually becomes the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage-workers - proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head."
But it is above all by defining the fundamental difference between capitalism and communism that the Manifesto reveals clearly the bourgeois character of the former Stalinist countries:
"In bourgeois society living labour is merely a means of multiplying accumulated labour. In communist society, accumulated labour is but the means towards the enlargement, enrichment and embellishment of the existence of the worker. In bourgeois society, the past dominates the present; in communist society the present dominates the past."
This is why the industrialisation successes of Stalinism in Russia in the 1930's at the expense of a savage reduction in the living conditions of the workers is the best proof of the bourgeois nature of this regime. The development of the productive forces to the detriment of the consumption power of the producers is the historic task of capitalism. Humanity had to go through this inferno of capital accumulation in order that the material preconditions for a classless society could be created. Socialism, on the contrary, and each and every real step towards that goal, is characterised first and foremost by the quantitative and qualitative growth in consumption, in particular of foodstuffs, clothing and housing. This is why the Manifesto identified the relative and absolute pauperisation of the proletariat as the main characteristic of capitalism, which becomes "incapable of ruling, because it is incapable of securing the existence of its slaves within their slavery, because it is obliged to let it sink to the point of having to feed it instead of being fed by it. Society can no longer live under its domination."
And this in a double sense: because impoverishment drives the proletariat to revolution; and because this mass impoverishment means that the extension of capitalist markets cannot keep pace with the extension of capitalist production. The result: the mode of production rebels against the mode of exchange; the productive forces rebel against a mode of production which they have outgrown; the proletariat rebels against the bourgeoisie; living labour against the rule of dead labour. The future of humanity affirms itself against the domination of the present by the past.
The Manifesto: the marxist demolition of "socialism in one country"
Capitalism has indeed created the preconditions of classless society, giving humanity for the first time the possibility of overcoming the struggle for survival, of man against man, by producing an abundance of the principal means of subsistence and human culture. It is for this reason alone that the Manifesto sings the praises of the revolutionary role of bourgeois society. But these preconditions - in particular the world market and the world proletariat itself - only exist on a world scale. The highest form of capitalist competition (itself but the modem version of the age old struggle of man against man for survival under the rule of scarcity) is the economic and military struggle for survival between bourgeois nation states. This is why the overcoming of capitalist competition, and the establishment of a truly collective human society, is only possible through the overcoming of the nation state, through a world proletarian revolution. The proletariat alone can assume this task since, as the Manifesto declares, "the workers have no country." The rule of the proletariat, we are told, will make national demarcations and antagonisms between peoples disappear more and more. "Its common action, at least in the civilised countries, is one of the first conditions of its emancipation."
Already before the Manifesto, in Principles of Communism Engels answered the question if the socialist revolution can be restricted to one country, as follows:
"No. Big industry already through the creation of the world market has placed all the peoples of the earth, and particularly the most civilised ones, in such an intercourse with one another, that each nation is dependent on what happens to the others (...) The communist revolution will therefore be no mere national affair, it will be a revolution incorporating simultaneously all the civilised countries i.e. at least England, America, France and Germany."
Here we have the final deadly blow of the Manifesto against the bourgeois ideology of the Stalinist counter-revolution: the so-called theory of socialism in one country, The Communist Manifesto was the compass guiding the world revolutionary wave of 1917-23. It was the glorious slogan of the Manifesto "workers of the world, unite!" which guided the Russian proletariat and the Bolsheviks in 1917 in their heroic struggle against the imperialist war 01 the capitalist fatherlands, in the proletariats seizure of power to begin the world revolution. It was the Communist Manifesto which formed the point of reference of the famous programmatic speech of Rosa Luxemburg at the founding congress of the KPD, at the heart of the German revolution, and of the founding Congress of the Communist International 1919. It was equally the uncompromising proletarian internationalism of the Manifesto, of the whole Marxist tradition, which inspired Trotsky in his struggle against "socialism in one country", which inspired the Communist Left in its over half a century of struggle against the Stalinist counter-revolution.
The Communist Left honours the Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848 today, not as a leftover from a distant past, but as a powerful weapon against the lie that stalinism was socialism, and as an indispensable guide towards the necessary revolutionary future of humanity.
Kr
[1] Le livre noir du communisme: crimes, terreur, repression.
[2] The so-called "grosse Lauschangriff" (great eavesdropping attack) of the German bourgeoisie, allegedly aimed against organised crimes, but which specifies 50 different offences, including different forms of subversion, as its target.
The ruling class cannot entirely bury the memory of the October 1917 revolution in Russia, where for the first time in history an exploited class took power at the level of an entire and immense country, Instead, as we have shown on numerous occasions in this International Review[1], it uses all the considerable means at its disposal to distort the meaning of this epochal event by conjuring up a great fog of lies and slanders. It is rather different with the German revolution of 1918-23. Here it has applied the policy of the historical blackout. Thus, casting a glance at the standard school history books, we will find that the October revolution is dealt with up to a point (with a hefty stress on its Russian peculiarities). The German revolution, however, is normally restricted to a few lines about "hunger riots" at the end of the war, or, at most, about the efforts of a shadowy band called the "Spartacists" to seize power here and there. This silence will probably be all the louder during the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of revolution in the Kaiser's Germany. The majority of the world's working class has probably never heard that there was a revolution in Germany at this time, and the bourgeoisie has very good reasons for maintaining this ignorance. Communists, on the other hand, the heirs of those "Spartacist fanatics", have no hesitation in saying loud and clear that these "unknown" events were so crucial that they determined the entire subsequent history of the 20th century.
When the Bolsheviks urged the Russian proletariat to take power in October 1917, it was not at all with the intention of making a purely "Russian" revolution. They understood that if revolution was possible in Russia, it was only because it was the product of a world-wide movement of the working class against the imperialist war, which had opened up an epoch of social revolution. And the insurrection in Russia could only prevail if it was the first act of the world-wide proletarian revolution.
The German revolution, then, was proof that the revolution was and could only be worldwide. The ruling class itself understood this very well: if Germany fell to "Bolshevism", the terrible disease would spread rapidly throughout Europe. It was proof that the working class struggle not only knows no national boundaries, but is the only antidote to the nationalist, imperialist frenzy of the bourgeoisie. Its "least" achievement was that it ended the slaughter of the first world war, because as soon as the revolutionary movement broke out, the world bourgeoisie recognised at once that it was time to stop its bickering and unite against a far more dangerous enemy, the revolutionary working class. The war was rapidly terminated and the German bourgeoisie - though almost stripped naked by the terms of the peace treaty - obtained from the other bourgeoisies all the means it required to deal with the enemy within.
Communism was possible and it was necessary in 1917. If the communist movement had been successful then, the world proletariat would still no doubt have faced gigantic tasks in constructing a new society. It would no doubt have made many mistakes that later generations of the working class can avoid thanks to bitter experience. But at the same time, it would not have had to undo the accumulating effects of capitalist decadence, with its dreadful legacy of terror and destruction, of material and ideological poisoning.
Founding Congress of the KPD: revolution, not reform
The grandeur and tragedy of the German revolution is in many ways encapsulated in Rosa Luxemburg's speech to the founding congress of the Communist party of Germany (KPD) in late December 1918.
In our on-going series on the German revolution[2], we have already written about the importance of this congress from the point of view of the organisational questions facing the new party - above all, the necessity for a centralised organisation capable of speaking with one voice throughout Germany. We have also touched upon some of the general programmatic issues which were hotly debated at this congress, in particular the parliamentary and trade union questions. We have seen that while Luxemburg and the Spartacus group - the real nucleus of the KPD - did not always defend the clearest position on questions of the latter type, she did tend to embody marxist clarity on the problem of organisation, as opposed to some of the more left wing strands who often expressed a distrust of centralisation. And in her speech - on the adoption of the party's programme - this same clarity shines through despite the secondary weaknesses that can be found within it. The profound political content of this speech was a reflection of the strength of the proletariat in Germany as a vanguard in the worldwide movement of the class. And at the same time, the fact that this towering speech was also her last, that the young KPD was soon to be decapitated following the failure of the Berlin uprising a mere two weeks later, also expresses the tragedy of the German proletariat, its inability to assume the gigantic historical tasks imposed upon it.
The reasons for this tragedy are, however, beyond the scope of this article. Our aim in this series is to show how the historical experience of our class has deepened its understanding both of the nature of communist society and the road towards it. In other words, it is to trace a history of the communist programme. The programme of the KPD, generally known as The Spartacus Programme, since it was originally published under the title ''What does Spartacus want?" in Die Rote Fahne, 4 December 1918[3] was a highly significant landmark in this history, and it was certainly no accident that the task of introducing it to the congress was conferred upon Luxemburg, given her unrivalled status as a marxist theoretician. Her opening words plainly affirm the importance of the adoption by the new party of a clear revolutionary programme in a historical juncture which was nothing if not revolutionary:
"Comrades: our task today is to discuss and adopt a programme. In undertaking this task we are not actuated solely by the consideration that yesterday we founded a new party and that a new party must formalise a programme. Great historical movements have been the determining causes of today's deliberations. The time has arrived when the entire socialist programme of the proletariat has to be established upon a new foundation "("On the Spartacus Programme", published as a pamphlet along with "What does Spartacus want?" by Merlin Press, London, 1971).
In order to establish what this new foundation has to be, Luxemburg then reviews the previous efforts of the workers' movement to formalise its programme. Arguing that "We are faced with a position similar to that which was faced by Marx and Engels when they wrote the Communist Manifesto seventy years ago ", she recalls that, at that moment, the founders of scientific socialism had considered the proletarian revolution to be imminent, but that the subsequent development and expansion of capitalism had proved them wrong - and, because their socialism was scientific, Marx and Engels had realised that a long period of organisation, of education, of fighting for reforms, of building the proletarian army was necessary before the communist revolution could be put on the agenda of history. From this realisation came the period of social democracy, in which a distinction was established between the maximum programme of social revolution and the minimum programme of reforms attainable within capitalist society. But as social democracy gradually accommodated itself to what appeared to be an eternally ascending bourgeois society, the minimum programme first detached itself from the maximum, and then more and more began to replace it altogether. This divorce between the immediate and the historical goals of the class was to a large extent already embodied in the Erfurt Programme of 1891, and - precisely at the time when the material possibility of winning durable reforms from capitalism was beginning to wear thin - reformist illusions of various shades increasingly took hold over the workers' party. Indeed, as we have seen in a previous article in this series[4], it is in this very speech that Luxemburg demonstrates that even Engels was not immune to the growing temptation to believe that with the conquest of universal suffrage, the working class could come to power through the bourgeois electoral process.
The imperialist war and the outbreak of proletarian revolution in Russia and Germany had definitively put paid to all illusions in a gradual, peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. These were the "great historical movements" that required the socialist programme to be "established upon a new foundation". The wheel had gone full circle:
The onset of capitalist decadence, signalled by the great imperialist war, and the proletariat's revolutionary rising against the war, necessitated a definitive break with the old social democratic programme; "Our programme is deliberately opposed to the leading principle of the Erfurt programme; it is deliberately opposed to the separation of the immediate and so-called minimum demands formulated for the political and economic struggle, from the socialist goal regarded as the maximal programme. It is in deliberate opposition to the Erfurt programme that we liquidate the results of seventy years' evolution; that we liquidate, above all, the primary results of the war, saying we know nothing of minimal and maximal programmes; we know only one thing, socialism; this is the minimum we are going to secure ".
In the remaining part of her speech, Luxemburg does not go into details about the measures put forward in the draft programme. Instead, she focuses on the most urgent task of the hour: the analysis of how the proletariat can bridge the gap between its initial spontaneous revolt against the privations of war and the conscious implementation of the communist programme. This requires above all a ruthless critique of the weaknesses of the revolutionary mass movement of November 1918.
This critique was not at all tantamount to dismissing the heroic efforts of the workers and soldiers who had paralysed the imperialist war machine. Luxemburg recognised the crucial importance of the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils across the length and breadth of the land in November 1918. "That was the key notion in this revolution which ... immediately gave it the stamp of a proletarian socialist revolution." And since the "alphabet" of this revolution, the call for workers' and soldiers' councils was learned from the Russians, its international and internationalist nature was also established from the fact that "the Russian revolution created the first watchwords for the world revolution ". But contrary to so many of her critics, even some of her "friendliest", Luxemburg was far from being a worshipper of the instinctive spontaneity of the masses. Without a clear class consciousness, the first spontaneous resistance of the workers cannot help but succumb to the wiles and manoeuvres of the class enemy. "It is characteristic of the contradictory aspects of our revolution, characteristic of the contradictions which attend every revolution, that at the very time when this great, stirring and instinctive cry was being uttered, the revolution was so inadequate, so feeble, so devoid of initiative, so lacking in clearness as to its own aims, that on November 10th our revolutionists allowed to slip from their grasp nearly half the instruments of power they had seized on November 9th ". Luxemburg denounced above all the workers' illusions in the slogan of "socialist unity" - the idea that the SPD, the Independents and the KPD should bury their differences and work together for the common cause. This ideology obscured the fact that the SPD had been placed in government by the German bourgeoisie precisely because it had already demonstrated its loyalty to capitalism during the war, and was now in fact the only party that could deal with the revolutionary danger; it also obscured the treacherous role of the Independents, who served mainly to provide a radical cover to the SPD and prevent the masses from making a clear break with it. The net result of these illusions was that the councils were almost immediately handed over to their worst enemies - the Ebert-Noske-Scheidemann counter-revolution, which garbed itself in the red robes of socialism and claimed to be the councils' surest defender.
The working class would have to wake up from such illusions and learn to soberly distinguish its friends from its enemies. The repressive, strike-breaking policies of the new "socialist" government would certainly educate it in this regard, opening the door to an open conflict between the working class and the pseudo-workers' government. But it would be another illusion to think that merely toppling the social democratic government at its focal point could secure the victory of the socialist revolution. The working class would not be ready to take and hold political power until it had passed through an intensive process of self-education by its own positive experience - through the tenacious defence of its economic interests, through mass strike movements, through the mobilisation of the rural masses, through the regeneration and extension of the workers' councils, through a patient and systematic combat to win them away from the nefarious influence of social democracy and over to the understanding that they were true instruments of proletarian power. The development of this process of revolutionary maturation would be such that, "the overthrow of the Ebert-Scheidemann or any similar government will be merely the final act in the drama ".
This part of Luxemburg's perspective for the German revolution has frequently been criticised for making concessions to economism and gradualism. These charges are not entirely without foundation. Economism - the subordination of the political tasks of the working class to the struggle for its immediate economic interests - was to prove itself a real weakness of the communist movement in Germany[5], and it can already be discerned in certain passages of Luxemburg's speech, as for example when she claims that as the revolutionary movement develops, "strikes will become the central feature and the decisive factors of the revolution, thrusting purely political questions into the background". Luxemburg was of course right to argue that the immediate politicisation of the struggle in November had not been a guarantee of its real maturity, and that the struggle would certainly have to flow back onto the economic terrain before it could reach a higher political level. But the experience in Russia had also shown that once the movement did begin to reach the point where the question of power was really being posed in the most important battalions of the working class, then strikes tended to be "thrust into the background" in favour of "purely political questions". It appears at this point that Luxemburg is forgetting her own analysis of the dynamic of the mass strike, in which she argues that the movement passes from economic to political questions and vice-versa in a continuous ebb and flow.
More serious is the charge of gradualism: In his text Allemagne: de 1800 aux "annees rouges" (1917- 23), December 1997, Robert Camoin writes that "the programme (of the KPD) seriously evades the question of the insurrection; the destruction of the state is formulated in localist terms. The conquest of power is presented as a gradual action, little by little wresting parcels of state power "(P63). And he quotes that section of Luxemburg's speech which argues that "for us, the conquest of power will not be affected at one blow. It will be a progressive act, for we shall progressively occupy all the positions of the capitalist state, defending tooth and nail each one that we seize ".
What Spartacus wanted
A revolutionary party needs a revolutionary programme. A small communist group or fraction, which does not have a decisive impact on the class struggle, can be defined around a platform of general class positions. But while a party certainly requires these class principles as the foundation stone of its politics, it also needs a programme which translates these general principles into practical proposals for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, and for the initial steps towards a new society. In a revolutionary situation, the immediate measures for the establishment of proletarian power obviously take on a primary importance. As Lenin wrote in his "Greetings to the Bavarian Soviet Republic", in April 1919:
"We thank you for your message of greeting and in turn we heartily salute the Soviet Republic of Bavaria. We would immediately like you to inform us more often and more concretely about the measures you have taken in your struggle against the bourgeois executioners, Scheidemann and Co: if you have created soviets of workers and household servants in the districts of the town; if you have armed the workers and disarmed the bourgeoisie; if you have made use of the warehouses of clothes and other articles as widely and as immediately as possible, to help the workers and above all the day-labourers and small peasants; if you have expropriated the factories and goods of the Munich capitalists as well as the capitalist agricultural enterprises in the surrounding area; if you have abolished the mortgages and rent of small peasants; if you have tripled the wages of day-labourers and workmen; if you have confiscated all the paper and print-works in order to publish leaflets and newspapers for the masses; if you have instituted the six hour day with two or three hours dedicated to the study of the art of state administration; if you have crowded the bourgeoisie together in order to immediately install workers in the rich apartments; if you have taken overall the banks; if you have chosen hostages from among the bourgeoisie; if you have established a food ration which gives more to workers than to members of the bourgeoisie; if you have mobilised all the workers at once for defence and for ideological propaganda in the surrounding villages. The most rapid and widespread application of these measures as well as other similar measures, carried out on the initiative of the soviets of workers and day-labourers and, separately, of small peasants, must reinforce your position."
The document "What does Spartacus want", offered as the draft programme for the new KPD, goes in the same direction as Lenin's recommendations. It is presented by a preamble which reaffirms the marxist analysis of the historic situation facing the working class: the imperialist war has confronted humanity with the choice between world proletarian revolution, the abolition of wage labour and the creation of a new communist order, or a descent into chaos and barbarism. The text does not underestimate the magnitude of the task facing the proletariat: "the establishment of the socialist order of society is the greatest task that ever fell to the lot of a class and of a revolution in the course of human history. This task involves the complete reconstruction of the state and an entire change in the social and economic foundations of society ". This change cannot be accomplished "by a decree issued by some officials, committee, or parliament". Previous revolutions could be carried through by a minority, but "the socialist revolution is the first revolution which can secure victory for and through the great majority of the workers themselves ". The workers, organised in their councils, had to take this whole immense social, economic, and political transformation into their own hands.
Furthermore, while calling for the "iron hand" of an armed and self-organised working class to put down the plots and resistance of the counter-revolution, the preamble argues that terror is a method alien to the proletariat: "the proletarian revolution requires no terror for the realisation of its aims: it looks upon manslaughter with hatred and aversion. It has no need for such means because the struggle it conducts is not against individuals but against institutions ". This critique of the "Red Terror" has itself been much criticised by other communists then and now. Rosa Luxemburg, who wrote the draft, and who made similar criticisms of the actual Red Terror in Russia, has been accused of pacifism, of advocating policies that would disarm the proletariat in the face of the counter-revolution. But the preamble shows no naive illusions in the possibility of making the revolution without encountering and indeed suppressing the ferocious resistance of the old ruling class, who "will sooner turn the country into a smoking heap of ruins than voluntarily relinquish its power to exploit the working class ". What the draft programme does do, however, is enable us to make the distinction between class violence - based on the massive self-organisation of the proletariat - and state terror, which is necessarily carried out by specialised minority bodies and always contains the danger of turning against the proletariat. We will return to this question later on, but we can certainly say here, in line with the arguments put forward in our text "Terrorism, terror and class violence"[6], that the experience of the Russian revolution has indeed confirmed the validity of this distinction.
The immediate measures that follow the preamble are the concretisation of its general perspective. We reprint them in full here:
"I. As Immediate Means for Making the Revolution Secure.
The disarming of the entire police force, of all officers, as well as of the non-proletarian soldiers.
The seizure of all supplies of arms and ammunition, as well as of all war industries, by the workers' and soldiers' councils.
The arming of the entire adult male population as the workers' militia. The formation of a red guard of the workers as the active part of the militia, for the effective protection of the revolution against counter-revolutionary plots and risings;
The removal of all officers and ex-officers from the soldiers' councils.
Substitution of authorised representatives of the workers' and soldiers' councils for all political organs and authorities of the old regime.
Creation of a revolutionary tribunal to try the men chiefly responsible for the war and its prolongation, namely, the two Hohenzollems, Ludendorff, Hindenberg, Tirpitz, and their fellow criminals, as well as all conspirators of the counter-revolution.
Immediate seizure of all means of subsistence to secure provisions for the people.
Abolition of all separate states; a united German Socialist Republic.
Removal of all parliaments and municipal councils, their functions to be taken over by the workers' and soldiers' councils and by the committees and organs of the latter bodies;
Election of workers' councils all over Germany by the entire adult working population of working people, of both sexes, in cities and rural districts, along the lines of industries, and election of soldiers' councils by the soldiers, excluding the officers and ex-officers. The right of workers and soldiers to recall their representatives at any time;
Abolition of all class distinctions, titles, and orders; complete legal and social equality of the sexes.
Radical social legislation, reduction of working hours to avoid unemployment and to conform to the physical exhaustion of the working class occasioned by the world war; limitation of the working day to six hours.
Immediate, thorough change of the policy with regard to food, housing, health, and education in the spirit of the proletarian revolution.
Further Economic Demands.
Annulment of the state debts and other public debts, as well as all war loans, except those subscribed within a certain limited amount, this limit to be fixed by the Central Council of the workers' and soldiers' councils.
Expropriation of the land held by all large and medium sized agricultural concerns; establishment of socialist agricultural cooperatives under a uniform central administration all over the country. Small peasant holdings to remain in possession of their present owners, until they voluntarily decide to join the socialist agricultural cooperatives.
Nationalisation by the Republic of Councils of all banks, ore mines, coal mines, as well as all large industrial and commercial establishments.
Confiscation of all property exceeding a certain limit, the limit to be fixed by the Central Council.
Election of administrative councils in all enterprises, such councils to regulate the internal affairs of the enterprises in agreement with the workers' councils, regulate the conditions of labour, control production, and, finally, take over the administration of the enterprise.
Establishment of a Central Strike Committee which, in constant cooperation with the industrial councils, shall secure for the strike movement throughout the country uniform administration, socialist direction, and most effective support by the political power of the workers' and soldiers' councils.
International Problems.
Immediate establishment of connections with the sister parties abroad in order to place the socialist revolution upon an international basis and to secure and maintain peace through international brotherhood and the revolutionary rising of the international working class."
arming the workers and disarming the counter-revolution. Equally important is its insistence on the fundamental role of the workers' councils as organs of proletarian political power, and on the centralised character of this power. In calling for the power of the councils and the dismantling of the bourgeois state, the programme is already the fruit of the gigantic proletarian experience in Russia; at the same time, on the question of parliament and municipal councils, the KPD takes one step further than the Bolsheviks had in 1917, when there was still confusion in the party about the possible coexistence of the soviets with the Constituent Assembly and municipal dumas. In the KPD programme, all these organs of the bourgeois state are to be dismantled without delay. Similarly, the KPD programme sees no role at all for the trade unions: alongside the workers' councils and red guards, the factory committees are the only other workers' organs it mentions. Although there were differences in the party on these latter two questions, the clarity of the 1918 programme was a direct expression of the revolutionary élan that animated the class movement at that time.
Inevitably, some of the elements in the programme were specific to the form that this collapse took in 1918: the imperialist war and its aftermath. Hence the importance of the questions of soldiers' councils, the reorganisation of the army, and so on - questions that would not have the same significance in a situation where the revolutionary situation is the direct result of the economic crisis, as is most likely in the future. More importantly, it was inevitable that a programme formulated at the commencement of a great revolutionary experience should contain weaknesses and lacunae precisely because so many crucial lessons. could only have been learned by living through that very experience; and it is worth noting that these weaknesses were common to the whole international workers' movement and were not, as is so often claimed, limited to the Bolshevik party which, because it alone faced the concrete
problems of the organisation of the proletarian dictatorship, suffered most cruelly from the consequences of these weaknesses.
This passage is imbued with the same proletarian spirit that runs through the work of Lenin between April and October 1917: the rejection of putsch ism, the absolute insistence that the party cannot call for the seizure of power until the mass of the proletariat has been won to its programme. But along with the Bolsheviks, the Spartacists also held the mistaken view that the party which has a majority on the councils then becomes the governing party - a conception that was to have very serious consequences once the revolutionary tide went into reflux.
But perhaps most striking of all is the paucity of the section dealing with the international revolution. The section "International Problems" almost has the air of being tacked on as an afterthought, and is extremely vague about the proletarian attitude to imperialist war and to the international extension of the revolution, even though without such an extension, any revolutionary rising in one country is doomed to defeat[8].
For all their importance, none of these weaknesses were critical, and could have been overcome if the revolutionary dynamic had continued to advance. What was critical was the immaturity of the German proletariat, the chink in its armour which rendered it vulnerable to the sirens of social democracy, and thus to be picked off in a series of isolated uprisings rather than concentrate its forces for a centralised assault on bourgeois power. But that is a story that we have taken up elsewhere.
The next article in this series takes us to the year 1919, the zenith of the world revolution, and to an examination of the platform of the Communist International and of the programme of the Communist Party in Russia, where the dictatorship of the proletariat was not merely a demand but a practical reality.
CDW
[1] See the article "The great lie: communism = Stalinism = Nazism in International Review 92
[2] For our series on the German revolution, see International Review nos 81-86 and 88-90 and this issue.
[3] The text was presented as a draft to the founding congress, and was adopted formally at the Berlin congress of December 1919.
[4] "1895-1905: Parliamentary illusions hide the perspective of revolution", International Review 88)
[5] see for example our book on the German and Dutch communist left)
[6] International Review 15
[7] For an analysis both of the strengths and the historically conditioned limitations of the Communist Manifesto see the article in the first volume of this series, International Review 72.
[8] It is worth pointing out that this weakness, along with some others, was substantially rectified in the 1920 programme of the KAPD: its section of revolutionary measures begins with the proposal that a council republic in Germany should immediately fuse with Soviet Russia.
The offensive the ruling class has launched against communism and against the dispersed revolutionary minorities which are around today is a question of life or death. The survival of a system that is prey to even more profound internal convulsions depends on the elimination of any possibility of a revolutionary movement maturing out of the revival of proletarian struggles - a movement consciously aimed at destroying this system and establishing a communist society. In order to attain this objective, the bourgeoisie has to discredit, isolate and thus politically, if not physically, annihilate the revolutionary vanguards which are so indispensable to the success of the proletariat's mission.
At this level, there have been in the last few months some important and significant advances made by different political formations. We will only cite two of them as examples, ones already mentioned in our press:
- the denunciation by all the main components of the proletarian milieu of the bourgeoisie's campaign of mystification against the International Communist Party's pamphlet Auschwitz or the Great Alibi, which is accused of denying the reality of the Nazi gas chambers, whereas in fact this pamphlet denounces both democracy and Nazism as two sides of the same coin[1];
- the common defence of the Russian revolution and its lessons in the public meeting held jointly by the Communist Workers Organisation and the ICC in November 1997[2].
Even if the groups who claim continuity with the work of Amadeo Bordiga, and whom we refer to as Bordigists[3], don't recognise the existence of a proletarian political milieu - though they do sometimes in an implicit way[4] - they are an important part of it because of the tradition they come from. This part of the revolutionary camp, the major part up until the beginning of the 1980s, was hit in 1982 by an explosion unprecedented in the history of the workers' movement, giving rise to new Bordigist formations alongside the splits that already existed, all of them claiming to be the true heirs and most of them calling themselves the International Communist Party. This situation, the result of the fact that the various groups who came out of the explosion have never made a serious re-examination of the causes of the crisis of 1982, has represented an important weakness for the whole proletarian milieu.
In this article, we will not be entering into all the elements of a debate which promises to be rich and interesting, and which even includes a group outside the Bordigist milieu like the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (Battaglia Comunista) to the extent that such a debate goes back to the very formations of the party in 1943-5, i.e. before the 1952 split between the Bordigist wing and the group led by Onorato Damen which has kept the name of their publication Battaglia Comunista to this day[5]. It is however important to point to certain elements which confer such value to this debate.
The first aspect is that the organisational question is at the heart of the discussion: if one reads the different articles of the groups involved, one can see how much this concern runs through them. Leaving aside for the moment the basic polemic between II Comunista, Le Proletaire and Programma Comunista, which to be honest we are not at this stage in a position to make any categorical statements about, the two groups, when they talk about what happened in the old Programme Communiste before 1982, both analyse a confrontation between an immediatist and voluntarist component on the one hand[6], and, on the other hand, a component more connected to the long term maturation of the class struggle. And both also show the central importance of the question of organisation: of a "partyist" type organisation against any "movementist" idea that the movement of the class is in itself sufficient for a successful revolution.
In its January 1997 issue, Programma Comunista refers to the necessity to understand the importance of patience, of not being immediatist, a general principle which we can but share.
The second aspect which gives value to this debate is the tendency to finally confront the question of the political roots of the crisis:
"We have to get down to work on the balance sheet of the crisis of the party, to draw up a balance sheet of all the questions which the last explosive crisis left unresolved: we will list them - the union question, the national question, the question of the party and its relations with other political regroupments as well as with the class, the question of the internal organisation of the party, the question of terrorism, the question of the revival of the class struggle and the immediate organisations of the proletariat ... the question of the course of imperialism" (Ibid.).
On this level, the group Le Proletaire-Il Comunista, in an article on the Kurdish question published in the French theoretical review Programme Communiste, devotes a long article to the critique of Programma Comunista (the Italian group) concerning an article the latter had written in 1994 which gives critical support to the PKK: "This fantasy recalls the illusions into which numerous comrades fell, including the international centre of the party, at the time of the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and which led to the outbreak of the crisis which blew our organisation apart ... Programma thus manages to fall into the same error committed yesterday by the liquidators of our party, EI Oumami and Combat. Perhaps if it had agreed to draw a serious balance sheet of the crisis of the party and its causes, instead of taking flight into beliefs about always being right, Programma would have been able to make a real qualitative leap and overcome its theoretical, political and practical disorientation, to find the correct orientation so that such a misadventure would not have happened to it" (Programme Comuniste 95).
This polemic is particularly important because beyond the fact that it represents a clear position on national liberation struggles, it seems to have finally recognised that this question was at the basis of the explosion of Programme Communiste in 1982[7]. This recognition augurs well for the future because as the nature of the debate shows, it will no longer be possible for Bordigism to begin again as if nothing had happened: the lessons of the past will have to be drawn. And this past can't be arbitrarily fixed at a given period.
We have already made allusion to the fact that, in the polemic, the different groups have gone all the way back to the constitution of the first organisation in the years 1943-45. Thus, Programme Communiste 94 raised the question as follows: "the reconstituted party ... did not remain immune from the influence of the positions of the anti-fascist Resistance and of a rebellious anti-Stalinism ... these weaknesses were to lead to the split of 1951-2, but this was a beneficial crisis, a crisis of political and theoretical maturation". We can find this kind of criticism of the party of the 1950s within the other branch of the split, i.e. Battaglia Comunista (see our article on the history of Battaglia in International Review 91).
In the same issue, Programme Communiste also makes a reference to the difficulties encountered by this group after May 1968:
"the negative effects of post-68 touched our party ... to the point of leading to its break-up ... The party was assaulted by positions which were a melange of workerism, guerrillarism, voluntarism, activism ... There was a widespread illusion that, after 1975, Bordiga's predicted date of a 'revolutionary crisis, the party would soon emerge from its isolation and acquire a certain influence ".
Programma Comunista goes further, and in a remarkable effort of reflection on its past difficulties, it goes back over the same period[8]: "The more the party found itself facing political and practical problems that varied in their nature, their dimension and their urgency (such as the woman question, questions like housing, unemployment, the appearance of new organisations outside the big traditional unions or the problems raised by the weight of national factors in certain countries), the more there was a tendency to entrench oneself in a fixed declaration of principles, to stiffen ideologically".
This observation has to be welcomed: it is a sign of political and revolutionary vitality to try to find answers to new problems posed by the class struggle. This reflection on the past of the old International Communist Party, and notably on the organisation question, by comrades who have maintained an activity after the explosion of the early 80s, is very important for the communist left.
We won't take things any further in this article. We simply want to welcome and underline the importance of this debate developing in the Bordigist camp. In previous articles we have tried to analyse the origins of the political currents which constitute the present proletarian political milieu, by raising two fundamental questions - 'The Italian Fraction and the Communist Left of France' (IR 90) and 'The formation of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista' (IR 91). We are convinced that the whole political milieu must go into these historical questions and come out of the retreat imposed by the counter-revolution in the 1950s, the future of the construction of the class party, of the revolution itself, depends strongly on this.
Ezechiele
[1] See for example 'Bourgeois attacks against the communist left: we support the response of the Parti Communiste Internationale (Le Proletaire) in World Revolution 200 and Internationalism 97.
[2] See 'Joint public meeting of the communist left: In defence of the October revolution', in WR 209, Internationalism 102 and in the CWO's own publication Revolutionary Perspectives 9.
[3] The main Bordigist formations which exist today and to whom we refer in this article are, with their publications: the International Communist Party which published Le Proletaire and Programme Communiste in France; and Il Comunista in Italy; the International Communist Party which publishes Programma Comunista in Italy, Cahiers Internationalistes in France and Internationalist Papers in English; the International Communist Party which publishes Il Partito Comunista in Italy and Communist Left in Britain.
[4] Programme Communiste 95 for example takes the defence of the communist left against the criticisms of our book The Italian Communist Left by a British Trotskyist journal Revolutionary History (vol. 5 no. 4).
[5] There is a pamphlet by Battaglia on the 1952 split and a more recent one called Among the shadows of Bordigism and its epigones which intervenes explicitly in the recent debate between Bordigist groups.
[6] Two of these groups which were to some extent representative of this component of the old Programme Communiste ended up in leftism - in Italy Combat and in France EI Oumami - and both have happily disappeared from the social and political scene.
[7] See the articles we devoted to the crisis of Programme Communiste in 1982 and which the ICC analysed as the expression of a more general crisis in the proletarian political milieu, in particular the articles in IRs 32-36.
[8] Programme Communiste 94 'In memory of a comrade of the old guard, Ricardo Salvador'.
Thirty years ago in France, nearly 10 million workers were engaged for a month in a great movement of struggle. For young comrades coming towards revolutionary positions today, it is very difficult to know what happened during that far-off month of May 1968. And this is not their fault. The bourgeoisie has always deformed the profound importance of these events, and bourgeois history (right or left, it is all the same) has always presented them as a "student revolt", when in reality it was the most important phase in a class movement which spread to Italy, the United States, and throughout the industrialised world. It is not surprising that the ruling class should try to hide the proletariat's past struggles. When unable to do so, it distorts them, presents them as something other than the signs of the historic and irresolvable antagonism between the main exploited class of our epoch, and the ruling class responsible for this exploitation. Today the bourgeoisie continues its work of mystifying history by trying to present the October revolution as a coup d'état by bloodthirsty, power-hungry Bolsheviks, the opposite to reality: the greatest attempt in history by the working class to "storm the heavens", to seize political power in order to begin transforming society into communism, in other words to abolish the exploitation of man by man. The bourgeoisie is trying to exorcise the danger of historical memory as a weapon of the working class. And precisely because the knowledge of its own past experience is vital to the working class in preparing the battles of today and tomorrow, it is up to the revolutionaries, the class' political vanguard, to recall this past experience.
On the 3rd May thirty years ago, a meeting of several hundred students was held in the courtyard of the Sorbonne in Paris, called by the UNEF (student union) and the "22nd March Movement" (formed a few weeks previously at the faculty of Nanterre in the Paris suburbs). There was nothing particularly exciting in the theorising speeches by the leftist "leaders". But there was a persistent rumour: the Occident will attack". This far-right movement gave the police an excuse to intervene to "separate' the demonstrators. The aim above all was to smash the student agitation which had been going on for several weeks at Nanterre. This agitation was simply an expression of student frustration, driven by such diverse motives as the contestation of academic mandarins or the demand for greater individual and sexual freedom in the daily life of the University.
And yet, "the impossible happened": agitation continued for several days in the Latin Quarter. It stepped up a level every evening: each demonstration, every meeting, attracted a few more people than the day before: ten, then thirty, then fifty thousand people. Clashes with the police became more violent. In the street, young workers joined the fight. Despite the open hostility of the PCF (Parti Communiste Francais), which slandered the "enrages" (literally, "the angry ones") and the "German anarchist" Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the CGT (the Stalinist-controlled union) was forced to avoid losing control of the situation by "recognising" the strikes, which had broken out unofficially and were spreading rapidly: ten million strikers disturbed the torpor of the 5th Republic, and marked the reawakening of the world proletariat.
The strike begun on 14th May at Sud-Avia-tion, and spread spontaneously. It was from the outset a radical departure from the "actions" organised hitherto by the unions. In the vital engineering and transportation sectors, the strike was almost total. The unions were overtaken by a movement which set itself apart from their traditional policies. The movement went beyond the control of the unions, marked from the start by an extended and often imprecise character, and often inspired by a profound, even if "unconscious" anxiety.
The unemployed, labelled as "declassed" by the bourgeoisie, played an important part in the confrontations. In fact, these "declassed", "misled" individuals were entirely proletarian. The proletariat consists, not just of workers and those who have already held down a job, but also of those who have not yet been able to work, and are already unemployed. They are the pure products of capitalism's decadent epoch. In mass youth unemployment, we can see one of the historic limits of capitalism, which because of generalised overproduction has become incapable of integrating new generations into the productive process. The unions, however, were to do everything in their power to regain control of this movement, which had started without them, and to some extent against them.
On Friday 17th May, the CGT distributed a leaflet which made quite clear the limits it intended to impose on its action: on the one hand, traditional demands coupled with agreements like those of Matignon in June 1936, guaranteeing the rights of union sections in companies; on the other, they called for a change of government, in other words for elections. Although they had been suspicious of the unions before the strike, had started the movement over the unions' heads, and had extended it on their own initiative, the workers behaved during the strike as if it was normal that it should be taken to its conclusion by the unions.
After being forced to follow the movement so as not to lose control of it, the unions finally pulled off a double coup with the precious help of the PCF: on the one hand, conducting negotiations with the government, while on the other calling the workers to stay calm, so as not to upset the serene holding of the new elections demanded by the PCF and the Socialists; at the same time they discreetly circulated rumours about the possibility of a coup d'état, and troop movements around the capital. In reality, although surprised and alarmed by the movement's radicalism, the bourgeoisie had no intention of using military repression. It knew very well that this could start the movement off again, forcing the union "conciliators" out of the game, and that a bloodbath would only have been much more expensive later on. It was not so much the CRS (Compagnie Republicaine de Securite, riot police) who attacked the demonstrations and dispersed demonstrators, but the much more skilful and dangerous union cops within the factories, who carried on their dirty work of dividing the workers.
The unions carried out their first police operation by encouraging the factory occupations, succeeding in shutting the workers up in their work place, thus preventing them from meeting, discussing, confronting each other in the street.
On the morning of the 27th May, the unions appeared before the workers with a compromise signed with the government (the Grenelle agreements). At Renault, the biggest company in the country and "barometer" of working class feeling, the CGT general secretary was shouted down by workers, who considered that their struggle had been sold out. Workers adopted the same attitude elsewhere. The number of strikers went on rising. Many workers tore up their union cards. This was when the unions and the government shared out the job of breaking the movement. The CGT, which had immediately disowned the Grenelle agreement - which it had itself signed - declared that "negotiations should be opened branch by branch in order to approve [the agreement)". The government and the bosses played along, making major concessions in some industries, which made it possible to begin a move back to work. At the same time, on 30th May, De Gaulle gave in to the demands of the left-wing parties: he dissolved parliament and called new elections. The same day, hundreds of thousands of his supporters marched down the Champs Elysees, It was a motley gathering of all those with a gut hatred for the working class and the "communists": the inhabitants of the wealthy districts, retired military men, nuns and concierges, shopkeepers and pimps. All this good society marched behind De Gaulle's ministers, led by Andre Malraux (the anti-fascist writer, well-known since his participation in the war in Spain in 1936).
The unions divided the work up amongst themselves: the minority CFDT took on a "radical" look, in order to keep control of the most combative workers. The CGT distinguished itself as a strike-breaker. In mass meetings, it would propose to bring the strike to an end, on the grounds that workers in neighbouring factories had already gone back to work: this was a lie. Above all, along with the PCF, it called for "calm" and a "responsible attitude" (even bringing up the bogey of civil war and repression by the army), so as not to disturb the elections to be held on 23rd and 30th June. The elections, when they came, resulted in a right-wing landslide, only adding to the disgust of the most combative workers who had continued their strike until they were held.
Despite its limitations, the general strike's immense élan helped the world-wide recovery of the class struggle. Coming after an uninterrupted series of retreats following the revolutionary events of 1917-23, the events of May 68 were a decisive turning point not only in France but in the rest of Europe and throughout the world. The strikes shook not only the state power, but also its most effective rampart, and the one most difficult to break: the left and the unions.
A "student" movement?
Once it had recovered from its surprise and its initial panic, the bourgeoisie set to finding explanations for these events which had disturbed its peace. It is therefore hardly surprising that the left used the student agitation to exorcise the real spectre that rose before the gaze of a frightened bourgeoisie - the proletariat - and that it limited the social events to a mere ideological quarrel between generations. May 68 was presented as the result of youthful boredom in the face of the modern world's dysfunctional changes. It is obvious that May 68 was marked by a definite decomposition of the values of the dominant ideology, but this "cultural" revolt was not the real cause of the conflict. In his preface to the Critique of Political Economy Marx showed that "with the change of the economic foundations the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical - in short ideological - forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out".
All the expressions of the ideological crisis have their roots in the economic crisis, not the other way round. It is this state of crisis which determines the course of things. The student movement was thus indeed an expression of the general decomposition of bourgeois ideology. It was a straw in the wind announcing a more fundamental social movement. But because of the very place of the university in the system of production, it is only very exceptionally that it has any connection with the class struggle.
May 68 was not a movement of students and young people, it was above all a movement of the working class which was raising its head after decades of counter-revolution. The radicalisation of the student movement was precisely the result of this presence of the working class.
Students are not a class, still less a revolutionary social stratum. On the contrary, they are specifically the vehicles of the worst kind of bourgeois ideology. If in 1968 thousands of young people were influenced by revolutionary ideas, it was precisely because the only revolutionary class of our epoch, the working class, was in the streets.
This resurgence put an end to all the theories about the "bourgeoisification" of the working class, its "integration" into the capitalist system. How else can one explain how all these theories, which had been so dominant in the university milieu where they had been elaborated by the likes of Marc use and Adorno, melted away like snowdrops in the sun and that the students turned towards the working class like moths to a flame? And how else can one explain that, in the following years, while continuing to agitate in the same way, the students stopped proclaiming themselves revolutionaries?
No, May 68 was not a revolt of youth against the "inadequacies of the modern world", it was not merely a mental revolt; it was the first symptom of social convulsions whose roots lay much deeper than the superstructure, in the crisis of the capitalist mode of production. Far from being a triumph for the theories of Marcuse, May 68 was their death sentence, sending them back to the world of chimeras whence they had come.
No, the beginning of the historic resurgence of the class struggle
The general strike of 10 million workers in a country at the heart of capitalism meant the end of a period of counter-revolution that had opened up with the defeat of the revolutionary wave of the 1920s, and had continued and deepened through the simultaneous action of fascism and Stalinism. Just before this, the middle of the 1960s had marked the end of the period of reconstruction following the Second World War and the beginning of a new open crisis of the capitalist system.
The first blows of this crisis hit a generation of workers who had not known the demoralisation of the defeat that came in the 20s and who had grown up during the "economic boom". At that point the crisis was only touching them lightly, but the working class began to feel that something was changing:
"A feeling of insecurity about tomorrow is developing among the workers and above all among the younger ones. This feeling is all the sharper for having been unknown to the workers in France since the war ... More and more the masses feel that all this fine prosperity is coming to an end. Attitudes of indifference and 'I couldn't care less' among the workers, so characteristic and so widely decried, are giving away to a growing disquiet ... It has to be admitted that an explosion of this kind is based on a long accumulation of discontent in the masses about their economic situation, even if a superficial observer might have noticed nothing (Revolution Intemationale, 2, old series, 1969).
And indeed a superficial observer can grasp nothing of what's happening in the depths of the capitalist world. It's no accident that a radical group with no solid Marxist basis like the Situationist International could write about the events of May 68 " You could not observe any tendency towards economic crisis ... the revolutionary eruption did not come out of an economic crisis ... what was frontally attacked in May was a capitalist economy functioning well" (Enrages and Situationists in the Occupations Movement, Situationist International, 1969).
Reality was very different and the workers were beginning to feel it in their bones.
After 1945, US aid made it possible to get production going again in Europe, which paid back a part of its debts by ceding its enterprises to American companies. But after 1955 the US stopped their "free" aid. The commercial balance of the US was positive while that of most of the other countries was negative. American capital continued to be invested more rapidly in Europe than in the rest of the world, which assisted the balance of payments in these countries, but soon unbalanced it for the US. This situation led to growing debts for the American Treasury, since the dollars invested in Europe or the rest of the world constituted debts for the latter towards the holders of all this money. From the 1960s, this external debt went beyond the gold reserves of the US Treasury, but this inability to cover the dollar did not yet put the US in difficulty as long as the other countries were indebted to the US. The US could thus continue to appropriate capital from the rest of the world by paying in paper. This situation only turned around with the end of the reconstruction in the European countries. The European economies were now able to launch products onto the world market in competition with those of the US: towards the middle of the 60s, the trade balance of most of the countries that had been assisted by the US became positive while after 1964 that of the US deteriorated more and more. This marked the completion of the reconstruction of the European countries. The productive apparatus now faced a saturated market obliging the national bourgeoisies to intensify the exploitation of their proletariats in order to confront the exacerbation of international competition.
France did not escape this situation and in 1967 France had to undertake unavoidable measures of restructuration: rationalisation, improved productivity, leading to an increase in unemployment. Thus, at the beginning of 1968, the number of unemployed went beyond 500,000. Partial unemployment appeared in many factories and led to reactions from the workers. A lot of strikes broke out, limited and still controlled by the unions, but expressing a certain malaise. The growth of unemployment was received badly by a generation produced by the demographic explosion that followed World War Two, and which was accustomed to full employment.
In general the bosses sought to reduce workers' living standards. The bourgeoisie and its government were mounting a growing attack on living and working conditions. In all the industrial countries, there was a tangible development of unemployment, economic perspectives were becoming more sombre, international competition sharper. At the end of 1967 Britain made its first devaluation of the pound in order to make its products more competitive. But this measure was annulled by the devaluations that took place in all the other countries. The austerity policies imposed by the Labour government of the day were particularly severe: massive cuts in public spending, withdrawal of British troops from Asia, wage freezes, the first protectionist measures.
The US, main victim of the European offensive, could only react severely and, from the beginning of January 1968, President Johnson announced a number of economic measures, while in March 1968, in response to devaluations of rival currencies, the dollar also fell.
These were the essentials of the economic situation prior to May 68.
A movement for immediate demands, but not just that
It was in this situation that the events of May 68 took place: a worsening economic situation which engendered a reaction in the working class.
Certainly, other factors contributed to the radicalisation of the situation: police repression against the students and the workers' demonstrations, the Vietnam War. Simultaneously all the post-war capitalist myths entered into crisis: the myths of democracy, economic prosperity, peace. This situation created a social crisis to which the working class gave its first response.
It was a response on the economic level, but not only on that level. The other elements of the social crisis, the discredit suffered by the unions and the traditional left forces, led thousands of young people and workers to pose more general questions, to look for answers about the underlying cause of their discontent and disillusionment.
Thus was produced a new generation of militants who were approaching revolutionary positions. They began to re-read Marx, Lenin, to study the workers' movement of the past. The working class not only rediscovered the dimension of its struggle as an exploited class but also began to reveal its revolutionary nature.
These new militants for the most part got derailed by the false perspectives of the different leftist groups and so were soon lost. While trade unionism was the weapon which allowed the bourgeoisie to block the mass movement of the workers, leftism was the weapon which broke the majority of militants formed in the struggle.
But many others managed to find authentically revolutionary organisations, those which represented the historic continuity with the past workers' movement - the groups of the communist left. While none of the latter were able to fully grasp the significance of the events, remaining on the side lines and thus leaving the field free to the leftists, other small nuclei were able to gather these new revolutionary energies together, giving rise to new organisations and a new effort towards the regroupment of revolutionaries, the basis for the future revolutionary party.
A long and tortuous historic resurgence
The events of May 68 represented the beginning of the historic resurgence of the class struggle, the break with the period of counter-revolution and the opening of a new historic course towards a decisive confrontation between the antagonistic classes of our time: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
It was a striking debut, which found the bourgeoisie momentarily unprepared; but the ruling class recovered quickly and was able to get the better of an inexperienced generation of workers.
This new historic course was confirmed by the international events which followed May 68.
In 1969, there broke out in Italy the great strike movement known as the Hot Autumn, a season of struggle which was to continue for several years during which the workers tended to unmask the unions and build their own organs for the direction of the struggle. A wave of struggles whose main weakness was to remain isolated in the factories with the illusion that a "hard" struggle in the factories was enough to make the bosses retreat. These limitations were to enable the unions to get their place back in the factories by presenting themselves in their new guise of "base organs", drawing in all the leftist elements who, in the ascendant phase of the movement, had played at being revolutionaries and who now found jobs as union hacks.
The 1970s saw other movements of struggle all over the industrial world: in Italy (the unemployed, the hospital workers); in France (LIP, Renault, the steelworkers of Longwy and Denain), in Spain, in Portugal and elsewhere. The workers were increasingly coming up against the unions who, despite their new "rank and file" garments, continued to look like the defenders of capitalist interests and saboteurs of workers' struggles.
In 1980 in Poland, the working class drew profit from the bloody experience it had been through in the previous confrontations of 1970 and 1976, organising a mass strike which blocked the whole country. This formidable movement of the workers in Poland, which showed the entire world the strength of the proletariat, its capacity to take control of its struggles, to organise itself through general assemblies and strike committees (the MKS) in order to extend the struggle across an entire country, was an encouragement for the working class everywhere. It was the trade union Solidarnosc, created by the bourgeoisie (with the aid of the western unions) to contain, control and derail the movement, which finally handed the workers over to the repression of the Jaruzelski government. This defeat led to a deep disarray in the world proletariat. It took it more than two years to digest this defeat.
During the 1980s, however, the workers began to draw on all the experience of union sabotage from the previous decade. New struggles broke out in the main countries and the workers began to take charge of their struggles, creating their own organs of struggle. The railway workers in France, the school workers in Italy, waged struggles based on organs controlled by the workers through strikers' general assemblies.
Faced with this maturation of the struggle, the bourgeoisie was forced to renew its own union weapons: it was in these years that a new form of "base unionism" was developed (the coordinations in France, the COBAS in Italy), disguised unions which copied the forms of the organs which the workers had created for the struggle, in order to drag the workers back into the union corral.
We have only touched upon what happened in these two decades after the French May. We think that it is enough to show that the latter was no mere passing incident, something specifically French, but really was the beginning of a new historic phase in which the working class had broken with the counter-revolution and had again appeared on the scene of history, starting out on the long road towards the confrontation with capital.
A difficult historic resurgence
If the new post-war generation of the working class managed to break with the counter-revolution because it had not directly known the demoralisation of defeat in the 1920s, it was lacking in experience and this historic resurgence of the struggle was to prove long and difficult. We have already seen the difficulties of settling scores with the unions and their role as defenders of capital. But an important and unforeseen historic event was to make this resurgence all the longer and more difficult - the collapse of the eastern bloc.
An expression of the erosion produced by the economic crisis, this collapse led to a reflux in the consciousness of the proletariat, a reflux which has been amply exploited by the bourgeoisie which has been trying to make up the ground it lost in the preceding years.
By identifying Stalinism with communism, the bourgeoisie presents the collapse of Stalinism as the death of communism, aiming a simple but powerful message at the working class: "the workers' struggle has no perspective, because there is no viable alternative to capitalism. It's a system with many faults, but it is the only one possible".
The reflux provoked by this campaign has been much more profound than the ones which took place in the previous waves of struggles. This time it was not a question of a movement that finished badly, of union sabotage succeeding in blocking a movement of struggle. This time, what was in question was the very possibility of having any long term perspective for the struggle.
However, the crisis which had been the detonator of the historic revival of the class struggle is still with us, resulting in ever more violent attacks on the workers' living standards. This is why in 1992 the working class was compelled to return to the fight, with the movement of strikes against the Amato government in Italy, followed by other struggles in Belgium, Germany, France, etc. A revival of combativity in the class which has not yet overcome the reflux in consciousness. This is why this revival has not yet gone back to the level it had reached at the end of the 80s.
Since then the bourgeoisie has not stood around with its arms folded. It has not allowed the proletariat to get on with its struggles and regain confidence through them. With even more strength and capacity to manoeuvre, the bourgeoisie organised the public sector strike in the autumn of 1995 in France: through a massive international press campaign, this strike was used to prove that the unions can organise the struggle and defend the interests of the proletariat. Similar manoeuvres took place in Belgium and Germany, resulting in a boosting of union credibility on an international scale, providing them with a renewed capacity to sabotage workers' militancy.
But the bourgeoisie does not only manoeuvre on this terrain. It has launched a series of campaigns aimed at keeping the workers stuck behind the defence of democracy (and thus of the bourgeois state): the "dirty hands" campaign in Italy, the Dutroux affair in Belgium, anti-racism in France - all these events had a lot of media publicity in order to convince the workers of the whole world that their problem was not the vulgar defence of their economic interests, that they should pull in their belts within their respective national states and rally to the defence of democracy, justice and other inanities.
But during these last two years, the bourgeoisie has also been trying to destroy the historic memory of the working class, discrediting the history of the working class and the organisations which refer to it. The communist left itself has been under attack, presented as the main inspiration for "negationism".
The bourgeoisie has equally been trying to distort the real meaning of the October revolution, which it presents as a Bolshevik coup, thus seeking to wipe out the memory of the great revolutionary wave of the 1920s in which the working class, though defeated, showed that it is capable of attacking capitalism as a mode of production and not only of defending itself against exploitation. In two enormous books originally written in France and Britain, but already translated into other languages, they are carrying on with the mystification that communism equals Stalinism, and is in fact responsible for all of Stalinism's crimes (see International Review 92).
But the future still belongs to the proletariat
If the bourgeoisie is so preoccupied with undermining the struggle of the working class, with distorting its history, with discrediting the organisations which defend the proletariat's revolutionary perspective, it is because it knows that the proletariat is not defeated; that, despite all its current difficulties, the road is still open to massive confrontations in which the working class will once again put the power of the bourgeoisie into question. And the bourgeoisie also knows that the aggravation of the crisis and the sacrifices it imposes on the workers will more and more force them to embark upon the struggle. It is through this struggle that the workers will rediscover confidence in themselves, that they will learn the real nature of the unions and find their own autonomous forms of organisation.
A new phase is opening up in which the working class will rediscover the road that was opened up 30 years ago by the great general strike of the French May.
Helios
In the previous article in this series, dealing with the Kapp Putsch in 1920, we underlined that having been through the defeats of 1919, the German working class returned to the offensive. But at the international level, the revolutionary wave was about to go into decline.
The ending of the war had already, in a number of countries, cooled revolutionary ardour, and above all had allowed the bourgeoisie to exploit the division between the workers of the "victorious" countries and those of the "defeated" countries. Furthermore, the forces of capital were succeeding in isolating more and more the revolutionary movement in Russia. The victories of the Red Army over the Whites - who had been strongly supported by the western democracies - did not prevent the ruling class from pursuing its offensive on an international scale.
In Russia itself the isolation of the revolution and the growing integration of the Bolshevik party into the state were making their effects felt. In March 1921 came the revolt of the workers and sailors of Kronstadt.
Against this background, the German proletariat was exhibiting a much stronger combativity than in other countries. Everywhere revolutionaries were facing the question: how to react to the offensive of the bourgeoisie when the world revolutionary wave is entering into reflux?
Within the Communist International (Cl), a political turnaround was taking place. The 21 Conditions for admission adopted by the Second Congress of the CI in the summer of 1920 expressed this clearly. In particular they imposed work within the trade unions and participation in parliamentary elections. The CI was thus returning to the old methods used during the ascendant period of capitalism, with the hope of reaching wider layers of the working class.
This opportunist turn was manifested in Germany particularly through the "Open Letter" addressed to the KPD in January 1921 to the trade unions and the SPD as well as to the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD, the KAPD and the USPD proposing "that all the socialist parties and trade union organisations should wage common actions to impose the most urgent economic demands of the working class". This appeal, which was addressed most particularly to the unions and the SPD, was to give rise to the "united front in the factories": "The VKPD wants to set aside the memory of the bloody responsibility of the majority of Social Democratic leaders. It wants to set aside the memory of the services rendered by the union bureaucracy to the capitalists during the war and in the course of the revolution." (Die Rote Fahne, 8 January 1921). Through this kind of opportunist flattery, e Communist Party was trying to draw the parties of Social Democracy to its side.
Simultaneously it theorised, for the first time, the necessity for a proletarian offensive: "If the parties and the unions to whom we are addressing ourselves refuse to initiate the struggle, the Unified Communist Party of Germany will then be forced to wage it alone, and it is convinced that the masses will follow" (ibid).
The unification between the KPD and the USPD, in December 1920, gave rise to the VKPD and had brought back the conception of the mass party. This was reinforced by the fact that the party now had 500,000 members. The VKPD also allowed itself to be blinded by the percentage of votes it won in the elections to the Prussian Landtag in February 1921 (almost 30%)[1].
Thus the party increasingly thought that it could "heat up" the situation in Germany. Many of its members dreamed that another right-wing putsch, like the one that had happened the year before, would provoke a workers' uprising with the perspective of taking power. Such ideas were to a large extent due to the increased influence of the petty bourgeoisie in the party since the Unification between the KPD and the USPD. The USPD, like any centrist current within the workers' movement, was strongly influenced by the conceptions and behaviour of the petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, the numerical growth of the party tended to accentuate the weight of opportunism as well as petty bourgeois impatience and immediatism.
It was in this context of a retreat in the international revolutionary wave, and of deep confusions in the revolutionary movement in Germany, that the bourgeoisie launched a new offensive against the proletariat in March 1921. The main target of this attack was the workers of central Germany. During the war a huge proletarian concentration had been formed in this area around the Leuna factories in Bitterfeld and in the Mansfeld basin. The majority of the workers there were relatively young and militant but had no great experience of organisation. The VKPD alone had 66,000 members there, the KAPD 3,200. In the Leuna factories 2,000 out of the 20,000 workers were members of the Workers' Unions.
Seeing that, following the confrontations of 1919 and the Kapp Putsch, many workers were still armed, the bourgeoisie badly wanted to pacify the region.
The bourgeoisie tries to provoke the workers
On 19 March 1919 a powerful military police force arrived in Mansfeld with the aim of disarming the workers.
This order did not come from the extreme right wing of the ruling class (the right parties and their forces within the army) but from the democratically elected government. Once again it was democracy which played the role of executioner to the working class, using any means necessary.
For the bourgeoisie, the aim was to disarm and defeat a relatively young and militant fraction of the German proletariat in order to weaken and demoralise the working class as a whole. More particularly, the ruling class wanted to strike a crucial blow at the proletariat's vanguard, its revolutionary organisations. By forcing the workers into a decisive but premature struggle in central Germany, the state would have the opportunity to isolate the communists from the rest of the working class. It wanted to discredit them first in order to then subject them to repression. In particular, it aimed to prevent the newly formed VKPD from consolidating itself and to prevent the growing rapprochement between the VKPD and the KAPD. In doing so, German capital was acting in the name of the world bourgeoisie in order to increase the isolation of the Russian revolution and weaken the CI.
At the same moment the International was impatiently waiting for the movements of struggle that would support the Russian revolution from outside. In a way it was waiting for the bourgeoisie to launch an offensive so that the working class, placed in a difficult situation, would react in strength. A number of violent minority actions -like the KAPD's blowing up of the Victory Column in Berlin on 13 March - had the explicit aim of provoking workers' combativity.
Paul Levi made this report of the intervention of the Moscow envoy, Rakosi, at a meeting of the VKPD Centrale: "The comrade explained that Russia was in an extraordinarily difficult situation. It was absolutely necessary for Russia to be relieved by movements in the west, and on this basis, the German party had to push for immediate action. The VKPD now had 500,000 members and it could count on of allowing of 1,500,000 workers, which was enough to overthrow the government. It was thus necessary to immediately engage in the battle with the slogan of overthrowing the government" (Levi, Letter to Lenin, 27 March 1921 ).
"On 17 March the KPD Central Committee held a meeting in which the directives of the comrade sent by Moscow were adopted as orientation theses. On 18 March Die Rote Fahne took up a new resolution and called for armed struggle without first saying what its objectives were, and it maintained the same tone for several days" (ibid)
The long awaited government offensive took place the next day with the entry of police troops into central Germany.
Can you force the revolution?
The police forces sent to central Germany on March 19 by the Social Democratic minister Horsing had been ordered to search houses in order to ensure that the workers were disarmed. The experience of the Kapp Putsch had dissuaded the government from using Reichswehr troops.
The same night a general strike for the region was decided, to begin on 21 March. On 23 March the first clashes took place between the Reich security police (SiPo) and the workers. The same day the workers of the Leuna factory in Merseburg proclaimed a general strike. On 24 March the KAPD and the VKPD launched a joint appeal for a general strike throughout Germany. In response to this there were sporadic demonstrations and exchanges of fire between strikers and police in several towns. In the whole country, about 300,000 workers came out on strike.
On the initiative of the KAPD and the VKPD there were dynamitings in Dresden, Freiberg, Leipzig, Plauen and elsewhere. The newspapers Hallische Zeitung and Saale Zeitung, which were being particularly provocative against the workers, were reduced to silence by explosives.
Although the repression in central Germany had pushed workers into spontaneous armed resistance, they were not able to fight the government forces in a coordinated way. The combat organisations set up by the VKPD and led by H Eberlein were militarily and organisationally ill-prepared. Max Holz, who led a workers' combat troop of 2,500 men, managed to get to within a few kilometers of the Leuna factory besieged by the government troops and tried to reorganise the workers' forces. But his troops were wiped out on 1 April, two days after the taking of the Leuna factories. Although there was little fighting spirit in other cities, the VKPD and the KAPD called for an immediate armed response against the police forces:
"The working class is called upon to enter into active struggle for the following objectives:
1. the overthrow of the government;
2. the disarming of the counter-revolution and the arming of the workers"
(Appeal dated 17 March 1921).
In another appeal on 24 March the VKPD wrote: "Remember that last year you defeated in five days the white guards and the scum of Baltikum's Freikorps thanks to the general strike and the armed uprising. Fight with us, like last year, to beat the counter-revolution! Begin the general strike everywhere! Break the violence of the counter-revolution with your own violence! Disarming of the counter-revolution, formation and arming of local militia on the basis of cells of workers, employees and functionaries!
Immediate formation of local proletarian militia! Take power in the factories! Organise production through factory councils and trade unions! Create work for the unemployed!"
However, locally the combat organisations of the VKPD as well as the workers who had armed themselves spontaneously were not only poorly prepared, but the local organs of the party were not in contact with the Centrale. The different combat groups, the best known of which were those under Max Holz and Karl Plattner, fought in different places in the zone of the uprising, isolated from each other. Nowhere were there any workers' councils to coordinate their actions. On the other hand, the government's troops were in close contact with the headquarters which directed them.
After the fall of the Leuna factories, the VKPD withdrew on 31 March its call for a general strike. On 1 April, the last armed workers' groups in central Germany dissolved themselves.
Bourgeois order reigned once more! Once again repression was unleashed. Once again workers were subjected to police brutality. Hundreds were shot, more than 6,000 arrested.
The hopes of the great majority of the VKPD and the KAPD - that provocative action by the apparatus of state repression would produce a dynamic response from the workers - crashed to the ground. The workers of central Germany had remained isolated.
The VKPD and the KAPD had quite clearly pushed for the battle without taking the whole of the situation into account. They thus found themselves completely isolated from the hesitant workers who were not ready to go into action, and they created divisions within the working class by adopting the slogan "Whoever is not with me is against me" (Die Rote Fahne, editorial of 20 March).
Instead of recognising that the situation was not favourable, Die Rote Fahne wrote:
"It's not only on the head of your leaders but on the head of each of you that bloody responsibility lies, when you tolerate in silence or protest without acting against the terror and the white justice unleashed on the workers by Ebert, Severing, Horsing and Co ... Shame and ignominy to the worker who is still not at his post".
In order to artificially provoke combativity, there were attempts to use the unemployed as a spearhead: "The unemployed were sent forward like assault troops. They occupied the gates of factories. They forced their way into the factories, lit fires here and there and tried to force the workers outside with cudgels ... it was a terrible spectacle to see the unemployed themselves getting chased out of the factories, weeping under the blows they received, and then fleeing from those who had sent them there" (Levi, ibid).
The fact that the VKPD, from before the beginning of the struggle, had had a false appreciation of the balance of forces, that afterwards it was incapable of revising its analyses, all this was tragic enough, but it did even worse by launching the slogan "Life or Death" according to the false principle that communists never retreat:
"In no case can a communist, even if he is in a minority, return to work! The communists have left the factories. In groups of 200, 300 men, sometimes more, sometimes less, they left the factories: the factory continued to operate. They are now unemployed, since the bosses seized the opportunity to purge the factories of communists at a time when a large part of the workers were on their side" (Levi, ibid).
What was the balance sheet of the March Action?
Although this struggle was forced on the working class by the bourgeoisie, and it was impossible to avoid it, the VKPD "committed a series of errors, the main one being that instead of clearly bringing out the defensive character of this struggle, through its call for an offensive it provided the most unscrupulous enemies of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie, the Social Democratic Party, the Independents, a pretext for denouncing the Unified Party as a maker of putsches. This error was further exacerbated by a certain number of party comrades who represented the offensive as the essential method of struggle for the Unified Party in the current situation" (Theses on Tactics, Third Congress of the CI, June 1921).
For communists to intervene to reinforce the workers' combativity is an elementary duty. But they don't do this at any price.
"The communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement" (Marx-Engels, The Communist Manifesto of 1848). This is why communists have to be characterised vis-a-vis the working class by their capacity to analyse correctly the balance of forces between the classes. To push a weak or insufficiently prepared class into decisive struggles, to lead it into the traps laid by the bourgeoisie, is the height of irresponsibility, for revolutionaries. Their first responsibility is to develop their capacity for analysing the level of consciousness and combativity within the class as well as the strategy being used by the ruling class. This is the only way that revolutionary organisations can really take up their leading role in the class.
Immediately after the March Action, violent debates developed within the VKPD and the KAPD.
False organisational conceptions: an obstacle to the party's ability to make a self-critique
In an orientation article on 4-6 April 1921, Die Rote Fahne affirmed that "the VKPD has inaugurated a revolutionary offensive" and that the March Action constituted "the beginning, the first episode of decisive struggles for power".
On 7 and 8 April its Central Committee met and instead of making a critical analysis of the intervention, Heinrich Brandler sought above all to justify the party's policy. For him the main weakness resided in a lack of discipline among the local militants of the VKPD and in the failures of military organisation. He declared that "we have not suffered any defeat. It was an offensive".
In response to this analysis, Paul Levi made the most virulent criticism of the party's attitude during the March Action.
Having resigned from the Central Committee in February 1921 along with Clara Zetkin, for, among others, divergences over the foundation of the Communist Party of Italy, Levi once again showed himself unable to take the organisation forward through criticism. The most tragic thing about this was that "Levi is basically right on many points in criticising the March Action in Germany" (Lenin, Letter to German Communists, 14 August 1921, Collected Works, Vol. 32). But instead of making his critique in the framework of the organisation, on 3 and 4 April he wrote a pamphlet which he published on the outside on 12 April without first submitting it for discussion within the party[2].
In this pamphlet, Levi not only spat at organisational discipline, he exposed all kinds of details about the internal life of the party. He thus broke a proletarian principle and put the organisation in danger by publicly revealing its mode of functioning. He was excluded from the party on 12 April for behaviour threatening the security of the organisation.[3]
As we showed in our previous article on the Heidelberg Congress of October 1919, Levi tended to see any criticism as an attack on the organisation, but also as an attack on his own person. He thus sabotaged any possibility of collective functioning. His point of view clearly expressed this: "Either the March Action was valid, which means that I should be excluded from the party. Or the March Action was an error and my pamphlet was justified" (Levi, letter to the VKPD Centrale). This attitude was harmful to the organisation and was repeatedly criticised by Lenin. After Levi's resignation from the VKPD Centrale in February, he wrote "And the resignation from the Central Committee? That is quite simply the greatest of errors. If we tolerate a state of affairs where members of the Central Committee resign as soon as they find themselves in a minority, the development and purification of the Communist Parties will never follow a normal course. Instead of resigning, it would have been better to have had a number of discussions about the litigious questions with the Executive Committee ... It is indispensable to do everything possible, and even the impossible - but, at all costs, to avoid resignations and not to exaggerate divergences" (Lenin, Letter to Clara Zetkin and Paul Levi, 16 April 1921, CW, Vol. 45).
The partly exaggerated charges which Levi made against the VKPD (which was virtually seen as the only one at fault, thus ignoring the responsibility of the bourgeoisie in provoking the March struggles) were based on a rather distorted view of reality.
After being expelled from the party, Levi edited for a short period the review The Soviet which became the mouthpiece of those who opposed the direction taken by the VKPD.
Levi tried to expound his criticisms of the VKPD's tactics in front of the Central Committee but it refused to let him into its meetings. Clara Zetkin did it in his place. He argued that "communists are not able to undertake actions in place of the proletariat, without the proletariat, and, in the final analysis, even against the proletariat" (Levi, ibid).
Clara Zetkin then proposed a counter-resolution to the position taken up by the party. The session of the Central Committee, in its majority, rejected the criticisms and underlined that "to avoid this action ... was impossible for a revolutionary party and would have meant a pure and simple renunciation of its calling to lead the revolution". The VKPD "must, if it is to fulfil its historic mission, hold firmly to the line of the revolutionary offensive which was at the basis of the March Action and march with determination and confidence in this direction" ('Leitsatze uber die Marzaktion', Die Internationale 4, April 1921).
The Centrale persisted with the tactic of the offensive and rejected all the criticisms, In a proclamation of6 April 1921, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) approved the party's attitude and declared: "The Communist International says to you: 'you acted well ' ... Prepare yourselves for new combats" (published in Die Rote Fahne, 14 April 1921).
It was at the Third Congress of the CI that the disagreements about the events in Germany began to be expressed. The group around Zetkin in the VKPD was strongly attacked in the first part of the discussion. But the interventions and the authority of Lenin and Trotsky led to a turnaround in the debates and cooled the hotheads.
Lenin, absorbed by the Kronstadt events and the affairs of state, had not had the time to follow the events in Germany or the debates about the balance sheet to be drawn. He had only just begun studying the situation more closely. On the one hand he very firmly rejected Levi's breach of discipline; on the other, he announced that the March Action, because of "its international importance and significance, must be submitted to the Third Congress of the Communist International". Lenin's concern was that discussion in the party should be as broad and unhindered as possible.
W Koenen, the VKPD's representative in the ECCI, was sent to Germany to ensure that the Central Committee of the German party would not take a definitive decision against the opposition. In the party press, it became possible for criticisms of the March Action to appear. Discussions on tactics opened up.
However, the majority of the Central Committee continued to defend the position adopted in March. Arkady Maslow called for a new approval of the March Action. Guralski, an envoy the ECCI, even declared that "we are not concerned with the past. The coming political struggles of the party are the best response to the attacks of the Levi tendency". At the Central Committee meeting of 3-5 May, Thalheimer intervened to call for unity in action by the workers. F Heckert pleaded for strengthening work in the trade unions.
On 13 May Die Rote Fahne published theses which developed the objective of artificially accelerating the revolutionary process. The March Action was cited as an example. The communists "must, in particularly grave situations where the essential interests of the proletariat are threatened, take a step ahead of the masses and seek by their initiative to draw them into the struggle, even at the risk of not being followed by a part of the working class". W Pieck, who in January 1919 had, against the decisions of the party, thrown himself along with Karl Liebknecht into the Berlin uprising, thought that confrontations within the working class "would take place more and more frequently. Communists must turn against the workers when they don't follow our appeals".
The reaction of the KAPD
While the VKPD and the KAPD had taken a step forward by carrying out joint actions, unfortunately these took place in unfavourable circumstances. The common denominator of the approach of the VKPD and the KAPD in the March Action was the desire to come to the aid of the working class in Russia. At this time the KAPD was still defending the revolution in Russia. The councilists who were to emerge from it took up an opposing position.
However the KAPD's intervention was beset by internal wrangling. On the one hand the leadership launched a joint appeal for a general strike with the VKPD and sent two representatives of the Centrale to central Germany, F Jung and F Rasch, to support the coordination of combat actions; on the other hand the local leaders of the KAPD, Utzelmann and Prenzlow, on the basis of their knowledge of the situation in the industrial region of central Germany, considered that any attempt at an uprising was insane and did not want to go any further than a general strike. They also intervened towards the Leuna workers, calling them to stay in the factory and prepare for a defensive struggle. The KAPD leadership acted without consulting the local party organs.
As soon as the movement was over, the KAPD timidly began a critical analysis of its own intervention. This analysis was also contradictory. In a reply to Levi's pamphlet, it highlighted the fundamentally erroneous approach of the VKPD Centrale. Hermann Gorter wrote:
"The VKPD has, through parliamentary activity - which in the conditions of bankrupt capitalism has no other meaning than the mystification of the masses - diverted the proletariat from revolutionary action. It has gathered up hundreds of thousands of non-communists and become a 'mass party '. The VKPD has supported the trade unions by the tactic of creating cells within them ... When the German revolution, having become more and more powerless, began to retreat, when the best elements of the VKPD became more and more dissatisfied and began calling for action, suddenly the VKPD decided on an grand enterprise for the conquest of political power. This is what it consisted of before the provocation by Horsing and the SiPo, the VKPD decided on an artificial action from above, without the spontaneous impulse of the broad masses; in other words it adopted the tactics of the putsch.
The Executive Committee and its representatives in Germany had for a long time been insisting that the party should strike out and show that it was a true revolutionary party. As if the essential aspect of a revolutionary tactic consisted simply of striking with all one's forces! On the contrary, when instead of affirming the revolutionary strength of the proletariat, a party undermines this same strength and weakens the proletariat by supporting parliament and the trade unions, and then after such preparations suddenly resolves to hit out by launching a great offensive action in favour of the same proletariat it has just been weakening, this can be nothing other than a putsch. That is to say, action decreed from above, having no source in the masses themselves, and thus doomed to failure from the start. And this attempt at a putsch has nothing revolutionary about it: it is opportunist in exactly the same way as parliamentarism or the tactic of union cells. Yes, this tactic is the inevitable other side of the coin of parliamentarism and the tactic of union cells, of collecting up non-communist elements, of the policy of leaders substituting for the policy of the masses, or, more precisely, the policy of the class. This weak and intrinsically corrupt tactic must inevitably lead to putsches" (Gorter, 'Lessons of the March Action', Afterword to the Open Letter to Comrade Lenin, Der Proletarier, May 1921).
This text by the KAPD puts its finger on the contradiction between the tactic of the United Front, which reinforced workers' illusions in the unions and social democracy, and the simultaneous and sudden call for an assault on the state. But at the same time, we find contradictions in the KAPD's own analysis: while on the one hand it talks about a defensive action by the workers, on the other it characterises the March Action as "the first conscious offensive by the revolutionary German proletarians against bourgeois state power" (F Kool, Die Linke gegen die Parteiherrschaft). In this respect, the KAPD even noted that "large masses of workers remained neutral, if not hostile, towards the combative vanguard". At the extraordinary congress of the KAPD in September 1921, the lessons of the March Action were not examined any further.
It was against this background of virulent debates within the VKPD and contradictory analyses by the KAPD, that the Communist International held its Third Congress, at the end of June 1921.
The International's attitude towards the March Action
Within the International, different tendencies had begun to form. The ECCI did not have a unified position on the events in Germany and did not speak with one voice. For a long time the ECCI had been divided on the analysis of the situation in Germany. Radek had developed many criticisms of the positions and behaviour of Levi and other members of the Centrale had seized upon them. However, these criticisms were not publicly and openly expressed within the VKPD at congresses or elsewhere.
Instead of publicly debating the analysis of the situation, Radek did a lot of damage to the functioning of the party. Often criticisms were not expressed openly and fraternally, but in a covert manner. Often debates were not centred round political errors but around the individuals responsible for them. The tendency towards the personalisation of political positions developed. Instead of building unity around a position and a method, instead of struggling as a body that functions collectively, the organisational tissue was destroyed in a completely irresponsible manner.
More generally the communists in Germany were themselves profoundly divided. On the one hand, at this moment, the two parties, the VKPD and the KAPD, which was also part of the CI, began to clash violently on the orientation to be followed.
Vis-a-vis the CI, before the March Action, parts of the VKPD had kept quiet about certain information about the situation; at the same time, divergences of analysis were not brought to the knowledge of the CI in all their breadth.
Within the CI itself, there was no real common reaction or unified approach to this situation. The Kronstadt uprising completely monopolised the attention of the Bolshevik party leadership, preventing it from following the situation in Germany in more detail. The way in which decisions were made in the ECCI was often not very clear and it was the same with the mandates given to the delegations. Certainly the mandates given to Radek and other ECCI delegates to Germany do not seem to have been decided with much clarity[4].
Thus, in this situation of growing divisions, notably within the VKPD, the ECCI members - in particular Radek - officiously entered into contact with tendencies within the two parties, unbeknownst to the central organs of the two organisations, with the aim of preparing for putschist actions. Instead of pushing the organisations towards unity, mobilisation and clarification, divisions were exacerbated and the tendency to take decisions outside the responsible organs was accelerated. This attitude, taken in the name of the ECCI, fuelled within the VKPD and the KAPD behaviour that could only damage the organisation.
Levi criticised this approach: "More and more frequently the envoys of the ECCI are overstepping their powers, and it is being shown later that these envoys have not been given such far-reaching powers" (Levi, Unser Weg, wider den Putschismus, 3 April 1921).
The structures of functioning and decision-making, as defined in the statutes both of the VKPD and the KAPD, were being bypassed. At the time of the March Action, in both parties, the appeal for the general strike was made without the whole organisation being involved in the reflection and decision. In reality it was the comrades of the ECCI who made contact with elements or certain tendencies within each organisation and who pushed for taking action. In this way the party as such was being bypassed.
Thus it was impossible to arrive at a unified approach by each party, still less at real joint action between the two parties.
To a large extent activism and putschism gained the upper hand in both organisations, accompanied by individual behaviour that was very destructive for the party and for the class as a whole. Each tendency began to carry out its own policies and to create its own informal, parallel channels. The concern for party unity, for a functioning in conformity with the statutes, was to a considerable extent lost.
Although the CI was weakened by the growing identification between the Bolshevik: party and the interests of the Russian state, and by the opportunist turn towards the tactic of the United Front, the Third Congress of the International still contained a collective and proletarian critique of the March Action.
For the Congress, the ECCI, with a correct political concern under Lenin's impulsion, ensured that there was a delegation representing the opposition within the VKPD. While the delegation from the VKPD Centrale was still trying to muzzle any criticism of the March Action, the Political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, on Lenin's proposition, decided that "as a basis to this resolution it is necessary to examine in precise detail, to bring to light the concrete errors committed by the VKPD during the March Action and to even more energetically be on guard against repeating them".
What attitude to adopt?
In the introductory report to the discussion on 'The world economic crisis and the new tasks of the Communist International', Trotsky underlined that "Today, for the first time, we don't see and feel ourselves so immediately close to our goal, the conquest of power. In 1919, we said: 'It's a question of months'. Today we are saying: 'It's perhaps a question of years '". The combat may last a long time, it will not progress so feverishly as we would have liked, it will be excessively difficult and will demand numerous sacrifices".
Lenin: "This is why the Congress must make a clean sweep of leftist illusions that the development of the world revolution will continue at the same mad pace as it did in the beginning, that without any interruption it will be carried along by a second revolutionary wave and that victory depends solely on the will of the party and its action" (Zetkin, Memories of Lenin).
The VKPD Centrale, under the responsibility of Thalheimer and Bela Kun, sent to the Congress draft theses on tactics which called on the CI to embark upon a new phase of action. In a letter to Zinoviev of 10 June 1921, Lenin considered that "the theses of Thalheimer and Bela Kun are radically false on the political level" (Lenin, Letters, Vol. 7).
The Communist Parties had nowhere conquered the majority of the working class, not only at the level of organisation, but also at the level of communist principles. This is why the tactic of the CI was the following:
"We must ceaselessly and systematically struggle to win over the majority of the working class, first of all inside the old unions" (ibid).
In discussion with the delegate Heckert, Lenin thought that "the provocation was as clear as day. And instead of mobilising the working masses behind defensive aims in order to push back the attacks of the bourgeoisie and prove that you had the right to do this, you invented your 'theory of the offensive', an absurd theory which provides all the reactionaries and police authorities with the opportunity of presenting you as aggressors against whom the people had to be defended!" (Heckert, 'My encounter with Lenin', Lenin as he was, Vol. 2).
The VKPD delegation and the specially invited delegation from the opposition within the VKPD clashed at the Congress.
The Congress was aware of the danger to the unity of the party. This is why it pushed for a compromise between the leadership and the opposition. The following arrangement was obtained: "The Congress considers that any splintering of the forces within the Unified Communist Party of Germany, any formation of fractions, without even talking about splits, would constitute the greatest danger for the whole movement". At the same time the resolution adopted warned against any vengeful attitudes: "the Congress expects the leadership of the Unified Communist Party of Germany to have a tolerant attitude towards the old opposition, provided that it loyally applies the decisions taken by the Third Congress" (Resolution on the March Action and the Unified Communist Party of Germany, Third Congress of the CI).
During the debates at the Third Congress, the KAPD delegation hardly expressed any self-criticism about the March Action. It seemed to be concentrating its efforts on the questions of work in the trade unions and parliament.
Although the Third Congress managed to be very self-critical about the putschist dangers that appeared at the time of the March Action, to warn against them and to eradicate this "blind activism", it unfortunately embarked upon the tragic and pernicious path of the United Front. While it rejected putschism, the opportunist turn inaugurated by the adoption of the 21 Conditions was confirmed and accelerated. The grave errors identified by Gorter for the KAPD, i.e. the CI's return to work in the unions and parliament, were not corrected.
Encouraged by the results of the Third Congress, from the autumn of 1921 the VKPD involved itself in the policy of the United Front. At the same time, this Congress posed an ultimatum to the KAPD: either fuse with the VKPD or be excluded from the CI. In September 1921, the KAPD left the CI. Part of the KAPD rushed into the adventure of immediately founding the Communist Workers' International. A few months later it was rent by a split.
For the KPD (which again changed its name in August 1921), the door towards opportunism was wide open. As for the bourgeoisie, it had obtained its objectives: thanks to the March Action it had managed to continue its offensive and weaken the working class still further.
While the consequences of the putschist attitude were devastating for the working class as a whole, they were even more so for the communists. Once again they were the main victims of the repression. The hunt for communists was stepped up. A wave of resignations hit the KPD. Many militants were deeply demoralised after the failure of the uprising. At the beginning of 1921, the VKPD had between 350-400,000 members. By the end of August it had only 160,000. In November it had no more than 135-150,000.
Once again the working class had fought in Germany without a strong, consistent communist party.
DV
[1] At the elections to the Prussian parliament in February 1921, the VKPO won 1.1 million votes; the USPD 1.1 million; the SPD, 4.2 million. In Berlin, the VKPD and the USPD put together obtained more votes than the SPD.
[2] Clara Zetkin, who agreed with Levi's criticisms, exhorted him in several letters to avoid behaviour that would damage the organisation. Thus on 11 April she wrote to him: "You must withdraw the personal note from the preface. It seems to me politically beneficial for you not to make any personal judgement on the Centrale and its members, whom you declare to be fit for a lunatic asylum and whose revocation you demand, etc. It would be more reasonable to keep solely to the politics of the Centrale and leave aside the people who are only its mouthpieces". Only the personal excesses should be suppressed". Levi would not be convinced. His pride and his penchant for always wanting to be right, as well as his monolithic conception of organisation, were to have grim consequences.
[3] "Paul Levi did not inform the party leadership of his intention to publish a pamphlet nor did he bring to its knowledge the main elements of its content. He had his pamphlet printed on 3 April, at a time when the struggle was still going on in several parts of the Reich and when thousands of workers were being hauled before special tribunals. so that his writings could only excite them to pronounce the most bloody sentences. The Centrale fully recognises the right to criticise the party before and after the actions that it leads. Criticism on the terrain of the struggle and complete solidarity in the combat is a vital necessity for the party and a revolutionary duty. Paul Levi's attitude does not go towards the strengthening of the party but towards its dislocation and destruction" (VKPD Centrale, 16 April 1921).
[4] The ECCI delegation was composed of Bela Kun, Pogany and Guralski. Since the foundation of the KPD Radek had played the role of "liaison" between the KPO and the CI. Without always having a clear mandate, he above all practiced the politics of informal and parallel channels.
"The USA is faced with a world dominated by 'every man for himself', where its former vassals are trying to withdraw as much as possible from the tight grip of the world cop, which they had to put up with as long as the threat from the rival bloc existed. In this situation, the only decisive way the US can impose its authority is to resort to the area in which they have a crushing superiority over all other states: military force. But in doing so, the US is caught in a contradiction:
- on the one hand, if it gives up using or extending the use of its military superiority, this will only encourage the countries contesting its authority to contest even more;
- on the other hand, when it does use brute force, even, and especially when this momentarily obliges its opponents to rein in their ambitions towards independence, this only pushes the latter to seize on the least occasion to get their revenge and squirm away from America's grip" (Resolution on the international situation from the 12th ICC congress, International Review 90).
In trying to repeat the Gulf war of 1990-91, the American bourgeoisie found itself isolated. Except for Britain, none of the important world powers fully supported the US initiative[1]. In 1990, the invasion of Kuwait provided the perfect argument for forcing all these countries to support them in the war. In 1996, the US again succeeded in launching missiles against Iraq, despite the opposition of most of the other powers and of the main Arab countries. In 1998, the threats and preparations for massive bombardments appeared to be completely out of proportion to the Iraqi action of limiting the scope of the UN inspectors. The pretext was thus easy to reject. But in addition to this, Clinton's hands were tied and - in contrast to 1990 - this time he gave a considerable margin of manoeuvre both to Sad dam Hussein and to the rival imperialisms. Taking advantage of America's isolation, Hussein was able to accept the reimposition of the UN inspections at the time, and under the conditions, most convenient to him. Even before the signing of the agreement between the UN and Iraq, significant factions of the US bourgeoisie had begun to realise what a mistake Clinton had made. As the American press pointed out after the accord "President Clinton didn't really have any choice" (International Herald Tribune, 25.2.98).
Saddam Hussein didn't inflict this set-back on the US all by himself. Without the support and advise proffered to Hussein by Russia and France, without the approval of the anti-American policy of these two powers by most of the European countries and by China and Japan, the Iraqi population - which suffers daily not only from Saddam's terrible yoke, but also from the effects of the economic embargo which ensures that a child dies every six minutes (see Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1998) - would once again have been subjected to the terror of US and British bombs.
The official and media reactions were very revealing about this set-back for the Americans. Instead of hearing exalted proclamations about the "saving of the peace" and the "triumph of civilised values", we heard two types of speeches: triumphal and satisfied from Russia and France, disappointed and vengeful from the American bourgeoisie. France's self-satisfaction was expressed in diplomatic terms by the former Gaullist minister Peyrefite, who considered that France "had helped Clinton to avoid a terrible faux pas by leaving the diplomatic option open to him "(Le Figaro cited by International Herald Tribune, 25.2.98). To this the Americans responded with bitterness and threats: "while the accord was a success to the extent that the French drew benefits from it, the latter have a particular responsibility to ensure that it is strictly adhered to in the weeks ahead" (ibid).
So this time the Americans had to retreat and call off "Desert Storm II": "The negotiations with the general secretary of the UN. Kofi Annan, makes it impossible for Clinton to go ahead with the bombing. This is why the US didn't want Annan to go to Baghdad" (Daily Telegraph, 24.2.98). And this is why France and Russia pushed for and sponsored the general secretary's trip. A number of significant and highly symbolic facts testify to this: Kofi Annan's trips between New York and Paris in the French Concorde; between Paris and Baghdad in Chirac's presidential plane; and above all, both before and after going, the "preferential" interviews between the general secretary of the UN and the latter. The conditions under which this whole journey took place were a slap in the face for the US and a failure for the US bourgeoisie.
This situation can only aggravate imperialist tensions, because the US is not going to allow its authority to be flouted like this without reacting.
What has just happened is the latest demonstration of the tendency towards "every man for himself' which typifies the present historical phase of decadent capitalism - its phase of decomposition. Saddam Hussein's ability to set a trap for the Americans in contrast to 1990 and 1996, is due essentially to the growing difficulty of the US to maintain its authority and a certain discipline behind its imperialist policies. This applies both to the small local imperialisms - in this case the Arab countries (Saudi Arabia for example refused the use of its air bases to American troops), or Israel which is challenging the whole Pax Americana in the Middle East - and America's big imperialist rivals.
The American bourgeoisie can't let this affront go. At stake is its hegemony in all continents, particularly the Middle East. It is already preparing the "next crisis" in Iraq:
"Very few in Washington believe that the last chapter in this story has been written" (New York Times, quoted by International Herald Tribune, 25.2.98). The rivalries between the major imperialisms over Iraq will centre around the question of the UN inspections, of who will control them, and around whether the embargo against Iraq is to continue or not. On this latter point, Russia and France are being opposed fiercely by the US, which is maintaining its armada in the Persian Gulf - a real pistol pointing at the Iraqis' heads. It has also made it quite clear that it will not tolerate the Europeans, especially France and Germany, getting mixed up in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The American bourgeoisie is preparing the "next crisis" in Africa and ex-Yugoslavia as well. It has clearly announced that it is carrying on its offensive in Africa, aimed at undermining the presence of France and European influence in general. It has also announced that it will maintain its military presence in Macedonia at a time when military tensions are growing in neighbouring Kosovo. In this province, it is clear that the recent confrontations between the Albanian populations and the Serbian police forces have a significance which goes well beyond the limits of the region. Behind the Albanian nationalist cliques stands Albania of course, and to a certain extent other Muslim countries like Bosnia and also Turkey, which has been the traditional bridgehead for German imperialism in the Balkans. Behind the Serbian forces we find the Russian "big brother" and, more discretely, the traditional allies of Serbia, France and Britain; meanwhile America has addressed a solemn warning to Serbia. Thus, despite the Dayton agreements of 1995, there is no definitive peace in the Balkans. This region remains a powder keg, where the different imperialisms and notably the most powerful amongst them will not give up pressing forward their strategic interests as we saw them do between 1991 and 1995.
The US reverse over Iraq is therefore the harbinger of sharpening imperialist tensions in every part of the world, bringing in their wake more massacres, more terror for the populations of the planet.
Capitalism's historic impasse is the cause of the bloody conflicts multiplying everywhere today, and of the continuation and dramatic deepening of those which are already there. All the great tirades about peace and the virtues of democracy are just a way of reassuring the population, and above all, of hindering the international proletariat from becoming aware of the warlike reality of capitalism. This reality is that every imperialism is merely preparing itself for the future conflicts that are bound to arise.
RL, 14 March
[1] The fact that Kohl at the Munich "Security Conference" in early February announced that Germany would put its air bases at the disposal of the US (something which would have gone without saying a few years ago) should not be seen as a sign of real German support for the US. On the one hand, sending planes from Germany to bomb Iraq is far from the best strategy given the distance and the number of "neutral" countries they would have to fly over. Thus Germany's proposal was a highly platonic one. At the same time, the policy of German imperialism is to move its pawns without overtly defying the US. Having opposed the big boss at the conference by supporting the French position on the question of the European arms industry (towards which the Americans are hostile), German diplomacy then had to show some "good will" on a question which didn't bother them that much.
Several times during the winter, Europe's two largest countries have witnessed mobilisations around the question of unemployment. In France, street demonstrations and occupations of public buildings (especially the offices of the unemployment agencies, the ASSEDIC) took place over several months in the country's main towns and cities. In Germany on 5th February, unemployed organisations and trades unions called a series of demonstrations across the country. The mobilisation was less extensive than in France, but it was reported at length by the media. Should we see these demonstrations as expressions of workers' combativity? We will see later that this is not the case.
However, the question of unemployment is fundamental for the working class, since it is one of the most important attacks to which it is subjected by a capitalism in crisis. At the same time, the rise of permanent unemployment is one of the best proofs of the bankruptcy of the capitalist system. And it is precisely the importance of this question which lies behind the mobilisations that we have seen lately.
Before we go on to analyse the meaning of these demonstrations, we must understand the importance of unemployment for the world working class, and its future perspectives.
Unemployment today and its perspectives
Today, unemployment affects enormous sectors of the working class, in most countries of the world. In the Third World, the proportion of the population without a job often varies between 30% and 50%. Even in a country like China, which in recent years has been presented by the "experts" as one of the great champions in the race for growth, there will be 200 million unemployed in two years[1]. In the East European countries of the ex-Russian bloc, economic collapse has thrown millions of workers onto the streets, and although some countries like Poland have been able to limit the damage, thanks to fairly sustained growth and wretched wage levels, in most of them, and especially in Russia, huge masses of workers have been reduced to utter penury, forced to survive in sordid "little jobs" like selling plastic bags in the corridors of the Metro[2].
In the more developed countries, the situation is less tragic. Nonetheless, mass unemployment has become a running sore in the social fabric. For the European Union as a whole, the official figure for "job seekers" relative to the population of working age is around 11 %. In 1990, just as the Russian bloc disintegrated and the American President George Bush promised an "era of peace and prosperity", the figure was 8%.
The following figures give some idea of the extent of the scourge of unemployment today:
Country | 96 rate | 97 rate |
Germany | 9.3 | 11.6 |
France | 12.4 | 12.3 |
Italy | 11.9 | 12.3 |
Britain | 7.5 | 5.0 |
Spain | 21.6 | 20.5 |
Holland | 6.4 | 5.3 |
Belgium | 9.5 |
|
Sweden | 10.6 | 8.4 |
Canada | 9.7 | 9.2 |
USA | 5.3 | 4.6 |
Source: OECD, UN
The figures are in need of some commentary.
In the first place, these are official figures, calculated according to criteria which hide a considerable part of the problem. They do not take into account (amongst other things): young people who are still in education because they cannot find work;
-the unemployed who are forced to accept underpaid jobs or lose their benefits;
-those who are sent on "training" schemes supposed to introduce them to the labour market, but which in fact are useless;
-older workers who are forced to accept early retirement.
Similarly, these figures take no account of partial unemployment, in other words all those workers unable to find stable full-time work (for example, temporary workers whose numbers have grown uninterruptedly for the last 10 years).
All these facts are well-known to the "experts" of the OECD who are obliged to admit, in their review for specialists, that: "The classic rate of unemployment... does not measure the totality of underemployment"[3].
Secondly, we need to understand the meaning of the figures for the "top of the class": the USA and Britain. For many experts, these figures prove the superiority of the "Anglo-Saxon model" over other models of political economy. And so today they din into our ears the fact that unemployment in the US has reached its lowest point for 25 years. It is true that the American economy currently enjoys higher growth rates than those of other developed countries, and that it has created 11 million jobs during the last five years. However, it should be clear that most of these new jobs are "MacDonalds jobs", in other words all sorts of precarious and very badly paid jobs, which keep poverty at levels unknown since the 1930s, with hundreds of thousands of homeless and millions of poor, deprived of all social insurance.
All this is clearly admitted by someone who can hardly be suspected of denigrating the USA, since he was Secretary for Labour in Clinton's first administration, and is a long-standing personal friend of the President: "For 20 years, a large part of the American population has seen real wages stagnate or fall, as a result of inflation. For the majority of workers, the decline has continued despite the recovery. In 1996, the average real wage was lower than in 1989, before the previous recession. Between mid-1996 and mid-1997, it rose by just 0.3%, while the lowest incomes continued to decline. The proportion of Americans considered as poor, according to the official definition and statistics, is higher today than it was in 1989"[4].
of 16 and 55, the official rate of unemployment only includes 37% of the unemployed as being without a job; the 63% that remain are classed as being "outside the working population ", despite being of working age"[6].
Similarly, the official publication of the American Department of Labour explained:
"The official rate of unemployment is convenient and well-known; nonetheless, if we focus too much on this measure alone, we can get a distorted view of the economies of other countries compared to the United States ... Other indicators are necessary if we want to interpret intelligently the respective situations on the different labour markets"[7].
In reality, on the basis of studies like these - hardly the products of some terrible "subversives" - we can estimate that the rate of unemployment in the USA is much closer to 13% than to the 5% which is put forward as the proof of the "American miracle". How could it be otherwise, when (according to the criteria of the International Labour Bureau), only the following are considered as unemployed:
- those who have worked for less than an hour during the week in question;
- those who have actively sought employment during the week
- those who are immediately available for work.
Thus in the USA, most youngsters who have some kind of casual job, someone who had mowed their neighbours' lawns or looked after their children for a few dollars, would not be considered as unemployed. The same is true for the man who has given up looking for work after months or years of rejections from hypothetical employers, or the single mother who is not "immediately available" because of the lack of creches.
The British "success story" is still more deceitful than that of its trans-Atlantic cousin. The naive observer is confronted with a paradox: between 1990 and 1997, the level of employment fell by 4%, and yet during the same period the rate of unemployment fell from 10% to 5%. In fact, as one thoroughly "serious" international financial institution puts it: "the fall in British unemployment seems to be due entirely to the increase in the proportion of the inactive"[8].
And to understand the mystery of this transformation of the unemployed into the "inactive", we can read the words of a journalist on the Guardian, a British newspaper which is hardly classified as a revolutionary publication: "When Margaret Thatcher won her first election, in 1979, there were officially 1.3 million unemployed in Britain. If the method of calculation had remained the same, there would today be just over 3 million. A recently published report by the Midland Bank even estimated the number at 4 million, or 14% of the working population - more than in France or Germany.
(...) the British government does not count the unemployed, but only those entitled to an increasingly targeted unemployment benefit. Having changed the method of calculation 32 times, it decided to exclude hundreds of thousands of unemployed from the statistics thanks to the new roles on unemployment benefit, which ends the right to benefit after 6 months instead of 12.
The majority of the jobs created are part time, which for many is not a choice. According to the work inspectorate, 43% of jobs created between winter 1992-93 and autumn 1996 were part time. Almost a quarter of the 28 million workers taken on, were for jobs of this kind. In France and Germany, the proportion is only one in six"[9].
The large-scale trickery which has allowed the bourgeoisie of the two Anglo-Saxon "employment champions" to give themselves such airs encounters a silence of complicity amongst the numerous "specialist" economists and politicians, and especially among the mass media (the deception is revealed only in confidential publications). The reason is simple: the aim is to anchor the idea that the policies applied with particular brutality during the last decade in these countries - reduction in wages and social protection, development of "flexibility" - are effective in limiting the damage of mass unemployment. In other words, the aim is to convince the workers that sacrifice "payoff", and that they have every interest in accepting the dictates of capital.
And since the ruling class never puts all its eggs in one basket, and since it wants to sow confusion in the working class by consoling them with the idea that a "capitalism with a human face" exists, some of its ideologues are now referring to the "Dutch model"[10]. We need therefore to say a word about the "good student" of the European class: the Netherlands.
Here again, official unemployment figures are meaningless. As in Great Britain, a fall in unemployment goes hand in hand with ... a fall in employment. Thus the rate of employment (i.e. the proportion of the working population actually in work) fell from 60% in 1970 to 50.7% in 1994.
The mystery disappears when we consider that: "In 20 years, the number of part time jobs as a proportion of the total has risen from 15% to 36%. And the phenomenon is accelerating, since (...) nine tenths of the jobs created in the last ten years total between 12 and 36 hours per week"[11]. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the surplus labour force has disappeared from the unemployment statistics to reappear in the still higher ones for invalidity. This is noted by the OECD, when it writes that: "The estimates of the number of unemployed hidden in the invalidity statistics vary widely, from a little over 10% to nearly 50%"[12].
As the article cited above from Le Monde Diplomatique says, "Unless we imagine a genetic weakness that only affects the Dutch, how else are we to explain that this country has more people unable to work than unemployed?". Obviously this method, which allows the bosses to "modernise" on the cheap by getting rid of their older and "inflexible" personnel, was only possible thanks to one of the world's most "generous" systems of social security. But as this system is more and more radically called into question (as it is in all the advanced countries), it will be more and more difficult for the bourgeoisie to go on hiding unemployment in this way. Moreover, the new law requires that it is companies that pay the first five years of in validity benefit, which will singularly discourage them from declaring the employees they want to get rid of "unable to work". In fact, the myth of the Low Countries' "social paradise" has already taken a serious knock from a European study cited in The Guardian (28/04/97), which found that 16% of Dutch children live in poor families, compared to 12% in France. As for Britain, the "miracle" country, the figure is 32%!
There are thus no exceptions to the rise of mass unemployment in the developed countries. In these countries, the real rate of unemployment (which needs to take account in particular of all the unwanted part-time jobs, and those who have given up looking for work) ranges from 13% to 30% of the working population. These figures are getting closer and closer to those experienced during the great depression of the 1930s: 24% in the USA, 17.5% in Germany, and 15% in Britain. Apart from the case of the USA, we can see that other countries are not far from reaching these sinister "records". In some, the rate of unemployment has even overtaken that of the 1930s. This is true in particular for Spain, Sweden (8% in 1933), Italy (7% in 1933), and France (5% in 1933), although this figure is probably an under-estimate[13].
Finally, we should not be deceived by the slight fall in unemployment rates for 1997, which appear in the table above. As we have seen, the official figures are highly misleading, and above all this small drop is due to the "recovery" in world production in recent years. It will soon be reversed as soon as the world economy again faces an open recession, as we have seen in 1974, 1978, at the beginning of the 1980s and the 1990s. The recession is inevitable, since the capitalist mode of production is absolutely incapable of overcoming the cause of all the convulsions it has undergone for the last 30 years: generalised over-production, a historic inability to find adequate markets to absorb its output[14].
Moreover, Bob Reich, Clinton's friend who we have already met above, is quite clear on the subject: "Expansion is a temporary phenomenon. For the moment, the USA benefits from a very high growth rate, which is pulling a large part of Europe with it. But the disturbances in Asia, with the increasing debt of us consumers, lead us to think that the vitality of this phase of the cycle cannot last much longer".
This "specialist", without of course daring to take his reasoning to its logical conclusion, has indeed put his finger on the fundamental elements in the world economy's present situation:
- capitalism has only been able to continue its "expansion" during the last 30 years, at the cost of an ever more astronomical debt on the part of every possible purchaser (especially households and companies; the under-developed countries in the 1970s; states, and especially the United States, during the 1980s;
the "emerging" Asian countries at the beginning of the 1990s ... );
- the bankruptcy of the latter, which became known at the beginning of the summer 1997, has a significance that extends well beyond their frontiers; it expresses the bankruptcy of the entire system, and will make it still worse.
Mass unemployment, which is the direct result of capitalism's inability to overcome the contradictions imposed on it by its own laws, is not going to disappear, nor even decline. It can only get inexorably worse, whatever tricks the ruling class tries to hide it with. It will continue to hurl growing masses of proletarians into the most intolerable poverty.
The working class faced with the question of unemployment
Unemployment is a scourge for the whole of the working class. It affects not just those without a job, but all workers. On the one hand, it is a serious blow to the increasing numbers of families with one or even several unemployed members. On the other, its effects are distributed through taxes on wages to pay for unemployment benefit. Finally, the capitalists use unemployment to blackmail workers over their wages and working conditions. In fact, during the decades since the open crisis put an end to capitalism's illusory "prosperity" of the thirty years of reconstruction, it is largely through employment that the ruling class has attacked the living conditions of the exploited. Ever since the strikes that shook Europe and the world in the wake of 1968, it has known that open wage reductions could only provoke extremely massive and violent reactions from the proletariat. Its attacks have thus been concentrated on reducing the indirect wage paid by the Welfare State and reducing social services, all in the name of "solidarity with the unemployed"; and at the same time, has reduced the cost of wages by throwing millions of workers on the street.
But unemployment is not just the spearhead of the attacks that a capitalism in crisis is forced to make on those it exploits. Once it has become massive and lasting, and has irrevocably thrown immense proportions of the working class out of wage labour, it becomes the most obvious sign of the definitive bankruptcy of a mode of production whose historic task was precisely to transform a growing proportion of the world's population into wage workers. In this sense, although for tens of millions of workers unemployment is a real tragedy, combining economic and moral distress, it can become a powerful factor in developing the class' consciousness of the need to overthrow capitalism. Similarly, while unemployment prevents workers from using the strike as a means of struggle, it does not necessarily condemn them to impotence. The proletariat's class struggle against the attacks of crisis-ridden capital is the essential means whereby it can regroup its forces and develop its consciousness with a view to overthrowing the system. The street demonstration, where workers come together despite their division into different companies and industrial branches, are an important means of struggle, which has been widely used in revolutionary periods. This is one place where unemployed workers can play a full part. As long as they are able to regroup outside the control of bourgeois organs, the unemployed can mobilise in the street to prevent evictions or the cutting off of electricity, they can occupy town halls and public buildings in order to demand the payment of emergency benefits, As we have often said, "when they lose the factory, the unemployed gain the street", and they can therefore more readily overcome the divisions into branches that the bourgeoisie maintains within the working class, notably through the trades unions. This is not abstract conjecture, but comes from the real experience of working class, especially during the 1930s in the USA, where many unemployed committees were set up outside the control of the unions.
This being said, despite the appearance of mass unemployment during the 1980s, nowhere have we seen the formation of significant unemployed workers' committees (apart from a few embryonic attempts, quickly stripped of their content by the leftists and long since defunct), still less mass mobilisations of unemployed workers. And yet, important workers' struggles developed during these years, where the workers proved more and more able to disengage themselves from the unions' grip. Several reasons explain why, unlike the 1930s, we have not yet seen a real mobilisation of unemployed workers.
For one thing, the rise in unemployment since the 1970s has been much more gradual than it was during the Great Depression. Then, the beginning of the crisis was like a rout, and witnessed an unparalleled explosion in unemployment (in the US, for example, unemployment rose from 3% in 1929 to 24% in 1932). In today's acute crisis, although we have seen periods of rapidly increasing unemployment (especially in the mid-1980s and in recent years), the bourgeoisie's ability to slow down the rhythm of economic collapse has allowed it to spread out the attacks against the proletariat, especially in the form of unemployment. Moreover, in the advanced countries the bourgeoisie has learned to confront the problem of unemployment much more adroitly than in the past. For example, by replacing abrupt redundancies with "social plans" (sending workers for a time of "retraining" before they find themselves out in the street, or giving them temporary pay-offs which help them to survive at first), the ruling class has largely succeeded in defusing the unemployment bomb. In most of today's industrialised countries, a laid-off worker often has 6 months before finding himself completely without any resources. Once he has already found himself isolated and atomised, it is much more difficult for him to regroup with his class brothers to act collectively. Finally, the fact that even massive sectors of the unemployed working class have proven unable to regroup, springs from the general context of capitalism's social decomposition, which encourages despair and an attitude of "looking after number one":
That said, the ICC has never considered that the unemployed could never join the struggle of their class. In fact, as we wrote in 1993:
"The massive workers' combats will constitute a powerful antidote against the noxious effects of decomposition, allowing the progressive surmounting, through the class solidarity that these combats imply, of atomisation, of "every man for himself", and all the divisions which weigh on the proletariat: between categories, branches of industry, between immigrants and indigenous workers, between the unemployed and workers with jobs. In particular, although the weight of decomposition has prevented the unemployed from entering the struggle (except in a punctual way) during the past decade, and contrary to the 30s, and while they will not be able to playa vanguard role comparable to that of the soldiers in Russia in 1917 as we had envisaged, the massive development of proletarian struggles will make it possible for them, notably in demonstrations on the street, to rejoin the general combat of their class, all the more so in that the numbers of unemployed who already have an experience of associated labour and of struggle at the workplace, can only grow. More generally, if unemployment is not a specific problem of those without work but rather a real question affecting and concerning all of the working class, notably as a clear and tragic expression of the historic weakness of capitalism, it is this same combat to come that will allow the proletariat to become fully conscious of if"[16].
It is precisely because the bourgeoisie has understood this threat that today it is promoting the mobilisation of the unemployed.
The real meaning of the "unemployed movements"
To understand the events of the last few months, we need first to highlight a crucial element: these "movements" were in no way an expression of a real mobilisation of the proletariat on its class terrain. We need only consider how the bourgeois media have given these mobilisations maximum coverage, even puffing up their size on some occasions. This held true, not just in the countries where they took place, but internationally. Since the beginning of the 1980s, experience - especially at the beginning of the struggles in autumn 1983, with the public sector strikes in Belgium - has shown that whenever the working class takes to the struggle on its own terrain, and really threatens the interests of the bourgeoisie, then a media blackout is applied. When we see the TV news devoting a considerable part of its time to cover the demonstrations, when the German television shows French unemployed marching, while French TV returns the compliment for the German unemployed marches shortly afterwards, we can be sure that the bourgeoisie has an interest in giving these events maximum publicity. In fact, what we had this winter was a small-scale "remake" of the events in France during the autumn of 1995, which received extensive world-wide media coverage. The aim was to set up an international manoeuvre to renew the trades unions' credibility before they were called on to intervene as "social firemen" with the outbreak of massive new workers' struggles. Just how much of a manoeuvre this was, appeared clearly when the Belgian unions organised a carbon copy of the French strikes, referring explicitly to "the French example". This was confirmed again a few months later, in May-June 1996, when the German union leaders openly called workers to "follow the French example" as they prepared ''the biggest demonstration since the war" on 15th June 1996[17]. This year, the German unions and unemployed organisations once again referred explicitly to "the French example", by coming to the 6th February demonstration carrying tricolour flags.
The question is thus not whether the unemployed movements in Germany and France correspond to a real workers' mobilisation, but rather what is the aim of the bourgeoisie in organising and publicising them.
The bourgeoisie is certainly behind the organisation of these movements. Evidence? In France, one of the demonstrations' main organisers was the CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail), the union run by the French "Communist" Party, which has three ministers in the government whose responsibility is to manage and defend the interests of the national capital. In Germany, the traditional unions, which cooperate openly with the bosses also took part. Alongside the unions, there are more "radical" organisations: for example in France, the AC group (Action contre le Chomage) largely led by the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, a Trotskyist organisation which sees itself as a sort of "loyal opposition" to the Socialist government.
What was the ruling class' aim in promoting these movements? Was it to forestall an immediate threat of mobilisation by unemployed workers? In fact, as we have seen, such mobilisations are not on the agenda today. In reality, the bourgeoisie had a double objective.
On the one hand, the aim was to create a diversion among the employed workers, whose discontent can only increase with the more and more brutal attacks to which they are subjected, and to make them feel guilty towards workers "who aren't lucky enough to have a job". In France, the agitation around unemployment was an excellent means of trying to interest workers in the government's proposal to introduce the 35-hour week, which is supposed to allow the creation of numerous jobs (and which will, above all, make it easier to freeze wages and increase work rates).
On the other hand, the bourgeoisie aimed, as in 1995, to forestall a situation which it will have to confront in the future. Although today we are not witnessing mobilisation and struggle by unemployed workers, as in the 1930s, this does not mean that the conditions of proletarian struggle are less favourable now than they were then. Quite the contrary. In the 1930s (for example in May-June 1936 in
The ruling class is very well aware of this. It knows that it will have to confront new class struggles against more and more brutal attacks on the workers. It knows that these future struggles by those in work, are likely to draw in increasing numbers of unemployed workers. And to date, the union organisations have only exercised a feeble degree of control over the unemployed. It is important for the bourgeoisie that when the unemployed join in the struggle, in the wake of the employed, they should not escape from the control of those organisations whose task is to regiment the working class and sabotage its combat: the trades unions of every description, including the most "radical". In particular, it is important that the unemployed workers' formidable combative potential, and their lack of illusions in capitalism (which today are expressed as despair) should not "contaminate" those in work when they launch themselves into the struggle. The mobilisations this winter began the bourgeoisie's policy of developing its control over the unemployed through the trades unions and the organisations like AC.
Even if they were the result of bourgeois manoeuvres, these mobilisations are thus a further indication that not only the ruling class itself has no illusions as to its ability to reduce unemployment, still less to overcome the crisis, but that it expects to engage in increasingly powerful struggles with the working
class.
Fabienne
[1]"... surplus labour in the countryside oscillates between 100 and 150 million people. In the cities, there are between 30 and 40 million people wholly or partially unemployed. Not to mention, of course, the crowds of young people about to enter the labour market" ("Paradoxale modernisation de la Chine", in Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1997).
[2] Unemployment statistics in Russia mean absolutely nothing. The official figure was 9.3% in 1996, when the country's GNP had fallen by 45% between 1986 and 1996. In reality, large numbers of workers spend their days at the workplace doing nothing (for lack of any orders for the company's goods), in return for pitiful wages (comparatively much lower than unemployment benefit in the Western countries), which force them to hold down a second job in the black economy just to survive.
[3] Perspectives de l'emploi, July 1993.
[4] Robert B. Reich: "Une economie ouverte peutelle preserver la cohesion sociale?", in Bilan du Monde 1998.
[5] "Unemployment and non-employment" in American Economic Review, May 1997.
[6] "Les sans-emploi aux Etats-Unis", L 'etat du monde 1998, Editions La Decouverte, Paris.
[7] "International Comparisons of Unemployment Indicators", Monthly Labor Review, Washington, March 1993.
[8] Bank of International Settlements, Annual Report, Basle, June 1997.
[9] Seamus Milne, "Comment Londres manipule les statistiques", Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1997.
[10] "France should take the Dutch economic model as its inspiration" (Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of the Bank of France, quoted in Le Monde Diplomatique of September 1997). "The example of Denmark and Holland show that it is possible to reduce unemployment while maintaining relative wages fairly stable" (Bank of International Settlements, Annual Report, Basle, June 1997).
[11] "Miracle ou mirage aux Pays-Bas?", Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1997.
[12] "The Netherlands 1995-96", Economic Studies of the OECD, Paris 1996.
[13] Sources: Encyclopaedia Universalis, article on the economic crises, and Maddison, Economic Growth in the West, 1981.
[14] See the International Review no.92, "Report on the Economic Crisis, 12th ICC Congress".
[15] "Decomposition, final phase of the decadence of capitalism", in International Review no.62.
[16] "Resolution on the International Situation", point 21, no.74.
[17] See our articles in International Review nos. 84-86.
[18] See the article on May 1968 in this issue.
Resolution on the International Situation
During the last year, the evolution of the international situation has fundamentally confirmed the analyses contained in the resolution, adopted by the 12th Congress of the Ice in April 1997. In this sense the resolution published below is simply a complement to its predecessor. It does not repeat those analyses, but verifies them and provides the updates demanded by the situation today.
The economic crisis
1) One of the points of the preceding resolution which has been confirmed most clearly is the part on the crisis of the capitalist economy. Thus, in April 97 we said that:
"Among the lies which have been spread far and wide by the ruling class to buttress belief in the viability of its system, a special place has been given to the example of the South East Asian countries, the "dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and the "tigers" (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia) whose current growth rates (sometimes in double figures) are the envy of the western bourgeoisies .... The debts of most of these countries, both external and at state level, has reached considerable levels, which subjects them to the same dangers as all the other countries ... Though they have up till now represented an exception, like their big Japanese neighbour, these countries cannot indefinitely escape the contradictions of the world economy which have transformed other 'success stories' into a nightmare, as in the case of Mexico" (point 7).
It took only four months for Thailand's difficulties to inaugurate the biggest financial crisis' since the 1930s, a financial crisis which spread to all the South East Asian countries and which required the mobilisation of more than $140 billion (much more than double the already exceptional Mexican loan in 1994/95) to prevent a much larger number of states declaring themselves bankrupt. The most spectacular case was obviously South Korea, a member of the OECD (the "rich man's club"), which could no longer make any repayments on a debt of more than $200 billion. At the same time, this financial collapse shook the biggest country in the world, China, whose "economic miracle" was also being boasted about not long ago, as well as the second economic power on the planet, Japan itself.
3) Marxists have to see beyond the speeches of the "experts" of the ruling class. If we were to believe them, the conclusion would be that things are going in the right direction for capitalism since they have announced a recovery for the world economy, and the repercussions of the Asian financial crisis have appeared less devastating than certain people might have thought a few months ago. Today, we are even seeing the world's main stock exchanges, beginning with Wall Street, beating all their records. In reality, recent events do not at all contradict any of the analyses made by marxists concerning the gravity and insoluble nature of the present crisis of capitalism. Behind the financial collapse of the "tigers" and "dragons", and the languorous illness of the Japanese economy, lies the astronomical indebtedness into which world capitalism has been sinking more and more with each day that passes.
"In the final analysis, far from enabling capitalism to overcome its crises, credit merely extends their force and gravity, as Rosa Luxemburg showed by applying marxism. Today the theses of the marxist left (...) at the end of the last century remain fundamentally valid. No more than before can credit enlarge solvent markets. However, faced with the definitive saturation of the latter (...), credit has become the indispensable condition for absorbing commodities, substituting itself for the real market" (Point 4).
" ... it has been mainly through the use of credit, of growing debt, that the world economy has managed to avoid a brutal depression like the one in the 1930s" (Point 5).
4) The most significant characteristic of the economic convulsions presently hitting Asia lies not so much in their immediate effects on the other developed countries as in the fact that they expose the total impasse facing the capitalist system today, a system forced into a permanent headlong plunge into debt (which will be further aggravated by the loans granted to the tigers and dragons). At the same time, the convulsions which have hit the "champions of growth" with such force are the proof that there is no recipe that will enable any group of countries of escape the crisis. Finally, because the financial storms are on a much greater scale than any of those in previous years, they reveal the continuing deterioration of the world capitalist economy.
Faced with the failure of the dragons, the bourgeoisie has shown, by mobilising enormous amounts of money on both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific, that despite the trade war between its different national fractions it is determined to avoid a situation similar to that of the 1930s. In this sense, the spirit or "every man for himself", which is so much a part of capitalist society in decomposition, is being limited by the necessity for the ruling class to avoid a general debacle that would drag the entire world economy into a total disaster. State capitalism, which developed with capitalism's entry into its phase of decadence, and particularly since the second half of the 1930s, has had the aim of guaranteeing a minimum of order between the different capitalist factions within -national frontiers. After the disappearance of the imperialist blocs that followed the collapse of the Russian bloc, the continuation of a concerted economic policy between the different states has made it possible to preserve this kind of "order" on an international scale[1]. This does not call into question the continuation and intensification of the trade war but allows it to be fought under certain rules that will allow the system to survive.
In particular, it has allowed the most developed countries to push the most dramatic expressions of the crisis towards the peripheral areas (Africa, Latin America, countries of the former Eastern bloc), even though the origins of the crisis lie at the heart of the capitalist system (Western Europe, USA, Japan). It also makes it possible to establish zones of relative stability, which is one reason behind the establishment of the Euro.
5) However, the application of state capitalist measures, all the co-ordination of economic policy between the most developed countries, all the "salvage plans" cannot save capitalism from a growing bankruptcy, even if they do enable it to slow down the pace of the catastrophe. The system may go through short-lived remissions, as has happened many times in the past, but after the "recovery" there will be new open recessions and more and more financial and economic convulsions.
- a fall in average growth rates (for the 24 OECD countries: 5.6% between 1960 and 1970; 4.1% for 1970-80; 3.4% for 1980-90; 2.9% for 1990-95);
- a general and dizzying rise in debt, particularly state debts (for the developed countries this now represents between 50 and 130% of a year's production);
- a growing fragility and instability of national economies, with increasingly brutal bankruptcies of industrial or financial sectors; - the ejection of ever-growing sectors of the working class from the productive process (for the OECD, 30 million unemployed in 1989, 35 million in 1993, 38 million in 1996).
And this process can only inexorably continue. In particular, permanent unemployment, which expresses the historic bankruptcy of a system whose reason for existing was to extend wage labour, cannot fail to grow, even if the bourgeoisie goes through all sorts of contortions to hide it and even if, for the moment, it has achieved a certain degree of stabilisation at this level. Alongside all sorts of other attacks - on wages, social benefits, health, working conditions - it will more and more be the principal way that the ruling class makes the exploited pay for the failure of its system.
Imperialist tensions
6) While the different national sectors of the bourgeoisie, in order to prevent the world economy from exploding, have managed to obtain a minimum level of co-ordination in their economic policies, things are very different in the domain of imperialist relations. The events of the past year fully confirm the resolution of the 12th congress of the ICC: "this tendency towards 'every man for himself', towards chaos in the relations between slates, with its succession of circumstantial and ephemeral alliances, has not been called into question. Quite the contrary" (point 10).
"In particular, since the end of the division of the world into two blocs, the USA has been faced with a permanent challenge to its authority by its former allies" (Point 11).
Thus we have seen the continuation and even the aggravation of Israel's lack of discipline in relation to its American patron, a lack of discipline illustrated recently by the failure of the Middle East mission by the negotiator Dennis Ross who was not able to do anything to re-establish the Oslo peace process, cornerstone of the Pax Americana in the Middle East. The tendency already noted in preceding years has thus been fully confirmed:
"Among other examples of this contesting of American leadership we can mention the loss of a monopoly of control over the situation in the Middle East, a crucial zone if ever there was one" (Point 12).
By the same token, we have seen Turkey taking its distance from its "great ally" Germany (which it has blamed for preventing it entering the European Union), while at the same time trying to establish, for its own reasons, a special military cooperation with Israel.
Finally, we have seen the confirmation of another point noted by the 12th congress:
" ... in company with France, Germany is exerting heavy diplomatic pressure on Russia, whose main creditor is Germany and which has not drawn any decisive advantages from its alliance with the US" (Point 15).
The recent Moscow summit between Kohl, Chirac and Yeltsin put the seal on a "Troika" which involves two of the USA's main European allies during the Cold War period, plus the power which, had demonstrated its allegiance to the world's gendarme for several years after the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Although Kohl claimed that this alliance was not directed against anyone, it is clear that these three thieves have got together behind America's back.
8) Thus, recent months have fully confirmed what we said earlier:
"As regards the international policy of the USA, the widespread use of armed force has not only been one of its methods for a long time, but is now the main instrument in the defence of its imperialist interests, as the ICC has shown since 1990, even before the Gulf war. The USA is faced with a world dominated by "every man for himself", where its fanner vassals are trying to withdraw as much as possible from the tight grip of the world cop, which they had to put up with as long as the threat from the rival bloc existed. In this situation, the only decisive way the US can impose its authority is to resort to the area in which they have a crushing superiority over all other stales: military force. But in doing so, the US is caught in a contradiction:
- on the one hand, if it gives up using or extending the use of its military superiority, this will only encourage the countries contesting its authority to contest even more;
- on the other hand, when it does use brute force, even, and especially when this momentarily obliges its opponents to rein in their ambitions towards independence, this only pushes the latter to seize on the least occasion to get their revenge and squirm away from America's grasp.
The assertion of its military superiority by a superpower works in a very different way depending on whether the world is divided into blocs, as before 1989, or whether there are no blocs. In the first place, the assertion of this superiority tends to reinforce the vassals' confidence in their leader, in its ability to defend them, and is thus an element of cohesion around the leader. In the second case, the display of force by the only remaining superpower has the opposite ultimate result of aggravating "every man for himself" even more so when there is no other power that can compete with it at the same level. This is why the success of the present US counter-offensive cannot be considered to be definitive to have overcome its crisis of leadership. Brute force, manoeuvres aimed at destabilising its rivals (as in Zaire today), with their procession of tragic consequences, will thus continue to be used by this power, serving to accentuate the bloody chaos into which capitalism is sinking" (point 1 7).
While the US has not recently had the opportunity to use its armed might and to participate directly in this "bloody chaos", this can only be a temporary situation, especially because it cannot allow the diplomatic failure over Iraq to pass without a response.
Besides which, the capitalist world, on the basis of antagonisms between the great powers, has indeed gone on sinking into military barbarism and massacres, illustrated in particular by the situation in Algeria and, most recently, by the confrontations in Kosovo which have re-Iit the fires in the Balkans powder-keg. In this part of the world, the antagonisms between Germany on the one hand, and Russia, France and Britain, traditional allies of Serbia, on the other, will not give the Dayton peace accord a long respite.
Even if the Kosovo crisis does not degenerate immediately, it is a clear indication that there can be no solid and stable peace today, particularly in this region which, owing to its place in Europe, is the main flashpoint in the world.
Class struggle
9) "This generalised chaos, with its train of bloody conflicts, massacres, famines, and more generally, the decomposition which invades all areas of society and which in the long run threatens to destroy it, is the result of the total impasse which capitalist society has reached. But at the same time, this impasse, with the permanent and increasingly brutal attacks that it provokes against the class that produces the vast majority of social wealth, obliges the latter to react and thus raises the perspective of a revolutionary upsurge" (Point 19).
Provoked by the first expressions of capitalism's open crisis, the historic revival of the working class at the end of the 1960s put an end to four decades of counter-revolution and prevented capitalism from bringing about its own response to the crisis: generalised imperialist war. Despite moments of retreat, workers' struggles exhibited a general tendency to detach themselves from the grip of the state's organs of control, notably the trade unions. This tendency was brutally halted with the campaigns that accompanied the collapse of the so-called "socialist regimes" at the end of the 80s. The working class suffered an important reverse, both at the level of its militancy and at the level of its consciousness: " ... in the main capitalist countries, the working class has been brought back to a situation which is comparable to that of the 1970s as far as its relation to unions and unionism is concerned: a situation where the class, in general, struggled within the unions, followed their instructions and their slogans, and in the final analysis, left things up to them. In this sense, the bourgeoisie has temporarily succeeded in wiping out from working class consciousness the lessons learnt during the 80s, following repeated experience of confrontations with the unions" (Resolution on the international situation, 12th congress of the ICC's section in France, Point 12).
Since 1992, the proletariat has returned to the path of struggle but because of the scale of the retreat it has been through, and the weight of the general decomposition of bourgeois society, its consciousness is still being held back and the rhythm of this revival is very slow. However, its reality is being confirmed not so much by workers' struggles themselves, which for the moment remain very weak, but by all the manoeuvres which the bourgeoisie has been deploying for several years:
"For the ruling class, which is fully aware that its growing attacks on the working class will provoke wide-scale reactions, it is vital to get in the first blow at a time when combativity is still at an embryonic stage and when the echoes of the collapse of the 'socialist' regimes still weigh very heavy on the workers' consciousness. The aim is to 'wet the powder' and to reinforce to the maximum its arsenal of trade unionist and democratic mystifications" (resolution from the 12th ICC congress, Point 21).
This policy of the bourgeoisie was illustrated once again during the summer of 1997 by the UPS strike in the US which ended in a "great victory" for the trade unions. It has also been confirmed by the big manoeuvres which, in several European countries, have surrounded and continue to surround the question of unemployment.
10) Once again, it has been by co-ordinating its actions in different countries that the ruling class has been taking charge of the growing discontent provoked by the inexorable rise of the scourge of unemployment. On the one band, in countries like France, Belgium and Italy they have been launching big campaigns around the theme of the 35-hour week, which is supposed to be able to create hundreds of thousands of jobs. On the other hand, in France and Germany, we have seen, under the auspices of the unions and different "committees" inspired by the leftists, the development of movements of the unemployed, with the occupation of public places and street demonstrations. In fact, these two policies are complementary. The campaign around the 35-hour week, and the actual application of this measure as decided on by the left government in France, makes it possible:
- to "demonstrate" that you can "do something" to create jobs;
- to put forward an "anti-capitalist" demand, since the bosses have declared themselves to be opposed to it;
- to justify a whole series of attacks against the working class which will be the counter-part to the reduction in hours (intensification uf productivity and line speeds, wage freezes, greater "flexibility", especially through the calculation of working hours on a yearly basis.
The mobilisation of the unemployed by different bourgeois forces also has several objectives:
- in the short term, it creates a diversion for the sectors of the working class who are still at work, and above all, tends to make them feel guilty;
- in the longer term, and above all, it has the aim of developing organs for controlling the unemployed workers who, up till now, have been relatively less policed by specialised bourgeois organs;
In fact, through these well publicised manoeuvres, which have been displayed by the media internationally, the bourgeoisie proves that it is conscious:
- of its inability to resolve the problem of unemployment (which means it has few illusions about its system seeing "light at the end of the tunnel");
- that the present situation, marked by a low level of militancy among the workers at work and by the passivity of the unemployed, will not last for long.
The ICC has shown that, owing to the weight of decomposition and the gradual way that capitalism has put tens of millions of workers on the dole over the last few decades, the unemployed have not been able to organise themselves and take part in the class struggle (as they did in some countries during the 1930s). However, we also showed that even if they will not be able to constitute a vanguard of the workers' struggle, they will be led to join other sectors of the working class when the latter begin to move on a masive scale, bringing to the movement a powerful combativity resulting from their miserable situation, their lack of sectionalist prejudices and of illusions in the future of the capitalist economy. In this sense, the current manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie towards the unemployed show that it is expecting to have to deal with struggles of the whole working class, and is doing all it can to ensure that the participation of unemployed workers in these struggles will be sabotaged by appropriate organs of control.
11) In this manoeuvre, the ruling class has called upon the classical trade unions but also on more "left" elements of its political apparatus (anarcho-syndicalists, Trotskyists, "operaists" and "autonomists") because, faced with the unemployed and their immense anger, it needs a more "radical" language than that usually spoken by the official unions. This fact also illustrates a point that was already in the resolution of the 12th ICC congress: we are today between two stages in the process of the revival of the class struggle, a moment where the action of classical unionism which dominated in the years 1994-96, although far from being discredited, will have to be complemented in a preventive manner by a more "radical", "rank and file" type of unionism.
12) Finally, the continuation of bourgeois ideological campaigns:
- on communism, fraudulently identified with Stalinism (notably the noise made about the Black Book of Communism, which has been translated into several languages) and against the communist left, via the anti-revisionist propaganda;
- in defence of democracy as the only alternative to all the expressions of capitalist decomposition and barbarism are the proof that the ruling class, aware of the potential contained in the present and future situation, is already preoccupied with sabotaging the long term perspectives of the proletarian combat, the road towards the communist revolution.
Faced with this situation, revolutionaries have the duty:
- to put forward the real communist perspective against all the falsifications spread far and wide by the defenders of the bourgeois order;
- to show the cynical nature of the bourgeois manoeuvres which call on the proletariat to defend democracy against the so-called "fascist" or "terrorist" danger;
- to denounce all the manoeuvres aimed at restoring strength and credit to all the union machinery whose function is to sabotage the future struggles of the class;
- to intervene towards the small minorities in the class who are raising questions about the crisis of capitalism and the ceaseless deterioration of living standards;
- to prepare to intervene in the ineluctable development of the class struggle.
[1] At the beginning of this period there was a tendency for these international organs of economic coordination and regulation to be boycotted, but the bourgeoisie very quickly drew the lessons about the dangers of "every man for himself".
Programme Communiste no.95 (PC)contains a serious polemic with the Programma Comunista/ Internationalist Papers group on the Kurdish question, criticising them for making grave concessions to nationalism; and what is particularly noteworthy is that the article argues that it was errors of exactly the same type that led to the explosion of the ICP in the early 80s. This willingness to discuss the crisis of the main Bordigist organisation in that period is a new and potentially fertile development. The same issue also contains a response to the review of the ICC's book on the Italian Left published by the UK Trotskyist journal Revolutionary History. Here, Programme Communiste show an awareness that the attack on the ICC contained in this review is also an attack on the whole tradition of the Italian communist left.
We refer our readers to the article in International Review no.93 for further commentary on these articles. In this issue, we want to respond to another text in Programme Communiste no.95 - a polemic with the Florence-based Il Partito group, criticising the latter for falling into mysticism.
Marxism against mysticism
At first sight this might seem to be a strange subject for a polemic between revolutionary groups, but it would be a mistake to think that the most advanced fractions of the proletarian movement are immune from the influence of religious and mystical ideologies. This was certainly the case in the struggle to found the Communist League, when Marx and Engels had to combat the sectarian, semi-religious visions of communism professed by Weitling and other; it was no less true during the period of the First International, when the marxist fraction had to confront the masonic ideologies of sects like the Philadelphians, and above all of Bakunin's "International Brotherhood".
But it was above all once it ceased to be a revolutionary class, and even more when it entered its epoch of decadence, that the bourgeoisie more and more abandoned the materialist outlook of its youth and relapsed into irrational and semi-mystical world-views: the case of nazism is a concentrated example. And the final phase of capitalist decadence - the phase of decomposition - has exacerbated such tendencies still further, as witness phenomena such as the upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism and the proliferation of suicidal cults. These ideologies are increasingly all-pervasive and the proletariat can by no means escape them.
The fact that the proletarian political milieu itself has to be on guard against such ideologies has been demonstrated clearly in the recent period. We can cite the case of the London Psychogeographical Association and similar "groups", which have concocted a snake-oil mixture of communism and occultism and have been busily trying to sell it in the milieu. Within the ICC itself, we have seen the activities of the adventurer JJ, expelled for seeking to create a clandestine network of "interest" in the ideas of freemasonry.
Moreover, the ICC has already briefly criticised ll Partito's efforts to create a "communist mysticism" (see the article on communism as the overcoming of alienation in International Review no.71) and Programme Communiste's more detailed criticisms are perfectly justified. The quotations from II Partito's press contained in the article in Programme Communiste show that the group's slide into mysticism has become quite overt. For II Partito, "the only society capable of mysticism is communism" in the sense that "the species is mystical because it knows how to see itself without a contradiction between the here and now ... and its future". Moreover, since mysticism, in its original Greek meaning, is defined here as "the capacity to see without eyes", the party too "has its mystique, in the sense that it is capable of seeing ... with its eyes closed, that it can see more than the individual eyes of its members" " ... the only reality which can live [the mystical] mode of life during the domination of class society is the party". And finally, "it is only in communism that the Great Philosophy coincides with being in an organic circuit between the action of eating (today seen as trivial and unworthy of the spirit) and the action of respiring in the Spirit, conceived sublimely as truly worthy of the complete being, that is to say, God".
Programme Communiste is also aware that the struggle of marxism against the penetration of mystical ideologies is not new. They cite Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-criticism, through which a combat was waged against the development of idealist philosophy in the Bolshevik party in the 1900s, and in particular against attempts to turn socialism into a new religion (the "God-building" tendency of Lunacharsky). Lenin's book - although suffering from certain important weaknesses[2] - drew a line in the sand not only against the relapse into religiosity that accompanied the retreat in the class struggle after the 1905 revolution, but also against the concomitant danger of liquidating the party, of its fracturing into clans.
Roots of the Bordigist Mystique
For a critique to be radical, however, it must go to the roots. And a striking weakness of PC's polemic is its inability to the roots of Il Partito's errors - admittedly a difficult task since these roots are to a greater or lesser extent common to all the branches of the Bordigist family tree.
This is apparent early on when Programme Communiste upbraids Il Partito for its claim to be "the true and only continuators of the party". But if Il Partito is the most sectarian of the Bordigist groups, sectarian withdrawal, the practice of ignoring or dismissing out of hand all other expression of the communist left, has always been a distinguishing feature of the Bordigist current, and certainly well before the appearance of Il Partito in the 1970s. And even if we can understand the origins of this sectarianism as a defensive reaction in the face of the profound counter-revolution that prevailed at the time of Bordigism' s birth in the 40s and 50s, it is still a fundamental flaw of this current and has caused no end of damage to the proletarian milieu. The very fact that we are now confronted with the existence of three groups all claiming to be the "International Communist Party" is proof enough of this, since it tends to cast discredit on the very notion of a communist organisation.
But even on the question of mysticism and religion, it must be admitted that Il Partito did not pick its ideas out of a clear blue sky. In fact, we can find some of the roots of "Florentine mysticism" in Bordiga himself. The following passage is from Bordiga's "Commentary on the 1844 Manuscripts", a text that first appeared in Il Programma Comunista in 1959 and was republished in Bordiga et La passion du communisme, edited by Jacques Camatte in 1972):
"When, at a certain point, our banal contradictor ... says that we are building our mystique, himself posing as a mind who which has gone beyond all fideism and mysticism, when he holds us in derision for kneeling down to the Mosaic or talmudic tablets of the Bible or the Koran, to gospels and catechisms, we reply to him .... that we do not consider as an offense the assertion that we can indeed attribute to our movement - as long as it has not triumphed in reality (which in our method precedes any ulterior conquest of human consciousness) - the character of a mystique, or, if you want, a myth.
Myth, in its innumerable forms, was not the delirium of minds which had their physical eyes shut to reality - natural and human in an inseparable manner as in Marx - but was an irreplaceable stage in the single road to the real conquest of consciousness .... ".
Before proceeding, it is necessary to put this passage in its proper context.
The currents of the communist left outside Bordigism have also criticised the inter-linked notions of internal monolithism and of the "great leader" which developed in the post-war party (see the reprint of the text by the Gau he Comrnuniste de France in International Review nos.33 and 34), and the use of the theory of "organic centralism" to justify elitist practices within the party[3]. These conceptions are all coherent with the semi-religious notion of the party as the guardian of a once and for all revelation accessible only to a select few; given this background, it is not altogether surprising that II Partiito should claim that the only true way of living the mystical life today is to join the Bordigist party!
Finally, we should also point out that all these conceptions of the party's internal functioning are profoundly linked to the Bordigist article of faith that the task of the party is to exert the dictatorship of the proletariat on behalf of, and even against, the mass of the proletariat. And the communist left - most particularly its Italian branch, in the days of Bilan, but also in the work of the GCF and the Damen tendency - have abundantly criticised this notion as well.
We thus think that Programme Communiste's criticisms of Il Partito must go deeper, to the real historical roots of its errors and in doing so, engage with the rich heritage of the entire communist left. We are convinced that we are not preaching to the deaf: the new spirit of openness within the Bordigist milieu testifies to that. And Programme Communiste even gives some important signs of movement on the party question itself, because at the end of their article, while still retaining the idea of the party as the "general staff" of the class, they insist that "there is no place in its functioning and its internal life for idealism, mystics, the cult of leaders or superior authorities, as is the case with parties who are about to degenerate and go over to the counter-revolution". We can only agree with these sentiments, and hope that the current debates in the Bordigist milieu will enable its components to take these developments to their logical conclusion.
Amos
[1] See the article on the joint public meeting of the Communist Left in defence of the October Revolution, published in World Revolution no.210, as well as in the CWO's Revolutionary Perspectives no.9.
[2] Programme Communiste neglect to mention that the historical communist left has made some serious criticisms of certain of the "philosophical" arguments contained in Lenin's book. In his Lenin as Philosopher, written during the 1930s, Pannekoek showed that in his effort to affirm the fundamentals of materialism, Lenin ignores the distinction between bourgeois materialism - which tends to reduce consciousness to a passive reflection of the external world - and the marxist dialectical standpoint which, while affirming the primacy of matter, also insists on the active side of human consciousness, its capacity to shape the external world. In the early 1950s the Gauche Communiste de France wrote a series of articles which recognised the validity of these criticisms, but in turn showed that Pannekoek himself was guilty of a kind of mechanical materialism when he tried to prove that Lenin's philosophical errors demonstrate that Bolshevism was no more than the representative of the bourgeois revolution in backward Russia. See the reprint of the 1948 article by Intemationalisme criticising Pannekoek's Lenin as Philosopher in International Review nos.25, 27, 28, and 30, and also our book on The Dutch Left, chapter 7 part 5.
[3] See Un chiarimento, Fra Ie ombre del bordighismo e dei suoi epigoni, supplement to Battaglia Comunista no. 11 , 1997.
In previous articles, we have outlined the history of the proletarian revolution in China (1919-1927), and clearly distinguished this from the period of counter-revolution and imperialist war which followed it (1927-1949)[1] [647]. We have shown that the so-called “Chinese people’s revolution”, built on the defeat of the working class, was nothing but a bourgeois mystification, designed to enrol the Chinese peasant masses into the service of the imperialist war. In this article, we will focus on the central aspects of this mystification: Mao Zedong himself as a “revolutionary leader”, and Maoism as a revolutionary theory, and one which claims to be a “development” of marxism to boot. We intend to demonstrate that Maoism has never been anything but a bourgeois ideological and political current, born from the guts of decadent capitalism.
Mao Zedong’s political current within the Communist Party of China (CPC) only appeared in the 1930s, in the midst of the counter-revolution when the CPC had been first defeated and physically decimated, then had become an organ of capital. Mao formed one of the numerous coteries which fought for control of the party, and so revealed its degeneration. Maoism, right from the start, had nothing to do with the proletarian revolution, except that it emerged from the counter-revolution that crushed the working class.
In fact, Mao Zedong only took control of the CPC in 1945, when “Maoism” became the official doctrine of the party, after the liquidation of the previously dominant coterie of Wang Ming, and while the CPC was fully involved in the sinister game of world imperialist war. In this sense, the rise of Mao Zedong’s gang is the direct product of his complicity with the great imperialist gangsters.
All this might astonish anyone who only knows the history of 20th century China through Mao’s writing, or bourgeois historiography. It has to be said that Mao took the art of falsifying the history of China and the CPC (he benefited from the experience of Stalinism and the gangs that preceded him in power from 1928 onwards) to such a level, that simply to recount events as they happened takes on the air of a fairy-tale.
This immense falsification is founded on the bourgeois and profoundly reactionary nature of Mao Zedong’s ideology. In rewriting history, in order to appear to the world as the eternal and infallible leader of the CPC, Mao was of course motivated by the ambition to strengthen his own political power. Nonetheless, he also served the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie: in the long term, it was vital to wipe out the historic lessons that the working class could learn from its experience during the 1920s; in the short term, the working and peasant masses had to be brought to take part in the imperialist slaughter. Maoism perfectly satisfied these two objectives.
The tissue of lies that surrounds the legend of Mao Zedong begins with the veil cast over his obscure political origins. Maoist historians may repeat endlessly that Mao was one of the CPC’s “founders”; they nonetheless remain very discreet about his political activity throughout the period of rising working class struggle. They would otherwise have to admit that Mao was part of the CPC’s opportunist wing, which blindly followed all the orientations of the degenerating Executive Committee of the Communist International. More precisely, they would also have to admit that Mao was a member of the CPC group which in 1924 joined the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the National Popular Party of the big Chinese bourgeoisie, on the fallacious pretext that this was not a bourgeois party but a “class front”.
In March 1927, on the eve of the bloody suppression of the Shanghai rising by Kuomintang troops, and while the CPC’s revolutionary wing was desperately calling for an end to the Kuomintang alliance, Mao was in the opportunist chorus, singing the praises of the butcher Chang-kai-shek, and approving the actions of the Kuomintang [2] [648].
Shortly afterwards, one of Mao Zedong’s companions in the Kuomintang, Qu Qiubai, was nominated leader of the CPC under the pressure of Stalin’s henchmen recently arrived in China. His main mission was to lay the responsibility for the crushing of the proletarian insurrection at the door of Chen Duxiu - who was to become a sympathiser of Trotsky, and symbol of one of the currents struggling against the opportunist decisions of the CI [3] [649] - by accusing him of having fallen into opportunism and having underestimated the peasant movement! The corollary of this policy was a series of disastrous adventures, in which Mao Zedong participated fully throughout the second half of 1927, and which only accelerated the dispersal and annihilation of the CPC.
If we are to believe history as corrected by Mao in 1945, he criticised the “left opportunist sliding” defended by Qu Qiubai. The truth is that Mao was one of this policy’s most stalwart partisans, as we can see from the Report on Hunan, which predicts “the impetuous uprising of hundreds of millions of peasants”. This prediction was concretised in the “Revolt of the Autumn Harvest”, one of the most significant fiascos of Qu Qiubai’s “insurrectionist” policy. The working class was crushed, and any possibility of a victorious revolution had disappeared with it; in such conditions, any attempt to provoke a peasant uprising could only be disastrous, and lead to new massacres. The famous “impetuous uprising of hundreds of millions of peasants” in Hunan was in fact reduced to the grotesque and bloody adventure of some 5,000 peasants and lumpens led by Mao, which ended in a rout, with the survivors fleeing into the mountains and their leader being pushed out of the Party’s Politburo.
During the period of the proletarian revolution, Mao Zedong was part of the CPC’s opportunist wing, actively contributing to the defeat of the working class and the annihilation of the CPC as a proletarian organisation.
In our previous articles, we have seen how the Communist Party of China was physically and politically exterminated by the combined action of Stalinism and Chinese reaction. From 1928, workers no longer joined the party en masse. Then, when the party was no longer Communist in anything but name, began the formation of the famous Red Army, bringing the peasantry and lumpen-proletariat increasingly into its ranks. Within the CPC, elements began to come to the fore, who had been the furthest from the working class, and needless to say closest to the Kuomintang. The party grew with the arrival of all sorts of reactionary dross, from Stalinists indoctrinated in the USSR, to Kuomintang generals, via warlords in search of territory, patriotic intellectuals, and even of “enlightened” members of the upper bourgeois and feudal classes. Within the new CPC, all this scum were ready for a fight to the death to gain control of the party and the Red Army.
As with all the parties of the Communist International, the counter-revolution was expressed in the degeneration of the CPC and its conversion into an instrument of capital. These parties became a terrible source of mystification for the whole working class, misleading it on such fundamental questions as that of the revolutionary organisation, in both its function and its internal functioning. The bourgeoisie’s official ideologues have only spread and amplified this work of mystification. Official historians present the CPC from 1928 to today as the model of a communist party: for the defenders of Western democracy, the internecine wars within the CPC are proof of the dubious behaviour of communists and marxism’s falsehood; for the unconditional defenders of Maoism, these same struggles were the means to defend the “politically correct line of the brilliant Chairman Mao”. These two categories of ideologue, though apparently opposed, in fact work in the same direction: the mendacious identification of the proletariat’s revolutionary organisations with their absolute opposite - the organisations born of capitalism’s decadence and the bourgeois counter-revolution. One thing is certain. Mao Zedong could only develop his full “potential” in the rotten setting of a CPC turned bourgeois. Mao had already tried out the gangster methods which were to serve him in controlling the party and the army during his “epic” retreat into the Xikang mountains - a disastrous rout if ever there was one. He took control of the region by making alliances with the leaders of the armed gangs that controlled it, only to eliminate them afterwards. This was the period which saw the birth of Mao’s gang, through his alliance with Zhu De, a rival general to Chiang-kai-shek, who was to become his inseparable companion. Mao knew how to kow-tow to better placed rivals, at least until he could supplant them in the party hierarchy. When Qu Qiubai was replaced by Li Lisan, Mao supported the latter’s “political line”, which in fact was nothing but a continuation of his predecessor’s “putschist” policy. Mao’s rewritten version of history tells us that he rapidly opposed Li Lisan. In reality, he participated fully in one of the disastrous coups attempted under the impetus of Bukharin in the CI’s “third period” (see letter from the CI, October 1929), and led by Li Lisan in the 1930s. The aim of these coups was to “take the cities” with a peasant guerrilla army. In 1930, Mao Zedong changed sides again, when the clique led by Wang Ming - known as “the returned [ie from Russia] students”, or the “28 Bolsheviks”, who had spent two years being trained in Moscow - began a clean-up to take control of the party, and removed Li Lisan. This was the time of the obscure “Fujian incident”. Mao Zedong undertook a large scale punitive expedition against the CPC in control of the Fujian region. The members of this section of the party were accused, depending on the version, of being either lackeys of Li Lisan, part of an anti-Bolshevik league, or members of the Socialist Party. Part of the truth only came out years after Mao’s death. In 1982, a Chinese review revealed that “the purges in western Fujian, which lasted several months and resulted in massacres throughout the Soviet zone, began in December 1930 with the Fujian incidents. Many leaders and militants of the Party were accused of being members of the Socialist Party and executed. The number of victims is estimated at between four and five thousand. In reality, there was not the slightest trace of a Socialist Party in the region...” [4] [650].
This purge was the price for Mao’s partial return to the good graces of the “returned students”. Despite being accused of having followed the Li Lisan line, and of having committed excesses in Fujian, he was neither liquidated nor deported like so many others. And although he was removed from his military command, he had the consolation of being made “President of the Soviets”, during the pompously named “First Congress of Soviets in China” at the end of 1931: this was an administrative role, under the control of the Wang Ming clique.
From this moment onwards, Mao tried both to strengthen his own clique, and to sow division in the ruling clique of “returned students”. But he remained under their heel, as we can see from the rejection by Wang Ming of Mao’s proposal of an alliance with the “Fujian government” (made up of generals in revolt against Chiang-kai-shek). Wang Ming did not want to prejudice his existing treaties with the USSR and Chiang-kai-Shek. Mao had to back down publicly, and accuse this “government” of “deceiving the people” [5] [651]. This also shows that although Mao was made President in 1934, the real strong man of the party remained Chang Wentian, prime minister of the “Soviets”, and one of the “returned students”.
The legend of the “Chinese people’s revolution” has always presented the Long March as the greatest “anti-imperialist” and “revolutionary” epic in history. We have already shown that its real objective was to transform a force of peasant guerrillas, scattered in a dozen regions around the country and occupied in struggle against the great landlords, into a regular centralised army capable of engaging in a war of positions. The aim was to create an instrument of Chinese imperialist policy. The legend also tells us that the Long March was inspired and led by President Mao. This is not entirely true. To start with, Mao was ill, and politically isolated by the Wang clique throughout the period of preparation for the Long March, unable to “inspire” anything at all. Furthermore, the March could not be “led” by anybody, even Mao, for the simple reason that the Red Army had no centralised command, but was made up of a dozen more or less independent regiments isolated from each other (the formation of a centralised General Staff was in fact one of the objectives of this campaign). The only element of cohesion in both the CPC and Red Army was the imperialist policy of the USSR, represented by the “returned students”. The latter’s strength was wholly due to the political, diplomatic, and military support of the Stalin regime. The legend also “teaches” us that it was during the Long March that Mao’s “correct line” overcame the “incorrect line” of Wang Ming and Zhang Kuo Tao. The truth is that the concentration of forces sharpened the rivalries within the leadership for control of the Red Army. Out of respect for the truth, we should also say that if Mao gained in influence during these sordid struggles, he did so in the shadow of the Wang clique. Two anecdotes are significant in this respect.
The first of these concerns the Zunyi meeting of January 1935. Maoists describe this meeting as “historic” because it supposedly marks the moment where Mao took command of the Red Army. In reality, this meeting was a plot (set in motion by the various cliques of the detachment in which Mao was travelling), in which Cheng Wentian (one of the “returned students”) was named Party Secretary, while Mao recovered the position he had held before his removal from the Military Committee. These nominations were disputed shortly afterwards by much of the party, since the Zunyi meeting did not have the status of a Congress. They were one of the underlying causes of the later split in the CPC.
The second anecdote concerns the events in the Sichuan region a few months later. Several Red Army regiments had concentrated here, and Mao tried to take overall command, with the support of the “returned students”. Mao’s nomination was opposed by Zhang Kuo Tao, an old member of the CPC, who had commanded one of the “red bases”, and led a more powerful regiment than that of Mao and Cheng Wentian. This led to a violent quarrel, which ended with a split in the Party and the Red Army, led by two different Central Committees. Zhang held his position in the Sichuan region, with most of the troops already concentrated there. Even Mao’s companions, like Liu Bocheng and the faithful Zhu De (who had followed him like a shadow since the rout of 1927 in Xikang), went over to Zhang Kuo Tao. Mao Zedong and Cheng Wentian fled the region and took refuge in the “red base” of Yanan, which was the final point of concentration for the regiments of the Red Army.
The troops that stayed in Sichuan remained isolated, and were decimated little by little, which obliged the survivors to join the army in Yanan. Zhang’s fate was sealed: he was immediately removed from his functions and went over to the Kuomintang in 1938. From these events sprang the Maoist legend of “the combat against the traitor Zhang Kuo Tao”. In reality, Zhang had no choice: if he was to escape the purges launched by Mao in Shangxi and stay alive, he needed the support of another faction of the bourgeoisie. But there was not the slightest class difference between Mao and Zhang, any more than there was between the CPC and the Kuomintang.
It is also worth remembering that it was during this period of military concentration in Sichuan that the CPC echoed the USSR’s imperialist policy (proclaimed by the 7th Congress of the Stalinised Communist International in 1935) by calling for a national united front against Japan: or in other words, calling for the exploited to put themselves at the service of their exploiters’ interests. This confirmed, not just the CPC’s bourgeois nature, but also its role as principal supplier of cannon-fodder for the imperialist war.
In Yanan, during the war with Japan between 1936 and 1945, Mao Zedong used cunning, trickery and purges to take control of the CPC and the Red Army. There were three phases in the Yanan clan war which marked Mao’s rise: the elimination of the Yanan base’s founding group, the consolidation of the Mao clique, and the first open conflict with the Wang Ming clique which was to lead to the latter’s elimination.
Maoism extols the expansion of the Red Army in Shangxi as a product of the peasants’ revolutionary struggle. We have shown that this expansion was based both on the CPC’s methods of enrolment of the peasantry (an inter-classist alliance, whereby the peasants obtained a reduction in rent — small enough to be acceptable to the landed proprietors — in exchange for their mobilisation in the imperialist slaughter), and on its alliances with regional warlords and with the Kuomintang itself. The events of 1936 are revealing in this respect, and they also show how the old Yanan leadership was liquidated.
When the regiment of Mao Zedong and Chang Wentian reached Yanan in October 1935, the region was already prey to factional struggles: Liu Shidan, founder and leader of the base since the beginning of the 1930s, had fallen victim to the purges and had been imprisoned and tortured. He received the immediate support of the newly arrived regiment. He was freed, in exchange for his subordination to Mao and Chang.
At the beginning of 1936, Liu Shidan’s troops were ordered to launch an expedition to the east, towards Shansi, to attack the local warlord Yan Jishan and the Kuomintang troops supporting him. The expedition was defeated and Liu Shidan killed. Another expedition towards the West met the same fate. These events, in particular Liu Shidan’s death, made it possible for Mao and Chang to take control of the Yanan base. The method is reminiscent of Mao’s seizure of the Jinggang mountains a few years previously: he began by allying himself with the zone’s leaders, but later on their supposed “tragic deaths” left him in sole command.
While the expeditions to East and West went to their defeat, Mao was setting up an alliance with another warlord. The Sian region, south of Yanan, was controlled by the mercenary Yang Hucheng, who had given shelter to the governor of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, and his regiments, after their defeat by the Japanese. Mao contacted Yang Hucheng in December 1935, and their non-aggression pact was established a few months later. This pact was the background to the “Sian incident” (see International Review no.84): Chang-kai-shek was taken prisoner by Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang, who wanted to try him for collaboration with the Japanese. Under pressure from Stalin, his capture was used solely to negotiate a new alliance between the CPC and the Kuomintang.
Needless to say, the Maoists have tried to portray the CPC’s alliances with the warlords and with the butcher of Shanghai — in which Mao took a direct part — as skilful manoeuvres intended to profit from the divisions existing in the ruling classes. It is true that the traditional bourgeoisie of landed proprietors and the military were divided, but not because they had different class interests, nor even because some were reactionary and others progressive, nor even because some were — as Mao would have it — “intelligent”, and others were not. Their divisions were based on their defence of particular interests, some favouring Chinese unity under Japanese control because this would gain or preserve their local power; while those, like the governor of Manchuria, who had been unseated, sought the support of other imperialist powers opposed to Japan.
In this sense, the alliance between the CPC and the Kuomintang was clearly bourgeois and imperialist, and went as far as to conclude a military aid agreement between the government of the USSR and Chiang-kei-shek, which included the supply of fighters and bombers and a convoy of 200 lorries, which remained the Kuomintang’s main source of supply until 1947. At the same time, the CPC was established in its own zone (the legendary Shanxi-Ganxu-Ningxia); it integrated the main regiments of the Red Army (the 4th and the 8th) into the army of Chiang-kai-shek, and had one of its commissions participating in the Kuomintang government.
At the level of the CPC’s internal life, we should point out that the commission which negotiated with, and then entered, the Chiang government, represented both the “returned students” (Po Ku and Wang Ming himself), and the Mao clique (Chou Enlai), which confirms that Mao did not yet control the party or the army, and that at least in appearance he was still allied with Stalin’s henchmen.
The rivalry between Mao and the “returned students” first came into the open at the CPC Central Committee’s plenary session of October 1938. Mao took advantage of the Wuhan fiasco (the seat of the Kuomintang government, which was attacked by the Japanese, and for whose defence Wang Ming was responsible) to undermine Wang Ming’s authority in the party. He nonetheless had to accept the nomination of Chang Wentian as General Secretary, and wait a further two years until the imperialist war made it possible to turn the situation to his advantage, against the clique of the “returned students”.
In 1941, the German army invaded the USSR. To avoid opening a new front, Stalin opted for a non-aggression pact with Japan. Its immediate consequence was the end of Russia’s military aid to the Kuomintang, but also the paralysis and fall of Wang Ming’s Stalinist faction in the CPC, obliged as it was to collaborate with the Japanese enemy. In December, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour brought America into the war for control of the Pacific. These events prompted a move towards the US by both the Kuomintang and the CPC, Mao’s faction in particular.
Mao launched an all-out attack on the “returned students” and their acolytes. This was the meaning of the punitive “rectification campaign”, which lasted from 1942 to 1945. Mao began by attacking the party leaders, especially the “returned students”, accusing them of being “dogmatic and incapable of applying marxism in China”. Mao made the most of the rivalries within the Wang clique, and succeeded in winning over some of its members, including Liu Chaichi who became party General Secretary, and Kang Cheng, who became the inquisitor in charge of Mao’s dirty work — the same position that Mao himself had held in Fujian in 1930.
The Wang clique’s press was suspended, while only that under Mao’s control was authorised to publish. The Mao clique took control of the party schools and militants’ reading. The purge continued, with arrests and persecutions spreading from Yanan throughout the party and the army. Some, like Chou Enlai, remained faithful to Mao. The “recalcitrants” were sent to the combat zones where they fell into the hands of the Japanese, or simply eliminated.
The purge reached its height in 1943, coinciding with the official dissolution of the Third International, and the USA’s mediation between the CPC and the Kuomintang. Some 50-60,000 people were liquidated during the purge. The leading “returned students” were eliminated: Chang Wentian was exiled from Yanan, Wang Ming narrowly escaped an attempted poisoning, Po Ku died mysteriously in an “air accident”.
Within the framework of the imperialist war, the “rectification campaign” corresponds to the CPC’s turn towards the United States. We have already examined this aspect in International Review no.84. We should simply point out that the impetus for this turn came from Mao and his clique, as we can see from the official correspondence of the US mission to Yanan at the time [6] [652]. And it was no accident that the struggle against the Stalinist clique coincided with a rapprochement with the USA. Of course, this does not make Mao a traitor to the “Communist camp”, as Wang Ming and the ruling clique in Russia were later to claim. It merely demonstrates the bourgeois nature of his policies. For Chiang-kai-shek, as for the whole Chinese bourgeoisie, Mao included, their chances of survival depended on their ability to calculate coldly which imperialist power they should serve: the USA or the USSR.
Nor is it an accident that the tone of the “rectification” became more moderate as the likelihood of a Soviet victory over Germany increased. The purge “officially” came to an end in April 1945, two months after the signature of the Yalta treaty, where the Allied imperialist powers decided, amongst other things, that Russia should declare war on Japan, just as it was preparing to invade northern China. This is why the CPC had to follow Russian orders. Mao’s temporary return to the Stalin camp was not made of his own free will, but because of the new division of the world between the great imperialist powers.
Nonetheless, the end result of the “rectification” was the control of the CPC and the army by Mao and his gang. Mao created for himself the title of Party President, and proclaimed Maoism, or “Mao Zedong thought”, to be “marxism applied to China”. Since then, the Maoists have resorted to legend to explain how Mao came to the leadership thanks to his theoretical and strategic genius, and to his struggle against the “incorrect lines”. They would have us believe that Mao founded the Red Army, created the agrarian reform programme, triumphantly led the Long March, created the red bases, etc. And it is all untrue! This is how the cunning parvenu Mao Zedong passed himself off for a Messiah.
Maoism, then, became a dominant theory during the world imperialist war, in a party which already belonged to the bourgeoisie, despite continuing to call itself communist. At the outset, Maoism aimed to justify and consolidate the grip of Mao and his gang on all the controls of the party. He also had to justify the party’s participation in the imperialist war, alongside the Kuomintang, the nobility, the warlords, the big bourgeoisie, and all the imperialist powers. To do so, he had to hide the real origins of the CPC. Maoism could not be satisfied with putting a particular “interpretation” on the clan war within the party: it had to deform completely the history of both the party and the class struggle. The defeat of the proletarian revolution and the degeneration of the CPC were carefully wiped out; the CPC’s new identity as an instrument of capital was justified “theoretically” by Maoism.
On this false foundation, Maoism demonstrated its abilities as another instrument of bourgeois propaganda used to mobilise the labouring masses, especially the peasantry, under the patriotic banners of imperialist war. Once the CPC had finally conquered power, Maoism became the official “theory” of the Chinese “People’s State”, in other words of the state capitalism set up in China.
Despite its vague references to a pseudo-marxist language, “Mao Zedong thought” cannot hide its sources in the bourgeois camp. When he took part in the coalition between the CPC and the Kuomintang, Mao considered already that the interests of the peasantry should be subordinated to the interests of the national bourgeoisie represented by Sun Yat Sen: “The defeat of the feudal forces is the real goal of the national revolution (...) The peasants have understood what Dr Sun Yat Sen wanted, but was unable to achieve during the forty years that he devoted to the national revolution” [7] [653]. In fact, the references to Sun Yat Sen’s principles remained at the centre of Maoist propaganda to enrol the peasants for imperialist war: “As far as the Communist Party is concerned, the whole policy that it has followed these last ten years corresponds to the revolutionary spirit of the Three Principles of the People and the Three Great Policies of Dr Sun Yat Sen” [8] [654]. “Our propaganda must conform to this programme: carry out the testament of Dr Sun Yat Sen by awakening the masses to resistance against Japan” [9] [655].
In the first article in this series, we already showed how during his “forty years devoted to the national revolution”, Sun Yat Sen was constantly seeking alliances with the great imperialist powers, Japan included. His “revolutionary nationalism”, as early as the “revolution” of 1911, was nothing but a vast mystification to hide the imperialist interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Maoism limited itself to adopting this mystification, in other words to putting itself in tune with the old ideological campaigns of the Chinese bourgeoisie.
Indeed, the “brilliant Mao Zedong thought” is little more than a vulgar plagiarism of the official Stalinist manuals of the day. Mao adulated Stalin, and made him out to be a “great continuator of marxism”, if only to ape the shameless falsification of marxism conducted by Stalin and his henchmen. Maoism’s so-called application of marxism to Chinese conditions is nothing other than the application of the ideological themes of the Stalinist counter-revolution.
We will now examine some of the main aspects of the supposed application of marxism, as revised by “Mao Zedong thought”.
On the proletarian revolution
A study of Chinese history on the basis of Mao’s works would leave the reader in complete ignorance of the repercussions within China of the proletarian revolutionary wave set off in 1917. Maoism (and so official history, whether Maoist or not) has buried the proletarian revolution in China lock, stock, and barrel.
When Mao does mention the proletarian revolution, it is only to include it within the “bourgeois revolution”: “The revolution of 1924-27 was carried out thanks to the collaboration of two parties - the CPC and the Kuomintang - on the basis of a well-defined programme. In barely two or three years, the national revolution encountered immense success (...) These successes were based on the creation of the revolutionary support base of Kuang Tong, and the victory of the Northern Expedition” [10] [656]. All this is pure falsehood. As we have seen, the period from 1924 to 1927 was characterised not by the “national revolution” but by the revolutionary wave amongst the working class in all the great Chinese cities, rising to the point of insurrection. The co-operation between the CPC and the Kuomintang, in other words the opportunist alignment of the proletarian party with the bourgeoisie, was built not on the basis of “enormous successes”, but of tragic defeats for the proletariat. And finally the “Northern Expedition”, far from being a revolutionary “victory”, was nothing but a bourgeois manoeuvre designed to control the cities and massacre the working class. And the high point of this expedition was precisely the massacre of workers by the Kuomintang.
As for the events of 1926, in the midst of an upsurge of the workers’ movement Mao could hardly avoid a reference to the “general strikes in Hong Kong and Shanghai, at the origin of the events of 30th May” [11] [657]. But by 1939, he had reduced these to a mere demonstration by the intellectual petty-bourgeoisie, and failed so much as to mention the historic Shanghai insurrection of 1927 in which almost one million workers took part [12] [658].
The systematic burial of the whole experience, and of the historic and worldwide importance of the revolutionary movement in China, is one of the essential aspects of Maoism’s “original” contribution to bourgeois ideology in obscuring proletarian class consciousness.
This is one of the historic principles of the proletariat’s historic struggle, and therefore of marxism, which contains within itself the question of the destruction of capitalist states and the overcoming of national boundaries imposed by bourgeois society. “It is indisputable that internationalism constitutes one of the cornerstones of communism. It has been well-established since 1848 that the “workers have no country” (...) If capitalism found in the nation the most appropriate framework for its own development, communism can only be established on a worldwide scale. The proletarian revolution will destroy all nations” (from the Introduction to our pamphlet Nation or Class?).
In Mao’s hands, this principle was turned into its exact opposite. For him, patriotism and internationalism were identical: “Can a communist internationalist also be a patriot? He not only can be, he must be (...) In wars of national liberation, patriotism is the application of the internationalist principle (...) We are both internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is: ‘struggle against the aggressor to defend the fatherland’” [13] [659]. Let us just recall in passing that the “national war” in question is none other than World War II! This is how the enrolment of workers into imperialist war becomes an application of proletarian internationalism! It is by using just such monstrous mystifications that the bourgeoisie gets the workers to massacre each other.
Mao Zedong cannot even claim the distinction of being the first to formulate this “ingenious” idea, whereby an internationalist can be a patriot at the same time. He merely repeated the speech of Dimitrov, one of Stalin’s hired ideologues: “Proletarian internationalism must, so to speak, “acclimatise itself” to each country (...) The national ‘forms’ of the proletarian struggle in no way contradict proletarian internationalism (...) The socialist revolution will be the nation’s salvation” [14] [660]. He himself was merely adopting the declarations of social-patriots of the Kautsky variety, who sent the proletariat to the slaughter in 1914: “All have the right and the duty to defend the fatherland; real internationalism consists in recognising this right for the socialists of every country” [15] [661]. We are more than willing to recognise Maoism’s continuity, not with marxism, but with those “theories” which have always tried to deform marxism in the service of capital.
The class struggle
We have already shown how Mao Zedong, throughout his works, buried the whole experience of the proletariat. And yet he never ceases to refer to “the proletariat’s leading role in the revolution”. Yet the most important part of “Mao Zedong thought” on the class struggle is that which subordinates the interests of the exploited classes to those of their exploiters: “It is now an established principle that in the war of resistance against Japan, everything must be abandoned in the interests of victory. Consequently, the interests of the class struggle must be subordinated to the interests of the war of resistance, and not enter into conflict with them (...) We must apply an appropriate policy of readjustment in the relations between the classes, a policy which does not leave the working masses without political and material guarantees, but which takes account of the interests of the possessing classes” [16] [662].
Mao Zedong’s terminology here is that of a classic bourgeois nationalist, who demands that workers make the supreme sacrifice in exchange for promises of “political and material guarantees”, but in the framework of the national interest, in other words in the framework of the interests of the ruling class. He is indistinguishable from the others, except for the particular cynicism which allows him to describe this as a “deepening of marxism”.
Maoism’s supposed “development of marxism” appears in the question of the state, through the theory of the “new democracy”, presented as the “revolutionary path” for under-developed countries. If we are to believe Mao Zedong, “the revolution of the new democracy (...) does not lead to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, but to the dictatorship of the united front of various revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat (...) It also differs from the socialist revolution, in that it can only defeat the domination of the imperialists, collaborationists, and reactionaries in China, since it eliminates none of those sectors of capitalism that contribute to the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle”.
Mao has thus discovered a new kind of state, which is supposedly the instrument of no particular class, but rather an inter-classist front or alliance. This may be a new formulation of the old theory of class collaboration, but it has nothing to do with marxism. The theory of the “new democracy” is nothing but a new version of bourgeois democracy, which claims to be the government of the people, in other words of all classes. The only difference is that Mao calls it a “front of various classes”, and as he himself recognised: “Essentially, the revolution of the new democracy coincides with the revolution that was called for by Sun Yat Sen with his Three Principles of the People (...) Sun Yat Sen said: “In modern states, the so-called democratic system is in general monopolised by the bourgeoisie and has become merely an instrument for oppressing the common people. By contrast, the democratic principle defended by the Kuomintang defends a democratic system in the hands of this common people, and will not allow that it should be confiscated by the few”” [17] [663].
Concretely, the theory of the “new democracy” was the means for controlling the largely peasant population in the zones under CPC control. It was later to become the ideological fig-leaf for the state capitalism set up when the CPC took power.
For years, Mao Zedong’s “philosophical works” were taught in university circles as “marxist philosophy”. Not only does Mao’s philosophy have nothing to do with the marxist method - despite its pseudo-marxist language - it is in total opposition to it. Mao’s philosophy, inspired by vulgarisations of Stalin, is nothing but a justification of its author’s political contortions. Let us consider, for example, the embarrassing rhetoric that he uses to deal with the question of contradictions: “In the process of development of a complex thing many contradictions are found, and one of these is necessarily the principle whose existence and development determines or influences the existence and development of the others (...) A semi-colonial country like China provides a complex framework to the relations between the principal contradiction and the secondary contradictions. When imperialism unleashes a war against such a country, the different classes which make up the latter (except a small number of traitors) can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. The contradiction between imperialism and the country in question thus becomes the principle contradiction, temporarily relegating the contradictions between the different classes within the country to a secondary and subordinate level (...) Such is the situation in the present war between China and Japan”.
In other words, the Maoist “theory” of “displaced contradictions” simply comes down to saying that the proletariat can and must abandon its struggle against the bourgeoisie in the name of the national interest, and that the antagonistic classes can and must unite in the framework of imperialist slaughter, that the exploited classes can and must bow to the interests of the exploiters. We can understand why the bourgeoisie all over the world spread Maoist philosophy in the universities, presenting it as marxism!
To sum up, we would say that Maoism has nothing to do with the working class’ struggle, nor its consciousness, nor its revolutionary organisations. It has nothing to do with marxism: it is neither a tendency within nor a development of the proletariat’s revolutionary theory. On the contrary, Maoism is nothing but a gross falsification of marxism; its only function is to bury every revolutionary principle, to confuse proletarian class consciousness and replace it with the most stupid and narrow-minded nationalist ideology. As a “theory”, Maoism is just another of those wretched forms adopted by the bourgeois in its decadent period of counter-revolution and imperialist war.
Ldo.
[1] [664] See International Review nos.81 and 84.
[2] [665] See the Report on an enquiry into the Hunan peasant movement, Mao Zedong, March 1927.
[3] [666] For more on Chen Duxiu, see the box below.
[4] [667] Quoted by Lazlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, Hurst & Co, 1992.
[5] [668] Speech by Mao at the 2nd Congress of the “Chinese Soviets”, published in Japan. Quoted by Lazlo Ladany, op. cit.
[6] [669] Lost Chance in China. The World War II despatches of John S. Service, Vintage Books, 1974.
[7] [670] Report on an enquiry into the Hunan peasant movement, Mao Zedong, March 1927.
[8] [671] The urgent tasks after the establishment of the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Mao Zedong, September 1937.
[9] [672] Present tactical problems in the anti-Japanese United Front, Mao Zedong, May 1940.
[10] [673] See the first article in this series, in International Review no.81.
[11] [674] Analysis of classes in Chinese society, March 1926.
[12] [675] The Chinese revolution and the CPC, Mao Zedong, December 1939.
[13] [676] The role of the CPC in the national war, Mao Zedong, October 1938.
[14] [677] Fascism, democracy, and the Popular Front, report presented by Georgi Dimitrov to the 7th Congress of the Comintern, August 1935.
[15] [678] Quoted by Lenin in The downfall of the Second International, September 1915.
[16] [679] The role of the CPC in the national war, op. cit.
[17] [680] The Chinese revolution and the CPC, op. cit.
The summit of European Union heads of state in May was intended as a solemn finale to the introduction of the common currency, the Euro. The meeting, held in Brussels, was supposed to celebrate their victory over "nationalist egotism". The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, declared beforehand that the new currency was above all the incarnation of peace in Europe for the next century, and in particular an end to the historic and bloody rivalry between Germany and France.
But facts are stubborn, and it is often when least expected that they blow to pieces the fraudulent ideas that the ruling classes invent to deceive both themselves, but especially those that they exploit. Instead of an expression of mutual confidence and peaceful collaboration between European states, the Brussels conference quickly turned into a fisticuffs over an apparently secondary question: when should the Frenchman Trichet replace the Dutch Duisenberg as President of the new European Central Bank (ECB) - an arrangement which itself violates the solemnly adopted treaty on the Euro.
When the dust settled, and the French President Chirac had finished boasting how he had imposed Duisenberg's replacement by Trichet after four years, and the German Finance Minister Weigel was no longer contradicting him with the assertion that Bonn's Dutch favourite could perfectly well stay for eight years "if he wanted", an embarrassed silence fell over the European capitals. How to explain this sudden relapse into a supposedly anachronistic spirit of national "prestige"? Why had Chirac endangered the common currency's introductory ceremony for no other reason than to see one of his compatriots at the head of the ECB, especially when the man in question has the reputation of being a clone of Bundesbank President Tietmeyer? Why did Kohl hesitate for so long to make the slightest concession on such an issue? Why was he so strongly criticised in Germany for the compromise that he eventually accepted? And why did the other nations resign themselves to such a dispute, despite their unanimous support for Duisenberg? After much head-scratching, the bourgeois press came up with an explanation, or rather with several explanations. In France, the Brussels argument was put down to German arrogance; in Germany, to inflated French national pride; in Britain, to the madness of the continentals who are unable to stick to their good old traditional currency.
Are not these excuses and "explanations" a proof in themselves that a real conflict of national interest was played out in Brussels? Far from limiting economic competition between the participating national capitals, the introduction of a single currency means an intensification of these rivalries. More especially, the conflict between the "good friends" Kohl and Chirac expresses the French bourgeoisie's disquiet at the growing economic and political strength, and aggressiveness, of its German crony. Despite all Kohl's diplomatic caution, Germany's economic and imperialist rise cannot but alarm its French "partner". Foreseeing his own coming retirement, Kohl has indeed left the following message to his successors: "The expression "German leadership" should be avoided, since it could lead to accusations that we are trying to win hegemony in Europe"[1].
Increasing aggressiveness of German capitalism
In fact, May 1998 saw two important developments which concretise Germany's intention to impose economic measures that will ensure the dominant position of German capitalism at the expense of its weaker rivals.
The first is the organisation of the European currency. The Euro was originally a French project, forced on Kohl by Mitterrand in exchange for French consent to German unification. At the time, the French bourgeoisie rightly feared that the Frankfurt Bundesbank would use the leading role of the Mark and a policy of high interest rates to force the whole of Europe into financing German re-unification. But once Germany threw its whole weight into the project (without which the Euro would never have existed), what finally emerged was a European currency corresponding to German, not French, notions and interests.
After the Brussels summit, the German bourgeoisie's view was expressed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "From the independence of the Central Bank and its establishment in Frankfurt, to the stability pact to support the Central Bank and the rejection of an "economic government" as a political counterweight to the ECB, in the final analysis France has been unable to impose a single one of its demands. Even the name of the single currency laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, the Ecu - which is a reminder of a historic French currency - has been abandoned on the road to Brussels in favour of the more neutral "Euro" (_) As far as its political prestige and ideas are concerned, France has come away empty-handed. Chirac played rough in Brussels in order to wipe out this impression, at least partially" (5th May, 1998).
The second important expression of Germany's aggressive economic expansion lies in the international buy-out operations being conducted by the main German motor manufacturers. The merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler will create the world's third largest car builder. Unable to survive as the third US manufacturer behind General Motors and Ford, and having already been saved once from bankruptcy by the American state, Chrysler had no choice but to accept the German offer, despite the fact that this gives access to its shares in NASA projects and the US armaments industry to Daimler, which is already Germany's biggest armaments and aeronautics manufacturer. The ink on this agreement was barely dry when Daimler announced its intention to buy Nippon Trucks. Although Daimler is the world's largest truck manufacturer, it still only holds 8 % of the important Asian market. Here again, the German bourgeoisie is in a position of strength. Although Japan knows full well that the Stuttgart giant intends to use this merger to increase its market share to 25 % - at Japan's expense' - it can hardly prevent the agreement, since the once proud Nippon Trucks is facing bankruptcy.
To complete the tableau, there is the dispute over the purchase of the British Rolls-Royce from Vickers, currently being fought out between two German companies, which in the light of history places the shareholders before an unpleasant choice. A sale to BMW would almost be a sacrilege to the memory of the Battle of Britain, where the Royal Air Force equipped with Rolls-Royce engines fought off a Luftwaffe largely supplied by the same BMW. "The idea of BMW owning Rolls-Royce breaks my heart" declared one venerable gentleman to the German press. Unfortunately, the only other choice is Volkswagen, a company created by the Nazis and which would oblige Her Majesty the Queen to get around in a "People's Car".
This is only the beginning of a process which will not be limited to the car industry. The French government and the European Commission in Brussels have just concluded an agreement on a plan to save the Credit Lyonnais, one of the main French banks. One of the plan's principal objectives is to prevent the most profitable parts of the Credit Lyonnais from falling into German hands[2].
During the Cold War, Germany, a major capitalist nation, was divided, militarily occupied, and deprived of complete sovereignty. It was politically unable to develop an international presence for its banks and businesses to match its industrial strength. When the world order born at Yalta collapsed in 1989, the German bourgeoisie no longer had any reason to tolerate this state of affairs, at least as far as business was concerned. Recent events have confirmed that the thoroughly democratic successors to Alfred Krupp and Adolf Hitler are just as capable when it comes to pushing their rivals out of the way. Scarcely surprising that their capitalist "friends" and "partners" should be so irritated.
The Euro: a tool against "look after number one"
Kohl understood earlier than his German colleagues that the disintegration of the imperialist blocs, but also the anxiety aroused by the re-unification of Germany, were likely to provoke a new wave of protectionism and an economic "look after number one" - something that until then had been restrained by the discipline of the American bloc. It was clear that Germany, as Europe's greatest industrial power and champion exporter, risked being the main victim of any such development.
The majority of the German bourgeoisie - so proud of the Deutschmark and so scared of inflation[3] - was brought round to Kohl's position by the European monetary crisis of 1993 (which had begun a year before when Britain and Italy left the European Monetary System). The crisis was provoked by substantial international currency speculation - itself an expression of capitalism's chronic and general crisis of overproduction. It almost led to an explosion of the EMS set up by Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing to prevent the uncontrolled and unforeseen currency fluctuations which threatened to paralyse intra-European trade. As the crisis advanced, the inadequacy of the system was revealed. Moreover, in j 993 the French bourgeoisie - which often demonstrates more determination than good sense - suggested replacing the German Mark with the French Franc as Europe's reference currency. This proposal was certainly unrealistic, and was unanimously rejected by France's "partners", notably Holland (Duisenberg's country'). All this convinced the German ruling class that there was a danger of an uncontrolled free for all. This is why they rallied round their Chancellor. The common currency was thus intended both to put an end to monetary fluctuations between the various European "trading partners", and to counter a potential tendency towards protectionism and the collapse of world trade. After all, Europe is, with the United States, the main centre of world commerce. Unlike America, however, Europe is divided into a multitude of national capitals. As such, it is a potential weak link in the chain of world trade. Today, even the most convinced advocates of a "United Europe", like the German CDU and SPD, are convinced that there is no alternative to a "Europe of nations"[4]. However, they can set up the Euro in order to limit the risks at the level of world trade. This is why the Euro is supported by most fractions of the bourgeoisie, not just in Europe but also in the USA.
But if there is such widespread support for the Euro, how does this express a sharpening of capitalist competition? What is the particular interest of the German bourgeoisie? Why is the German version of the Euro an expression of aggressive self-defence against its rivals? In other words, why does it annoy Chirac so?
Euro: the strong impose their rules on the weak
The conflict in Europe over the Euro
It is true that the common European currency serves the interests of all its participants. But this is only a part of the reality. For the weaker countries, the protection offered by the Euro is much like the generous protection that the Mafia offers its victims. Confronted with Germany's superior exporting power, most of its European rivals have, during the last thirty years, had regular recourse to currency devaluations (eg Italy, Sweden, Britain), or at least to a policy of economic stimulation and a weak currency (France). In Paris, the conception of fiscal policy "at the service of economic expansion" has been no less a state doctrine than the Bundesbank's "monetarism". At the beginning of the 1930s, such policies, and abrupt devaluations in particular, were amongst the European nations' favourite weapons at Germany's expense. Under the new Germanic law of the Euro, this will no longer be possible. At the heart of this system is a principle that France finds it hard to swallow: the principle of independence for the ECB, which in fact means its dependence on the policy and support of Germany.
The weaker countries - Italy is a classic example - have slight means to maintain a minimum of stability outside the Euro, without the access to the capital, currency markets, and competitive interest rates that the system offers. Britain and Sweden are relatively more competitive that Italy, and less dependent on the German economy than France and Holland, and will be able to survive longer outside the Euro. But within its protective walls, the others will have lost some of their weapons against Germany.
Germany could compromise on the issue of Trichet and the presidency of the ECB. But it has accepted no compromise on the organisation of the Euro, any more than it has on the international expansion of its banks and industries. It could not be otherwise. Germany is the motor of the European economy. But after thirty years of open crisis, even Germany is a "sick man" of the world economy. It is enormously dependent on the world market[5]. The number of unemployed is approaching that of the 1930s. And it has a further, extremely expensive, problem to resolve: the economic and social costs of reunification. It is decadent capitalism's irreversible crisis of overproduction which has shaken the German economy to its core, forcing it, like the other capitalist giants, to fight mercilessly for its own survival.
Kr, 25th May 1998
[1] Declaration by Kohl at a meeting of the Bundestag parliamentary commission on the finances and business of the European Union, 21/4/98.
[2] It is worth noting the important role played by the highly respectable Trichet in the Credit Lyonnais affair: that of hiding the bank's insolvency from the public for several years.
[3] The German bourgeoisie has not forgotten 1929, but nor has it forgotten 1923 when the Reichsmark was not worth the paper it was printed on.
[4] The world's division into competing national capitals can only be overcome by the world proletarian revolution.
[5] According to the OECD, Germany's exports were $511 billion in 1997, second only to the USA with $688 billion, and well ahead of Japan with $421 billion.
In parallel with our series 'Communism is not a nice idea, it is on the agenda of history', we are publishing a number of classic documents of the revolutionary movement of the 20th century relating to the means and goals of the proletarian revolution. We begin with the platform of the Communist International adopted by its founding Congress in March 1919 as the basis for adherence of all genuine revolutionary groups and currents to the new world party.
1919 was the zenith of the great revolutionary wave which came in the wake of the 1914-18 imperialist war. The October insurrection in Russia, the seizure of power by the workers' soviets under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, had ignited a flame which threatened to engulf the capitalist world. Between 1918 and 1920, Germany, at the very heart of world capitalism, experienced a series of revolutionary uprisings; mass strikes broke out in key industrial cities from Italy to Scotland and from the USA to Argentina; at the very time the CI was holding its Congress, news came through of the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.
But at the same time, events just prior to the Congress had demonstrated the grave consequences that would ensue if this growing mass movement was not guided by a programmatically clear and internationally centralised communist party. The defeat of the Berlin uprising in January 1919, which had led to the assassination of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, was to no small extent the result of the inability of the fledgling KPD to lead the workers away from the traps of the bourgeoisie so that they could preserve their forces for a more propitious moment. The formation of the CI thus corresponded to the most urgent needs of the class struggle. It was the fulfilment of the work of the revolutionary left ever since the collapse of the Second International in 1914.
But far from being a leadership imposed from without, the CI was itself an organic product of the proletarian movement, and the clarity of its programmatic positions in 1919 reflects its close connection to the most profound forces at work in the revolutionary wave. By the same token, the later opportunist degeneration of the CI was intimately linked to the decline of this wave and the isolation of the Russian bastion.
The platform was drafted by Bukharin and the KPD delegate Eberlein, both of whom also had the responsibility of summarising its main points before the Congress. It is worth quoting from Bukharin's opening remarks because they show how the platform incorporated some of the most important theoretical advances made by the communist movement as it emerged from the wreckage of social democracy:
"First comes the theoretical introduction. It gives a characterisation of the whole present epoch from a particular point of view, namely, one that takes the bankruptcy of the capitalist system as its starting point. Previously, when introductions of this sort were composed, they simply gave a general description of the capitalist system. In the most recent period, in my opinion, this has become insufficient. Here we must not only give a general characteristic of the capitalist and imperialist system, but also show the process of disintegration and collapse of this system. That is the first aspect of the question. The second is that we must examine the capitalist system not just in its abstract form, but concretely in its character as world capitalism, and we should examine it as something that is a single entity, as an economic whole. And if we look at this world capitalist economic system from the standpoint of its collapse, then we have to ask ourselves: how was this collapse possible? And that is why we must analyse, first of all, the contradictions of the capitalist system" (proceedings of the First Congress of the CI, Report on the Platform).
Bukharin also goes on to point out that in this epoch of disintegration, "the previous form of capital - dispersed, unorganised capital - has almost disappeared. This process had already begun before the war and strengthened while it was underway. The war played a great organising role. Under its pressure, finance capitalism was transformed into an even higher form, the form of state capitalism".
From the beginning, then, the CI was founded on the understanding that by the very fact of developing into a world economy, capitalism had also reached its historic limits, had entered its epoch of decline. This is a striking rebuff to all the modernisers who think that "globalisation" is something new and, furthermore, has conferred a new lease of life on capitalism I But it is equally a sharp reminder to those revolutionaries (particularly in the Bordigist tradition) who profess descent from the programmatic positions of the CI and yet reject the notion of capitalist decadence as a cornerstone of revolutionary politics today. As for the notion of state capitalism, which Bukharin played a key role in elaborating, we shall have occasion to return to its significance in the context of our series on communism. Suffice it to say here that the International considered it important enough to include as a fundamental feature of the new epoch.
Following the general introduction, the platform focuses on the central issues of the proletarian revolution: first and foremost, the conquest of political power by the working class; secondly, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the economic transformation of society. On the first point, the platform affirms the essential lessons of the October revolution: the necessity for the destruction of the old bourgeois state power and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat, organised through the council or soviet system. Here the platform was supplemented by the Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, drafted by Lenin and adopted by the same Congress.
The break from social democracy with its fetishism of democracy in general and bourgeois parliaments in particular was axed around this point; and the demand for the transfer of power to the workers' councils was the simple but irreplaceable rallying cry of the whole international movement.
The section on the economic measures is necessarily general; only in Russia had this become a concrete question (and, furthermore, one that could not be solved in Russia alone). It puts forward the bare essentials of the transition towards a communist society: the expropriation of the great private and state enterprises; the first steps towards the socialisation of distribution in place of the market; the gradual integration of small producers into social production. The series on communism will examine some of the difficulties and misconceptions that hampered the revolutionary movement of the day when it came to these problems. But the measures put forward in the CI platform were nevertheless an adequate point of departure, and their weaknesses could have been overcome given the successful development of the world revolution.
"If we were writing only for Russians, we would take up the role of the trade unions in the process of revolutionary reconstruction. However, judging by the experience of the German communists, this is impossible, for the comrades there tell us that the position occupied by their trade unions is the complete opposite of the one taken by ours. In our country, the trade unions play a vital role in the organisation of useful work and are a pillar of Soviet power. In Germany, however, it is just the opposite. This was brought about, evidently, by the fact that the German trade unions were in the hands of the Yellow Socialists - Legien and Company. Their activity was directed against the interests of the German proletariat. That continues even today, and the proletariat is already dissolving these old trade unions. In place of them, new organisations have arisen in Germany - the factory and plant committees, which are trying to take production into their own hands. The trade unions there no longer play any kind of positive role. We cannot work out any kind of concrete line on this, and therefore we say only that, in general terms, to manage the enterprises, institutions must be created that the proletariat can rely on, that are closely bound to production and embedded in the production process ...."
We can take issue with some of Bukharin's formulations here (particularly on the role of the unions in Russia) but the passage is still a striking indication of the receptive attitude of the International at that moment. Faced with the new conditions imposed by the decadence of capitalism, the CI expresses a concern to give expression to the new methods of proletarian struggle appropriate to these conditions; and this is clear proof that its platform was a product of the high tide of the worldwide revolutionary movement, and remains an essential reference for revolutionaries today.
The contradictions of the world capitalist system, formerly hidden deep within it, have erupted with colossal force in a gigantic explosion: the great imperialist World War.
Capitalism sought to overcome its own anarchy by organising production. Mighty capitalist associations formed, such as syndicates, cartels, and trusts, replacing the numerous, competing entrepreneurs. Bank capital merged with industrial capital. The finance capitalist oligarchy came to dominate all of economic life; it used its organisation, based on this power, to achieve exclusive supremacy. Monopoly took the place of free competition. Capitalists in association replaced the individual capitalist; organisation replaced insane anarchy.
Capitalism also tried to overcome its contradictory social structure. Bourgeois society is a class society. In the largest "civilised" nations, capital wanted to conceal its social contradictions. It bribed its wage slaves at the expense of the plundered colonial peoples, thereby forging common interests between exploiter and exploited with respect to the oppressed colonies - the yellow, black, and red colonial peoples - and shackling the European and American working class to the imperialist "fatherland".
But continuous bribery, the very technique that made the working class patriotic and enslaved it psychologically, was transformed by the war into its opposite. Physical annihilation and utter enslavement of the proletariat; enormous hardship, suffering, and degradation; worldwide famine - these were the final pay-off for the "civil peace". This "peace" was shattered. The imperialist war was turned into a civil war.
A new epoch is born: The epoch of capitalism's decay, its internal disintegration; the epoch of the proletarian, communist revolution.
The imperialist system is collapsing. Turmoil in the colonies and in the newly independent small nations; proletarian revolts and victorious proletarian revolutions in some countries; disintegration of the imperialist armies; utter incapacity of the ruling classes to guide the destinies of nations any further - that is the true picture of conditions around the world today.
Against this, world capital is arming itself for the final battle.
Using the "League of Nations" and pacifist phrase-mongering to conceal its intentions, it is making a last attempt to paste the crumbling pieces of the capitalist system back together and rally its forces against the ever-growing proletarian revolution.
The proletariat must answer this outrageous new conspiracy of the capitalist class by conquering political power, directing that .power against the class enemy, and wielding it as a lever of economic transformation. The final victory of the world proletariat will mean the beginning of the real history of liberated humanity.
The conquest of political power by the proletariat means destroying the political power of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie's mightiest instrument of power is the bourgeois state apparatus with its capitalist army led by officers of the bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy, its police and security forces, its judges and jailers, preachers, government bureaucrats, and so forth. The conquest of political power does not mean merely a change of personnel in the ministries. Instead, it means destroying the enemy's state apparatus; seizing real power; disarming the bourgeoisie, the counter-revolutionary officers, and the White Guards. It means arming the proletariat, the revolutionary soldiers, and the workers' Red Guard; removing all bourgeois judges and organising proletarian justice; abolishing the rule of reactionary government officials; and creating new organs of proletarian administration. The key to victory for the proletariat lies in organising its power and disorganising that of the enemy; it entails smashing the bourgeois state apparatus while constructing a proletarian one. Only after the proletariat has achieved victory and broken the resistance of the bourgeoisie can it make its former enemies useful to the new order, placing them under its control and gradually drawing them into the work of communist construction.
The proletarian state is an apparatus of repression like every other, but it is wielded against the enemies of the working class. Its purpose is to break and eliminate the resistance of the exploiters, who use every means in a desperate struggle to drown the revolution in blood. The dictatorship of the proletariat, which openly gives the working class the favoured position in society, is at the same time a provisional institution. As the bourgeoisie's resistance is broken, and it is expropriated and gradually transformed into a part of the workforce, the proletarian dictatorship wanes, the state withers away, and with it, social classes themselves.
So-called democracy, that is, bourgeois democracy, is nothing but a veiled dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The highly touted general "will of the people" is no more real than national unity. In reality, classes confront each other with antagonistic, irreconcilable wills. Bur since the bourgeoisie is a small minority, it needs this fiction, this illusion of a national "will of the people", these high-sounding words, to consolidate its rule over the working class and impose its own class will on the proletariat. By contrast the proletariat, the overwhelming majority of the population, openly wields the class power of its mass organisations, its councils, in order to abolish the privileges of the bourgeoisie and to safeguard the transition to a classless, communist society.
Bourgeois democracy puts the primary emphasis on purely formal declarations of rights and freedoms, which are beyond the reach of working people, the proletarians and semi-proletarians, who lack the material resources to exercise them. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie uses its material resources, through its press and organisations, to deceive and betray the people. In contrast, the council system, the new type of state power, assigns the highest priority to enabling the proletariat to exercise its rights and freedom.
The power of the councils gives the best palaces, buildings, printing plants, paper stocks, and so forth to the people for their newspapers, meetings, and organisations. Only thus does real proletarian democracy even become possible.
Bourgeois democracy, with its parliamentary system, only pretends to give the masses a voice in running the government. In reality the masses and their organisations are completely excluded from real power or participation in state administration. Under the council system the mass organisations govern, and through them the masses themselves, since the councils involve a constantly increasing number of workers in administering the state. Only in this way is the entire working population gradually integrated into actually governing. Therefore the council system rests on the mass organisations of the proletariat: the councils themselves, the revolutionary trade unions, the co-operatives, and so on.
Bourgeois democracy and the parliamentary system widen the .gulf between the masses and the state by separating legislative and executive power and by means of parliamentary elections without recall. Under the council system on the other hand, right of recall, the unification of legislative and executive powers, and the character of the councils as working bodies all serve to connect the masses with the administrative organs of government. This bond is further strengthened by the organisation of elections in the council system on the basis of production units, not artificial geographic districts.
Thus, the council system puts into practice true proletarian democracy, democracy by and for the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie. This system favours the industrial proletariat as the best organised, most politically mature, and leading class, under whose hegemony the semi-proletarians and small farmers in the countryside will make gradual progress. The industrial proletariat must utilise its temporary advantages to tear the poorer petty-bourgeois masses in the countryside away from the influence of the large peasants and the bourgeoisie and to organise and educate them as fellow workers in the construction of communism.
The breakdown of capitalist order and work discipline make 'it impossible to return to production on the old basis under the existing relationship of class forces. Even when they are successful, workers' struggles for higher wages fail to bring the desired improvements in the standard of living, as soaring prices on all basic necessities wipe out every gain. The workers' living conditions can he raised only when the proletariat itself, and not the bourgeoisie, controls production. The powerful struggles for higher wages by workers in every country, through their elemental driving force and tendency to become generalised, clearly express the desperate situation workers face. These battles make it impossible for capitalist production to continue. The resistance of the bourgeoisie prolongs the old society's death agony and threatens to destroy economic life completely. In order to break this resistance and to expand the productive forces of the economy as rapidly as possible, the proletarian dictatorship must expropriate the big bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy and transform the means of production and distribution into collective property of the proletarian state.
Communism is now being born amid the rubble of capitalism; history leaves humanity no other way out. The utopian slogan of reconstructing the capitalist economy, advanced by the opportunists as a way to put off socialisation, only prolongs the process of disintegration and creates the danger of complete collapse. Communist revolution, on the other hand, is the best and the only means by which society can preserve its most important productive force, the proletariat, and thereby save itself.
The proletarian dictatorship most definitely will not divide up the means of production and distribution; on the contrary, its purpose is to subordinate production to a centralised plan.
The first steps toward socialising the whole economy include: socialisation of the system of big banks, which now direct production; take-over by the proletarian state power of all of the agencies for economic control by the capitalist state; seizure of all municipal enterprises; socialisation of branches of production dominated by cartels and trusts, as well as those where seizure is practical because capital has been concentrated and centralised; nationalisation of agricultural estates and their transformation into socially operated agricultural enterprises.
As far as the small enterprises are concerned, the proletariat must gradually combine them, depending on their size.
It must be made very clear here that small property owners will not be expropriated under any circumstances, nor will proprietors who do not exploit wage labour be subject to any coercive measures. This layer will gradually be drawn into socialist organisation by example and experience, which will show it the advantages of the new system. This system will free the small farmers and the urban petty bourgeoisie from the economic yoke of usury capital and the landed aristocracy, and from the burden of taxation (in particular by cancelling all government debts).
The proletarian dictatorship will be able to accomplish its economic task only to the degree that the proletariat can establish centralised agencies to administer production and introduce workers' management. To that end it will have to use the mass organisations that are most closely linked to the production process.
In the sphere of distribution, the proletarian dictatorship must replace the market with the equitable distribution of products. To accomplish this the following measures are in order: socialisation of wholesale firms; takeover by the proletariat of all distribution agencies of the bourgeois state and the municipalities; supervision of the large consumer cooperatives, which will continue to play a major economic role during the transitional period; and gradual centralisation of all these institutions and their transformation into a single system distributing goods in a rational manner.
In the sphere of distribution as in that of production, all qualified technicians and specialists should be utilised, provided their political resistance has been broken and they are capable of serving the new system of production rather than capital.
The proletariat will not oppress them; for the first time it will give them the opportunity to develop their creative abilities to the utmost. Capitalism created a division between manual and intellectual labour; the proletarian dictatorship, by contrast, will foster their co-operation and so unite science and labour.
Along with the expropriation of the factories, mines, estates, and so on, the proletariat must also do away with exploitation of the population by capitalist landlords. It must place the large buildings in the hands of the local workers' councils and resettle workers in the bourgeoisie's houses, and so forth.
During this time of great upheaval, the council power will have to steadily centralise the entire administrative apparatus, while also involving ever broader layers of the working population in direct participation in government.
The revolutionary epoch requires the proletariat to use methods of struggle that bring all of its strength to bear. That means mass action and its logical consequence, direct confrontations with the bourgeois slate machinery in open battle. All other methods, such as revolutionary utilisation of bourgeois parliament, must be subordinated to this goal.
In order for this struggle to be successful, it will not be enough to split with the outright lackeys of capital and the hangmen of the communist revolution, the role played by the right-wing Social Democrats. It is also necessary to break with the centre (the Kautskyites), who abandon the proletariat in its hour of greatest need and flirt with its sworn enemies.
On the other hand, a bloc is needed with the forces in the revolutionary workers' movement who, although not previously part of the Socialist party, now for the most part support the proletarian dictatorship in the form of council power. Certain forces in the syndicalist movement are an example of this.
The revolutionary movement's growth in all countries; the danger of its being strangled by the league of capitalist states; the attempts of social-traitor parties to unify their forces by founding the Yellow "International" in Bern, the better to serve Wilson's League of nations; and moreover, the absolute necessity of co-ordinating proletarian actions: all these considerations make it essential to establish a truly revolutionary and proletarian Communist International.
The International, which puts the interests of the international revolution ahead of so-called national interests, will make mutual aid among the proletariat of different countries a reality. Without economic and other forms of mutual assistance, the proletariat cannot organise the new society. By the same token, in contrast to the Yellow social-patriotic International, international proletarian communism will support exploited colonial peoples in their struggles against imperialism in order to hasten the ultimate downfall of the world imperialist system.
At the beginning of the World War, the capitalist criminals claimed that they were only defending the common fatherland. But the bloody deeds of German imperialism in Russia, the Ukraine, and Finland soon showed its actual predatory nature. Now the Entente countries are being exposed, even before the backward layers of the population, as international bandits and murderers of the proletariat. In concert with the German bourgeoisie and social patriots, and mouthing hypocritical rhetoric about peace, they are strangling the proletarian revolution in Europe with their war machines and with brutalised, barbaric colonial troops. The White Terror of the bourgeois cannibals defies description. The working class's victims are without number. It has lost its best Liebknecht and Luxemburg.
The proletariat must defend itself against this terror no matter what the cost. The Communist International summons the whole world proletariat to this final battle. Weapon against weapon! Power against power'!
Down with capital's imperialist conspiracy!
Long live the international republic of proletarian councils!
1) Throughout its history, the workers’ movement has had to deal with the penetration into its ranks of alien ideologies, coming either from the ruling class or from the petty bourgeoisie. This penetration has taken a number of forms within working class organisations. Among the most widespread and best-known we can point to:
2)
Sectarianism is the typical expression of a petty bourgeois conception of
organisation. It reflects the petty-bourgeois mindset of wanting to be king of
your own little castle, and it manifests itself in the tendency to place the
particular interests and concepts of one organisation above those of the
movement as a whole. In the sectarian vision, the organisation is “all alone in
the world” and it displays a regal disdain towards all the other organisations
that belong to the proletarian camp, seen as “rivals” or even “enemies”. As it
feels threatened by the latter, the sectarian organisation in general refuses
to engage in debate and polemic with them. It prefers to take refuge in its
“splendid isolation”, acting as though the others did not exist, or else
obstinately putting forward what distinguishes itself from the others without
taking into account what it has in common with them.
3)
Individualism can also derive from petty bourgeois influences, or from directly
bourgeois ones. From the ruling class it takes up the official ideology which
sees individuals as the subject of history, which glorifies the “self-made man”
and justifies the “struggle of each against all”. However, it is above all
through the vehicle of the petty bourgeoisie that it penetrates into the organisations
of the proletariat, particularly through newly proletarianised elements coming
from strata like the peasantry and the artisans (this was notably the case last
century) or from the intellectual and student milieu (this has been especially
true since the historic resurgence of the working class at the end of the 60s).
Individualism expresses itself mainly through the tendency :
4)
Opportunism, which has historically
constituted the most serious danger for the organisations of the proletariat,
is another expression of the penetration of petty bourgeois ideology. One of
its motor-forces is impatience, which expresses the viewpoint of a social
stratum doomed to impotence, having no future on the scale of history. Its
other motor is the tendency to try to conciliate between the interests and
positions of the two major classes in society, the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie. From this starting point, opportunism distinguishes itself by the
fact that it tends to sacrifice the general and historic interests of the
proletariat to the illusion of immediate and circumstantial “successes”. But
since for the working class there is no opposition between its struggle inside
capitalism and its historical combat for the abolition of the system, the
politics of opportunism in the end lead to sacrificing the immediate interests
of the proletariat as well, in particular by
pushing the class to compromise with the interests and positions of the
bourgeoisie. In the final analysis, at crucial historical moments, such as imperialist war and
proletarian revolution, opportunist political currents are led to join the
enemy camp, as was the case with the majority of the Socialist parties during
World War I, and with the Communist parties on the eve of World War II.
5)
Adventurism (or putschism[1] [681])
presents itself as the opposite of opportunism. Under cover of “intransigence”
and “radicalism” it declares itself to
be ready at all times to launch the attack on the bourgeoisie, to enter into
the “decisive” combat when the
conditions for such a combat don’t yet exist for the proletariat. And in so
doing it does not hesitate to qualify as opportunist and conciliationist, even
as “traitorous”, the authentically proletarian and marxist current which is
concerned to prevent the working class from being drawn into a struggle which
would be lost in advance. In reality, deriving from the same source as
opportunism - petty bourgeois impatience - it has frequently converged with the
latter. History is rich in examples in which opportunist currents have
supported putschist currents or have been converted to putschist radicalism.
Thus, at the beginning of the century, the right wing of German Social
Democracy, against the opposition of its left wing represented notably by Rosa
Luxemburg, gave its support to the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were
adepts of terrorism. Similarly, in January 1919, when even Rosa Luxemburg had
pronounced against an insurrection by the Berlin workers, following the
provocation by the Social Democratic government, the Independents, who had only
just left this government themselves, rushed into an insurrection which ended
in a massacre of thousands of workers, including the main communist leaders.
6)
The combat against the penetration of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology
into the organisations of the class, as well as against its different
manifestations, is a permanent responsibility for revolutionaries. In fact, it
can even be said that it is the main combat which the authentically proletarian
and revolutionary currents have had to wage within the organisations of the
class, to the extent that it is much more difficult than the direct fight
against the declared and official forces of the bourgeoisie. The fight against
sects and sectarianism was one of the first waged by Marx and Engels,
particularly within the International Workingmen’s Association (IWA).
Similarly, the fight against individualism, notably in the form of anarchism,
mobilised not only the latter but also the marxists of the Second International
(particularly Luxemburg and Lenin). The combat against opportunism has
certainly been the most constant and systematic carried out by the
revolutionary current since its origins:
The
fight against putschism has not been as constant a necessity as the struggle
against opportunism. However, it has been waged since the first steps of the
workers’ movement (against the immediatist Willich-Schapper tendency in the
Communist League, against the Bakuninist adventures over the Lyon “Commune” in
1870 and the civil war in Spain in 1873). Similarly, it was particularly
important during the revolutionary wave of 1917-23: in particular, it was
largely the Bolsheviks’ ability to carry out this struggle in July 1917 that
allowed the October revolution to take place.
7)
The preceding examples show that the impact of these different manifestations
of the penetration of alien ideologies depends closely on:
For
example, one of the most important expressions of the penetration of petty
bourgeois ideology, and the one most explicitly fought against, opportunism,
even if it is a permanent feature in the history of the workers’ movement,
found its terrain par excellence in the parties of the Second International,
during a period:
Similarly,
the penetration of opportunism into the parties of the Third International was
strongly determined by the ebb in the revolutionary wave. This encouraged the
idea that it was possible to gain an audience in the working masses by making
concessions to their illusions on questions like parliamentarism, trade
unionism or the nature of the “Socialist” parties.
The importance of the historic
moment to the different type of penetration of alien ideologies into the class
is revealed even more clearly when it comes to sectarianism. This was
particularly significant at the very beginning of the workers’ movement, when
the proletariat was only just emerging from the artisans and journeymen’s
societies with their rituals and trade secrets. Again, it went through a major
revival in the depth of the counter-revolution with the Bordigist current,
which saw withdrawing into its shell as an (obviously false) way of protecting
itself from the threat of opportunism.
8)
The phenomenon of political parasitism, which to a large extent is also the
result of the penetration of alien ideologies into the working class, has not
been accorded, within the history of the workers’ movement, the same amount of
attention as other phenomena such as opportunism. This has been the case
because parasitism has only significantly affected proletarian organisations in
very specific moments in history. Opportunism, for example, constitutes a
constant menace for proletarian organisations and it expresses itself above all
when the latter are going through their greatest phases of development. By
contrast, parasitism does not basically manifest itself at the time of the most
important movements of the class. On the contrary, it is in a period of
immaturity of the movement when the organisations of the class still have a
weak impact and not very strong traditions that parasitism finds its most
fertile soil. This is linked to the very nature of parasitism, which, to be
effective, has to relate to elements looking for class positions but who find
it hard to distinguish real revolutionary organisations from currents whose
only reason for existing is to live at the expense of the former, to sabotage
their activities, indeed to destroy them. At the same time, the phenomenon of
parasitism, again by its nature, does not appear at the very beginning of the
development of the organisations of the class but when they have already been
constituted and have proved that they really defend proletarian interests.
These are indeed the elements
which we find in the first historic manifestation of political parasitism, the
Alliance of Socialist Democracy, which sought to sabotage the combat of the IWA
and to destroy it.
9) It
was Marx and Engels who first identified the threat of parasitism to
proletarian organisations:
“It
is high time to put an end, once and for all, to the internal conflicts
provoked daily in our Association by the presence of this parasitic body.
These quarrels only serve to waste
energies which should be used to fight against the bourgeois regime. By
paralysing the activity of the International against the enemies of the working
class, the Alliance admirably serves the bourgeoisies and the governments" (Engels,
“The General Council to all the members of the International” - a warning
against Bakunin’s Alliance).
Thus
the notion of political parasitism is not at all an “ICC invention”. It was the
IWA which was the first to be confronted with this threat against the
proletarian movement, which it identified and fought. It was the IWA, beginning
with Marx and Engels, who already characterised the parasites as politicised
elements who, while claiming to adhere to the programme and organisations of
the proletariat, concentrated their efforts on the combat not against the
ruling class but against the organisations of the revolutionary class. The
essence of their activity was to denigrate and manoeuvre against the communist
camp, even if they claimed to belong to it and to serve it:[2] [682]
“For
the first time in the history of the class struggle, we are confronted with a
secret conspiracy at the heart of the working class whose aim is to destroy not
the existing regime of exploitation, but the very Association which represents
the bitterest enemy of this regime” (Engels, Report to the Hague Congress
on the Alliance).
10)
To the extent that the workers’ movement, in the shape of the IWA, possesses a
rich experience of struggle against parasitism, it is of the utmost importance,
if we are to face up to the present-day parasitic offensives and arm ourselves
against them, to recall the principal lessons of this past struggle. These
lessons concern a whole series of aspects:
In
fact, as we shall see, on all these aspects there is a striking similarity
between the situation facing the proletarian milieu today and the one
confronted by the IWA.
11)
Although it affected a working class which was still historically
inexperienced, parasitism only appears historically as an enemy of the workers’
movement when the latter has reached a certain level of maturity, having gone
beyond the infantile sectarian stage.
“The first phase of the struggle of the proletariat was characterised
by the movement of the sects. This was justified in a period in which the
proletariat had not developed sufficiently to act as a class” (Marx/Engels).
It was the appearance of marxism, the maturation of proletarian class
consciousness and the capacity of the class and its vanguard to organise the
struggle which set the workers’ movement on a healthy foundation:
“From this moment on, when the movement of the working class had
become a reality, the fantastic utopias were called upon to
disappear....because the place of these utopias had been taken by a clear
understanding of the historical conditions of this movement and because the
forces of a combat organisation of the working class were more and more being
gathered together” (Marx, first draft of The Civil War in France).
In fact, parasitism appeared
historically in response to the foundation of the First International, which
Engels described as “the means to progressively dissolve and absorb all the
different little sects” (Engels, letter to Kelly/Vischnevetsky).
In other words, the International
was the instrument that obliged the different components of the workers’
movement to embark upon a collective and public process of clarification, and
to submit to a unified, impersonal, proletarian organisational discipline. It
was in resistance to this international “dissolution and absorption” of all
these non-proletarian programmatic and organisational particularities and
autonomies that parasitism first declared war on the revolutionary movement:
“The sects, which at the beginning had been a lever to the movement,
became an obstacle to as soon as they were no longer on the order of the day;
they then became reactionary. The proof of this is the sects in France and
Britain, and recently the Lassalleans in Germany, where after years of
supporting the organisation of the proletariat, they have become mere
instruments of the police” (Marx/Engels, The so-called split in the
International).
12)
It is this dynamic framework of analysis developed by the First International
that explains why the present period, that of the 80s and above all of the 90s,
has witnessed a development of parasitism unprecedented since the time of the Alliance and the Lassallean current. For
today we are confronted with all sorts of informal regroupments, often acting
in the shadows, claiming to belong to the camp of the communist left, but
actually devoting their energies to fighting the existing marxist organisations
rather than the bourgeois regime. As in the time of Marx and Engels, the
function of this reactionary parasitic wave is to sabotage the development of
open debate and proletarian clarification, and to prevent the establishment of
rules of behaviour that link all members of the proletarian camp. The
existence:
are
among the most important elements presently provoking the hatred and offensive
of political parasitism.
As we
saw with the experience of the IWA, it is only in periods when the workers’
movement leaves behind a stage of basic immaturity and reaches a qualitatively
superior level, a specifically communist level, that parasitism becomes its
main opponent. In the current period, this immaturity is not the product of the
youth of the workers’ movement as a whole, as in the days of the IWA, but is
above all the result of the 50 years of counter-revolution which followed the
defeat of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23. Today, it is this break in organic
continuity with the traditions of past generations of revolutionaries which
above all else explains why there is such a weight of petty bourgeois
anti-organisational reflexes and behaviour among so many of the elements who
lay claim to marxism and the communist left.
13)
There are a whole series of similarities between the conditions and
characteristics of the emergence of parasitism in the days of the IWA, and of
parasitism today. However, we should also note an important difference between
the two periods: last century, parasitism largely took the form of a structured
and centralised organisation within the class’ organisation, whereas
today its form is essentially that of little groups, or even of “non-organised”
elements (though the two often work together). This difference does not call
into question the fundamental identity of the parasitic phenomenon in the two
periods, which can be explained essentially by the following facts:
In this sense, it is important to say clearly that the present dispersal
of the proletarian political milieu, and any sectarian behaviour which prevents
or hinders an effort towards the regroupment of fraternal debate between its
different components, plays into the hands of parasitism.
14)
Marxism, following the experience of the IWA, has pointed out the differences
between parasitism and the other manifestations of the penetration of alien
ideologies into the organisations of the class. For example, opportunism, even
if it can initially manifest itself in an organisational form (as in the case
of the Mensheviks in 1903) fundamentally attacks the programme of the
proletarian organisation. Parasitism, on the other hand, if it is to carry out
its role, does not a priori attack the programme. It carries out its activity
essentially on the organisational terrain, even if, in order to “recruit”, it
is often led to put into question certain aspects of the programme. Thus at the
Basle Congress of 1869, we saw Bakunin launch his battle cry of “the abolition
of the right of inheritance”, because he knew that he could gather numerous
delegates around this empty, demagogic demand, given that many illusions
existed on this question in the International. But his real aim in doing so was
to overturn the General Council influenced by Marx, and which fought against
this demand, in order to constitute a General Council devoted to himself.[4] [684]
Because parasitism directly attacks the organisational structure of proletarian
formations, it represents, when historical conditions permit its appearance, a
much more immediate danger than opportunism. These two expressions of the
penetration of alien ideologies are a mortal danger for proletarian
organisations. Opportunism leads to their death as instruments of the working
class through their passage into the bourgeois camp, but to the extent that
opportunism above all attacks the programme, it only reaches this end through a
whole process in which the revolutionary current, the left, is able to develop
within the organisation a struggle for the defence of the programme.[5] [685]
By contrast, to the extent that it is the organisation itself, as a structure,
which is threatened by parasitism, this leaves the proletarian current much
less time to organise its defence. The example of the IWA is significant in
this respect: the whole of the struggle against the Alliance lasted no more
than 4 years, between 1868 when Bakunin entered the International and 1872 when
he was expelled at the Hague Congress. This simply underlines one thing: the
necessity for the proletarian current to attack parasitism head on, not to wait
until its already done its worst before launching the fight against it.
15)
As we have seen, it is important to distinguish parasitism from other
expressions of the class’ penetration by alien ideologies. However, one of
parasitism’s characteristics is that it uses these other expressions. This
springs from parasitism’s origins, which are also the result of the penetration
of alien influences, but also from the fact that its approach - whose aim, in
the final analysis, is the destruction of proletarian organisations - is not
encumbered with principles or scruples. As we have seen, within the IWA and the
workers’ movement of the day, the Alliance was distinguished by its ability to
make use of the remnants of sectarianism, to use an opportunist approach (on
the question of the right of inheritance, for example), and to launch into
completely adventurist undertakings (the Lyon “Commune”, and the civil war of
1873 in Spain). Similarly, it was strongly founded on the individualism of a
proletariat which had barely emerged from the artisan and peasant classes
(especially in Spain and the Swiss Jura). The same
characteristics are also to be found in parasitism today. We have already
mentioned the role of individualism in the formation of parasitism, but it is
worth pointing out that all the splits from the ICC which have since formed
parasitic groups (GCI, CBG, EFICC), have been based on a sectarian approach,
splitting prematurely and refusing to take the debate to a clear conclusion.
Similarly, opportunism was one of the marks of the GCI, which accused the ICC
(when still a “tendency” within the organisation) of not imposing sufficiently
rigorous conditions on new candidates, only to turn to the most unprincipled
recruitment, even modifying its programme to accommodate the fashionable
leftist mystifications of the day (such as “Third Worldism”). The same
opportunism was demonstrated by the CBG and the EFICC at the beginning of the
1990s, when they entered an incredible round of bargaining, in an attempt to
begin a process of regroupment. Finally, as far as adventurism-putschism is
concerned, it is remarkable that, even if we leave aside the GCI’s softness for
terrorism, all these groups have systematically plunged head first into the
traps that the bourgeoisie lays for the class, calling on the workers to
develop their struggle when the ground had been mined in advance by the ruling
class and the unions, particularly, for example, during the autumn of 1995 in
France.
16)
The experience of the IWA has revealed the difference that can exist between
parasitism and the swamp (even if the latter term was not used at the time).
Marxism defines the swamp as a political zone divided between the positions of
the working class, and those of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. Such
areas can emerge as a first step in a process of coming to consciousness by
sectors of the class, or of breaking from bourgeois positions. They can also
contain the remnants of currents which at a certain point did express a real
effort by the class to come to consciousness, but which have proved unable to
evolve with the new conditions and experience of the proletarian struggle. The
groups of the swamp can rarely maintain a stable existence. Torn between the
positions of the proletariat, and those of other classes, they either fully
adopt the positions of the proletariat, or go over to those of the bourgeoisie,
or end up split between the two. Such a process of decantation is generally
given greater impetus by the great events that confront the working class (in
the 20th century, these have been essentially
imperialist war and proletarian revolution), and the general direction of this
decantation is largely dependent on the evolution of the balance of forces
between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Faced with these currents, the attitude
adopted by the left of the workers’ movement has never been to consider these
groups completely lost for the workers’ movement, but to give an impetus to the
clarification within them, to allow the clearest elements to join the combat
while firmly denouncing those who go over to the enemy class.
17)
Within the IWA, there existed alongside the vanguard marxist current, currents
which we could define as belonging to the swamp. Such was the case, for
example, with certain Proudhonist currents which in the first part of the 19th century had formed a real
vanguard of the French proletariat. By the time of the struggle against the
parasitic Alliance, these groups were no longer a vanguard.
Nonetheless, despite their confusions they were capable of participating in the
struggle to save the International, notably during the Hague Congress. The
attitude of the marxist current towards them was quite different from its
attitude towards the Alliance. There was never any question of
excluding them. On the contrary, it was important to involve them in the
struggle against the Alliance, not only because of their weight
within the International, but also because the struggle itself was an
experience which could help these currents to greater clarity. In practice,
this combat confirmed the existence of a fundamental difference between the
swamp and parasitism: where as the former is traversed by a proletarian life
which allows its best elements to join the revolutionary current, the latter’s
fundamental vocation is to destroy the class organisation, and it is completely
unable to evolve in this direction, even if some individuals who have been
deceived by parasitism may be able to do so.
Today, it is equally important to distinguish between the currents of
the swamp[6] [686]
and the parasitic currents. The groups of the proletarian milieu must try to
help the former evolve towards marxist positions, and provoke a political
clarification within them. Towards the latter, they must exercise the greatest
severity, and denounce the sordid role that they play to the great profit of
the bourgeoisie. This is all the more important, in that the confusions of the
currents in the swamp are particularly vulnerable to the attacks of parasitism
(particularly given their reticence towards organisation, as in the case of
those that come from councilism).
18)
Every penetration of alien ideology into proletarian organisations plays the
game of the enemy class. This is particularly evident when it comes to
parasitism whose aim is the destruction of these organisations (whether this is
openly avowed or not). Here again, the IWA was particularly clear in affirming
that even if he was not an agent of the capitalist state, Bakunin served the
interests of the state far better than any agent could have done. This does not
at all signify that parasitism in itself represents a sector of the political
apparatus of the ruling class like the bourgeois currents of the extreme left
like Trotskyism today. In fact, in the eyes of Marx and Engels, even the best
known parasites of their day, Bakunin and Lassalle, were not seen as political
representatives of the bourgeois class. This analysis derived from their
understanding that parasitism as such does not constitute a fraction of the bourgeoisie,
having neither a programme or orientation for the national capital, nor a
particular place in the state organs for controlling the struggle of the
working class. This said, bearing in mind what a service parasitism renders to
the bourgeoisie, the latter accords it a particular solicitude. This expresses
itself in three main forms:
Here it should be noted that while the majority of parasitic currents
advertise a proletarian programme, the latter is not indispensable for an
organisation in carrying out the functions of political parasitism, which is
not distinguished by the positions it defends but by its destructive attitude
towards the real organisations of the working class.
19)
In the present period, when proletarian organisations don’t have the notoriety
that the IWA had in its day, official bourgeois propaganda does not on the
whole concern itself with providing support to the parasitic groups and
elements (which in any case would have the disadvantage of discrediting them in
front of the elements who are searching for communist positions). It should
however be noted that in the bourgeois campaigns around “negationism”
specifically aimed at the communist left, an important place is reserved for
groups like the ex-Mouvement Communiste, La Banquise, etc, who are presented as
representatives of the communist left, when in fact they have a strong
parasitic colouring.
On the other hand, it was indeed
a state agent, Chénier,[7] [687]
who played a key role in the formation within the ICC of a “secret tendency”
which, having provoked the loss of half the section in Britain, gave rise to one
of the most typical parasitic grouplets, the CBG. Neither should we exclude the
possibility that certain elements who were at the origin of the 1978 split from
the ICC which gave rise to the GCI were also agents of the state or leftist
organisations (as some of those who seceded at the time now think).
Finally, the efforts of bourgeois
currents to infiltrate the proletarian milieu and carry out a parasitic
function there can be seen clearly with the activities of the Spanish leftist
group Hilo Rojo (which for years had been trying to get into the good books of
the proletarian milieu before launching an all-out attack on it), or those of
the OCI (an Italian leftist group certain of whose elements have come from
Bordigism and which today presents itself as the “true heir” of this current).
20)
The penetration of state agents into the parasitic circles is obviously
facilitated by the very nature of parasitism, whose fundamental calling is to
combat the real proletarian organisations. Indeed, the fact that parasitism
recruits among those elements who reject the discipline of a class
organisation, who have nothing but contempt for its statutory functioning, who
rejoice in informalism and personal loyalties rather than loyalty to the
organisation, leaves the door of the parasitic milieu wide open to infiltration
of this type. These doors are equally wide open to those involuntary
auxiliaries of the capitalist state, the adventurers, those declassed elements
who seek to place the workers’ movement in the service of their own ambitions,
of their quest for a notoriety and power denied to them by bourgeois society.
In the IWA, the example of Bakunin is obviously the best known in this regard.
Marx and his comrades never claimed that Bakunin was a direct agent of the
state. But this didn’t stop them from identifying and denouncing not only the
services he involuntarily rendered to the ruling class, but also the approach
and class origins of adventurers within proletarian organisations and the role
they play as leaders of parasitism. Thus, with regard to the actions of
Bakunin’s secret Alliance within the IWA, they wrote that the “declassed
elements” had been able “to infiltrate it and establish secret
organisations at its very heart”. The same approach was taken up by Bebel
in the case of Schweitzer, the leader of the Lassallean parasitic current: “he
joined the movement as soon as he saw that there was no future for him within
the bourgeoisie, that for him, whose mode of life had declassed him very early
on, the only hope was to play a role in the workers’ movement in keeping with
his ambition and his capacities” (Bebel: Autobiography).
21)
This being said, even if parasitic currents are often led by declassed
adventurers (when not by direct state agents), they do not only recruit in this
category. We can also find there elements who at the outset are animated by a
revolutionary will and who don’t set out to destroy the organisation but who:
end
up developing a deep hostility towards the proletarian organisation, even if
this hostility is masked by “militant” pretensions.
In the IWA, a certain number of
members of the General Council, such as Eccarius, Jung and Hales, fall into this
category.
Moreover, parasitism is capable
of recruiting sincere and militant proletarian elements who, affected by petty
bourgeois weaknesses or through lack of experience, allow themselves to be
deceived or manipulated by openly anti-proletarian elements. In the IWA, this
was typically the case with most of the workers who were part of the Alliance in Spain.
22)
As far as the ICC is concerned, most of the splits which led to the formation
of parasitic groups were very clearly made up of elements animated by the petty
bourgeois approach described above. The impetus given by intellectuals seeking “recognition”, frustrated by not
receiving it from the organisation, impatience because they did not manage to
convince other militants of the “correctness” of their positions or at the slow
pace of the development of the class struggle, sensitivity to criticisms of
their positions or their behaviour, the rejection of centralisation which they
felt to be “Stalinism”, were the motive force behind the formation of the
“tendencies” which led to the formation of more or less ephemeral parasitic
groups, and to the desertions which fuelled informal parasitism. In succession,
the 1979 “tendency” which gave birth to the “Groupe Communiste Internationaliste”,
the Chénier tendency, one of whose avatars was the defunct “Communist Bulletin
Group”, the McIntosh-JA-ML “tendency” (largely made up of members of the
central organ of the ICC) which gave rise to the EFICC, (now Internationalist
Perspective) are typical illustrations of this phenomenon. In these episodes it
could also be seen that elements who undoubtedly had proletarian concerns
allowed themselves to be led astray by personal loyalty towards the leading
members of these “tendencies” which were not really tendencies but clans as the
ICC has already defined them. The fact that all these parasitic splits from our
organisation first appeared in the form of internal clans is obviously no
accident. In reality, there is a great
similarity between the organisational behaviour that lies at the basis of the
formation of clans and those which fuel parasitism: individualism, statutory
frameworks seen as a constraint, frustration with militant activity, loyalty
towards personalities to the detriment of loyalty towards the organisation, the
influence of “gurus” (elements seeking to have a personal hold over other
militants).
In fact, what the formation of
clans already represents - the destruction of the organisational tissue - finds
its ultimate expression in parasitism: the will to destroy proletarian
organisations themselves.[8] [688]
23)
The heterogeneity which is one of the marks of parasitism, since it counts in
its ranks both relatively sincere elements and those animated by a hatred of
the proletarian organisation, even political adventurers or direct state
agents, makes it the terrain par excellence for the secret policies of
those elements who are most hostile to proletarian concerns, enabling them to
drag the more sincere elements behind them. The presence of these “sincere”
elements, especially those who have dedicated real efforts towards the
construction of the organisation, is actually one of the preconditions for the
success of parasitism since its lends credit and authority to its false
“proletarian” passport (just as trade unionism needs its “sincere and devoted”
militants in order to carry out its role). At the same time, parasitism, and
its leading elements, can only establish control over a large part of their
troops by hiding their real aims. Thus, the Alliance in the IWA was made up of several
circles around “citizen B”, and there were secret statutes reserved for the
“initiated”. “The Alliance divides its members into two
castes, the initiated and the non-initiated, aristocrats and plebeians, the
latter being condemned to be directed by the former via an organisation whose
very existence is unknown to them” (Engels, Report on the Alliance). Today, parasitism acts in the
same way and it is rare for the parasitic groups, and particularly the
adventurers or frustrated intellectuals who animate them, to openly parade
their programmme. In this sense, “Mouvement Communiste”,[9] [689]
which clearly says that the left communist milieu has to be destroyed, is both
a caricature of parasitism and a mouthpiece for its real underlying aims.
24)
The methods used by the First International and the Eisenachers against
parasitism have served as a model for those used by the ICC today. In the
public documents of the congresses, in the press, in open meetings and even in
parliament, the manoeuvres of parasitism were denounced. Again and again, it
was shown that it was the ruling classes themselves who stood behind these
attacks and that their goal was the destruction of marxism. The work of the Hague Congress as well as Bebel’s famous
speeches against the secret politics of Bismarck and Schweitzer revealed the
capacity of the workers’ movement to give a global explanation for these
manoeuvres while denouncing them in an extremely concrete manner. Among the
most important reasons given by the First International for publishing the
revelations about Bakunin, we can point above all to the following:
But
at the centre of this policy lay the necessity to unmask political adventurers
like Bakunin and Schweitzer.
It cannot be emphasized often enough that such an attitude characterised
Marx’s whole political life, as we can see in his denunciation of the acolytes
of Lord Palmerston or Herr Vogt. He understood very well that sweeping such
affairs under the carpet could only benefit the ruling class.
25)
It is this great tradition that the ICC is continuing with its articles on its
own internal struggles, its polemics against parasitism, the public
announcement of the unanimous exclusion of one of its members by the 11th international congress, the
publication of articles on freemasonry, etc. In particular, the ICC’s defence
of the tradition of the court of honour in the case of elements who have lost
the confidence of revolutionary organisations, in order to defend the milieu as
a whole: all this partakes of exactly the same spirit as that of the Hague
Congress and the commissions of inquiry of the workers’ parties in Russia
towards people suspected of being agents provocateurs.
The storm of protest and accusations broadcast by the bourgeois press
following the publication of the principal results of the inquiry into the Alliance shows that it is
this rigorous method of public denunciation that scares the bourgeoisie more
than anything else. Similarly, the way that the opportunist leadership of the
Second International, in the years prior to 1914, systematically ignored the
famous chapter “Marx against Bakunin” in the history of the workers’ movement
shows the same fear on the part of all defenders of petty bourgeois
organisational conceptions.
26)
Towards the petty bourgeois infantry of parasitism, the policy of the workers’
movement has been to make it disappear from the political scene. Here the
denunciation of the absurdity of the positions and political activities of the
parasites plays an important role. Thus Engels, in his celebrated article “The
Bakuninists at work” (during the civil war in Spain) backed up and completed
the revelations on the organisational behaviour of the Alliance.
Today, the ICC has adopted the same policy by fighting against the
adepts of the different organised and “unorganised” centres of the parasitic
network.
With regard to the more or less proletarian elements, more or less taken
in by parasitism, the policy of marxism has always been quite different. It has
always been to drive a wedge between these elements and the parasitic leadership
which is directed and encouraged by the bourgeoisie, showing that the first are
the victims of the second. The aim of this policy is always to isolate the
parasitic leadership by drawing the victims away from its sphere of influence.
Towards these “victims”, marxism has always denounced their attitude and their
activities while at the same time struggling to revive their confidence in the
organisation and the milieu. The work of Engels and Lafargue towards the
Spanish section of the First International is a perfect concretisation of this.
The ICC has also followed this
tradition by organising confrontations with parasitism in order to win back the
elements who have been deceived. Bebel and Liebknecht’s denunication of
Schweitzer as an agent of Bismarck at a mass meeting
of the Lassallean party at Wuppertal is a well known
example of this attitude.
27)
The fact that the tradition of struggle against parasitism has been lost since
the great combats within the IWA, owing to:
This
constitutes a major weakness for the proletarian political milieu faced with
the parasitic offensive. This danger is all the more serious as a result of the
ideological pressure of the decomposition of capitalism, a pressure which, as
the ICC has shown, facilitates the penetration of the most extreme forms of
petty bourgeois ideology and creates an ideal terrain for the growth of
parasitism.[10] [690]
It is thus a very important responsibility of the proletarian milieu to engage
itself in a determined combat against this scourge. To a certain extent, the
capacity of revolutionary currents to identify and combat parasitism will be an
indication of their capacity to combat the other dangers which weigh on the
organisations of the proletariat, particularly the most permanent danger,
opportunism.
In fact, to the extent that
opportunism and parasitism both come from the same source (the penetration of
petty bourgeois ideology) and represent an attack against the principles of
proletarian organisation (programmatic principles for the first, organisational
principles for the second), it is quite natural for them to tolerate each other
and to converge. Thus it was not at all a paradox that in the IWA we saw the
“anti-statist” Bakuninists hand in hand with the “statist” Lassalleans (who
represented a variety of opportunism). One of the consequences of this is that
it is basically up to the left currents of proletarian organisations to wage
the combat against parasitism. In the IWA, it was directly Marx and Engels and
their tendency who assumed the fight against the Alliance. It was no
accident that the main documents produced during this combat bore their
signature (the circular of 5 March 1872, The so-called split in the
International was written by Marx and Engels; the 1873 report on “The
Alliance for Socialist Democracy and the International Workingmen’s
Association” by Marx, Engels, Lafargue and Utin).
What was valid in the time of the
IWA remains valid today. The struggle against parasitism constitutes one of the
essential responsibilities of the communist left and is part of the tradition
of its bitter struggles against opportunism. Today it is one of the basic
components in the preparation of the party of tomorrow, and in fact is one of
the determining factors both of the moment when the party can arise and its
capacity to play its role in the decisive battles of the proletariat.
[1] [691]
It is obviously necessary to
distinguish the two meanings that can be given to the term “adventurism”. On
the one hand, there is the adventurism of certain declassed elements, political
adventurers, who have failed to play a role within the ruling class. Realising
that the proletariat is called to occupy a vital place in society’s life and in
history, they try to win a recognition from the working class, or from its
organisations, which will allow them to play that personal role which the
bourgeoisie has refused them. The aim of these elements in turning towards the
class struggle is not to put themselves in its service, but on the contrary to
put the struggle in the service of their ambition. They seek notoriety by
“going to the proletariat”, as others do by travelling round the world. On the
other hand, the term adventurism also describes a political attitude which
consists of launching into ill-considered action when the minimal condition for
success - a sufficient maturity within the class - does not exist. Such an
attitude may come from political adventurers looking for thrills, but it can
just as well be adopted by utterly sincere workers and militants, devoted and
disinterested, but lacking in political judgement, or eaten up with impatience.
[2] [692]
Marx and Engels where not
alone in identifying and describing political parasitism. For example, at the
end of the 19th century, a great marxist theoretician like
Antonio Labriola adopted the same analysis of parasitism: “In this first
type of our present parties [he is writing here about the Communist League],
in what we might call the first cell of our complex, elastic, and highly
developed organism, there existed not only a consciousness of the mission to be
accomplished by, but also the only appropriate forms and methods of association
of, the first beginners of the proletarian revolution. This was no longer a
sect: that form was already outmoded. The immediate and fantastic domination of
the individual had been done away with. The organisation was dominated by a
discipline, whose source lay in experience and necessity, and in the doctrine
which must be precisely the conscious reflection of this necessity. The same
was true of the International, which only appeared authoritarian to those who
tried and failed to impose their own authority on it. The same must and will be
true in all the workers parties: and wherever this characteristic is not or
cannot yet gain influence, a still elementary and confused proletarian
agitation will engender nothing but illusions and a pretext for intrigues. And
where this is not the case, then it will be a sect where the fanatic rubs
shoulders with the madmen and the spy; it will be a repeat of the International
Brotherhood, which latched on to the International like a parasite and
discredited it (...) or else it will be a group of declassed and petty
bourgeois malcontents who spend their time speculating about socialism, as they
would about any other term politically in fashion” (Essai sur la
conception matérialiste de l’histoire).
[3] [693]
This phenomenon was of course
reinforced by the weight of councilism which, as the ICC has pointed out, is
the price that the workers’ movement has paid, and will pay, for the grip of
Stalinism during the period of counter-revolution.
[4] [694]
This of course is why, at this
congress, Bakunin’s friends supported the decision to strengthen substantially
the powers of the Central Council. Later, they were to demand that these did
not go any further than the role of a “letter box”.
[5] [695] The history of the workers’ movement
has seen many of these long struggles undertaken by the Left. Amongst the most
important, we can cite:
[6] [696]
In our own epoch, the swamp is
represented notably by the variations on the councilist current (like those
which emerged with the class struggle at the end of the 1960s, and which will
probably reappear in future periods of class struggle), by remnants of the past
like the De Leonists in the Anglo-Saxon countries, or by elements breaking from
leftism.
[7] [697]
There is no proof that Chénier
was an agent of the state security services. By contrast, his rapid rise,
immediately after his exclusion from the ICC, within the state administration,
and above all within the apparatus of the Socialist Party (in government at the
time), demonstrates that he must have been already been working for this
apparatus of the bourgeoisie while he was still presenting himself as a
“revolutionary”.
[8] [698] In response to the ICC’s analyses
and concerns over parasitism, we are often told that the phenomenon only
concerns our own organisation, whether as a target or as a “supplier”, through
splits, of the parasitic milieu. It is true that today, the ICC is parasitism’s
main target, which is explained easily enough by the fact that it is the
largest and most widespread organisation of the proletarian movement. It
consequently provokes the greatest hatred from the enemies of this movement,
which never miss an occasion to stir up hostility towards it on the part of
other proletarian organisations. Another reason for this “privilege” of the ICC
is the fact precisely that our organisation has suffered the most splits
leading to the creation of parasitic groups. We can suggest several
explanations for this phenomenon.
Firstly, of
all the organisations of the proletarian political milieu which have survived
the 30 years since 1968, the ICC is the only new one, since all the others
already existed at the time. Consequently, our organisation suffered from a
greater weight of the circle spirit, which is the breeding ground for clans and
parasitism. Moreover, the other organisations had already undergone a “natural
selection” before the class’ historic resurgence, which had eliminated all the
adventurers, semi-adventurers, and intellectuals in search of an audience, who
lacked the patience to undertake an obscure labour in little organisations with
a negligible impact on the working class. At the moment of the proletarian
resurgence, this kind of element judged it easier to “rise” in a new
organisation in the process of formation, than in an older organisation where
the “places were already taken”.
Secondly,
there is generally a fundamental difference between the (equally numerous)
splits that have affected the Bordigist milieu (which was the most developed
internationally until the end of the 1970s), and those which have affected the
ICC. In the Bordigist organisations, which claim officially to be monolithic,
splits are usually the result of the impossibility of developing political disagreements
within the organisation, and do not therefore necessarily have a parasitic
dynamic. By contrast, the splits within the ICC were not the result of
monolithism or sectarianism, since our organisation has always allowed, indeed
encouraged, debate and confrontation within it: the collective desertions were
the result of impatience, individualist frustrations, a clan approach, and
therefore bore within themselves a parasitic spirit and dynamic.
This
being said, we should point out that the ICC is far from being parasitism’s
only target. For example, the denigration by Hilo Rojo and “Mouvement
Communiste” are aimed at the entire communist left. Similarly, the special
target of the OCI is the Bordigist Current. Finally, even when the parasitic
groups focus their attacks on the ICC and spare, or even flatter, the other
groups of the proletarian political milieu (as was the case with the CBG, and
as Échanges et Mouvement does continuously), this is generally designed to
increase the divisions between the groups - something that the ICC has always
been the first to fight.
[9] [699]
A group consisting of
ex-members of the ICC who had belonged to the GCI, and of old transfers from
leftism, not to be confused with the “Mouvement Communiste” of the 1970s, which
was one of the apostles of modernism.
[10] [700] “At the outset, ideological
decomposition obviously affects the capitalist class first and foremost, and
then the petty-bourgeois strata which have no real autonomy. We can even say
that the latter identify particularly well with decomposition, in that their
own situation, their lack of any future, matches the major cause of ideological
decomposition: the absence of any perspective in the immediate for society as a
whole. Only the proletariat bears within itself a perspective for humanity, and
in this sense it also has the greatest capacity for resistance to this
decomposition. However, it is not completely spared, notably because it rubs
shoulders with the petty-bourgeoisie which is decomposition’s principle
vehicle. The different elements which constitute the strength of the
proletariat directly confront the various facets of this ideological
decomposition:
Clearly,
the behaviour typical of parasitism - pettiness, the false solidarity of the
clan, hatred for organisation, mistrust, slander - is nourished by today’s
social decomposition. According to the proverb, the most beautiful flowers grow
from manure. Science teaches that many parasitic organisms like it just as
well. And in its own domain, political parasitism follows the laws of biology,
making its honey from society’s putrefaction.
The period 1918-20, the "heroic" phase of the international revolutionary wave inaugurated by the October insurrection in Russia, was also the period in which the communist parties of the day formulated their programme for the overthrow of capitalism and the transition towards communism.
In IR 93 we examined the programme of the newly formed KPD - the Communist Party of Germany. We saw that it consisted essentially of a series of practical measures designed to guide the proletarian struggle in Germany from the stage of spontaneous revolt to the conscious conquest of political power. In IR 94 we published the Platform of the Communist International - drawn up at its founding congress as a basis for the international regroupment of communist forces and as an outline of the revolutionary tasks facing the workers in all countries.
At almost exactly the same moment, the Communist Party of Russia - the Bolshevik party - published its new programme. The programme was closely linked to the CI platform and indeed had the same author - Nikolai Bukharin. Even so, to a certain extent, this separation between the CI platform and the programmes of its national parties - and between the latter programmes themselves - reflected the persistence of federalist conceptions inherited from the period of social democracy; and, as Bordiga was later to point out, the inability of the "world party" to subject its national sections to the priorities of the international revolution was to have very serious consequences in the face of the retreat of the revolutionary wave and the isolation and degeneration of the revolution in Russia. We will have occasion to return to this particular problem. And yet it is instructive to make a specific study of the RCP programme and to compare it with the ones previously mentioned. The KPD programme was the product of a party faced with the task of leading the masses towards the seizure of power; the CI platform was seen more as a general point of reference for those aiming to regroup with the International than as a detailed programme of action. Indeed, it is one of history's little ironies that the CI did not adopt a formal and unified programme until its 6th Congress in 1928. Here again Bukharin was the author, but this time the programme was also the International's suicide note, since it adopted the infamous theory of socialism in one country and thus ceased to exist as an organ of the internationalist proletariat.
The RCP programme, for its part, was drawn up after the toppling of the bourgeois regime in Russia and was thus first and foremost a precise and detailed statement of the aims and methods of the new soviet power. In short, it was a programme for the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus stands as an invaluable indication of the level of programmatic clarity attained by the contemporary communist movement. Not only that: although we shall not hesitate to point to those parts of the programme which practical experience was to put into question or definitively refute, we shall also be showing that in most of its essentials this document remains a profoundly relevant reference point for the proletarian revolution of the future.
The RCP programme was adopted at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. The need for a fundamental revision of the old 1908 programme had been apparent at least since 1917 when the Bolsheviks had abandoned the perspective of the "democratic dictatorship" in favour of the proletarian conquest of power and the world socialist revolution. At the time of the 8th Congress there were numerous disagreements within the party about the way forward for the soviet power (we shall return to this in a subsequent article) and so in some senses the programme expressed a certain compromise between different currents in the party; but since, like the CI platform, the document was very much a product of the bright hopes and radical practices of the early phase of the revolution, it was able to satisfy the majority of the party, including many of those who had begun to feel that the revolutionary process in Russia was not advancing with sufficient rapidity or even that certain basic principles were being put into question.
The programme was shortly to be accompanied by a considerable work of explanation and popularisation - The ABC of Communism, penned by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. This book was constructed around the points of the programme but is more than a mere commentary on it; rather it became a classic in its own right, a synthesis of marxist theory and its development from the Communist Manifesto to the Russian Revolution, written in a lively and accessible style that made it a manual of political education both for the party membership and for the broad mass of workers who supported and sustained the revolution. If this article focuses on the RCP programme rather than The ABC of Communism, it is because a detailed examination of the latter is outside the scope of a single article; it is by no means intended to lessen the importance of the book, which still repays reading today.
The same point can be made even more emphatically with regard to the numerous decrees issued by the soviet power in the initial phases of the revolution, and to the 1918 constitution which defined the structure and functioning of the new power. These documents also need to be examined as part of the "programme of the proletarian dictatorship", not least because, as Trotsky wrote in his autobiography, "during that first period the decrees were really more propaganda than actual administrative measures. Lenin was in a hurry to tell the people what the new power was, what it was after, and how it intended to accomplish its aims" (My Life, Penguin edition, p 356). These decrees covered not only burning political and economic issues - such as the structure of the state and the army, the struggle against the counter-revolution, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and workers' control of industry, the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany etc - but also numerous social issues such as marriage and divorce, education, religion, and so on. Again in Trotsky's words, these decrees "will be preserved forever in history as the proclamations of a new world. Not only sociologists and historians, but future legislators as well, will draw repeatedly from this source" (ibid, p 358). But precisely because of their immense scope, their analysis lies beyond the ambitions of this essay, which will focus on the 1919 Bolshevik programme for the very reason that it provides us with the most synthetic and concise statement of the general goals of the new power and the party whose aims it had adopted.
The epoch of proletarian revolution
The programme begins, like the platform of the CI, by situating itself in the new "era of the world-wide proletarian communist revolution", characterised on the one hand by the development of imperialism, the ferocious struggle for world dominion by the great capitalist powers, and thus by the outbreak of imperialist world war - the concrete expression of the collapse of capitalism; and, on the other hand, by the international revolt of the working class against the horrors of capitalism in decay, a revolt which had taken tangible form in the October insurrection in Russia and the development of the revolution in all the central capitalist countries, particularly Germany and Austria-Hungary. The programme itself does not elaborate on the economic contradictions of capitalism which had led to this collapse; these are examined in The ABC of Communism, although even the latter does not really formulate a definite and coherent theory of the origins of capitalist decadence. By the same token - and in surprising contrast to the CI platform - the programme does not utilise the concept of state capitalism to describe the internal organisation of the bourgeois regime in the new era; again however, this concept is elaborated in The ABC of Communism and in other theoretical contributions by Bukharin which we will come to in another article. Finally, like the CI platform, the RCP programme is absolutely firm in its insistence that it is impossible for the working class to make the revolution "without making it a matter of principle to break off relations with and wage a pitiless struggle against that bourgeois perversion of socialism which is dominant in the leading official social democratic and socialist parties ".
Having affirmed its membership of the new Communist International, the programme then moves on to the practical tasks of the proletarian dictatorship "as applied in Russia, a land whose most notable peculiarity is the numerical predominance of the petty bourgeois stratum of the population". The subheadings that follow in this article correspond to the order and titles of the sections of the RCP programme.
General politics
The first task of any proletarian revolution - the revolution of a class which has no economic base in the old society - must be to consolidate its political power; and in line with the Platform of the Communist International and the accompanying Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship, the RCP programme's "practical" sections begin by affirming the superiority of the soviet system to bourgeois democracy. Against the misleading all-inclusiveness of the latter, the former, based primarily on workplace rather than territorial base units, openly proclaims its class character; in contrast to bourgeois parliaments, the soviets, with their principle of permanent mobilisation through base assemblies and of the immediate revocability of all delegates, also provide the means for the immense majority of the exploited and the oppressed population to exert a real control over the organs of state power, to participate directly in social and economic transformation, and this regardless of race, religion or gender. At the same time, since the immense majority of the Russian population was made up of the peasantry - and since marxism recognises only one revolutionary class in capitalist society - the programme also registers the leading role of the "industrial urban proletariat" and points out that "our Soviet Constitution reflects this, by assigning certain preferential rights to the industrial proletariat, as opposed to the comparatively disunited petty bourgeois masses in the villages" (specifically, as Victor Serge explains in his book Year One of the Russian Revolution, "The All-Russian Congress of Soviets consists of representatives of local soviets, the towns being represented by one deputy for every 25, 000 inhabitants and the country areas by one deputy for every 125, 000. This article formalises the dominance of the proletariat over the peasantry" (Chicago 1972 edition, p271).
The programme, it must be remembered is a party programme, and a true communist party can never be satisfied by any status quo until it has reached the ultimate goal of communism, at which point there will be no need for the party to exist as a separate political organ. That is why this section of the programme repeatedly insists on the need for the party to fight for the increasing participation of the masses in the life of the soviets, to raise their political and cultural level, to combat the national chauvinism and prejudices against women that still exist in the proletariat and other oppressed classes. It is noteworthy that there is within the programme no theorisation of the dictatorship of the party - this was to come later, even if the question of whether or not the party wields power had always been ambiguous for the Bolsheviks and indeed for the entire revolutionary movement at the time. Rather the opposite: there is a real awareness expressed in the programme that the difficult conditions facing the Russian bastion at the time - cultural backwardness, civil war - had already created a real danger of bureaucratisation in the soviet power, and it therefore outlines a series of measures to combat this danger:
"1. Every member of a soviet must undertake some definite work in the administrative service.
2. There must be a continuous rotation among those who engage in such duties, so that each member shall in turn gain experience in every branch of administration.
By degrees, the whole working population must be induced to take turns in the administrative service".
In fact, these measures were largely insufficient given that the programme underestimates the real difficulties posed by the imperialist encirclement and the civil war: the siege conditions, the famine, the grim reality of territorial warfare fought with the most extreme ferocity, the dispersal of the most advanced layers of the proletariat to the front, the plots of the counter-revolution and the corresponding Red Terror: all this sapped the lifeblood from the soviets and other organs of proletarian democracy, more and more subsuming them into a vastly atrophied bureaucratic apparatus. By the time the programme had been written, the involvement of even the most advanced workers in the tasks of state administration was having the effect of removing them from the life of the class and of turning them into bureaucrats. Instead of the tendency for the withering away of the state advocated in Lenin's State and Revolution, it was the soviets that began to wither away, isolating the party at the head of a state machine that had become increasingly divorced from the self-activity of the masses. In such circumstances, the party, far from acting as the most radical critic of the status quo, tended to merge with the state and so become an organ of social conservation (for more on the conditions facing the proletarian bastion at this time, see 'Isolation spells the death of the revolution' in IR 75)
This rapid and tragic negation of the radical vision that Lenin had stood for in 19 J 7 - a state of affairs which had already advanced to a considerable degree by the time the RCP programme was adopted - is frequently utilised by the enemies of revolution to prove that this vision was at best utopian, at worst a mere deception aimed at winning the support of the masses and propelling the Bolsheviks to power. For communists, however, it is proof only that if socialism in one country is impossible, this is no less true of that proletarian democracy which is the political precondition for the creation of socialism. And if there is an important weakness in this and other parts of the programme, it is in the passages that imply that merely applying the principles of the Commune, of proletarian democracy, in the case of Russia could lead to the disappearance of the state, without clearly and unambiguously stating that this could only be the result of a successful international revolution.
The problem of nationality
While on many questions, not least the problem of proletarian democracy, the RCP programme was faced above all with the practical difficulty of applying its measures in the conditions of the civil war, the section on the problem of nationality is flawed from the outset. Correct in its starting point - the "primary importance of ... the policy of uniting the proletarians and semi-proletarians of various nationalities in a joint revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie ", and in its recognition of the need to overcome feelings of suspicion engendered by long years of national oppression, the programme adopts the slogan that had been defended by Lenin since the days of the Second International: the "right of nations to self-determination" as the best way to allay these suspicions, and applicable even (and especially) under soviet power. On this point the author of the programme, Bukharin, took a significant step backwards from the position he, along with Piatakov and others, had put forward during the imperialist war: that the slogan of national self-determination was "first of all utopian (it cannot be realised within the limits of capitalism) and harmful as a slogan which disseminates illusions" (letter to the Bolshevik Central Committee, November 1915). And as Rosa Luxemburg showed in her pamphlet The Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks' policy of allowing "subject nations" to secede from the soviet power simply handed over the proletarians of these newly "self-determining" bourgeois nations to their own predatory ruling classes, and above all to the schemes and manoeuvres of the great imperialist powers. The same disastrous results were obtained in "colonial" countries like Turkey, Iran or China where the soviet power thought it could ally itself with the "revolutionary" bourgeoisie. In the 18th century Marx and Engels had certainly supported certain struggles for national independence, but only because in that period capitalism still had a progressive role to play vis-a-vis the old feudal or despotic remnants of a previous era. At no stage in history could "national self-determination" mean anything but self- determination for the bourgeoisie. In the epoch of the proletarian revolution, where the entire bourgeoisie stands as a reactionary obstacle to human progress, the adoption of this policy was indeed to prove extremely harmful to the needs of the proletarian revolution (see our pamphlet Nation or Class and the article on the national question in IR 67). The one and only way to struggle against the national enmities that existed within the working class was to work for the development of the international class struggle.
Military affairs
This is inevitably an important section of the programme given that it was written when the internal civil war was still raging. The programme affirms certain basics: the necessity for the destruction of the old bourgeois army and for the new Red Army to be an instrument for the defence of the proletarian dictatorship. Certain measures are put forward to ensure that the new army does indeed serve the needs of the proletariat: that it should be "exclusively composed of the proletariat and the kindred semi-proletarian strata of the peasantry"; that training and instruction in the army be "effected upon a basis of class solidarity and socialist enlightenment", to which end "there must be political commissars, appointed from among trusty and self-denying communists, to cooperate with the military staff", while a new category of officers composed of class conscious workers and peasants must be trained and prepared for leading roles in the army; in order to prevent the separation between the army and the proletariat, there must be "the closest possible association between the military units and the factories, workshops, trade unions and poor peasants' organisations", while the period of barrack life should be "reduced to the utmost". The use of military experts inherited from the old regime was accepted on condition that that such elements be strictly supervised by the organs of the working class. Prescriptions of this type express a more or less intuitive awareness that the Red Army was particularly vulnerable to escaping the political control of the working class; but given that this was the first Red Army and the first soviet state in history, this awareness was inevitably limited both at the theoretical and the practical level.
The last paragraph of the section already poses certain problems, where it says that "the demand for the election of officers, which had great importance as a matter of principle in relation to the bourgeois army whose commanders were especially trained as an apparatusfor the class subjugation of the common soldiers (and, through the instrumentality of the common soldiers, the subjugation of the toiling masses), ceases to have any significance as a mailer of principle in relation to the class army of workers and peasants. A possible combination of election with appointment from above may he expedient for the revolutionary class army on practical grounds".
While it is true that elections and collective decision-making have their limitations in a military context - particularly in the heat of the battle - the paragraph seems to underestimate the degree to which the new army was itself reflecting the bureaucratisation of the state by reviving many of the old norms of subordination. In fact, a "Military Opposition", linked to the Democratic Centralism group, had already arisen in the party, and at the 8th Congress it was particularly voiciferous in criticising the tendency to deviate from the "principles of the Commune" in the organisation of the army. These principles are important not merely on "practical" grounds but above all because they create the best conditions for the political life of the proletariat to infuse the army. But during the civil war period, the opposite was tending to happen: the imposition of "normal" military methods was helping to create a climate in favour of the militarisation of the entire soviet power. The leader of the Red Army, Trotsky, became more and more associated with such an approach in the period 1920-21.
The basic problem we are dealing with here is the problem of the transitional state. The Red Army - like the special security force, the Cheka, which is not even mentioned in the programme - is a statist organ par excellence, and, while it can be used to safeguard the gains of the revolution, cannot be considered as a proletarian and communist organ. Even exclusively composed of proletarians (which could hardly be the case in Russia), it inevitably appears as an organ one step removed from the collective life of the class. It was thus particularly damaging that the Red Army, like other state institutions, was more and more escaping the overall political control of the workers' councils; while at the same time, the dissolution of the Red Guards, based in the factories, deprived the class of a means of direct self-defence against the danger of internal degeneration. But these were lessons that could only be learned through the often merciless school of revolutionary experience.
Proletarian Justice
This section of the programme complements the one on general politics. The destruction of the old bourgeois state also involves the replacement of the old bourgeois courts with a new apparatus of justice in which judges are elected from among the workers, and jurors drawn up from amongst the mas of the labouring population; the new court system was [Q be simplified and made more accessible to the population than the old labyrinth of higher and lower courts. Penal methods were [Q be freed of any attitude of revenge and become constructive and educational. The long term aim being that "the penal system shall ultimately be transformed into a system of measures of an educative character" in a society without classes or a state. The ABC of Communism, however, pointed out that the urgent demands of the civil war had required the new popular courts to be supplemented by revolutionary tribunals to deal not only with "ordinary" social crime but with the activities of the counter-revolution. The summary justice handed out by these tribunals was a product of bunting necessity, although abuses were committed, and certainly carried the danger that the introduction of more humane methods would be postponed indefinitely. Thus the death penalty, abolished by one of the first decrees of the new soviet power in 1917, was rapidly restored in the fight against the White Terror.
Education
Like the proposed penal reforms, the soviet power's efforts to overhaul the education system were very much subject to the demands of the civil war, Furthermore, given the extreme backwardness of social conditions in Russia, where illiteracy was widespread, many of the proposed changes themselves aimed no further than enabling the Russian population to reach a level of education already attained in some of the more advanced bourgeois democracies. Hence the call for free, compulsory co-educational schooling for all children up to the age of 17; for the provision of crèches and kindergartens to free women from domestic drudgery; for the removal of religious influence from the schools; the provision of extra-scholastic facilities such as adult education, libraries, cinemas etc etc.
Nevertheless, the longer term aim was "the transformation of the school so that from being an organ for maintaining the class dominion of the bourgeoisie, it shall become an organ for the complete abolition of the division of society into classes, an organ for the communist regeneration of society ".
To this end, the "unified labour school" was a key concept, elaborated more completely in The ABC of Communism. Its function was seen as that of beginning to overcome the division between elementary, middle and upper schools, between the sexes, between common schools and elite schools. Here again, it was recognised that such a school was the ideal of every advanced educationist, but as a unified labour school it was seen as a crucial factor in the communist abolition of the old division of labour. The hope was that from a very early stage in a child's life, there would no longer be any rigid separation between mental education and productive work, so that "in communist society, there will be no closed corporations, no stereotyped guilds, no petrified specialist groups. The most brilliant man of science must also be skilled in manual labour ... .A child's first activities take the form of play; play should gradually pass into work by an imperceptible transition, so that the child learns from the very outset to look upon labour, not as a disagreeable necessity or an a punishment, but as a natural and spontaneous expression of faculty. Labour should be a need, like the desire for food and drink; this need must be instilled and developed in the communist school".
These basic principles would surely remain valid in a future revolution. Contrary to certain strains of anarchist thought, school cannot be abolished overnight, but its aspect as an instrument for imposing bourgeois discipline and ideology would certainly have to be attacked straight away, not only in the content of what is taught (The ABC is very insistent on the need to instil the school with a proletarian outlook in all areas of education), but also in the way (hat teaching takes place (the principle of direct democracy, as far as possible, would have to replace the old hierarchies within the school). Similarly, the gulf between manual and mental labour, work and play would also have to be addressed from the start. In the Russian revolution, numerous experiments took place in these directions; although disrupted by the civil war, some of them continued well into the 1920s. Indeed, one of the signs that the counter-revolution had finally triumphed was that the schools once again became instruments for the imposition of bourgeois ideology and hierarchy, even if concealed in the garb of Stalinist "marxism".
Religion
The inclusion of a specific section on religion in the party programme was, at one level, an expression of the backwardness of Russian material and cultural conditions, compelling the new power to "complete" certain tasks unrealised by the old regime, in particular, the separation of church and state and the ending of state provision for religious institutions. However, this section also explains that the party cannot remain satisfied with the measures "which bourgeois democracy includes in its programmes but has nowhere carried out owing to the manifold associations that actually obtain between capital and religious propaganda". There were longer term aims guided by the recognition that "nothing but the fulfilment of purposiveness and full awareness in all the social and economic activities of the masses can lead to the complete disappearance of religious prejudices". In other words, religious alienation cannot be eliminated without the elimination of social alienation, and this is possible only in a fully communist society. This did not mean that the communists took a passive attitude to the existing religious illusions of the masses; they had to be actively fought on the basis of a scientific conception of the world. But this was above all a work of propaganda; it was completely foreign to the Bolsheviks to advocate the forcible suppression of religion - another hallmark of the Stalinist regime which could dare in its counter-revolutionary arrogance to have realised socialism and thus to have extirpated the social roots of religion. On the contrary, while carrying out a militant atheist propaganda, it was necessary for the communists and the new revolutionary power to "avoid anything that can wound the feelings of believers, for such a method can only lead to the strengthening of religious fanaticism". This is also far removed from the approach of anarchism, which favours the method of direct provocation and insult.
These basic prescriptions have not lost their relevance today. The hope, sometimes expressed in Marx's earlier writings, that religion was already dead for the proletariat, has not been fulfilled. Not only the persistence of social and economic backwardness in many parts of the world, but also the decadence and decomposition of bourgeois society, its tendency to regress to extremely reactionary forms of thought and belief, have ensured that religion and its various offshoots remain a powerful force of social control. Consequently communists are still faced with the necessity to fight against the "religious prejudices of the masses".
Economic Affairs
The proletarian revolution necessarily begins as a political revolution because, having no means of production or social property of its own, the working class needs the lever of political power in order to begin the social and economic transformation that will lead to a communist society. The Bolsheviks were fundamentally clear on the fact that this transformation could only be carried to its conclusion on a global scale; although as we have noted, the RCP programme, this section included, does contain a number of ambiguous formulations which talk about the establishment of complete communism as a kind of progressive development within the "soviet power", without making it clear whether this refers to the existing soviet power in Russia or to a world-wide republic of councils. In the main, however, the economic measures advocated in the programme are relatively modest and realistic. A revolutionary power could certainly not avoid posing the "economic" question from the start, since it is precisely the economic chaos provoked by the collapse of capitalism which compels the proletariat to intervene in order to ensure that it provide society with the minimum needed for survival. This was the case in Russia where the demand for "bread" was one of the main factors of revolutionary mobilisation. However, any idea that the working class, having assumed power, could set about calmly and peacefully reorganising economic life was immediately dismissed by the speed and brutality of the imperialist encirclement and the White counter-revolution which, coming in the wake of the World War, had "bequeathed an utterly chaotic situation" to the victorious proletariat. In these conditions, the primary aims of the soviet power in the economic sphere were defined as being:
* the completion of the expropriation of the ruling class, the seizure of the principal means of production by the soviet power;
* the centralisation of all economic activities in all the areas under soviet rule (including those in "other" countries), under a common plan; the aim of such planning was to secure "a universal increase in the productive forces of the country" - not for the sake of the "country" but in order to ensure "a rapid increase in the quantity of goods urgently needed by the population";
* the gradual integration of small-scale urban production (handicrafts etc) into the socialised sector via the development of cooperatives and other more collective forms;
* the maximum use of all available labour power by "the general mobilisation by the soviet power of all members of the population who are physically and mentally fit for work";
* the encouragement of a new labour discipline based on a collective sense of responsibility and solidarity;
* the maximation of the benefits of scientific research and technology, including the use of specialists inherited from the old regime.
These general guidelines remain fundamentally valid both as the first steps of a proletarian power seeking to produce the necessities for survival in a given area, and for the real begirmings of communist construction by the world-wide republic of councils. The main problem here was again the harsh conflict between overall aims and immediate conditions. The project of raising the consuming power of the masses was straight away thwarted by the demands of the civil war which turned Russia into a veritable caricature of a war economy. So great was the chaos brought about by the civil war that "the development of the productive powers of the country" remained a complete non-starter. Instead the vastly diminished productive powers of Russia, the result of the imperialist war, were still further diminished by the ravages of the civil war and by the necessity to feed and clothe the Red Army in its combat against the counter-revolution. The fact that this war economy was highly centralised, and, in conditions of financial chaos, virtually did away with monetary forms, led to its being dubbed "war communism"; but this altered nothing of the fact that military necessities more and more prevailed over the real aims and methods of the proletarian revolution. In order to maintain its collective political rule, the working class needs to have secured at least the basic material necessities of life and in particular to have the time and energy to engage in political life. But we have already seen that instead, during the civil war, the working class was reduced to absolute penury, its best elements dispersed to the front or swallowed up in the growing "soviet" bureaucracy, subject to a real process of "declassment" as others fled to the countryside or scrabbled to survive by petty trade and theft; those who remained in factories which still produced were forced to work longer hours than ever before, sometimes under the watchful eye of Red Army detachments. The Russian proletariat made these sacrifices willingly, but since they were not compensated by the extension of the revolution, they were to have profoundly damaging longer term effects, above all in undermining the proletariat's capacity to defend and maintain its dictatorship over society.
The RCP programme, as we have also seen, did recognise the danger of growing bureaucratisation during this period, and advocated a series of measures to combat it. But whereas the "political" section of the programme is still wedded to the defence of the soviets as the best means of maintaining proletarian democracy, the section on economic affairs emphasises the role of the trade unions, both in the management of the economy and in the defence of the workers from the excesses of bureaucracy: "The participation of the trade unions in the conduct of economic life, and the involvement by them of the broad masses of the people in this work, would appear at the same time to be our chief aid in the campaign against the bureaucratisation of the soviet power. This will also facilitate the establishment of an effective control over the results of production".
That the proletariat, as the politically dominant class, also needs to exercise to the maximum a direct control over the process of production, is axiomatic and - on the understanding that political tasks cannot be subordinated to economic tasks, above all in the period of the civil war - this remains true throughout all phases of the transition period. Workers who cannot "rule" in the factories are unlikely to be able to take political control over an entire society. But what is mistaken here is the idea that the trade unions could be the instrument for this task. On the contrary, by their very nature, the trade unions were much more susceptible to the virus of bureaucratisation; and it was no accident that the trade union apparatus became the organs of an increasingly bureaucratic state within the factories. by abolishing or absorbing the factory committees which had been a product of the revolutionary élan of 1917, and which were therefore a far more direct expression of the life of the class and a far better base for resisting bureaucracy and regenerating the soviet system as a whole. But the factory committees are not even mentioned in the programme. It is certainly true that these committees often suffered from localist and syndicalist misconceptions, in which each factory was seen as the private property of the workers who worked within them: during the desperate days of the civil war, such ideas reached their nadir in the practice of workers bartering "their own" products for food and fuel. But the answer to such errors was not to absorb the factory committees into the trade unions and the state; it was to ensure that they functioned as organs of proletarian centralisation by linking them much more closely to the workers' soviets - an obvious possibility given that the same factory assembly which elected delegates to the town's soviet also elected its factory committee. To these observations we should add: the difficulties that the Bolsheviks had in understanding that the trade unions were obsolete as organs of the class (a fact confirmed by the very emergence of the soviet form) was also to have very grave consequences in the International, especially after 1920, where the influence of the Russian communists was decisive in preventing the CI from adopted a clear and unambiguous position on the trade unions.
Agriculture
The basic approach to the peasant question in the programme had already been outlined by Engels in relation to Germany. Whereas large scale capitalist farms could be socialised fairly rapidly by the proletarian power, it would not be possible to compel the small farmers to join this sector. They would have to be won over gradually, primarily thanks to the capacity of the proletariat to prove in practice the superiority of socialist methods.
In a country like Russia, where pre-capitalist relations still held sway in much of the countryside, and where the expropriation of the great landed estates during the revolution had resulted in the peasants dividing up the land into innumerable smallholdings, this was all the more true. The policy of the party could thus only be to, on the one hand, encourage the class struggle between the semi-proletarian poor peasants and the rich peasants and rural capitalists, helping to create special organs for the poor peasants and rural proletarians who would be the main support for the extension and deepening of the revolution in the countryside; and, on the other hand, to establish a modus vivendi with the smallholding middle peasants, helping them materially with seed, manure, technology etc, so as to increase their yield, and at the same time fostering cooperatives and communes as transitional steps towards a real collectivisation. "The party aims at detaching them [the middle peasants] from the rich peasants, at bringing them over to the side of the working class by paying special attention to their needs. It attempts to overcome their backwardness in cultural matters by measures of an ideological character, carefully avoiding any coercive steps. On all occasions upon which their vital interests are touched, it endeavours to come to a practical agreement with them, making to them such concessions as will promote socialist construction". Given the terrible economic scarcity in Russia immediately after the insurrection, the proletariat was not in a position to offer these strata much in the way of material improvement, and indeed, under war communism, many abuses against the peasants were committed during the requisitioning of grain to feed the army and the starving cities. But this was till a far cry from the forced Stalinist collectivisation of the 1930s, which was based on the monstrous assumption that the violent expropriation of the petty bourgeoisie (and this for the requirements of a capitalist war economy) signified the achievement of socialism.
Distribution
"In the sphere of distribution, the task of the soviet power at the present time is unerringly to continue the replacement of trade by a purposive distribution of goods, by a system of distribution organised by the slate upon a national scale. The aim is to achieve the organisation of the whole population into an integral network of consumers' communes, which shall be able with the utmost speed, purposiveness, economy and a minimal expenditure of labour, to distribute all the necessary goods, while strictly centralising the whole distributive apparatus". The existing cooperative associations, defined as "petty bourgeois ", were to be as far as possible transformed into" consumer communes led by the proletarians and the semi-proletarians" . This passage conveys all the grandeur but also all the limitations of the Russian revolution. The communisation of distribution is an integral part of the revolutionary programme and this section shows how seriously it was taken by the Bolsheviks. But the real progress they had made towards it was greatly exaggerated during - and indeed because of the war communism period. War communism was in reality no more than the collectivisation of misery and was largely imposed by a state machine that was already slipping out of the workers' hands. The fragility of its basis was proved as soon as the internal civil war had ended, when there was a rapid and general return to private enterprise and trade (which had in any case flourished as a black market under war communism). It is certainly true that, just as the proletariat will have to collectivise large sectors of the productive apparatus after the insurrection in one region of the world, it will also have to do the same for many aspects of distribution. But while these measures may have some continuity with the constructive policies of a victorious world revolution, neither should the they be identified with the latter. The real communisation of distribution depends on the capacity of the new social order to "deliver the goods" more effectively than capitalism (even if the goods themselves differ substantially). Material scarcity and poverty are the soil of commodity relations; material abundance the only solid basis for the development of collectivised distribution and for society to "inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1875).
Money and Banks
As with distribution, so with money, its "normal" vehicle under capitalism: given the impossibility of immediately installing integral communism, above all in the confines of a single country, the proletariat can only take a series of measures which tend in the direction of a moneyless society. However, the illusions of war communism - in which the collapse of the economy was confused with its communist reconstruction - lend an over-optimistic tone to this and other related sections. Equally over-optimistic is the notion that merely nationalising the banks and fusing them into a single state bank would constitute the first steps towards "the disappearance of banks and to their conversion into the central book-keeping establishment of communist society". It is doubtful that organs so central to the operation of capital can be taken over in this way, even if the physical seizure of the banks will certainly be necessary as one of the first revolutionary blows aimed at paralysing the hand of capital.
Finance
"During the epoch in which the socialisation of the means of production confiscated from the capitalists has begun, the state power ceases to be a parasitic apparatus nourished upon the productive process. There now begins its transformation into an organisation directly fulfilling the function of administering the economic life of the country. To this extent the state budget will be a budget of the whole of the national economy". Again, the intentions are laudable but bitter experience was to show that in the conditions of an isolated or stagnating revolution, even the new commune-state more and more becomes a parasitic apparatus feeding on the revolution and the working class; and even in the best conditions it can no longer be assumed that merely centralising finances in the hands of the state "naturally" leads an economy that once functioned on the basis of profit to become one functioning on the basis of need.
The housing question
This section of the programme is more rooted in immediate necessities and possibilities. A victorious proletarian power cannot avoid taking rapid steps to relieve homelessness and overcrowding, as did the soviet power after 1917, when it "completely expropriated all the houses belonging to capitalist landlords and handed them over to the urban soviets. It effected mass settlements of workers from the suburbs in the bourgeois dwellings. It handed over the best of these dwellings to the workers' organisations, arranging for the upkeep of the houses at the cost of the state; it undertook to provide the workers' families with furniture, etc". But here again, the programme's more constructive aims - the clearing of slums and the provision of decent housing for all - remained largely unrealised in a war-ravaged country. And while the Stalinist regime embarked upon massive housing schemes later on, the dreadful results of these schemes (the infamous workers' barracks of the ex-Eastern bloc) were certainly no solution to the "housing problem ".
Evidently, the longer term solution to the housing question lies in a total transformation of the urban and rural environment - in the abolition of the antithesis between town and country, the reduction of urban gigantism and the rational distribution of the world's population over the face of the earth. Clearly such grandiose transformations cannot be carried through until after the definitive defeat of the bourgeoisie.
Labour protection and social welfare work
The immediate measures put forward here, given the extreme conditions of exploitation prevailing in Russia, are merely the application of minimum demands long fought for in the workers' movement: the 8-hour day, disability and unemployment benefit, paid holiday and maternity leave, etc. And as the programme itself admits, even many of these gains had to suspended or modified due to the demands of the civil war. However, the document pledges the party to fight not only for these "immediate demands" but also for more radical ones - in particular, the reduction of the working day to six hours so that more time could be devoted to training, not only in work-related areas but also and above all in state administration. This was crucial because, as we have already noted, a working class weighed down by daily labour will not have the time or energy for political activity and the running of the state.
Public Hygiene
Here again it was a matter of struggling for "reforms" which were long overdue because of the terrible conditions of existence experienced by the Russian proletariat (diseases related to slum housing, unsupervised hygiene and safety standards at work), etc. Thus, "the Russian Communist Party regards the following as its immediate tasks:
1. the vigorous pursuance of extensive sanitary measures in the interests of the workers, such as:
(a) improvement of the sanitary condition of all places of public resort; the protection of earth, water and air;
(b) the organisation of communal kitchens and of the food supply generally upon a scientific and hygienic foundation;
(c) measures to prevent the spread of disease of a contagious character;
(d) sanitary legislation (. . .)
4. a campaign against social diseases (tuberculosis, venereal disease, alcoholism).
5. The free provision of medical advice and treatment for the whole population" .
Many of these apparent basics, however, have yet to be achieved in many regions of the globe. If anything, the scope of the problem has widened immeasurably. To begin with, the bourgeoisie, faced with the development of the crisis, is everywhere cutting back the medical provisions that had begun to be regarded as "normal" in the advanced capitalist countries. Secondly, the aggravation of capitalism's decadence has vastly amplified certain problems, above all through its "progressive" destruction of the natural environment. Whereas the RCP programme only briefly mentions the need for the "protection of earth, water and air", any programme of the future would have to recognise what an enormous task this represents after decades of systematic poisoning of "earth, water and air".
CDW
We have noted that the essential radicalism of the RCP programme was a product of the unity of aim and purpose in the Bolshevik party in 1919, and a reflection of the high revolutionary hopes of that moment. In the next article in this series we shall examine a further effort by the Bolshevik party to understand the nature and tasks of the transition period, this time posed in a more general and theoretical manner. Once again the author of the text in question - The Economics of the Transformation Period - was Nikolai Bukharin.
The full extent of the financial crisis which began just over a year ago in South-East Asia is beginning to emerge. It took a new plunge during the summer with the collapse of the Russian economy, and the unprecedented convulsions of the "emerging countries" of Latin America. But today, it is the developed countries of Europe and North America that are in the firing line, with a continuing slide on their stock exchanges and the constant downward adjustment oftheir forecast growth. We have come a long way from the bourgeoisie's euphoria of a few months back, expressed in the dizzying rise in western markets during the first half of 1998.
Today, the same "specialists" who had congratulated themselves on the "good health" of the Anglo-Saxon countries, and who forecast a recovery for all the European countries, are the first to talk of recession, or even "depression". And they right to be pessimistic. The clouds gathering over the most powerful economies are pregnant, not with some passing squall, but with a veritable temptest, an expression of the dead-end into which the capitalist economy has plunged.
The summer of 1998 devastating for the capitalist system's credibility: a deepening crisis in Asia, prey to a lasting recession which has evev hit the two major economies of China and Japan; a menacing situation looming over Latin America; the spectacular crash of the Rusian economy; close to record falls on world's stock market. In three weeks, the rouble lost 70% of it's value (since June 1991, Russia's GDP has fallen by between 50% and 80%). On 31st August - the famous "blue Monday", according to athe expression of a journalist who dared not call it "black" - Wall Street fell by 6.4%, while the Nsdaq (the exchange specialising in technology shares) fell by 8.5%. The nxt day, the European exchanges were hit in their turn. Frankfurt begn the morning with a 2% fall, Paris with 3.5%. During the day, Madrid lost 4.23%, Amsterdam 3.56% and Zurich 2.15%. In Asia, during 31st August Hong Kong fell by mre than 7%, while Tokyo fell sharply to reach its lowest position for 12 years. Since then, the stock markets have continued to fall, so that by 21st September (and the situation will probably be worse by the time this issue of the International Review goes to press) most of the indices had returned to the same level as the beginning of the year. New York was up to 0.32% and Frankfurt 5.09%, but London, Zurich, Amsterdam, and Stockholm were all down.
This accumulation of events is not due to chance. Nor it is the sign of some "passing crisis of confidence" in "emerging economies", or of a "salutary automatic correction of an over-valued market". It is on the contrary another episode in the decline of capitalism as a whole, a descent into hell caricatured by the disintegration of the Russian economy.
The crisis in Russia
The world ruling class and its "experts" had a serious fright a year ago, with the financial crisis in South-east Asia. For months afterwards, they consoled themselves with the thought that this crisis had not dragged the other "emerging economies" down with it. The media went on about the "specific" natue of the difficulties affecting Thailand, Indonesian, Korea, etc. Alarm-bells rang again when chaos gripped the Russian economy at the beginning of the summer1. The "international community", which had already paid heavily for South-east Asia, found itself forced to cough up an aid of $22.6 billion over 18 months - combined, as usual, with draconian conditions: a drastic reduction in state spending, an increase in taxes (especially taxes on wags, to compensate for the Russian state's inability to collect taxes from business), price rises and a rise in pension subscriptions. And all this, when the living conditions of Russian workers are already wretched, and most state and many private sector workers have notbeen paid for months. A dramatic expression of their poverty is the fall in life expectancy since June 1991; down from 69 to 58 years for men; the birth rate has also fallen substantially.
A month later, it was clear that these funds were merely good money thrown after bad. After a dreadful week, which saw the Moscow stock market plummet, and hundreds of banks teeter on the edge of bankruptcy, on 17th August the Yeltsin government was forced to abandon its last shred of credibility: the rouble and its parity wtih the dollar. Of the first tranche of IMF aid - $4.8 billion in July - $3.8 billion were swallowed up in a vain defence of the rouble. As for the remaning billion dollars, they were not used to restore the government's finances, still less to pay worker's back wages, for the simple reason that they had also melted away, to service the national debt (which already devours more than 35% of the country's income), in other words in interest payments fallen due during this period.not to mention the money that sticks to the fingers of this or that faction of a gangsterised bourgeoisie. The failure of this policy means not only a string of bank failures (more than 1,500 banks were affected), a plunge into recession, and an explosion of the state's dollar debt, but a return to galloping inflation which is already forecast to reach 200% or even 300% this year.
This disaster immediately provoked a political crisis in the upper echelons on the Russian state, which had still not been resolved at the end of September. The discomfiture of the ruling circles, which makes Russia look more and more like a vulgar banana republic, alarmed the Western bourgeoisies. But while the ruling class frets over the fate of Yeltsin and his henchmen, it is the Russian people and the working class who are paying the heavy price of thi situation and its consequences. The rouble's fall has already increased by 50% the price of imported food-stuffs, which amount for more than half of Russia's consumption. Production is barely 40% of its level prior to the fall of the Berlin wall.
Today, reality fully confirms what we said nine years agoin our "Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the Eastern bloc", written in September 1989: "Faced with the total collapse of their economies, the only way out for these countries, not to any real competitiveness, but at least to keeping their heads above water, is to introduce mechanisms which make it possible to impose a real responsibility on their leaders. These mechanisms presuppose a "liberalisation" of the economy, the creation of a real internal market, a greater "autonomy" for enterprises and the development of a strong "private" sector (...) However, while this kind of programme has become more and more vital, its application runs up against virtually insurmountable obstacles" (International Review no. 60)
A few months later, we added: "(...) some fractions of the bourgeoisie answer that a new Marshall Plan is needed, to rebuild these countries' economic potential (...) today, a massive infection of capital in the East European countries aimed at developing their economic, and specially industrial potential, cannot be on the agenda. Even supposing that such an industrial potential were to be re-established, the goods it produced would only burden stiil further an already super-saturated world market. The countries emerging form Stanlinism today are in the same position as the unde- developed countries: for the latter, the policy of massive credit injections during the 1970s and 80s has simply lead to the catastrophic situation which is well known today (a debt of $1.400 billion, and economies in a still worse state than before). The fate of the East European countries (whose economies in many ways resembles those of the under-developed world) cannot be any different (...) The only thing we can expect is their provision of emergency credit or aid, to allow these coutries to avoid an open financial bankrsuptcy and famines, which would worsen the convulsions that shake them" ("After the collapse of the Eastern bloc, destabilisation and chaos", International Review no. 61)
Two years later, we wrote: "In order to loosen the financial strangulation of the ex-USSR, the G7 agreed to a year's delay in the repayment of interest on the Soviet debt, which now stands at $80 billion. But this will be like putting plaster on a wooden leg because in any case all the credits just disappear down a huge hole. Two years ago, there were all sorts of illusion floating around about the "new markets" that were being opened up by the collapse of the Stalinist regimes. Today, when one of the expressions of the world economic crisis is a sharp crisis of liquidity, the banks are more and more reluctant to place their capital in this part of the world" (Editorial, International Review no.68)
Against all the interested illusions of the bourgeoisie and its flatterers, the reality of events has thus confirmed what Marxist theory has allowed revolutionaries to foresee. Today, complete disintegration and dreadful poverty are growing at the very gates of "fortress Europe".
The media's attempt to persuade us once the wave of panic at the stock markets has passed, the consequences will be minimal for the real economy internationally, have had little success. This is hardly surprising, since the capitalist's desire to reassure themselves, and above all to hide the gravity of the crisis from the working class, are confronted with the harsh reality of events. Firstly, Russia's creditors have been placed in a difficult situation. The Western banks lent almost $75 billion to Russia. They hold Treasury bonds whose value has fallen by 80%; repayments have been halted for those denominated in dollars. The Western bourgeoisie is also worried lest the other countries Eatern Europe slide into the same nightmare, and they have good reason: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic account between them for 18 times more investment than Russia. At the end of August, the Warsaw stock market fell by 9.5%, while Budapest lost 5.5% - a sign that a capital is already beginning to deset these new financial markets. Moreover, and even more immediately, Russia is drhe agging down with it the other countries of the CIS, whose economies are closely linked to its own. Even if Russia is only a "minor debtor" in the world economy, relative to other regions, its situation is particularly serious given its geopolitical position as a nuclear minefield in the heart of Europe, threatened with a plunge into chaos by its political and financial crisis.
The fact that the Russian debt is small relative to those of South East Asia, or other parts of the world, is poor consolation. Other dangers are looming, notably the threat of a financial crisis in Latin America, which in recent years has been the main recipient of direct foreign investment in "developing countries" (45% of the total in 1997, as opposed to 20% in 1980 and 38% in 1997). The threat of devaluation in Venezuela, the abrupt fall in raw materials prices since the Asian crisis, which has hit the Latin American countries even harder than Russia, a colossal national and foreign debt (Brazil, with the world's seventh highest GDP, has a national debt far greater than Russia's), all go to make Latin America a time bomb which threatens to add to the disaster in Russia and Asia. A time bomb set to go off at the very gates of the world's greatest power the USA.
However, the main threat does not come from the less developed countries, but from the hyper-developed second economic power on the planet: Japan.
The crisis in Japan
Even before disaster hit the Russian economy, in June 1998 n earthquake centered in Tokyo threatened to destabilise the whole world economic system.since 1992, despite seven "recovery plans" which have injected the equivalent of 2-3% ofGDP into the economy every year, and a 50% devaluation of yen in three years which should have upheld the competitiveness of Japanese products on the world market, the Japanese economy have continued to decline. The Japanese state has continuously delayed taking measures to "cure"its banking sector, for fear of confronting the social and economic consequences, in an already fragile situation. Unrecoverable debts now amount to some 15% of the GDP... enough to plunge the Japanese, and so the world economy into a recession without precedent since the great crisis in 1929. Given Japan's inability to get out of the recession, and the government's hesitation to take the necessary counter-measures, the yen has been thetarget of massive speculation, threatening all the currencies of the Far East with a series of devaluations which would trigger a nightmare scenario of deflation. On 17th june 1998, alarm bells rang on the financial markets: the US Federal Reserve gave massive support to a yeh which had begun to slide. However, this only puts the disaster off for later: with the help of the international community, japan was able to put off the day of reckoning, but only at the price of a dizzying rise in debt. The national debt alone is now equivalent to one year's production (100% of GNP)
It is interesting to note at this point, that the same "liberal" economists who once denounced the intervention of the state in the economy, and who have the greatest influence today in the world's great financial institutions and in Western governments, are now crying out for a new and massive injection of public money into the banking sector in order to save it from bankruptcy. Here is the proof that despite all their ideological chatter about "less state intervention", the bourgeoisie's "experts" know very well that the state is the last rampant against economic disaster. When they talk about the "less state", they essentially mean "less welfare state", in other words less social protection (sick pay, unemployment benefit, minimum wage) for the working class, and all their speeches simply mean more and worse attacks on the workers.
Finally, on 18th September, government and opposition signed a compromise to save the Japanese banking system. Instead of launching a recovery, however, these new measures were greeted with a new slide in the markets - an indication of world financiers' deep distrust in the planet's second economic power, presented for decades as the "model" to follow. Deutsche Bank's chief in Tokyo, Kenneth Courtis - a serious witness if ever there was one, did not mince his words:
"We must reverse the downward trend, which is more serious than at the beginning of the 1970s (plummeting investments and consumption.) We have now entered a phase where new bad debts are being created. Thre is much talk about the banks' bad debts, but none about those of households. With the fall in the value of housing and the rise in unemployment, we are likely to see a growing inability to repay loans guaranteed by mortgages on property held by individuals. These mortgages have reached the fabulous sum of $7,500 billion, while the properties have lost 60% of their value. There is a latent social and political problem (...) there should be no mistake: a large scale purge of the economy is underway... the companies that survive will be incredibly strong. The greatest threat to the world economy since the 1930s is likely to take shape in Japan..." (Le Monde, 23rd September).
Clearly, for the Japanese economy - and for the Japanese working class- the worst is still to come. Workers have already been hard ht by ten years of stadnation, and now recession, and will now have to suffer repeated austerity plans, massive redundancies, and increase exploitation in a context where financial crisis is combined with tha closure of some of the country's most important factories. However, since the working class has not yet digested the ideological defeat it suffered with the collapse of the Eastern bloc, this is not the capitalist's most pressing concern. Much more alarming is the destruction of their illusions and the growing realisation of the catastrophic perspectives for their economy.
Towards a new world recession
We have become used, during previous alerts to hearing comforting declarations from the "specialists", along the lines that "trade in South East Asia is not very important", "Russia's weight in the world economy is small", "the European economy is sustained by the perspective of the Euro", "the fundamentals of the US economy are good". Today, the tone has changed! The mini-crash at the end of August throughout the world's markets has been a reminder that, when a tree's weakest branches break first in the storm, it is because the trunk can no longer draw enough energy from its roots to nourish them. The heart of the problem lies in the central countries, and the stock market professionals have no doubt about it. When every reassuring declaration is immediately given the lie by events, it is no longer possible to hide the truth. More fundamentally, the bourgeoisie now has to prepare public opinion for the painful economic and social consequences of an increasingly inevitable recession: "a world recession has not been banished. The American authorities have judged it necessary to make it known that they are following events closely (...) the probability of a worldwide economic slowdown is not a negligeable one. A large part of Asia is in recession. In the USA, the fall in share is in encouraging households to save more, at the expense of consumption, provoking an economic slowdown" (Le Soir, 2nd September)
The crisis in eastern Asia has already led to massive devaluation of capital, throughthe closure of hundreds of production sites, the devaluation of shares, the bankruptcy of thousands of businesses, and the fall into profound poverty of tens of millions of people: "the most dramatic collapse of a country in the last 50 years" is how the World Bank describes the situation in Indonesia. Moreover, the decline in tha Asian stock markets was triggered by the official announcements of both Korea's and Malaysia's entry into recession in the second quarter of 1998. Together with Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Thailand, almost the whole of the much vaunted South East Asia region is going down, since even Singaporeis expected to enter recession by the end of the year. Only China and Taiwan are keeping their heads above the water - but for how long? Indeed, the issue in Asia is no longer recession but depression: "Depression is when the fall in production and trade accumulates to such a point that the social foundations of economic activity are undermined. At this point, it becomes impossible to foresee the tendency being reversed, and difficult, if not pointless to adopt the classic measures for recovery. Many of the Asian countries are in this situation today, to the point that the entire region is under threat" (Le Monde Diplomatique, September 1998). If we combine the economic difficulties in the central countries with the recession with the world's second economy - Japan - and througout South East Asia, adding on the deflationary effects of the crash in Russia on the countries of Easter Europe and Latin America (in particular the fall in raw material prices, notably oil), then we end up with an inevitable contraction of the world market which will be the basis for a new international recession. Indeed, the IMF has already included substantial deflationary effects in its own forecasts: the crisis will cut 2% off world growth rates compared to 1997 (4.7%), while the main blow will come in 1999. The third millennium, which was supposed to open on the definitive victory of capitalism and the new world order, seems likely to begin with zero gowth!
Continuity and limitations of palliative measures
For more than 30 years, the plunge into ever-increasing debt, and the diversion of the crisis' most devastating effects onto the periphery, has made it possible for the international bourgeoisie to put of the day of reckoning. This policy, which is still in extensive use today, is showing more and more signs of exhaustion. The new financial order which has progressively replaced the post-war Bretton Woods agreement "today appears extremely costly. The rich countries (USA, European Union, Japan) have benefited from it, while the small ones have been easily submerged by even a modest capital inflow" (John Llwellyn, global chief economist at Lehman Brothers, London). It is proving more and more difficult to contain the most devastating effects of the crisis on the margins of the international economic system. The economic decline and upheavals are so great that their repercussions will be inevitably be felt in the most powerful countries. After the bankruptcy of the Third World, the Eastern bloc, and South East Asia, the world's second largest economy - Japan - is swaying. This is no longer a matter of the periphery: one of the three poles at the very heart of the system is infected. Another unmistakable sign of the exhaustion of palliative measures is the growing inability of international institutions like theIMF and the World Bank - set up to avoid the repetition of events like 1929 - to extinguish the fires that burst out ever more frequently in the four corners of the world. This is expressed concretely in financial circles by uncertainty as to the IMF's status as "lender of last resort". The markets mumur that the IMF no longer has the resources to play the part of fireman: "Apart from anything else, the latest repercussions of the Russian crisis have shown that the IMF was no longer inclined - no according to some - to systemically play the fireman. The decision last week of the IMF and the G7 group of industrialised countries not to provide extra financial support for Russia can be considered fundamental for future policies of investment in the emerging countries (...) Translation: nothing says that the IMF will intervene financially to extinguish a potential crisis in Latin America or elsewhere. This is not going to reassure investors" (Agence France Presse, Le Soir, 25th August). Increasingly, like the drifting African economy, the bourgeoisie h s no choice but to abandon whole sectors of its world economy, in order to isolate the most gangrened parts and preserve a minimum of stability on a smaller foundation. This is one of the main reasons for the acceleration in the creation of regional economic groupings (European Community, NAFTA, etc). Just as, since 1995m the bourgeoisie in the developed countries has worked to renew the credibility of its trades unions to try to control the workers; struggles to come, so the Euro represents an effort t o resist the financial and monetary tremors to come, while working to stabilise whatever stiil works in the world economy. It is in this sense that the European bourgeoisie describes the Euro as a shield. A cynical calculation has begun to be worked out: international capitalism establishes a balance sheet comparing the cost of the measures needed to rescue a country or region, and the consequences of a bankruptcy if nothing were done. In the future, there is thus no guarantee that the IMF will function as "lender of last resort". This uncertainty is starving a so-called "emerging" countries of the capital on which they had built their "prosperity", thus rendering hypothetical any economic recovery.
The bankruptcy of capitalism
Not so long ago, the term "emerging countries' made the world's capitalists tremble with excitement, as they desperately searched the world market for new terrain for the accumulation of capital. They were the icing on the cake for the hired hacks who presented them as the proof of capitalism's youth, discovering a "second wind" in these regions. Today, the term immediately evokes stock exchange panic and the fear that some "far-off" region should infet the central countries with a new crisis.
But the crisis does not come from this part of the world in particular. It is not a crisis of "youthful countries" but a crisis senility, of a system that entered its decadence more tha 80 years ago, and which has been confronting its insoluble contradictions ever since: the impossibility of finding ever more solvent markets for goods produced in order to ensure the continued accumulation of capital. Two world wars, and destructive open crisis like the present one, that has lasted for thirty years, have been the price. To keep going, the system has constantly cheated with its own laws. And the main "cheat" has been the plunge into ever more fantastic levels of debt.
The absurdity of the rusian situation, whre both banks and the state only survived at the cost of an exponential increase in debt, which forced them to go further into debt just to pay the interest on debts already contracted, is not a "Russian" madness. The entire world economy has survived for decades at the cost of the same absurd flight into debt, because this is the only answer it has to its contracdictions, the only answer it has to its contradictions, the only means of artificially creating new markets for capital and commodities. The whole world sytem is built on an enormous and increasingly fragile house of cards. The massive loans and investments in the "emerging" countries, themselves financed by other loans, have been no more than a means to push the system's explosive contradictions from the centre to the periphery. The repeated stock market crashes - 1987, 1989, 1997, 1998 - express the increasing extnt of capitalism's collapse. The question this raises is not why we are in such a brutal recession, but why it has not come much earlier. The only answer is: because the bourgeoisie worldwide has done everything to put off the day of reckoning by cheating with its own laws. And today, Marxism once again makes no distinction between the experts of "liberalism" and the advocates of "stricter financial and economic control". None of them can rescue an economic system whose contradictions are exploding despite all its cheating. Only Marxism has shown the bankruptcyof capitalism to be inevitable, making this understanding a weapon in the struggle of the exploited.
And when the bill has to be paid, when the fragile financial system cracks, t hen the fundamental contradictions are once again in control: we see the plunge into recession, the explosion of unemployment, strings of bankruptcies, of companies and whole industrial sectors. In a few months, in Thailand and Indonesia for example, the crisis plunged tens of millions deep in poverty. The bourgeoisie itself hs been forced to recognise this reality - which shows just how serious the situation is. Nor is this restricted to the so-called "emerging" countries. The recession is coming to all the central countries of capitalism. The highest levels of debt are owed, not by countries like Russia or Brazil, but by the very heart of capitalism: Japan and the USA. Following two quarters of negative growth, Japan is now officially in recession, and its GDP is expected to fall by 1.5% for 1998. Britain, presented not so long ago, alongside the US, as a model of economic "dynamism" has been forced by the threat of inflation to plan a "cooling" of the economy, and a "rapid rise in unemployment" (according to Liberation of 13th August). Redundancies are already proliferating in manufacturing (100,000 lay-offs out of 1.8 months).
Asia presents us with the perspective for the world capitalist economy. Despite all the "rescue" plans designed to return these countries to health and restore their vigour, we have seen the recession make itself at home, forming huge pockets of poverty and famine.
Capitalism has no solution to its crisis, which in return has no solution within this system. This is why the only solution to the barbarism and poverty that it imposes on humanity, is its overthrow by the working class. Thanks to its concentration and its historic experience, the proletariat at the very heart of capitalism, and in Europe notably, bears a decisive responsibility towards its class brothers in the rest of the world.
MPF
1 We should point out that the IMF's annual general meeting in October 1997 considered that the next major country "at risk" could well be Turkey. So much for the lucidity of the bourgeoisie's most qualified "experts"!
On numerous occasions in our press, we have denounced the massacres and crimes of the "great democracies" and shown that the "allies" shared responsibility for the holocaust with the Nazis (International Reviews 66 and 89). Contrary to the lying propaganda of the bourgeoisie, which repeats endlessly that the Second World War was a struggle between the democratic and humanist "forces of good" and the "absolute evil" of Nazi totalitarianism, this conflict was really a bloody conflict between rival imperialist interests, both as barbaric and as murderous as each other.
Once the war was finished and Germany defeated, the natural tendencies of decadent capitalism took their course and the new rivalries between former allies came to the surface. A regime of famine and terror was imposed on the European populations, especially in Germany. Here again, contrary to the propaganda of the Western bourgeoisies, this policy was by no means exclusive to Stalinism.
The episode of the Berlin airlift in 1948 marked a brutal acceleration of imperialist antagonisms between the blocs formed around Stalinist Russia and the USA. It was a turning point in the latter's policy towards Germany. Far from being an expression of their humanism, the Berlin airlift was an expression of their counter-offensive against Russia's imperialist ambitions. At the same time, it allowed them to hide their policy of terror, of organised famine, of mass deportation and imprisonment in labour camps which they had imposed on the German population right after the war.
It is not surprising that the democratic victor, of World War II - the French, British and American bourgeoisies - have taken the opportunity this year to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Berlin airlift that began on June 26 1948. According to their propaganda, this event proved, on the one hand, the humanitarianism of the Western democratic powers and their mercy towards a defeated nation; and on the other provided a beacon of resistance against the threats of Russian totalitarianism. For more than a year over 2.3 million tons of relief goods were flown on 277,728 flights by American and British planes to a West Berlin that had been blockaded by Russian imperialism. The passion for peace, freedom and human dignity revealed by this historical episode continues to live on today in the hearts of the western imperialists, according to their own media and politicians.
Nothing could be further from the truth, either of the history of the last 50 years in general or of the real meaning of the Berlin airlift in itself. In reality the airlift essentially marked a change of American imperialist policy. Germany was no longer to be de-industrialised and turned into farmland as put forward at the Potsdam Conference of 1945 but was now to be reconstructed as the bulwark of the newly created Western imperialist bloc against the Eastern bloc. This change on the part of Western imperialism was not motivated by compassion. Instead the reason for the reorientation was the threat of Russian hegemony spreading to Western Europe as a result of the latter's economic and political dislocation after the mass slaughter and destruction of World War II. Thus the Berlin airlift, while feeding pan of a starving population, was a well-devised propaganda stunt to hide the misery of the past few years, and to sell the new orientation to the West German and Western European populations who were, henceforth, to be held hostage to the emerging Cold War. Thanks to these "humanitarian" supply flights, three US bomber groups were sent to Europe, placing Soviet targets well within the range of their B-29s ...
Nevertheles the celebration of the airlift today, despite a special visit by US President Clinton to Berlin, has been relatively quiet. One probable explanation for the low intensity of this particular anniversary campaign is that a sustained celebration would raise uncomfortable questions about the real policy of the Allies towards the German proletariat during and immediately after World War II. It might reveal too much of the hypocrisy of the democracies, and their own crimes against humanity. It would also help vindicate the communist left which has consistently denounced all the barbaric manifestations of decadent capitalism, whether in the form of democracy, fascism, or Stalinism.
The ICC has often shown1, along with other political tendencies of the communist left, how the crimes of Allied imperialism during the Second World War were no less heinous than those of the fascist imperialisms. They were the product of capitalism at a particular stage of its historic decline. The fire bombings or nuclear erasure of major German and Japanese cities at the end of the war showed the spurious philanthropy of the Allies. The bombing of all the densely populated centres in Germany did not have the object of destroying military or even economic targets. The dislocation of the German economy at the end of the war was not achieved by these 'area bombings' but by the destruction of the transport system2. Instead the bombardment was designed specifically to decimate and terrorise the working class and prevent a revolutionary movement developing out of the chaos of defeat as it had after 1918.
But 1945, year zero, did not bring an end to the nightmare.
"The 1945 Potsdam Conference and the inter-Allied agreement of March 1946 formulated concrete decisions to ... reduce German industrial capacity to a low level and instead give agriculture a greater priority, In order to eliminate the German economy's capacity to wage war, it was decided to implement a total ban on the German output of strategic products such as aluminium, synthetic rubber and synthetic benzene. Furthermore Germany would be obliged to reduce its steel capacity to 50% of its 1929 level, and the superfluous equipment would be dismantled and transported to the victorious countries of both East and West"3.
It is not difficult to imagine the 'concrete decisions' that had been made in respect of the welfare of the population:
"At the surrender in May 1945, schools and universities were closed, as well as radio stations, newspapers, the national Red Cross and mail service. Germany was also stripped of much coal, her eastern territories, [accounting for 25 % of Germany's arable land] industrial patents, lumber, gold reserves, and most of her labour force. Allied teams also looted and destroyed Germany's factories, offices, laboratories and workshops ... Starting on May 8th, the date of the surrender in the West, German and Italian prisoners in Canada, Italy, the USA and the UK, who had been fed according to the Geneva convention, were suddenly put on greatly reduced rations ... ( .... )
"Foreign relief agencies were prevented from sending food from abroad; Red Cross food trains were sent back to Switzerland; all foreign governments were denied permission to send food to German civilians; fertiliser production was sharply reduced; and food was confiscated during the first year, especially in the French zone. The fishing fleet was kept in port while people starved".
Germany was effectively turned into a vast death camp by the Russian, British, French and American occupying powers. The Western democracies captured 73 % of all German prisoners in their zones of occupation. Many more of the German population died after the war than had during battle, air raids, and concentration camps during the war. Between 9 and 13 million people perished as a result of the policy of Allied imperialism between 1945-50. There were three main foci of this monstrous genocide.
* Firstly amongst a total of 13.3 million ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern parts of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary etc., as allowed by the Potsdam agreement. This ethnic cleansing was so inhumane that only 7.3 million arrived at their destination within the post-war borders of Germany; the rest 'disappeared' in the most gruesome circumstances.
* Secondly amongst the German prisoners of war who died as a result of the starvation and diseased conditions of the allied camps - between 1.5 and 2 million.
* Finally amongst the population in general who were put on rations of around 1000 calories per day, guaranteeing slow starvation and sickness - 5.7 million died as a result.
The full extent of this unimaginable barbarism still remains the best kept secret of the democratic imperialisms. Even the German bourgeoisie is to this day covering up the facts so that they can only be gleaned by independent research comparing inconsistencies in the official records. For example the estimate of the number of civilians who perished in this period is reckoned, among other ways, by the enormous shortfall in population recorded by the census of Germany in 1950. The role of the democratic imperialisms in this extermination campaign has become clearer after the fall of the Soviet Empire and the opening of the Soviet archives. Many of the losses that had previously been blamed on the USSR by the West have turned out to be the latter's responsibility: many more prisoners of war for example died in the camps run by the Western powers than did those in the Russian zone. Their deaths were simply not recorded or were hidden under other headings. The scale of the slaughter is not surprising considering the conditions: prisoners were left without food or shelter; the numbers were swelled by the sick turned out of the hospitals; at night they could be randomly machine-gunned for sport. Feeding the prisoners by the civilian population was decreed a capital offence4.
The extent of the starvation of the civilian population, 7.5 million of whom were homeless after the war, can be deduced also from the rations that were allocated to them by the Western occupiers. In the French zone where conditions were worst the official ration in 1947 was 450 calories per day, half the ration of the infamous Belsen concentration camp.
The Western bourgeoisie still presents this period as one of 'readjustment' for the German population after the inevitable horrors of World War II. The deprivations were a 'natural' consequence of post-war dislocation. In any case, the bourgeoisie argues, the German population deserved such treatment as retribution for starting the war and to pay for the war crimes of the Nazi regime. This repulsive 'argument' is particularly hypocritical for a number of reasons. Firstly because the complete destruction of German imperialism was already a war aim of the allies before they had decided to use the 'great alibi' of Auschwitz to justify it. Secondly, those immediately responsible for National Socialism and its imperialist ambitions - the German bourgeoisie - emerged relatively unscathed from the war and its aftermath. While many figureheads were executed at the Nuremburg Trials, the majority of the functionaries and bosses of the Nazi era were 'recycled' and took up posts in the new democratic state set up by the allies.5 The German proletariat that suffered the most from the post-war policy of the allies had no responsibility for the Nazi regime: they were the first of its victims. The allied bourgeoisies, which had supported Hitler's repression of the proletariat after 1933, targeted an entire generation of the German working class during and after the war not out of revenge for the Hitler era, but to exorcise the spectre of a German revolution that haunted them from the aftermath of World War I.
It was only when this murderous objective had been achieved and when US imperialism realised that the exhaustion of Europe after the war might lead to the domination of Russian imperialism over the whole continent that the policy of Potsdam had to be changed. The reconstruction of Western Europe demanded the resurrection of the German economy. Then the wealth of the United States, swollen in part by reparations already looted from Germany, could be funnelled into the Mar hall Plan to help rebuild the European bastion of what was to become the Western bloc. The Berlin airlift of 1948 was the symbol of this change of strategy.
The crimes of imperialism in their fascist and Stalinist form are well known. When those of the democratic imperialisms are clearer to the world's working class, then the scope of the proletariat's historic mission will be more sharply revealed. No wonder the bourgeoisie wants to try and fraudulently assimilate the ork of the communist left on this question [Q the lies of the extreme right and to ‘negationism'. The bourgeoisie wants to hide the fact that genocide, instead of an aberrant exception perpetrated by evil madmen, has been the general rule of the history of decadent capitalism.
Como
1 International Review 83 "Hiroshima: The Lies of the bourgeoisie". IR 88 "Anti-fascism justifies Barbarism ", lR 89 "Allies and Nazis both responsible for the holocaust".
2 According to The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-45, The Official Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit, that has only just been published!
3 Hennan Van der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval, Pelican 1987.
4 James Bacque, Crimes and Mercies, The fate of German civilians under Allied occupation 1945-50, Warner Books.
5 See Tom Bower, Blind eye to Murder
In the industrialised countries, the summer period is one where, in general, the bourgeoisie concedes holidays to its exploited in order that they may recover their energy for work and become more productive for the rest of the year. The workers in turn have learnt to their cost, that the dominant class profits from their dispersion, their separation from the place of work and their lack of vigilance to accelerate the attacks against their living conditions. Thus, while the workers rest, the bourgeoisie and its governments do not remain inactive. However, for several years, the holiday period has also become one of the most fertile for the aggravation of imperialist tensions. For example, Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, leading to the Gulf crisis and war. In the summer of 1991 ex-Yugoslavia began to break up and brought war to the heart of Europe for the first time for nearly half a century. More recently, the summer of 1995 saw the NATO bombardment and US-supported Croat offensive against the Serbs. We could go on giving more examples.
By contrast, the summer of 1997 was particularly calm from the standpoint of imperialist confrontations. The international situation was no calmer as a result: during this summer, and independently of any calculation by the capitalists and their governments, there began the financial crisis in the South East Asian countries, which presaged the convulsions in which the world economy is floundering today.
The summer of 1998 returned to the "traditional" sharpening of imperialist conflict, with the war in the Congo and the bombing of two US embassies in Africa, followed by the American bombardment of Sudan and Afghanistan. At the same time, the state of the world economy has worsened considerably.
In particular, the chaos in Russia has been followed by a sharp decline in "emerging countries" such as those in Latin America, and by a historic fall in the value of stock markets in the developed world.
This recent unfurling of convulsions throughout the capitalist world is no accident. It expresses a new step by bourgeois society into insurmountable contradictions. There is no direct, mechanical link between today's economic upheavals and the increase in military confrontations. But they all spring from the same source: the world economy's plunge into a crisis which expresses the capitalism's historical dead-end ever since it entered its decadent phase with the outbreak of World War I.
This is why the 20th Century which is drawing to a close is recognised as the century of the greatest tragedies in human history. And only the world working class, by carrying out the communist revolution, can prevent the 21st Century from being worse still. This is the main lesson that workers must draw from world capitalism's plunge into crisis and increasing barbarism.
The victorious conquest of power by the working class in Russia in October 1917 lit a flame that illuminated the whole world. The working class of neighbouring countries immediately followed the example given by the Russian workers. In November 1917 the working class in Finland joined the fight. In the Czech provinces, in Poland, in Austria, in Rumania and Bulgaria in 1918, waves of strikes shook the regimes in power. And when, in turn, in November 1918, the German workers took the stage, the revolutionary wave had reached a key country, a country which would be decisive for the ultimate outcome of the struggles, and where the defeat or victory of the revolution would be determined.
The German bourgeoisie responded by putting an end to the war in November 1918, and by using Social Democracy and the unions - working hand in glove with the army - to sabotage the movement and to empty it of its content. Finally, through provoking a premature uprising and above all by making full use of the forces of 'democracy', the bourgeoisie prevented the working class from taking power and thus extending the Russian revolution.
The international bourgeoisie unites to stop the revolutionary wave
The series of uprisings which took place in 1919, in Europe as in other continents, the foundation of the Hungarian soviet republic in March, the formation of workers' councils in Slovakia in June, the wave of strikes in France in the spring as well as the powerful struggles in the USA and Argentina, all these events took place at a time when the extension of the revolution to Germany had suffered a major set-back. Since the key player in the extension of the revolution, the working class in Germany, had not succeeded in overthrowing the capitalist class with a sudden and rapid assault, the wave of struggles began to lose its élan in 1919. Although the workers continued to battle heroically against the offensive of the bourgeoisie in a series of confrontations, in Germany itself with the Kapp putsch in March 1920 and in Italy in the autumn of the same year, these struggles did not manage to push the movement forward.
By the same token, these struggles did not break the offensive that the capitalist class had launched against the isolated proletarian bastion in Russia. In the spring of 1918, the Russian bourgeoisie, which had been overthrown very quickly and almost without any violence, began to wage a civil war, supported by 14 armies of the 'democratic' states. In this civil war, which was to last almost three years and was accompanied by an economic blockade aimed at starving the workers, the White armies of the capitalist states bled the Russian working class dry. After the years of blockade and encirclement, the Russian working class, through the military offensive of the Red Army, had won the civil war, but it was completely exhausted, with over a million dead, and, above all, it was politically enfeebled.
At the end of 1920, when the working class had already been through its first major defeat in Germany, when the working class in Italy had been caught in the trap of the factory occupations, when the Red Army had failed in its march on Warsaw, the communists began to understand that the hopes for a rapid and continuous extension of the revolution were not going to materialise. At the same time the capitalist class realised that the principal, mortal danger represented by the insurrection in Germany had retreated, for the moment at least.
The generalisation of the revolution had been countered above all because the capitalist class had quickly drawn the lessons of the workers' successful conquest of power in Russia.
The historical explanation of the explosive development of the revolution, and its rapid defeat, lies in the fact that it arose in response to an imperialist war, and not to a generalised economic crisis as Marx had envisaged. Unlike the situation which prevailed in 1939, the proletariat had not been defeated in a decisive manner before the First World War; it was thus capable, despite three years of carnage, of coming up with a revolutionary answer to the open barbarism of world imperialism. Putting an end to the war and thus preventing the massacre of even more millions could only be done rapidly and decisively, by directly attacking the regimes in power. This is why the revolution, once it had broken out, developed and spread so quickly. And in the revolutionary camp, everyone hoped for a rapid victory of the revolution, at least in Europe.
However, while the bourgeoisie is incapable of ending the economic crisis of its system, it can stop an imperialist war when it is faced with the threat of revolution. This is what it did once the revolutionary wave reached the heart of the world proletariat in Germany, in November 1918. In this way the exploiters were able to reverse the dynamic towards the international extension of the revolution.
The balance sheet of the 1917-23 revolutionary wave shows conclusively that world war, even before the era of atomic weapons, does not provide a favourable soil for the victory of the proletariat. As Rosa Luxemburg argued in The Junius Pamphlet, modern world war, by killing millions of proletarians, including the most experienced and conscious battalions of the class, poses a threat to the very foundations of the victory of socialism. Furthermore, it creates conditions of struggle which are different depending on whether the workers are in the victorious or the losing countries. It was no accident that the revolutionary wave was strongest in the camp of the defeated, in Russia, Germany, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but also in Italy (which only formally belonged to the victorious side), and that it was much less strong in countries like Britain, France and the US. These latter were not only able to temporarily stabilise their economies thanks to the spoils of war, but also to contaminate many workers with the euphoria of 'victory'. The bourgeoisie even succeeded to some extent in stoking up the fires of chauvinism. Thus, despite the world wide solidarity with the October revolution and the growing influence of internationalist revolutionaries during the course of the war, the nationalist poison secreted by the ruling class continued to do its destructive work in the proletariat once the revolution had begun. The revolutionary movement in Germany gives us some edifying examples of this: the influence of extremist and so-called 'left communist' nationalism - that of the 'national Bolsheviks' who, during the war, in Hamburg distributed anti-semitic leaflets against the Spartacist leadership because of its internationalist positions; the patriotic feelings sharpened after the signing of the Versailles Treaty; the anti-French chauvinism stirred up by the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, etc. As we will see in a subsequent article, the Communist International, in its phase of opportunist degeneration, more and more tried to ride this nationalist wave instead of opposing it.
But the intelligence and deviousness of the German bourgeoisie was not only revealed when it put an end to the war as soon as the workers began to launch their assault on the state. Unlike the working class in Russia, which was faced with a weak and inexperienced bourgeoisie, the German workers came up against a unified bloc of the forces of capital, with Social Democracy and the unions at its head.
By drawing maximum profit from the illusions the workers still had in democracy, by using and aggravating the divisions resulting from the war, notably between 'victors' and 'vanquished', by setting up a whole series of political manoeuvres and provocations, the capitalist class succeeded in luring the working class into traps and defeating it.
The extension of the revolution had been halted. Having survived the first wave of workers' reactions, the bourgeoisie could then go onto the offensive. It was to do everything in its power to turn the balance of forces in its favour.
We will now examine how the revolutionary organisations reacted in the face of this blockage in the class struggle and what were {he consequences for the working class in Russia.
The Communist International between its 2nd and 3rd Congresses
When the working class began to move in Germany in November 1918, the Bolsheviks, from December, began calling for an international conference. At this time most revolutionaries thought that the conquest of power by the working class in Germany would succeed at least as quickly as in Russia. In the letter of invitation to his conference, it was proposed that it be held in Germany (legally) or in Holland (illegally) on 1 February 1919. Initially, no-one foresaw holding it in Russia. But the crushing of the Berlin workers in January, the assassination of the revolutionary leaders Luxemburg and Liebknecht, and the repression organised by the Freikorps under the direction of the SPD made it impossible to hold this meeting in the German capital. It was only at this point that Moscow was chosen. When the Communist International was founded in March 1919, Trotsky wrote in Izvestia on 29 April 1919: "If today the centre of the Third International lies in Moscow - and of this we are profoundly convinced - then on the morrow this centre will shift west- ward: to Berlin, to Paris, to London".
For all the revolutionary organisations the policy of the CI was determined by the interests of the world revolution. The initial debates at the congress were centred on the situation in Germany, on the role of Social Democracy in crushing the working class in January and the necessity to combat this party as a capitalist force.
In the article just mentioned Trotsky wrote: "The revolutionary 'primogeniture' of the Russian proletariat is only temporary ... The dictatorship of the Russian working class will be able to finally entrench itself and to develop into a genuine, all-sided socialist construction only from the hour when the European working class frees us from the economic yoke and especially the military yoke of the European bourgeoisie". And again: "if the European people do not rise up and overthrow imperialism, it is we who will be overthrown ... there is no doubt about this. Either the Russian revolution opens the floodgates to the struggles in the west, or the capitalists of all countries will annihilate and strangle our struggle" (Trotsky to the 2nd Congress of Soviets).
After several parties had joined the CI in a short space of time, it was noted at its Second Congress in July 1920 "In certain circumstances, there can be a danger of the CI being diluted in a milieu of semi-convinced groups that have not yet freed themselves from the ideology of the 2nd International. For this reason, the 2nd World Congress of the CI considers that it is necessary to establish very precise conditions for the admission of new parties".
Although the International was founded in the heat of the situation, it established certain clear delimitations on questions as central as the extension of the revolution, the conquest of political power, the clearest possible demarcation from Social Democracy and the denunciation of bourgeois democracy. On the other hand other questions, like the unions and the parliamentary question, were left open.
The majority of the CI adopted the orientation of participating in parliamentary elections but without this being an explicit obligation. This was the result of the fact that a strong minority (notably the group around Bordiga , then known as the 'abstentionist fraction') was totally opposed to this. On the other hand, the CI decided that it was obligatory for all revolutionaries to work in the trade unions. The delegates of the KAPD, who in a totally irresponsible manner had left the Congress before it had begun, were unable to defend their point of view on these questions, unlike the Italian comrades. The debate, which had already begun prior to the Congress with the publication of Lenin's Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, would evolve around the question of the methods of struggle in the new epoch of the decadence of capitalism. It was through this political battle that the communist left made its appearance.
With regard to the perspectives for the class struggle, the 2nd Congress was still optimistic. During the summer of 1920 everyone was expecting an intensification of the revolutionary struggle. But after the defeat of autumn 1920, this tendency went into reverse.
The reflux in the class struggle, springboard for opportunism
In the "Theses on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern", at its Third Congress in July 1921, the CI analysed the situation as follows:
"During the year that elapsed between the Second and Third Congresses of the Communist International a series of working class uprisings and battles have resulted in partial defeats (the Red Army offensive against Warsaw in August 1920; the movement of the Italian proletariat in September 1920; the uprising of the German workers in March 1921).
The first period of the revolutionary movement after the war is characterised by the elemental nature of its onslaught, by the considerable formlessness of its methods and aims and by the extreme panic of the ruling classes; and it may be regarded by and large as terminated. The class self-confidence of the bourgeoisie and the outward stability of its slate organs have undoubtedly become strengthened (...) The leaders of the bourgeoisie ... have everywhere assumed the offensive against the working masses, on both the economic and the political fronts (...) In view of this situation the Communist International presents 10 itself and to the entire working class the following questions: To what extent do these new political interrelations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat correspond to the more profound interrelationship of forces between these two contending camps? Is it true that the bourgeoisie is about to restore the social equilibrium which had been upset by the war? Are there grounds for assuming that the epoch of political paroxysms and class battles is being superseded by a new and prolonged epoch of restoration and capitalist growth? Doesn't this necessitate a revision of programme or tactics on the part of the Communist International?"
And in the "Theses on Tactics" it was suggested that "The world revolution ... will necessitate a longer period of struggles ... The world revolution is not a linear process".
The CI would adapt to the new situation in different ways.
The slogan 'to the masses': a step towards opportunist confusion
In a previous article, we have already looked at the pseudo-theory of the offensive. Part of the CI and a part of the revolutionary camp in Germany were pushing for an 'offensive', to 'strike a blow' in support of Russia. They theorised their adventurism in a 'theory of the offensive', according to which the party can launch an assault on capital, without taking into account the balance of forces or the militancy of the class, as soon as the party is sufficiently brave and determined.
However, history shows that the proletarian revolution cannot be provoked in an artificial manner and that the party cannot compensate for a lack of militancy and initiative among the masses. Even if the CI finally rejected the adventurist actions of the KPD at its Third Congress in July 1921, it then went on to advocate opportunist methods of increasing its influence among the undecided masses: ""to the masses", this is the first slogan that the Third Congress sends to the communists of all countries". In other words, if the masses were marking time, the communists had to go to the masses.
In order to increase its influence among the masses, the CI in autumn 1920, had already pushed for the establishment of mass parties in a number of countries. In Germany, the left wing of the centrist USPD had joined the KPD to form the YKPD in December 1920 (which raised its membership to 400,000). In the same period, the Czech Communist Party with its 350,000 members and the French Communist Party with its 120,000 were admitted to the International.
"From the day of its foundation the Communist International has clearly and unambiguously made its goal the formation not of small communist sects ... but participation in the struggle of the working masses, the direction of this struggle in a communist spirit and the creation in the course of this struggle of experienced, large, revolutionary mass communist parties. From the beginning of its existence, the CI has rejected sectarian tendencies by calling on its associated parties - whatever their size - to participate in the trade unions in order to overturn from within their reactionary bureaucracy and to make the trade unions mass revolutionary organs, organs of struggle ... At its Second Congress the Communist International publicly rejected sectarian tendencies in its resolutions on the trade union question and on arliamentarism ... Thanks to the tactics of the Communist International (revolutionary work in the trade unions, the open letter, etc) communism in Germany ... has become a great revolutionary mass party. In Czechoslovakia, the communists have managed to win over the majority of the politically organised workers ... Sectarian communist groups (like the KAPD) on the other hand, have not had the slightest success" ("Theses on tactics", Third Congress of the CI).
In reality, this debate on the means of the struggle and the possibility of a mass party in the new epoch of decadent capitalism had already begun at the founding congress of the KPD in December 1918-January 1919. At this time, the debate revolved around the union question and around whether it was still possible to use bourgeois parliaments.
Even though, at this congress, Rosa Luxemburg still pronounced herself in favour of participating in parliamentary elections and for working in the unions, it was with the clear vision that new conditions of struggle had arisen, conditions in which revolutionaries had to fight for the revolution with the greatest perseverance and without the naive hope in a 'rapid solution'. Warning against impatience and precipitation, she said with great emphasis: "If I describe the process in this way, it is because this process seems to be a longer one than we at first imagined". Even in the last article she wrote, just before she was murdered, she affirmed: "from all this we can conclude that we cannot expect a final and lasting victory at this moment" ('Order reigns in Berlin').
The analysis of the situation and the evaluation of the balance of forces between the classes has always been one of the primordial tasks for communists. If they do not correctly assume these responsibilities, if they continue to see things moving forward when they are about to move backwards, there is the danger of falling into impatient reactions into adventurism, and into trying to substitute artificial measures for the real movement of the class.
It was the leadership of the KPD, at its conference of October 1919, after the first reflux of the struggles in Germany, which proposed to orient the party towards working in the unions and parliamentary elections in order to increase its influence in the working masses. In doing so it was turning its back on the majority vote taken at the founding congress. Two years later, at the Third Congress of the CI, this debate resurfaced.
The Italian left around Bordiga had already attacked the orientation of the Second Congres on participation in parliamentary elections (see its "Theses on Parliamentarism"), warning against an approach which would be a fertile soil for opportunism. And though the KAPD failed to make itself heard at the Second Congress, its delegation intervened at the Third Congress in more difficult circumstances and fought against this opportunist dynamic. Whereas the KAPD stressed that "the proletariat needs a highly formed party-nucleus", the CI sought salvation in the creation of mass parties. The position of the KAPD was rejected.
As for the opportunist orientation of 'going to the masses', it was to facilitate the adoption of the tactic of the 'United Front', which was adopted a few months after the Third Congress.
What is notable here is that the CI embarked on this journey at a time when the revolution in Europe was not extending and the wave of struggles was in retreat. Just as the Russian revolution of 1917 was only the opening of an international wave of revolutionary struggles, the decline of the revolution and the political regression of the International were simply the result and expression of the evolution of the international balance of class forces. The historically unfavourable circumstances of a revolution emerging out of a world war, combined with the intelligence of the bourgeoisie which had put an end to the war and played the democratic card, had prevented the extension of the revolution and created the conditions for opportunism to grow within the International.
The debate on the evolution of Russia
In order to understand the reactions of revolutionaries to the isolation of the working class in Russia and the change in the balance of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, we have to examine the evolution of the situation in Russia itself.
In October 1917, when the working class, under the leadership of the Bolshevik party, took political power, there was no illusion that socialism could be built in Russia alone. The whole class had its eyes fixed on the outside, awaiting help from there. And when the workers took the first economic measures like the confiscation of the factories and steps towards taking control of production, it was precisely the Bolsheviks who warned them against any false hopes in such measures. The Bolsheviks were particularly clear on the fact that political measures were the vital priority, ie measures oriented towards the generalisation of the revolution. They were clear that the conquest of political power in one country did not do away with capitalism. As long as the working class had not overthrown the ruling class on a world scale, or at least in the most decisive regions, political measures remained primordial and decisive. In the economic sphere, the proletariat could only administer, to the best of its interests, the scarcity that characterises capitalist society.
But the situation was more serious than this. In the spring of 1918 when the capitalist states imposed an economic blockade and entered the civil war on the side of the Russian bourgeoisie, the workers and peasants of Russia faced a truly disastrous economic situation. How were they to resolve the grave problems of food shortages while at the same time dealing with the sabotage orchestrated by the capitalist class? How were they to organise and coordinate the military effort needed to respond to the attacks of the White Armies? Only the state was able to assume such tasks. It was indeed a new state that had arisen after the insurrection and which, at many levels, was still composed of the old layers of functionaries. And to deal with the breadth of the tasks imposed by the civil war and the fight against sabotage from within, the militias of the initial period were no longer sufficient; it was necessary to create a Red Army and special organs of repression.
Thus, while the working class had genuinely held the reins of power in the short period since the October revolution, a period where the main decisions were taken by the soviets, a process rapidly developed in which the soviets were more and more to lose their power and their means of coercion to the benefit of the post-insurrectionary state. Instead of the soviets controlling the state apparatus, exerting their dictatorship over the state and using it as an instrument in the interests of the working class, it was this new "organ" which the Bolsheviks erroneously called a "workers' state" - which began to undermine the power of the soviets and impose its own directives on them. This evolution had its origins in the fact that the capitalist mode of production continued to prevail. Moreover, not only did the post-insurrectionary state not tend to wither away - it tended to swell more and more. This tendency was to become more acute the more the revolutionary wave ceased to extend and began to go into retreat, leaving the working class in Russia increasingly isolated. Less and less was the proletariat able to put pressure on the capitalist class on an international level; less and less was it able to counteract its plans and in particular to prevent its military operations against Russia. In this way the bourgeoisie was to dispose of a greater margin of manoeuvre in order to strangle the revolution in Russia. And it was within this overall dynamic that the post-insurrectionary state in Russia was to develop. Thus, it was the capacity of the bourgeoisie to prevent the extension of the revolution which was at the basis of this state becoming more and more hegemonic and "autonomous".
In order to deal with the growing scarcity imposed by the capitalists, with the bad harvests, with sabotage by the peasants, with the destruction caused by the civil war, with the famines and epidemics which resulted from all this, the state directed by the Bolsheviks was forced to take more and more coercive measures of all kinds, such as the requisitioning of the grain harvest and the rationing of nearly all goods. It was equally forced to try to strike up commercial links with the capitalist countries; this was posed not as a moral question but as a question of survival. Scarcity and trade could only be administered by the state. But who controlled the state?
Who should control the state? The party or the councils?
At the time, the concept that the class party should take power in the name of the proletariat and thus hold the commanding posts in the new state was widely shared among revolutionaries. Thus after October 1917 the leading members of the Bolshevik party occupied the highest positions in the new state and began to identify themselves with the state.
This conception could have been put into question and rejected if, after a number of victorious insurrections elsewhere, and especially in Germany, the working class had triumphed over the bourgeoisie on an international level. After such a victory, the proletariat and its revolutionaries would have been better placed to see the differences, and even the conflict of interests, between the state and the revolution. It would have thus been easier for them to have made a more effective critique of the errors of the Bolsheviks. But the isolation of the Russian revolution meant that the party more and more stood for the interests of the state instead of the interests of the international proletariat. Progressively, every initiative was taken out of the hands of the workers and the state became more and more autonomous, spreading its tentacles everywhere. As for the Bolshevik party, it was at once the main promoter and the main hostage of this development.
At the end of the civil war, the famine got even worse during the winter of 1920-21, to the point where the population of Moscow, part of which tried to flee the famine fell by 50 % , and that of Petrograd by two thirds. Peasant revolts and workers' protests were on the increase. A wave of strikes broke out in the Petrograd region and the Kronstadt sailors were the spearhead of this resistance against the deterioration of living conditions and against the state. They put forward economic and political demands rejecting the dictatorship of the party and calling for the renewal of the soviets.
The state, with the Bolshevik party at its head, decided to confront the workers violently, considering them to be counter-revolutionary forces manipulated from the outside. For the first time, the Bolshevik party participated in a homogeneous manner in the violent crushing of a part of the working class. And this took place at the very moment it was celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Paris Commune and two years after Lenin at the founding Congress of the CI, had inscribed the slogan 'all power to the soviets' on the flag of the International. Although it was the Bolshevik party which concretely assumed the crushing of the Kronstadt uprising, the whole revolutionary movement of the time was mistaken about its nature. The Russian Workers' Opposition, like the parties that belonged to the International, denounced the rising clearly.
In response to this situation of growing discontent, and in order to encourage the peasants to produce more and bring their crops to market, it was decided in March 1921 to introduce the New Economic Policy (NEP), which, in reality, did not represent a "return" to capitalism since capitalism had never been abolished, but was merely an adaptation to the phenomenon of scarcity and to the laws of the market. At the same time, a trade agreement was signed between Russia and Britain.
With regard to this question of the state and the identification of the party with the state, there were divergences within the Bolshevik party. As we wrote in the International Review nos 8 and 9, the left communists in Russia had already rung the alarm and warned against the danger of a state capitalist regime. In 1918, the journal Kommunist had protested against the measures of discipline imposed on the workers. Even though, with the civil war, most of these criticisms were put on the back-burner, and the party closed ranks to face up to the aggression by the capitalist states, an opposition continued to develop against the growing weight of bureaucracy within the party. The Democratic Centralism group around Ossinski, founded in 1919 criticised the workers' loss of initiative and called for the reestablishment of democracy within the party, notably at the 9th Congress in the autumn of 1920, where it denounced the party's growing bureaucratisation.
Lenin himself, despite holding the highest state responsibilities, was the one who in many ways saw most clearly the danger that the new state could represent for the revolution. He was often the most determined in his arguments calling for the workers to defend themselves against this state.
Thus, in the debate on the union question, Lenin insisted on the fact that the unions had to serve in the defence of workers' interests, even against the "workers'" state which in fact suffered from severe bureaucratic deformations. This was clear proof that Lenin admitted that there could be a conflict of interest between the state and the working class. Trotsky, on the other hand, called for the total integration of the unions into the "workers" state. He wanted to complete the militarisation of labour, even after the end of the civil war. The Workers' Opposition group which appeared for the first time in March 1921, at the 10th Congress of the party, wanted production to be controlled by the industrial unions, themselves under the control of the soviet state.
Within the party, decisions were more and more transferred from party conferences to the Central Committee and the recently formed Politburo. The militarisation of society which the civil war had provoked had spread throughout the state to the very ranks of the party. Instead of pushing for the initiative of party members in the local committees, the party submitted the whole of its political activity to the strict control of the leadership, through the system of political "departments". This led to the decision, at the 10th Congress, to ban fractions in the party.
In the second part of this article, we will analyse the resistance of the communist left against this opportunist tendency and the way the International more and more became the instrument of the Russian state.
DV
Over the summer there was no pause in the convulsions of the capitalist world. On the contrary, as has often been the case in recent years, the summer period was marked by a brutal aggravation of imperialist conflicts and military barbarism. The bombings of the US embassies in Africa, the US reprisals in Sudan and Afghanistan, the rebellion in the Congo against the new Kabila regime, involving a number of neighbouring states, etc. All these new events can be added to the multitude of armed conflicts that have been devastating the world and highlight the fact that under the reign of capitalism human society is sinking into bloody chaos.
On a number of occasions we have shown in our press that the collapse of the eastern bloc at the end of the 1980s did not result in a "new world order" as announced by the US President of the day, George Bush, but in the greatest chaos in human history. Since the end of the second imperialist butchery, the world had lived under the yoke of two military blocs whose constant confrontations over a period of more than four decades led to more deaths than during the world war itself. However, the division of the world between the two imperialist blocs, while fuelling many local conflicts, obliged the two superpowers to exert a certain discipline in order to keep these conflicts within "acceptable" limits and prevent them degenerating into a general state of chaos.
The collapse of the Eastern bloc, and the resulting disappearance of the opposing bloc, did not bring an end to imperialist antagonisms between capitalist states, on the contrary. The threat of a new world war may have retreated for the time being, since the blocs that might have waged it no longer exist, but, sharpened by the capitalist economy sinking into an insurmountable crisis, rivalries between states have intensified and become increasingly uncontrollable. In 1990, by deliberately provoking the Gulf crisis and the war in which it gave evidence of its enormous military superiority, the USA tried to affirm its authority over the whole planet, and particularly over its former allies in the Cold War. However, the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia saw these allies confronting each other and putting American hegemony into question. Some supported Croatia (Germany), others Serbia (France and Britain), whereas the USA, after first supporting Serbia, ended up supporting Bosnia. This was the beginning of a tendency towards "every man for himself" in which international alliances have become more and more temporary and in which America has found it harder to exert its leadership.
We had the most striking illustration of this situation last winter when the USA had to renounce its military threats against Iraq and accept a solution negotiated by the General Secretary of the UN and supported by a country like France which since the beginning of the 90s has been openly challenging US hegemony (see International Review 93, "A reverse for the US which will raise military tensions"). What has happened over the summer provides further illustration of this tendency towards each for themselves and even of a spectacular acceleration of it.
The war in the Congo
The chaos that now marks the relations between states becomes blindingly obvious when you survey the various conflicts that have shaken the planet recently. For example, in the war that is now going on in the Congo, we can see countries which less than two years ago were giving their support to the offensive waged by Laurent-Desire Kabila against the Mobutu regime, ie Rwanda and Uganda, now fully supporting the rebellion against this same Kabila. More strangely, these countries, which had seen the US as their main ally against the interests of the French bourgeoisie, now find themselves on the same side as the latter, which is giving discrete support to the rebellion against Kabila, considered as an enemy since he overthrew the pro-French Mobutu regime. Still more surprising is the decisive support Angola gave the Kabila regime when it was on the verge of collapse. Kabila, who at the beginning did have Angolan support (notably through the training and equipment of the Katanga gendarmerie) has been allowing the troops of UNIT A, which is at war with the present regime in Luanda, to take refuge and train in Congolese territory. Apparently, Angola has been paying him back for this disloyalty. To further complicate matters, Angola, which just one year ago helped bring about the victory of the Denis Sassou Ngesso clique, supported by France against Pascal Lissouba for control of Congo- Brazzaville, now finds itself in the camp opposing France. Finally, with regard to the USA's efforts to strengthen its grip on Africa, particularly against French interests, we can say that, despite the successes represented by the installation of a "friendly" regime in Rwanda, and above all by the elimination of Mobutu who was supported to the bitter end by France, the Americans are now just treading water. The regime which the world's first power set up in Kinshasa in May 1997 has now succeeded in arraying against itself not only a considerable proportion of the population which had welcomed it with flowers after thirty years of "mobutism", but also a good number of neighbouring countries, and particularly its Ugandan and Rwandan patrons. In the present crisis, American diplomacy has been particularly silent (it has restricted itself to "demanding instantly" that Rwanda should not get involved and should suspend all military aid to the country), while its French adversary, notwithstanding its necessary discretion, has been clearly supporting the rebellion.
In reality, what is so striking about this, in the midst of the chaos engulfing central Africa, is the fact that the various African states are more and more escaping the control of the great powers. During the cold war, Africa was one of the stakes in the rivalry between the two imperialist blocs who dominated the planet. The old colonial powers, and especially France, were given a mandate by the Western bloc to police the continent on the latter's behalf. One by one, the different states which, shortly after independence, had tried to ally with the Russian bloc (for example, Egypt, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique) changed camp and became faithful allies of the American bloc, even before the collapse of its Soviet rival. However, as long as the Eastern bloc, even though weakened, maintained its presence, there existed a fundamental solidarity between the Western powers in their efforts to prevent Russia from regaining its footholds in Africa. It was precisely this solidarity which fell apart as soon as the Russian bloc disintegrated. For the USA, the fact that France still maintained a grip over a good part of the African continent, a grip out of proportion with its economic and above all its military weight on the world arena, became an anomaly, all the more so because France lost no opportunity to challenge American leadership. In this sense, the fundamental element underlying the different conflicts which have ravaged Africa over the last few years has been the growing rivalry between these two former allies, France and the USA, with the latter trying by all possible means to chase the former out of its traditional spheres of influence. The most spectacular concretisation of this American offensive was the overthrow of the Mobutu regime in May 1997, a regime which for decades had been one of the key pieces in France's imperialist strategies in Africa (and in the strategy of the US during the cold war). When he came to power, Kabila took no time in declaring his hostility towards France and his "friendship" towards the USA, which had just put him in power. At this time, behind the rivalries between the different cliques, particularly ethnic ones, which were confronting each other on the ground, the mark of the conflict between France and America was clearly visible, as it had been not long before with the change of regimes in Rwanda and Burundi to the benefit of the pro-American Tutsi factions.
Today it would be difficult to discern the same lines of conflict in the new tragedy which is sweeping the Congo. In fact it appears as if the different states involved in the conflict are essentially playing their own game, independent of the fundamental confrontation between France and the USA which has determined African history in the recent period. Thus Uganda, which was one of the main artisans of Kabila' s victory, is now dreaming of heading up a "Tutsiland" which would regroup Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and the western provinces of Congo. Rwanda, for its part, by participating in the offensive against Kabila, aims at carrying out an "ethnic cleansing" of the Congolese sanctuaries of the Hutu militias, which have been continuing their raids against the Kigali regime. Rwanda also wants to get its hands on the Kivu province (furthermore, one of the leaders of the rebellion, Pascal Tshipata, said on 5th August that it had come about as a result of Kabila breaking his promise to cede Kivu to the Banyamulenge who had supported him against Mobutu).
Neither did Angola's support for Kabila come without strings. In fact this support is more like the rope that supports the hanged man. By ensuring that the survival of the Kabila regime depends on its military aid, Angola is in a position to dictate its terms: banning UNIT A rebels from Congolese territory and the right to pass through Congolese territory to the Cabinda enclave which is geographically cut off from its Angolan owners.
The general tendency towards "every man for himself" which had been expressed more and more by the former allies of the American bloc, and which came out in a striking manner in ex-Yugoslavia, has taken a supplementary step with the Congo conflict; now, countries of the third or fourth rank, like Angola or Uganda are affirming their imperialist ambitions independent of the interests of their "protectors". And it is this same tendency that we could see at work in the bombings of the American embassies on 7th August and the "reprisals" by the US two weeks later.
The bombing of the American embassies and the US reprisals
The detailed preparation, coordination and murderous violence of the August 7th bombings makes it likely that these actions were not carried out by an isolated terrorist group but were supported or even organised by a state. Moreover, immediately after these attacks, the American authorities declared that the war against terrorism would from now on be the leading objective of their policy (an objective forcefully underlined by President Clinton at the UN on 21st September). In reality, and the US government is very clear about this, the target of such declarations is the states which practice or support terrorism. This policy is not new: for a number of years now the US has been pointing the finger at "terrorist states" such as Libya, Syria and Iran. Obviously, there are "terrorist states" which don't rouse the anger of the US: those which support movements which serve its interests (as is the case with Saudi Arabia which has financed the Algerian fundamentalists at war with a regime allied to France). However, if the world's leading power has accorded such importance to this question, this is not just a matter of propaganda for circumstantial interests. The fact that terrorism has today become a means used more and more commonly in imperialist conflicts is an illustration of the chaos developing in the relations between states1, a chaos which is allowing countries of no great importance to argue the toss with the great powers, especially the greatest of them all - a development which can only further undermine its authority.
The two US ripostes to the attacks on its embassies, the cruise missile strikes on a factory in Khartoum and Osama Ben Laden's base in Afghanistan, illustrate in a striking manner the real state of international relations today. In both cases, the world's leading power, in order to reassert its global leadership, has once again resorted to what constitutes its essential strength: its enormous military superiority over everyone else. The American army is the only one that could bring death on such a scale and with such diabolical precision tens of thousands of kilometres away from its own territory, and without taking the slightest risk. This was a warning to any country that might be tempted to lend support to terrorist groups, but also to the Western powers which maintain good relations with such countries. Thus, the destruction of the factory in Sudan, even if the pretext given for it (that it was making chemical weapons) has not stood up well to investigation, did allow the US to hit an Islamic regime which maintains good relations with France.
However, as on other occasions, this recourse to military force proved to be of little use as a means of rallying other countries around the US. To begin with, nearly all the Arab or Muslim countries condemned the strikes. Secondly, the big Western countries, even when they made a show of supporting the action, made known their reservations about the methods used by the US. This is new testimony to the considerable difficulties that the world's most powerful country is having in affirming its leadership: in the absence of another superpower (as was the case when the USSR and its bloc existed), the use of military force does not succeed in consolidating alliances around the US, or in overcoming the chaos it aims to combat. Very often such policies only sharpen the antagonism towards the US and further aggravate the tendency towards every man for himself.
The constant development of this tendency and the difficulties of American leadership appeared clearly with the bombing of Ben Laden's bases in Afghanistan. The question whether he really did order the bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi has not been clarified. However, the fact that the US decided to deploy its cruise missiles against his training bases in Afghanistan shows that the US does consider him to be an enemy. And yet during the time of the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, this same Ben Laden was one of the USA's best allies, and they financed and armed him generously. Even more surprising is the fact that Ben Laden enjoys the protection of the Taliban, for whom US support (with the complicity of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) was a decisive factor in their conquest of Afghan territory. Today, the Taliban and the USA are on opposing sides. But in fact there are several reaSOI1~ that enable us to understand why the US struck this blow against them.
First, the unconditional support hitherto accorded the Taliban by Washington has been an obstacle to the "normalisation" of its relations with the Iranian regime. This process was advanced in a spectacular manner with the friendly exchanges between the US and Iranian football teams in the last World Cup. However, in their diplomacy towards Iran, the US has lagged behind countries like France, which at that very same moment was sending its minister of foreign affairs to Tehran. For America it was important not to miss the opportunities afforded by the warming of its relations with Iran and not to allow other countries to pull the carpet from under its feet.
But the blow against the Taliban was also a warning against the latter's temptations to take their distance from Washington now that their almost complete victory on the home front has made them less dependent on American aid. In other words, the world's leading power wants to avoid what happened with Ben Laden happening on a bigger scale with the Taliban - its former friends becoming enemies. But in this case as in many others, there is no guarantee that the US coup will pay off. Every man for himself and the chaos it leads to cannot be counter-acted by the world cop resorting to force. These phenomena are an integral part of the current historical phase of capitalist decomposition and they are insurmountable.
Furthermore, the basic inability of the US to resolve this situation is having its repercussions in the internal life of its bourgeoisie. Behind the crisis facing the US administration over "Monicagate", there are probably internal political causes. Also, this scandal, which has been covered so systematically by the media being used to divert the workers' attention from a worsening economic situation and the growing attacks of the bosses, a need demonstrated by the rise of working class militancy (strikes at General Motors, American Airline, etc). There again, the surreal aspect of the trials of Clinton is further witness to the fact mat bourgeois society is rotting on its feet, However, such an offensive against an American president, which could lead to his downfall, reveals above all the malaise of the bourgeoisie of the world's most powerful country which is incapable of imposing i leadership on me planet.
This said, the problems of Clinton and even of me whole American bourgeoisie are only a minor aspect of me drama now being out on a world scale. For a growing number of human beings, and today this is particularly me case in me Congo, the chaos that keeps on growing all over the world is synonymous with massacres, famines, epidemic and barbarism. A barbarism which took a new step forward in the summer and which will continue LO get worse as long as capitalism has not been overthrown.
Fabienne
1 In the article 'Faced with the slide into barbarism the necessity and possibility of the revolution' in International Review 48, first quarter of 1987, we already showed that terrorist attacks like the ones in Paris in 1986 were one of the manifestations of capitalism's entrance into a new phase in its decadence, the phase of decomposition. Since then, all the convulsions which have shaken the planet, particularly the collapse of the Russian imperialist bloc at the end of the 80s have abundantly illustrated capitalism's continuing descent into decomposition.
Those who are today posing questions about the revolutionary perspectives of the working class come across a proletarian political milieu which is considerably dispersed1. The movement towards this milieu by newly arising militant forces is held back by several factors. First there is the general pressure of the ideological campaigns against communism. Then there is the whole confusion sown by the 'leftist' currents of the bourgeois political apparatus as well as the array of parasitic groups and publications which claim to be communist but which merely make the content and organisational form of communist politics look ridiculous2. Finally there is the fact that the different organised components of the communist left mutually ignore each other most of the time and run away from the public confrontation of their political positions, whether we are talking about their programmatic principles or their organisational origins. This attitude is a barrier to the clarification of communist political positions, to the understanding of what the different tendencies of this milieu have in common, and of the divergences which explain their separate organisational existence. This is why we think that anything which goes towards breaking with this attitude has to be welcomed, providing that it is based on a political concern to publicly and seriously clarify the positions and analyses of other organisations.
This clarification is all the more important as regards the groups that present themselves as the heirs of the 'Italian Left'. This current is composed of a number of organisations and publications which all refer back to the same common trunk - the Communist Party of Italy in the 1920s (which mounted the most consistent opposition to the Stalinist degeneration of the Communist International) and also to the constitution of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (PCInt) in Italy in 1943. This 1943 PCInt was to give rise to two tendencies in 1952: on the one hand the Partito Cornunista Internazionalista (PCInt)3, on the other hand the Partito Comunista Internazionale (PCI)4 animated by Bordiga. Over the years the latter has dislocated and given birth to at least three main groups who all call themselves the PCI, as well as a multitude of more or less confidential small groups, without mentioning the individuals who nearly all present themselves as the "only" continuators of Bordiga. The label of "Bordigism" is often used (frequently as a term of abuse) to describe the continuators of the Italian Left, because of the personality and the notoriety of Bordiga.
For its part the ICC, while it does not refer back to the PCInt of 1943, does refer to the Italian Left of the 1920s, to the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy which later became the Italian Fraction of the International Communist Left in the 1930s, as well as to the French Fraction of the Communist Left which in the 1940s opposed the dissolution of the Italian Fraction into the newly-formed PClnt, since it considered the constitution of the party to be premature and confused 5.
What are the common positions and the divergences? Why such an organisational dispersion? Why so many groups and "parties" coming from the same historical tendency? Such are the questions which any serious group has to deal with, if it is to respond to the need for political clarity which exists in the working class as a whole, as well as among the more politicised minorities which appear within the class.
It is in this sense that we have welcomed the recent internal polemics within the Bordigist milieu, which has shown an attempt, serious if a little timid, to go into the question of the political roots of the explosive crisis of the PCI-Programma Comunista in 1982 (see International Review 93). It was in the same spirit that we briefly took position, in the article 'Marxism and mysticism' in IR 94, on the debate between the two Bordigist formations which publish respectively Le Proletaire and II Partito Comunista. In this article we showed that while Le Proletaire was correct in criticising Il Partito's slide towards mysticism. these ideas did not come out of the blue but have their roots in Bordiga himself; and we concluded this article by affirming that Le Proletaire's criticisms of Il Partito "must go deeper, to the real historical roots of its errors and in doing so, engage with the rich heritage of the entire communist left". And it is again in this spirit that we are welcoming the appearance of a pamphlet published by Battaglia Comunista on Bordigism: 'Among the shades of Bordigism and its epigones', a critical balance sheet of the Bordigism of the post-war period, which explicitly presents itself as a "clarification" as it says in the pamphlet's subtitle.
A good critique of the conceptions of Bordigism
We share the essentials of BC's analysis and critique of Bordigism's conceptions about the historical development of capitalism: "In sum, the risk is precisely one of taking up an abstract stance in the face of a 'historical development of situations' of which - and here we are in agreement with Bordiga - 'the party is both a factor and a product', precisely because historical situations are never like a simple photocopy of each other, and their differences must always be estimated in a materialist fashion".
We can also underline the validity of the critique that BC makes of the implications these conceptions have for the capacity of the organisation to live up to the demands of the situation: "It is a materialist truth that the party is also a historic product, but there is the risk of reducing this principle to a completely contemplative affirmation, to a passive and abstract view of social reality. There is the risk of once again falling into mechanical materialism, which has nothing dialectical about it, and which neglects the links, the phases the movement has to pass through over various situations. There is the risk of not understanding the relations which reciprocally influence each other in historical development, and thus of reducing the preparation and activity of the party to an idealist 'historic' presence, or to a 'formal' appearance".
A strong point of BC's critique of Bordigism resides in the fact that BC tries to go to the roots of the divergences, by going back to the various positions which already made their appearance within the PCInt of 1943, up to 1952 when the split took place between the Bordigists on the one hand and the Battaglists on the other. With regard to this we should note that BC has made a particular effort to document and analyse this period by publishing two Quaderni di Battaglia Comunista, no 6 'The process of the formation and birth of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista' and no. 3, 'The Internationalist Split of 1952, Documents'.
The richness of BC's critique also resides in the fact that it deals with aspects of the structure and functioning of the revolutionary organisation as well as with the programmatic positions it has to defend.
In the next part of this article, we will limit ourselves to certain questions relating to the first point, around which BC develops a very effective critique of organic centralism and the myth of unanimism as theorised by Bordiga and defended by his political heirs.
Organic centralism and unanimism in decisions
In substance, organic centralism, as opposed to democratic centralism, corresponds to the idea that the revolutionary organisation of the proletariat must not submit to the logic of the formal approval of decisions by the majority of the party; this 'democratic' logic is a logic borrowed from the bourgeoisie for whom the position that wins out is the one that receives the most votes, independent of whether it corresponds to the needs and perspectives of the working class:
"The adoption and general or partial use of the criterion of consul1ation and deliberation on the basis of numbers and majorities, when it is foreseen in the statutes or in the technical praxis, has a technical or expedient character, but not the character of a principle. The bases of the party organisation cannot therefore resort to rules which are those of other classes or other forms of historical domination, like the hierarchical obedience of simple soldiers to the various officers and leaders inherited from military or pre-bourgeois theocratic organisations, or to the abstract sovereignty of electors delegated to representative assemblies or executive committees which are typical of the juridical hypocrisy of the capitalist world, the critique and destruction of such organisations is the essential task of the proletarian and communist revolution" (Bordigist text published in 1949 and reproduced in BC's pamphlet 'The Internationalist Split').
We can understand Bordiga's fundamental concern when, with his return to active politics after the war, he was trying to stand up to the invasive ideology of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, to the grip they could so easily have over a generation of militants newly integrated into the PCInt, most of them inexperienced, not well formed theoretically and often even influenced by counter-revolutionary ideologies7. The concern can be understood, but we cannot agree with the solution that Bordiga came to. BC rightly responds:
"To condemn democratic centralism as the application of bourgeois democracy to the revolutionary political organisation is above all a method of discussion comparable to that used on many occasions by Stalinism ". BC then recalls how "Bordiga, after 1945, on a number of occasions ridiculed the 'solemn resolutions of sovereign congresses' (and the foundation of Programme Communiste in 1952 had its origins in precisely such a disdain for the first two congresses of the Partito Comunista Iniemasionalista)".
Naturally, in order to realise organic centralism, it was necessary to validate "unanimism", ie the idea that the party cadres are ready to passively accept the (organic) directives of the centre, setting aside their divergences, or hiding them, or at most circulating them discretely in the corridors at the official meetings of the party. Unanimism is the other side of the coin to organic centralism. All this can be explained by the idea - which was taken up by a large part of the PClnt in the 1940s (the part which was later to form Programme) - according to which Bordiga was the only one intellectually capable of resolving the problems posed to the revolutionary movement after the war. Let us cite this significant testimony by Ottorino Perrone (Vercesi):
"The Italian party is for the most part made up of new elements, without theoretical formation - political virgins. The old militants themselves have for 20 years been isolated, cut of ffrom any developing political thought. In the present situation the militants are incapable of dealing with problems of thought and ideology. Discussion can only disturb them and will do more harm than good. For the moment they need to walk on solid ground, even if it is made up of old positions which are now out of date but which have at least been formulated and are comprehensible to them. For the moment it is enough to group together those who have a will to act. The solution to the great problems raised by the experience between the wars demands the calm of reflection. Only a 'great mind' can approach them fruitfully and give them the answers they require. General discussion will only lead to confusion. Ideological work cannot be done by the mass of militants, but only by individuals. As long as these brilliant individuals have not arisen, we cannot hope to advance ideologically. Marx and Lenin were such individuals, such geniuses, in the past. We must await the arrival of a new Marx. We in Italy are convinced that Bordiga is such a genius. He is now working on a whole series of responses to the problems tormenting the militants of the working class. When this work appears, the militants will only have to assimilate it, and the party to align its politics and its action with these new developments" (taken from the article 'The concept of the brilliant leader', lntemationalisme 25, August 1947, reproduced in IR 33, second quarter of 1983).
This testimony is the expression of a whole conception of the party which is alien to revolutionary marxism, in that unlike the stupidities against democratic centralism cited above, we have here a truly bourgeois conception of the revolutionary vanguard. Consciousness, theory, analysis, are presented asthe exclusive task of a minority - and even at some level, of a single intellectual - while the party has to do no more than wait for the directives from the leader (imagine how long the working class as a whole would have to wait if it had a party like that for its guide!). This is the real meaning of organic centralism and the need for unanimity8. But how can this be squared with the fact that Bordiga was the comrade who, in order to defend the positions of the minority, created and animated the abstentionist fraction of the Italian Socialist Party, and who demonstrated his militant courage in defending the views of his party within the Communist International, and as a result of all this was an inspiration to the comrades in exile who, during the years of fascism in Italy, constituted the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy with the aim of drawing up a balance sheet of the defeat in order to form the cadres of the future party? No problem: all that can be dismissed by saying that the Fraction is no longer of any use; now, the brilliant leader will resolve everything.
When such a party has been fanned and is active, it has no further use within itself for fractions which are divided ideologically and still less organisationally" (extract from 'Notes on the bases of the organisation of the class party', a Bordigist text published by the PClnt in 1949 and reproduced in BC's pamphlet 'The Internationalist Split').
The limits of Battaglia's critique
As we said before, we consider that BC's criticisms are very valuable and we agree on a good number of the points dealt with. There is however a weak point in the critique which has often been a subject for polemics between our two organisations, and which is important to clarify. This weak point concerns the analysis of the formation of the PClnt in 1943, which for us obeyed an opportunist logic - an analysis which BC obviously doesn't share - which is a considerable weakness in its critique of Bordigism. We cannot go back over each aspect of the problem here; in any case we have examined this question in the two recent articles we have already mentioned, 'On the origins of the ICC and the IBRP', but it is important to recall the main points:
1. Contrary to what BC says, ie that in any case we were always opposed to the formation of the party in 1943, let us remember that "When in 1942-43 the great workers' strikes began, that were to lead to the fall of Mussolini and his replacement by the pro-Allied Badoglio ... the Fraction considered, in line with the position it had always held, that 'the course towards the transformation of the Fraction into the Party is open in Italy'. The Conference of August 1943 decided to renew contact with Italy, and asked its militants to prepare to return as soon as possible" (IR 90).
2. Once the modalities for building this party in Italy were known - modalities which consisted of regrouping comrades from the old Livorno party of 1921, each with their own history and its consequences, without the slightest verification of a common platform, thus throwing away all the work carried out by the Fraction in exile10, the Gauche Communiste de France11 began to develop some very strong criticisms, which we share in all their essentials.
3. Among other things, this critique concerned the integration into the party, and in a position of highest responsibility, of someone like Vercesi who had been expelled from the Fraction for participating, at the end of the war, in an anti-fascist committee in Brussels. Vercesi had not made the slightest criticism of his activity.
4. The criticism also concerned the integration into the party of elements from the minority of the Fraction in exile who had split to go and carry out propaganda work among the republican militias during the war in Spain in 1936. Here again, the criticism was not about the integration of these elements as such but about the fact that it had been done without any prior discussion on their past errors.
5. Finally, there was a criticism of the PClnt's ambiguous attitude towards the anti-fascist partisans.
A fair number of the criticisms that BC make of the Bordigist wing of the PClnt in the years 1943-52 concern errors that were really the expression of this unprincipled unification which had been at the basis of the formation of the Party; comrades of both wings of the Party were aware of this and the GCF had denounced it without any concessions12. The subsequent explosion of the Party into two branches in a phase of great difficulty resulting from the reflux of the struggles which had broken out during the war, was the logical consequence of the opportunist way the Party had been constructed.
It is precisely because this is the weak point of its text that BC is led into some strange contortions: sometimes it minimises the differences between the two tendencies within the PCInt at the time; at other times it makes out that they only appeared at the time of the split and, at still other times it attributes them to the Fraction in exile itself.
When BC minimises the problem, it gives the impression that before the PCInt there was nothing, that there wasn't the whole work of the Fraction beforehand and later of the GCF which carried out a major work of reflection and came to a number of important conclusions:
"When we reconsider all these events, the short but intense historic period in which the Pclnt was formed has to he kept in mind: it was among other things inevitable that after nearly two decades of dispersion and isolation of the surviving cadres of the Italian left, that there would he some internal differences, based mainly on misunderstandings and on different balance-sheets drawn from various personal and local experiences" (Quademi di Battaglia Comunista no. 3, 'The Internationalist Split').
When BC makes it look as if the divergences only appeared at the time of the split, it is simply committing a historical falsehood which tends to hide the responsibility of its political ancestors for trying to swell the party's ranks with as many militants as possible in a purely opportunist manner:
"What happened in 1951-52 took place precisely in the period in which certain of the most negative characteristics of this tendency - which would have continued to cause other damage, notably thanks to the work of the epigones - manifested themselves for the first time" (ibid, our emphasis). Finally, when BC attributes to the Fraction the divergences which later expressed themselves within the Party, it only shows that it has not understood the difference between the of a fraction and those of a party. The task of a fraction is to make a balance sheet of a historic defeat and to prepare the cadres of the future party. It is inevitable that in malting this balance sheet different points of view will be expressed and this is why Bilan defended the idea that, in this internal debate, it was necessary to make the widest possible criticisms without any ostracism. The task of the party, on the other hand, is to assume, on the basis of a platform and a programme which is clear and agreed upon by all, the political leadership of workers' struggles in a decisive moment of class confrontations, so that an osmosis develops between party and class and the party is recognised as such by the class "But in the Fraction before the Party and within the Party afterwards there cohabited two states of mind which the definitive victory of the counter-revolution ... was led to separate" (ibid).
It is precisely this incomprehension of the respective functions of fraction and party which has led BC (like Programma itself through its various splits) to carry on calling its organisation a party, even though the workers' upsurge at the end of the war was completely exhausted and it was necessary to go back to the patient but no less absorbing work of completing the balance sheet of the defeat and forming the future cadres. In this regard, despite the falsity of certain arguments put forward by Vercesi and other elements of the Bordigist wing, BC is also wrong to dismiss as liquidationist the idea that since the historic period had changed, it was necessary to go back to the work of a fraction:
"They were the first steps which would later lead certain elements to envisage the demobilisation of the Party, the suppression of the revolutionary organisation and the renunciation of any contact with the masses, by replacing the militant function and responsibility of the party by the life of a fraction, of a circle which would be a school of marxism" (ibid).
On the contrary, it was precisely the formation of the Party and the pretence of developing the work of a party when the objective conditions for this did not exist which pushed and still pushes Battaglia to take a few steps towards opportunism, as we showed recently in an article that appeared in our territorial press about BC's intervention towards the GLP, a political formation that has come out of the autonomist milieu:
"Honestly, our fear is that BC, instead of playing its role of political leadership towards these groups by pushing them to clarify and to reach a political coherence, is tending out of opportunism to adapt itself to their activism, closing its eyes to their political deviations, and thus running the serious risk of being pulled into the leftist dynamic which the GLP contain"13.
This is a serious matter because, leaving aside the danger of sliding towards leftism, BC is limiting its intervention to that of a local group with an intervention towards students and autonomists. In reality BC has a vitally important role to play both in the current dynamic of the proletarian camp, and in the development of the IBRP itself.
5th September 1998, Ezechiele
To obtain the pamphlet in Italian Fra les ombre del bordighismo e dei sui epigone: Battaglia Comunista, Casella Postale 1753, 20101, Milano, Italy.
1 As we have already developed on a number of occasions in our press. what we understand by the proletarian political milieu is made up of those who derive from or who are moving towards the positions of the communist left. Because it is made up of groups and organisations who have been able to maintain the principles of proletarian internationalism in and since the Second World War, and who have always denounced the counter-revolutionary character of Stalinism and the left of capital. the communist left. With those who take up its principles and attach themselves to this tradition, is the only authentically proletarian political milieu.
2 See IR 94, 'Theses on parasitism'
3 This is the group which publishes Prometeo and Battaglia Comunista and which in the 1980s formed the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (IBRP) with the Communist Workers' Organisation of Britain.
4 The theoretical organ of the PCI after the split was Programma Comunista in Italy and Programme Communiste in France, the countries where it had its strongest representation.
5 See the polemic 'On the origin of the ICC and the IBRP: The Italian Fraction and the Communist Left of France', IR 90; 'The formation of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista', lR 91.
The different Bordigist groups have the bizarre habit of all calling, themselves the International Communist Party. To differentiate them we refer to them by the best known periodical each one publishes internationally, even when these groups exist in several countries. We therefore talk about Le Proletaire (which publishes II Comunista in Italy); II Partito (which publishes under the same name) and Programma Comunista, which is now distinct from Programme Communiste in France).
6 The pamphlet currently exists in Italian; it will be available in French at the end of 1998 and in English the following year.
7 Consider the following passage taken from a letter to the Executive Committee in March 1951 (this was right in the middle of the split) and signed by Bottaioli, Stefanini, Lecci and Damen: "In the Party press we often find theoretical formulations, political indications and practical justifications which show the determination of the EC to develop Party cadres who are not organisationally very reliable and are politically unprepared, rather like guinea pigs for experiments of political dilettantism which has nothing in common with the politics of a revolutionary vanguard" (our emphasis).
8 The alternative to organic centralism is naturally not anarchism, the obsessive search for individual liberty, the lack of discipline, but to assume one's militant responsibility in the debates of the revolutionary organisation and in the class, all the while applying the orientations and decisions of the organisation once they have been adopted.
9 See also the older polemics on this theme: 'The party disfigured: the Bordigist conception' in IR 23 'Against the concept of the brilliant leader', IR 33; 'Discipline. Our principal strength' in IR 34.
10 On the very low level of political formation of the party cadres, we have already cited at the beginning of this article testimonies both from the Battaglia and Programma wings of the Party.
11 The Gauche Communiste de France was formed around the positions of the Italian Fraction in 1942, initially taking the name French Nucleus of the Communist Left, then the French Fraction.
12 This is how the Bordigist group Le Proletaire put it in an article devoted to the 1952 split:
"Another point of disagreement was the way of seeing the process of the formation. of the Party as a process of 'aggregating' dispersed nuclei whose lacunae would be compensated mutually (this was in particular the case with the famous attempt at the 'four way regroupment' - quadrofolio - through the fusion of different groups, including Trotskyists, which went through various re-editions, all of them unfruitful, before being incarnated in the formula of the 'Bureau' ... " (Taken from 'The meaning of the
1952 split in the Partito Comunista Internazionalista', Programme Communiste 93, March 1993).
13 See the article 'The Proletarian Struggle Groups': an incomplete attempt to reach a revolutionary coherence', Rivoluzione Internazionale, soon to be published in Revolution Internationale.
The bourgeoisie recently celebrated the end of the First World War. Obviously, there have been many emotional declarations about the terrible tragedy of this war. But in all these commemorations, in the declarations of the politicians and in the newspapers and on the TV, the events which actually led the governments to put an end to the war are never mentioned. Reference is made to the military defeat of the central empires, Germany and its Austrian ally, but the decisive element which led the latter to ask for an armistice is carefully avoided: the revolutionary movement which developed in Germany at the end of-1918. Neither has there been any question of identifying the real responsibilities for this butchery - and this is quite understandable. Of course, the "specialists" have pored over the archives of the different governments to conclude that it was Germany and Austria who pushed hardest for war. The historians have also shown that the war aims of the Entente were quite specific. However, in none of their "analyses" is the real cause of the war pointed out: the capitalist system itself. And this is again perfectly understandable: only marxism can explain why it wasn't the "will" or the "rapacity" of this or that government which lay at the root of the war, but the very laws of capitalism. For our part, the anniversary of the end of the First World War is an occasion to return to the analyses made by revolutionaries at the time, and to the struggle they waged against the war. We will base ourselves in particular on the writings and attitude of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, for we are also commemorating the 80th anniversary of their murder by the bourgeoisie. This is the best homage we can give to these two magnificent fighters for the world proletariat[1] at a time when the bourgeoisie is seeking in all sorts of ways to kill their memory.
The war which broke out in Europe in August 1914 had been preceded by numerous other wars on this continent. We can recall, for example (if we limit ourselves to the 19th century) the Napoleonic wars and the war between Prussia and Prance in 1870. However there are fundamental differences between the conflict of 1914 and all the previous ones. The most obvious one was the carnage and barbarity it inflicted on the continent of "civilisation", Today, after the much greater barbarity of the Second World War, what happened in World War I appears almost modest. But in the Europe of the turn of the century, when the last military conflict of any importance had been in 1870, and when there was still a glow from the last embers of the "belle époque", the epoch of the zenith of the capitalist mode of production which had allowed the working class to make significant improvements in its living conditions, the brutal plunge into mass slaughter, into the daily horror of the trenches and a poverty not seen for half a century, was seen as an incomparable summit of barbarism, especially by the exploited. On both sides, among the main belligerents, Germany and France, the soldiers and the population had heard from their forebears about the war of 1870 and its cruelty. But what they were going through had little in common with that episode. The conflict of 1870 had only lasted a few months, and had involved a far smaller number of victims (some hundred thousand); neither did it result in the ruin of either victor or vanquished. With the First World War, the numbers of the dead, mutilated and wounded had to be counted in millions[2]. The daily hell suffered at the front and at the rear lasted more than 4 years. At the front, this horror took the form of an underground existence, of living in mud and filth, with the stench of corpses, in permanent fear from shells and machine gun fire, and of the spectacle that awaited the survivors: mutilated corpses, the wounded lying for days in shell craters. At the rear, the majority faced backbreaking labour to supply the troops and produce ever more weapons; they faced price rises which slashed their wages two or five times, interminable queues in front of empty shops; hunger; the permanent anguish of learning of the death of a husband, a brother, a father or a son; the pain and despair, the broken lives, when the terrible news arrived, as it did millions of times.
The other clear and unprecedented feature of this war, and which explains its massive barbarism, is that it was a total war. The whole power of industry, the entire workforce was subjugated to a single goal: the production of armaments. All males from the end of adolescence to the beginning of old age were mobilised. It was also total from the point of view of the damage it did to the economy. The countries which had been the actual fields of battle were destroyed; the economies of the European countries were ruined by the war; it was the end of their centuries-old power and the beginning of their decline to the benefit of the USA. It was total, finally, because it was not restricted to the original belligerents: practically all the European countries were dragged in and it swept over other continents, with war fronts in the Middle East, with the mobilisation of the colonial troops and with the entry into the war on the Allied side of Japan. the USA, and several countries of Latin America.
In fact, the scale of the barbarism and the destruction that it provoked itself shows the 1914-18 war was a tragic illustration of what marxists had foreseen: the entrance of the capitalist mode of production into its period of decline. of decadence. It strikingly confirmed the alternative predicted Marx and Engels in the previous century: socialism or a collapse into barbarism.
But it is also the task of marxism and marxists to give a theoretical explanation of this new phase in the life of capitalist society.
The fundamental causes of the World War
The aim of the book that Lenin wrote in 1916, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism was to identify the fundamental causes of the war; but it fell to Rosa Luxemburg, in her book The Accumulation of Capital, written in 1912, two years before the world war broke out, to make the most profound analysis of the conditions that were about to hit capitalism in this new period of its existence.
"Imperialism is the political expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of the non-capitalist environment ... With the high development of the capitalist countries and their increasingly severe competition in acquiring non-capitalist areas, imperialism grows in lawlessness and violence, both in aggression against the non-capitalist world and in ever more serious 'conflicts among the competing capitalist countries. But the more violently, ruthlessly and thoroughly imperialism brings about the decline of non-capitalist civilisations, the more rapidly it cuts the very ground from under the feet of capitalist accumulation. Though imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the career of capitalism, it is also a sure means of bringing it to a swift conclusion. This is not to say that capitalist development must be actually driven to this extreme: the mere tendency towards imperialism of itself takes forms which make the final phase of capitalism a period of catastrophe" (ibid, 'Protective Tariffs and Accumulation', p 446).
"The more ruthlessly capital sets about the destruction of non-capitalist strata at home and in the outside world, the more it lowers the standard of living for the workers as a whole, the greater also is the change in the day to day history of capital. It becomes a string of political and social disasters and convulsions, and under these conditions, punctuated by periodical economic catastrophes or crises, accumulation can go on no longer.
But even before this natural economic impasse of capital 's own creating is properly reached it becomes a necessity for the international working class to revolt against the rule of capital.
Capitalism is the first mode of economy with the weapon of propaganda, a mode which tends to engulf the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies, tolerating no rival at its side. Yet at the same time it is also the first mode of economy which is unable to exist by itself, which needs other economic systems as a medium and soil. Although it strives to become universal, and, indeed, on account of this tendency, it must break down - because it is immanently incapable of becoming a universal form of production. In its living history it is a contradiction in itself, and its movement of accumulation provides a solution to the conflict and aggravates it at the same time. At a certain stage of development there will be no other way out than the application of socialist principles. The aim of socialism is not accumulation hut the satisfaction of toiling humanity's wants by developing the productive forces of the entire globe. And so we find that socialism is by its very nature an harmonious and universal system of economy" (ibid, 'Militarism as a province of accumulation', p 467).
After the outbreak of the war, in the Anticritique, written in 1915 in response to the criticisms her book had provoked, Luxemburg updated her analysis:
"What distinguishes imperialism as the last struggle for capitalist world domination is not simply the remarkable energy and universality of expansion but - and this is the specific sign that the circle of development is beginning to close - the return of the decisive struggle for expansion from those areas which are being fought over back to its home countries. In this way, imperialism brings catastrophe as a mode of' existence back from the periphery of capitalist development to its point of departure. The expansion of capital, which for four centuries had given the existence and civilisation of all non-capitalist peoples in Asia, Africa, America and Australia over to ceaseless convulsions and general and complete decline, is now plunging the civilised peoples of Europe itself into a series of catastrophes whose final result can only be the decline. of civilisation or the transition to the socialist mode of production " (in Monthly Review Press, 1972, p 147).
At the same time Lenin's book, in defining imperialism, insisted on one of its particular aspects - the export of capital from the developed countries to the backward countries in order to counter-act the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, the result of the rise in the proportion of constant capital (machines, raw materials) in relation to variable capital (wages), which is alone able to create profit.
For Lenin, the rivalries between the industrialised countries to grab hold of the less developed zones and export their capital there had led to the confrontation between the great powers.
However, even if there are differences in the analyses elaborated by Luxemburg, Lenin and other revolutionaries of the day, they all converged on an essential point: this war was not the result of the bad policies or the ill will of this or that governing clique; it was the ineluctable consequence of the development of the capitalist mode of production. In this sense, these two revolutionaries denounced with the same energy any "analysis" which sought to make the workers think that there was an "alternative" to imperialism, militarism and war within capitalism. Thus Lenin demolished Kautsky's thesis about the possibility of a "super-imperialism" which could establish an equilibrium between the great powers and eliminate their military conflicts. He also destroyed all the illusions about "international arbitration" which men of "good will" and the pacifist sectors of the bourgeoisie presented as the means to reconcile the antagonists and put an end to the war. This is exactly what Luxemburg put forward in her book:
"Seen in this light, the position of the proletariat with regard to imperialism leads to a general confrontation with the rule of capital. The specific rules of its conduct are given by that historical alternative [ie between the ruin of civilisation and the arrival of socialist production].
According to official 'expert' marxism, the rules are quite different. The belief in the possibility of accumulation in an 'isolated capitalist society', the belief that capitalism is conceivable even without expansion, are the theoretical formula of a quite distinct tactical tendency. The logical conclusion of this idea is to look to imperialism not as a historical necessity, as the decisive conflict for socialism, but as the wicked invention of a small group of people who profit from it. This leads to convincing the bourgeoisie that, even from the point of view of their capitalist interests, imperialism and militarism are harmful, thus isolating the alleged small group of beneficiaries of this imperialism and forming a bloc of the proletariat with broad sections of the bourgeoisie in order to 'moderate' imperialism, starve it out by 'partial disarmament' and 'draw its claws '! ... The final confrontation between proletariat and capital to settle their world-historic contradiction is converted into the utopia of a historical compromise between proletariat and bourgeoisie to 'moderate' the imperialist contradictions between capitalist states" (ibid, p147-8).
Finally, Luxemburg and Lenin used the same terms to explain why it was Germany which played the role of sparking off the World War (the big idea of those who are looking for the country responsible for the war) while at the same time treating the two camps in exactly the same way:
of the policies of the two colossi which, well before the present hostilities, had extended the tentacles of their financial exploitation all over the world and had divided it up economically. They had to clash with each other, because from the capitalist point of view, a new division of the world had become inevitable" (Lenin, The war and the revolution).
This unity in the analysis of the causes of the war coming from revolutionaries originating from countries in opposing camps also applied to the policy they put forward for the proletariat and to their denunciation of the social democratic parties who had betrayed the class.
The role of revolutionaries during the war
However difficult it was for the revolutionaries to carry out their propaganda at a time when the bourgeoisie had installed a real state of siege, preventing any expression of a proletarian voice, this action by Rosa and her comrades was an essential preparation for the future. Although she was imprisoned in April 1915 she wrote The Crisis in German Social Democracy which was "the spiritual dynamite to turn the bourgeois order upside down" as Clara Zetkin, a close comrade of Rosa, wrote in her preface of May 1919.
This book is pitiless charge-sheet against the' war itself and against every aspect of bourgeois propaganda; the best homage we can render to Rosa Luxemburg today is to publish a few (too) short extracts from it.
At a time when in all belligerent countries, all the different mouthpieces of bourgeois propaganda were trying to outdo each other in their nationalist frenzy, she began the book by denouncing the chauvinist hysteria which had seized hold of the population.
"The excesses of a spy-hunting populace, the singing throngs, the coffee-shops with their patriotic songs ... the violent mobs, ready to denounce, ready to persecute women, ready to whip themselves into a delirious frenzy over every wild rumour ... the atmosphere of ritual murder, the Kishinev (pogrom) air that left the policeman at the comer as the only remaining representative of human dignity" (Junius Pamphlet, p4).
Then, she exposes the reality of this war:
"Shamed, dishonoured, wading in blood and dripping with filth, thus capitalist society stands. Not as we usually see it, playing the roles of peace and righteousness, of order, of philosophy, of ethics - but as a roaring beast, as an orgy of anarchy, as a pestilential breath, devastating culture and humanity - so it appears in all its hideous nakedness" (ibid, p5). Thus, from the very start, Rosa goes to the heart of the question: against the pacifist illusions which pined for a bourgeois society "without its excesses", she pointed the finger at the real guilty party: capitalism as a whole. And immediately she took care to denounce the role and content of capitalist propaganda, whether it came from the traditional bourgeois parties or from Social-Democracy:
"War is methodical, organised, gigantic murder. But in normal human beings this systematic murder is possible only when a state of intoxication has been previously created. This has always been the tried and proven method of those who make war. Bestiality of action must find a commensurate bestiality of thought and senses; the latter must prepare
and accompany the former" (p 20).
"The world war that began officially on 4th August 1914 was the same world war toward which German imperialism had been driving for decades, the same war whose coming the social democracy had prophesied year after year. This same war has been denounced by social democratic parliamentarians, newspapers and leaflets a thousand times as a frivolous imperialistic crime, as a war that is against every interest of culture and against every interest of the nation" (ibid, p 67).
Obviously, she made a particularly sharp critique of German Social-Democracy, which had been the beacon of the Socialist International, and whose treason had made the work of enrolling the proletariat so much easier for the government, in Germany but also in the other countries. She concentrated her fire against the social-democrat argument that on the German side the aim of the war was to defend "civilisation" and the "freedom of the peoples" against Tsarist barbarism.
In particular she denounced the justifications of Neue Zeit, the theoretical organ of the party, which appealed to the old analysis of Marx and Engels which had stigmatised Russia as the "prison-house of peoples" and the main bulwark of reaction in Europe.
"After the Social-Democratic [parliamentary] group had stamped the war as a war of defence of the German nations and European culture, the Social-Democratic press proceeded to hail it as the 'saviour of the oppressed nations '. Hindenberg became the executor of Marx and Engels" (ibid, p72).
In denouncing the lies of social democracy, Rosa pointed out the real role it was playing:
"In refuting the existence of the class struggle, the Social-Democracy has denied the very basis of its own existence.. It has thrown aside the most important weapon it possessed, the power of criticism of the war from the peculiar point of view of the working class. Its only mission now is to play the role of gendarme over the working class under a state of military rule" (ibid, p87).
Finally, one of the most important aspects of Rosa's book is the perspective it puts forward for the proletariat: putting an end to the war through revolutionary action. Just as she affirmed (and she cited bourgeois politicians who were very clear about this) that the only force that could have prevented the outbreak of the war bad been the struggle of the proletariat. So she went back to the resolution of the 1907 congress of the International, confirmed by the 1912 congress (the extraordinary congress held in Basle):
"Should war nevertheless break out, it shall be the duty of the social democracy to work for a speedy peace, and to strive with every means in its power to utilise the industrial and political crisis to accomplish the awakening of the people, thus hastening the overthrow of capitalist class rule".
Rosa based herself on this resolution to denounce the treason of social democracy, which did exactly the opposite to what it had committed itself to do. She called for the united action of the world proletariat to put an end to the war while underlining the danger that the war represented for the future of socialism.
"But here is proof also that the war is not only grandiose murder, but the suicide of the European working class. The soldiers of socialism, the workers (if England, of France, of Germany, of Italy, of Belgium are murdering each other at the bidding of capitalism, are thrust in cold, murderous irons into each other's breasts, are toile ring over their graves, grappling in each other's death-bringing arms ...
This madness will not stop, and this bloody nightmare of hell will not cease until the workers of Germany, of France, of Russia and of England will wake up out their drunken sleep; will clasp each other's hands ill brotherhood and will drown the bestial chorus of war agitators and the hoarse cry of capitalist hyenas with the mighty cry of labour: "Workers of the world, unite!"" (ibid, pI34) .
It should be noted that in her hook, Rosa Luxemburg, like the rest of the left or the party which firmly opposed the war (unlike the "marxist centre" animated by Kautsky, which with all sorts of contortions justified the policy of the leadership) did not draw all the consequences of the Basle resolution by putting forward the slogan which Lenin expressed very clearly: "turn the imperialist war into a civil war". And it was for this reason that at the Zimmerwald conference of September 1915, the representatives of the current around Luxemburg and Liebknecht were on the "centrist" position represented by Trotsky and not the position of the left around Lenin. It was only at the Kienthal conference in April 1916 that this current joined the Zimmerwald left.
However, even with these insufficiencies, there is no question that Luxemburg and her comrades carried out a considerable work in this period, which was to bear fruit in 1918.
But before going on to this last period, we must highlight the extremely important role played by Rosa's comrade, assassinated on the same day by the bourgeoisie: Karl Liebknecht.
While sharing her political positions, Liebknecht lacked the theoretical depth of Rosa and her talent for writing articles (this is why, for lack of space, we haven't cited his writings here). But his determined and courageous attitude, his extremely clear denunciations of the imperialist war, of all those who justified it, whether openly or in a roundabout way, as well as his denunciation of pacifist illusions, made Liebknecht during this period the symbol of the proletarian struggle against the imperialist war. Without going into details about his activities (see our article "Revolutionaries in Germany during the First World War", in International Review no.81), we will recall here a significant episode: his participation, on 1 May 1916, in a demonstration in Berlin of 10,000 workers against the war, where he made a speech and raised the slogan "Down with the war, down with the government", which led to his immediate arrest. This in turn resulted in the first political mass strike in Germany, which broke out at the end of May. We should also note that before the military tribunal which sat in judgement over him on 28th June, he fully defended his action, knowing that this attitude could only make his punishment more severe, and he used the platform of the tribunal to make another denunciation of the imperialist war, of capitalism which was responsible for it; and he once again called the workers to the struggle. From then on, in all the countries of Europe, the name and example of Liebknecht became one of the rallying flags of all those who were fighting against the imperialist war and for the proletarian revolution, not least Lenin himself.
The proletarian revolution and the end of the war
The perspective outlined in the Basle resolution was concretised for the first time in February 1917 in Russia, with the revolution that overthrew the Tsarist regime. After three years of nameless butchery and misery, the proletariat began to raise its head, overturning the old regime and advancing towards the socialist revolution. We will not go back over the events in Russia which we have examined recently in this Review[4]. But it is important here to say that it was not only in Russia that the year 1917 saw the workers in uniform revolting against the barbarism of the war. Not long after the February revolution massive mutinies broke out in a number of armies at the front. Thus, the three other main countries of the Entente - Britain, France and Italy - faced major mutinies which led their governments to exert a ferocious repression. In Prance, around 40,000 troops collectively disobeyed orders and a part of them even attempted to march on Paris where there were workers' strikes going on in the arms factories. This convergence between the class struggle in the rear and the revolt of the soldiers is probably one of the reasons why the repression carried out by the French bourgeoisie was relatively moderate: out of 554 condemned to death by military courts martial, only 50 were shot. This "moderation" had no place in the British and Italian armies, where there were 306 and 750 executions respectively.
Last November, during the celebrations of the end of the First World War, the bourgeoisie. and the particularly the social-democratic parties which form the government in the majority of European countries today, have given us a new angle on their hypocrisy about the mutinies of 1917, new proof of their desire to destroy the memory of the working class. In Italy, the minister of defence made it known that we should "render honour" to the shot mutineers, and in Britain they have been paid "public homage". As for the chief of the French "Socialist" government, he decided to "fully reintegrate into the collective national memory" those who had been "shot as an example". "Comrade" Jospin is a front runner in the hypocrisy stakes, for who were the ministers of munitions and of war at the time the mutineers were shot? The "Socialists" Albert Thomas and Paul Painleve.
In fact, what these "Socialists" who make all kinds of pacifist speeches and who are so moved by the atrocities of the First World War forget to say is that in 1914, in the main European countries, they were in the front lint' for the task of mobilising the workers and sending them to the slaughter. By trying to reintegrate the mutineers of the First World War "into the collective national memory", the left wing of the bourgeoisie is trying to make us forget that they really belong to the memory of the world proletariat[5].
As for the official interpretation of the politicians and tame historians, that the revolts of 1917 were only directed against an incompetent command, it does not stand up to the fact that these movements took place in both camps all along the different fronts. Are we to believe that World War I was entirely led by incompetents'} Moreover, these revolts began when the first news of the Russian revolution reached the other countries[6]. In fact, what the bourgeoisie is trying to hide is the undeniably proletarian content of the mutinies and the fact that the only real opposition to the war came from the working class.
During the same period, the mutinies hit the country with the most powerful proletariat and whose soldiers were in direct contact with the Russian soldiers on the eastern front: Germany. The events in Russia were greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm among the German troops and there were frequent outbreaks of fraternisation on this front[7]. The mutinies began in the fleet during the summer of 1917. The fact that it was the sailors who led these movements is significant: nearly all of them were workers in uniform (whereas there were a lot more peasants among the footsoldiers). The revolutionary groups, especially the Spartakists, had an important influence on the sailors and this was growing. The Spartakists put forward a clear perspective for the whole working class:
"Only through revolution and the conquest of the people's republic in Germany can the genocide be ended and generalised peace installed. And this is also the only way that the Russian revolution can succeed. Only the world proletarian revolution can liquidate the world imperialist war" (Spartakus letter no. 6, August 1917).
And it was this programme that was to come alive through the growing struggles of the working class in Germany. In the framework of this article we cannot go into these struggles in detail (see our series in the International Review, beginning with 11.0.81), but it is necessary to recall that one of the reasons that pushed Lenin and the Bolsheviks to consider in October 1917 that the conditions were ripe for the seizure of power by the proletariat in Russia was precisely the development of the struggle amongst the workers and soldiers in Germany.
What we have to highlight is how the intensification of the workers' struggles and the soldiers' revolts on a proletarian terrain was the decisive element that pushed the German ruling class to ask for an armistice, and so brought the war to an end.
"Spurred on by the revolutionary developments in Russia and in the wake of several precursory movements, a mass strike broke out in April 1917. In January 1918 about a million workers threw themselves into a new strike movement and formed a workers' council in Berlin. Under the influence of the Russian events the military fronts crumbled more and more throughout the summer of 1918, the factories were at boiling point: more and more workers gathered in the streets to strengthen the response to war ... " ("The German Revolution, Part II", International Review no.82).
In October 1918, the bourgeoisie changed the Chancellor. Prince Max von Baden replaced Count Georg Hertling, and brought the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) into government. The revolutionaries immediately understood the role that social-democracy was to play. Rosa Luxemburg wrote: "By entering the ministry, government socialism is putting itself forward as capitalism's defender and is barring the way to the mounting proletarian revolution".
During this same period the Spartakists held a conference with other revolutionary groups which launched an appeal to the workers:
"We must support in every way the mutinies of the soldiers, go on to the armed insurrection, broaden the armed insurrection into a struggle to transfer power to the workers and soldiers and ensure victory through the workers' mass strikes. This is the task of the coming days and weeks".
"On 23rf October Liebknecht was freed from prison. More than 20,000 workers came to greet him when he arrived in Berlin ...
On 28th October there began in Austria, in the Czech and Slovak provinces as well as in Budapest, a wave of strikes which led to the overthrow of the monarchy. Workers' and soldiers' councils in the image of the Russian soviets sprang up everywhere ...
When on 3rd November the fleet in Kiel was to go to sea to continue the war, the sailors mutinied. Soldiers' councils were created and workers' councils followed in the same wave ...
The Spartakists produced an appeal to the workers of Berlin on 8 November which went as follows:
"Workers and soldiers! What your comrades have managed to do in Kiel, Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Rostock, Flensburg, Hanover, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Munich and Stuttgart you too must do. Because the victory of your brothers there, and the victory of the proletariat of the whole world, depends on the height that your struggle is able to Teach, its tenacity and success ... Workers and soldiers! The immediate aims of your struggle must be ...
- the election of workers and soldiers councils, the election of delegates in all factories and all military units
- the immediate establishing of relations with other workers' councils in Germany
- the government to be controlled by the commissars of the workers' and soldiers' councils
- immediate liaison with the international proletariat and particularly with the Russian workers' republic.
Long live the socialist republic!
Long live the International!"
On the same day, a Spartakist leaflet called on the workers to come out onto the streets:
"Come out of the factories! Come out of the barracks! Hold out your hands! Long live the socialist republic!"
That evening, the revolutionary workers and soldiers occupied the printing press of a bourgeois newspaper and published the first issue of Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag), the daily paper of the Spartakists, which immediately warned against the SPD: "There is no community of interests with those who have betrayed you for the last four years. Down with capitalism and its agents! Long live the International!".
On the same day, faced with the rising tide of revolution, the bourgeoisie took steps. It forced the abdication of Kaiser Wihelm II, proclaimed the Republic, and named a Social-Democrat leader, Ebert, as chancellor. The latter also received the blessing of the executive committee of the councils which contained a number of social democratic functionaries. A "Council of People's Commissars" was nominated, composed of members of the SPD and the USPD (ie the "centrists" expelled from the SPD in February at the same time as the Spartakists). In fact, behind this very "revolutionary" title (the same as that of the soviet government in Russia) hid a perfectly bourgeois government which was to do everything it could to prevent the proletarian revolution and to prepare the massacre of the workers.
The first measure taken by the government was to sign the armistice the day after it was set up (and while German troops were still occupying enemy territory). After the experience of the revolution in Russia, where the continuation of the war had been a decisive factor in the mobilisation of the proletariat and the development of its consciousness up to the point where it overthrew the bourgeois regime in October 1917, the German bourgeoisie knew quite well that it had to stop the war immediately if it did not want to end up like the Russian bourgeoisie.
Although today the spokesmen of the ruling class carefully hide the role of the proletarian revolution in putting an end to the war, it is a reality which has not escaped serious and scrupulous historians (whose writing is reserved for a small minority):
"Having decided to continue negotiations despite Ludendorff, the German government was soon forced to do so. First of all, the capitulation of Austria had created a new and terrible threat to the south of the country. Then, and most importantly, the revolution broke out in Germany (...) [the German delegation] signed the armistice on 11th November, at 05:20, in Foch's famous railway carriage. It signed in the name of the new government, which was urging it to make haste (...) The German delegation won some meagre advantages, which according to Pierre Renouvin, "all had the same aim: to leave the German government with the means to fight Bolshevism ". In particular, the army gave up 30,000 machine guns instead of 25,000. It was allowed to remain in occupation of the Ruhr, the heart of the revolution, instead of it being "demilitarised?" (Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, in Le Monde, 12th November 1998[8]).
Once the armistice was signed; the social democratic government developed a whole strategy to hold back the proletarian movement and to smash it. In particular, it worked on the divisions between the soldiers and the advanced workers, since the majority of the soldiers saw no need to carry on the struggle once the war" was over. At the same time, the social democracy was to rely on the illusions which a good pan of the working class still had in it, in order to isolate the Spartakists from the great majority of the workers.
We will not go into details here about the period from the armistice to the events which led to the murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht (this period is examined in nos 82 and 83 of our Review). However, the public writings a few years later by general Groener, commander in chief of the army from the end of 1918 to the beginning of 1919 are extremely edifying as regards the policies carried out by Ebert, who was in daily contact with him:
influence with the people and the masses and able to reconstruct a governing force along with the military command (...) In the first place the issue was to take the power out of the hands of the workers' and soldiers' councils of Berlin. An enterprise was undertaken with this aim. Ten divisions were to enter Berlin. Ebert agreed (...) We elaborated a programme which envisaged, after the entry of the troops, the cleaning up of Berlin and the disarmament of the Spartakists. This was also agreed with Ebert, whom I recognised for his absolute love of his country (...) This alliance was sealed against the Bolshevik danger and the council system" (October-November 1925, Zeugenaussage).
In January 1919 the government delivered a decisive blow against the revolution. Having amassed 80,000 soldiers around Berlin, on 4th January it launched a provocation by dismissing the prefect of police, Eichorn, a member of the USPD. Huge demonstrations responded to this provocation. Although the founding congress of the Communist Party of Germany, led by Luxemburg and Liebknecht, had four days earlier estimated that the situation was not yet ripe for insurrection, Liebknecht allowed himself to be drawn into the trap and took part in an Action Committee which called precisely for the insurrection. This was a real disaster for the working Class. Thousands of workers, and particularly the Spartakists, were massacred. Luxemburg and Liebknecht, who did not want to leave Berlin, were arrested on 15th January and coldly executed without trial by the soldiery, on the pretext of "trying to escape". Two months later, Leo Jogisches, Rosa's former partner and also a leader of the Communist Party, was murdered in jail.
Today we can understand why the bourgeoisie, and especially its "socialist" parties, try to throw a veil over the events which put an end to the World War.
In the first place, the "democratic" parties, and above all the "socialists", have no wish to have their role in the massacre of the working class exposed, a role which today is supposed to be only carried out by "Fascist or Communist dictatorships" .
Fabienne
[1] We should recall that, a few weeks after their murder, the first session of the first congress of the Communist International began by paying homage to these two militants and that afterwards the organisations of the workers' movement have regularly saluted their memory.
[2] For a country like France, 16.8% of those mobilised were killed. The proportion is not much lower for Germany: 15.4%, but it goes up to 22% for Bulgaria, 25% for Romania, 27% for Turkey, 37 % for Serbia. Certain categories of combatants went through an even more terrible decimation: thus, for France, 25 % of the infantry were killed and a third of the young men who were 20 in 1914. In this country, it was not until 1950 that the population return to its August 1914 level. Moreover, we should not forget the human tragedy of all those injured and mutilated. Some mutilations were particularly atrocious: on the French side alone there were some 20,000 gueules cassees (lit., "broken faces "). soldiers so hideously disfigured that they were incapable of reintegrating into society and ended their days in the ghetto of special institutions. Then there were the hundreds of thousands of young men who returned from war completely insane, and whom the authorities generally preferred to treat as malingerers.
[3] On both sides, the lies of the bourgeois press competed in grossness and infamy. "In August 1914, the Allies were already denouncing the "atrocities" committed by the invaders against the populations of Belgium and northern France: children's hands cut off rape, hostages shot and villages burned "to set an example" (...) Meanwhile, the German press published daily accounts of the "atrocities" committed by Belgian civilians against German troops: eyes put out, fingers cut off prisoners burnt alive" ("Realite et propagande: la barbarie allemande", in L'Histoire, November 1998).
[4] See nos. 88-91 of the International Review.
[5] The French prime minister cited in his speech a verse from the "Chanson de Craonne" composed after the mutinies. But he carefully avoided citing the passage which says:
"Ceux qu'ontle pognon, ceux la reviendront,
Car c'est pour eux qu'on creve.
Mais c'est fini, car les troujjions
Vont tous se mettre en greve"
("Those with the money will return/we're getting killed for them but it's all finished, for the infantry/ will all go out on strike")
[6] Following the mutinies in the French army, ten thousand Russian soldiers who had been fighting on the western front alongside the French soldiers were withdrawn from the front and spent the rest of the war in the camp of La Courtine. It was vital that the enthusiasm they were expressing for the revolution evolving in their country should not contaminate the French soldiers.
[7] It should be noted that fratemisation on the front began only a few months after the beginning of the war, and the first departures for the front with flowers in the guns and the slogans "A Berlin!" or "Nach Paris!". "25th December 1914: no enemy activity. During the night and the day of the 25", communication established between the French and Bavarians, from trench to trench (conversations, cigarettes and flattering notes sent by the enemy ... , even visits by some soldiers to the German trenches)" (Log book of the 139th Brigade). One general writes to another on 1st January 1915: "It should be noted that when the men stay too long in the same place, they end up too familiar with their neighbours opposite; the result is conversations and sometimes even visits which usually have inconvenient consequences". This continued throughout the war, especially in 1917. In a letter written in November 1917 and intercepted by the postal censorship, a French soldier writes to his brother-in-law: "We are only 20 metres from the Boches, but they are pretty decent since they send us cigars and cigarettes, and we send them our bread" (quotations taken from L'Histoire, January 1998).
[8] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Pierre Renouvin are widely respected historians who specialise in this period.
In the last article in this series (International Review no.95), we examined in some detail the 1919 programme of the Communist Party of Russia, considering it to be an important gauge of the highest levels of understanding that the revolutionaries of those days had reached about the forms, methods, and goals of the communist transformation of society. But any such examination would be incomplete if we ignored that period's most serious effort to elaborate, alongside the practical measures outlined in the RCP programme, a more general and theoretical framework for analysing the problems of the transition period. This, like the Programme itself, was the work of Nikolai Bukharin, whom Lenin considered to be "the most valuable and most prominent theoretician of the party"; and the text in question is the Economics of the Transformation Period (henceforward ETP), written in 1920. According to the editor of the 1971 English edition of this book, "Up until the introduction of the Five-year plan, in 1928, which coincided with Bukharin's downfall as the leader of the Comintern, Economics of the Transformation Period was considered as an achievement of Bolshevik theory next in importance to Lenin's State and Revolution"(Bergman Publishers, New York, and Pluto Press, p 212)
As we will show, Bukharin's book contains some fundamental weaknesses which have not allowed it to pass the test of time in the way that State and Revolution has. It nevertheless remains an important contribution to marxist theory.
Bukharin had risen to prominence during the great imperialist war, when along with Piatakov and others, he was active in a group of Bolshevik exiles in Switzerland (the so-called 'Baugy group'), which was situated on the, extreme left of the party. In 1915 he published Imperialism and World Economy, in which he showed that capitalism, precisely by becoming a global system, a world economy, had created the conditions for its own superseding; but that far from evolving peacefully into a harmonious world order, this 'globalisation' had plunged the system into the throes of violent collapse. This line of thought paralleled the work of Rosa Luxemburg. In her book The Accumulation of Capital (1913) Luxemburg, with a more profound reference to the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, had demonstrated why capitalism's period of expansion was now at an end. Like Luxemburg, Bukharin showed that the concrete form of capitalism's decline was the exacerbation of inter-imperialist competition, culminating in the World War. Imperialism and World Economy was also a landmark in the marxist analysis of state capitalism, the totalitarian political and economic regime required by the sharpening of both imperialist antagonisms 'externally' and of social antagonisms 'internally'. The relative subordination of competition within each capitalist country had, Bukharin emphasised only been the corollary of the accentuation of conflict between national "state capitalist trusts" for the domination of the world market.
In his article 'Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State' (1916), Bukharin went further into the implications of these developments. The rise of this national state capitalist kraken, which was spreading its tentacles into all aspects of social and economic life, led Bukharin (as Pannekoek had done a few years earlier) to revisit the classics of marxism and to return defending the view that the proletarian revolution could not conquer such a state but would have to fight for its "revolutionary destruction" and the creation of new organs of political power. Another equally radical conclusion drawn from his analysis of the new stage in capitalism was summarised in the theses that the Baugy group presented to the Berne Bolshevik conference in 1915. Here, Bukharin and Piatakov, in line with the arguments put forward by Rosa Luxemburg at the same time called for the party to reject the slogans of 'national self-determination' and 'national liberation':
"The imperialist epoch is an epoch of the absorption of small states by the large states units ... It is therefore impossible to struggle against the enslavement of nations otherwise than by struggling against imperialism, ergo - by struggling against finance capital, ergo against capitalism in general. Any deviation from that road, any advancement of 'partial' tasks, of the 'liberation of nations' within the realms of capitalist civilisation, means a diverting of proletarian forces from the actual solution of the problem" (quoted in D Gluckstein, The Tragedy of Bukharin, Pluto Press, 1994, p15).
Initially, Lenin was furious with Bukharin on both counts. But whereas he never changed his mind on the national question, he was step by step converted to what he had initially termed Bukharin's "semi-anarchist" position on the state - and of course was in turn accused of "semi-anarchism" when he expounded his new vision in State and Revolution in 1917.
It is thus clear that at this stage in the germination and flowering of the proletarian revolution provoked by the World War, Bukharin was at the very spearhead of the marxist effort to understand the new conditions brought about by the decadence of capitalism; and a number of his most important theoretical contributions not only appear in the ETP, but are further elaborated within it.
In the first place, Bukharin's book has to be seen alongside such seminal works as Lenin's The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky and Trotsky's Terrorism and Communism, which led the Bolsheviks' response to the bastardised marxism of Karl Kautsky, who had passed from a position of centrism and pacifism to one of out and out defence of the bourgeois order against the threat of revolution - but who still claimed the crown of marxist orthodoxy in doing so. Lenin had mainly replied to Kautsky's advocacy of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian democracy of the soviets, while Trotsky's book focussed on the problem of revolutionary violence. For his part, Bukharin had already seen Imperialism and World Economy and similar works as a polemic against Kautsky's theory of 'ultra-imperialism', which pretended that capitalism was advancing towards a unified world order in which war could only be an aberration. Now, in the ETP, Bukharin set about re-establishing the marxist conception of social change in opposition to the Kautskyite idyll of a peaceful and orderly transition to socialism. Echoing Marx, Bukharin insists that for any new social order to emerge, the old one has to pass through a phase of profound crisis and collapse - and that this is more than ever true of the passage from capitalism to communism: " ... the experience of all revolutions, which from the very point of view of the development of productive powers had a powerful, positive influence, shows that this development was bought at the price of an enormous plundering and destruction of these powers. (...) If that is so ... then it must be a priori evident that the proletarian revolution is inevitably accompanied by a strong decline of productive powers, for no revolution experiences such a broad and deep break in old relationships and their rebuilding in a new way" (p105-6). ETP is to a very large extent a defence of the Russian revolution despite the considerable "costs" it involved, and against all those who pointed to those costs in order to counsel the workers to be good law-abiding citizens whose only hope for social change lay with the ballot box.
Secondly, ETP reiterates the argument that, although it has effectively established itself as a world economy, capitalism is incapable of organising humanity's productive forces as a unified, conscious subject, since it is precisely upon reaching this stage that capitalist competition is pushed to its most extreme and catastrophic conclusions. But here Bukharin goes further and arrives at a number of brilliant anticipations about capitalism's mode of functioning in its decadent epoch, i.e. its obligation to survive through the sterilisation and outright destruction of the productive forces, above all through the war economy and war itself. This is where Bukharin introduces his concept of "expanded negative reproduction" - a term that may be open to question, but which certainly grapples with a fundamental reality, as where Bukharin shows that despite the apparent growth it brings about, war production actually signifies not an expansion but a destruction of capital: "War production has a completely different meaning: a cannon does not transform itself into an element of the new cycle of production; powder is shot into the air and in no way appears in a new shell in the following cycle. On the contrary. The economic effect of these elements in actu is of purely negative quality ... Let us observe the means of consumption with which the army is supplied. Here we perceive the same thing. The means of consumption do not produce labour powers, for the soldiers do not figure in the process of production; they are eliminated from it, they are outside of the process of production ... the process of reproduction assumes with the war a 'deformed', regressive, negative character, namely: with every successive production cycle, the real base of production grows narrower and narrower, the 'development' is carried out not in a widening but in a continually narrowing spiral" (p44-45). In decadent capitalism, this ever-narrowing spiral is the essential reality of economic activity even outside of periods of open global warfare, both because of the tendency towards a permanent war economy and because more and more capitalism finances its 'growth' through the totally artificial stimulus of debt. Bukharin's insights offer an excellent rebuttal to all those worshippers of economic growth who scoff at the notion of capitalism being decadent because they cannot see the decadent, fictitious essence of this growth.
Again, on the question of state capitalism, ETP repeats previous formulations about state capitalism, showing it to be the characteristic form of capital political organisation in the epoch of decay. Bukharin recalls its dual function: both to limit economic competition within each national capital, the better to a e economic and above all military competition on the world arena; and to preserve social peace in a situation where the miseries provoked by economic crisis and war tend to push the proletariat towards a confrontation with the bourgeois regime. Of particular interest is Bukharin's recognition that the most important way that state capitalism guards the existing order is through the annexation of the old workers' organisations, their incorporation into the state Leviathan: "The method of restructuring was the same method as the subordination to the all-encompassing bourgeois state. The betrayal of the socialist parties and the unions expressed itself in the very fact that they entered into the service of the bourgeois state, that they were actually nationalised by this imperialist state, that they transformed themselves into labour departments of the military machine" (p41).
This lucidity about the characteristics and forms of capitalism in decay was accompanied by a genuine grasp of the methods and aims of the proletarian revolution. ETP shows that a revolution which aims to replace the blind laws of the commodity with the conscious regulation of social life by a liberated humanity can only be conscious revolution, founded on the self-activity and self-organisation of the proletariat through its new organs of political power such as the soviets and the factory committees. At the same time, the revolution engendered by the collapse of the capitalist world economy can only be a world-wide revolution, and it can only arrive at its ultimate goals on the scale of the entire globe. Bukharin's concluding paragraphs summarise the authentic, internationalist hopes of the day, anticipating a future in which "for the first time since humanity existed, a system arises which is constructed harmonically in all its parts; it knows neither social hierarchy nor hierarchy of production. It annihilates once and for all the struggle of people against people and welds the entire human race into a community which rapidly seizes the countless riches of nature" (p173. The French edition of the text uses the word "anarchy" rather than "hierarchy" in the above passage. We are not sure how the original Russian text put it).
The recognition of the authentic means and goals of the revolution cannot, however, remain at the level of generality; it has to be applied and concretised in the revolutionary process itself - an extremely difficult task which, in the case of the Russian revolution, required much painful experience and many years of reflection. Globally, this work of drawing and deepening the lessons of the Russian revolution was carried out by the communist left in the wake of the revolution's defeat. But even in the heat of the revolution, and within the Bolshevik party itself, critical voices emerged who were already laying the bases for future reflection. However, although Bukharin's name is generally connected to the Left Communist opposition in the party in 1918,the Bukharin of ETP had by 1920 embarked on a trajectory that was to take him away from the communist left as a whole; and the book reflects this in that, alongside its significant contributions to marxist theory, it has a deeply 'conservative' side, in which the author slides away from the radical critique of the status quo - even the 'revolutionary' status quo - towards an apologia for things as they were. To be more exact, Bukharin - and in this he was by no means alone, but merely provided the theoretical underpinning of a more widespread illusion - tends to conflate the methods and exigencies of 'war communism' with the actual emergence of communism itself; he looks at a contingent - and extremely difficult situation - for the revolution, and deduces from this certain 'laws' or norms which are universally applicable to the transition period as a whole. Before going further with this line of argument, it is necessary to point out that Bukharin was quick to defend himself against it. In December 1921, he wrote an 'afterword' to the German edition which begins: "Since this book was written, some time has elapsed. Since then in Russia the so-called 'new direction in economic policy' has been adopted, which for the first time brought socialised industry, petit-bourgeois economy, private-capitalist business, and the 'mixed' enterprises into correct economic relation to each other. This specifically Russian change, the deepest precondition of which is the peasant-agrarian character of the country, caused some of my ingenious critics to remark that I must rewrite my work from the beginning. This view rests on the total illiteracy of these clever ones, who in their sacred simplicity do not grasp the difference between an abstract examination, which depicts things and processes in their 'ideal cross-cut' - according to the expression used by Marx - and the empirical reality, which is always and under all circumstances infinitely more complicated than its abstract representation. 1 have not written an economic history of Soviet Russia but rather a general theory of the transition period, for which the powers of comprehension of the journalists par excellence and of the narrow 'practical men' who are unable to comprehend the general problems, are no match" (p202)[1].
Bukharin's strictures against his bourgeois critics are no doubt valid. The fact remains that Bukharin himself, throughout the ETP, also fails to grasp the difference between general theory and empirical reality. A number of examples could be given in support of this contention; we will restrict ourselves only to the most significant.
One of the great illusions of the war communism period was precisely that it was indeed communism; and one of the main sources of this illusion was the apparent disappearance of capitalist categories such as money and wages. It was this same illusion - together with war communism's statification of vast swathes of the economy - which later gave rise to the idea that the NEP of 1921 represented a step back towards capitalism because it restored a considerable amount of formal private ownership and brought the commodity economy back into the open. In fact, the disappearance of money and wages in the period 1918-20 was by no means the result of a deliberate, pre-planned policy by the soviet power; rather it directly expressed the catastrophic collapse of the economy in the face of economic blockade, imperialist invasion and internal civil war. It went hand in hand with widespread famine and disease, the depletion of the cities, and the physical and social decimation of the working class. Of course, this very heavy 'cost' of the revolution was imposed on it by the furious class hatred of the entire world bourgeoisie; and the Russian proletariat paid it willingly, making the most gigantic and heroic sacrifices to ensure the military crushing of the forces of counter-revolution. But, as we shall see later on, the biggest 'cost' of this struggle was the very rapid political enfeeblement of the working class and of its real dictatorship over society. To confuse this terrible situation with the conscious construction of communist society is a very serious error; and as the following passage shows, Bukharin did make this error:
"This phenomenon (the tendency towards the disappearance of value) is for its part also tied to the collapse of the money system. Money represents the real social tie, those knots, in which the entire developed commodity system is entangled. It is conceivable that in the transition period, in the process of the annihilation of the commodity system as such, a process of 'self-negation' of money occurs. It is expressed at first in the so-called 'money devaluation', second, in the fact that the distribution of money symbols become dependent on the distribution of products, and vice versa. Money ceases to be a universal equivalent and becomes a conventional - and thereby highly imperfect - symbol of the circulation of products.
Wages become an illusory quantity which has no content. As long as the working class is the ruling class, wage labour disappears. In socialised production there is no wage labour, and insofar as there is no wage labour, there are also no wages as the price of the labour power sold to the capitalists. Only the outer shell remains of wages - the money form, which together with the money system approaches self-annihilation. In the system of the proletarian dictatorship, the 'worker' receives a social share (in Russian, 'payok'), but no wages" (p147).
It is evident that Bukharin is confusing a number of different things here. First, he confuses the period of the civil war - the period of life and death struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie - with the real transition period, which can only begin its proper, constructive work once the civil war has been won on a world scale. Secondly, and consequently, he confuses the collapse of the money system as a result of economic breakdown - devaluation, dire scarcity - with the real overcoming of the commodity economy, which can only be completed through the communist unification of global society and the emergence of a society of abundance. Otherwise, any 'abolition' of money or wages in a given region remains under the overall domination of the law of value and in no way guarantees an automatic movement towards communism. And yet Bukharin clearly gives the impression that in Russia this desirable stage has already been reached - there is even a Russian word for it, and the worker has got inverted commas around himself, implying that he is no longer part of the exploited. And this is the most dangerous error in this passage: the idea that once the proletariat has won political power, established its political dictatorship, and got rid of private ownership of the means of production, there is no wage labour, no more exploitation. Bukharin states this even more explicitly elsewhere, when he says that "capitalist production relations are absolutely inconceivable under the political rule of the working class" (p50). In appearance very radical, such formulations actually came to justify the increasing exploitation of the working class.
Before going further into this point, it is instructive to give another example of Bukharin's methodological error. War communism was also characterised by the application of military solutions to more and more areas of the revolution's life - most perniciously, to areas where it is vital that political aspects take precedence over military ones. One of the most important of these concerns the international extension of the revolution. A proletarian bastion that has established itself in one region cannot extend the revolution by imposing it militarily on other sectors of the world working class; the revolution extends itself above all by political means, by propaganda, by example, by calling on the workers of the world to rise up against their own bourgeoisies. And indeed, at the height of the revolutionary wave that began in 1917, this was exactly how the revolution did extend. By 1920, however, the Russian revolution was already experiencing the deadly consequences of isolation, of the defeat of the revolutionary assaults in other countries. In this situation - which was coupled with a growing military success in the internal civil war - many Bolsheviks began to put their hopes in spreading the revolution at bayonet point. The Red Army's advance on Warsaw was fuelled by these hopes - and the failure of this 'experiment', which merely pushed the Polish workers into a common front with their own bourgeoisie, was to confirm how misplaced these hopes had been. Bukharin, on the other hand, had been a fervent advocate of "revolutionary war" during the 1918 debates over the Brest-Litovsk treaty; and his 1920 work contains strong echoes of this position. Once again, he takes a contingent reality of the Russian situation - the necessity for a war of fronts across the huge territory of Russia, and the unavoidable formation of a standing army - and turns it into a 'norm' of the entire civil war period: "With the growth of the revolutionary process into the revolutionary world process, the civil war is transformed into a class war, which is led by a regular 'red army' on the part of the proletariat" (p109). In fact the opposite is more likely to be true: the more the revolution spreads worldwide, the more it will be led directly by the workers' councils and their militias, the more the political aspects of the struggle will predominate over the military, the less there will be a need for a 'red army' to lead the struggle. A war of fronts is not at all the proletariat's strong point. In purely military terms, the bourgeoisie will always have the best weapons. The proletariat's strength resides in its capacity to organise, to spread its struggles, to win over more and more sectors of the class, to undermine the armed forces of the enemy through fraternisation and the development of class consciousness. In another passage, Bukharin shows even more clearly that he has turned things on their head by identifying class war with military conflict between states:
"Socialist war is class war, which must be distinguished from simple civil war. The latter is not war in the true sense of the word, for it is not war between two state organisations. In class war, on the other hand, both sides are organised as state powers - on the one side the state of finance capital, on the other side the state of the proletariat". This idea is even more dangerous than the position Bukharin put forward in 1918, where he largely envisaged a defensive war of resistance by partisan units; here, the world revolution itself becomes an apocalyptic battle between two kinds of state power. It is significant that Lenin, who had firmly opposed Bukharin in the Brest-Litovsk debate, but whose marginal notes on the ETP rarely raise substantial criticisms, has no patience with this argument, which he calls a "total confusion" (p213).
One of the ironies of the ETP is that Bukharin, who had expressed such a high point of clarity in the understanding of state capitalism, completely fails to recognise the danger of state capitalism emerging out of the degeneration of the revolution. We have already noted that Bukharin insists that capitalist relations cannot exist under the political dictatorship of the proletariat. In another passage, Bukharin says explicitly that "since state capitalism is a growing together of the bourgeois state with capitalist trusts, it is evident that one can speak of no kind of 'state capitalism' in the dictatorship of the proletariat, which in principle excludes such a possibility" (p116). And he elaborates this further with the following argument: "In the system of state capitalism, the economically active subject is the capitalist state, the collective total capitalist. In the dictatorship of the proletariat, the economically active subject is the proletarian state, the collectively organised working class, 'the proletariat organised as state power'. In state capitalism, the production process is a process of production of surplus value which falls into the hands of the capitalist class, with the tendency to transform this value into surplus product. In the proletarian dictatorship, the production process serves as a means of systematic satisfaction of social needs. The system of state capitalism is the most perfect form of exploitation of the masses by a handful of oligarchs. The system of proletarian dictatorship makes any kind of exploitation whatsoever inconceivable, for it transforms the collective capitalist property and its private capitalist form into collective proletarian property '. Therefore, according to its essence, in spite of the formal similarity, the diametrical opposite is provided" (p117). And finally: "If one does not - as the representatives of bourgeois science do - regard the state apparatus as all organisation of neutrally mystical nature, then one must comprehend that all functions of the state also bear a class character. It follows that one must keep strictly separate bourgeois nationalisation and proletarian nationalisation. Bourgeois nationalisation leads to a system of state capitalism. Proletarian nationalisation leads to a state form of socialism. Just as the proletarian dictatorship. is the negation, the antipode of bourgeois dictatorship, proletarian nationalisation is the negation, the complete opposite of bourgeois nationalisation" (p120).
Of the numerous flaws in these arguments, two stand out most clearly. To begin with, we have, once again, Bukharin's confusion between the period of civil war, where proletarian bastions can exist temporarily in individual countries or regions, and the period of transition proper, which commences once the proletariat has won power on a global scale. The whole experience of the Russian revolution teaches us that the appropriation by the state of the means of production, even by the soviet state, does not do away with exploitation. This would be true in a proletarian dictatorship operating under 'optimal' conditions (an expanding world revolutionary process, maximum workers' democracy, etc), since the worldwide exigencies of the law of value would still exert their pitiless pressure on the workers. It is even more true in a proletarian bastion suffering from isolation and extreme material deprivation: in such circumstances, a tendency towards degeneration would appear straight away, as it did in Russia. The workers would be faced with the' imminent danger of losing their political authority and independence, while on the economic front they would be subjected to ever more draconian demands on their living and working conditions. To talk in such circumstances of the 'impossibility of exploitation', simply because the private capitalists have been expropriated, can only weaken the efforts of the proletariat to defend itself on both the political and economic fronts.
Secondly, history has indeed confirmed that the organ through which this process of degeneration expresses itself most readily is precisely the 'proletarian' state. Bukharin's simplistic definition of ' the state as a mere 'tool' of the ruling class ignores the more profound marxist understanding that the state, in its historic origins, was not the ex nihilo creation of a ruling class, but "arose" out of a situation of growing class antagonisms that threatened to pull society apart. This does not mean that is "mystically neutral": it arises to defend a divided order and can thus only operate on behalf of the economically dominant class. But neither does it mean that the state no more than a passive tool of such a class. In fact, state capitalism is precisely the expression of the fact that, in its epoch of decline, capital has had to function more and more 'without capitalists'. Even in the so-called mixed economies, it is the private capitalist, the 'finance capitalists' and the rest, who have had to subordinate their particular interests to the impersonal and general needs of the national capital, which are imposed above all by the state.
In the period of instability that follows the destruction of the old bourgeois state, a new state emerges, once again out of the need to hold society together, to prevent class antagonisms from tearing it asunder. But this time, there is no 'economically dominant' class: the new ruling class is also an exploited class which does not own any means of production. Consequently, there is even less reason for assuming that the new state automatically operates on behalf of the proletariat. It will only do so if the working class is organised and conscious, and imposes its revolutionary direction on the new state power. The moment the revolution enters into retreat, the forces of social conservation will tend to gather around the state and make it their instrument against the interests of the proletariat. And this is why state capitalism remains a profound danger even under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
For the proletariat to guard against such dangers, it needs to maintain its own class organs as intact and as vibrant as possible both its unitary organs (councils, factory committees, etc) and its political vanguard, the party. But the ETP, far from seeing the need for these organs to avoid entangling themselves with the state, calls for the authentic class organs of the proletariat to fuse themselves into the state - to subordinate themselves entirely to it:
"Now we must raise the question as to the general principle of the system of the proletarian apparatus, i. e. as to the interchanging relationships between different forms of the proletarian organisations. It is clear that the same method is formally necessary for the working class as for the bourgeoisie at the time of state capitalism. This organisational method exists in the coordination of all proletarian organisations with one all-encompassing organisation, i.e. with the state organisation of the working class, with the soviet state of the proletariat. The 'nationalisation' of the trade unions and the effectual nationalisation of all mass organisations of the proletariat result from the internal logic of the process of transformation itself. The minutest cells of the labour apparatus must transform themselves into agents of the general process of organisation, which is systematically directed and led by the collective reason of the working class, which finds its highest and most all-encompassing organisation in its state apparatus. Thus the system of state capitalism dialectically transforms itself into its own inversion, into the state form of workers' socialism" (p 79).
By the same "dialectic", Bukharin explains elsewhere that the system of one-man management, of appointment from above in the running of industry - a practice which became almost universal in the war communism period and was in reality a set-back resulting from the break-down of the industrial proletariat and the loss of its self-organisation -actually expresses a higher phase of revolutionary maturation. This is because it "does not rest on the principal change of relations of production but in the discovery of such a form of administration which guarantees maximum efficiency. The principle of far-reaching eligibility from below upward (usually even by the workers within the factories) is replaced by the principle of painstaking selection in dependence on technological and administrative personnel, on the competence and the reliability of the candidates" (p 130). In other words, since capitalist relations have already been abolished by the 'proletarian state', the military principle of "maximum efficiency" can replace the political principle of the self-education of the proletariat through its direct and collective participation in the running of the economy and the state.
And by the same dialectic, state coercion of the proletariat becomes the highest form of class self-activity: "It is obvious that this element of compulsion, which is here the self-compulsion of the working class, grows from the crystallised centre towards the significantly more amorphous and dispersed periphery. This is the conscious power of cohesion of the little parts of the working class, which, power represents for some categories, subjectively, an external pressure, which constitutes, for the entire working class, objectively, its accelerated self-organisation" (p156-7). By the "amorphous periphery", Bukharin means not simply the other, non-exploiting strata of society, but "the less revolutionary" strata of the working class itself, for whom there is "the necessity of compulsory discipline, the compulsory character of which is that much more tangible the less the internal voluntary discipline"(p156). It is certainly true that the working class, in a revolution, will have to practice a gigantic self-discipline, and that it will have to ensure that majority decisions are adhered to. But there can be no question of 'compelling' the more backward layers of the class to adhere to the communist project; and the experience of the Kronstadt tragedy has taught us that settling even the most acute conflicts within the class by violence can only weaken the proletariat's hold on society. Bukharin's dialectics, by contrast, already appear as an apology for an increasingly intolerable militarisation of the proletariat. Taken to their logical conclusion, they lead straight to the terrible error committed at Kronstadt, herein the "crystallised centre" - the party- state apparatus, which had increasingly divorced itself from the masses - imposed "compulsory discipline" on what it judged to be the "amorphous periphery", the "less revolutionary" layers of the proletariat - who were actually calling for the very necessary regeneration of the soviets and an end to the excesses of war communism.
After initially criticising the NEP, Bukharin soon became its most enthusiastic advocate. Just as the ETP tended to see war communism as the 'finally discovered' road to the new society, Bukharin's later writings more and more presented the NEP, with its pragmatic, cautious approach, as the exemplary model of the transition period. His sudden conversion to a kind of 'market socialism' has provoked a revival of interest in Bukharin among latter day bourgeois economists, repentant Stalinists and others, but naturally not in the authentically revolutionary writings of his earlier period. By 1924 Bukharin had gone even further: the NEP had already achieved socialism - socialism in a single country. At this point, Bukharin had begun to operate as Stalin's ally against the left, as his tame theoretician - even though, within a few years, Bukharin himself was to be crushed under the Stalinist juggernaut.
This rapid about-face is not quite so startling as it might appear. The apologia for war communism and NEP alike were based on significant concessions to the idea that some kind of socialism was being built within the confines of Russia, or at the very least that a "primitive socialist accumulation" (a term used in the ETP) was taking place. From here to the conclusion that socialism had already arrived was not altogether too dizzying a leap - although it needed the counter-revolution to act as a stepping stone.
Nonetheless, Bukharin's trajectory from the extreme left of the party in the 1915-19 period, to the extreme right after 1921, does need some explaining. In The Tragedy of Bukharin (1994), Donny Gluckstein approaches the question from the standpoint of the Trotskyist SWP. This is an extremely sophisticated work, and contains many criticisms of Bukharin's thought, including the ETP, which are formally identical to those made by the communist left. But the fundamentally leftist approach of Gluckstein's book reveals itself when, in answering the question about Bukharin's trajectory, it focuses on the question of Bukharin's 'philosophical' method, its tendency towards scholasticism, towards formal logic, towards posing rigid 'either/or' alternatives, as well as its penchant for Bogdanov's 'monist' philosophy and for amalgamating marxism with sociology. Thus, the jump from uncritical advocacy of war communism to the equally uncritical embracing of the NEP betrays a lack of dialectical thinking, an inability to see the complex and ever-changing nature of reality. By the same token, Bukharin's call for revolutionary war in the Brest-Litovsk debate is also based on a set of methodological errors, since it assumes that the Russian revolution was faced with an absolute and immediate choice between 'selling out' to German imperialism, or making a heroic if doomed gesture in front of the world proletariat; and just as the ETP had reduced the extension of the world revolution to little more than a concluding flourish, an afterthought to the creation of communist relations in Russia, so the Bukharin of 1918 had been prepared to sacrifice the entire proletarian bastion in Russia for a world revolution which was not yet an immediate reality and was thus treated as a kind of abstract ideal. Certainly, both Lenin and Trotsky made a number of incisive criticisms of Bukharin's method - some of Lenin's appear in his marginal notes to the ETP. But behind his emphasis on this point, Gluckstein has another agenda - proving that Bukharin's rigid either/or method was fundamentally that of left communism. The book's critique of Bukharin is thus a 'warning' against what happens when you mess around with left communist positions and politics.
We do not intend to refute Gluckstein's attack on the "theoretical roots of left communism" here. While there is undoubtedly a connection between Bukharin's political errors and some of his underlying 'philosophical' conceptions, the latter are by no means identical with left communism and are more often antithetical to it. In any case, it is much more instructive to consider Bukharin's over-all trajectory as a reflection of the course of the revolution in general. It is often the case that the 'personal' trajectory of a revolutionary has an almost symbolic relationship to the more general one. Trotsky, for example, was expelled from Russia in the wake of the defeat of the 1905 revolution, returned to lead the October victory, and was expelled again in 1929 when the counter- revolution had swept all before it. Bukharin's trajectory is different, but equally significant: his best contributions to marxism were in the years 1915-19, when the revolutionary wave was either building up or reaching its high point, and the Bolshevik party was acting as a real laboratory of revolutionary thought. But although, as we have mentioned, Bukharin's name was closely associated with the Left Communist group in 1918, he followed a different road from that of the other leading left communists after 1919. Bukharin's main bone of contention in 1918 had been the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Once this debate was closed, other committed 'lefts' trained their attention on the internal problems of the regime, particularly the danger of opportunism and bureaucratism in the party and the state. Some of these elements - such as Sapranov and V Smirnov - maintained and elaborated their criticisms throughout the period of degeneration and even into the depths of the counter-revolution. Bukharin, on the other hand, was to more and become a 'man of the state' - one might say, the 'theoretician of the state'. Certainly this trajectory explains the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the ETP, with its melange of radical theory and conservative apologia for the status quo, for at this point the Russian revolution itself had reached a watershed where both the upward movement and the downward movement were in contention. After 1921, the downward movement clearly predominated, and now Bukharin more and more became the spokesman and rationaliser of the process of degeneration, even though he became yet another of its victims in the end. Behind this personal history of intellectual decline lies the history of the Bolshevik party, which, the more it fused itself with the state, the more it became unable to play the role of a real political and theoretical avant-garde. The story of how the most far-seeing elements of the Bolshevik party, and of the international communist movement, resisted this course will have to be told in future articles in this series.
CDW
[1] In this same afterword, Bukharin also says that his work has been wrongly taken as a justification for the theory of the "offensive under all circumstances", which had a considerable following in the German party and which had contributed to the disaster of the March Action in 1921.
Nevertheless, there are certain connections, notably in the way that the ETP tends to present the decline of capitalism not as a whole epoch but as a final, once and for all death crisis, from which a "restoration of industry, of which the utopians of capitalism dream, is impossible" (p57). The theory of the offensive was based precisely on the idea that there was no prospect of any capitalist reconstruction and that the open crisis could only get worse and worse.
Perhaps more to the point, Bukharin's apocalyptic view of the crisis also lends support to his tendency to equate the collapse of capitalism with the emergence of communism. In the face of the bourgeoisie, Bukharin was right to insist that the proletarian revolution inevitably involved a certain level of social anarchy, of breakdown in the productive activities of society. But there is in the ETP a definite underestimation of the dangers posed to the proletariat if this process of breakdown goes too far - dangers that were very real in the Russia of 1920, where the working class had been decimated and to a certain extent decomposed by the ravages of the civil war. Certain passages of the book give the impression that the more the economy disintegrates, the more salutary this is, the more it is hastening the development of communist social relations.
The ruling class' speeches about the "good health" and perpetuity of its system of exploitation have been increasingly exposed by the numerous economic convulsions over the last 30 years: the recessions of 1974-75, of 1980-82 or the especially acute one of 1990-93; cataclysms on the stock market like that of October 1987, or the "Tequila effect" of 1994 etc. However, the swelling stream of bad economic news since August 1997 - the collapse of the Thai currency, the debacle of the Asiatic "tigers" and "dragons", the brutal purge of world stock markets; the bankruptcy of Russia, the fragile situation of Brazil and other "emerging" economies in Latin America, and above all the serious state of the world's second economy, Japan - constitutes the most serious episode in the historic crisis of capitalism. It clearly confirms the analysis of marxism and demonstrates the necessity for the overthrow of capitalism through the world proletarian revolution.
The form taken by the crisis over the last 30 years, above all in the main industrialised countries, has not been that of the brutal depression that occurred in the 1930's. What we have seen is a slow and progressive descent into the hell of unemployment and poverty, through successive recessions. At the same time, the worst ravages have been most concentrated in the countries of the periphery: Africa, South America, Asia that have sunk irremediably into a total morass of barbarism and decomposition.
For the bourgeoisie of the main industrialised countries, where the most important proletarian masses are concentrated, this hitherto unknown form taken by the historic crisis of capitalism has the advantage of concealing the death agony of capitalism and creating the illusion that its convulsions will be transitory, and that they will correspond to the cyclical crises typical of the previous century, which were followed by periods of intense development.
As a weapon in the struggle against such mystifications we are publishing a study of the last 30 years. On the one hand, it will demonstrate that the slow and escalating rhythm of the crisis has been the result of the state's "managing" the crisis by cheating the laws of the capitalist system (notably through the recourse to astronomical levels of debt, the likes of which have never been seen in the history of humanity) and on the other hand, that these policies are not any kind of solution to capitalism's incurable disease. The price of deferring its most catastrophic expressions in the most important countries is: increasingly explosive contradictions and the aggravation of the incurable cancer of world capitalism.
Crash or progressive collapse?
Marxism has made clear that capitalism has no solution to its historic crisis, a crisis that goes back to the First World War. Nevertheless, the form and causes of this crisis have been the object of discussion amongst the revolutionaries of the Communist Left[1]. Is the form that of the deflationary depression typical of the cyclical crisis of the ascendant period (between 1820 and 1913)? Or rather, is it one of a process of progressive degeneration during which the whole world economy collapses into an increasingly acute state of stagnation and decomposition?
In the 1920s, some tendencies in the KAPD put forward the "Theory of the crash" according to which the historic crisis of capitalism would take the form of an irreversible brutal collapse that would impose on the proletariat the need to make the revolution. Some Bordigist currents who think that a sudden crisis will force the proletariat to resort to revolutionary action also express this vision.
We cannot enter here into a detailed analysis of this theory. However, it is to clear that the evolution of capitalism since 1914 has disproved it at the political as much as at the economic level. Historical experience has confirmed that the bourgeoisie is capable of moving mountains to prevent the spontaneous and sudden crash of its system of production. The problem of the outcome of the historic crisis of capitalism is not strictly economic but above all and essentially political, dependent on the evolution of the class struggle:
* Will the proletariat develop its struggles towards the imposition of its revolutionary dictatorship which will rescue humanity from the present morass and lead to communism as a new mode of production that overcomes and resolves the insoluble contradictions of capitalism?
* Will the survival of the system plunge humanity into barbarity and definitive destruction, be it through generalised world war, or through the slow agony of progressive and systematic decomposition[2]?
The bourgeoisie has responded to the permanent crisis of its system with the universal tendency of state capitalism. State capitalism is not only an economic response, but also a political one, as much a necessity for the carrying out of imperialist war as for confronting the proletariat. From the economic point of view, state capitalism constitutes an effort not so much at overcoming or solving this crisis, but at managing and slowing it[3].
Just as the proletariat's international revolutionary wave of 1917-23 made clear the threat to its system at the decisive political level, so the brutal depression of 1929 demonstrated to the bourgeoisie the grave dangers that its historical crisis contained at the economic level. The bourgeoisie did not give up on either of these two fronts. It developed the totalitarian form of its state to serve as a defensive bastion against the proletarian threat and against the economic contradictions of its system of exploitation. This totalitarian state expressed itself on the economic level as the general tendency to state capitalism, which took different forms: Nazi, Stalinist, and "democratic".
In the la 30 years, marked as much by the open reappearance of the historic crisis of capitalism as by the rebirth of the proletarian struggle, we have seen the bourgeoisie perfect and generalise its state mechanisms for managing the economic crisis in order to avoid its abrupt and uncontrolled explosion, at least in the main industrial concentrations (Europe, North America, Japan) which is where the historic outcome of the incurable crisis of capitalism will be determined[4].
At its formation, our Current stated that "At given moments, the confluence of some of these indicators could trigger a massive slump in a given national capital such as Britain, Italy, Portugal, or Spain. This is a possibility that we don't dismiss. However, although such a collapse would give an irreparable blow to the world economy (British assets and investments abroad alone amount to £20 billion), the world capitalist system could still drag on as long as a modicum of production were maintained in some advanced countries such as the US, Germany, Japan and the Eastern European countries. All such events of course lend 10 engulf the whole system, and crises are inevitably world crises today, But for the reasons we have outlined above, we have reason to believe that the crisis will be drawn-out - extremely convulsive and with jagged curves, but more like a snowballing effect than a steep sudden fall. Even the disintegration of a national economy will not necessarily send all the capitalists to hang themselves, as Rosa Luxemburg remarked in a slightly different context. For this to happen, the personification of national capital, the state, must be strangled by none other than the revolutionary proletariat"[5].
Similarly, after the violent economic events of the 1980s we showed that "the capitalist machine has not completely collapsed. Despite the record number of bankruptcies, despite the increasingly frequent and serious cracks in the system, the profit machine continues to junction, concentrating new and gigantic fortunes - the product of the carnage among different capitals - and boasts with cynical arrogance of the benefits of ‘liberalism'".[6]
A ruling class does not commit suicide or lock up shop and give the keys to the class that is replacing it. We can see this with the feudal class which after a furious resistance made a pact with the bourgeoisie that gave it a place in the new order. It will be even less the case with the bourgeoisie which knows full well that it can expect nothing but its own disappearance from the social order represented by the proletariat.
As much for the mystification and defeat of the proletariat as to keep its economic system afloat, it is necessary that members of the bourgeoisie do not become demoralised and throw in the towel. This means that the state has to maintain at all costs the economic edifice, to give it the best possible appearance of normality and effectiveness, in order to assure the minimum of confidence and credibility in the economy.
At all events, the crisis is the best ally of the proletariat for the completion of its revolutionary mission. However, this is not something spontaneous and mechanical, but takes place through the development of its struggle and its consciousness. If the proletariat is to develop its reflection on the fundamental causes of the crisis the groups of the Communist Left have to carry out a tenacious and obstinate struggle to show the reality of the death agony of capitalism and denounce all the efforts of state capitalism to avoid the crisis through, slowing it down, hiding it, deflecting it from the nerve centres of world capitalism on to the more peripheral regions where the proletariat has less social weight.
Managing the crisis
The notion of "managing the crisis" to use the terms of the Report from our last International Congress[7], is crucial. Since 1967, world capitalism has responded to the open reappearance of its historic crisis through a policy of managing the crisis, which is central to understanding both the course of economic evolution over this period, and the success the bourgeoisie has had until now in hiding the gravity and magnitude of the crisis from the proletariat.
This policy of managing the crisis constitutes the most finished expression of the general historical tendency to state capitalism. In reality over the last 30 years the Western states have developed a practice of manipulating the law of value, of massive and generalised debt, of authoritarian state intervention towards economic agents and the productive process, of tricks with money, foreign trade and public debt, which make the state planning methods of the Stalinist bureaucracies look like child's play. All of the Western bourgeoisie's chatter about the "market economy", the "play of free market forces", the "superiority of liberalism" and the like is in reality an enormous mystification. For the last 70 years, as the Communist Left has affirmed, there have not been two "economic systems", one of them "a planned economy" and the other a "free economy", but one system: capitalism, which in its long drawn out death agony is sustained by increasingly enveloping and totalitarian state intervention.
This state intervention to manage the crisis, that seeks to adapt itself to it and seeks to slow it down and postpone it, has allowed the main industrial countries to avoid a brutal collapse, a general disintegration of the system. However, it has neither solved the crisis nor resolved any of its most acute expressions such as unemployment or inflation. The only achievement of 30 years of "managing the crisis" is a kind of organised descent towards the abyss, a chance for the planned fall through successive recessions whose only real result has been to indefinitely prolong the suffering insecurity and desperation of the working class and the immense majority of the world's population. On the one hand, the working class of the great industrial centres has been subjected to a systematic policy of gradual but progressive cuts in its wages, its living conditions, its stability of employment, its very survival. On the other hand, the great majority of the world's population, which lives in misery in the enormous periphery that surrounds the nerve centres of capitalism, has been submerged in a situation of barbarity, hunger and death that could well be classed as the greatest genocide ever suffered by humanity.
This policy of managing the crisis however, is the only one possible for the whole of world capitalism, the only one that can keep it afloat even if it is at the price of leaving increasingly large parts of its own economic body to fall into the abyss. The most important and decisive countries from the imperialist and economic point of view, but above all for the confrontation between the classes, concentrate all their efforts on deflecting the crisis onto the weaker countries, with less resources faced with its devastating effects and with less importance in the struggle against the proletariat. Thus, in the 1980's, a large part of Africa, a good slice of South and Latin America and a series of Asian countries collapsed. Since 1989, it has been the turn of the countries of Eastern Europe, Central Asia etc, which until then had been subject to the domination of that giant with feet of clay called Russia. Now it is the turn of the former Asian "dragons" and "tigers", that in the case of Indonesia is confronted with the most brutal and rapid fall of any country's economy for 80 years.
We have had a lot of talk from politicians, union leaders, or "experts" in "economic models", about "appropriate economic policies" and "solutions to the crisis". The harsh reality of the crisis over the last 30 years has shown up all this talk for what it is: unutterable stupidity, or the vulgar tricks of mountebanks. The "Swedish model of the social market economy" is no longer heard about, the "Japanese model" has been hurriedly withdrawn from the propaganda catalogues, the "German model" has been discreetly consigned to the museum, the endlessly repeated scratched record of the "success" of the Asian "tigers" and "dragons" has been dropped from the ideological jukebox in the course of a few months. In practice the only possible policy for all governments, be they Right wing, Left wing, dictatorial or "democratic", "liberal" or "interventionist", is to manage the crisis, the planned and most gradual possible descent into the inferno.
This policy of managing and accompanying the crisis cannot have the effect of keeping world capitalism in a static situation, where the brutal contradictions of the regime of exploitation can be perpetually contained and limited. Such "stability" is impossible because of the nature of capitalism itself, the dynamism of its internal contradictions that unceasingly push it to seek the valorisation of capital, to compete for the re-division of the world market. For these reasons, the policy of palliatives, of slowing the crisis has the perverse effect of aggravating, making more violent and profound capitalism's contradictions. The "success" of capitalism's economic policies over the last 30 years can be reduced to the avoiding of the worst of the crisis but, meanwhile, the time-bomb has increased in size, it has become more explosive, more dangerous, more destructive:
* Thirty years of debt have increased the overall fragility of the financial mechanisms that make their use for managing the crisis much more difficult and dangerous.
* Thirty years of generalised overproduction has meant successive amputations of the industrial and agricultural apparatus of the world economy that reduces the size of the market and makes this overproduction much more serious and burdensome.
* Thirty years of postponement and dosage of unemployment mean that today it is much more serious and causes an endless chain of lay-offs, the casualisation of work, underemployment etc.
All of capitalism's cheating of its own economic laws means that the crisis has not taken the form of a sudden collapse of production as happened in the cyclical crisis of ascendant capitalism last century or as we saw in the depression of 1929. Nevertheless, the crisis has taken a more widespread form, more destructive for the living conditions of the proletariat and the whole of humanity: a descent by successive, progressively more brutal, stages towards a situation of increasingly generalised stagnation and decomposition.
The convulsions that have been taking place since August 1997 mark a new stage in the descent towards the abyss. We can have no doubt that this is the worst episode of the last 30 years, the biggest step that capitalism has taken in this descent. In order to better grasp its effects on the living conditions of the proletariat and on the aggravation of the capitalist crisis it seems to us necessary to go back over the entire period.
In International Review no.8 (article on "The international political situation"), we showed that capitalism's policy of "managing and accompanying the crisis" has three axes: "Deflecting the crisis onto other countries, the intermediate classes, and the proletariat". These three axes have marked the policy of managing the crisis and had been defined in the different stages of the collapse of the system.
The policy of the 1970s
In 1967, the devaluation of the pound sterling was one of the first clear signs of a new open crisis of capitalism after the years of relative prosperity granted by the reconstruction of the world economy following the enormous destruction of the Second World War. There was the first shock of unemployment that rose to 2 % in some European countries. Governments responded with policies of increased public spending which rapidly hid the situation and allowed a recovery of production during 1969-71.
In 1971, the crisis took the form of violent monetary storms concentrated around the world's main currency: the dollar. The Nixon government was able to postpone the problem temporarily, but this had serious consequences for the future evolution of capitalism: it dismantled the Bretton Woods Agreement adopted in 1944, and which since then had regulated the world economy.
Bretton Woods itself definitively abandoned the gold standard and replaced it with the dollar standard. At the time, this already marked a step towards the weakening of the world monetary system and a stimulus to the policy of debt. In its 'ascendant period capitalism tied currencies to the reserves of gold and silver, which established a more or less coherent correspondence between the extension of production and the monetary mass in circulation avoiding or at least alleviated the uncontrolled recourse to credit. Linking currencies to the dollar standard eliminated this control mechanism and, leaving aside the substantial advantage it gave to American capitalism over its competitors, it involved a considerable risk of monetary and credit instability.
This threat remained latent as long as reconstruction provided the room for the sale of continually expanding production. However, it exploded from 1967 when this margin for manoeuvre was dramatically reduced. The abandoning of the dollar standard and its replacement by IMF Special Drawing Rights allowed each state to issue its currency without any guarantee beyond itself. The threat of instability and the uncontrolled growth of debt became more tangible and dangerous.
The 1972-73 "boom" not only hid these problems but brought with it one of the illusions which capitalism has used to disguise its mortal crisis: in these two years production reached record levels. These were essentially based on the unleashing of consumption.
Drunk with this ephemeral "success", capitalism boasted about overcoming the crisis and the failure of marxism in its assertion of the system's mortal collapse. These proclamations were soon unmasked by the so-called "oil crisis" of 1974-75, the worst since the Second World War: levels of production in the industrialised countries fell by between 2% and 4%.
The response to this new convulsion was based around two axes:
* the striking growth of public deficits in the industrialised countries, especially in the United States;
* but above all, the enormous growth of debt in the Third World and the countries of the East. The years between 1974-1977 saw what the biggest wave of lending in history was then: $78 billion were loaned to Third World countries, not including those that belonged to the Russian bloc. To give some idea of the unprecedented nature of the level of these loans one only bas to compare them to those issued to European countries between 1948-53 under the Marshall Plan: a total of $15 billion which was already a record for the time.
These measures brought about a recovery of production although this never reached the levels of 1972-73. However, the cost was the explosion of inflation which in some central countries surpassed 20% (in Italy it reached 30%). Inflation is a characteristic feature of decadent capitalism[8], due to the immense mass of unproductive spending that the system bears in order to survive: war production, hypertrophy of the state apparatus, gigantic financial costs, advertising etc. These costs are incomparably greater than the costs of circulation and growth typical of the ascendant period. However, in the mid-1970s, this permanent and structural inflation became galloping inflation because of the accumulation of public deficits brought about by the uncontrolled emission of money without any counter-part.
The evolution of the world economy in the second half of the 1970s oscillated between recovery and recession. Each effort to revive the economy lead to the outburst of inflation (which the capitalists called "overbeating"), which meant that governments bad to impose a "freeze" on growth by increasing interest rates, sudden reductions in the rate of circulation of money, etc, which led to recession. This clearly demonstrated the general impasse of the capitalist economy due to over-production.
The balance-sheet of the 1970s
After this brief description of economic evolution during the 1970s, we can draw some conclusions at two levels:
* the economic situation,
* the decline in working class living conditions .
The general economic situation
1. Levels of production were high. The average level of growth in production during the decade in the 24 countries of the OECD was 4.1 %. During the 1972-73 boom it reached 8%, and even 10% in Japan. Nevertheless, it is possible to see a clear tendency towards decline in comparison to the previous decade:
Average levels of production in the countries of the OECD
1960-70 | 5.6% |
1970-73 | 5.5% |
1976-79 | 4% |
2. Massive lending to the Third World allowed the exploitation and incorporation into the world market of the last, although very small, pre-capitalist vestiges. We can thus say that the world market underwent a very limited expansion, as it bad during the reconstruction period after 1945.
3. The whole productive sector grew, including the traditional sectors such as ship-building, mining, iron and steel that experienced a great expansion between 1972-78. However, this expansion was their swan song: from 1978 the signs of increasing market saturation led to the infamous "restructuring" (euphemism concealing massive lay-offs) that began in 1979 and made their mark in the following decade.
4. The phases of recovery affected the whole world economy more or less evenly. With a few exceptions (a significant example was the decline in production in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) all countries benefited from the increase of production. There were no countries "disconnected" from recovery, such a we saw in the 1980s.
5.The price of raw materials maintained a constant tendency to increase, which peaked with the speculative oil boom (between 1972 and 19 after which the tendency began to reverse.
6. Armaments production took off in relation to the 1960 and increased spectacularly from 1976.
7. From 1975 levels of debt accelerated strongly. although in comparison to what was to come they were minuscule. They were characterised by:
* fairly moderate growth in the central countries (although from 1977 there was a spectacular . e in the United States during the Carter administration);
* but a massive increase in the countries of the Third World.
"Underdeveloped" countries' debts
(source: World Bank)
1970 | $70,000 M |
1975 | $170,000 M |
1980 | $580,000 M |
8. The banking system was solid: loans (for consumption and investment, to families, businesses, and institutions) were subject to a series of very rigorous controls and guarantee .
9. Speculation was still a limited phenomenon although the feverish speculation in oil (the famous petrodollars) heralded a tendency towards its generalisation in the following decade.
The situation of the working class
1. Unemployment remained relatively limited although it grew constantly from 1975. In the 24 OECD countries, there were 7 million unemployed in 1968; by 1979, the figure had risen to 18 million.
2. There were significant nominal increases in wages (these reached 20-25 %) and in countries like Italy sliding wage scales index-linked to inflation were introduced. This growth in wages was misleading since globally wages lost ground faced with galloping inflation
3. Permanent jobs massively predominated and in the most important countries there was a strong growth in public sector jobs.
4. Social spending, subsidies, social security systems, housing, health and education benefits, all grew significantly.
5. During the decade, the decline in living conditions was real but fairly smooth. The bourgeoisie, alerted by the historic rebirth of the class struggle and enjoying considerable room for manoeuvre on the economic terrain, preferred to concentrate its attacks on the weakest sectors of the national capital rather than on the working class. The decade of the 1970's was the "years of illusion" characterised by the political dynamic of "the left in power".
In the next part of this article we will draw a balance-sheet of the 1980s and 1990s which will allow us on the one hand to evaluate the violent degradation of the economy and the situation of the working class and on the other to comprehend more clearly the sombre perspectives of the new descent towards the inferno, that the period opened up by August 1997 contains.
Adalen
[1] There are essentially two theories as to the cause of the crisis: the saturation of the world market and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. See in relation to this question the articles in International Review nos. 13, 16, 23, 29, 30,76 and 83.
[2] See International Review no.62 "The decomposition of capitalism".
[3] See International Review no.21 "On state capitalism" and International Review No 23 "The proletariat in decadent capitalism".
[4] See International Review no.31 "The proletariat of Western Europe at the centre of the class struggle".
[5] See the article on the international situation in International Review no. 1.
[6] See International Review no.56.
[7] See the Report we published in International Review no.92.
[8] See our pamphlet The decadence of capitalism
Ever since the end of the 1960s and the formation of the groups which were to create the ICC in 1975, we have been subjected to a dual criticism. For some - generally the various organisations that go under the name of “International Communist Party”, directly descended from the Italian Left - we are idealists on the question of class consciousness and organisational anarchists. For others - usually from anarchism or the councilist current which reject, or at least under-estimate the need for political organisation and a communist party - we are supposed to be “partyists” and “Leninists”. The former base their assertions on our rejection of the “classical” position of the workers’ movement on the seizure of power by the communist party during the dictatorship of the proletariat, and our non-monolithic view of the functioning of a political organisation. The latter reject our rigorous conception of the revolutionary militant, and our constant efforts to build a united, centralised international organisation.
Today, another criticism of the councilist variety, but more virulent, has made its appearance: the ICC is degenerating, has become a “Leninist”[1] [707] sect, and is on the point of abandoning its own platform and political principles. We defy anyone to prove this lie, which cannot be justified by anything in our publications or our programmatic texts. The outrageousness of this denunciation - we are no longer in the realm of criticism - cannot be doubted by anybody who reads the ICC’s press seriously and without bias. However, the fact that this lie is put about by ex-militants of the organisation, might lead the inattentive or inexperienced reader to conclude that “there is no smoke without fire”. In fact, these ex-militants have joined the milieu of what we call “political parasitism”.[2] [708] This milieu is opposed to our constant fight for the international regroupment of revolutionary forces, and for the unity of the proletarian political movement in the historic struggle against capitalism. Consequently, it tries to undermine and weaken both our fight against informalism and dilettantism in militant activity and our ardent defence of an internationally united and centralised organisation.
Have we become Leninists as our critics and denouncers claim? This is a serious accusation, and we cannot just run away from it. But to answer it seriously, we must first know what we are talking about. What is “Leninism”? What has it represented in the history of the workers’ movement?
“Leninism” and the cult of Lenin appeared at the same time, just after Lenin’s death in 1924, following two years of illness which drastically reduced his political activity. The ebb of the international revolutionary wave which had put an end to World War I and the isolation of the proletariat in Russia are the fundamental causes for the rising power of the counter-revolution. The main signs of this process were the annihilation of the power of the workers’ councils, and of all proletarian life within them, the bureaucratisation and the rise of Stalinism within Russia itself, and especially within the Bolshevik Party. Dramatic political mistakes - in particular, for example, the identification of the party and the proletariat with the Russian state which justified the repression of Kronstadt - played a major part in the development of both the bureaucracy and Stalinism. Lenin is not exempt from criticism, even though he was often the one best able to oppose the process of bureaucratisation, as he did in 1920 (against Trotsky and many of the Bolshevik leaders who advocated the militarisation of the trades unions), and at the end of his life when he denounced Stalin’s growing power and proposed to Trotsky to form an alliance, or a bloc as he said, “against bureaucratism in general, and against the organisation bureau [under Stalin’s thumb] in particular”.[3] [709] Only once death had ended his political authority did the counter-revolutionary bureaucratic tendency develop the personality cult of Lenin:[4] [710] Petrograd was rechristened Leningrad, his body mummified, and above all an ideology of “Leninism” and “Marxism-Leninism” was developed. The troika of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev thus aimed to appropriate Lenin’s “legacy” as a means of struggle against Trotsky within the Russian party, and of seizing power within the Communist International. The Stalinist offensive to take control of the different communist parties was based around the “Bolshevisation” of these parties and the exclusion of militants who refused to accept the new policy.
In his 1939 biography of Stalin, Boris Souvarine emphasises the opposition between Lenin and “Leninism”: “There is no continuity, properly speaking, between the old Bolshevism and the new “Leninism”.[5] [711] This is how he defines “Leninism”: “Stalin made himself its first classical author, with his pamphlet Foundations of Leninism, an anthology of lectures to the “red students” of the Sverdlov communist university at the beginning of April 1924. In this laborious compilation, where uninspired sentences alternate with quotations, we search in vain for the critical thought of Lenin. Everything living, relative, conditional, and dialectic in his work, becomes passive, absolute, catechising, and littered moreover with contradictions”.[6] [712]
“Leninism” is the “theory” of Socialism in one country, utterly opposed to Lenin’s internationalism.
The advent of “Leninism” marks the victory of the opportunist course charted by the Communist International since its 3rd Congress, in particular with the tactic of the United Front and the slogan of “going to the masses”, as isolation weighed more and more heavily on revolutionary Russia. The errors of the Bolsheviks were a negative factor that encouraged this opportunist course. It is worth recalling here that the incorrect position on “the party holding power” was shared by the whole revolutionary movement of the time, including Rosa Luxemburg and the German Left. It was only in the early 1920s that the KAPD began to point out the contradiction inherent in a revolutionary party taking power and identifying itself with the new state created by the victorious insurrection.
Various oppositions began to develop against this opportunist, then frankly counter-revolutionary gangrene. The most coherent were the left oppositions in Russia, Italy, Germany and Holland, which remained faithful to internationalism and October 1917. They fought against the increasing opportunism of the CI, and were expelled one after the other during the 1920s. Those of them that managed to maintain an organised existence opposed the practical implications of “Leninism”, in other words the policy of “Bolshevisation” of the communist parties. Especially, they fought against the replacement of organisation in local sections, in other words on a territorial, geographical basis, by organisation in factory cells, which ended up by regrouping militants on a corporatist basis and helped to empty the parties of any really communist life, dependent as it is on general political debate and discussion.
The propagation of “Leninism” sharpened the struggle between Stalinism and the left oppositions. It was accompanied by the development of the theory of “socialism in one country”, which is a complete break with Lenin’s intransigent internationalism, and with the experience of October. This rise of opportunism marked the definitive victory of the counter-revolution. By abandoning internationalism and adopting “socialism in one country” as a part of its programme, the CI died - as an International - at its 6th Congress in 1928.
In 1925, the adoption by the CI’s 5th Congress of the “Theses on Bolshevisation” revealed the Stalinist bureaucracy’s increasing grip on both the CI and the Communist Parties. Itself a product of the Stalinist counter-revolution, Bolshevisation became the main organisational vector of the CI’s member parties’ accelerated degeneration. The increasing use of repression and state terror in Russia, and the expulsions from the other parties, show how bitter and fierce was the struggle. For Stalinism, there still existed a serious danger of the formation of a strong international opposition around Trotsky, who alone would have been able to regroup the major part of the surviving revolutionary forces. This opposition stood against the policy of opportunism, and had every chance of success in wresting the party leaderships from Stalinism, as we can see from the examples of Italy and Germany.
One of the aims of “Bolshevisation” was thus to erect an opposition between Lenin and the other great figures of communism from the other left currents - between Lenin and Trotsky, of course, but also between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg: “A real Bolshevisation is impossible without overcoming the errors of Luxemburgism. “Leninism” must be the unique compass for the communist parties throughout the world. Anything that is distanced from “Leninism” is also distanced from marxism”.[7] [713]
Stalinism thus tore apart the unity between Lenin and Luxemburg, between the Bolshevik tradition and the other lefts that emerged from the 2nd International. In the wake of Stalinism, the social-democratic parties also helped to erect a water-tight barrier between the “good democratic” Rosa Luxemburg, and the “bad dictatorial” Lenin. Nor does this belong solely to the past. The unity between these two great revolutionaries is still subject to attack. Hypocritical praise is heaped on Luxemburg’s “farsightedness” for her criticism of the Bolsheviks and the Russian revolution, as often as not by the direct political descendants of her social-democrat assassins, in other words by today’s socialist parties. Especially by the German socialist party, doubtless on the grounds that Rosa Luxemburg was... German!
This is yet another confirmation of the alliance and common interests of the “classic” forces of capitalism, and the Stalinist counter-revolution. In particular, it confirms the alliance between Stalinism and social-democracy to falsify the history of the workers’ movement and to destroy marxism. We can bet that the bourgeoisie will not miss the opportunity to celebrate - in its own way - the 80th anniversary of the assassination of Rosa Luxemburg and the Spartakists in Berlin in 1919.
“It is a painful spectacle for revolutionary militants to see the assassins of those who made the October Revolution allied to the assassins of the Spartakists and daring to commemorate the death of these proletarian leaders. Those who have heaped betrayal on betrayal to lead the international counter-revolution have no right to talk of Rosa Luxemburg, whose life was one of intransigence, struggle against opportunism, and revolutionary firmness”.[8] [714]
Today, most of the elements of the parasitic milieu find it all the easier to contribute to these falsifications of history, in that they hang about with the anarchists, another milieu which specialises in attacking Lenin and everything he represents.
Unfortunately, most of the truly proletarian groups and currents are lacking in political clarity. By its theoretical weaknesses and political mistakes, councilism makes its own little contribution to the wall that the ruling class would like to erect between the Bolshevik party and the Dutch and German lefts, between Lenin on the one hand, Luxemburg on the other. In the same way, their political weaknesses - or aberrations, when it comes to the theory of “invariance” dear to the Bordigists - mean that the Bordigist Groups and even Battaglia Comunista (PCInt) do not understand the importance of defending Lenin, Luxemburg, and all the left fractions that came out of the Communist International.
It is important that we remember the unity and continuity of the struggle waged not just by the individuals Lenin and Luxemburg, but by the Bolshevik party and the other lefts within the 2nd International. Despite their debates and disagreements, they were always on the same side of the barricades when the working class was confronted with decisive events. Lenin and Luxemburg were the leaders of the revolutionary left at the Stuttgart Congress of the Socialist International (1907), when together they successfully put forward an amendment to the resolution on the attitude of socialists to war, calling on them “by every means possible to use the economic and political crisis provoked by the war to awaken the people and thereby to hasten the overthrow of capitalist domination”; Lenin even entrusted Rosa Luxemburg with the Russian party’s mandate in the discussion on this question. Faithful to their internationalist struggle within their respective parties, they stood against the imperialist war. Luxemburg’s Spartakist current took part, with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, in the internationalist conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal (1915 and 1916). With all the lefts, they were wholeheartedly enthusiastic in their support for the Russian revolution:
“The Russian Revolution is the mightiest event of the World War (...) That the Bolsheviks have based their policy entirely upon the world proletarian revolution is the clearest proof of their political farsightedness and firmness of principle, and of the bold scope of their policies (...) The party of Lenin was the only one which grasped the mandate and duty of a truly revolutionary party and which, by the slogan “All power in the hands of the proletariat and peasantry”, ensured the continued development of the revolution (...) Moreover, the Bolsheviks immediately set as the aim of this seizure of power a complete, far-reaching revolutionary programme: not the safeguarding of bourgeois democracy, but a dictatorship of the proletariat for the purpose of realising socialism. Thereby they won for themselves the imperishable historic distinction of having for the first time proclaimed the final aim of socialism as the direct programme of practical politics”.[9] [715]
Does this mean that there were no differences between these great figures of the workers’ movement? Obviously not. Nor does it mean that we should ignore them. But if we are to learn from these differences, then we must first be able to recognise and defend what united them: the class struggle, the consistent revolutionary struggle against capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and all its political forces. Luxemburg’s text, that we have quoted above, is an unsparing criticism of the policy of the Bolshevik party in Russia. But she is careful to establish the framework within which her criticisms are to be understood: solidarity and common struggle with the Bolsheviks. She violently denounces the opposition by Kautsky and the Mensheviks to the proletarian insurrection. And to avoid any ambiguity as to her class position, or any distortion of her words, she ends thus: “In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia. And in this sense, the future everywhere belongs to “Bolshevism””.
The defence of these comrades, and their class unity, is a task bequeathed to us by the Italian Left, and one which we intend to continue. Lenin and Luxemburg belong to the revolutionary proletariat. Here is how the Italian fraction of the communist left understood the defence of this legacy against Stalinist “Leninism” and social-democracy:
“But alongside this brilliant proletarian leader [Lenin], stand the equally imposing figures of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. These products of an international struggle against revisionism and opportunism, expression of the German proletariat’s revolutionary will, belong to us and not to those who want to make Rosa a standard-bearer against Lenin and the Party, or to make Liebknecht the standard-bearer for an anti-militarism which in reality finds expression in votes for arms spending in the different “democratic” countries”.[10] [716]
We have not yet answered the accusation that we have changed position on Lenin. However, the reader can already see clearly and concretely that we are resolutely opposed to “Leninism”, and that we remain faithful to the tradition of the left fractions from which we spring, and in particular of the Italian fraction of the 1930s. We try to apply the method which struggles for the defence of the historic unity and continuity of the workers’ movement, against “Leninism”, and against all the attempts to divide and oppose its different marxist fractions. Against abstract and mechanical oppositions made from quotations taken out of context, we situate the positions adopted by different currents, their debates and polemics, within their real historical context, inside the workers’ movement - in other words within the same camp. This is the method that marxism has already tried to apply. This is the very opposite of “Leninism”, which indeed is completely rejected by those who really follow Lenin’s example today. It is amusing to see that those who continue at least this aspect of the Stalinist “method” today, include precisely those who accuse the ICC of becoming “Leninist”!
The contemporary adepts of the “method” of “Leninism”, at least in this respect, can easily be identified in different milieus. It is fashionable among the anarcho-councilists, and amongst the parasitic elements, to try - fraudulently - to appropriate the Dutch Left, and to oppose it to the other left fractions, and of course to Lenin. Just as Stalin and his “Leninism” betrayed Lenin, so these elements betray the tradition of the Dutch Left and its great figures like Anton Pannekoek - hailed with respect and admiration by Lenin in State and Revolution - or like Herman Gorter, who was swift to translate this marxist classic as early as 1918. Before becoming a councilist theoretician during the 1930s, Pannekoek was one of the foremost elements of the marxist wing of the 2nd International, alongside Luxemburg and Lenin. Because of his councilist critiques of the Bolsheviks from the 1930s onwards, it is easier to distort Pannekoek’s place in the workers’ movement than it is, for example, with Bordiga. Today, Pannekoek is the object of particular attention aimed at eradicating any memory of his membership of the Communist International, or of his enthusiastic and resolute support for the October Revolution. The Dutch and German Left, as much as the Russians and Italians within the CI, belong to the proletariat and to communism. In identifying our origins with all the left fractions that emerged from the CI, we are also using the method of the Dutch Left, like all the Lefts:
“The World War and the revolution which it has engendered have shown that there is only one tendency in the workers’ movement which really leads the workers towards communism. Only the extreme left of the social-democratic parties, the marxist fractions, the party of Lenin in Russia, of Bela Kun in Hungary, of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany, have found the one correct path.
The tendency which always aimed at the violent destruction of capitalism, which in the evolutionary period used the political struggle and parliamentary action for revolutionary propaganda and to organise the proletariat, is today using state power for the revolution. The same tendency has also found the means to break the capitalist state, to transform it into a socialist state, and to build communism: the workers’ councils, which contain within themselves all political and economic forces; the same tendency, finally, has discovered and established forever what the class did not know until now: the organisation by which the working class can overthrow and replace capitalism”.[11] [717]
Even after the KAPD was excluded from the CI in 1921, it tried to remain faithful to its principles, and in solidarity with the Bolsheviks:
“Despite the exclusion of our tendency from the Moscow Congress, we remain in complete solidarity with the Russian Bolsheviks (...) We remain in solidarity not just with the Russian proletariat, but also with its Bolshevik leaders, even though we must vigorously criticise their behaviour within international communism”.[12] [718]
In defending the unity and continuity of, and tracing our origins “to the successive contributions of the Communist League of Marx and Engels (1847-52), the three Internationals (the International Workingmen’s Association, 1864-72, the Second International, 1889-1914, the Communist International, 1919-28), the left fractions which detached themselves from the degenerating Third International in the years 1920-30, in particular the German, Dutch and Italian Lefts”,[13] [719] the ICC is remaining faithful to the marxist tradition within the workers’ movement. In particular, it is part of the constant and unified struggle of the “tendency” defined by Gorter: the left fractions within the Second and Third Internationals. In this sense, we are faithful to Lenin, to Rosa Luxemburg, to Pannekoek and Gorter, and to the tradition of the left fractions during the 1930s, Bilan first and foremost.
Faithful to the left fractions who fought Stalinism in the most difficult conditions, we reject any accusation of “Leninism”. And we also denounce our accusers: they use the same method as Stalin to identify “Leninism” with Lenin. Ever armed with the Stalinist “method”, they do not even try to base their accusations on real, concrete evidence - such as our written or verbal positions - but rather on hear-say and lies. They claim that our organisation has become a sect, and is degenerating, in order to drive away all those elements who are trying to find a consistent revolutionary political perspective. The accusation is all the more slanderous, in that behind “Leninism” hides the accusation of Stalinism, when it is not declared outright.
The denunciation of our supposed “Leninism” is essentially based on tittle-tattle concerning our internal functioning, in particular on the claimed impossibility of debate within the organisation. We have already answered these accusations,[14] [720] and will not return to them here. Suffice it to return the compliment, after we have shown who are the real followers of the non-marxist, falsely revolutionary, “Leninist” method.
Once we have rejected the accusation of “Leninism”, a much more serious accusation remains: have we abandoned our critical spirit towards Lenin on the question of political organisation? Has the ICC changed position on Lenin, specifically as far as the role and functioning of the political organisation and the party is concerned? For our part, we see no discontinuity in the ICC’s position on Lenin and the organisational question between our beginnings in the 1970s, and 1999.
We stand alongside Lenin in the struggle against economism and Menshevism. This is nothing new. We are in agreement with the method used and the critique developed against economism and the Mensheviks. And we consider that we agree also with most of the different points developed by Lenin. There is nothing new here.
We maintain our criticism of some of Lenin’s positions on the organisation question: “Some of the ideas defended by Lenin (notably in One step forward, two steps back) on the hierarchical and “military” nature of the organisation, which have been exploited by Stalinists to justify their methods, are to be rejected”.[15] [721] We have not changed position on these criticisms either. However, the question deserves an answer in greater depth, both to understand the real extent of Lenin’s mistakes and to understand the historical significance of the debates within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP).
This question is a central one for revolutionaries, and to treat it seriously - including Lenin’s errors - we must remain faithful to the method and lessons of the different communist lefts, as we have emphasised in the first part of this article. We refuse to pick out the bits we like in the workers’ movement and ignore the bits we dislike. Such an attitude is a-historical, and worthy only of those who presume to judge, 100 years on, a historical process made of hesitations, successes and failures, numerous debates and contributions, at the price of immense sacrifice and difficult political struggle. This is true for theoretical and political questions. It is equally true for questions of organisation. The fact that Plekhanov turned chauvinist in World War I and ended as a Menshevik, that Trotsky ended up in “Trotskyism”, or that Pannekoek ended in councilism, deprives their political and theoretical contributions of none of their richness, relevance, or militant interest. The shameful deaths of the Second and Third Internationals, the Bolshevik party’s end in Stalinism, in no way diminish either their role in the history of the workers’ movement, or the validity of their organisational gains.
Have we changed our opinion on this? Not in the least: “There exist organisational gains just as there are theoretical gains, and one conditions the other in a permanent way”.[16] [722]
Just as Rosa Luxemburg’s criticism of the Bolsheviks in The Russian Revolution must be situated within the context of the class unity between her and the Bolsheviks, so our criticisms of Lenin on the organisational question must be placed in the framework of our unity with Lenin in his struggle - both before and after the formation of the Bolshevik fraction, for the construction of the party. This position is not new, and there is nothing surprising about it. Today, as we “repeated” in 1991, “we reaffirm[17] [723] that “the history of the fractions is the history of Lenin”[18] [724] and that only on the basis of the work that they accomplished will it be possible to reconstruct tomorrow’s world communist party”.[19] [725]
Does this mean that our understanding of the revolutionary organisation has remained unchanged since the formation of the ICC? Does it mean that our understanding has not been enriched, deepened, during the debates and organisational struggles that the ICC has been through? If this were the case, then the ICC could stand accused of being a lifeless organisation without internal debate, a sect content with reciting the holy texts of the workers’ movement. This is not the place to go back over all the ICC’s organisational debates and struggles since its formation. On each occasion - if the ICC were not to be weakened or even liquidated - we have had to return to the study of the “organisational gains” of the workers’ movement, to reappropriate, sharpen, and enrich them.
But the reappropriation and enrichment that we have accomplished on the organisational question does not mean that we have changed our general position on this question, nor even our position on Lenin. The work we have done lies in continuity with history, and with the organisational legacy of the workers’ movement. We defy anyone to show that there has been a break in our position. The organisational question is as political as any other. Indeed, we consider that it is the central question which, in the final analysis, determines the ability to deal with all other theoretical and political questions. In this, we are in accord with Lenin. In this, our position remains the same one that we have always defended. We have always maintained that it was greater clarity on the organisational question, especially on the role of the fraction, that made it possible for the Italian Left not only to survive as an organisation, but even to be able to draw the clearest and most coherent theoretical and political lessons - including by taking up and developing the initial contributions of the Dutch and German Lefts - on the trades unions, state capitalism, and the state in the transitional period.
The ICC has always identified with the struggle of the Bolsheviks on the organisational question. Their example lay behind our insistence that “The idea that a revolutionary organisation builds itself voluntarily, consciously, with premeditation, far from being a voluntarist idea is on the contrary one of the concrete results of all marxist praxis”.[20] [726]
In particular, we have always declared our support for Lenin’s fight against economism. In the same way, we have always supported his struggle against those who were to become the Mensheviks at the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP. This is not new. Nor is it new that we consider What is to be done? (1902) as an essential work in the fight against economism, and One step forward, two steps back (1903) as a vital text in understanding what was at stake and along what lines the RSDLP split. It is nothing new for us to affirm that these two texts are classics of marxism, and that the main lessons that Lenin draws in them are still relevant today. To say that we agree with the struggle, the method used, and many of the arguments given in both texts in no way diminishes our criticism of Lenin’s errors.
What was essential in What is to be done? in the context of the time, in the Russia of 1902? What made it possible to take a step forward for the workers’ movement? What side should we have taken? The side of the economists, because Lenin repeats Kautsky’s incorrect conception of class consciousness? Or Lenin’s side, against the economist obstacle to the formation of a coherent organisation of revolutionaries?
What was essential in One step forward, two steps back? To side with the Mensheviks because Lenin, in the heat of the polemic, defended false ideas on certain points? Or to side with Lenin for the adoption of rigorous membership criteria, for a unified and centralised party against the continued existence of autonomous circles?
In this case, to pose the question is to answer it. Lenin himself corrected his mistakes on consciousness and the vision of a “militarised” party, especially after the experience of the 1905 mass strike in Russia. The existence of a Bolshevik fraction and a rigorous organisation gave the Bolsheviks the means to draw the most fruitful political lessons from 1905, although they were less clear at the outset on the dynamic of the mass strike, especially in comparison to Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, or even Plekhanov. It allowed them to overcome their previous mistakes.
What were Lenin’s mistakes? Some were linked to his polemics. Others were concerned with theoretical questions, especially on class consciousness.
Lenin’s defects were those of his qualities. A great polemicist, he would “twist the bar” (exaggerate) by taking up his opponents’ arguments and turning them around against their authors. “We all know now that the economists twisted the bar one way. To straighten it, I had to twist it in the opposite direction, which I did”.[21] [727] But this method, which is very effective in polemic and in clearly polarising the argument - vital in any debate - also has its limitations, and can become a weakness. By “twisting the bar”, Lenin exaggerated and deformed his real positions. What is to be done? illustrates the point, as he himself recognised:
“At the 2nd Congress, I had no notion of setting up my formulations in What is to be done? as special principles or “programmatic points”. On the contrary, I used the expression “straightening what has been twisted”, which was to be so extensively quoted afterwards. In What is to be done? I said that we had to correct everything that had been distorted (“twisted”) by the “economists” (...) The meaning of these words is clear: What is to be done? corrects economism polemically, and it would be wrong to judge the pamphlet from any other standpoint”.[22] [728]
Unfortunately, there are many today who judge What is to be done? and One step forward, two steps back “from another standpoint”, concerned more with the letter of the text than its spirit. There are many who take Lenin’s exaggerations literally. First, there were his contemporary critics, amongst them Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg who answered the second work in The organisation question in Russian social-democracy (1904). Twenty years later, the Stalinists used these words to justify “Leninism” and the Stalinist dictatorship, on the basis of these unfortunate formulations used in the heat of the polemic. When Lenin is accused of being dictatorial, bureaucratic, of Jacobinism, or preaching military discipline and a conspiratorial vision, out of a narrow spirit of party struggle, he takes up his opponents’ terms and develops them, “twisting the bar” in his turn. He is accused of having a conspiratorial view of the organisation when he defends the need for strict membership criteria, and for discipline in the conditions of repression and illegality? This is his response, as a polemicist:
“According to its form a strong revolutionary organisation of that kind in an autocratic country may also be described as a “conspirative” organisation, because the French word “conspiration” means in Russian “conspiracy”, and we must have the utmost conspiracy for an organisation of that kind. Secrecy is such a necessary condition for such an organisation that all the other conditions (number and selection of members, functions, etc) must all be subordinated to it. It would indeed be extremely naïve, therefore, to fear the accusation that we Social-Democrats desire to create a conspirative organisation. Such an accusation would be as flattering to every opponent of Economism as the accusation of being followers of Naro-dovolism[23] [729] would be”.[24] [730]
In his reply to Rosa Luxemburg (1904), which Kautsky and the German SPD leadership refused to publish, he denied being the source of the formulations that he adopted:
“Comrade Luxemburg says that according to me, “The Central Committee is the only active nucleus of the Party”. In reality, this is not exact. I have never defended such an opinion (...) Comrade Luxemburg writes that I preach the educational value of the factory. This is inexact: it was not me, but my adversary who claimed that I identify the Party with a factory. I derided my opponent appropriately by using his own words to demonstrate that he confused two aspects of factory discipline, which is unfortunately also the case with comrade Luxemburg”.[25] [731]
By contrast, it is much more important to criticise a theoretical error by Lenin in What is to be done?. According to Lenin, “We said that there could not yet be Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without”.[26] [732] We will not here go back over our criticism and our position on the question of consciousness.[27] [733] It is obvious that this position - which Lenin adopted from Kautsky - is not only false but extremely dangerous. It was to justify the party’s exercise of power in the place of the working class after October 1917. It was later to serve as an effective weapon of Stalinism, in particular in justifying the putschist uprisings in Germany in the 1920s, and above all in justifying the bloody repression of the working class in Russia.
Do we really need to point out that our position on this question remains unchanged?
Lenin had to confront much criticism after the RSDLP’s 2nd Congress and the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Plekhanov and Trotsky were the only ones to reject explicitly the position that class consciousness “could only be brought from without”. The best-known critique was Rosa Luxemburg’s Organisation question in Russian social-democracy, which is used by today’s detractors of Lenin to... set the two great militants against each other and prove that the Stalinist worm was already present in the “Leninist” fruit. This, in other words, is the Stalinist lie turned on its head. In fact, Luxemburg deals mainly with the exaggerated positions (the “twisted bar”), and develops ideas which although correct in themselves remain abstract and detached from the real, practical struggle that took place at the Congress.
“Comrade Luxemburg sublimely ignores our party struggles, and discourses at length on questions which it is impossible to treat seriously (...) The comrade does not want to know what positions I upheld at the Congress, nor against whom my theses were directed. She prefers to treat me to a lesson on opportunism... in the countries of parliamentary democracy!”.[28] [734]
One step forward, two steps back clearly highlights what was at stake at the Congress, and in the struggle that took place there: the struggle against the continued existence of circles in the party, and for a clear and rigorous demarcation between the working class and the political organisation. Although she failed to appreciate the way they were posed concretely, Luxemburg remained clear as to the general aims:
“How to effect a transition from the type of organisation characteristic of the preparatory stage of the socialist movement - usually featured by disconnected local groups and clubs, with propaganda as a principal activity - to the unity of a large, national body suitable for concerted political action over the entire vast territory ruled by the Russian state? That is the specific problem which the Russian social-democracy has mulled over for some time”.[29] [735]
When we read this passage, it is clear that Luxemburg shared Lenin’s aims, and stood on the same ground. Considering the “centralist”, “authoritarian” even, position of both Luxemburg and Leo Jogisches in the Polish social-democracy - the SDKPiL - there can be no doubt that had she been a member of the RSDLP, she would have taken part in the fight against the circles and the Mensheviks. Lenin would surely have been obliged to rein in her energy, perhaps even her excesses.
As for us, today almost a century later, our position on the precise distinction between the political and unitary organisations of the working class comes to us from the Socialist International, and especially from the advances achieved by Lenin. In effect, he was the first - in the particular situation of Tsarist Russia - to pose the conditions for the development of a small minority organisation, whereas the replies of both Trotsky and Luxemburg were still governed by the idea of the mass party. Similarly, it is from Lenin’s struggle against the Mensheviks on Point 1 of the Statutes at the RSDLP’s 2nd Congress that we draw our rigorous and clearly defined position on membership of the communist organisation. Finally, we consider that this Congress and Lenin’s activity in it represent a high point in the theoretical and political development of the organisation question, especially on the issue of centralisation against federalist, individualist, and petty-bourgeois ideas. While recognising the positive part played by the circles in the initial regroupment of revolutionary forces, this is the point where it was necessary to go beyond this stage, and to form real unified organisations, to develop political relationships based on fraternity and mutual confidence among all the militants.
We have not changed our position on Lenin. Our basic organisational principles, especially our Statutes, which are based on and synthesise the experience of the workers’ movement on the question, are extensively inspired by the contributions made by Lenin in his struggle for the organisation. Without the experience of the Bolsheviks on the organisational question, there would be a large gap in the ICC’s organisational foundations, and in those of the communist party of tomorrow.
In the second part of this article, we will return to what is said, and what is not said, in What is to be done?, whose aim and contents have been and are largely ignored, or intentionally distorted. We will show that Lenin’s work is a real classic of marxism, and a historical contribution to the workers’ movement, on the level of both consciousness and organisation. In short, how far the ICC identifies also with What is to be done?.
RL
[1] [736] See for example, the text Prise de position sur l’évolution récente du CCI by RV, one of our ex-militants, which we have published in our pamphlet La prétendue paranoia du CCI.
[2] [737] See our “Theses on political parasitism” in International Review no.94.
[3] [738] Quoted by Trotsky in My Life.
[4] [739] It is worth recalling once again Lenin’s own words on the attempts to recuperate the great revolutionary figures: “After their death, they are turned into inoffensive icons, canonised we might almost say, and their “name” enrobed in a certain glory to “console” and mystify the oppressed classes; their revolutionary doctrine is thus stripped of its “content”, its revolutionary edge is blunted, it is debased (...) Germany’s bourgeois savants, who only yesterday specialised in the demolition of marxism, today talk more and more of a “national-German” Marx”. And the Stalinists talk about a “national Great-Russian” Lenin, we might add.
[5] [740] Boris Souvarine, Staline, Editions Gérard Lebovici 1985, p.311.
[6] [741] idem, p.312.
[7] [742] Thesis 8 on Bolshevisation, 5th Congress of the Communist International.
[8] [743] Bilan no.39, the theoretical bulletin of the Italian fraction of the Communist Left, January 1937.
[9] [744] “The Russian Revolution”, in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Pathfinder Press, 1970.
[10] [745] Bilan no.39, 1937.
[11] [746] Herman Gorter, “The victory of marxism”, published in Il Soviet 1920, and reprinted in Invariance no.7, 1969.
[12] [747] Anton Pannekoek in Die Aktion no.11-12, quoted in our book on the Dutch Left.
[13] [748] From the Basic Positions published on the back of every one of our publications.
[14] [749] See the article on our 12th Congress: “The political strengthening of the ICC” in International Review no.90.
[15] [750] “Report on the structure and functioning of the organisation of revolutionaries” to the International Conference of the ICC, January 1982, in International Review no.33.
[16] [751] “Report on the question of the organisation of our International Communist Current”, International Review no.1, April 1975.
[17] [752] We cannot resist the temptation to quote one of our ex-militants who today accuses us of being “Leninist”: “By contrast, we should salute Rosa Luxemburg’s lucidity (...) and the Bolsheviks’ ability to organise as an independent fraction with its own means of intervention within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. This is why they were in the proletariat’s vanguard in the revolutionary struggles at the end of World War I” (RV, “Continuity of the proletariat’s political organisations”, in International Review no.50, 1987).
[18] [753] Intervention by Bordiga at the 6th extended Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1926.
[19] [754] Introduction to our article on “The relationship between fraction and party in the marxist tradition”, Part III, International Review no.65.
[20] [755] “Report on the question of the organisation of our International Communist Current”, International Review no.1, April 1975.
[21] [756] Proceedings of the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, Edition Era, 1977.
[22] [757] Lenin, “Preface to the anthology On 12 Years”, September 1907, Edition Era, 1977.
[23] [758] From “Narodnaya Volya”, one of the secret organisations of the Russian terrorist movement in the 1870s.
[24] [759] In One step forward, two steps back.
[25] [760] What is to be done?, Lenin’s emphasis, chapter on “Conspirative” Organisation and “Democracy”, in Essential Works of Lenin, Bantam Books, 1971.
[26] [761] What is to be done?, chapter on “The beginning of the spontaneous revival”
[27] [762] See our pamphlet Communist organisations and class consciousness.
[28] [763] Lenin’s answer to Rosa Luxemburg, op. cit.
[29] [764] “Organisational question of social-democracy”, in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Pathfinder Press, 1970.
Between 16th and 19th December 1998, Iraq was hit by more cruise missiles than during the entire 1991 Gulf War. After threats which were not followed up in February and November 1998, the US has unleashed a new hell on an Iraqi population which has already been subjected to the terrible war of 1991 and the sanctions that followed, bringing in their wake famine, disease, and an intolerable poverty. When the Russian bloc collapsed in 1989, US President Bush announced "a new world order of peace and prosperity". Since then, we have seen increasing chaos, still more war, and an unprecedented chaos, still more war, and an unprecedented spread of poverty throughout the world. The recent bombing of Iraq has only added to the list. They also confirm what we wrote in the following article, which was completed before the last bombardment: "A bloody spiral of destruction in which the force employed by the US in defence of its authority tends to become more frequent and massive, the political results of these efforts more questionable, the generalisation of chaos and militarism more certain, the abandonment of common rules of the game more pronounced".
As the article demonstrates, the US is increasingly forced to act on its own account, without bothering to obtain the agreement of the UN, supposedly the guardian of "international law". This time, the bombing began during TV prime time in America, while the Security Council was still in session to examine the report drawn up by Richard Butler, head of UNSCOM, which was supposed to have been the pretext for the US intervention. This report is now notorious for being stuffed with lies, completely in contradiction with another report examined at the same time, drawn up by the International Atomic Energy Commission and which came to the conclusion that Iraq had complied with the UN�s decisions (1). The decidedly unenthusiastic reaction of the USA�s "allies" (with the exception of Britain (2)), including in particular Kofi Annan, to the US coup is a clear illustration that the American government has come rounund to a position long since adopted by a substantial part of the US bourgeoisie, represented especially by the Republican Party: undertaking unilaterally those interventions considered necessary to uphold US hegemony, rather than trying to obtain the agreement of other powers or of the UN (in order to hold them hostage). This disagreement within the US bourgeoisie as to the best means to uphold an increasingly beleaguered US hegemony in the world allows us to explain the "Monicagate" affair. In this sense, the abundance of "analyses" published in the press of other countries, explaining US strikes by Clinton�s desire to put off his impeachment, is solely intended to discredit US foreign policy by presenting it as sowing death and destruction to serve the president�s own sordid self-interest. In fact, Clinton did not launch unilateral strikes on Iraq because of Monicagate, rather there was a Monicagate because Clinton failed to adopt this line earlier, notably in February 1998. However, as the article that follows demonstrates, this new orientation of US policy will not be able to alter the essential given of international relations: growing chaos, and repeated use of armed force by the US to enforce its continually declining authority. Already, we can see that the only real success achieved by the American government is to have sabotaged the military rapprochement between Britain and the other European countries. As for the rest, the US strikes have only strengthened Saddam Hussein, while the diplomatic failure of Clinton�s journey to Israel and Palestine only highlights the limited success of the Wye Plantation agreement.
According to the bourgeois media, the year 1998 ended with an important strengthening of peace, international collaboration and the defence of human rights in the world. In the Persian Gulf, the threat of American and British force - backed up this time by the "international community" - imposed on Iraq the continuation of arms inspections aimed at removing weapons of mass destruction from the "irresponsible hands" of the bloody dictator Saddam Hussein. In the Middle East, the American sponsored "peace process" - on the verge of collapse - was salvaged by the Wye Plantation Agreement, through which US President Clinton, thanks to "endless hours of patient persuasion" pushed Arafat and Netanyahu to begin implementing parts of the "Oslo Agreement" based on the celebrated formula "land for peace". In the Balkans, NATO - again through the threat of violence - put an end to open, large scale military operations between Serbian and Kosovo-Albanian forces and imposed a fragile cease fire to be patrolled by international "observers for peace". And at the end of the year, U.S. and South African diplomacy launched a new offensive claimed to be capable of ending the war in the Congo, while the French President Chirac was even reready to shake the hand of the "Congolese dictator" Kabila at the Francophone African Summit in Paris, allegedly in pursuit of the same goal.
Has the bourgeoisie - at the end of a century during which it smashed the Communist International and turned the world into a gigantic imperialist slaughterhouse - begun to rule society according to the peace keeping charter of the United Nations and the humanitarian principles of Amnesty International? The propaganda of the ruling class, whether concerning the democratic crusade against Pinochet or the alleged peace established in The Middle East or in the Balkans, does all it can to place the imperialist conflicts of the present in this deceptive light. But the reality of these conflicts reveals exactly the opposite: the aggravation of the militarist barbarism of a capitalist system in agony, the continuing explosion of the imperialist struggle of each against all, the growing necessity for the USA to employ military force in defence of its global authority.
Behind the imposition of the "authority of the United Nations" (UN) on Iraq, the imposition of "negotiations" between Serbia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), or of "land for peace" on the Israeli and Palestinian bourgeoisie, there lies the counter-offensive of American imperialism, against the global undermining of its authority. In reality, America has imposed itself in Iraq and in Kosovo precisely througrough a demonstrative disregard for the "rules" and "authority" of the United Nations, which in the past years has been increasingly employed against American interests.
This in turn marks an important turning point in American policy towards the rest of the world, towards a more aggressively "unilateral" pursuit of its national interests. It was the USA itself which, in preparing a new military strike against Iraq in November, threw in the dustbin of history the charade of "unity" and "international legality" of the UN so dear to the heart of bourgeois propaganda. This was not always the US position. After the collapse of the world order of Yalta with the disintegration of the Russian imperialist bloc, it was the USA itself- at the height of its authority as the sole remaining world power - which used the UN and its Security Council to force the Gulf War on the rest of the world. By luring Saddam into invading Kuwait, Washington was able to present this war as a necessary defence of "international law" (which in class society has always been the right of the strongest), legitimised by the "international community". Saddam was trapped: he could not pull out of Kuwait without a fight, as this might have led to the fall of his regime. But with Saddam, the rest of the imperialist world, and above all the other main powers of the now the now defunct Western bloc were also trapped: obliged to take part in or pay for a war aimed in reality at crushing their ambitions towards a greater independence from the USA.
A year ago Iraq, having drawn the lessons of the Gulf War, turned the tables by itself using the UN and its Security Council against America. As opposed to the question of the occupation of Kuwait, Saddam now placed at the centre of the new Gulf crisis the obstruction of the UN armaments inspections: a secondary question which made it difficult for Washington to justify a common military action, and easy for Iraq to back down at any moment. This time the US, not Iraq was trapped, enabling the allies and advisors of Baghdad in the Security Council, France and Russia, and the UN Secretary General Annan to implement a "diplomatic solution", the main result of which was to prevent the deployment of American and British armed force, and thus humiliate the world�s leading power. This was the high point to date in the undermining of the authority of the sole remaining super-power, which already became manifest soon after the Gulf War when a recently re-united Germany sponsored the independence of Croatia and Slovenia and thus the break-up of Yugoslavia, against the will of Washington.
It is in response to this undermining of its leadership that the American counter-offensive is now responding, shaking off the shackle represented by the UN iUN in the process. In an attempt to shake off the embargo against Iraq and profit from the conflict of interest within the UN Security Council, Saddam again deployed the obstruction of the arms inspections in order to provoke a crisis, and again backed down at the last moment to prevent an American military strike. But this time Saddam had to back down so fast and under such humiliating circumstances, that the outcome of this crisis was undoubtedly a strengthening of America�s authority world wide. The difference this time was that the US, as opposed both to the Gulf War and to the crisis a year ago, no longer gave a damn about getting permission to strike from the UN. The "sympathy" and "understanding" which the other major powers showed for Washington�s "impatience with Saddam" - presented by bourgeois propaganda as a revival of the spirit of unity among the "great democracies" - is explained solely by the fact that the US was visibly no longer in the mood to be stopped by anybody. Openly criticising the aggressive American policy under such circumstances, while lacking the concrete means to obstruct it, would for the other powers have been equivalent to publicly sharing in the humiliation imposed on Saddam.
Long before the Iraq crisis of last year, the use of the UN against Washington was already clearly demonstrated by the different military conflictconflicts in ex-Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Here already, the principle big power backers of Serbia - Britain, France and Russia - used the UN in order to prevent the United States, for as long as possible, from playing a leading role, especially in the Bosnian conflict. And this is why, when the USA finally succeeded (momentarily) in imposing its authority on its European rivals in Bosnia via military strikes and the Dayton Agreement, this was done, not through the UN but through NATO, once the specific military organisation of the US imperialist bloc, and the one which Washington is still able to dominate. Alongside its show of might in the Gulf, the threat of a NATO military intervention in Kosovo and the rest of Serbia under US leadership constituted the second pillar of the American counter-offensive in defence of its leadership. The principle American success was not that it obliged Milosevic to withdraw troops from Kosovo: in reality Washington allowed the Serb army to remain there long enough to severely weaken the German backed Kosovo-Albanian KLA. Its success lay above all in obliging its pro-Serb NATO ex-Allies Britain and France to line up in support of its intervention threat against Serbia - a repetition of its success in Bosnia and, as far as France is concerned, during the Gulf War. Just like Saddam, Milosevic had to back down on time to prevent American missiles raining on his head. And here again (as with Iraq), the anti-American strategy of demanding a UN Security Council mandate for the use of military force against Serbia, a card openly played in the Kosovo crisis above all by Russia, was foiled by Washington�s newly pronounced "unilateralism". In view of the coming winter and the homelessness of the war refugees in Kosovo, declared Clinton, there could no longer be any question of the world�s leader waiting for "permission" to strike from the UN, Russia or anybody else.
The United Nations, like its predecessor the League of Nations, is not a peace-keeping organisation uniting the capitalist powers under a common international law, but an imperialist den of thieves, the role of which is completely determined by the balance of power between the main capitalist rivals. It is precisely for this reason that the evolution of the policy of the USA towards the UN is not without significance. During the Cold War the UN, strictly divided between the two imperialist blocs, mainly served bourgeois pacifist propaganda, although it could sometimes be used by the Western bloc with its clear majority among the permanent members of the Security Council (composed of the winning powers from World War II). After 1989, the capacity of the USA to exploit the UN for its own interests was to prove short-lived. Tlived. The Gulf War, that dramatic demonstration of the superiority of the US over the rest of the imperialist world, was quickly followed by the explosion of "every man for himself" in the relations between capitalist states, and thus the undermining of US leadership. Since, in a world without imperialist blocs, chaos and "every man for himself" inevitably became the dominant tendency in the world, the UN itself inevitably began to be used to undermine American authority. This is why the American bourgeoisie, throughout the 1990s, has taken an increasingly hostile stance towards that organisation, regularly refusing to pay its membership fees. Nevertheless, until the present American offensive, the Clinton Administration hesitated to write off the United Nations as a possible instrument for the mobilisation of other powers behind itself. Indeed, the dissatisfaction of important parts of the American bourgeoisie in the face of these hesitations partly explains the recent pressure on Clinton through the Lewinsky Affair. Present US policy towards Iraq and Serbia shows that the US has indeed been obliged to pursue much more of a "go it alone" policy than at the time of the Gulf War or even Dayton. In reality, this policy is the admission by the world�s super-power itself that the dominant trend is towards every man for himself, not American leadership. Of course, when the United States sets its armed forces in motion, there is no power in the world capable of opposing it. But in so doing the US, while enhancing its status as first power, will only undermine its own leadership, and increase international chaos.
By tossing aside the rules of the game of the UN, Washington has effectively rendered this dinosaur from the end of the last World War more or less irrelevant. But this development will benefit not only America, but also its most important rivals: the vanquished powers of World War II, Germany and Japan, both excluded from the Security Council. More important: from now on NATO itself will become the most important political body within which the rivalries between the ex-allies of the Western Bloc will be fought out. It was not least in response to the imposition of US policy towards Kosovo via the NATO that Germany�s new foreign minister Fischer called for a renunciation of the alliance�s first strike nuclear strategy (3), and that Blair at the summit meeting with the French government in St. Malo officially committed Britain to what is called "strengthening the European pillar of NATO" - at the expense of America of course. This represents a raising of the stakes in the conflict between the great powers. NATO, like the UN, is a left over from a past world order. But it is a much more important remnant, still representing the main instrument of America�s military presence in Europe.
But if the threat of war against Saddam and Milosevic is an expression, not of unity but rivalry between the great powers, surely the Wye Plantation Agreement between Clinton, Netanyahu and Arafat is a triumph of peaceful persuasion, warmly welcomed in Europe? In reality Wye, however modest and fragile the agreement between Israel and the PLO, is another victory for US imperialism, not least because the CIA has officially been charged with implementing part of it. Nor was the "persuasion" exercised by the USA quite so peaceful: the American military mobilisation in the Gulf at the same moment was intended, indirectly, as a warning to Netanyahu and Arafat as much as to Saddam. Above all, it was a warning to the European rivals of America not to poke their noses too closely into one of the strategically most important and explosive zones of the world, where America intends to maintain its dominance at all costs.
Such warnings are more than necessary. Despite the present US offensive, the struggle of the other powers to shake off American domination can only sharpen. Precisely because the US is militarily able to impose its interests at the expense of any other existing power, none of these other imperialisms have a basic interest in a further strengthening of the American position. This also goes for Britain, which has common interests with America in relation to Iraq, but oppos opposed interests in Europe, Africa, and not least in the Middle East. The other powers are condemned to contest the USA, whether they want to or not, thus plunging the world into barbarism. The US, as the sole possible representative of capitalist world order, is condemned to impose its order, thus plunging the world into barbarism. The basis of this contradiction is the absence of blocs. When blocs exist, the strengthening of the leader enforces the position of the other bloc members against the rival bloc. In the absence of such a rival, and thus of imperialist blocs, the strengthening of the leader contradicts the interest of the others. This is why the explosion of each for himself, as well as the counter-offensives of the US, are a given of the present historical situation. Today, as during the Gulf War, the US is on the offensive. Although no American missiles were fired against Iraq or Serbia this time, today�s situation represents not a repetition of the early 90s, but an escalation. A bloody spiral of destruction in which the force employed by the US in defence of its authority tends to become more frequent and massive, the political results of these efforts more questionable, the generalisation of chaos and militarism more certain, the abandonment of common rules of the game more pronounced. The rivalry between the "western democracies", the alleged "vanquishers of Communism" is at the very heart of this barbarism, which in the long term threatens the survival of humanity even without a Third World War. Understanding the essence of this imperialist barbarism must become part of the proletariat�s class consciousness and its determination to destroy the capitalist system.
6 December 1998
1)In fact, we have since learnt that the report was written in close collaboration with the US government. Nor is this the first time that the latter has produced falsified evidence to justify military action. For example, the 5th August 1964 attack on two US destroyers by the North-Vietnamese fleet, which served as the pretext for beginning the bombardment of North Vietnam, turned out afterwards to have been a pure fabrication. The technique is as old as war itself, and one of its best-known cases was the famous "Ems telegram" of 13th July 1870, which allowed Bismarck to push France into declaring war on Prussia - a war which the latter was sure of winning.
2)Although we should note that Blair�s support for US action was not unanimously approved by the British bourgeoisie, being severely criticised by much of the press.
3)Existing NATO strategy envisages being the first to use nuclear strikes.
From the Left Opposition's debate within the CI to the rejection of national liberation struggles by the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left.
However, the situation in China was also one of the questions which allowed the "Left Opposition" to structure itself, and the "Italian Left" (which published the review Bilan) to affirm itself politically as one of the most important currents within the international opposition, a current which in the years that followed developed an activity and a political reflection of inestimable value.
The mid-1920s were a crucial period for the working class and its revolutionary organisations. Could the revolution still develop and advance on a world level? If not, could the Russian revolution survive for long in its isolation? These were questions that preoccupied the communist movement, and the whole CI was hanging on the possibilities of the revolution in Germany. Since 1923, the policy 0 the CI had been to push for insurrection. Zinoviev, who was still its president, had totally underestimated the scale of the defeat in Germany[2]. He declared that it was merely an episode and that new revolutionary assaults were on the agenda in several countries. The CI clearly had a feeble political compass, and in trying to make up for the ebb of the revolutionary wave, it fell into an increasingly opportunist strategy. From 1923 onwards, Trotsky and the first Left Opposition denounced its grave errors and showed their tragic consequences, but did not go so far as to speak of treason. The degeneration of the CI gathered pace; at the end of 1925 the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin triumvirate came apart, and the CI was then under the leadership of Stalin and Bukharin. The "putschist" policy which had prevailed under Zinoviev was replaced by a policy based on the view that capitalism had entered a long phase of "stabilisation". This was the right wing course, which in Europe centred round the united front with the "reformist" parties[3]. In China the CI adopted a policy which went beyond even what the Mensheviks had advocated for the economically undeveloped countries. From 1925 onwards, it put forward the idea that what was on the agenda was the Kuomintang's policy and the bourgeois revolution: the communist revolution would have to come afterwards. This position ended up leading the Chinese workers to the slaughter.
In fact it was during the ultra-leftist, putschist period that the CI harassed the CCP into entering into the Kuomintang, which at the CI's 5th Congress was declared a "sympathising party" of the International (Pravda, 25 June 1924). It was a "sympathising" party that would be the gravedigger of the proletariat!
The Stalinised CI "considered the Koumintang to be an organ of the Chinese national revolution. The communists went en masse under the name and banner of the Kuomintang. This policy led to the communists entering the national government in March 1927. They were given the portfolios of Agriculture (after the party declared itself opposed to any agrarian revolution and in favour of "stopping the overly vigorous actions by the peasants"), and of Labour, in order to channel the working masses towards a policy of compromise and treason. The CCP July plenum also pronounced itself to be against the seizure of the land, against the arming of the workers and peasants - in other words, for the liquidation of the party and the class movements of the workers and for subjecting them totally to the Kuomintang, in order to avoid a break with the latter at any cost. All were in agreement with this criminal policy. From the right under Peng Chou Chek, to the centre under Chen Duxiu and the so-called left under Tsiou Tsiou-Bo" (Bilan no. 9, July 1934).
This opportunist policy, so brilliantly analysed by Bilan a few years later, having pushed the CCP to more or less dissolve into the Kuomintang, resulted in a terrible defeat for the Chinese workers: "on 26'h March, Chiang Kai-Chek began his coup by arresting a number of communists and sympathisers ... These facts were hidden from the Executive Committee of the CI, whereas much noise had been made about Chiang Kai-Chek's anti-imperialist speech at the Congress of Labour in 1926. The Kuomintang troops began their march towards the north. This would serve as a pretext for stopping the strikes in Canton, Hongkong, etc ... As the troops approached there was an uprising in Shanghai, the first between 19 and 24 February; the second, on 21 March, was victorious. Chiang Kai-Chek's troops only entered the city on 26 March. On 3 April, Trotsky wrote a warning against the 'Chinese Pilsudski'[4]. On 5 April Stalin declared that Chiang Kai-Chek had accepted discipline, that the Kuomintang was a kind of revolutionary bloc or parliament"[5].
"Following these events, the delegation of the Communist International, on 17 April, gave its support at Hunan to the 'left Kuomintang'[6], in which the communist ministers participated. There, on 15 July, there was a re-edition of the Shanghai coup. The victory of the counter-revolution was ensured. A period of systematic massacre followed: it was estimated discretely that 25, 000 communists were killed". And, in September 1927 "the new leadership of the CP ... fixed the insurrection for 13 December ... A soviet was set up from above. The uprising was brought forward to the 10 December. On the 13th, it was totally repressed. The second Chinese revolution had been definitively crushed"[7].
The defeat of the Chinese revolution represented the most severe condemnation of the strategy of the CI after the death of Lenin, and above all of the Stalinised CI.
In his letter to the VIth Congress of the CI, July 1928 (see The Third International After Lenin, Pathfinder Press, 1970), Trotsky wrote that the opportunist policy of the CI had first weakened the proletariat in Germany in 1923, then deceived it and betrayed it in Britain and finally in China. "Here are the immediate and indisputable causes of the defeats". And he went on "In order to grasp the significance of the present left turn[9], we have to have a complete view not only of the slide towards the general right-centrist line which was totally unmasked in 1926-27, but also of the previous ultra-left period of 1923-25 in preparing this slide".
In effect, the CI leadership had repeated over and over again in 1924 that the revolutionary situation was still developing and that "there would be decisive battles in the near future". "It was on the basis of this fundamentally false judgement that the Vth Cngress established its whole orientation, around the middle of 1924"[10]. The Opposition expressed its disagreement with this vision and "sounded the alarm"[11]. "In spite of the political reflux, the Vth Congress demonstrably oriented itself towards insurrection ... 1924 became the year of adventures in Bulgaria[12] and Estonia[13]". This ultra-leftism of 1924-25, "completely disoriented in front of the situation, was replaced by a right deviation"[14].
The Left Opposition stood against the line of a "bloc with the Kuomintang", maintained by Stalin and theorised by Bukharin and the ex-Menshevik Martynov. The problems debated were the role of the national bourgeoisie, of nationalism and the class independence of the proletariat.
This text was followed on 14th April by Zinoviev's Theses addressed to the Politburo of the CP of the USSR[17]. Here he reaffirmed Lenin's position on national liberation struggles, in particular that a Communist Party must not subordinate itself to any other party and that the proletariat must not stray onto the terrain of interclassism. He also reaffirmed the idea that "the history of the revolution has shown that any bourgeois democratic revolution, if it does not transform itself into a socialist revolution, inevitably lakes the path of reaction".
However, even if was defeated, the Opposition's combat within the CI was fundamental. It had an enormous international echo, in all the CPs. Above all, it is certain that without it, the present-day left communist currents would not exist. In China itself, where the Stalinists imposed a black-out on the texts of the Opposition, Chen Duxiu managed to send his Letter to all members of the CCP (he was excluded from the party in August 1929; his letter is dated 10 December of the same year), in which he took position against Stalin's opportunism on the Chinese question.
There was finally a regroupment after Trotsky was expelled from the USSR, a regroupment which took the name International Left Opposition (ILO), but this also failed to make use of many of the energies of the time.
pronounced in favour of the positions defended by Trotsky then those developed in his Letter to the VIth Congress of the CI in 1928. They even signed a joint declaration "To the communists of China and the whole world" (12 December 1930). Candiani[19] signed it in the name of the Italian Fraction.
While the ILO had been moving towards a clear understanding of the tasks of the hour, very quickly its uncritical political attachment to the first four congresses of the CI made it tilt towards opportunist positions as soon as the revolutionary tide patently went into retreat. This was not the same with the Italian Fraction which clearly differentiated itself on the three issues under debate concerning the colonial countries (national liberation struggles, democratic slogans and wars between imperialists in these countries).
Contrary to the theses of the IInd Congress of the CI, the Fraction adopted a Resolution on the Sino-Japanese conflict (February 1932), in which it posed this question in a radically new way for the workers' movement. It make a break with the classic position on national liberation struggles[20]:
It goes on: "The role of the proletariat is to struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat ...
During the course of the 1930s, the Fraction's position became even more precise, as can be seen from the Resolution on the Sino-Japanese conflict, December 1937 (Bilan 45):
Democratic Slogans
With the question of democratic slogans the same problem was being posed - that of national liberation struggles. Could there still be different programmes for the proletariat of the developed countries and for those where the bourgeoisie had not yet carried out its revolution?
"We said that in countries where capitalism had not established its economic and political leadership over society (the example of the colonies), the conditions existed - for a certain period - for a struggle by the proletariat for democracy. But we also insisted that this should not be defined in a vague way, that we had to be precise about the class basis for this struggle ... In the present situation of the mortal crisis of capitalism, this would be destined to precipitate the dictatorship of the party of the proletariat ...
To the second point belong above all the tasks of social transformation in the countryside.
... the political disagreement between our Fraction and the Russian left has expressed itself more clearly. But we have to be definite that this disagreement remains in the realm of tactics, as has been proved by a meeting between Bordiga and Lenin ..."
In Spain, the fact that the Opposition has adopted the political position of supporting the so-called democratic transformation of the state, has removed any possibility of a serious development in our section of the questions that relate to the resolution of the communist crisis.
Democratic slogans and the agrarian question
(...) A transformation (the liberation of the agrarian economy from the social relations of feudalism) of the economy of a country like Spain into an economy like the ones in the more advanced countries will coincide with the victory of the proletarian revolution. But this does not mean at all that capitalism cannot set out on the road towards this transformation ... The communist programmatic position must continue to fully reaffirm the demand for the 'socialisation of the land'":
"The institutional slogans of the colonial question
We want to deal here with the colonial countries, where, despite the industrialisation of an important part of the economy, capitalism still does not exist as a governing class in power"
The partial demands of the working class
The bourgeois parties and above all the social democracy insist particularly on the need to guide the masses towards the defence of democracy. They demand - and because of the lack of a communist party, have obtained this - that the workers abandon the struggle for the defence of wages and in general of the masses' living standards, as is now happening in Germany".
The imperialist war and the Chinese Trotskyists
In this domain, Trotsky ended up reneging on the positions he had defended in 1925-27, the ones he had defended in The International After Lenin (as well as in his declaration 'To the communists in China and the whole world' in 1930). At that time he had stood by the idea that the bourgeois solution of imperialist war must be opposed by the proletariat's struggle for its own revolutionary interests, since "the bourgeoisie has definitively gone over to the camp of the counter-revolution". In addressing the members of the Chinese Communist Party, he had added: "Your coalition with the bourgeoisie was correct up until 1924, even up to the end of 1927, but now it has no value".
Bilan violently attacked Trotsky's position in its Resolution on the Sino-Japanese conflict in February 1932.
The Fraction even published an article, in Bilan no. 46, January 1938, which was entitled "A great renegade with a peacock's tail: Leon Trotsky"[24].
At the end of this article it is important to note that only the Italian Fraction was able to develop the arguments which showed why national liberation struggles were no longer 'progressive' but had become counter-revolutionary in the present phase of the development of capitalism. It was the Gauche Communiste de France, and later on the ICC, who were to strengthen this position by giving it a solid theoretical foundation.
MR
[1] Zinoviev's Theses for the Politburo of the CP of the USSR, 14 April 1927.
[2] Cf. the articles in recent issues of the International Review on the German revolution. Trotsky wrote that the failure in 1923 in Germany was "a gigantic defeat" (The International after Lenin).
[3] The name given to the socialist or social democratic parties which had betrayed during the First World War.
[4] The Polish dictator who had just crushed the Polish working class: a founding member of the Polish Socialist Party which was a reformist and nationalist tendency.
[5] Trotsky in The International after Lenin.
[6] The existence of a "Left Koumintang" was a fable invented by the Stalinised CI.
[7] Harold Isaacs. The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution 1925-27
[8] Bilan no. 9 July 1934
[9] This was the term for the course followed by the CI after 1927
[10] Underlined by Trotsky himself
[11] idem, Trotsky
[12] An uprising which took place from the 19 to the 28 September before being crushed
[13] In December 1924 an uprising was organised involving 200 CP members. It was smashed in a matter of hours.
[14] ibid Trotsky
[15] At the end of 1925, the Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev triumvirate fell apart. An oppositional 'bloc' was formed called the United Opposition.
[16] We know today that this slogan wasn't adequate: Trotsky himself questioned its validity since the course was no longer favourable to revolution
[17] Theses which were to have been discussed at the future 7th Plenum of the CI and the 15th Congress of the CP of the USSR.
[18] This was what the opposition called "The Thermidor of the Russian revolution".
[19] Enrico Russo (Candiani), a member of the Executive Committee of the Italian Fraction
[20] Even today the Bordigist component has trouble taking up the position of the Fraction: for example it accuses the lCC's position of being "indifferentist".
[21] The only tendency which took up the same position as Italian and Belgian Fractions of the Communist Left was constituted by the Revolutionary Workers' League (known after the name of its representative, Oelher) and the Grupo de Trabajadores Marxistas (also known after its representative Eiffels).
[22] This referred to the "Aventin " tactic in which the CP withdrew from the parliament dominated by the fascists and regrouped at Aventin with the centrists and social-democrats. This policy was denounced as opportunist by Bordiga.
[23] This refers to the Stalinised CI and CPs.
[24] For our part, we consider that Trotsky did not betray the working class since he dies before the generalisation of the world war. This doesn't apply to the Trotskyists (Cf our pamphlet Le Trotskyisme contre la Classe Ouvierre).
The plunge into an open recession which will be still deeper than its predecessors - some are even talking of "depression" - is silencing the "experts’" talk about lasting economic growth. If the latter are to be believed, the domino collapse of the South-East Asian economies since summer 1997 should have been no more than a blip, without any great effect on the economies of the developed countries. Since then, a tidal wave has passed over countries from Russia to Brazil, from Venezuela to Japan, to strike the heart of the great capitalist powers: "the time has come for an agonising reappraisal". has come for an agonising reappraisal".
Perspectives for the main countries - Annual GDP in %
|
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
|||
OECD |
3.2 |
2.0 |
1.2 |
|||
US |
3.9 |
3.3 |
1.0 |
|||
Japan |
0.9 |
-3.0 |
-1.0 |
|||
Germany |
2.3 |
2.6 |
1.5 |
|||
France |
2.2 |
2.2 |
2.8 |
|||
Italy |
1.5 |
1.4 |
2.0 |
|||
UK |
3.3 |
2.3 |
0.8 |
|||
Spain |
3.0 |
3.6 |
3.1 |
|||
Holland |
3.3 |
3.3 |
2.4 |
|||
Belgium |
2.7 |
2.7 |
1.9 |
|||
Switzerland |
0.7 |
1.8 |
1.9 |
Between July and December 1998, at least $3.5 trillion have gone up in smoke as the stock markets collapsed: the equivalent to 12% of annual world production has been lost, half in the USA, the rest in Europe and Asia. In Japan, the state has decided to inject $520 billion "into its banks, in order to save them from sinking and to reanimate the world’s second economy". Everywhere, "analysts are revising abruptly downwards forecast company profits, just as the first massive redundancies are being announced". The self-satisfaction among the West European ruling classes at the launch of the euro can barely hide their deep anxiety. They are talking less and less about Europe’s supposedly "sheltered" status from the rest of the world economy. Everywhere, "the forecast of 2% growth for 1999, originally considered too pessimistic, may well turn out, on the contrary, very difficult to achieve".
All this would be laughable, were it not that the first to suffer the cost of this new and dramatic acceleration in the crisis will be the hundreds of millions of workers and unemployed, who willemployed, who will be plunged into growing poverty with no hope of a way out. The African continent has already been virtually abandoned to its fate, prey to the ravages of famine, disease, massacres, and constant "local" wars. Now it is the turn of the South-East Asian countries to be dragged down in the spiral of social decomposition sweeping all before it. In the USA, the losses on the stock exchange directly affect millions of workers whose savings and pension funds are invested in the stock market. In the developed countries, despite all the reassuring talk, the ruling class is unleashing new attacks against working class living conditions: cuts in wages and in all kinds of social benefits, "flexibility", lay-offs, "job cuts", savage cuts in health service budgets, housing and education; the list of measures being concocted in the "democratic" countries is a long one, as the bourgeoisie tries to save its profits in the world financial storm.
What is happening is neither a "healthy purge" nor a "readjustment", in the face of excessive speculation, which need simply be regulated to stave off disaster. Unbridled speculation is only a symptom of the dead-end in which the world economy finds itself. It is the result of the impossibility of countering the shrinking world market and the falling rate of profit. In a merciless trade war between all the world’s capitalists, the capital that cannot be invested in production because the inanadequacy of the market means that it would make a loss, takes refuge in a financial speculation which is all the more hazardous in that it corresponds, not to any production in the real economy, but simply to massive and generalised debt. The shattering failure of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund is a striking illustration: "Although this speculative fund only had $4.7 billion of capital, its debt had risen to $100 billion. According to some estimates, its total commitments on the market represented $1.3 trillion, almost the value of France’s GDP! A giddy rise in commitments involving some of the great names in world finance". We are certainly confronted with unbridled speculation. But those who today are outraged at "such practices" neglect, above all, to mention that these are the "normal" functioning of capitalism today. "All the great names of world finance" - banks, companies, private and state financial institutions - behave in the same way, following the instructions of the states which fix the rules of the game, and the advice of international organisms like the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and others, which can be summed up as "reduce the cost of labour by every means possible!".
With disaster at the heart of the industrialised world, the "experts" seem to have discovered the "damage" done by the "reduction in the state" and "globalisation" that for almost 20 years have been the main themes of p propaganda for a "rich, free, and prosperous" capitalism. During the same 20 years, the working class has learned to its cost what this propaganda is worth: a mystification to justify the attacks on workers’ living conditions, and a proliferation of measures intended to maintain the competitiveness of each national capital against its rivals in the economic war. Apart from its use against the working class, the defence of "less state" and "globalisation" has above all been a weapon of the powerful against the weak. The "less state" and the denunciation of "protectionism" by the North American bourgeoisie has not stopped the US increasing from 20% to 35% the proportion of imports subjected to draconian controls in the name of "safety" or "pollution", or any other alibi to hide its own protectionism. While the state has disposed of a whole series of responsibilities in the management of large companies, through privatisation, this does not mean that it has given up its prerogative of political control over the national capital, or that the framework of capitalist economic management has gone beyond national frontiers. Quite the contrary: "less state" was nothing but the form of each national capital’s necessary adaptation to the intensification of an economic war in which the state has always played the commanding role, hand in hand with the major companies. "Globalisation" was nothing but the imposition of rules for the same economic war, to give the great capitalist powers as much of a free hand as possible to pillage their rivals on the battleground of the world market. Today, the idea of "more state" is making a comeback in the bourgeoisie’s propaganda, especially on the part of Western Europe’s social-democratic governments, because the new acceleration of world capitalism’s inexorable bankruptcy has once again brought to the fore the elementary demands of capital: close ranks against each national capital to confront the competition and attack the living conditions of the working class.
After 30 years of descent into the abyss of economic crisis (whose main characteristics and moments of acceleration since the 1970s we summarise in the article that follows), today the heart of the capitalist "world economic order" is unsteady. Behind the international solidarity put forward to confront the "Asian crisis", and the apparent common desire to "rethink the international monetary system", or to "reinvent Bretton Woods", the bourgeoisie of the main industrialised countries has in fact been drawn into an ever sharper struggle of "each against all", a considerable reinforcement of state capitalism as the policy of determined defence of each national capital, whose main target in every country is the working class, and a flight into conflict as we can see from the sharpening imperialist tensions that we also deal with in this issue.
4 January 1999
Note: Sources for this article include L’Expansion [766], December 1998; World Bank [767], December 1998; Le Monde Diplomatique [768], "Anatomie d’une crise financière", November-December 1998.
The 20th century began with the entry of the capitalist system into its phase of decadence: with the First World War, and with the first world wide revolutionary storm of the proletariat which brought that war to a halt and opened the combat for a communist society. Already at that time, revolutionary marxism announced the alternative facing humanity - socialism or barbarism - and predicted that in the event of the failure of the revolution, the First World War would be followed by a second one, and by the greatest and most dangerous regression of human culture in the history of humanity. With the isolation and strangulation of the October revolution in Russia - the result of the defeat of the world revolution - the most profound counter-revolution in history triumphed for half a century. In 1968 a new undefeated generation of proletarians brought this counter-revolution to an end, and barred the road to the inherent culmination of capitalism’s descent into a third world war and the probable destruction of humanity. Twenty years later, Stalinism was toppled - not however by the proletariat, but as the result of the entry of the decadent capitalism into its final phase of decomposition.
Ten years on, the century is ending as it begun: with economic convulsions, imperialist conflicts and developing class struggles. The year 1999 especially is already marked by a considerable aggravation in imperialist conflicts, clearly shown by the NATO military offensive unleashed against Serbia at the end of March.
Today, a capitalism in its death throes is facing one of the most difficult and dangerous moments in modern history, comparable in gravity to that of the two world wars, to the outbreak of proletarian revolution in 1917-19, or to the Great Depression which began in 1929. But today, neither world war nor world revolution are pending in the foreseeable future. Rather, the gravity of the situation is conditioned by a sharpening of contradictions at all levels:
- imperialist tensions and the development of world disorder;
- a very advanced and dangerous moment in the crisis of capitalism;
- attacks against the world proletariat unprecedented since the last world war;
- and an accelerating decomposition of bourgeois society.
In this situation, so full of danger, the bourgeoisie has placed the reins of government in the hands of that political current best able to take care of its interests: Social Democracy, the current mainly responsible for crushing the world revolution after 1917-18. The current which saved capitalism at that time, and is now returning to the controls in order to defend the threatened interests of the capitalist class.
The responsibility weighing on the proletariat today is enormous. Only by developing its militancy and consciousness can it bring forth the revolutionary alternative which alone can secure the survival and the further ascent of human society. But the most important responsibility weighs on the shoulders of the communist left, the existing organisations of the proletarian camp. They alone can furnish the theoretical and historical lessons and the political method without which the revolutionary minorities emerging today cannot attach themselves to the preparation of the class party of the future. In some ways, the communist left finds itself in a similar situation today to that of Bilan in the 1930s, in the sense that it is obliged to understand a new and unprecedented historical situation. Such a situation requires both a profound attachment to the theoretical and historical approach of marxism, and revolutionary audacity in understanding situations which are not really covered by the schemas of the past. In order to fulfil this task, open debates between the existing organisations of the proletarian milieu are indispensable. In this sense, the discussion, clarification and regroupment, the propaganda and intervention of the small revolutionary minorities is an essential part of the proletarian response to the gravity of the world situation on the threshold of the next millennium.
Furthermore, faced with the unprecedented intensification of capitalist military barbarity, the working class demands of its communist vanguard the full assumption of its responsibilities in defence of proletarian internationalism. Today, the groups of the communist left are alone in defending the classic positions of the workers’ movement against imperialist war. Only the groups which belong to this current - the only one which did not betray during World War II - can give a class response to the questioning which is bound to appear within the working class.
The revolutionary groups must give as united a response as possible, thereby giving expression to the indispensable unity of the proletariat against the unleashing of chauvinism and conflicts between nations. In doing so, the revolutionaries will adopt the tradition of the workers’ movement which figured especially in the conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and in the policies of the left within these conferences.
Imperialist conflicts
1) The new war which has just broken out in ex-Yugoslavia with NATO’s bombardment of Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, is the most important event on the imperialist scene since the collapse of the Eastern bloc at the end of the 1980s. This is because:
- this war does not just concern a peripheral country, as was the case with the Gulf War in 1991, but a European one;
- this is the first time since World War II that a European country and its capital has been massively bombarded;
- this is the also first time since World War II that the main defeated country of World War II - Germany - has intervened by committing combat troops directly in battle;
- this war is an additional major step forward in the process of the destabilisation of Europe, with an immense impact on the exacerbation of worldwide chaos.
Thus, after the breakup of Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards, its main component, Serbia, is now itself threatened with disintegration, while at the same time the eventual disappearance of the remains of the old Yugoslav federation (Montenegro and Serbia) is looming on the horizon. More generally, the present war, notably through the massive arrival of refugees in Macedonia, is bringing with it a destabilisation of this country and threatens to involve Bulgaria and Greece which both have their own pretensions to be considered as its “godfathers”. The involvement of Greece also threatens to draw in Turkey, and thus to provoke a conflagration throughout the Balkans and much of the Mediterranean.
Moreover, the war which has just broken out is likely to create serious difficulties within a whole series of European bourgeoisies.
In the first place, the intervention of NATO against a traditional ally of Russia is for the bourgeoisie of this country a veritable provocation which threatens to destabilise it still further. On the one hand, it is clear that Russia no longer has the means to weigh on the world situation as soon as the great powers, and especially the USA, are involved. At the same time, a whole series of sectors within the Russia bourgeoisie are protesting at Russia’s present impotence, especially the ex-Stalinist and ultra-nationalist sectors, which will destabilise the country’s government even more. Moreover, the paralysis of the Moscow government’s authority can only incite the different republics of the Russian Federation to contest the central government.
Furthermore, although a real homogeneity exists within the German bourgeoisie in favour of intervention, other bourgeoisies such as the French may be affected by the contradiction between their traditional alliance with Serbia, and their participation in the NATO action. Similarly, bourgeoisies like the Italian bourgeoisie have reason to fear the repercussions of the present situation in the shape of a new influx of refugees from this part of the world.
2) One aspect which most emphasises the extreme gravity of the war taking place today is precisely the fact that it is happening at the heart of the Balkans, which since the beginning of the century has been seen as the powder-keg of Europe.
The war of 1914 was preceded by two Balkan wars, which already contained some of the premises of World War I. Above all, the first world slaughter began in the Balkans with Austria’s desire to tame Serbia, and Russia’s reaction in favour of its Serbian ally. The formation of the first Yugoslav state after World War I was an expression of the military defeat of Austria and Germany. In this sense it was, like the Versailles Treaty, one of the main points of friction which opened the way to World War II. During the war the different components of Yugoslavia lined up behind their traditional allies (Croatia with Germany, Serbia with the Allies); the reconstitution of the Yugoslav state after World War II, within frontiers very close to those of the first Yugoslav state, was once again a concretisation of the defeat of the German bloc and of the fact that the Allies intended to maintain a barrier to the ambitions of German imperialism in the direction of the Middle East.
In this sense, Germany’s very offensive attitude in the direction of the Balkans immediately after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, once there was no longer any need for solidarity against the USSR (an attitude which stimulated the break-up of Yugoslavia with the formation of the independent states of Slovenia and Croatia), highlighted the fact that this region was becoming once again a major theatre of confrontation between the imperialist powers in Europe.
Today, a further factor in the seriousness of the situation is that, contrary to the First or even the Second World Wars, the USA now has a definite military presence in this part of the world. The world’s greatest power could not remain outside one of the major theatres of imperialist confrontation in Europe and the Mediterranean. It has thus demonstrated its intention to be present in all the crucial zones of confrontation between different imperialist interests.
3) Although the Balkans are an epicentre of imperialist tension, the form of the present war (all the NATO countries against Serbia) does not reflect the real antagonistic interests of the different belligerent countries. Before we put forward the real war aims of the the countries involved, it is necessary to reject the false explanations which have been given for the war.
The official justification by the NATO countries (ie that this is a humanitarian operation in favour of the Kosovo Albanian population) is utterly disproved by the mere fact that this population has never before suffered such repression on the part of the Serbian armed forces, and the fact that both the American and the other NATO bourgeoisies knew perfectly well that this would happen before the operation, as indeed some sectors of the US bourgeoisie are pointing out today. The NATO operation is not the first military intervention to dress itself up as a humanitarian action, but it is one of those where the lie appears most blatantly.
We must also reject any idea that the present NATO action represents a reconstitution of a Western camp against the power of Russia. The fact that the Russian bourgeoisie is seriously affected by the present war does not mean that this was one of the aims of the NATO countries. These countries, and particularly the USA, have no interest in aggravating the chaos reigning in Russia today.
Moreover, those explanations (which we find even amongst the revolutionary groups) which try to interpret the present NATO offensive as an attempt to control the region’s raw materials express an under-estimation of, or even a blindness towards, what is really at stake in the present situation. By trying to give a narrowly materialist explanation based solely on immediate economic interests, they are leaving the terrain of a real marxist understanding of the present situation.
This situation is determined in the first place by the need for the world’s greatest power constantly to assert its military supremacy despite the evaporation of its authority over its ex-allies following the collapse of the Eastern bloc.
Secondly, Germany’s active presence in this conflict, for the first time in half a century, is the expression of a new step in the assertion of its status as a candidate to the leadership of a future imperialist bloc. This status presupposes that Germany is recognised as a first class power, able to play a direct part at the military level. Today, NATO gives Germany the perfect cover for getting around the implicit prohibition on military intervention in imperialist conflicts, imposed on it since its defeat in World War II.
To the extent that it can only weaken Serbia, Germany’s traditional enemy in its ambitions directed towards the Middle East, the present operation corresponds to the interests of German imperialism, especially if this operation leads to the dismemberment of the Yugoslav Federation, and of Serbia itself through the loss of Kosovo.
For the other powers involved in the war, particularly for France and Britain, there is a contradiction between their traditional alliance with Serbia, clearly expressed during the period when these powers were responsible for the command of UNPROFOR, and the present operation against it. But for both these countries, a failure to take part in “Operation Allied Force” would have meant being excluded from the game in a region as important as the Balkans. For these two countries, the role that they could hope to play in the diplomatic resolution of the Yugoslav crisis will be conditioned by the scale of their participation in this military operation.
4) In this sense, the participation of countries like France or Britain in the present Operation Determined Force contains important similarities with the direct military (eg France) or financial (eg Japan) participation of countries in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. However, there remain very important differences between the present war and that in the Gulf.
One of the main characteristics of the Gulf War was the American bourgeoisie’s planning of the entire operation, from the trap set for Iraq in 1990 right up to the cessation of hostilities concretised by Saddam Hussein’s retreat from Kuwait. This expressed the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the Eastern bloc’s collapse, leading to the disappearance of the Western bloc, the USA still maintained a powerful leadership over the world situation, which permitted it to keep a complete grip on both military and diplomatic operations. Although the purpose of the Gulf War was to force the USA’s ex-allies like France and Germany to toe the line and to restrain their desire to contest American hegemony, these ex-allies had still not had the opportunity to develop their own imperialist aims in contradiction with those of the USA.
The war unfolding today does not correspond to a scenario written from first to last by the American power. Since 1991, there have been many expressions of opposition to US authority, on the part both of second-rate powers like Israel, and of the most faithful allies of the Cold War such as Great Britain. It was precisely in Yugoslavia that there occurred the unprecedented divorce between the two best allies of the 20th Century, when Britain decided to play its own hand alongside the French. The difficulties of the USA in asserting their own imperialist interests in Yugoslavia were one of the reasons for the replacement of Bush by Clinton.
The USA’s eventual victory through the Dayton Accords in 1996 was not a definitive victory in this part of the world, nor did it halt the general tendency to lose its position as the world’s dominant power.
Today, although the USA is leading the anti-Milosevic crusade, it is obliged to take into consideration far more than before the specific play of the other powers - especially Germany - which introduces a considerable factor of uncertainty into the outcome of the whole operation.
In particular, the US bourgeoisie did not have a single scenario worked out in advance, but several. The first, which the American bourgeoisie would have preferred, involved a retreat by Milosevic in the face of the threat of military strikes, as had already been the case with the Dayton Accords. This was the scenario which the US envoy Holbrooke tried to play out to the end, even after the failure of the Paris conference.
In this sense, while in 1991 the USA’s massive military intervention was the only option envisaged for the Gulf crisis (and they made sure that no others were possible by preventing any diplomatic solution), the military option taking place today is the result of the failure of the diplomatic option: the military blackmail represented by the conferences of Paris and Rambouillet.
The present war, with the new destabilisation of the European and world situation that it represents, is another illustration of the inescapable dilemma confronting the USA today. The tendency to “every man for himself” and the more and more explicit assertion of their imperialist pretensions by the ex-allies of the USA increasingly forces the latter to display and use its enormous military superiority. At the same time, this policy can only lead to a still greater aggravation of the chaos that reigns already in the world situation.
One aspect of this dilemma appears in the present case - as it did already before Dayton when the US encouraged Croat ambitions in the Krajina - in the fact that US military intervention is in some sense playing into the hands of its main potential rival. However, the respective imperialist interests of the USA and Germany are expressed on very different timescales. Germany is obliged to envisage its rise to the status of superpower in the long term, whereas America is confronted in the here and now - as it has been for several years - with the loss of its leadership and the rise of world chaos.
5) An essential feature of the present world disorder is thus the absence of imperialist blocs. Indeed, in the struggle for survival of all against all in decadent capitalism, the only form which a more or less stable world order can assume is that of the bi-polar organisation in two rival war camps. This however does not mean that the present absence of imperialist blocs is the cause of contemporary chaos, since capitalism has already undergone a period without imperialist blocs - the 1920s - without this involving any particular chaos in the world situation.
In this sense, the disappearance of the existing blocs in 1989, and the ensuing breakdown of world order, are signs that we have now reached a much more advanced stage in the decadence of capitalism than in 1914 or 1939. This is the stage of decomposition, the final phase of the decadence of capitalism.
In the last analysis, this phase is the result of the permanent burden of the historic crisis, the accumulation of all the contradictions of a declining mode of production over an entire century. But the period of decomposition was inaugurated by a specific factor: the blockage of the road to world war over two decades by an undefeated generation of the proletariat. In particular, the weaker Eastern bloc finally collapsed under the weight of the economic crisis because, in the last analysis, it was unable to fulfil its reason for existence: the march towards generalised warfare.
This confirms a fundamental thesis of marxism about 20th century capitalism: that war has become its mode of existence in its epoch of decline. This does not mean that war is a solution to the crisis of capitalism - quite the contrary. What it means is that the drive towards world war - and thus ultimately the destruction of humanity - has become the means through which imperialist order is maintained. It is the move towards global war which obliges the imperialist states to group together and accept the discipline of bloc leaders. It is this same factor which allows the nation state to maintain a minimum of unity within the bourgeoisie itself, and which, until now, has allowed the system to limit the total atomisation of a bourgeois society in its death throes by imposing on it the discipline of the barracks; which has countered the ideological void of a society without a future by creating the community of the battlefield.
Without the perspective of world war, the way is clear for the fullest development of capitalist decomposition: a development which even without world war has the potential to destroy humanity.
The perspective today is that of a multiplication and omnipresence of local wars and of interventions of the great powers, which the bourgeois states are able to develop to a certain extent even without the adherence of the proletariat.
6) Nothing allows us to exclude the possibility of the formation of new blocs in the future. The bi-polar organisation of imperialist competition, being a “natural” tendency of declining capitalism, appeared already embryonically at the very beginning of the new phase in 1989-90 with the unification of Germany, and has continued to assert itself since then through the latter’s rising power.
While remaining an important factor of the international situation, the tendency towards the formation of blocs cannot however be realised in the foreseeable future: the counter-tendencies working against it are stronger than ever before (the growing instability both of alliances and of the internal situation of most of the capitalist powers). For the moment, the tendency towards new blocs has itself mainly the effect of strengthening the dominant trend of “each for himself”.
In fact, the process of formation of new blocs is not fortuitous, but follows a certain pattern, and requires certain conditions of development, as the blocs of the two world wars and the Cold War clearly demonstrate. In each of these cases, imperialist blocs grouped on the one hand a number of “have not” nations out to contest the existing division of the world, and thus assuming the offensive role of the “trouble-makers”, and on the other hand a bloc of “satiated” powers as the main beneficiaries and defenders of the status quo. To come into existence, the challenger bloc needs a leader militarily strong enough to contest the main powers of the status quo, and behind which the other “have nots” can rally.
At present there is no power even remotely capable of militarily challenging the USA. Germany and Japan, the strongest rivals of Washington, still lack atomic weapons, an essential attribute of a modern great power. As for Germany, the “designated” leader of an eventual future bloc against the USA because of its central position in Europe, it does not at present belong to the “have not” states. In 1933, in particular, Germany was almost a caricature of such a state: cut off from its neighbouring strategic zones of influence in central and south-eastern Europe through the Versailles system; financially bankrupt and cut off from the world market through the Great Depression and the economic autarchy of the colonial empires of its rivals. Today on the contrary the rise of German influence in its former zones of influence is proving irresistible; it is the economic and financial heart of the European economy. This is why Germany, as opposed to its attitude before the two wars, belongs today to the more “patient” powers, able to develop its power in a determined and aggressive, but methodical and - to date - often discreet manner.
In reality, the manner in which the Yalta world order disappeared - an implosion under the pressure of the economic crisis and decomposition, and not through a re-division of the world via war - has given rise to a situation in which there no longer exist clearly defined and recognised zones of influence of the different powers. Even those areas which 10 years ago appeared as the imperialist backyard of certain powers (the USA in Latin America or the Middle East, France in its language zone of Africa) are being engulfed by the ambient “each for himself”. In such a situation, it is still far from decided which powers will belong in the end to the group of the “satiated” countries, and which will end up empty-handed.
7) In reality, it is not so much Germany or any of the other challengers of the world’s remaining super-power, but the United States itself which in the 1990s has assumed the role of the “aggressive” power militarily on the offensive. This in turn is the clearest expression of a new stage in the development of the irrationality of war in decadent capitalism, directly linked to the phase of its decomposition.
The irrationality of war is the result of the fact that modern military conflicts - as opposed to those of capitalist ascendancy (wars of national unification, or of colonial conquest which served the economic and geographic expansion of capitalism) - are aimed solely at the re-division of already existing economic and strategic positions. Under these circumstances, the wars of decadence, through the devastation they cause and their gigantic cost represent not a stimulus, but a dead weight for the capitalist mode of production. Through their permanent, totalitarian and destructive character they threaten the very existence of modern states. As a result, although the cause of capitalist wars remains the same - the competition between nation states - their goal changes. Rather than wars in pursuit of definite economic gains, they increasingly become wars in pursuit of strategic advantages designed to assure the survival of the nation in the case of a global conflagration. Whereas in capitalist ascendancy the military served the interests of the economy, in decadence it is increasingly the economy which serves the needs of the military. Capitalist economy becomes a war economy.
Like the other major expressions of decomposition, the irrationality of war is thus a general tendency unfolding throughout decadent capitalism. Already in 1915, Rosa Luxemburg’s Junius Pamphlet recognised the primacy of global strategic considerations over immediate economic interests for the main protagonists of World War I. By the end of World War II the Communist Left of France could already formulate the thesis of the irrationality of war.
But during these wars, and the ensuing Cold War, a remnant of economic rationality survived in the fact that the offensive role was mainly assumed, not by those powers that drew the main economic advantages from the existing division of the world, but by those largely excluded from these advantages.
Today, the war in ex-Yugoslavia - from which none of its belligerents can expect to draw the slightest economic advantage - only confirms what was already strikingly evident during the Gulf War in 1991: the absolute irrationality of war from the economic viewpoint.
8) The fact that war today has lost even a semblance of economic rationality, and has become simply synonymous with chaos, does not at all mean that the bourgeoisie is confronting the situation in a disorderly or empirical manner. On the contrary: this situation is forcing the ruling class to take a particularly systematic and long-term grip on its military preparations. During the recent period, this has been expressed notably by:
- the development of ever more sophisticated and expensive armaments systems in America, Europe and Japan in particular - armaments which the great powers above all require for eventual future conflicts against each other;
- the rise in “defence” budgets, with the USA taking the lead (an additional $100 billion allocated for the modernisation of the armed forces in the coming six years), reversing a certain trend towards a decline in military budgets at the end of the Cold War (the so-called “peace dividend”);
At the political and ideological level, signs of serious war preparations include:
- the development of a whole ideology to justify military interventions: that of “humanitarianism” and the defence of “human rights”;
- the coming to government, in most of the leading industrialised countries, of left wing parties, those best able to represent this humanitarian war-mongering (this is of particular importance in Germany, where the SPD-Green coalition has the task of overcoming the political obstacles to its military intervention abroad);
- the orchestration of systematic political attacks against the internationalist traditions of the proletariat against imperialist war (slandering of Lenin as an agent of German imperialism in World War I and Bordiga as collaborator of the fascist bloc in World War II, of Rosa Luxemburg - recently in Germany - as a predecessor of Stalinism etc). The more capitalism moves towards war, the more the heritage and present organisations of the communist left will become the favoured target of the bourgeoisie.
In fact, these bourgeois ideological campaigns are not aimed solely at preparing the ground politically for war. The fundamental objective of the ruling class is to turn the proletariat away from its own revolutionary perspective, a perspective which the incessant aggravation of the capitalist crisis will inevitably put more and more on the agenda.
The Economic Crisis
9) If, in the epoch of capitalist decline, the economic crisis takes on a permanent and chronic character, it has mainly been at the end of periods of reconstruction after world wars that this crisis has assumed an openly catastrophic character, with brutal drops in production, profits and workers’ living standards, and a dramatic rise in mass unemployment. This was the case from 1929 until World War II. It is the case today.
Although since the late 1960s the crisis has unfolded in a slower and less spectacular manner than after 1929, the way in which the economic contradictions of a declining mode of production have accumulated over three decades becomes today increasingly difficult to hide. The 1990s in particular - despite all the propaganda about the “economic health” and the “fantastic profits” of capitalism - have been years of tremendous acceleration of the economic crisis, dominated by faltering markets, bankrupt companies, and an unprecedented development of unemployment and pauperisation.
At the beginning of the decade the bourgeoisie hid this fact by presenting the collapse of the Eastern bloc as the final victory of capitalism over communism. In reality the ruin of the east was a key moment in the deepening world capitalist crisis. It revealed the bankruptcy of one bourgeois model of crisis management: Stalinism. Since then, one economic model after another has bit the dust, beginning with the second and third industrial powers of the world, Japan and Germany. They were to be followed by the failure of the Asian tigers and dragons, and of the “emerging” economies of Latin America. The open bankruptcy of Russia confirmed the incapacity of “western liberalism” to rejuvenate the countries of Eastern Europe.
Until now the bourgeoisie, despite decades of chronic crisis, has always been convinced that there can no longer be economic convulsions as profound as those of the Great Depression, which after 1929 shook the very foundations of capitalism. Although bourgeois propaganda still tries to present the economic catastrophe which engulfed east and south-east Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, and Brazil at the beginning of 1999 as a particularly severe, but temporary and con-junctural recession, what these countries have in reality suffered is a depression every bit as brutal and devastating at that of the 1930s. Such figures as the trebling of unemployment or falls in production of 10% or more in one year speak for themselves. Moreover, such areas as the former USSR or Latin America are today incomparably more affected by the crisis than was the case during the 30s.
It is true that ravages on this scale are still mainly restricted to the peripheries of capitalism. But this “periphery” includes not only agricultural and raw material producers, but industrial countries containing tens of millions of proletarians. It includes the eight and the tenth economies of the world: Brazil and South Korea. It includes the largest country on Earth, Russia. It will soon include the most populous country, China, where after the insolvency of the largest investment house, the Gitic, the confidence of international investors has begun to crumble.
What all of these bankruptcies show is that the state of health of the world economy is much worse than in the 1930s. As opposed to 1929, the bourgeoisie in the last 30 years has not been surprised or inactive in the face of the crisis, but has constantly acted to control its course. This is what gives the unfolding of the crisis today its protracted, remorselessly deepening nature. It deepens despite all the efforts of the ruling class. The sudden, brutal and uncontrolled character of the crisis in 1929 is also explained by the fact that the bourgeoisie had dismantled its state capitalist control of the economy (which it was forced to introduce during World War I), and only reintroduced and enforced this regime from the early 30s on. In other words: the crisis struck so brutally because such instruments as the war economy of the 30s and the international co-ordination of the western economies after 1945 had not yet been developed. In 1929 there did not yet exist a permanent state supervision of the economy, of the stock markets and international trade agreements, no lender of last resort, no international fire brigade to bail out those in difficulties. Between 1997-99 on the contrary whole economies with considerable economic and political significance for the capitalist world have gone down the drain despite the existence of all of these state capitalist instruments. The International Monetary Fund, for instance, supported Brazil with massive funding already before the recent crisis, in pursuit of its new strategy of crisis prevention. It promised to defend the Brazilian currency “at all costs” - and failed.
10) Although the central countries of capitalism have escaped this fate until now, they are certainly facing their worst recession since the war - in Japan it has already begun.
Today the bourgeoisie tries to blame the increasing difficulties of the central economies on the “Asian”, “Russian” and “Brazilian” crises. In fact the opposite is the case: it is the growing impasse of the central economies of capitalism, due to the exhaustion of solvent markets, which has produced the successive collapse of the “Tigers” and “Dragons”, of Russia, Brazil, etc.
The recession in Japan reveals the considerable reduction of the central countries’ economic room for manoeuvre. A series of massive “Keynesian” conjunctural programmes of the government (the recipe discovered by the bourgeoisie in the 30s) have failed to refloat the economy and avoid recession;
- the latest rescue operation - $520 billion to bail out insolvent banks - has failed to restore confidence in the financial system;
- the traditional aggressive policy of maintaining employment at home through export offensives on the world market has reached its limit: unemployment is rising fast, the policy of negative interest rates to supply sufficient liquidity and maintain a weak yen favourable to exports has run out of steam; it is now clear that these goals, as well as a reduction in the public debt, can only be achieved through a return to the inflationist policy of the 70s. This trend, which other industrial countries will follow, spells the beginning of the end of the famous “victory over inflation”, and new dangers to world trade.
In America, the alleged “boom” of the past years has been achieved at the expense of the rest of the world through a veritable explosion of its balance of trade and payments deficits, and through the soaring debts of private households (household savings in the US are now virtually non-existent). The limits of such a policy are now being reached, with or without the “Asian flu”.
The situation is no better in “Euroland”, along with America the sole remaining capitalist model: in the main western European countries, the shortest and weakest post-war recovery is already coming to a close, with falling growth rates and rising unemployment in Germany in particular.
It is the recession in the central countries which at the beginning of the new century is destined to reveal the full extent of the agony of the capitalist mode of production.
11) But if historically the impasse of capitalism is much more flagrant than in the 30s, and if the present phase represents the most important acceleration in the past three decades, this does not mean we can expect an abrupt and catastrophic collapse in the heartlands of capitalism as in the 30s. This is what happened in Germany between 1929-32, when (according to the statistics of the day) industrial production dropped 50%, prices 30%, wages 60%, and unemployment increased from two to eight million within three years.
Today on the contrary, while considerably deepening and accelerating, the crisis retains its more or less controlled, protracted character. The bourgeoisie has proven its capacity to avoid a repetition of the 1929 crash. It has achieved this not only through the erection of a permanent state capitalist regime from the 30s on, but above all through an internationally co-ordinated crisis management in favour of the strongest powers. It learnt to do this after 1945 in the framework of the Western bloc, which brought together North America, western Europe and eastern Asia under US leadership. After 1989 it proved its capacity to maintain this crisis management even without imperialist blocs. Thus, whereas at the imperialist level 1989 was the beginning of the rule of world chaos and “each for himself”, at the economic level this is not as yet the case.
The two most dramatic consequences of the crisis of 1929 were:
- the collapse of world trade under an avalanche of competitive devaluations and protectionist measures leading to the autarchy of the pre-war years;
- the fact that the two strongest capitalist nations, the United States and Germany, were the first and the worst affected by industrial depression and mass unemployment.
The national state capitalist programmes which were then adopted in the different countries - the Five Year Plans in the USSR, the Four Year Plans in Germany, the New Deal in the USA etc. - in no way altered this fragmentation of the world market: they accepted this framework as their point of departure. As opposed to this, in face of the crisis of the 70s and 80s the western bourgeoisie acted rigorously to prevent a return to the extreme protectionism of the 30s, since this was the precondition for assuring that the central countries would not be the first victims like in 29, but the last to suffer the most brutal consequences of the crisis. The result of this system has been that whole portions of the world economy such as Africa, most of eastern Europe, the greater part of Asia and Latin America have been or are being for all intents and purposes eliminated as actors on the world stage and plunged into the most unspeakable barbarism.
In his struggle against Stalin in the mid 1920s, Trotsky demonstrated that not only socialism, but even a highly developed capitalism is impossible in one country. In this sense the autarchy of the 1930s was a gigantic step backwards for the capitalist system. In fact, it was only possible because the road to world war was open - something which is not the case today.
12)The present international state capitalist crisis management imposes certain rules for the commercial war between national capitals - trade, financial, currency or investment agreements and treaties, rules without which world trade under present conditions would be impossible.
That this capacity of the main powers (underestimated by the ICC at the beginning of the 1990s) has not yet reached its limits is demonstrated by the project of a common European currency, showing how the bourgeoisie is obliged by the advance of the crisis to take increasingly complicated and audacious measures to protect itself. The Euro is first and foremost a gigantic state capitalist measure to counteract one of the most dangerous weak points in the defence lines of the system: that fact that of the two centres of world capitalism, North America and western Europe, the latter is divided into a series of national capitals, each with their own currency. Dramatic monetary fluctuations between them, such as that which smashed the European Monetary System in the early 90s, or competitive devaluations like in the 30s, threaten to paralyse trade within Europe. Thus, far from representing a step towards a European imperialist bloc, the Euro project is supported by the United States, which would be one of the main victims of such a collapse of the European market.
The Euro, like the European Union itself, also illustrates the way in which this co-ordination between states, far from abolishing the trade war between them, is a method of organising it in favour of the strongest. If the common currency is a stability anchor for the European economy, it is at the same time a system designed to assure the survival of the strongest powers (above all the country which dictated the conditions of its construction, Germany) at the expense of the weaker participants (which is why Britain, due to its traditional strength as a world financial power, still affords itself the luxury of remaining outside).
We are confronted with an infinitely more developed state capitalist system than that of Stalin, Hitler or Roosevelt in the 1930s, in which not only the competition within each nation state, but to a certain extent that of national capitals on the world market assume a less spontaneous, more regulated - in fact more political character. Thus, after the debacle of the “Asian crisis” the leaders of the main industrial countries insisted that in future the IMF should adopt more political criteria in deciding which countries to bail out and at what price (and conversely which ones can be eliminated from the world market).
13) With the acceleration of the crisis, the bourgeoisie today finds itself obliged to revise its economic policy: this is one of the meanings of the establishment of left governments in Europe and the United States. In Britain, France or Germany the new left governments have developed a critique of the previous policy of “globalisation” and “liberalisation” launched in the 80s under Reagan and Thatcher, calling for more state intervention in the economy, and for a regulation of the international flow of capital. The bourgeoisie realises today that this policy has reached its limit.
“Globalisation”, by lowering trade and investment barriers in favour of the circulation of capital, was the response of the leading powers to the danger of a return to the protectionism and autarchy of the 1930s: a state capitalist measure protecting the strongest competitors at the expense of the weaker ones. But today, this measure is in turn in need of stronger state regulation, aimed not at revoking, but controlling the global movement of capital.
“Globalisation” is not the cause of the insane international speculation of the past years - but it has opened the door wide to its development. As a result, from being a refuge for capital menaced by the absence of real profitable investment outlets, speculation has itself become an enormous danger to capital. If the bourgeoisie is reacting to this danger today, this is not only because this development is capable of bringing entire, more peripheral national economies to their knees almost overnight (Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil etc) but above all because leading capitalist groupings in the main countries are likely to go bankrupt in the process. In fact, the principal goal of the IMF programmes for these different countries in the past two years was to save not the countries directly affected, but the speculative investments of western capitalists, whose bankruptcy would have destabilised the international finance structures themselves.
Just as “globalisation” never replaced the competition of the nation state by that of the multinationals, as bourgeois ideology pretended, but was a policy of certain national capitals, in the same way the policy of “liberalisation” was never a weakening of state capitalism, but a means of making it more efficient, and of justifying enormous cuts in social budgets in particular. Today’s situation of sharpened crisis, however, demands a much more direct and obvious state intervention (such as the recent nationalisation of failing Japanese banks, a measure which was publicly called for by the G7 states). Such circumstances are no longer compatible with a credible “liberal” ideology.
At this level also, the left of capital is better equipped to implement the new “corrective measures” (something the resolution of the 10th congress of the ICC 1993 already pointed out regarding the replacement of Bush by Clinton in the USA). Politically, because the left is historically less tied to the clientele of private capitalist interests than the right, and thus better able to adopt measures that go against the will of particular groupings, but which defend the national capital as a whole. Ideologically, because it was the right which invented and mainly implemented the previous policy now being revised.
This modification does not mean that the so-called “neo-liberal” economic policy will be completely abandoned. In fact, a sign of the gravity of the situation is that the bourgeoisie is compelled to combine the two policies, both of which have increasingly serious effects on the world economy. Such a combination, balancing on a tight rope between the two policies, can only further aggravate the situation.
This does not however imply that there is an economic “point of no return” beyond which the system is irretrievably doomed to disappear. Nor is there any theoretically fixed limit to the amount of debt (the main drug of dying capitalism) which the system can administer to itself without making its own existence impossible. In fact, capitalism passed its economic limits with the entry into its phase of decadence. Since then, capitalism has only been able to survive by an increasing manipulation of its own laws, a task which only the state can perform.
In this sense the limits to the existence of capitalism are political and not economic. The denouement of the historic crisis of capitalism depends on the evolution of the balance of forces between the classes:
- either the proletariat will develop its struggle until it imposes its worldwide revolutionary dictatorship;
- or capitalism, through its tendency towards war, will plunge humanity into barbarism and definitive destruction
The Class Struggle
14) In response to the first signs of the new open crisis at the end of the 60s, the return of the class struggle in 1968, ending four decades of counter-revolution, barred the road to world war, and began to open up a renewed perspective for humanity. During the first great struggles of the late sixties and early seventies a new generation of revolutionaries began to be secreted by the class, and the necessity of proletarian revolution was debated in the general assemblies of the class. During the different waves of workers’ struggles between 1968 and 1989, a difficult but important experience of struggle was acquired, and consciousness within the class developed in confrontation with the left of capital, particularly the unions, despite a series of obstacles placed in the path of the proletariat. The high point of this whole period was the mass strike of 1980 in Poland, demonstrating that in the Russian bloc also - historically condemned by its weakened position, to be the “aggressor” in any war - the proletariat was not prepared to die for the bourgeois state.
However, if the proletariat barred the road to war, it was unable to take significant steps towards its answer to the crisis of capitalism: the proletarian revolution. It was this stalemate in the balance of class forces, with neither of the two main classes of modern society able to enforce its own solution, which opened up the period of the decomposition of capitalism.
By contrast, it was the first truly world historical event of this period of decomposition - the collapse of the Stalinist (so-called Communist) regimes in 1989 - which brought the period of developing struggles and consciousness since 1968 to a close. The result of this historical earthquake was the most profound retreat in combativity and above all in consciousness since the end of the counter-revolution.
This set-back did not represent an historic defeat of the class, as the ICC already pointed out at the time. By 1992, with the important struggles in Italy, the working class had already returned to the path of struggle. But in the course of the 1990s, this path was to prove much slower and more difficult then in the previous two decades. Despite such struggles, the bourgeoisie, in 1995 in France, and soon afterwards in Belgium, Germany, and the USA, was still able to profit from the hesitant combativity and political disorientation of the class in order to organise spectacular movements aimed specifically at restoring the credibility of the unions, and which further weakened the class consciousness of the workers. Through such actions, the unions attained their highest level of popularity since more than a decade. After the massive union manoeuvres in November-December 1995 in France, the resolution on the international situation of the 12th congress of the ICC’s section in France (1996) noted: that “in the main capitalist countries, the working class has been brought back to a situation which is comparable to that of the 1970s as far as its relations to unions and unionism is concerned (...) the bourgeoisie has temporarily succeeded in wiping out from working class consciousness the lessons learnt during the 80s, following repeated experience of confrontations with the unions”.
This whole development confirmed that after 1989 the path towards decisive class confrontations had become longer and more difficult.
15) Despite these enormous difficulties the 90s has been a decade of the re-development of class struggles. This was already confirmed, in the mid-90s, through the strategy of the bourgeoisie itself:
- the highly publicised union manoeuvres aimed at strengthening the unions before an important build-up of workers’ combativity rendered such large scale mobilisations too dangerous;
- the subsequent equally artificially orchestrated “unemployed movements” in France, Germany and other countries during 1997-98, designed to divide employed from unemployed workers — making the former feel guilty, creating unionist structures for the future containment of the latter - revealed the concern of the ruling class about the long term radicalising potential of unemployment and the unemployed;
- enormous and incessant ideological campaigns - often using themes linked to decomposition such as the Dutroux affair in Belgium, ETA terrorism in Spain, the extreme right in France, Austria or Germany - calling for the defence of bourgeois democracy, were multiplied to sabotage the reflection of the workers. All this showed that the ruling class itself was convinced that the worsening of the crisis and of attacks would give rise to new expressions of working class militancy. Furthermore, all of these preventative actions were co-ordinated and publicised at the international level.
The correctness of the class instinct of the bourgeoisie was soon demonstrated by a significant increase in workers’ struggles towards the end of the decade.
Not for the first time, the first important sign of a serious development of combativity came from the Benelux countries, with strikes in different sectors during 1997 in the Netherlands, notably in the world’s largest port, Rotterdam. This important signal was soon to be confirmed in another small, but highly developed western European country, Denmark, when almost half a million employees of the private sector (a quarter of all wage labourers of that country) went on strike for almost two weeks in May 1998. This movement revealed:
- a tendency towards massive struggles;
- the necessity for the unions to revert to their task of controlling, isolating and defeating movements, so that the workers at the end were not euphoric (as in France in 1995), but had lost their first illusions;
- the necessity for the bourgeoisie to return to the policy of internationally playing down or, where possible blacking-out, news of struggles, in order not to spread the “bad example” of workers’ resistance.
Since then, this strike wave has continued in two directions:
- large scale actions organised by the unions (Norway, Greece, United States, South Korea) under the pressure of growing workers’ discontent;
- a multiplication of smaller, unofficial, sometimes even spontaneous struggles in the central capitalist nations of Europe - France, Britain, Belgium, Germany - where the unions take the lead in order to contain and isolate them.
Also noteworthy are:
- the growing national and international simultaneity of struggles, especially in western Europe;
- the outbreak of combat in response to the different aspects of the capitalist attacks: lays-offs and unemployment, falling real wages and cuts in the social wage, intolerable conditions of exploitation, reduction in holiday benefits etc;
- the embryonic beginnings of a reflection within the class about which demands to raise and how to struggle, and even about the present state of society;
- the obligation for the bourgeoisie - although the official unions have not yet been seriously discredited in the recent movements - to develop the card of “fighting unionism” and “base unionism” with the heavy involvement of leftism.
16) Despite these steps forward, the evolution of the class struggle since 1989 has remained painful and not without set-backs, above all because of:
- the weight of decomposition, a growing factor against the development of collective solidarity and of an historical and coherent theoretical reflection within the class;
- the very extent of the set-back which began in 1989, which at the level of consciousness will weigh negatively for a long time to come, since it is the perspective of communism itself which has been attacked.
Underlying this set-back - which threw the proletarian struggle back more than a decade - is the fact that in the epoch of decomposition, time is no longer on the side of the proletariat. Although an undefeated class can prevent the slide towards world war, it cannot prevent the proliferation of all the manifestations of the rotting of the social order.
In fact, this set-back was itself the expression of the fact that the proletarian struggle lagged behind the general acceleration of the decline of capitalism. In particular: despite the whole significance of Poland 1980 for the world situation, nine years later it was not the international class struggle which toppled the Stalinist regimes in eastern Europe - the working class was completely absent at the moment of their collapse.
Nevertheless, the proletariat’s central weakness between 1968 and 1989 lay not in a general backwardness (contrary to the rapid development of the revolutionary situation which emerged from World War I, the slow evolution of struggle post-1968 in response to the crisis has many advantages), but above all in a difficulty in politicising its fight.
This difficulty is the result of the fact that the generation which in 68 ended the longest counter-revolution in history was cut off from the experience of past generations of its class, and reacted to the trauma inflicted on it by Social Democracy and Stalinism with a general tendency to reject “politics”.
Thus the development of a “political culture” becomes the central question of the coming struggles. This question in fact contains the answer to a second one: how to compensate the lost ground of the past years, to overcome the present amnesia of the class concerning the lessons of its struggles before 1989?
It is clear that this cannot be done through repeating the combats of the two preceding decades: history does not permit such repetitions, least of all today when time is running out for humanity. But above all, the proletariat is an historical class, even if the lessons of twenty years are presently absent from its consciousness. In reality the process of politicisation is nothing other than that of rediscovering the lessons of the past and so developing a perspective for future struggles.
17) We have a number of good reasons for assuming that the coming period, in the long term, will in many ways be particularly favourable for such a politicisation. These favourable factors include:
- the advanced state of the crisis itself, pushing forward proletarian reflection on the need to confront and overcome the system;
- the increasingly massive, simultaneous, and generalised character of the attacks, posing the need for a generalised class response. This includes the enormous question of unemployment, the embodiment of the bankruptcy of capitalism, and a question around which struggles of the future will develop. It will also tend to include the question of inflation, a prime means of capitalism to put pressure on the working class and other layers of society;
- the increase in state repression as the bourgeoisie is more and more compelled to outlaw all real expressions of the proletarian struggle;
- the omnipresence of war, destroying the illusions in the possibility of a peaceful capitalism. The present war in the Balkans, a war at the very heart of the capitalist system, will in itself have an important impact on the workers’ consciousness. For all its humanitarian disguises, and whatever immediate effect it may have on the class struggle, this and future wars will tend to expose the catastrophic perspective that this system offers humanity. In addition to which, the accelerating slide towards war will demand increasing military budgets and thus growing sacrifices from the working class, forcing the latter to defend its own interests against the imperialist interests of the national capital.
Other favorable factors include:
- the strengthening of the combativity of an undefeated class. It is only by entering the combat that the workers can regain the experience of being part of a collective class, recover their lost self-confidence, begin to pose class issues on a class terrain, and once more cross swords with unionism and leftism;
- the entry into struggle of a second undefeated generation of workers. The combativity of this generation is still fully intact. Already born into a capitalism in crisis, it is free of some of the illusions of the generation after 68. Above all, as opposed to the workers after 68, the young workers of today can learn from a generation before them which already has a considerable experience of struggle to pass on. In this way the “lost” lessons of the past can be reconquered in struggle by the combined efforts of two generations of proletarians. This is the normal process of accumulation of historical experience which the counter-revolution brutally interrupted;
* this experience of common reflection on the past, in face of the need for generalised combat against a dying system, will give rise to proletarian discussion circles, to nuclei of advanced workers who will in particular try to reappropriate the lessons of the whole history of the workers’ movement. In such a perspective, the responsibility of the communist left will be much greater than in the past 30 years.
This potential is not wishful thinking. It is already confirmed by the bourgeoisie, which is fully aware of this potential danger, and is already taking preventive action with incessant denigrations against the revolutionary past and present of its class enemy.
Above all: in view of the degradation of the world situation the bourgeoisie is afraid that the class will discover those episodes which demonstrate the power of the proletariat, which show that it is the class which holds the future of humanity in its hands: the revolutionary wave of 1917-23; the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in Russia, the ending of World War I through the revolutionary movement in Germany.
18) This concern of the ruling class with the proletarian danger is reflected not least in the coming to government of the left in 13 of the 15 countries of the European Union.
The return of the left to government in so many important countries, beginning with the USA after the Gulf War, is made possible by the blow to proletarian consciousness inflicted by the events of 1989, as the ICC already pointed out in 1990:
“This is why, in particular, we have to update the ICC’s analysis of the ‘left in opposition’. This was a necessary card for the bourgeoisie at the end of the 70s and throughout the 80s due to the class’ general dynamic towards increasingly determined and conscious combats, and its growing rejection of democratic, electoral, and trade union mystifications. (...) By contrast, the class’ present reflux means that for a while this strategy will no longer be a priority for the bourgeoisie. This does not necessarily mean that these countries will see the left return to government: as we have said on several occasions (...) this is only absolutely necessary in periods of war or revolution. By contrast, we should not be surprised if it does happen, nor should we put t down to ‘accident’ or to a ‘specific weakness’ of the bourgeoisie in these countries” (International Review no61).
The 12th ICC congress resolution, of spring 1997, after correctly predicting the victory of Labour at the May 1997 general elections in Britain, added:
“it is important to underline the fact that the ruling class is not going to return to the themes of the 70s when the ‘left alternative’ with its programme of ‘social’ measures, even of nationalisations, was put forward in order to break the elan of the wave of struggles which had begun in 1968, by derailing discontent and militancy onto the election dead-end”.
The autumn 98 electoral victory of Schröder-Fischer over Kohl in Germany confirmed:
- that the return of left governments is in no way a return to the 70s: the SPD did not come to power in the midst of big struggles, as had once been the case under Brandt. It made no unrealistic electoral promises beforehand, and is pursuing a very “moderate” and “responsible” course in government;
- that in the present phase of the class struggle it is normally not a problem for the bourgeoisie to put the left, in particular the Social Democrats, in government. In Germany it would have been easier than other countries to leave the right in government. As opposed to most other western powers, where the right wing parties are either is a state of disarray (France, Sweden), divided on foreign policy (Italy, Britain) or weighed down by backward, irresponsible tendencies (USA), in Germany the right, although somewhat worn down by 16 years in government, is in an orderly state, and is quite capable to dealing with the affairs of the German state.
However, the fact that Germany, the country today possessing the most ordered and cohesive political apparatus (reflecting its status as potential imperialist bloc leader) brought back the SPD, reveals that the card of the left in government is not only possible today, but has become a relative necessity (just as the left in power in the 80s was a relative necessity). In other words it would be a mistake for the bourgeoisie not to play this card now.
We have already shown which necessities at the level of imperialist policy and crisis management have paved the way for left governments. But on the social front also there are above all two important reasons for such a government today:
- after long years of right wing governments in key countries like Britain and Germany, the reinforcement of the electoral mystification demands the democratic alternation now - all the more so since in the future it will become much more difficult to have the left in government. Already at the time of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, and even more so since the fall of Stalinism, bourgeois democracy is the most important anti-proletarian mystification of the ruling class, which must permanently be cultivated;
- although the left is not necessarily the most suitable for attacking the working class today, it has the advantage over the right of attacking in a more prudent and above all less provocative manner than the right. This is a very important quality at present, where it is vital for the bourgeoisie, wherever possible, to avoid important and massive struggles of its mortal enemy, since such struggles possess today an important potential for the development of the self-confidence and political consciousness of the proletariat as a whole.
International Communist Current,
April 5 1999
With the publication of the 1920 programme of the Communist Workers Party of Germany (KAPD), we complete the section of this series devoted to the communist party programmes which came out during to the communist party programmes which came out during the height of the revolutionary wave (see International Review no.93, the 1918 programme of the KPD; International Review no.94, the platform of the Communist International; International Review no.95, the programme of the Russian Communist Party).
We have dealt elsewhere with the historic background to the formation of the KAPD (see our series on the German revolution, in particular International Review no.89). The split in the young KPD was in many ways a tragedy for the development of the proletarian revolution, but this isn’t the place to analyse its causes and consequences. Our aim here is to show the degree of revolutionary clarity this document represents, since there is no question that nearly all the best forces of communism in Germany went with the KAPD.
According to the leftist legend (unfortunately based on the false conceptions adopted by the Communist International after 1920), the KAPD was the manifestation of an insignificant, sectarian, semi-anarchist current that was trounced once and for all by the publication of Lenin’s Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder. In fact, as we have also shown elsewhere (for example in our introduction to the platform of the CI, and in the article on the degeneration of the Communist International in this issue), at the high water mark of the revolutionary tide, the positions of the left were to a great extent dominant both in the KPD and the CI itself. It is true that, by 1920, within the CI and its component parties, the first effects of the stagnation of the world revolution and of the isolation of Soviet Russia were beginning to make themselves felt, giving rise to a conservative reaction which was to increasingly place the left in an oppositional stance. But even as an opposition, the left communists were very far from being an infantile or anarchist sect. Indeed, what stands out more than anything else in this programme is the degree to which the characteristic positions of the KAPD - the rejection of the parliamentary and trade union tactics then being adopted by the CI - were based on a real assimilation of the marxist concept of the decadence of capitalism, which is affirmed in the very opening paragraph of the programme proper. This conception had been affirmed with equal insistence at the founding congress of the CI, but the International as a whole subsequently proved unable to follow through all its implications at the programmatic level.
The KAPD’s position on parliament and the trade unions had nothing in common with the moralism and anti-politicism preached by the anarchists, since, as the KAPD spokesman Jan Appel (Hempel) argued at the third congress of the CI in 1921, it was based on a recognition that participation in parliament and the unions had indeed been valid tactics in the ascendant period of capitalism but had become obsolete in the new period of capitalist decline. In particular, the programme shows that the German left had already established the theoretical bases for explaining how the unions had become "one of the main pillars of the capitalist state".
The accusation of sectarianism was also applied to what the KAPD put forward as an alternative to the trade unions. In his Infantile Disorder, for example, Lenin charges the KAPD with trying to replace the existing mass union organisations with artificially constructed "pure revolutionary unions". In fact, the KAPD’s method was the quintessentially marxist one which consists in particular of relating to the real movement of the class. As Hempel put it at the third congress, "as communists, as people who want to and must take the leadership of the revolution, we are obliged to examine the organisation of the proletariat under this angle. What we in the KAPD say was not born, as comrade Radek believes, in the head of comrade Gorter in Holland, but through the experience of the struggles we have waged since 1919" (La Gauche Allemande, Invariance, 1973, p 32). It was the real movement of the class which had given rise to the workers’ councils or soviets in the first explosion of the revolution, in direct opposition both to parliamentarism and trade unionism. With the dissolution or recuperation of the original workers’ councils in Germany, the most militant struggles had given rise to the "factory organisations" which are referred to at some length in the programme. It is true that the emphasis on these more localised, workplace organs rather than on the centralised soviets was the result of the movement going onto the defensive, and that, not fully understanding this development, the KAPD was led into the mistaken view that these factory organisations, regrouped into "Unionen", could be maintained almost as a permanent nucleus of the councils of the future. But since at the time of the programme the Unionen regrouped up to 100,000 militant workers, they were by no means an artificial construct of the KAPD.
Another accusation frequently levelled at the KAPD was that it was "anti-party". This formulation completely distorts the complex reality of the German revolutionary movement of the time. To a certain extent, the KAPD actually expressed a real high point in the clarification of the role of the communist party. We have already published the KAPD’s Theses on the Role of the Party (see International Review no.41, 1985), which are founded on the recognition - derived to no small measure from the Bolshevik experience - that in the epoch of the revolution the party could not be a "mass" organisation but was a programmatically advanced minority whose essential task, as expressed in the programme, was, through its determined participation in the class struggle, to elevate the "self consciousness of the proletariat". The programme also contains the first hints of the criticism of the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised by the party, a conception (or rather a practise, since it was not theorised till later) which was to have such disastrous consequences for the Bolsheviks in Russia.
There is no doubt, however, that there were other trends within the KAPD at the time, and that some of these were indeed influenced by anarchism, in particular the "councilist" current around Otto Ruhle. The ransom paid to this current is reflected in the preface to the programme which contained the federalist and even individualist notion that "the autonomy of the members in all circumstances is the basic principle of a proletarian party, which is not a party in the traditional sense". Since the KAPD had to a large extent been forced out of the KPD through the manoeuvrings of an irresponsible clique around Paul Levi, this reaction against uncontrolled "chiefs" and bourgeois politicking was understandable, but it also expressed a weakness on the organisation question which, with the further retreat of the revolution, was to have catastrophic consequences for the very survival of the German left.
The "councilist" trend also expressed a tendency to break solidarity with the Russian revolution when it was faced with the difficult conditions imposed by isolation and civil war - a tendency which later expressed itself in an open renunciation of the whole Russian experience as being no more than a belated bourgeois revolution. But on this point there is no ambiguity at all in the programme: solidarity with the beleaguered Soviet power is made explicit from the beginning, and it also very correctly identifies the victory of the revolution in Germany as the key to the victory of the world revolution and thus to the salvation of the proletarian bastion in Russia.
A comparison with the "practical measures" contained in the KPD programme of 1918 shows a great deal of similarity with those of the KAPD programme, which should come as no surprise. The latter, however, is clearer on the international tasks of the German revolution. It also goes further into the question of the economic content of the revolution, emphasising the necessity to take immediate steps towards gearing production to need rather thaearing production to need rather than accumulation (even if we might question how rapidly such a transformation could take place, as well as the programme’s conception that a "socialist economic bloc" formed with Russia alone could make significant steps towards communism). Finally, the programme raises some "new" issues not dealt with by the 1918 programme, such as the proletarian revolution’s approach to art, science, education and youth. The KAPD’s concern for these questions is also interesting because it shows that it was not - as has often been argued - a purely "workerist" current blind to the more general problems posed by the communist transformation of social life.
(May 1920) (1)
It was in the whirlwind of revolution and counter-revolution that the foundations of the German Communist Workers Party were laid. But the birth of the new party doesn’t date from Easter 1920, when the "opposition", which up to then had only been united through vague contacts, came together in an organisational sense. The birth of the KAPD coincides with a phase of the development of the KPD (Spartacus League), during the course of which a clique of irresponsible leaders, placing their personal interests above those of the proletarian revolution, attempted to impose a personal conception of the "death" of the German revolution on the majority of the party. The latter energetically stood up against this manifestation of personal interest. The KAPD was born when this clique, basing itself on the personal conception that it had elaborated, tried to transform the tactic of the party, which, up to then had been revolutionary, into a reformist tactic. This treacherous attitude of Levi, Posner and Company led to the recognition of the fact that the radical elimination of any policy of leaders must constitute the first condition for the progress of the proletarian revolution in Germany. It is in reality the root of the opposition which appeared between us and the Spartacus League, an opposition of such depth that the gulf which separates us from the KPD is greater than the opposition which exists between the likes of Levi, Pieck, Thalheimer, etc., on one side, and the Hilferdings, Crispiens, Stampfers, Legiens (2) on the other. The idea that in a really proletarian organisation the revolutionary will of the masses is the preponderant factor in the taking of tactical positions is the leitmotif in the organisational construction of our party. To express the autonomy of the members in all circumstances is the basic principle of a proletarian party, which is not a party in the traditional sense.
It is thus evident to us that the programme of the party that we are conveying here. and which has been drawn up by the programme commission mandated by the congress, must remain a draft programme up until the next ordinary congress declares itself in agreement with the present version (3). Of the remainder of the proposed amendments, which could concern the fundamental positions and tactics of the party, they are hardly likely to be adopted given that the programme has faithfully formulated, in a broader framework, the content of the programmatic declaration adopted unanimously by the party congress. But eventual formal amendments will change nothing of the revolutionary spirit which animates each line of the programme. The marxist recognition of the historic necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat rests for us an immutable and steadfast guide for the international class struggle. Under this flag, the victory of the proletariat is assured.
Berlin. Mid-May 1920.
The world economic crisis, born from the world war, with its monstrous social and economic effects which produce the thunderstruck impression of a field of ruins of colossal dimensions, can only signify one thing: the Twilight of the Gods of the bourgeois-capitalist world order is nigh. Today, it is not a question of the periodic economic crises which were once a part of the capitalist mode of production; it is the crisis of capitalism itself; we are witnessing convulsive spasms of the whole of the social organism, formidable outbursts of class antagonisms of an unprecedented pitch, general misery for wide layers of populations: all this is a fateful warning to bourgeois society. It appears more and more clearly that the ever-growing antagonism between exploiters and exploited, that the contradiction between capital and labour, the consciousness of which is becoming more widespread even among those previously aparead even among those previously apathetic layers of the proletariat, cannot be resolved. Capitalism is experiencing its definitive failure, it has plunged itself into the abyss in a war of imperialist robbery; it has created a chaos whose unbearable prolongation places the proletariat in front of the historic alternative: relapse into barbarism or construction of a socialist world.
Of all the peoples of the Earth only the Russian proletariat has up to now succeeded in its titanic struggle to overthrow the domination of its capitalist class and seize political power. In a heroic resistance it has pushed back the concentrated attack of the army of mercenaries organised by international capital, and it now confronts a task of unsurpassed difficulty: that of reconstructing, on a socialist basis, an economy totally destroyed by world war and the civil war which followed it for more than two years. The fate of the Russian republic of councils depends on the development of the proletarian revolution in Germany. After the victory of the German revolution we will see the emergence of a socialist economic bloc which, through the reciprocal exchange of the products of industry and agriculture, will be capable of establishing a real socialist mode of production, no longer obliged to make economic, and thus also political, concessions to world capital. If the German proletariat doesn’t fulfil its historic task very soon, the development of the world revolution will be called into question for years, if not for decades. In fact it is Germany which is today the key to the world revolution. The revolution in the "victor" countries of the Entente can only get underway when the great barrier of central Europe has been raised. The economic conditions of the proletarian revolution are incomparably more favourable in Germany than in the "victor" countries of western Europe. The German economy, ruthlessly plundered after the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty, has brought to a head a degree of pauperisation which demands a rapid and radical solution. Furthermore, the peace of the brigands of Versailles does not only weigh on the capitalist mode of production in Germany, but makes life increasingly unendurable for the proletariat as well. Its most dangerous aspect is that it undermines the economic foundations of the future socialist economy in Germany, and thus, in this sense, also calls into question the development of the world revolution. Only one headlong push forward by the German proletarian revolution can bring us out of this dilemma. The economic and political situation in Germany is more than ripe for the outbreak of proletarian revolution. At this stage of historic evolution, where the process of the decomposition of capitalism can no longer be artificially obscured, the proletariat has to become aware that it needs an energetic intervention in order to effectively use the power that it already possesses. In an epoch of revolutionary class struggle like this, where the last phase of the struggle between capital and labour has begun and where the decisive combat itself is already underway, there can be no question of compromise with the enemy, but only a fight to the death. In particular, it is necessary to attack the institutions which seek to make a bridge across the gulf of class antagonisms and which orient themselves towards class collaboration (4) between exploiters and exploited. At a time when the objective conditions for the outbreak of the proletarian revolution have already arrived, and when the permanent crisis can only get worse and worse, there must be reasons of a subjective nature that are holding back the accelerated progress of the revolution. In other words: the consciousness of the proletariat is still partly trapped by bourgeois or petty-bourgeois ideology. The psychology of the German proletariat, in its present aspect, shows very distinct traces of a long-standing enslavement to militarism, and is characterised by a real lack of self-awareness. This is the natural product of the parliamentary cretinism of the old Social Democracy and of the USPD on one side, and of the absolutism of the union bureaucracy on the other. These subjective elements play a decisive role in the German revolution. The problem of the German revolution is the problem of the development of the German proletariat’s consciousness of itself.
Recognising this situation and the necessity to accelerate the rhythm of the development of the revolution in the world, as well as being faithful to the spirit of the 3rd International, the KAPD is fighting for the maximum demand of the immediate abolition of bourgeois democracy and the establishment of the dictatorship of the working class. It rejects in the democratic constitution the principle, doubly absurd and untenable in the present period, of conceding to the exploiting capitalist class political rights and the power to exclusively dispose of the means of production.
In conformity with its maximalist views the KAPD equally declares itself for the rejection of all reformist and opportunist methods of struggle, which is only a way of avoiding serious and decisive struggles with the bourgeois class. The party doesn’t seek to avoid these struggles, but on the contrary actively encourages them. In a State which carries all the symptoms of the period of the decadence of capitalism, the participation in parliamentarism is also part of these reformist and opportunist methods. In such a period, to exhort the proletariat to participate in parliamentary elections can only nourish the dangerous illusion that the crisis can be overcome through parliamentary means. It means resorting to a means used in the past by the bourgeoisie in its class struggle, whereas we are now in a situation where only the methods of proletarian class struggle, applied in a resolute and forthright manner, can have a decisive effect. Participation in bourgeois parliamentarism in the thick of the proletarian revolution can only signify the sabotage of the idea of the councils.
The idea of the councils in the period of proletarian struggle for political power is at the centre of the revolutionary process. The more or less strong echo that the idea of the councils arouses in the consciousness of the masses is the thermometer which makes it possible to measure the development of the social revolution. The struggle for the recognition of the revolutionary factory councils and political workers’ councils in the framework of a given revolutionary situation logically gives rise to the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat against the dictatorship of capitalism. This revolutionary struggle, whose specific political axis is constituted by the idea of the councils, is compelled, under the pressure of historic necessity, to come up against the totality of bourgeois social order and thus also against its political form, bourgeois parliamentarism. The system of councils or parliamentarism? It is a question of historic importance. To build a proletarian-communist world or to be shipwrecked in the storms of bourgeois-capitalist anarchy? In a situation as totally revolchy? In a situation as totally revolutionary as the present situation in Germany, participation in parliamentarism thus signifies not only the sabotage of the idea of councils, but also helps to give the putrefying bourgeois order a new lease of life, and thus to obstruct the progress of the proletarian revolution.
Aside from bourgeois parliamentarism, the unions form the principal rampart against the further development of the proletarian revolution in Germany. Their attitude during the world war is well-known. Their decisive influence on the principal orientation and tactics of the old Social Democratic Party led to the proclamation of the "Union Sacrée" with the German bourgeoisie, which was equivalent to a declaration of war on the international proletariat. Their effectiveness as social-traitors found its logical continuation at the time of the outbreak of the November 1918 revolution in Germany. Here they showed their counter-revolutionary intentions by co-operating with crisis-ridden German industrialists to set up a "community of labour" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) for social peace. They have maintained their counter-revolutionary attitude up to today, throughout the whole period of the German revolution. It is the bureaucracy of the unions which have most violently opposed the idea of the councils which was taking more and more profound root in the German working class; it is the unions who found the means to successfully paralyse all strivings for proletarian political power, which logically resulted from mass actions on the economic terrain. The counter-revolutionary character of the union organisations is so notorious that numerous bosses in Germany will only take on workers belonging to a union group. This reveals to the whole world that the union bureaucracy will take an active part in the maintenance of a capitalist system which is coming apart at the seams. The unions are thus, alongside the bourgeois substructure, one of the principal pillars of the capitalist state. Union history over these last 18 months has amply demonstrated that this counter-revolutionary formation cannot be transformed from the inside. The revolutionising of the unions is not a question of individuals: the counter-revolutionary character of these organisation is located in their structure and in their specific way of operating. From this it flows logically that only the destruction of the unions can clear the road for social revolution in Germany. The building of socialism needs something other than these fossilised organisations.
It is in the mass struggles that the factory organisation appears. It surfaces as something which hasn’t had and couldn’t have any equivalent, but that is not its novelty. What is new is that it penetrates everywhere during the revolution, as a necessary arm of the class struggle against the old spirit and the old foundations which were its base. It corresponds to the idea of the councils; that is why it is absolutely not a pure form or a new organisational trick, or even a "dark mystery"; organically born in the future, constituting the future, it is the form of expression of a social revolution which tends towards a society without classes. It is an organisation of pure proletarian struggle. The proletariat cannot be organised for the merciless overthrow of the old society if it is torn into strips by job category, away from its terrain of struggle; it must carry out its struggle in the factory. It is here that workers stand side by side as comrades; it is here that all are forced to be equal. It is here that the masses are the motor of production and are ceaselessly pushed to take control of production, to unveil its secrets. It is here that the ideological struggle, the revolutionising of consciousness, undergoes a permanent tumult, from man to man, from mass to mass. Everything is oriented towards the supreme class interest, not towards the craze for founding organisations, and the particular job interests are reduced to the measure which is due to them. Such an organisation, the backbone of the factory councils, becomes an infinitely more supple instrument of the class struggle, always an organism receiving fresh blood, owing to the permanent possibility of re-elections, revocation, etc. Going forward in the mass actions and along with them, the factory organisations will naturally have to create for themselves the centralised organs which correspond to their revolutionary development. Their principal business will be the development of the revolution and not programmes, statutes and plans in detail. It is not a credit bank or life assurance, even if - this goes without saying - it makes collections when it’s necessary to support strikes. Uninterrupted propaganda for socialism, factory assemblies, political discussions etc., all that is part of its tasks; in brief, it is the revolution in the factory.
In the main, the aim of the factory organisation is twofold. The first aim is the destruction of the unions, the totality of their bases and all the non-proletarian ideas which are concentrated around them. No doubt of course in this struggle the factory organisation will meet as desperate enemies all the bourgeois formations; but the same applies to the partisans of the USPD and the KPD, in so far as the latter are trapped unawares in the old schemas of Social Democracy (even if they adopt a politically different programme, they essentially remain a politico-moral critique of the "errors" of Social Democracy). These tendencies can even act as open enemies, inasmuch as in their eyes political trafficking and the diplomatic arts are still "above" the gigantic social struggle in general. Faced with these petty drudges one can have no scruples. There can be no agreement with the USPD (5) as they do not recognise the justification of factory organisations, on the basis of the struggle for workers’ councils. A great number of the masses already recognise them, rather than the USPD, as their political leadership. This is a good sign. The factory organisation, by unleashing mass strikes and by transforming their political orientation, basing themselves every time on the political situation of the moment, will contribute much more rapidly and much more thoroughly to unmasking and destroying the counter-revolutionary trade unions.
The second great aim of the factory organisation is to prepare for the building of communist society. Any worker who declares for the dictatorship of the proletariat can become a member (6). Moreover it is necessary to resolutely reject the trade unions, and to be resolutely free from their ideological orientation. This last condition will be the cornerstone for being admitted into the factory organisation. It is through this that one shows one’s adhesion to the proletarian class struggle and to its own methods; we do not demand adhesion to a more precise party programme. Through its nature and its inherent tendencies the factory organisation serves communism and leads to the communist society. Its kernel will always be expressly communist, its struggle pushes everyone in the same direction. On the other hand, the programme of the party has to deal with social reality in its widest sense; and the most serious intellectual qualities are demanded from party members. A political party like the KAPD, which goes forward and rapidly modifies itself in liaison with the world revolutionary process, can never have a great quantitative importance (if it is not to regress and become corrupt). But the revolutionary masses are, on the contrary, united in the factory organisations through their class solidarity, through the consciousness of belonging to the proletariat. It is this which organically prepares the unity of the proletariat; whereas on the basis of a party programme alone this unity is never possible. The factory organisation is the beginning of the communist form and becomes the foundation of the communist society to come.
The factory organisation carries out its tasks in close union with the KAPD.
The political organisation has the task of bringing together the most advanced elements of the working class on the basis of the party programme.
The relationship of the party to the factory organisation comes from the nature of the factory organisation. The work of the KAPD inside these organisations will be that of an unflagging propaganda, as well as putting forward the slogans of the struggle. The revolutionary cadres in the factory become the mobile arm of the party. Further, it is naturally necessary that the party always takes on for itself a more proletarian character, that it complies with the dictatorship from below. Through this the circle of its tasks grows wider, but at the same time it acquires the most powerful support. What has to be achieved is that the victory (the taking of power by the proletariat) ends up in the dictatorship of the class and not the dictatorship of a few party leaders and their clique. The factory organisation is the guarantee of this.
The phase of taking political power by the proletariat demands the firmest repression of capitalist-bourgeois movements. That will be achieved by putting in place an organisation of councils exercising the totality of political and economic power. In this phase the factory organisation itself becomes an element of the proletarian dictatorship, carried through into the factory. This latter moreover has the task of transforming itself into the base unit of the councils’ economic system.
The factory organisation is an economic condition for the construction of the communist community (Gemeinwesen). The political form of the organisation of the communist community is the system of the councils. The factory organisation intervenes so that political power is only exercised by the executive of the councils.
The KAPD thus struggles for the realisation of the maximum revolutionary programme, the concrete demands of which are contained in the following points:
1. Immediate political and economic fusion with all victorious proletarian countries (Soviet Russia, etc.), in the spirit of the international class struggle, with the aim of a common self-defence against the aggressive actions of world capital.
2. Arming of the politically organised revolutionary working class, setting up local military defence groups (Ortswehren), the formation of a Red Army; disarmament of the bourgeoisie, of all police, all officers,rgeoisie, of all police, all officers, of "citizens’ defence groups" (Einwohnerwehren) (7), etc.
3. Dissolution of all parliaments and all municipal councils.
4. Formation of workers’ councils as legislative and executive organs of power. Election of a central council of delegates of the workers’ councils of Germany.
5. Meeting of a congress of German councils as a supreme political authority of the Councils of Germany.
6. Taking over control of the press by the working class under the leadership of the local political councils.
7. Destruction of the bourgeois judicial apparatus and the immediate installation of revolutionary tribunals. Taking charge of the bourgeois prison system and the security services by appropriate proletarian organs.
1. Cancellation of state and other public debts, cancellation of war reparations (9).
2. Expropriation by the republic of councils of all banks, mines, foundries as well as the large firms of industry and commerce.
3. Confiscation of all wealth over a certain threshold, the latter fixed by the central council of the workers’ councils of Germany.
4. Transformation of private landed property into collective property under the leadership of the competent local and rural councils (Gutsräte).
5. The republic of councils to take charge of all public transports.
6. Regulation and central management of the totality of production by the higher economic councils, which must be mandated by the congress of economic councils.
7. Adaption of the whole of production to need, based on the most detailed statistical economic calculations.
8. Ruthless enforcement of the obligation to work.
9. Guarantee of individual existence relative to food, clothing, housing, old age, sickness, invalidity, etc.
10. Abolition of all caste, decorative and titled differences. Complete juridical and social equality of the sexesdical and social equality of the sexes.
11. Immediate radical transformation of provisions, housing and health in the interests of the proletarian population.
12. At the same time as the KAPD declares the most resolute war on the capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois state, it directs its attack against the totality of bourgeois ideology and makes itself the pioneer of a world proletarian-revolutionary conception. An essential factor in the acceleration of the social revolution resides in the revolutionising of the whole intellectual world of the proletariat. Conscious of this fact, the KAPD supports all revolutionary tendencies in science and the arts, all those elements which correspond to the spirit of the proletarian revolution.
In particular, the KAPD encourages all serious revolutionary efforts which allow the youth of both sexes to express themselves. The KAPD rejects all domination over youth.
The political struggle compels the youth to attain a superior development of its forces; this gives us the certitude that it will accomplish its greatest tasks with a total clarity and resolution.
In the interests of the revolution, it is the duty of the KAPD that youth gets all the support possible in its struggle.
The KAPD is conscious also that after the conquest of political power by the proletariat, a great domain of activity falls upon youth in the construction of communist society: the defence of the republic of councils by the Red Army, the transformation of the process of production, the creation of communist labour schools which will carry out their creative tasks in close connection with the factory.
This then is the programme of the Communist Workers’ Party of Germany. Faithful to the spirit of the Third International, the KAPD remains attached to the idea of the founders of scientific socialism, according to which the conquest of political power by the proletariat signifies the destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie. To destroy the totality of the bourgeois state apparatus with its capitalist army under the leadership of bourgeois and landed officers, with its police, its gaolers and its judges, with its priests and bureaucrats - here is the first task of the prole here is the first task of the proletarian revolution. The victorious proletariat must be steeled against the blows of the bourgeois counter-revolution. When this is imposed on it by the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must strive to crush the exploiters’ civil war with a ruthless violence. The KAPD is conscious that the final struggle between capital and labour cannot be settled inside national frontiers. As little as capitalism stops in front of national frontiers and holds back due to some national scruple or other in its incursion through the world, as little can the proletariat afford to be hypnotised by nationalist ideology and lose sight of the fundamental idea of international class solidarity. The more the idea of the international class struggle is clearly grasped by the proletariat, the more it will become the leitmotif of world proletarian policy, and the more impulsive and massive will be the blows of the world revolution which will break into pieces the decomposing capitalist world. Beyond all national particularities, beyond all frontiers and all fatherlands, the eternal beacon shines for the proletariat: PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE.
Berlin. 1920.
In the last issue of the International Review we saw how, since 1967, capitalism has confronted the open reappearance of its historic crisis, by developing state intervention in the economy in order to try to slow down and push its worst effects on to the periphery, the weakest sectors of its own national capital and, of course, onto the whole of the working class. We analysed the evolution of the crisis and the response of capitalism in the 1970s. We are now going to look at the development of its evolution during the 1980’s. This analysis will allow us to understand that the state’s policy of “accompanying the crisis in order to slow it down and spread it out” resolved nothing, nor did it bring about anything but the aggravation of the fundamental contradictions of capitalism.
The crisis of 1980-82
At the 2nd International Congress of the ICC held in 1977[1], we highlighted the way that the expansionist policies employed by capitalism were becoming increasingly less effective and were comng to a dead-end. The oscillations between “recovery” which provoked inflation and sudden slow-downs ending in recession led to what was called “stagflation” (recession and inflation at the same time) and demonstrated capitalism’s serious situation and the insoluble character of these contradictions. The incurable illness of overproduction, in its turn, globally aggravated the imperialist tensions in such a way that in the last years of the decade there was a considerable aggravation of military confrontations and the development of the arms race at both the nuclear and the convention level[2].
The 1980s began with an open recession that lasted until 1982 and which in many ways was worse than the previous recession in 1974-75: production stagnated (growth rates were negative in Great Britain and the European countries), unemployment grow spectacularly (in 1982, the USA registered in one month alone half a million job losses); industrial production fell in Great Britain in 1982 to the level of 1967 and for the first time since 1945, world trade fell for two consecutive years[3]. This lead to the closure of factories and mass unemployment at levels not seen since 1929. What has been called industrial and agricultural desertification began to develop and has continued ever since. On the one hand, entire regions of old traditional industries saw the systematic closure of factories and mines and unemployment levels shooting towards 30%. This happened in such areas as Manchester, Liverpool or Newcastle in Great Britain, Charleroi in Belgium; the Lorraine in France or Detroit in the United States. On the other hand, in many countries agricultural overproduction was such that governments financed the abandoning of vast areas of agriculture, and aid for farming and fishing was brutally cut causing the increasing ruin of small and medium peasants and unemployment amongst agricultural workers.
However, after 1983, there was an economic recovery, which initially remained, limited to the United States but spread to Europe and Japan from 1984-85. This recovery was basically brought about by the United States’ colossal levels of debt which raised production and progressively allowed the economies of Japan and Western Europe to get onto the bandwagon of growth.
This was the famous “Reaganomics” which at the time was presented as the great solution to the crisis of capitalism. This “solution” was also presented as the return to the “basics of capitalism”. Faced with the “excess” of state intervention which characterised state economic policies during the 1970’s (Keynesianism) and which was called “socialism” or the “proclivity” to socialism, the new economic theoreticians presented themselves as “neo-liberals” and their recipes for “less state”, the “free market”, etc were vaunted far and wide.
In reality, Reaganomics was not a great solution (from 1985, as we will see, it was necessary to pay the price of the USA’s levels of debt) nor was it a supposed “retreat of the state”. What the Reagan government did was to launch a massive rearmament program (under the name “Star Wars”, it made a powerful contribution to bringing its rival bloc to its knees) through the classic recourse to state debt. The famous locomotive was not fuelled by the healthy combustibles of a real expansion of the market but by the adulterated fuel of generalised debt.
The “new” politics of debt.
The only new thing about Reagan’s policy was the form for achieving these levels of debt. During the 1970s, the state was directly responsible for financing the growing deficits in public spending through increasing the monetary mass. This meant that the state supplied the money that the banks needed in order to lend money to businesses, to private borrowers, or to other states. This caused money to depreciate continually and so led to an explosion of inflation.
We have already seen the growing impasse in which the world economy found itself, especially that of America at the end of the 1970s. In order to get out of this episode, in the last two years of the Carter administration, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Volker, radically changed credit policy. He closed the taps of monetary emission, this provoked the 1980-82 recession, but simultaneously opened the way for massive financing through the emission of bonds and securities that were constantly renewed in the market. This orientation was taken up and generalised by the Reagan administration and spread throughout the world.
The mechanism of “financial engineering” was as follows. On the one hand, the state issued bonds and securities in order to finance its enormous and ever growing deficits which were subscribed to by the financial markets (banks, business and individuals). On the other hand, it pushed the banks to search for loans in the financial markets, and at the same time to issue bonds and securities and to carry out successive expansions of capital (issuing of shares). It was a question of a highly speculative mechanism which tried to exploit the development of a growing mass of fictitious capital (idle surplus value incapable of being invested in new capital).
In this way, the weight of private funds became more important than public funds in the financing of debt (public and private).
The financing of public debt in the USA
in billions of dollars
|
1980 |
1985 |
1990 |
1995 |
1997 |
Public |
24 |
45 |
70 |
47 |
40 |
Private |
46 |
38 |
49 |
175 |
260 |
(Global Development Finance)
This does not mean that there was a lessening of the weight of the state (as the “liberals” proclaim), but rather there was a reply to the increasing needs of financing (and particularly immediate liquidity) which meant a massive mobilisation of all the available disposable capital.
This supposedly “liberal” and “monetarist” policy meant that the rest of the world economy financed the famous US locomotive. Japanese capitalism especially, with its enormous trade surplus, bought massive amounts of Treasury bonds and securities, as well as the different issues by companies in this country. The result was that the United States, which since 1914 had been the world’s main creditor, from 1985 was converted into a net debtor and, from 1988, it became the world’s main debtor. Another consequence was that from the end of the 80s, Japanese banks held almost 50% of American property shares. Finally this form of indebtedness meant that “while in the period 1980-82 the industrialised countries poured $49,000 million more than they received into the so-called developing countries, in the period 1983-89 the latter supplied to the former $242,000 million more” ( Prometeo no 16, organ of Battaglia Communista, article “A new phase in the capitalist crisis”, December 1998).
The method used for repay the interest and principle on the issued bonds was the issuing of new bonds and securities. This meant increasing levels of debt and the risk of borrowers not subscribing to new issues. In order to continue to attract investors there were regular re-appropriations of dollars through various artificial revaluations of foreign exchange rates. The result of this was that, on the one hand, an enormous flood of dollars entered the world economy and, on the other hand, the USA developed a gigantic trade deficit that year after year broke new records. The majority of the industrialised countries more or less followed the same policy: using money as an instrument for attracting capital.
All of this encouraged a tendency which was to deepen throughout the 90s: the complete adulteration and manipulation of money. The classic function of money under capitalism was to be the measure of value and standard of price, in order to do this the money of the different states had to be backed by a minimal proportion of precious metals[4]. These reserves of noble metals tended to reflect the growth and development of the wealth of a country, this also tended to reflected through the price of its money.
We have already seen in the previous article how capitalism throughout the 20th century has abandoned these reserves and this has meant that money has circulated without any equivalent, with all the risks that entails. Nonetheless, the 80s constituted a real qualitative leap towards the abyss: the phenomenon, already serious, of money being completely separated from a counter-part in gold or silver, worsened throughout the decade. This was joined: firstly by the game of appreciation/depreciation in order to attract capital which caused tremendous speculation in these and, secondly; the increasingly systematic recourse to “competitive devaluation”: ie, the lowering of the price of money by decree with the aim of helping exports.
The pillars of this “new” economic policy were, on the one hand, the constant snowballing of the massive emission of bonds and securities, and, on the other, the incoherent manipulation of money by means of a sophisticated and complicated “financial system” which in reality was the work of the whole state and the large financial institutions (banks, savings banks and investment companies, which have very close links with the state). In appearance it was a “liberal” and “non-interventionist” mechanism, in practice it was a typical construction of Western state capitalism, which is to say a management based on the combination of the sectors dominated by private and state capital.
This policy was presented as the magic potion capable of bringing about economic growth without inflation. In the 70s, capitalism had found itself confronted by the insoluble dilemma of inflation or recession, now, whatever their political colouring (“socialist”, “leftist” or “centre”), governments converted to the “neo-liberal” and “monetarist” credo, and proclaimed that capitalism had overcome this dilemma and that inflation had been reduced to levels of 2 to 5% without harming economic growth.
This policy of the “struggle against inflation” and of supposed “growth without inflation” was based on the following means:
1. The elimination of “surplus” industrial and agricultural productive capacity which led to the closure of numerous industrial installations and massive lay-offs.
2. The drastic cutting of subsidies to industry and agriculture that also brought with it unemployment and closures.
3. The pressure to reduce costs and to increase productivity meant in reality a masked and gradual deflation based on brutal attacks against the working class of the central countries and a permanent lowering of the price of raw materials
4. The pushing of the inflationary effects onto the most peripheral countries, through mechanisms of monetary pressure and, especially, through the devaluation of the dollar. Thus, in Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia etc, there were explosions of hyperinflation leading to price increases reaching 30% a day!
5. Above all, the repaying debts with new debts. The financing of debt went from the issuing of paper money to it being carried out by the issuing of bonds (state bonds and securities, business shares etc), which led to the slowing down of the long-term effects of inflation. The debts contracted through the issue of bonds were repaid through new issues. These bonds were the objects of unstoppable speculation. The over-valuation of their price (this over-valuation was complemented by the manipulation of the price of money) meant that the underlying enormous inflationary pressures were delayed to a future date.
Measure (4) did not resolve inflation but simply changed its location (pushing it onto the weakest countries). Measure (5) may have delayed inflation until the future but at the cost of stoking up its counter-part: the bomb of monetary and financial instability and disorder.
As for measures (1) and (3) these may have reduced inflation in the short-term but their consequences will be much more serious in the medium to long-term. In fact, these measures constitute a hidden deflation, that is, a methodical and organised reduction by the state of real productive capacity. As we underlined in International Review no59 “This production may correspond to goods that are really made, but it’s not a production of values (...) capitalism hasn’t grown richer. On the contrary, it has grown poorer” (5).
The process of industrial and agricultural desertification; the enormous reduction in costs, lay-offs and general impoverishment of the working class, was methodically and systematically carried out by all governments throughout the 1980s and this has seen a major escalation in the 1990s which has taken the form of a hidden and permanent deflation. While 1929 produced a brutal and open deflation, in the 80s capitalism unleashed a hitherto unknown tendency: controlled and planned deflation, a form of gradual and methodical demolition of the bases of capitalist accumulation, a state of slow but irreversible de-accumulation.
The cutting of costs, the elimination of obsolete, and uncompetitive sectors, the gigantic growth of productivity were not symptoms in themselves of the growth and development of capitalism. It is certain that these phenomena accompanied the phases of capitalism’s development in the 19th Century. However, then they had meaning because they were at the service of the extension and broadening of the capitalist relations of production and the growth and formation of the world market. Their function in the 80s correspondent to a diametrically opposed aim: to protect from overproduction and their results are counter-productive, making it even worse.
For this reason, if these policies of “competitive deflation”, as the economists modestly call them, in the short-term reduce the bases of inflation, in the medium to long term they will reinforce and stimulate them, since the reduction of the basis of the reproduction of global capital can only be compensated for, on the one hand, by an always increasing mass of debt, and on the other, unproductive spending (armaments, state, financial and commercial bureaucracy). As we said in the Report on the Economic Crisis to our 12th International Congress: “the real danger of ‘growth’ leading to inflation is situated elsewhere: in the fact that any such growth today, any so-called recovery, is based on a huge increase in debt, on the artificial stimulation of demand - in other words on fictitious capital. This is the matrix which gives birth to inflation because it expresses a profound tendency in decadent capitalism: the growing divorce between money and value, between what goes on in the “real” world of the production of things and a process of exchange that has become such an “extremely complex and artificial mechanism” that even Rosa Luxemburg would be astounded if she could witness it today” (International Review. No 92).
Therefore, in reality, the only thing that has sustained the fall in inflation during the 80s and 90s has been the systematic postponing of debt through the merry-go-round of the issuing of new debts which have replaced the previous ones and the explosion of global inflation in the increasingly numerous weakest countries.
All of this was illustrated clearly by the debt crisis that exploded from 1982 in the Third World countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria etc). These states who had fed their expansion in the 70s through enormous debts (see the first part of this article) threatened to declare themselves bankrupt. The most important countries reacted rapidly and came to their “aid” with plans for debt “reconstruction” (the Brady Plan) or through direct intervention by the International Monetary Fund. In reality, what they were seeking to do was to avoid a brutal collapse of these states which would have destabilised all of the world economic system.
The remedies that were employed were a copy of the “new policy of debt”:
- The application of brutal plans for deflation under the direct control of the IMF and the World Bank that meant terrible attacks on the working class and the whole population. Those countries that in the 70s had lived the dream of “development” woke up to find themselves in a nightmare of generalised poverty from which they could not escape.
- The conversion of the loans in the National Debt into bonds that carried very high interest rates (10 to 20% more than the world average) and formidable speculation in them. The debt did not disappear: it was transformed into deferred debt. Far from the debt of the Third World countries falling it grew vertiginously throughout the 80s and 90s.
1929 |
1987 |
At the level of the productive apparatus: Crisis in traditional industries such as mining, textiles and railways, although subsequently there would be a strong expansion. |
Chronic crisis in sectors that continued to fall through the 90s and furthermore crisis in “modern” sectors such as white goods, automobiles, electronic. |
At the financial level: The speculation that provoked the crash was very recent (from the beginning of 1928) and was relatively new. |
Speculation had been developing since 1980 and there had been a series of precedents in the previous decade (eg. Petrodollars) |
At the level of crisis of overproduction: After several years of growth it appeared from 1929 onwards. |
The crisis preceded the crash and had lasted intermittently for 20 years. |
At the level of state capitalist policies: State intervention was very limited before the crash: widespread from 1933 onwards, it managed to thwart crisis and to restart production. |
State intervention was massive and systematic from the 30s and had had recourse to numerous measures from 1970 which had only episodically restarted production. |
The palliative of armaments: Massive war production deferred the crisis after 1934. |
Over-armament developed from 1945 and in the 80s it underwent a gigantic acceleration but as a means for palliating and deferring the crisis it was already worn-out. |
The crash of 1987
From 1985, the American locomotive began to run out of steam. Growth rates fell slowly, but inexorably and this was gradually transmitted to the European countries. Politicians and economists talked about a “soft landing”, that is to say they tried to put a break on the mechanism of debt that lay behind an increasingly uncontrollable speculation. The dollar, after years of revaluation, underwent a brutal devaluation: falling by more than 50% between 1985 and 1987. This momentarily eased the American deficit and brought about a reduction in the payment of interest on this debt, but the counter-part was the brutal 27% fall of the New York stock exchange in October 1987.
This figure was quantitatively less than the fall recorded in 1929 (more than 30%), however a comparative table of the situations in 1987 and 1929 allows one to understand that in 1987 the problems were much worse (see the bottom of this page).
The stock market crisis of 1987 meant a brutal purging of the speculative bubble that had fed the reactivation of the economy by Reaganomics. Since then, this reactivation has drained away. In the last half of the 80s we saw rates of growth between 1% and 3%: in effect, stagnation. But at the same time, the decade ended with the collapse of Russia and its satellites in the Eastern bloc, a phenomenon that although it had its roots in the particularities of these regimes was fundamentally a consequence of the brutal aggravation of the world economic crisis.
Along with the collapse of the Russian imperialist bloc a very dangerous tendency appeared from 1987: the instability of the whole of the world financial system, which was to lead to increasingly frequent tremors that demonstrate its growing fragility and vulnerability.
General balance sheet of the 1980s
We are going to draw some conclusions about the whole of the decade; as with the previous article these will concern the evolution of the economy as much as the situation of the working class. A comparison with the 1970s reveals a serious decline.
Evolution of the economic situation
1. Levels of growth in production reached their peak in 1984: 4.9%. The average for the period was 3.4%, whilst that for the previous decade was 4.1%.
2. There was an severe contraction of the industrial and agricultural apparatus. This was a new phenomenon after 1945 which affected the main industrialised countries. The following table which refers to three central countries (Germany, Great Britain and the USA) demonstrates a fall in industry and mining and a growing displacement towards unproductive and speculative sectors.
Evolution of production by sectors between 1974 and 1987 (%)
|
Germany |
GB |
US |
|
Mining |
-8.1 |
-42.1 |
-24.9 |
|
Industry |
-8.2 |
-23.8 |
-6.5 |
|
Construction |
-17.2 |
-5.5 |
12.4 |
|
Trade & catering |
-3.1 |
5.0 |
15.2 |
|
Finance & insurance |
11.5 |
41.9 |
34.4 |
|
(source OECD)
3. The majority of productive sectors suffered a fall in their levels of production. This could be seen as much in cutting edge sectors (cars, electronics, white goods) as in the “tradition-al” sectors (shipyards, engineering, tex-tiles, mining). Thus, for example, levels of car production in 1987 were the same as in 1978.
4. The situation in agriculture was disastrous:
- The countries of the East and the 3rd World were obliged for the first time since 1945 to import basic foodstuffs.
- The European Union decided to leave 20 million hectares fallow.
5. Production did grow in information technology, telecommunications, and electronics, nevertheless, this growth did not compensate for the fall in heavy industry and agriculture.
6. The periods of recovery did not affect the whole of the world economy; they were also short and accompanied by periods of stagnation (for example, between 1987 and 1989).
- The recovery in the USA during the period 1983-85 was high but between 1986-89 it was well below the average of 1970.
- The recoveries were weaker (a global situation of semi-stagnation) in all the countries of Western Europe except in Germany.
- A good number of Third World countries were uncoupled from the train of growth and fell into stagnation.
- The countries of the East suffered an almost general stagnation during the whole of the decade (except Hungary and Czechoslovakia).
7. Japan and Germany managed to maintain levels of acceptable growth from 1983. This growth was higher than the average and permitted enormous trade surpluses which transformed them into important financial creditors. However, these levels of growth were not as high as in the two previous decades.
Average annual growth of GDP in Japan
1960-70 |
8.7% |
1970-80 |
5.9% |
1980-90 |
3.7% |
(source: OECD)
8. The price of raw materials fell throughout the whole decade (save the period 1987-88). This allowed the industrialised countries to alleviate the underlying weight of inflation at the cost of the “Third World” countries (producers of raw materials) that progressively collapsed into total stagnation.
9. Armaments production under went its most important historical growth: between 1980-1988 it grow by 41% in the USA according to official figures. This growth means, as the Communist Left had already demonstrated, terminally weakening the economy. This is proved by American capital: at the same time as it was unceasingly increasing its share of world armaments production; the share of its exports in the world trade of important sectors fell, as can be seen from the following table:
% of exports in world trade
|
1980 |
1987 |
Machine tools |
12.7% |
9% |
Cars |
11.5% |
9.4% |
informatics |
31% |
22% |
10. Debt underwent a brutal explosion as much at the quantitative level as the qualitative:
At the quantitative level:
- In the “Third World”, it grew in an uncontrollable way:
The total debt in millions of $ of the underdeveloped countries
1980 |
580.000 |
1985 |
950.000 |
1988 |
1,320.00 |
(source the World Bank)
- it took off spectacularly in the USA:
The total debt in $ of the USA
1970 |
450.000 |
1980 |
1,069.00 |
1988 |
5,000.000 |
(source OECD)
- however, it was moderate in Japan and Germany.
At the qualitative level:
- the USA became a debtor country in 1985 after being a creditor for 71 years;
- in 1988, the United States was transformed into the most indebted country on the planet not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. This can be clearly seen from the fact that, while Mexico’s foreign debt represented 9 months of its GDP and Brazil’s 6 months, in the USA it represented 2 years of GDP!
- in the industrialised countries, the weight interest payments on loans represented on average 19% of the state budget.
11. The financial apparatus, which had previously been relatively stable and healthy, from 1987 became to suffering increasingly server storms:
- Significant banking collapses, the most serious of which was that of the Savings and Loans banks in American in 1988 with debts of $500,000 million.
- A succession of stock exchange crashes began in 1987: in 1989 there was another crash, though it was less serious due to state measures which immediately stopped trading when prices fell by 10%.
- Speculation took on a spectacular form. In Japan, for example, excessive property speculation caused a crash in 1989 whose consequences have been felt ever since.
The situation of the working class
1. We have seen the worst wave of unemployment since 1945. Unemployment rose brutally in the industrialised countries:
The number of unemployed in the 24 countries of the OECD
1979 |
18,000.000 |
1989 |
30,000.000 |
(source: OECD)
2. The appearance in the industrialised countries of a tendency towards under-employment (temporary, part-time and precarious work) while in the “Third World” under-employment became generalised.
3. From 1985 the governments of the industrialised countries adopted measures which encouraged temporary contracts under the pretext of “the struggle against unemployment”. In this way by 1990, temporary contracts effected 8% of the workforce in the OECD, while permanent jobs were declining.
4. Nominal wages grow very modestly (the average in the OECD countries between 1980-88 was 3%) and did not compensate for inflation despite its very low level.
5. Social spending (social security systems, housing subsidies, health, education, etc) suffered its first important cuts.
This decline in the living conditions of the working class was dramatic in the “underdeveloped” countries and serious in the industrialised countries. In the latter it was not as smooth or slow as in the previous decade despite the fact that governments, in order to avoid the unification of the struggles, organised the attacks in a gradual and planned way in order to avert them being too sudden and generalised.
However, for the first time since 1945 capitalism was incapable of increasing the total work force: the number of wage earners grew at a rate lower than the increase in the world population. In 1990 the International Labour Organisation put forward a figure of 800 million unemployed. This clearly shows the aggravation in capitalism’s crisis and thoroughly exposes the lying discourse of the bourgeoisie about the recovery of the economy.
Adalen
[1] See International Review no 11 “From the crisis to the war economy”, Report on the world economic situation of the 2nd Congress.
[2] The decade closed with the invasion of Afghanistan which led to a long and destructive war.
[3] See International Review no 26.
[4] “Just as every country needs a reserve fund for its internal circulation, so too it requires one for circulation in the world market. The functions of hoards, therefore, arise in part out of the function of money as medium of payments and circulation internally, and in part out of its function as a world money” (Marx: Capital Vol 1 Part 1 chapter 3 page 243 -Penguin Books 1979-) Marx is more specific a bit further on that “Countries with developed bourgeois production limit the hoards concentrated in the strong rooms of the banks to the minimum required for the performance of their specific functions”.
Report on the Crisis from the 8th International Congress.
In the first part of this article, we answered the accusation that we have become “Leninists”, and that we have changed position on the organisational question. We have shown not only that “Leninism” is opposed to our political principles, but also that it aims to destroy the historic unity of the workers’ movement. In particular, it rejects the struggle of the marxist lefts first within, then outside, the 2nd and 3rd Internationals by setting Lenin against Rosa Luxemburg, Pannekoek, etc. “Leninism” is the negation of the communist militant Lenin. It is the expression of the Stalinist counter-revolution of the early 1920s.
We also reaffirmed that, while we have always identified with Lenin’s struggle against economism and the Mensheviks for the construction of the party, we also continue to reject his errors on the organisational question, especially on the hierarchical and “military” nature of the organisation. On the theoretical level, we disagree with Lenin on the question of class consciousness, supposedly introduced into the class from the outside. At the same time, these errors have to be situated within their historical context in order to understand their importance and their real meaning.
What is the ICC’s position on What is to be done? and on Two steps forward, one step back? Why do we say that these two texts of Lenin’s are invaluable gains on the theoretical, organisational, and political level? Do our criticisms of these texts - on points which are by no means secondary, in particular on the issue of class consciousness in What is to be done? - call into question our fundamental agreement with Lenin.
“It would be wrong and caricatural to oppose a substitutionist Lenin of What is to be done? to the clear and healthy vision of a Rosa Luxemburg or a Leon Trotsky (who during the 1920s was to become the ardent advocate of the militarisation of labour and the all-powerful dictatorship of the party!)”.[1] [769] Our position on What is to be done? begins with our method for understanding the history of the workers’ movement, based on its unity and continuity, as we explained in the first part of this article. It is not new, and dates from the foundation of the ICC.
There are two main sections to What is to be done?, written in 1902. The first deals with the question of class consciousness and the role of revolutionaries. The second deals directly with organisational questions. The whole constitutes a merciless critique of the “economists”, who thought that consciousness could develop within the working class solely on the basis of the economic struggle. They therefore tended to under-estimate revolutionary organisations, and to deny them any active political role: their task was limited to “helping” the economic struggle. As a natural consequence of this under-estimation of the role of revolutionaries, economism opposed the formation of a centralised organisation able to intervene broadly and with one voice on all questions, whether economic or political.
Lenin’s 1903 text One step forward, two steps back complements What is to be done? on the historical level, and gives an account of the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks at the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP which had just taken place.
As we have said, the main weakness of What is to be done? is on class consciousness. What was the attitude of other revolutionaries on this question? Prior to the 2nd Congress, only the “economist” Martinov opposed Lenin’s position. It was only after the Congress that Plekhanov and Trotsky criticised Lenin’s incorrect idea of a consciousness imported into the working class from outside. They were the only ones to reject explicitly Kautsky’s position, adopted by Lenin, that “socialism and the class struggle emerge in parallel, and do not engender each other [and that] science is born not by the proletariat but by bourgeois intellectuals”.[2] [770]
Trotsky’s response on this issue is correct enough, though it remains very limited. We should not forget that we are in 1903, while Trotsky’s reply (Our political tasks) dates from 1904. The debate on the mass strike had barely begun in Germany, and was only really to develop with the experience of 1905 in Russia. Trotsky clearly rejects Kautsky’s position, and stresses the danger of substitutionism inherent in it. But although Trotsky makes a virulent attack on Lenin’s organisational positions, he does not distinguish himself completely from Lenin on the consciousness issue. Indeed, he understands and explains the reasons behind Lenin’s position:
“When Lenin adopted Kautsky’s absurd idea of the relationship between the “spontaneous” and “conscious” elements in the proletariat’s revolutionary movement, he was only making a rough sketch of the tasks of his time”.[3] [771]
We should also point out that nobody amongst Lenin’s new opponents protested at Kautsky’s position on consciousness before the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, when they were all united in the struggle against economism. At the Congress, Martov, the Menshevik leader, adopted exactly the same position as Lenin and Kautsky: “We are the conscious expression of an unconscious process”.[4] [772] After the Congress, so little importance was accorded the subject that the Mensheviks were still denying any programmatic disagreement, and putting the split down to Lenin’s “crazy ideas” about organisation: “With my poor intelligence, I am unable to understand what may be meant by ‘opportunism on organisational problems’ posed as something autonomous, bereft of any organic tie to programmatic and tactical ideas”.[5] [773]
Plekhanov’s criticism, while true, remains somewhat general and is limited to re-establishing the marxist position on the question. His main argument is that it is not true that “the intellectuals ‘worked out’ their own socialist theories ‘completely independently from the spontaneous growth of the workers’ movement’ - this has never happened and could never happen”.[6] [774]
Before and during the Congress, when he was still in agreement with Lenin, Plekhanov limited himself to the theoretical level on the class consciousness issue. But he failed either to deal with the debates of the 2nd Congress, or to answer the central question: what kind of Party, and what role for the Party? Only Lenin gave a response.
In his polemic against economism, Lenin had one central concern on the theoretical level: the question of class consciousness and its development in the working class. We know that Lenin soon went back on his adoption of Kautsky’s position, in particular with the experience of the mass strike in 1905 and the appearance of the first Soviets. In January 1917 - before the beginning of the Russian revolution and in the midst of imperialist war - Lenin returned to the mass strike of 1905. Whole passages - on “the interlocking of economic and political strikes” - could have been written by Luxemburg or Trotsky.[7] [775] And they give an idea of Lenin’s rejection of his initial idea, itself largely the result of “overstating the case” for polemical reasons.[8] [776]
“The real education of the masses can never be separated from an independent political struggle, and above all from the revolutionary struggle of the masses themselves. Only action educates the exploited class, action alone allows it to measure its strength, broaden its horizon, increase its capacities, enlighten its intelligence and temper its will”.[9] [777] This is a far cry from Kautsky.
But even in What is to be done?, the passages on consciousness are contradictory. Alongside the incorrect position, for example, Lenin adds: “This shows us that the ‘spontaneous element’ is fundamentally nothing other than the embryonic form of the conscious element”.[10] [778]
These contradictions are the expression of the fact that Lenin, in common with the rest of the workers’ movement in 1902, did not have a very clear or precise position on class consciousness.[11] [779] The contradictions in What is to be done?, as well as his later positions, show that Lenin was not particularly attached to Kautsky’s position. In fact, there are only three passages in What is to be done? where Lenin writes that “consciousness must be imported from the outside”, and of these one has nothing to do with Kautsky.
Rejecting the idea that it is possible “to develop the workers’ political class consciousness from within their economic struggle, that is to say on the basis solely (or at least principally) of the struggle... [Lenin replies that] ...political class consciousness can only be brought to the worker from outside, in other words from outside the economic struggle, outside the sphere of the relations between workers and employers”.[12] [780] The formulation is confused, but the idea is correct and does not correspond to the two other passages where he speaks of consciousness being brought “from outside”. His thinking is much more precise in another passage: “The political struggle of the social-democracy is much wider and more complex than the economic struggle of the workers against the bosses and the government”.[13] [781]
Lenin very clearly rejects the position developed by the “economists”, that class consciousness is a direct, mechanical, and exclusive product of the economic struggle.
We stand with What is to be done? in the struggle against economism. We agree also with the critical arguments used against economism, and we believe that their theoretical and political content remains relevant today.
“The idea that class consciousness does not appear mechanically from the economic struggle is entirely correct. But Lenin’s error is to think that class consciousness cannot be developed from the economic struggle, and must be introduced from the outside by a party”.[14] [782]
Is this a new appreciation on the part of the ICC? Here are some quotations from What is to be done? that we adopted, in 1989, in a polemic with the IBRP[15] [783] in order to support then what we are saying today: “The socialist consciousness of the worker masses is the only basis that can assure our triumph (...) The party must always have the possibility to reveal to the working class the hostile antagonisms between its interests and those of the bourgeoisie. [The class consciousness attained by the party] must be infused into the working masses with an increasing fervour (...) it is necessary to concern oneself as much as possible with the development of the consciousness of the workers in general. [The task of the party is to] use the sparks of political consciousness that the economic struggle generates in the spirit of the workers to raise them to the level of social-democratic consciousness”.[16] [784]
For Lenin’s detractors, the conceptions set out in What is to be done? prefigure Stalinism. There is therefore supposedly a link between Lenin and Stalin, including on the organisational issue.[17] [785] We have already dealt with this lie, on the historical level, in the first part of this article. We also reject it on the political level, including on the questions of class consciousness and political organisation.
There is a continuity running from What is to be done? to the Russian revolution, but certainly not to the Stalinist counter-revolution. This unity and continuity exists with the whole revolutionary process which links the mass strikes of 1905 and 1917, which ran from February 1917 to the revolution in October. For us, What is to be done? heralds the April Theses of 1917: “... in view of the fact that [the masses] are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with particular thoroughness, persistence and patience to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection existing between capitalism and the imperialist war (...) The masses must be made to see that the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies are the only possible form of revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is (...) to present a patient, systematic, and persistent explanation (...) especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses”.[18] [786] For us, What is to be done? heralds the October insurrection and the power of the Soviets.
Our present-day “anti-Leninist” detractors completely ignore this central concern of What is to be done? with consciousness, thus adopting one element of the Stalinist method which we have already denounced in the first part of this article. Just as Stalin had the images of old Bolshevik militants erased from photographs, so they erase the essential parts of Lenin’s thinking and accuse us of becoming “Leninists”, in other words Stalinist.
For Lenin’s uncritical adulators, like the Bordigist current, we are hopeless idealists because we insist on the role and importance of “class consciousness in the working class” for the proletariat’s historical and revolutionary struggle. For anyone who takes the trouble to read what Lenin wrote, and to immerse themselves in the real process of political confrontation and discussion of the time, both accusations are false.
What is to be done? brings other fundamental contributions at the political and organisational level, in particular Lenin’s clear distinction between the unitary organisations that the class creates for its day-to-day struggle, and its political organisations.
“These circles, professional associations and organisations of workers are necessary everywhere; they must be as widespread as possible, and their functions as varied as possible; but it is absurd and damaging to confuse them with the organisation of revolutionaries, to erase the line that separates them (...) the organisation of a revolutionary social-democratic party must of necessity be different in type to the organisation of the workers for the economic struggle”.[19] [787]
At this level, the distinction was not a new discovery for the workers’ movement. International, and especially German, social-democracy was clear on the question. But in its struggle against economism (the Russian variety of opportunism), and taking account of the particular conditions of the class struggle in Tsarist Russia, What is to be done? goes further and puts forward a new idea.
“The organisation of revolutionaries must include mainly and above all men whose profession is revolutionary action. This characteristic common to all members of such an organisation should efface any distinction between workers and intellectuals, and still more between different professions. Necessarily, such an organisation should not be very large, and it should be as clandestine as possible”.[20] [788]
Let us pause for a moment here. It would be wrong to see this passage as solely determined to the historical conditions within which Russian revolutionaries were working, in particular of illegality, clandestinity, and repression. Lenin puts forward three points which are universally and historically valid, whose validity has indeed been confirmed over and over to this day. The first is that to be a communist militant is a voluntary and serious act (he uses the word “professional”, which was also taken up by the Mensheviks in the debates at the Congress). We have always agreed with this conception of militant commitment, which combats and rejects any dilettante attitude.
Secondly, Lenin defends a vision of the relations between militants which goes beyond the division between worker and intellectual,[21] [789] or “leader and led” as we would say today, which goes beyond any vision based on hierarchy or individual superiority, in a community of struggle within the party. He also opposes any division between militants by trade or industrial branch. He rejects in advance the factory cells which were set up during the “Bolshevisation” of the party, in the name of “Leninism”.[22] [790]
Finally, he considered that the party should “not be very large”. He was the first to see that the period of mass workers’ parties was coming to an end.[23] [791] Certainly, this clarity was fostered by conditions inside Russia. But it was the new conditions of the proletariat’s life and struggle, expressed especially in the “mass strike”, which also determined the new conditions of the activity of revolutionaries, in particular the “smaller”, minority nature of the revolutionary organisations in the period of capitalist decadence which opened at the beginning of the century.
“But it would be (...) ‘tail-endism’ to think that under capitalism the whole class, or almost the whole class, could one day raise itself to the point of acquiring the degree of consciousness and action of its vanguard, of its Social-Democratic Party”.[24] [792]
While Rosa Luxemburg, Pannekoek, and Trotsky were among the first to draw the lessons of the appearance of the mass strike and the workers’ councils, they remained prisoners of a vision of workers’ parties as mass political organisations. Rosa Luxemburg criticised Lenin from the standpoint of a mass party,[25] [793] to such a point that she too could fall into error, as when she wrote: “in reality, the social-democracy is not linked to the organisation of the working class, it is the very movement of the working class”.[26] [794] She too was a victim of her own “over-stating the case” in polemic, and of her position alongside the Mensheviks on the organisation question during the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, and so slid unhappily onto the terrain of the Mensheviks and the “economists” by drowning the organisation of revolutionaries in the class.[27] [795] She was to correct her position later, but it was Lenin who formulated most clearly the distinction between the organisation of the whole working class and the organisation of revolutionaries.
What is to be done?, and One step forward, two steps back, are thus essential political advances in the history of the workers’ movement. More precisely, the two works represent “practical” political gains on the organisational level. Like Lenin, the ICC has always considered the organisational question as a political question in its own right. The political organisation of the class is different from its unitary organisation, and this has practical implications, at its own level. Amongst them, it is essential to have a strict definition of what it means to join and belong to the party, in other words a definition of the militant, his tasks, his duties, his rights, in short his relation to the organisation. The battle at the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP around the first article of the statutes is well known: this was the first confrontation, within the Congress itself, between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The difference between the formulations proposed by Lenin and Martov may appear insignificant:
For Lenin, “A party member is one who accepts the Party’s programme and supports the Party both financially and by personal participation in one of the Party organisations”. For Martov, “A member of the RSDLP is one who accepts the Party’s programme, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations”.
The divergence lies in the recognition as members of the Party either militants who belong to the Party and are recognised as such by the latter — Lenin’s position — or militants who do not formally belong to the Party, but who support it at one time or another, in one activity or another, or even simply who declare themselves as Social-Democrats. This position of Martov and the Mensheviks is thus broader, more “flexible”, less restrictive and less precise than Lenin’s.
Behind this difference lies a fundamental question which quickly came to light in the Congress, and which confronts revolutionary organisations to this day: who is a member of the Party, and — still more difficult to define — who is not?
For Martov, things were clear: “The more widespread the appellation of Party member, the better. We can only be glad if every striker, every demonstrator, taking responsibility for his actions, can declare himself a member of the Party”.[28] [796]
Martov’s position tends to dissolve the revolutionary organisation into the class. It comes back to the same “economism” which he had previously fought against, alongside Lenin. His argument in favour of his proposed Statute boils down to liquidating the very idea of a vanguard, unified Party, centralised and disciplined around a precise political programme, and a rigorous collective will to action. It also opens the door to opportunist policies of unprincipled “recruitment” of militants, which puts the Party’s long term development in hock to immediate results. It is Lenin who is correct:
“On the contrary, the stronger our organisations of real social-democrats, the less will be the hesitation and instability within the Party, and the wider, more varied, richer and more fruitful will be the Party’s influence on the elements of the working class around it, and led by it. It is impossible to confuse the Party, the vanguard of the working class, with the class as a whole”.[29] [797]
The extreme danger of Martov’s opportunist position on the organisation, recruitment, and membership of the Party very quickly appeared in the Congress with the intervention of Axelrod: “It is possible to be a sincere and devoted member of the social-democratic party, and yet be completely inapt for the organisation of a rigorously centralised combat”.[30] [798]
How can one be a member of the Party, a communist militant, an yet “inapt for the organisation of a rigorously centralised combat”? To accept such an idea would be as absurd as to accept the idea of a revolutionary and militant worker “inapt” for any collective class action. Any communist organisation can only accept militants who are apt for its discipline and the centralisation of its combat. How could it be otherwise? Unless we are to accept that there is no imperative demand on militants to respect the relationships of the organisation, the decisions it adopts, and the necessity of its combat. Unless, indeed, we reduce to ridicule the very notion of a communist organisation, which must be “the most determined fraction of all the workers’ parties in every country, the fraction that pulls forward all the others”.[31] [799] The proletariat’s historic struggle is a united class combat on the historical level, collective and centralised on the international level. Like their class, the communists’ combat is historic, international, permanent, united, collective and centralised, which is opposed to any individualist vision. “While critical consciousness and initiative are of a very limited value for individuals, they are fully realised in the collectivity of the Party”.[32] [800] Whoever is unable to take part in this centralised combat is inapt for militant activity and cannot be recognised as a member of the Party. “The Party should only admit elements capable of at least a minimum of organisation”.[33] [801]
This “aptitude” is the fruit of communists’ political and militant conviction. It is gained and developed in participation in the historic struggle of the proletariat, especially within its organised political minorities. For any consistent communist organisation, every new militant’s conviction in and “practical” — not platonic — aptitude for a rigorously centralised fighting organisation are both preconditions for his membership and a concrete expression of his political agreement with the communist programme.
The definition of the militant, of what it means to be a member of a communist organisation, is an essential question today. What is to be done? and One step forward, two steps back provide the foundations for our answers to many organisational questions. This is why the ICC has always based itself on the Bolshevik combat at the 2nd RSDLP Congress to distinguish clearly and firmly between a militant, who “participates personally in one of the Party organisations”, as Lenin insisted, and a sympathiser, a fellow-traveller who “accepts the Party’s programme, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular [or irregular, we would add] personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations”, as it is put in Martov’s definition, which was eventually adopted by the 2nd Congress. In the same way, we have always defended the principle that “once you want to be a member of the Party, you must also recognise the relationships of the organisation, and not just platonically”.[34] [802]
None of this is new for the ICC. It is at the core of its constitution, as is proven by the Statutes adopted at its first International Congress in January 1976.
It would be wrong to think that this question no longer poses any problems today. Firstly, although its last political expressions are silent or on the point of disappearing,[35] [803] councilism remains today in some sort the heir to economism and Menshevism at the organisational level. In a period of greater working class activity, there is no doubt that councilist pressure to “deceive oneself, close one’s eyes to the immensity of our tasks, restrict these tasks [by forgetting] the difference between the vanguard detachment and the masses that surround it”,[36] [804] will find a renewed vigour. Then again, even in the milieu which claims its heritage solely from the Italian Left and from Lenin, in other words the Bordigist current and the IBRP, Lenin’s method and political thought on organisation issues is far from being put fully into practice. We need only consider the Bordigist PCI’s unprincipled recruitment policy during the 1970s. This kind of activist and immediatist policy ended up provoking the PCI’s explosion in 1982. We need only consider the lack of rigour of the IBRP (which regroups the CWO in Britain and Battaglia Comunista in Italy), which sometimes has difficulty in deciding who is a militant of the organisation and who is only a sympathiser or a close contact, despite all the dangers of such organisational vagueness.[37] [805] Opportunism on the organisational question is today one of the most dangerous poisons for the proletarian political milieu. Unfortunately, the incantation of Lenin and the “compact and powerful party” are no antidote.
What does Rosa Luxemburg say in her polemic with Lenin on the question of the militant and his membership of the party?
“The conception expressed here [ie., in One step forward, two steps back] in a rigorous and exhaustive manner is that of a relentless centralism. The life-principle of this centralism is, on the one hand, the sharp accentuation of the distinction of the organised troops of explicit and active revolutionaries from the unorganised, though revolutionary, milieu which surrounds them; on the other hand, it is the strict discipline and the direct, decisive, and determining intervention of the central committee in all activities of the local organisations of the party”.[38] [806]
Although Luxemburg does not take an explicit position against Lenin’s precise definition of the militant, her ironic tone in writing of “the organised troops of explicit and active revolutionaries”, and her complete silence when it comes to the political battle in the Congress around article 1 of the Statutes, show that her position at the time was incorrect, and paralleled that of the Mensheviks. She remained a prisoner of the vision of a mass party which the German social-democracy of the day put forward as an example. She did not see the problem, and in fact avoids it by missing the point of the debate. Her silence on the debate around article 1 of the Statutes means that Lenin was right to reply that she “limits herself to repeating empty phrases without trying to give them a meaning. She holds up scarecrows without going to the heart of the debate. She has me uttering commonplaces, general ideas, and absolute truths and tries to remain silent on the relative truths which are based on precise facts”.[39] [807]
As with Plekhanov and many others, Luxemburg’s general considerations — even when they are correct in themselves — do not answer the real political questions posed by Lenin. As we said in 1979, “Luxemburg’s general concern was correct — the insistence on the collective character of the workers’ movement — but the insistence that ‘the emancipation of the workers is the task of the workers themselves’ brought with it incorrect practical conclusions”.[40] [808] She misses the political gains in the Bolsheviks’ combat.
Without the debate on article 1, the question of the party, clearly defined and clearly distinct both organisationally and politically from the working class as a whole, would not have been definitively settled. Without Lenin’s fight for article 1, the question would not be a prime political gain on organisational matters, on which today’s communists must lean in building their organisation, not just when it comes to accepting new militants, but also and above all for establishing clear, rigorous relations between the militants and the revolutionary organisation.
Is this defence of Lenin’s position on article 1 something new for the ICC? Have we changed position? “To be a member of the ICC, [the militant] must integrate into the organisation, participate actively in its work, and carry out the tasks which are allotted to him” says the article in our own Statutes which deals with the question of militant membership of the ICC. It is perfectly clear that we have adopted, without any ambiguity, Lenin’s conception, the spirit and even the letter of the Statutes that he proposed to the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, and certainly not those of Martov or Trotsky. It is a pity that the ex-members of the ICC who today accuse us of becoming “Leninists” have forgotten what they themselves adopted at the time. Undoubtedly they were guilty of doing so without thinking, in the flush of post-68 student enthusiasm. At all events, it is particularly dishonest of them to accuse the ICC of having changed position, and to claim that it is they who are faithful to the true, original ICC.
We have briefly presented our conception of the revolutionary militant, and shown how much it owes to Lenin’s contribution in What is to be done? and One step forward, two steps back. We have emphasised the importance of translating this definition of the militant as faithfully and as rigorously as possible into daily militant practice, through the organisation’s Statutes. Here again, we have always been faithful to Lenin’s method and the lessons he has left on organisational matters. The political struggle to establish precise rules regulating organisational relationships, in other words Statutes, is fundamental. The struggle to have them respected is equally so, of course. Without this, grand declarations on the Party remain mere empty words.
In the framework of this article, space prevents us from setting out our conception of the unity of the political organisation, and showing how Lenin’s struggle at the RSDLP’s 2nd Congress against the survival of circles, is a considerable theoretical and political contribution. But we want to insist on the necessity of the practical importance of translating the need for this unity into the organisation’s Statutes:: “The unitary nature of the ICC is also expressed in these Statutes” (ICC Statutes). Lenin expressed this reason and necessity very well.
“Aristocratic anarchism does not understand that formal Statutes are necessary precisely to replace the limited ties of the circles with the wider ties of the Party. The ties within or between circles neither could nor should have taken on a precise form, since it was based on camaraderie and uncontrolled and unmotivated ‘confidence’. Party ties cannot and must not be based on either the one or the other, but on formal statutes, drawn up ‘bureaucratically’[41] [809] (from the standpoint of the undisciplined intellectual), and whose strict observation will alone guard us from the whims and caprices of the circles, against their petty arguments called the free ‘process’ of ideological struggle”.[42] [810]
The same is true of the organisation’s centralisation against any federalism, localism, or vision which sees the organisation as a sum of parties or even autonomous revolutionary individuals. “The international congress is the sovereign body of the ICC” (ICC Statutes). On this level also, we consider ourselves the heirs of Lenin and of the necessary practical expression of his combat in the organisation’s statutes, both for the RSDLP of the time, and for the organisations of today.
“At the time when we are re-establishing the real unity of the Party, and dissolving in this unity the circles which have outlived their usefulness, this summit is necessarily the Congress of the Party, which is its supreme organism”.[43] [811]
The same is true for internal political life: Lenin’s contribution is particularly concerned with internal debate, the duty — not merely the right — to express any disagreement within an organisational framework and to the organisation as a whole; and once debates are settled and decisions taken by the Congress (which is the sovereign body, the organisation’s general assembly in effect), then the subordination of both parts and individual militants to the whole. Contrary to the widespread ieda that Lenin was a dictator who sought only to stifle debate and political life within the organisation, in reality he consistently opposed the Menshevik vision of the Congress as “a recorder, a controller, but not a creator”.[44] [812]
For Lenin and for the ICC, the Congress is a “creator”. In particular, we utterly reject the idea of binding mandates for delegates to the Congress, which is contrary to the widest, most dynamic, and most fruitful debate, and which would reduce the Congress to being nothing but a “recorder”, as Trotsky wanted in 1903. A “recording” congress would enshrine the supremacy of the parts over the whole, the reign of “everyman master in his own house”, of localism and federalism. A “recording and controlling” congress is the negation of the congress’ sovereign nature. Like Lenin, we are for the congress as “sovereign body” of the party, and which must have the power of decision and “creation”. The “creative” congress implies delegates who are not the prisoners of binding mandates.[45] [813]
The fact that the congress is the sovereign body also implies its preponderance over all the different parts of the communist organisation, in programmatic, political, and organisational terms.
“‘The Congress is the supreme instance of the Party’. Consequently, anyone who in one way or another prevents a delegate from addressing the Congress on any question of the life of the Party, without reserve or exception, transgresses the discipline of the Party and the rule of the Congress. The controversy thus boils down to the dilemma: circle spirit or Party spirit? Limitation of the rights of the delegates to the Congress, in the name of the imaginary rights or rules of all sorts of colleges or circles, or the complete, effective, and not merely verbal dissolution of all inferior instances, of all the little groups, before the Congress”.[46] [814]
On these points also we not only claim the heritage of Lenin’s combat, we express these conceptions whose heirs we are, and which we believe we continue, in our own organisational rules, in other words in our Statutes.
We have seen that neither Luxemburg nor Trotsky reply to Lenin on article 1 of the Statutes. They completely ignore both this question and that of the Statutes in general. They prefer to remain at the level of abstract generalities. And when they deign to evoke the Statutes, they completely underestimate them. At best, they consider the political organisation’s Statutes as nothing more than safety barriers, indicating the edge of the road and the limits not to be crossed. At worst, they see them as nothing more than tools of repression, exceptional measures to be used only with extreme caution. We should point out in passing that this vision of the statutes is the same as that of Stalinism, which also sees the statutes as instruments of repression, though without the “caution”.
For Trotsky, Lenin’s formulation of article 1 would have left “the platonic satisfaction [of having] discovered the surest statutory remedy against opportunism (...) Without a doubt this a simplistic, typically administrative way of resolving a serious practical question”.[47] [815]
Without realising it of course, Luxemburg herself answers Trotsky, when she says that in the case of a party that is already formed (eg a mass social-democratic party as in Germany), “a more rigorous application of the idea of centralism in the constitution and a stricter application of party discipline can no doubt be a useful safeguard against the opportunist current”.[48] [816] She agrees with Lenin for the German case, ie in general. By contrast, for the Russian case, she begins with “abstract truths” (“opportunist errors cannot be warded off in advance; only after they have taken on tangible forms in practice can they be overcome through the movement itself”), which are meaningless, and which in reality justify “in advance” any renunciation in the struggle against opportunism on organisational matters. Which she does not fail to do later on, still in the case of the Russian party, by making fun of the statutes as “paper paragraphs”, and “penpushers’ methods”, considering them as exceptional measures:
“The party constitution should not be seen as a kind of self-sufficient weapon against opportunism but merely as an external means through which the decisive influence of the present proletarian-revolutionary majority of the party can be exercised”.[49] [817]
We have never agreed with Rosa Luxemburg on this point: “Luxemburg continued to reiterate that it was for the mass movement to overcome opportunism; revolutionaries could not accelerate this movement artificially (...) Luxemburg never came to understand the fact that the collective character of revolutionary activity is something which grows and develops”.[50] [818] On the question of the statutes, we are and always have been in agreement with Lenin.
For Lenin, the statutes are much more than mere formal rules of functioning, rules to which we appeal in exceptional circumstances. Unlike Luxemburg, or the Mensheviks, Lenin defined the statutes as rules of conduct, the spirit which should animate the organisation and its militants from day to day. Far from understanding the statutes as a means of coercion and repression, Lenin saw them as weapons determining the responsibility of different parts of the organisation and of militants towards the whole political organisation; imposing a duty of open, public expression of political difficulties and disagreements before the whole organisation.
Lenin did not think of the expression of viewpoints, nuances, discussions, or disagreements as a right of militants, a right of the individual against the organisation, but rather as a duty and responsibility towards the whole party and its members. The communist militant is responsible, before his comrades in struggle, for the party’s political and organisational unity. The statutes are tools at the service of the unity and centralisation of the organisation, and therefore weapons against federalism, against the circle spirit, against cronyism, against any parallel life and discussion within the organisation. For Lenin, the statutes are not simply external limits, they are more than just rules: they are a political, organisational, and militant way of life.
“Controversial questions, within the circles, were not settled according to the statutes, ‘but through struggle and threats to leave’ (..) When I was only a member of a circle (...) I had the right, to justify for example my refusal to work with X, merely to invoke my uncontrolled, unmotivated distrust. Now that I am a member of the Party, I no longer have the right to invoke solely a vague suspicion, since this would open the door to the crazes and extravagances of the old circles; I am obliged to give a motive for my confidence or ‘suspicion’ with formal arguments, in other words to this or that formally established measure of our programme, our tactics, or our statutes. My duty is to no longer content myself with an uncontrolled ‘I have confidence’ or ‘I have no confidence’, but to recognise that I am accountable for my decisions, just as any fraction of the Party is for its, before the Party as a whole; I must follow a formally defined path to express my ‘distrust’, to win others over to the ideas and desires which spring from this distrust. We have risen from the uncontrolled ‘confidence’ of the circles to a party conception, which demands the observation of strict procedures and determined motives to express and verify confidence”.[51] [819]
The revolutionary organisation’s statutes are not merely exceptional measures, safety barriers. They are the concretisation of the organisational principles proper to the proletariat’s political vanguards. They are the products of these principles, at one and the same time a weapon in the fight against organisational opportunism, and the foundation on which the revolutionary organisation must be built. They are the expression of its unity, its centralisation, its political and organisational life, and its class character. They are the rule and the spirit which must guide the militants from day to day in their relations with the organisation and other militants, in the tasks entrusted to them, in their rights and duties, and in their daily personal life, which can be in contradiction neither with their militant activity nor with communist principles.
For us, as for Lenin, the organisational question is a political question in its own right. More than that, it is a fundamental political question. The adoption of statutes and the constant fight for their observance lie at the heart of an understanding of and the battle for the construction of the political organisation. The statutes are also a theoretical and political question in their own right. Is this a discovery for our organisation? A change of position?
“The ICC’s unitary nature is expressed also in the present statutes, which are valid for the whole organisation (...) These statutes constitute a concrete application of the ICC’s conceptions in organisational matters. As such, they form an integral part of the ICC’s platform” (Statutes of the ICC).
In the struggle of the proletariat, this struggle of Lenin was an essential moment in the formation of its political organ, which was finally concretised with the foundation of the Communist International in March 1919. Before Lenin, the First International (the International Workingmen’s Association) had been an equally important moment. An important moment after Lenin was the fight of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left for its own organisational survival.
There is a red thread, a continuity of organisational theory, principles, and politics, that runs through these different experiences. Today’s revolutionaries can only anchor their action in this historic continuity.
We have quoted extensively from our own texts, which show unambiguously what is our heritage as far as the organisational question is concerned. Our method, in re-appropriating the political and theoretical gains of the workers’ movement is not an invention of the ICC. We are the heirs of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left and its publication Bilan in the 1930s, and of the Communist Left of France and its review Internationalisme in the 1940s. This is the same method we have always used, and without which the ICC would not exist, or at least not in its present form.
“The most complete expression of the solution to the problem of the role of the conscious element, the Party, in the victory of socialism, has been given by the group of Russian marxists of the old Iskra, and notably by Lenin who as early as 1902 has given a definition in principle of the problem of the party in his remarkable work What is to be done? Lenin’s notion of the Party was to serve as a backbone to the Bolsheviks, and was to be one of that party’s greatest contributions to the international struggle of the proletariat”.[52] [820]
There is no doubt that the world communist party of tomorrow will not be formed without Lenin’s contributions in the matter of principle, theory, politics, and organisation. The real — and not merely verbal — re-appropriation of these gains, along with their rigorous and systematic application to today’s conditions, is one of the most important tasks for today’s little communist groups, if they are to contribute to the process of formation of this Party.
RL
[1] [821] ICC pamphlet on Communist Organisations and Class Consciousness, 1979
[2] [822] Kautsky, quoted by Lenin in What is to be done?
[3] [823] Trotsky in Our political tasks.
[4] [824] From the proceedings of the 1903 Congress
[5] [825] P. Axelrod, On the origins and meaning of our organisational differences, letter to Kautsky, 1904.
[6] [826] G. Plekhanov, The working class and the social-democratic intellectuals, 1904.
[7] [827] See Luxemburg’s 1906 Mass strike, party, and unions, and Trotsky’s 1905, written in 1908-09.
[8] [828] See the first part of this article in International Review no.96.
[9] [829] Lenin, Report on 1905, written in 1917.
[10] [830] Lenin, What is to be done?
[11] [831] Marx’s work is much clearer on the question. But much of the latter was unknown to revolutionaries of the day, being either unavailable or unpublished. A basic work on the question of consciousness, The German Ideology, was only published for the first time in 1932!
[12] [832] Lenin, What is to be done?
[13] [833] Idem.
[14] [834] Communist organisations and class consciousness, ICC pamphlet, 1979.
[15] [835] This article (International Review no.57) was written, not by the ICC but by the comrades of the Grupo Proletario Internacionalista, which was later to form the ICC’s section in Mexico.
[16] [836] “Class consciousness and the Party”, in (International Review no.57), 1989.
[17] [837] Amidst all the lies of the bourgeoisie, we should note the little contribution from RV, ex-militant of the ICC, who declares that “there is a real continuity and coherence between the conceptions of 1903 and actions like the banning of fractions within the Bolshevik Party or the crushing of the Kronstadt workers’ revolt” (RV, “Prise de position sur l’évolution récente du CCI”, published by us in our pamphlet La prétendue paranoia du CCI).
[18] [838] Lenin, April Theses.
[19] [839] Lenin, What is to be done?
[20] [840] Idem.
[21] [841] We hardly need to remind our reader here of the low educational level, and the extent of illiteracy among Russian workers at the time. This did not prevent Lenin from considering that they should and could take part in the activity of the party in just the same way as the “intellectuals”.
[22] [842] See the first part of this article in the previous issue.
[23] [843] “He also turned away from the Social Democratic conception of a mass party. For Lenin the new conditions of struggle meant that there was a need for a minority vanguard party which would work for the transformation of economic struggles into political ones” (Communist organisations and class consciousness, ICC, 1979).
[24] [844] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[25] [845] “This militant, who had passed through the school of social-democracy, developed such an unconditional attachment to the mass character of the revolutionary movement that, for her, the party had to adapt itself to anything which bore this character” (Communist organisations...).
[26] [846] Rosa Luxemburg, Questions of organisation in Russian social-democracy.
[27] [847] Our reader will have remarked also that this position leaves the door wide open to the position that sees the party substituting itself for the action of the working class, to the point where it exercises state power in the name of the class, or attempts to carry out “putschist” actions, as the Stalinists were to do in the 1920s.
[28] [848] Martov, quoted by Lenin in One step forward, two steps back.
[29] [849] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[30] [850] Proceedings of the 2nd Congress of the RSDLP, translated from the Spanish “Era” edition by us.
[31] [851] Marx, Communist Manifesto.
[32] [852] Theses on the tactics of the Communist Party of Italy (Rome Theses), 1922.
[33] [853] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[34] [854] The Bolshevik Pavlovich, quoted by Lenin in One step forward, two steps back.
[35] [855] See World Revolution no.222 for our response to the decision by the Dutch group Daad en Gedachte to cease publication.
[36] [856] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[37] [857] We have already criticised the vagueness and opportunism of BC in Italy on this question with regard to the militants of the GLP (see World Revolution no.220). The case is not an isolated one. An article recently appeared on the IBRP web site (www.ibrp.org [858]) entitled “Should revolutionaries work in reactionary trades unions?”. In this unsigned article (retranslated back from the French by us), whose author could be a member of the CWO, the question of the title is answered: “materialists, not idealists, must answer in the affirmative”. Two arguments are put forward: “There are many combative workers in the unions”, and “communists should not despise organisations which regroup masses of workers” (sic). This position completely contradicts that of Battaglia at its last Congress (and therefore we presume of the IBRP), which defends the idea that “there can be no real defence of workers’ interests, even their most immediate interests, other than outside and against the union line”. Above all, the problem is that we have no idea who wrote the article: a militant or a sympathiser of the IBRP? And in either case, why no position on it, why no criticism? Did the comrades forget? Or is it out of opportunism in order to recruit a new militant who apparently has not completely broken with leftism? Or is this simply an under-estimation of the organisational question? Once again, for the groups of the IBRP this is reminiscent of Martov. Since then, the text has been withdrawn from the web site, without further comment.
[38] [859] Rosa Luxemburg, “Organisational questions of Russian social-democracy”, in Selected Political Writings, Monthly Review Press, 1971.
[39] [860] Lenin, “Reply to Rosa Luxemburg”, published in Trotsky, Nos tâches politiques, Edition Belfond.
[40] [861] Communist organisations and class consciousness.
[41] [862] Another example of Lenin’s polemical method, which took up his opponents’ accusations to turn them against them (see the first part of this article).
[42] [863] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[43] [864] Idem.
[44] [865] Trotsky, Report of the Siberian delegation.
[45] [866] Eberlein, delegate of the German Communist Party to what was originally to have been no more than an international conference in March 1919, was mandated to oppose the foundation of the Third, Communist, International. It was clear for all the participants, in particular the Bolshevik leaders Lenin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, that the International could not be formed without the German CP. Had Eberlein remained a “prisoner” of his imperative mandate, deaf to the debates and the dynamic of the conference, then the International as world party of the proletariat would never have been founded.
[46] [867] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[47] [868] Trotsky, Report of the Siberian delegation.
[48] [869] Rosa Luxemburg, “Organisational questions of Russian social-democracy”.
[49] [870] Idem.
[50] [871] Communist organisations and class consciousness.
[51] [872] Lenin, One step forward, two steps back.
[52] [873] Internationalisme, no.4, 1945.
The war which has just broken out in ex-Yugoslavia, with the bombardment of Serbia by NATO forces, is the most serious event on the scene of world imperialism since the collapse of the Eastern bl of world imperialism since the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989. Although the forces in operation remain far fewer, for the moment, than during the Gulf War in 1991, the significance of the present conflict is of a different order of magnitude altogether. Today, the barbarity of war is unleashed in the heart of Europe, no more than a couple of hours away from its major capitals. This was already true during the previous conflicts which have ravaged ex-Yugoslavia since 1991 and which have already claimed hundreds of thousands of victims. But this time, it is the great capitalist powers themselves, including the USA, which are the direct protagonists of the war.
This war in Europe is of such importance because this is the continent where capitalism was born, which is still the worlds major industrial region, and which has been both the major prize and the epicentre of all the 20th Centurys great imperialist conflicts, from the First and Second World Wars onwards. Europe was the stake in the Cold War which opposed the US and Russian blocs for more than 40 years, even though the episodes of open war were fought out in the periphery (Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, etc). Amongst other things, the present conflict is taking place in a particularly sensitive area of the continent: the Balkans, whose geographical (far more than its economic) position has made it one of the most fought-over places on the planet ever since World War I. We should not forget that World War I began in Sarajevo.
Finally, another element gives a particular dimension to the present conflict: the direct and active participation of Germany in the fighting, and in an important position. For more than 50 years, its defeat in World War II has forced Germany to forego any military intervention. The fact that the German bourgeoisie has today returned to the battlefield is indicative of the general aggravation of military tension, which can only get worse as decadent capitalism sinks further into its insoluble economic crisis.
The politicians and media of NATO present the war as an action in defence of "human rights", against a peculiarly revolting regime which is responsible, amongst its other misdeeds, for the "ethnic cleansing" which has stained Yugoslavia in blood since 1991. In reality, the "democratic" powers care not a jot for the population of Kosot a jot for the population of Kosovo, just as they are completely indifferent to the fate of the Kurd and Shiite populations of Iraq, which they left to be massacred by the troops of Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War. The sufferings inflicted by dictators on persecuted civilian populations have always been the pretext for the great "democracies" to unleash "just" war. This was the case, in particular, during World War II, when the extermination of the Jews by the Hitler regime (which the Allies did nothing to stop, even when they could have done so) served as a justification for the crimes committed by the "democracies": amongst others, the 250,000 killed by Allied bombardments in Dresden alone during the night of 13th-14th February 1945, or the civilian populations liquidated by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August 1945. If the media have been inundating us for weeks with images of the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees fleeing Milosevics barbarity, it is to justify NATOs military campaign, which was initially greeted with considerable scepticism, if not outright hostility, by the populations of the NATO countries. It is also intended to gain their support for the last phase of Operation "Determined Force", should the bombing fail to subdue Milosevic: a ground offensive, which could lead to extensive casualties amongst Allied troops as well as the Serbs.
In reality, the "humanitarian disaster" of the refugees from Kosovo was both foreseen and desired by the "democracies", to justify their war plans: just as the massacre of the Kurds and Shiites in Iraq was provoked deliberately when the Allies called on them to revolt against Saddam Hussein during the war.
But it is not at Belgrades door, or even Washingtons, that we should lay responsibility for this war. It is capitalism as a whole that is responsible for the war, and the barbarism of war, with all the massacres, genocide, and atrocities that it brings in its wake, will only come to an end when capitalism is overthrown by the world working class. Otherwise, capitalism will drag the whole of human society down with it in its death throes.
Communists have a duty of solidarity in the face of imperialist war and all its atrocities. But this solidarity does not go to this or that nation or people, which include both victims and executioners, the exploited and the exploiters, whether the latter have the face of a Milosevic, or the nationalist clique of the KLA which is already forcibly recruiting men of fighting age from the refugee columns. Communist solidarity is class solidarity, towards the workers and exploited whether Serb or Albanian, to the workers in uniform who are killed or transformed into assassins in the name of the "Fatherland" or "Democracy". And it is first and foremost up to the world proletariats biggest battalions, the workers of Europe and North America, to demonstrate this solidarity, not by marching behind the banners of pacifism but by developing their struggles against capitalism, against their exploiters in their own countries.
Communists have the duty to denounce with equal force both the pacifists and the warmongers. Pacifism is one of the proletariats worst enemies. It cultivates the illusion that "good will" or "international negotiations" can put an end to wars. By doing so, it maintains the lie that there could exist a "goie that there could exist a "good" capitalism, respectful of "peace" and "human" rights, and so turns the workers away from the class struggle against capitalism as a whole. Worse still, they become the recruiting sergeants for military "crusades", with the argument: "Since wars are provoked by bad, nationalist, bloodthirsty capitalists, we will only have peace when we liquidate these bad capitalists... by making war on them if need be". We have seen exactly this in Germany, where the main leader of the 1980s pacifist movements, Joschka Fischer, is today the man mainly responsible for his countrys imperialist policy. He is even proud of it, declaring that "For the first time for a long time, Germany is making war in a good cause".
From the first days of the war, the internationalists, with their modest means, have spoken out against the imperialist barbarism. On 25th March, the ICC published a leaflet which it is distributing to the workers of 13 countries, and which our readers will find in our territorial publications. Nor was our organisation the only one to react in defence of the internationalist position. All the groups which consider themselves part of the Communist Left reacted at the same moment, putting forward the same internationalist principles (1). In the next issue of the International Review, we will return in more detail to the positions and analyses developed by these different groups. But we must start by emphasising everything that unites us (the defence of internationalist positions, as they were expressed at the conferences of Kienthal and Zimmerwald during World War I, as well as in the first congresses of the Communist International), and which opposes us to all those organisations (Trotskyists, Stalinists, etc.), which while claiming to belong to the working class inject the poison of nationalism or pacifism into it.
Obviously, the role of communists is not limited to defending their principles, however important and fundamental this task may be. It consists also of providing an analysis which will allow the working class to understand what is at stake, what are the elements in play, what are the main aspects of the international situation. The analysis of the war in Yugoslavia, which had only just begun, was one of the main axes of the un, was one of the main axes of the ICCs 13th Congress, held at the beginning of April. In the next issue of the International Review, we will return to this Congress, but in this issue we are publishing the resolution on the international situation which it adopted, much of which is devoted to the present war.
10th April, 1999
1) International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party, Partito Comunista Internazionale -- Il Programma Comunista, Partito Comunista Internazionale --
Il Comunista, Partito Comunista Internazionale --
Il Partito Comunista.
In the previous article in this series, in International Review no 95, we showed how the capacity of the bourgeoisie to prevent the international extension of the revolution, and the reflux of the international wave of struggles, sparked off an opportunist reaction in the Communist International. This opportunistic turn by the CI met the resistance of those forces who were later to be called the communist left. The slogan of the 2nd Congress “to the masses” - rejected by the left communist groups - was already at the centre of the debate in 1920; and the 3rd Congress of the CI, held in 1921, was a vital moment in the battle of the communist left against the tendency to subordinate the interests of the world revolution to the interests of the Russian state.
The contribution of the KAPD
At the 3rd World Congress of the CI, the KAPD intervened for the first time directly in the debates, developing a whole range of criticisms of the CI’s entire approach. In its interventions in the sessions on the economic crisis and the new tasks of the CI, on the activities report of the ECCI, on the question of tactics and the union question, and above all in relation to the developments in Russia, the KAPD always stressed the leading role of revolutionaries; but in contrast to the concepts of the majority of the CI, the KAPD insisted that it was no longer possible to form mass parties.
While the delegates from Italy, who in 1920 had defended their minority position on parliamentarism so heroically against the CI, said very little on the developments in Russia and on the relationship between the Soviet government and the CI, it was the merit of the KAPD to have raised this question at the 3rd Congress.
Before we deal in more depth with the positions and the attitude of the KAPD, it should be stressed that in view of the new epoch, and the rapid unfolding of events, the KAPD was far from being a homogenous and united party. While the KAPD had the courage to start drawing the lessons of the new epoch in relation to the parliamentary and union question, and saw that it was no longer possible to maintain a mass party, it also lacked a certain caution, circumspection and political rigor in the assessment of the balance of forces and in relation to the organisation question. Rather than using all available means to struggle for the defence of the organisation, it tended to take hasty decisions.
Not surprisingly the KAPD shared many confusions of the revolutionary movement of the time. Like the Bolsheviks they also thought the party would have to seize power. And according to the KAPD the post-insurrectionary state would be made up of the workers’ councils.
At the 3rd Congress the KAPD delegation addressed the question of the relationship between the state and the party in the following manner: “We do not for a moment forget the difficulties into which Russian Soviet power has fallen owing to the postponement of the world revolution. But we also see the danger that out of these difficulties there may arise an apparent or real contradiction between the interests of the revolutionary world proletariat and the momentary interests of Soviet Russia’ (Hempel, cited in Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23, Volume 3, p. 393). “But the political and organisational separation of the 3rd International from the system of Russian State policy is the goal that we have to work towards, if we want to meet the conditions of revolution in Western Europe (Minutes of the Congress, p224).
At the 3rd Congress the KAPD tended to underestimate the consequences of the fact that the bourgeoisie had managed to prevent the revolutionary wave from spreading. They should have seen the implications of the fact that the international extension of the revolution had been thwarted. They should have taken up the argumentation of Rosa Luxemburg, who had already understood in 1917 that “in Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia, it can only be solved internationally”. And they should have based themselves on the appeal of the Spartakusbund of November 1918, who warned that “if the ruling classes in your countries manage to strangle the proletarian revolution in Germany and in Russia, then they will turn against you with even bigger force (...) Germany is pregnant with social revolution, but socialism can only be accomplished by the world proletariat.” (Spartakusbund, November 1918). The KAPD did not place sufficient emphasis on the disastrous consequences of the failure of the revolution to extend. Instead it tended to look for the roots of the problems within Russia itself.
“The shining idea of a Communist International is and remains alive, but it is no longer tied to the existence of Soviet Russia. The star of Soviet Russia has lost much of its attraction in the eyes of revolutionary workers, to the extent that Soviet Russia is developing more and more into an anti-proletarian, petty-capitalist peasant state. It is no pleasure to say such a thing, but we have to know that the clear understanding even of the toughest facts, that the ruthless expression of such insights is the only condition for developing the atmosphere which the revolution needs to remain alive. (...) We have to understand that the Russian Communists, due to the conditions of the country, due to the composition of the population, due to the context of the international situation, had no other choice but to establish a dictatorship of the party, which was the only firmly functioning, disciplined organism in the country; we have to understand that the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks was absolutely correct despite all the difficulties, and that the workers of western and central Europe carry the main responsibility for the fact that today Soviet Russia, since it cannot rely on the revolutionary forces of other countries, is compelled to rely on the capitalist forces.
It is a fact that Soviet Russia has to rely on the capitalist forces of Europe and America (...). Since Soviet Russia is forced today to rely on capitalist forces in the area of internal and external economic policy, how long will Soviet Russia remain what it is? How long and how will the RCP still remain the same RCP that it used to be? Will it be able to do this by remaining a governing party? And if - in order to remain a communist party - it can no longer be a governing party, what do we think the further development of Russia would look like? (‘The Soviet Government and the 3rd International’, Kommunistische Arbeiterzeitung, autumn 1921).
While the KAPD had become aware of the dangers threatening the working class, it offered the wrong explanation. Instead of underlining that the lifeblood of the revolution, the activity of the soviets, was being cut off because the revolution had became more and more isolated; instead of seeing that this made it possible for the state to strengthen at the expense of the working class, leading to the disarming of the soviets, strangling the workers’ initiatives, and to the Bolshevik Party being more and more absorbed by the state - the KAPD tended to opt for a deterministic, and in reality fatalistic argumentation. By claiming, as the KAPD did, that “the Russian Communists due to the conditions of the country, due to the composition of the population, due to the context of the international situation had no other choice but to establish a dictatorship of the party”, it made it impossible to understand how the working class in Russia, organised in its soviets, was able to seize power in October 1917. The idea of the rise of a “petty-capitalist peasant state” is also a distortion of reality, since it downplayed the danger of the consequences of the international isolation of the revolution and of the rise of state capitalism. These ideas, formulated in this text only as a first explanation, were later developed into a fully fledged theoretical explanation by the council communists.
The ICC has exposed the mistaken and unmarxist ideas of the councilists in relation to the development in Russia (see our articles in International Review 12 & 13, reproduced in our pamphlet October 1917, Start of the World Revolution, and our book on the Dutch left).
In particular we reject:
-the theory of a double revolution, which arose in some parts of the KAPD in 1921 with the reflux in the revolutionary wave and the emergence of state capitalism. According to this view, a proletarian revolution had occurred in Russia in the industrial centres and at the same time there had been a democratic peasant revolution on the countryside;
-the fatalism which is hidden behind the idea that the revolution in Russia was necessarily going to succumb to the weight of the peasantry and that the Bolsheviks were predestined from the start to degenerate;
-the separation between different geographical areas (the theory of the meridian), according to which there are different conditions and means of revolution in Russia and in western Europe;
-the wrong approach to the question of trade relations with the west, because this gave rise to the illusion that money could be abolished immediately in one country and that it was possible to hold out or to even construct socialism in one country in the longer term.
We shall now go into the debate at that time and take up in a more detailed manner the positions of the KAPD, to show how much the groups of the communist left were searching for clarity.
The growing conflict between the Russian state and the interests of the world revolution
At a time when the CI was unconditionally supporting the foreign policy of the Russian state, the KAPD delegation put its finger on the real issue:
‘We all remember the incredibly strong propagandistic effect of the diplomatic declarations of Soviet Russia at a time when the Workers’ and Peasant Government did not have to take into consideration the need to sign trade deals... The revolutionary movement of Asia, which is a great hope for all of us and a necessity for the world revolution, can be supported by Soviet Russia neither officially nor unofficially. The English agents in Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey are working very cleverly, and every revolutionary step of Russia undermines the implementation of the trade deals. Given this situation, who has to direct the foreign policy of Soviet Russia? Who has to take decisions? The Russian trade representatives in England, Germany, America, Sweden etc.? Whether they are communists or not, they have to practice a policy of agreement.
As far as the situation within Russia is concerned there are similar if not more dangerous effects. In reality political power now lies in the hands of the Communist Party (and not in the hands of the soviets) (...) whereas the scarce revolutionary masses in the party feel that their initiatives are being inhibited and look at the tactics of manoeuvring with growing suspicion; in particular there is a big apparatus of functionaries, a growing influence of those forces who joined the Communist Party not because it is a Communist Party, but because it is a governing party’
Whereas most delegates more and more uncritically backed up the Bolshevik party, which was in the process of being integrated into the state apparatus, the delegation had the courage to point to the contradiction between the working class and its party on the one hand, and the state on the other:
‘Since the RCP has eliminated the initiative of revolutionary workers and eliminates it even more, since it has to offer more space to capital than previously, it has started to change its character despite all precautionary measures; however long it remains a governing party it cannot prevent the economic basis that it is founded upon as a governing party from becoming more and more shattered, which means that the foundations of its political power are becoming more and more limited.
What would happen to Russia, and to the revolutionary development in the whole world, once the Russian party was no longer a governing party, is a question that can hardly be overlooked. And yet things are moving in a direction, whereby if there are no revolutionary risings in Europe acting as a counterweight, it will become necessary for this question to be posed in all seriousness. We have to pose the question very seriously: would it not be better to give up state power in Russia in the interest of proletarian revolution instead of clinging to it (...)
The same Russian Communist Party, which is now in such a critical situation in relation to its role as a communist and as a governing party, is also the absolutely leading party of the 3rd International (...). This is where the tragic knot can be seen, where the 3rd International has been caught up in such a way that its revolutionary lifeblood is being strangled. The Russian comrades under the decisive influence of Lenin not only do not create a counter-weight in the 3rd International against the Russian state’s policy of regression, but they do everything to synchronise the politics of the International with this curve of regression (...) Today the 3rd International is a tool of the Soviet government’s reformist policy of entente.
Surely, Lenin, Bukharin etc are real revolutionaries to the bottom of their in their hearts, but they have become like the whole central committee of the party carriers of state authority, and they thus inevitably have submitted to the law of the development of a necessarily conservative policy’ (KAZ, ‘Moscow Politics’, autumn 1921).
At the ensuing extraordinary congress of the KAPD in September 1921 Goldstein said the following: “...Will it be possible for the CP of Russia to reconcile these two contradictions in some way or other in the long-term? Today the RCP shows already a double character. On the one hand since it is still a governing party in Russia, it has to represent the interests of Russia as a state, and on the other hand it has to and wants to represent the interests of international class struggle’ (Extraordinary Congress of the KAPD, Sept. 1921, p. 59).
The German left communists were quite right to point out the role of the Russian state in the opportunistic degeneration of the Communist International, and to defend the interests of the world revolution against the interests of the Russian state.
However, as we said above, the first and principal cause of the opportunist turn of the International was not the role of the Russian state, but the failure of the extension of the revolution to the western countries, and the subsequent retreat of the international class struggle. Thus, whereas the KAPD tended to mainly blame the Russian CP for this opportunism, in reality the unprincipled “adjustment” to the social democratic illusions of the masses profoundly affected all the workers’ parties at that time. In fact, well before the Russian Communists, and in defiance of the policies of the CI at that moment, it was the leadership of the KPD in Germany itself which was the first to impose this opportunist turn after the defeat of January 1919 in Berlin, excluding the left, the future KAPD, from the party in the process.
In reality, the weaknesses of the KAPD itself were first and foremost the product of the disorientation resulting from the defeat and ensuing reflux of the revolutionary movement, particularly in Germany itself. Robbed of the authority of its revolutionary leadership, which had been murdered by Social Democracy in 1919, reacting with revolutionary impatience to the retreat of the revolution, which it long refused to recognise, and with an insufficient assimilation of the organisational traditions of the workers’ movement, German left communism, one of the clearest and most determined political expressions of the rising revolutionary wave, was unable (as opposed to the Italian Left) to cope with the defeat of that revolution. Which factors aggravated these weaknesses of the KAPD?
The weaknesses of the KAPD on the organisation question
In order to explore the reasons for the weaknesses on the organisation question in the KAPD we must go back somewhat.
We have to recall that as a result of mistaken organisational conceptions within the KPD, the Zentrale led by P.Levi had expelled the majority of the party at the October 1919 Party Congress because of its position on the union and parliamentary question. Those who had been expelled founded the KAPD in April 1920 following the gigantic struggles of the working class against the Kapp coup. This early split amongst communists in Germany, the result of a false approach to the organisation question, led to a fatal weakening of the class. And the tragedy was that the left wing in turn - after having been expelled from the KPD - became an active defender of this mistaken concept.
A few months later we can see an illustration of this weakness, when the KAPD delegation to the 2nd Congress of the CI, O. Rühle and P. Merges, withdrew from the work of the congress and “deserted”. One year later, when being confronted with the ultimatum of the 3rd Congress of the CI, either to join forces with the VKPD or face expulsion from the International, the KAPD once again showed this great weakness in relation to the defence of the organisation. The expulsion of the KAPD from the CI provoked a lot of hostility and anger within the ranks of the KAPD towards the International.
On the one hand this was to prevent the newly arising forces of the communist left from working together. The German and Dutch wing of the communist left did not manage to oppose the enormous pressure of the Bolshevik party and to build up together with the Italian left around Bordiga a common resistance from within the CI against its growing opportunism. Moreover, at the same time the KAPD had a strong inclination towards rash and hasty decisions, as the following statements of the KAPD show.
How to react to the danger of degeneration of the Comintern?
Flight or fight?
“In the future, Soviet Russia will no longer be a factor of world revolution; it will become a bastion of the international counter-revolution.
The Russian proletariat thus has already lost control over the State.
This doesn’t mean anything else but that the Soviet government now has to become the defender of the interests of the international bourgeoisie (...) The Soviet government has to become a government ruling against the working class, after having joined openly the camp of the bourgeoisie. The Soviet government is the Communist Party of Russia. Therefore the RCP has become an opponent of the working class, because being the Soviet government it has to defend the interests of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the proletariat. This won’t last long; the RCP will have to undergo a split.
It won’t last long before the Soviet government will be forced to show its real face as a national-bourgeois state. Soviet Russia is no longer a proletarian-revolutionary state, or to put it more precisely Soviet Russia cannot yet become a proletarian-revolutionary state.
Because only the victory of the German proletariat through the conquest of political power could have prevented the Russian proletariat from its present fate, could have saved it from the misery and repression imposed by its own Soviet government. Only a revolution in Germany, and then a western European revolution could have helped the outcome of the class struggle between Russian workers and Russian peasants in favour of the Russian workers.
The 3rd Congress submitted the interests of proletarian world revolution to the interests of a bourgeois revolution in a single country. The supreme organ of the proletarian International has submitted the International to the service of a bourgeois state. The autonomy of the 3rd International has thus been suppressed and submitted to direct dependence on the bourgeoisie.
The 3rd International is now lost for proletarian world revolution. In the same way as the 2nd International the 3rd International is now in the hands of the bourgeoisie.
Therefore the 3rd International will always prove its worth whenever it will be necessary to defend the bourgeois state of Russia. But it will always fail whenever it will be necessary to support proletarian world revolution. Its activities will be form a chain of continuous betrayals of proletarian world revolution...
The 3rd international is lost for the proletarian world revolution.
From being a vanguard for proletarian world revolution the 3rd International has become its most bitter enemy (...) It was because of the disastrous intertwining of the leadership of the state - whose originally proletarian character has been transformed over the past years into a totally bourgeois character - with the leadership of the proletarian International, in the hands of one and the same organ, that the 3rd International failed in its original task. Confronted with the alternative of bourgeois state policy and proletarian world revolution, the Russian communists voted for the interests of the former and they placed the 3rd International into its service’ (‘The Soviet government and the 3rd International taken in tow by the international bourgeoisie’, August 1921).
While the KAPD was right in denouncing the growing opportunism of the CI, while it detected the danger of the CI being strangled at the hands of the Russian state and being turned into its instrument, the KAPD made the mistake of considering these dangers as an already finished process.
Even if the balance of forces had already tilted in 1921 and the international wave of struggles was in reflux, the KAPD showed a dangerous impatience and an underestimation of the need for a persevering and tenacious struggle for the defence of the organisation. This is why the basic idea of the KAPD that the CI is “a tool of the Soviet government’s reformist policy of entente”, that “The 3rd International is now lost for proletarian world revolution. From being a vanguard for proletarian world revolution the 3rd International has become its most bitter enemy...” is exaggerated because premature at that time. Within the KAPD itself it led to the feeling that the battle for the CI was already over. The KAPD had sensed something which was to become true later, but the wrong estimate of the level of opportunism and degeneration that the CI had reached led to a global, indiscriminate rejection of the vital struggle against opportunism WITHIN the CI.
Although the ultimatum of the 3rd World Congress has to be taken into consideration in explaining the anger and outrage of the KAPD, this should not hide the fact that the comrades of the KAPD withdrew in a precipitous manner from the battle and failed in their duty to defend the organisation.
Once again it was a tragedy to see how false and insufficient organisational concepts can have such a disastrous effect, and how much they undermine the impact of correct political positions. This highlights once again that a correct stand on the organisation question itself can become decisive for the survival of an organisation.
Another example of this weakness can be seen through the attitude of the KAPD delegation at the 3rd Congress. While the KAPD delegation at the 2nd World Congress had left without any fight whatsoever, the delegation to the 3rd World Congress raised its voice as a minority and called for a special congress of the KAPD afterwards.
Although the KAPD delegation complained that the 3rd Congress had already started to put a brake on the debate by distorting the positions of the KAPD, by limiting speaking time, by changing the agenda, and by selecting participation at discussions (the KAPD delegation reported that it had been excluded from participation in a debate of the ECCI, which met during the Congress discussing the status of the KAPD), the KAPD delegation itself declined to take the floor during the debate on the status of the KAPD, because they said they “wanted to avoid being unwilling players in a comedy”. They withdrew from the debate under protest.
Instead of understanding that the degeneration of an organisation is a process, in which a long persevering struggle is indispensable; in which precipitous action needs to be avoided; in short, where it is necessary to lead a struggle like the Italian left did, the KAPD jumped to conclusions and condemned the CI very quickly instead of trying to continue to fight from within.
The same delegation declared the CI and the RCP to be “lost for the proletariat”. To some extent the overwhelming weight of the RCP had played a major role when the KAPD neglected the task of regrouping other delegates to form a fraction. Although there were some episodic contacts, no common line could be found between the Italian delegates and the KAPD, although the Italian left had stood up against the rising opportunism in the CI regarding the parliamentary question.
The expulsion of the KAPD from the CI meant a weakening of the position of the Italian left at the 4th Congress, when the Communist Party of Italy, under the leadership of Bordiga, was forced by the CI to fuse with the Italian Socialist Party. Thus the ‘German’ and ‘Italian’ Left always found themselves fighting in isolation against the opportunism of the CI, unable to lead a common struggle. But the current around Bordiga had grasped the need for a tenacious fight in defence of the organisation. For example when Bordiga in 1923 was thinking of writing a manifesto announcing a break with the CI, he finally withdrew the draft, because he was convinced of the need to continue his fight within the CI and within the Italian Party.
At the extraordinary conference of the KAPD in September 1921 the KAPD hardly dealt with the assessment of the balance of forces on a world scale. The party was able to see, as Reichenbach put it at the conference, that “in times where external factors, factors due to (the weight) of capital, or confusion, lack of clarity in the class, slow down the pulse of the revolution, to the extent that the belief in revolution recedes, then the proletarian party of combat, which is the carrier of the idea of revolution, will be smaller in size. But this doesn’t mean that it will disappear’ (p. 27). But the KAPD did not draw the conclusions regarding the immediate tasks of the organisation. The majority of the party still considered revolution to be immediately on the agenda. Sheer will seemed more important than an assessment of the balance of forces. Moreover a part of the KAPD was to start the adventure of the foundation of the Communist Workers International (KAI) in spring 1922.
This incapacity to grasp the retreat of the class struggle finally played a decisive role in the incapacity of the KAPD to survive after the wave of struggles went into reflux and when the rising counter-revolution imposed new conditions.
Mistaken answers from Russia:
the incapacity of the communists to draw the right lessons
Despite all its shortcomings and its wrong conclusions, the KAPD did have the merit of posing the problem of the growing conflict between the Russian state, the working class and the CI, even if it was unable to offer the right answers. The communists in Russia, on the other hand were to have the greatest difficulties in understanding the nature of this conflict.
Because of the growing integration of the party into the state apparatus they could only develop a very limited view of the problem. Lenin, who had synthethised the lessons of Marxism on the question of state and revolution in 1917 in the clearest manner, had at the same time had been part of the state leadership since 1917, and he brought these growing contradictions and difficulties to the fore.
Today, bourgeois propaganda takes great pains to present Lenin as the father of Russian totalitarian state capitalism. In reality, of all the Russian communists at the time, Lenin, with a brilliant revolutionary intuition, came closest to recognising that the transitional state which arose after the October revolution does not really represent the interests and politics of the proletariat. From this Lenin concluded that the working class must struggle to impose its policies on the state, and must have the right to defend itself against that state.
At the 11th party conference in March 1922 Lenin observed with great concern: “Well, we have lived through a year, the state is in our hands, but has it operated the New Economic Policy in the way we wanted this past year? No. But we refuse to admit that that it did not operate in the way we wanted. How did it operate? The machine refused to obey the hand that guided it. It was like a car that was going not in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired, as if it were being driven by some mysterious, lawless hand” (volume 33, March/April 1922, 11th party conference).
Lenin had also defended this concern, in particular against Trotsky, during the trade union debate in 1921. On the surface, the issue was the role of the trade unions within the proletarian dictatorship; in reality, the central question was whether or not the working class should have the right to engage in its own class struggle to defend itself against the traditional state. According to Trotsky, since the state is by definition a workers’ state, the idea of the proletariat defending itself against the state is an absurdity. Thus Trotsky, who at least had the quality of following the logic of his position to its conclusion, openly advocated the militarisation of labour. Although he was not yet able to clearly recognise that the transitional state was not a workers’ state (a position later developed and defended by Bilan in the 30s), Lenin insisted on the necessity for the workers to defend themselves against the state.
Despite this correct concern on the part of Lenin, it is evident that the Russian communists were unable to achieve any real clarity on this question. Lenin himself, like other communists of the time, continued to consider the enormous weight of the petty bourgeoisie in Russia to be the main source of counter-revolutionary potential and not the bureaucratised state. “At the present moment the enemy is not the same as it was yesterday. The enemy is not the scores of White armies... The enemy is the grey day to day running of the economy in a country dominated by small peasants with a ruined big industry. The enemy is the petty bourgeois element; the proletariat is fragmented, split, exhausted. The ‘forces’ of the working class are not unlimited... The influx of new forces from the proletariat is weak, sometimes very weak (...) We still will have to put up with the inevitable slow-down in the growth of new forces of the working class” (‘New times, old mistakes in new form’, Lenin, 20.8.1921, volume 33, German edition).
The reflux of the class struggle - oxygen for state capitalism
After the defeats of the working class internationally in 1920 conditions for the working class in Russia were to worsen considerably. More and more isolated, the workers in Russia faced a state, headed by the Bolshevik Party, which was more and more imposing its violence on them, as in Kronstadt in 1921. The crushing of the revolt in Kronstadt led to the strengthening of those forces in the party who were aiming at the strengthening of the state at the expense of the working class and who also sought to chain the CI to the Russian state.
The Russian state was aspiring more and more to a ‘normal’ position amongst the other capitalist states.
The orientation of the Russian state towards recognition by the other capitalist states
Already in spring 1921 the German bourgeoisie had secretly made contact with Moscow in order to explore the possibility of rearming the Reichswehr (after the signing of Versailles treaty) and of modernising the Russian armaments industry once the civil war had come to an end. Above all, German heavy industry, which had modernised its equipment during WW1, was eager to co-operate with Russia. Aeroplanes were planned to be manufactured by Albatrosswerke, submarines by Blöhm & Voss, guns and shells by Krupp. The Reichswehr was to train Red Army officers, making it possible for German troops to train on Russian soil.
At the end of 1921 the Soviet state proposed a general conference to settle relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world, involving all the European powers and the USA. But by then secret negotiations between Germany and Russia had long been underway. Of course on the Russian side these negotiations were not led by the CI but by leaders of the state apparatus. At the Genoa conference, Chicherin, the leader of the Russian delegation, talked about the vast potential of Russia’s untapped resources, and the possibility that they could be developed and made available through the co-operation of western capitalists. While the Genoa conference broke up, Germany and Russia had concluded in nearby Rapallo a secret agreement - which - as E.H. Carr writes, “was the first major diplomatic occasion on which either Soviet Russia or the Weimar republic had negotiated as an equal”. But Rapallo was more than that.
During the winter 1917-18 the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was only signed after the German offensive against Russia because it was the aim of the Bolsheviks to protect the isolated workers’ bastion against the offensive of German imperialism. The treaty had been imposed on the Russian working class, and it was only signed after a wide and open debate in the Bolshevik party. However, this principle was to be broken with the signing of Rapallo. Not only did the treaty signed by Russian state representatives involve secret arms deals, but at the 4th World Congress in November 1922 it was not even mentioned!.
The instruction of the CI to the CP in Turkey and Persia “to support the movement in favour of national freedom in Turkey (and in Persia)” in reality led to a situation where the respective national bourgeoisies could massacre the working class much easier. The interests of the Russian state, which required firm links with these states, had prevailed.
Step by step the CI was subordinated to the needs of the foreign policy of the Russian state. Whereas in 1919, at the time of the foundation of the CI, the whole orientation had been the destruction of capitalist states, from 1921 on the orientation of the Russian state was more and more clearly towards stabilisation in foreign affairs. The failure of the world revolution to spread had given enough space for the Russian State to claim its position.
At the common conference of the ‘workers’ parties’ which met at the beginning of April 1922 in Berlin, to which the CI had invited the parties of the 2nd and 2 ½ Internationals, the CI delegation tried above all to look for support for the diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia, for the establishment of trade relations between Russia and the west, and for help for Russia to reconstruct. In 1919 the 2nd International had been denounced as the butcher of the revolution; in 1920, at the 2nd Congress, 21 conditions of admission had been adopted in order to delineate the CI from and fight against the 2nd International. Now, on behalf of the Russian state, the CI delegation sat at the same table with the parties of the 2nd International. It had become obvious that the Russian state was not interested in the extension of world revolution but aimed above all at strengthening its own position. The more the CI was taken in tow by the state, the more clearly it turned its back on internationalism.
Within Russia: cancerous growth of the state apparatus
The orientation of the Russian state towards recognition by the other states went hand in hand with the strengthening of the state apparatus within Russia.
The ever increasing integration of the party into the state, the growing concentration of power in the hands of an ever more concentrated and limited circle of ‘ruling forces’, the growing dictatorship of the state over the working class were now being accelerated by the single-minded and systematic efforts of those forces who aimed at the expansion and fortification of the state apparatus at the expense of the working class, at the strangling of working class life.
In April 1922 Stalin was nominated General Secretary of the party at the 11th party congress. By then Stalin occupied three important posts at the same time: he was head of the Peoples’ Commissariat for Nationality Questions, of the Peoples’ Commissariat for Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, and he was a member of the Politburo. By being appointed General Secretary, Stalin could quickly take over the day to day running of the party, and he managed to make the Politburo dependent on the General Secretary. Already at an earlier stage, Stalin had been appointed head of the ‘purging activities’ in March 1921 at the 10th party congress[1]. In March 1921 some members of the Workers’ Opposition group had asked the ECCI to “denounce the suppression of autonomy, of workers’ initiative, and the fight against members who had divergent opinions... The united forces of the party and union bureaucracy, by taking advantage of their power and their position, breach the principle of workers’ democracy” (Rosmer, p. 110) But after the RCP put pressure on the ECCI, the ECCI rejected the complaint of the Workers’ Opposition group.
Instead of leaving the initiative for nominating their delegates in the hands of the local party units, as the integration of the party into the state advanced, these nominations were taken over by the leadership of the party and thus the state. Elections and votes within the party on a local party unit level were no longer desired, since the power of decision was placed more and more in the hands of the General Secretary and the Org-bureau which was headed by Stalin. All the delegates for the 12th party congress in 1923 were nominated by the party leadership.
If we underline the role of Stalin here, it is not because we want to reduce the problem of the state to one person - Stalin - and thus limit and underestimate the danger flowing from the state. The reason is that the state, which had arisen out of the very survival-needs of capitalism itself, which had absorbed the Bolshevik Party into its structures, and which was now stretching out its tentacles to the CI, had become the centre of counter-revolution. But counter-revolution was not an anonymous or purely passive activity of unknown, faceless, invisible forces. It was to take shape concretely in the party and state apparatus. Stalin, the General Secretary, was an important force pulling the strings of the party on different levels - in the Politburo, in the provinces, and he became the driving force behind those forces who were fighting against any revolutionary residues in the party.
Within the Bolshevik Party this process of degeneration provoked resistance and convulsions that we have dealt with more specifically in our articles in International Review nos. 8 & 9.
Despite the above-mentioned confusions, Lenin was going to be one of the most determined opponents of the state apparatus. After Lenin was hit by a first stroke in May 1922 and a second on March 9 1923, he drafted a document - later to be known as his Testament - in which he demanded the replacement of Stalin as General Secretary. Thus Lenin, who had worked together with Stalin for years, broke with him and declared war upon him. However, being paralysed in bed, fighting against his agony, this break and declaration of war was never published in the party press, which by then was in the firm grip of the General Secretary himself - Stalin!.
At the same time it was no coincidence that Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin defended the typically bourgeois concept of the need for a ‘successor’ to Lenin, according to which a triumvirate composed of these three members should constitute the leadership. It was against this background of a power struggle by the ‘triumvirate’ within the party that a group of opponents to this trend issued a “Platform of the 46” in the summer of 1923, criticising the strangling of proletarian life in the party, which for the first time since October 1917 had refused to make any calls for world revolution on May 1st 1922.
In the summer of 1923 a number of strikes erupted in Russia, in particular in Moscow.
At a time when the Russian state was strengthening its position within Russia and was striving for recognition by other capitalist states, the process of degeneration in the CI after the opportunist turn at the 3rd Congress was to accelerate, due to the pressure of the Russian state.
The 4th World Congress: submission to the Russian state
By adopting the policy of the United Front, in December 1921 through the ECCI, and at the 4th Congress in November 1922, the CI was about to throw overboard the principles of the 1st and 2nd congress, during which the CI had insisted on the need for the sharpest demarcation and fight against Social Democracy.
To justify this policy, the CI argued that with the current balance of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat “the broadest masses of the proletariat have lost belief in their ability to conquer power in any foreseeable time. They are driven back to the defensive.... the conquest of power as an immediate task of the day is not on the agenda” (cited in Carr, op cit,p 439) .
Therefore it was necessary to unite with the workers who were still under the influence of Social Democracy:
‘The slogan of the 3rd congress, ‘to the masses’ is more valid than ever (...) The tactics of the united front is the offer of a united struggle of communists with all workers, who belong to other parties or groups(...) Under certain circumstances communists must be ready to work together with non-communist workers’ parties and with workers’ organisation in order to form a workers’ government’.(Theses on tactics, 4th Congress).
It was the German KPD which was the first party to push for this tactic - as we shall see in the next article in this series.
Within the CI this new opportunist step, which pushed the workers into the arms of Social Democracy, met with the fiercest resistance from the Italian left.
Already in March 1922, once the theses on the united front had been adopted, Bordiga wrote in Il Comunista: “As far as the workers’ government is concerned, as ask: why do we want to ally with the Social Democrats? To do the only things that they know how to, can and will do, or to ask them to do what they don’t know how to, cannot or will not do? Are we to say to the Social Democrats that we are ready to collaborate with them, even in parliament and even in this government baptised as a ‘workers’ government? In this case, that is to say if we are asked to elaborate in the name of the Communist Party a project of a workers’ government in which communists have to participate along with the socialists, and to present this government to the masses as ‘anti-bourgeois’, we reply, and we take full responsibility for this reply, that such an attitude is opposed to all the fundamental principles of communism. To accept this political formula would in fact mean tearing up our flag, on which it its written: there can be no proletarian government which is not formed on the basis of the revolutionary victory of the proletariat” (Il Comunista, 26. 3. 1922).
At the 4th congress the Italian party declared: “ The Communist Party of Italy does not agree to taking part in organisms that are made up of different political organisations_It will thus avoid participating in common declarations with political parties when these declarations contradict its programme and are presented to the proletariat as the result of negotiations aimed at finding a common line of action... to talk about a workers’ government... amounts to denying in practise the political programme of communism, ie the necessity to prepare the masses for the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Relazione del PCI al IV Congresso dell’Internaionale Comunista, November 1922).
But after the exclusion of the KAPD from the CI in autumn 1921, and when the most critical voice against the degeneration of the Comintern was silenced, the Italian left once again had to defend the position of the communist left on its own.
At the same time an additional aggravating factor has to be taken into consideration. In October 1922 Mussolini’s troops seized power in Italy, which led to a worsening of the conditions for revolutionaries. The group around Bordiga obviously had to take a position on the rise of fascism. Being absorbed by this question, the Italian left had far less time to focus on the unfolding degeneration of the CI and the Bolshevik party.
At the same time the 4th Congress created the conditions for a further submission of the CI to the interests of the Russian state. Mixing up the interests of the Russian state and the interests of the CI, the chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev, said this in relation to the stabilisation of capitalism and the termination of attacks against Russia: “We may now say without exaggeration that the Communist International has survived its most difficult time, and is so strengthened that it need fear no attack from world reaction” (cited in Carr, op cit, p 439).
Since the perspective of the conquest of power was no longer immediately on the agenda, the 4th Congress gave the orientation that apart from united front tactics, the working class should focus on the support for and defence of Russia. The resolution on the Russian revolution highlights the extent to which the CI analysed the situation through the spectacles of the Russian state and no longer from the point of view of the international working class. The problem of the reconstruction of Russia was pushed into the foreground:
“The 4th World Congress of the CI expresses its greatest gratitude and highest admiration to the toiling masses of Soviet Russia that they have been able (...) to defend the acquisitions of the revolution up until today against all enemies from within and from without.
The 4th World Congress observes with great satisfaction that the first workers’ state in the world (...) has fully proven its vitality and its force to develop. The Soviet state has come out of the horrors of the civil war strengthened. The 4th World Congress observes with satisfaction that the policy of Soviet Russia has created and strengthened the most important preconditions for the construction and development towards a communist society: i.e. the Soviet power, the Soviet order, i.e. the dictatorship of the proletariat. Because this dictatorship alone.... guarantees the complete overcoming of capitalism and paves the way for the realisation of communism.
Hands off Soviet Russia! Legal recognition of Soviet Russia! Each strengthening of Soviet Russia means a weakening of the world bourgeoisie’ (Resolution on the Question of the Russian Revolution).
The degree to which the CI was under the thumb of the Russian state half a year after Rapallo also became visible when, against the background of rising imperialist tensions, the possibility was considered that Russia could establish a military bloc with another capitalist state. Although the CI still asserted that such an alliance would serve the purpose of overthrowing a bourgeois regime, in reality the CI had more and more become a tool of the Russian state: “I assert that we are already great enough to conclude an alliance with a foreign bourgeoisie in order, by means of this bourgeois state, to be able to overthrow another bourgeoisie... Supposing that a military alliance has been concluded with a bourgeois state, the duty of the comrades in each country consists in contributing to the victory of the two allies”. Bukharin, cited in Carr, op cit, p. 442), A few months later the CI and the German KPD were to put forward this perspective in relation to an alliance between the ‘oppressed German nation’ and Russia. In the confrontation between Germany and the victorious countries of WW1 the CI and the Russian state took sides with Germany, calling it a victim of French imperialists interests.
Already in January 1922, at the ‘First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East’, the CI had proclaimed the need for co-operation between communists and ‘non-communist revolutionaries’ as the key orientation. The 4th Congress now decided in its theses on tactics “to support to the best of their capacities the national-revolutionary movements which are directed against imperialism”; at the same time it rejected firmly “the refusal of the communists of the colonies to take part in the struggle against imperialist violation under the pretexts of the abandoning of a supposed ‘defence’ of autonomous class interests. This is the worst type of opportunism, which can only discredit proletarian revolution in the East’ (Guidelines on the Eastern Question).
Thus the CI contributed to a major weakening and disorientation of the working class.
Once the culminating point of the revolutionary wave had been reached in 1919, once the international extension of the revolution had been prevented, permitting the Russian state to strengthen its position and subordinate the CI to its interests, the bourgeoisie felt stronger internationally and drafted plans in order to deal a final blow against that part of the working class which had remained most combative - the proletariat in Germany. We shall therefore examine the events of 1923 in Germany in the next article.
Dv.
[1] After the membership of the Bolshevik party had increased in 1920 to 600,000, between 1920-21 some 150,000 members were expelled from the party. It is obvious that not only careerists were expelled but also many workers’ elements. The ‘purging commission’ headed by Stalin was one of the most powerful organs in Russia.
The ICC held its 13th Congress at the end of March and beginning of April 1999. As for any organisation in the workers’ movement, the Congress is an extremely important moment in our organisation’s life and activity. This Congress, however, was particularly important. On the one hand, it was the last one of the 20th century, and the preparatory reports were intended even more than usual to give a historical dimension to the subjects they dealt with. On the other, irrespective of any demands of the calendar, the Congress was held at a moment marked by the acceleration of history constituted by the war in Yugoslavia.
This is an event of the utmost historical importance, since:
“- this war does not just concern a peripheral country, as was the case with the Gulf War in 1991, but a European one;
- this is the first time since World War II that a European country and its capital has been massively bombarded;
- this is the also first time since World War II that the main defeated country of World War II - Germany - has intervened by committing combat troops directly in battle...” (Resolution on the International Situation).
In this sense, the war in Yugoslavia and its analysis, its implications for the working class and for the communist organisations, were at the heart of the Congress’ concerns, which it expressed in its decision to publish its resolution on the international situation immediately in the International Review no.97.
This resolution, a synthesis of the reports presented to the Congress and its discussions, emphasised the fact that:
“Today, a capitalism in its death throes is facing one of the most difficult and dangerous moments in modern history, comparable in gravity to that of the two world wars, to the outbreak of proletarian revolution in 1917-19, or to the Great Depression which began in 1929. But today, neither world war nor world revolution are pending in the foreseeable future. Rather, the gravity of the situation is conditioned by a sharpening of contradictions at all levels:
- imperialist tensions and the development of world disorder;
- a very advanced and dangerous moment in the crisis of capitalism;
- attacks against the world proletariat unprecedented since the last world war;
- and an accelerating decomposition of bourgeois society” (ibid).
All these elements are dealt with at length in the resolution. In this issue, they are developed further in the form of extensive extracts from the report presented to the Congress on the burning issue of the hour: that of imperialist conflicts.
Moreover, the Congress resolution notes that: “In this situation, so full of danger, the bourgeoisie has placed the reins of government in the hands of that political current best able to take care of its interests: Social Democracy, the current mainly responsible for crushing the world revolution after 1917-18. The current which saved capitalism at that time, and is now returning to the controls in order to defend the threatened interests of the capitalist class” (ibid).
In this sense, the Congress adopted an orientation text entitled “The reasons for the presence of left parties in government in the majority of European states today”, which we are also publishing below, along with several additions which draw together elements put forward in the discussion.
Of course, the evolution of the capitalist crisis and the class struggle were also the object of important discussions during the Congress. In this issue of the International Review, we are publishing the third part of the article on “Thirty years of open capitalist crisis”, which deals with much the same issues as the report presented to the Congress. In the next issue, we will publish the report, adopted by the Congress, on the evolution of the class struggle, which is illustrated in particular by this passage in the resolution: “The responsibility weighing on the proletariat today is enormous. Only by developing its militancy and consciousness can it bring forth the revolutionary alternative which alone can secure the survival and the further ascent of human society” (ibid).
Apart from the analysis of different aspects of the international situation, and its extreme seriousness, the Congress’ main concern was to examine the responsibility of revolutionaries confronted with this situation, as the resolution highlights: “But the most important responsibility weighs on the shoulders of the communist left, the existing organisations of the proletarian camp. They alone can furnish the theoretical and historical lessons and the political method without which the revolutionary minorities emerging today cannot attach themselves to the preparation of the class party of the future. In some ways, the communist left finds itself in a similar situation today to that of Bilan in the 1930s, in the sense that it is obliged to understand a new and unprecedented historical situation. Such a situation requires both a profound attachment to the theoretical and historical approach of marxism, and revolutionary audacity in understanding situations which are not really covered by the schemas of the past. In order to fulfil this task, open debates between the existing organisations of the proletarian milieu are indispensable. In this sense, the discussion, clarification and regroupment, the propaganda and intervention of the small revolutionary minorities is an essential part of the proletarian response to the gravity of the world situation on the threshold of the next millennium.
Furthermore, faced with the unprecedented intensification of capitalist military barbarity, the working class demands of its communist vanguard the full assumption of its responsibilities in defence of proletarian internationalism. Today, the groups of the communist left are alone in defending the classic positions of the workers’ movement against imperialist war. Only the groups which belong to this current - the only one which did not betray during World War II - can give a class response to the questioning which is bound to appear within the working class.
The revolutionary groups must give as united a response as possible, thereby giving expression to the indispensable unity of the proletariat against the unleashing of chauvinism and conflicts between nations. In doing so, the revolutionaries will adopt the tradition of the workers’ movement which figured especially in the conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and in the policies of the left within these conferences”.
This was the framework for the 13th ICC Congress’ discussions on its activities.
The third part of this history of the capitalist crisis is dedicated to the decade of the 90s. This decade has still not drawn to a close, and yet the last 30 months have been especially serious at the economic level[1].
The last decade has seen the collapse of all the models of economic management that capitalism has presented as a panacea and solution to its crises: 1989 saw the disintegration of the Stalinist model, which the bourgeoisie presented as “communism”, the better sell the lie of the “triumph of capitalism”. Since then, the much praised German, Japanese, Swedish, Swiss models, and finally, the “tigers” and “dragons” have fallen one after the other, though in a more discreet way. This series of failures demonstrates that capitalism has no solution to its historical crisis and that all the years of cheating and manipulating economic laws have only made the situation worse.
The collapse of the Eastern bloc and the world recession of 1991-93
The fall of the countries of the old Russian[2] bloc was a genuine disaster: between 1989 and 1993 production fell regularly by between 10% to 30%. Between 1989 and 1997 Russia lost 70% of its productive industry! Whilst the rhythm of this fall has moderated since 1994, the balance-sheet remains devastating: the figures are still negative in countries such as Bulgaria, Romania or Russia, while only in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are they positive.
The collapse of these economies, which cover more than a sixth of the world’s surface, has been the most serious of the 20th century in times of “peace”. To this should be added the list of victims of the 80’s: the majority of the African countries and good number of the Asiatic, Caribbean, Central American and South American countries. The foundations of capitalist reproduction at the world level suffered a new and important amputation.
However, the collapse of the countries of the old Eastern bloc was not an isolated event, it heralded a new convulsion of the world economy: after five years of stagnation and financial tensions (see our previous article), from the end of 1990 recession gripped the main industrial heart-lands:
- The United States suffered a slow-down in growth between 1989 and 1990 (2% and 0.5%), which turned negative in 1991: -0.8%,
- Great Britain experienced its worst recession since 1945, lasting until 1993,
- In Sweden the recession was the most violent of the post-war period leading to a situation of semi-stagnation (the famous “Swedish model” has disappeared from the text books),
- Although the recession was delayed in Germany and in the other countries of Western Europe, it exploded from the middle of 1992 and lasted throughout 1993-94. In 1993 German industrial production fell by 8.3% and for all the countries of the EU it fell by a total of 1%,
- Japan from 1990 fell into a state of gradually evolving recession: average growth during the period 1990-97 was a wretched 1,2% and this despite the fact that the government launched 11 recovery plans!
- Unemployment hit new records. This is made clear enough by a few figures:
- in 1991 the 24 countries of the OECD eliminated 6 million jobs,
- between 1991 and 1993 in the 12 countries of the European Union 8 million jobs were destroyed,
- in 1992, German unemployment reached levels not seen since the 1930s and since then far from falling it has continued growing, to reach 4 million in 1994 and 5 million in 1997.
Although in the terms of the fall in indices of production, the recession of 1991-93 looks smoother than those of 1974-75 and 1980-82 there are a series of qualitative elements that demonstrate the contrary:
- Unlike the previous recession no sector was spared by the crisis,
- The recession hit the armaments and computer sectors, which had not been affected before, especially hard. In 1991 IBM laid off 20,000 (80,000 in 1993); NCR 18,000; 10,000 at Digital Equipment; Wang 8,000 etc. In 1993 the modernised and powerful German car industry planned 100,000 layoffs,
- This gave rise to phenomena not seen in the previous recessions. These had occurred because governments, confronted with the threat of inflation, turned off the taps of credit. Between 1991-93, on the contrary, enormous injections of credit failed to stimulate the economic machine: “Unlike the recessions of 1967, 1970, 1974-75, 1980-82, the increase in monetary volume created directly by the state (notes and coins issued by the central bank) no longer produces an increase in the volume of bank credits. The American government has put its foot down on the accelerator, the banking machine has not responded” (International Review no 70 “A recession unlike its predecessors”). Thus, between 1989 and 1992 the United States Federal Reserve lowered interest rates 22 times, from 10% to 3% (a level lower than the inflation rate which meant that money was being lent to banks practically for free) but this still did not stimulate the economy. This was what the experts call the “credit-crunch”, the “contraction of credit”.
- This caused a major outbreak of inflation. The figures for 1989-90 are:
USA 6%
Great Britain 10.4%
E.E.C 6.1%
Brazil 1800%
Bulgaria 70%
Poland 50%
Hungary 40%
USSR 34%
The recession of 1991-93 saw the tendency to the return of the feared combination that so scared the bourgeois governments in the 1970’s: recession and inflation, or “stagflation”. This demonstrates in a general way that the “management of the crisis” which we analysed in the first article of this series, cannot either overcome or even attenuate capitalism’s illnesses and can do no more than put them off, such that each recession is worse than its predecessor but not as bad as the one to come. Thus, that of 1991-93 manifested 3 very important qualitative features:
- Credit was increasingly incapable of relaunching production,
- The worsening threat of a combination between the stagnation of production, on the one hand, and the explosion of inflation on the other,
- The cutting-edge sectors: computers, telecommunications, armaments, which until then had been free from the crisis, were now being hit.
A recovery without jobs
Following 1994 and after some timid attempts in 1993, the economy of the United States, accompanied by Great Britain and Canada, began to show increased growth, though never greater than 5%. This allowed the bourgeoisie to cry victory and to proclaim economic “recovery” to the four winds with talk of “years of uninterrupted growth” etc.
This “recovery” was based on:
- The massive increase in the debt of the United States and the world economy as a whole:
- Between 1987 and 1997 the USA’s total debt grew by $628 million every day. The foundations of this debt were: on the one hand, a drainage of the enormous mass of dollars that circulate throughout the world[3] and, on the other hand, the uncontrolled stimulation of domestic consumption which brought about such a collapse in savings that in 1996 the value of savings was negative for the first time in 53 years;
- China and the so-called Asiatic “tigers” and “dragons” received substantial funds based on the parity between their currencies and the dollar (a great deal for the foreign investors), which fuelled their rapid but illusory growth;
- A series of important Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico) were the centre of enormous speculative loans paid for by high short-term interest rates.
- A spectacular growth of labour productivity which allowed the lowering of costs and made American goods more competitive.
- An aggressive trade policy on the part of American capital whose pillars were:
- Obliging its rivals to dismantle their tariffs and other protectionist mechanisms
- The manipulation of the dollar, allowing its exchange rate to fall when the priority was to stimulate exports and making it rise when it was essential to attract funds
- Taking full advantage of all the instruments that the USA has as the main imperialist power (military, diplomatic, economic) in order to improve its position on the world market.
The European countries followed the same route as the USA and from 1995 also enjoyed “growth” although at a much lower level (figures fluctuated between 1% and 3%).
The most distinct characteristic of this new “recovery” is that it is a recovery without jobs, which constituted a new development compared to previous ones. Thus:
- unemployment did not stop growing between 1993-96 in the countries of the OECD
- large companies, far from increasing jobs continued to destroy them: it is calculated that in the USA the Fortune 500 companies shed 500,000 posts between 1993-96
- For the first time since 1945 the number of civil servants fell. The American federal administration cut 118,000 jobs between 1994-96
- Unlike the previous phases of recovery the growth in business profits was not accompanied by a growth in employment, quite the contrary.
The new jobs that have been created are badly paid, and part time.
This recovery that increased unemployment is eloquent testimony to the level of gravity that the historic crisis of capitalism has reached since as we pointed out in International Review no 80 “When the capitalist economy is functioning in a healthy manner, the increase or maintenance of profits is the result of the growth in the number of workers exploited and the capacity to extract greater masses of surplus value from them. When it is suffering from a chronic illness, despite the reinforcement of exploitation and productivity, the lack of markets prevents it from maintaining its profits without reducing the number of workers to exploit, without destroying capitalism”.
As with the open recession of 1991-93, the recovery of 1994-97, due to its fragility and its violent contradictions, is a new expression of the aggravation of the capitalist crisis; but it differs from previous ones in that:
- Many fewer countries were involved
- The USA no longer played the role of world locomotive giving an impetus to its “partners”, rather this recovery was achieved at the cost of others, principally Germany and Japan
- Unemployment continued to grow; the best that can be said is that it grew more slowly
- The recovery was accompanied by continuous financial and stock market convulsions. Amongst others:
- The collapse of the Mexican economy (1994)
- The upheaval in the European Monetary System (1995)
- The bankruptcy of Barings Bank (1996)
We can conclude that in the evolution of the capitalist crisis over the last 30 years each moment of recovery has been weaker than the previous one although stronger than the one to follow, whereas each phase of recession is worse than the previous one although not as bad as the following one.
So-called “globalisation”
During the 90s, we have seen the flowering of the ideology of “globalisation”. According to this the imposition throughout the globe of the laws of the market, budgetary rigour, labour flexibility and the unrestricted circulation of capital, will permit the “definitive” overcoming of the crisis (to be sure, along with a whole new load of crushing sacrifices on the backs of the proletariat). As with all the “models” that have proceeded it, this new alchemy is another attempt by the main capitalist states to “accompany” the crisis and to try to slow it down. There are three main elements to this:
- A formidable increase in productivity
- A reduction in trade barriers and restrictions on world trade
- A spectacular development of financial transactions.
The increase in productivity
Throughout the 90s, the most industrialised countries have experienced a major increase in productivity. In this growth we can distinguish between on the one hand, the reduction in costs; on the other, the growth in the organic composition of capital (the proportion between constant and variable capital).
Many factors have contributed to the reduction in costs:
- A tremendous pressure on wage costs: reduction of the nominal wage and increasing cuts in that part of wages materialised in social spending
- A vertiginous fall in the prices of raw materials
- The organised and systematic elimination of the unprofitable parts of the productive apparatus - as much in the private sector as in the public - through various mechanisms: closures pure and simple, privatisation of state property, mergers, sale and transfer of shares
- So-called “delocalisation”, in other words the transfer of low added value production to Third World countries with very low labour costs and ridiculously low prices (frequently due to dumping), allowing the central countries to lower their costs.
The overall result was a universal reduction in labour costs (a brutal increase in both absolute and relative surplus value).
Levels of annual variation of
Unit Labour Costs
(source: the OECD)
|
1985-95 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
Australia |
3.8 |
2.8 |
1.7 |
2.8 |
Austria |
2.4 |
-0.6 |
0.0 |
-0.2 |
Canada |
3.1 |
3.8 |
2.5 |
0.8 |
France |
1.5 |
0.9 |
0.8 |
0.4 |
Germany |
0.0 |
-0.4 |
-1.5 |
-1.0 |
Italy |
4.1 |
3.8 |
2.5 |
0.8 |
Japan |
0.5 |
-2.9 |
1.9 |
0.5 |
Korea |
7.0 |
4.3 |
3.8 |
-4.3 |
Spain |
4.2 |
2.6 |
2.7 |
2.0 |
Sweden |
4.4 |
4.0 |
0.5 |
1.7 |
Switzerland |
3.5 |
1.3 |
-0.4 |
-0.7 |
Great Britain |
4.6 |
2.5 |
3.4 |
2.8 |
United States |
3.1 |
2.0 |
2.3 |
2.0 |
As far as the growth in the composition of capital is concerned, this has continued throughout the period of decadence since it is indispensable to compensate the fall in the rate of profit. During the 90s, the systematic introduction of robotics, information technology, and telecommunications has given this a new impetus.
This growth in organic composition gives this or that individual capital, or even a whole nation, a certain advantage over its competitors, but what does this mean from the point of view of the whole of world capital? In the ascendant period, when the system was able to incorporate new masses of workers into its relations of exploitation, the growth in organic composition constituted an accelerating factor of capitalist expansion. In the present context of decadence and 30 years of chronic crisis, the effect of these increases in organic composition is completely different. While they are vital to each individual capital, to allow it to compensate the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, they have a different effect for capitalism as a whole in that they aggravate overproduction and reduce the very base of exploitation by lowering the amount of variable capital, ie by throwing ever-greater masses of workers onto the streets.
The reduction in customs barriers
Bourgeois propaganda has presented the elimination of customs barriers over the decade as a “triumph of the market”. We cannot make a detailed analysis here[4], but it is necessary to reveal the reality that is hidden behind the ideological smoke screen:
- This elimination of tariff barriers and protectionist measures has been essentially one-way: it has been carried out by the weakest countries for the benefit of the strongest and has particularly affected Brazil, Russia, India, etc. Far from reducing their customs barriers, the most industrialised countries have created new ones using the alibis of environmental protection, “human rights” etc. Contrary to its presentation by bourgeois ideology, this policy has sharpened imperialist tensions.
- Faced with the aggravation of the crisis, the most industrialised countries have imposed a policy of “co-operation” whose content is focused on:
- Pushing the effects of the crisis and the aggravation of competition onto the weakest countries,
- Impeding by all means a collapse of world trade that will do nothing but increase even more the crisis with especially serious consequences in the central countries.
Globalisation of financial transactions
A new escalation of debt took place during the 1990’s. Quantity was transformed into quality, and we can say that debt was converted into super-debt:
- During the 70’s debt could be reduced by running the risk of provoking a recession; since the mid-1980’s debt has become a permanent and growing necessity for every state during recovery as much as in periods of recession: “Debt is not a choice, an economic policy that the world’s leaders can decide to use, or not. It is a constraint, a necessity forced on them by the very functioning and contradictions of the capitalist system” (International Review no 87 “The casino economy”)
- On the one hand, states, banks and businesses need an influx of fresh credits which could only be obtained through the financial markets. This leads to a frenzied competition to attract lenders. Increasingly elaborate devices have been developed to this end: establishing a forced parity between local currencies and the dollar (this is the device used by China or the famous “tigers” and “dragons”), currencies re-valuations to attract funds, increasing interest rates etc.
- On the other hand, “profits made from production no longer find enough outlets in profitable investment to increase productive capacity. ‘Crisis management’ thus means finding other outlets for this excess floating capital, to avoid their abrupt devaluation” (idem). It is the states and the most respectable financial institutions themselves that have stimulated a frenzied speculation not only to avoid this gigantic bubble of fictitious capital bursting, but also to alleviate the cost of ever-increasing debt.
It is thus this super-debt, and the exuberant and irrational speculation which it has caused, that has led to this famous “free movement” of capital, the use of electronics and the Internet in financial transactions, the indexing of currencies in relation to the dollar, the free repatriation of profits_ The complicated financial engineering of the 80’s (see the previous articles) looks like child’s play compared to the sophisticated and labyrinthine gimmicks of the financial “global-isation” of the 90’s. Until the middle of the 80’s speculation, which has always existed under capitalism, had not gone beyond being a more or less temporary phenomenon. Since then it has turned into a deadly, but indispensable, poison which has become inseparable from the process of super-indebtedness, and which has to be integrated into the functioning of the system. The weight of speculation is enormous: according to figures from the World Bank so-called “hot money” has risen to $30 billion, of which $24 billion come from the industrialised countries.
A provisional balance-sheet of the 1990s
We want to offer some provisional conclusions (for the period 1990-96, before the explosion that has been called “the Asiatic Crisis”), that, however, appear significant to us.
I - Evolution of the economic situation.
1. The average levels of growth have continued falling:
Levels of increase in GNP
(average for the 24 OECD countries)
1960-70 |
5.6% |
1970-80 |
4.1% |
1980-90 |
3.4% |
1990-95 |
2.4% |
2. The amputation of the directly productive industrial and agricultural sectors has become permanent and affects all sectors, the “out-dated” as much as the “cutting-edge ”.
Evolution of the % of GDP taken up by directly productive sectors
(industry and agriculture)
|
1975 |
1985 |
1996 |
United States |
36.2 |
32.7 |
27.8 |
China |
74.8 |
73.5 |
68.5 |
India |
64.2 |
61.1 |
59.2 |
Japan |
47.9 |
44.2 |
40.3 |
Germany |
52.2 |
47.6 |
40.8 |
Brazil |
52.3 |
56.8 |
51.2 |
Canada |
40.7 |
38.1 |
34.3 |
France |
40.2 |
34.4 |
28.1 |
Great Britain |
43.7 |
43.2 |
33.6 |
Italy |
48.6 |
40.7 |
33.9 |
Belgium |
39.9 |
33.6 |
32 |
Israel |
40.1 |
33.1 |
31.3 |
South Korea |
57.5 |
53.5 |
49.8 |
3. In the struggle against the inevitable fall in the rate of profit, businesses resort to a whole series of measures which will alleviate the fall in the short-term, but will only aggravate the problem in the medium term:
- Lowering of labour costs and increasing the organic composition of capital
- Decapitalisation: the massive transfer of assets (factories, property, financial investments etc) in order to boost profits
- Concentration: business mergers have undergone a spectacular growth.
The value of mergers in billions of $
(source JP Morgan)
|
European Union |
United States |
1990 |
260 |
240 |
1992 |
214
|
220
|
1994 |
234 |
325 |
1996 |
330 |
628 |
1997 |
558 |
910 |
1998 |
670 |
1500 |
Whilst the gigantic process of the concentration of capital between 1850 and 1910 reflected a development of production and was positive for the evolution of the economy, the present process expresses the opposite. It is a a defensive response, designed to compensate for the strong contraction of demand, organising the reduction of productive capacity (in 1998 the industrialised countries cut their productive capacity by 10%) and reducing the work force: prudent estimates put the total reduction of jobs due to mergers carried out in 1998 at 11%.
4. There was a new reduction in the foundations of the world market: a large part of Africa, a certain number of Asian and American countries, have participated very weakly as they have sunk into a situation of decomposition; these have become known as “black holes”: a state of chaos, the resurgence of forms of slavery, an economy based on barter and looting, etc.
5. The countries once considered as “models” have fallen into prolonged stagnation. This is the case in Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Sweden where:
- The average rate of increase of production for the period 1990-97 did not exceed 2%;
- Unemployment grew significantly: between 1990-97 it practically doubled (for example, in Switzerland average unemployment between 1970-1990 was 1%; in 1997 it had increased to 5.2%);
- From being creditors, all four countries became debtors (Swiss households are the most indebted in the world after the USA and Japan);
- Most significant is the situation of the Swiss economy, until recently considered the healthiest in the world:
Growth of Swiss GNP
1992 - 0.3%
1993 - 0.8%
1994 - 0.5%
1995 - 0.8%
1996 - 0.2%
1997 - 0.7%
6. The level of debt continued its unstoppable escalation turning into super-debt:
- World debt rose to a figure of $30 trillion (one and a half years of world production);
- Germany, Japan and all the countries of Western Europe joined the ranks of the highly indebted (in the previous decade it had been much more moderate):
% of debt to GNP (source: World Bank)
|
1975 |
1985 |
1996 |
United States |
|
48.9
|
64.2 |
Japan |
45.6 |
67 |
87.4 |
Germany |
24.8 |
42.5 |
60.7 |
Canada |
43.7 |
64.1 |
100.5 |
France |
20.5 |
31 |
56.2 |
Great Britain |
62.7 |
53.8 |
54.5 |
Italy |
57.5 |
82.3 |
123.7 |
Spain |
12.7 |
43.7 |
69.6 |
Belgium |
58.6 |
122.1 |
130 |
- The countries of the Third World suffered a new overdose of debt:
Total debt of the “underdeveloped”
countries (source: World Bank)
1990 1.480,000 million $
1994 1.927,000 million $
1996 2.177,000 million $
7. The financial apparatus suffered the worst convulsions since 1929 leaving it no longer the secure place it had been up until the middle of the 1980s. Its deterioration has gone along with a gigantic development of speculation which has affected all activity: shares on the stock markets, property, art, agriculture etc.
8. Two phenomena, which have always existed under capitalism, have taken on alarming proportions over the decade:
- The corruption of politicians and economic managers, which is the product of two combined factors:
- The increasingly overwhelming weight of the state in the economy (businesses are increasingly dependent on its investment plans, its subsidies, its purchases),
- The growing difficulty of gaining a reasonable profit through “legal” means.
- The gangsterisation of the economy, the increasingly strong inter-penetration between states, banks, businesses and traffickers (of drugs, arms, children, emigrants etc). The most dubious businesses are the most profitable and the most ‘respected’ institutions both governmental and private cannot help but satisfy their appetites. This makes increasingly clear a tendency towards the decomposition of the economy.
9. In line with the above, a phenomenon has appeared in the industrialised states, that of the increasingly obvious falsification of economic indicators and “creative” accounting tricks of all kinds, which until now have been the preserve of banana republics and Stalinist regimes. This is another expression of the aggravation of the crisis since for the bourgeoisie it has always been necessary to dispose of reliable statistics (especially, in the countries of “Western” state capitalism that need the market to impose its final verdict on the functioning of the economy).
The World Bank, the source of many statistics, includes as a part of GDP the notion of “non-tradable services”, which includes the pay of the military, civil servants and teachers. Another method of exaggerating the figures is to consider as “self-consumption” not only agricultural activities, but a whole series of services. The much praised “budget surplus” of the American state, is a fiction gained through playing with the surpluses of the Social Security funds[5]. However, due to their great social and political importance, the most scandalous tricks are played on the unemployment statistics with a view to substantially lowering them:
- In the USA our publication Internationalism no 105 has made clear the tricks used by the Clinton administration to achieve its “magnificent” unemployment figures: including as active workers those working part time, eliminating from the statistics the unemployed who refuse meaningless jobs, count the various part time jobs done by one worker as if they were done by different individuals, etc.
- In Germany only those who look for jobs of at least 18 hours a week are considered unemployed, whilst in Holland the figure is 12 hours a week and in Luxembourg 20 hours[6].
- Austria and Greece have got rid of monthly statistics in preference for quarterly ones which allow them to mask the real figures.
- In Italy, those who work between 20 and 40 hours a week or who work between 4 and 6 months a year are not considered unemployed. In Great Britain those unemployed that receive no state benefits are eradicated from the figures.
II - The situation of the working class
1. Unemployment has accelerated brutally throughout the decade:
Unemployment in the 24 countries of the OECD
1989 30 million
1993 35 million
1996 38 million
% of unemployment in the industrialised countries (source: ILO)
|
1976 |
1980 |
1990 |
1996 |
USA |
7.4 |
7.1 |
6.4 |
5.4 |
Japan |
1.8 |
2 |
2.1 |
3.4 |
Germany |
3.8 |
2.9 |
5 |
12.4 |
France |
4.4 |
6.3 |
9.1 |
12.4 |
Italy |
6.6 |
7.5 |
10.6 |
12.1 |
Great Britain |
5.6 |
6.4 |
7.9 |
8.2 |
The ILO showed that in 1996 world-wide unemployment or under-employment had reached the threshold of one billion people.
2. The chronic under-employment of the Third World has spread to the industrialised countries:
- In 1995 part time contracts (also known as “dustbin contracts”) made up 20% of the workforce in the 24 countries of the OECD;
- The ILO report for 1996 observed that “between 25% and 30% of the world’s workers rely on a shorter day’s work than they would want, or on a wage which is less than the minimum necessary to live decently”.
3. In the Third World there has been a massive development in forms of exploitation such as: child labour (some 200 million according to statistics from the World Bank for 1996); slavery or forced labour - even in a developed country like France, diplomats have been condemned for treating as slaves domestic personnel brought from Madagascar or Indonesia.
4. Along with generalised mass layoffs (especially in the large companies) governments have adopted policies of “reducing the costs of redundancy”:
- Reduction in layoff compensation,
- Cuts in unemployment benefits, and in the number of beneficiaries.
5. Wages have suffered their first nominal fall since the 1930s:
- Wage levels in Spain in 1997 were lower than those in 1980,
- In the USA the average wage fell by 20% between 1974 and 1997,
- In Japan wages have fallen for the first time since 1955 (by 0.9% in 1998).
6. Substantial cuts in social spending have become permanent. By contrast taxes, prices, and Social Security levies all continue to grow.
7. Since the middle of the decade, capital has opened another front of attack: the elimination of legal minimum working conditions. This has had a number of consequences:
- The increase in the working day (particularly through the demagogy about the “35 hour week” which presupposes the flexible calculation of working hours on a yearly basis and therefore the reduction in overtime payments)
- The elimination of limits on the retirement age,
- The elimination of limits on the age for beginning work (2 million children already work in the European Union)
- Reduced protection against work accidents, work-related illnesses etc.
8. Another, non-negligible aspect is that banks, insurance companies etc are pushing workers to place their small savings (or help from parents or grandparents) in the Russian roulette of the stock market, making them the first victims of its continuous summersaults. However, a worse problem is that, with the elimination or the cutting of the derisory pensions from Social Security, workers are being forced to depend for their retirement on Pension Funds which invest the bulk of their capital on the stock market which causes serious uncertainty: for example the main Fund for education workers in the USA lost 11% of its value in 1997 (see Internationalism no 105).
Bourgeois propaganda has insisted ad nauseam about the lessening of inequality, about the “democratisation” of wealth and consumption. Thirty years of capitalism’s deepening historic crisis has systematically given the lie to these proclamations and confirmed the marxist analysis of the tendency of increasing impoverishment of the working class and the whole exploited population brought about by the aggravation of crisis. Capitalism is concentrated into on the one hand, an ever smaller minority with enormous and provocative riches and on the other a growing majority suffering terrible and lacerating poverty. Some figures gathered in the 1998 Annual Report of the UN are significant: whilst in 1996 the 358 richest people in the world concentrated in their hands the same amount of money as the 2.5 billion poorest, in 1997 the first 225 held the same equivalent.
Adalen
[1] It is not an aim of this series of articles to analyse the new stage of the historic crisis of capitalism opened up in August 1997 with the so-called “Asian crisis”. See International Review no 92 and after for a more specific study.
[2] It is not the aim of this article to analyse the consequences of this on the class struggle, imperialist tensions and on the life of the countries submitted to the Stalinist regime. In order to do this we refer everyone to the articles we have published in the International Review, especially in numbers 60,61,62,63, and 64.
[3] Whilst American production represents 26,7% of the world, the dollar amounts to 47,5% of bank deposits, 64,1% of the world’s reserves and 47,6% of transactions (figures from the World Bank)
[4] See International Review no 86 “Behind the ‘globalisation’ of the economy: the aggravation of the capitalist crisis”.
[5] According to analysis published by the New York Times of 9-11-98
[6] These and the following figures have been taken from the Official Diary of the European Community (1997).
“The world we live in is a little mad. In Kosovo we discover crimes against humanity every day; other less spectacular but equally horrible conflicts in Africa and Asia; economic and financial crises which break out suddenly, unforeseen and destructive; growing poverty in many parts of the world...” (quoted in Le Monde, 22/6/99). Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Eastern bloc and the disappearance of the USSR, ten years after the enthusiastic declarations about the “victory of capitalism” and the opening of a new “era of peace and prosperity”, this is the disillusioned - or rather discreetly cynical - observation of one of the bourgeoisie’s principal leaders: Jacques Chirac, president of France. Another eminent bourgeois politician, ex-US president Jimmy Carter has much the same to say about capitalism’s reality since 1989: “When the Cold War came to an end ten years ago, we expected an era of peace. Instead, we have had a decade of war” (quoted in International Herald Tribune of 17/6/99). The situation of the capitalist world is catastrophic. The economic crisis has reduced billions of human beings to abject poverty. According to Le Monde Diplomatique of June 1999, “Half the world’s population lives with less than $1.50 per day, and a billion men and women live with less than $1". Every continent is ravaged by the atrocities of war. This madness - in J. Chirac’s words - is implacable, devastating, bloody; it is the consequence of the historic impasse of the capitalist world, and its latest expressions are the wars in Serbia and Kosovo, and between India and Pakistan, these two latter in possession of nuclear weapons.
As the air war comes to an end in Yugoslavia, and the great imperialist powers once again cry victory, as the media develop huge campaigns on the humanitarian benefits of NATO’s war and the noble cause that it defended, as the talk is of reconstruction, peace, and prosperity for the Balkans, it is good to bear in mind these discreet confidences - offered in a moment of weariness? - of Carter and Chirac. They reveal the reality behind the deceitful propaganda that we are subjected to day after day.
For us communists, they are nothing new. Marxism[1] has always insisted within the workers’ movement that capitalism could only lead to an economic impasse, to crisis, poverty, and bloody conflicts between bourgeois states. Marxism has always, especially since World War I, insisted that “capitalism is war”. Peacetime is only a moment in the preparation of imperialist war. The more the capitalists talk of peace, the more they prepare for war.
During the last ten years, the columns of our International Review have denounced, over and over again, the talk of a “victory of capitalism”, the “end of communism”, the “prosperity to come” and the “disappearance of war”. We have constantly denounced the “peace that prepares war”. We have denounced the responsibility of the great imperialist powers in the proliferation of local conflicts around the world. The imperialist antagonisms between the main capitalist countries are responsible for the vivisection of Yugoslavia, the explosion of robbery and murder of every kind on the part of the smaller nationalist gangsters, and for the unleashing of war. In this Review, we have already denounced the inevitable development of military chaos in the Balkans: “The butchery which has now been raging in ex-Yugoslavia for three years is not about to end. It is potent proof of how the wars and chaos born out of the decomposition of capitalism are aggravated by the big imperialist powers. And also that, in the name of ‘humanitarian intervention’, the only alternative they can propose is either to bomb the Serb forces or to arm the Bosnians. In other words, faced with the war and chaos provoked by the decomposition of the capitalist system, the most powerful and industrialised nations can only respond by adding more war” (International Review no.78, 3rd quarter 1994).
When this was written, the alternative was between bombing the Serbs or arming the Bosnians. In the end, they bombed the Serbs and armed the Bosnians. As a result, the war claimed still more victims; Bosnia is divided into three “ethnically cleansed” zones and occupied by the armies of the great powers; the population lives in poverty, many of them are refugees who will never return home. Populations that lived side by side for centuries are now torn apart and divided by blood and slaughter.
Great and small imperialisms sow terror and death
In Kosovo, “learning the lesson of Bosnia”, the great imperialisms straight away bombed the Serb forces and sent weapons to the Kosovar UCK, adding still more to the war. The enthusiastic admiration of military experts and journalists for NATO’s 1,100 aircraft, the 35,000 sorties, the 18,000 bombs and missiles used to “treat” - it’s the term they use - 2,000 targets, are sickening. The result of this terror exercised by imperialisms great and small, by NATO, the Serbian forces, and the UCK: tens of thousands of deaths, appalling crimes committed by the soldiery of the minor imperialist gangsters, by the Serb paramilitaries and the UCK, a million Kosovars and 100,000 Serbs forced to flee, leaving their houses burning and their belongings looted, held to ransom by both sides. The great imperialist powers are responsible for the terror and massacres perpetrated by the Serb militia and the UCK. The Serb and Kosovar populations are the victims of imperialism, just as the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs were during the war in Bosnia, and remain to this day. Since 1991, the nationalist and imperialist division of Yugoslavia has been the cause of more than 250,000 deaths and 3 million refugees.
What do the democratic states have to say to this? “We have to accept a few deaths in order to save a greater number” (Jamie Shea on 15th April, quoted in the supplement to Le Monde of 19/6/99). This declaration by the NATO spokesman, to justify the murder of innocent Serb and Kosovar civilians by the “collateral damage” of the “great democracies” is no better than the fanaticism of the dictators demonised for the benefit of propaganda, whether they be Milosevic today, Saddam yesterday, or Hitler before them. This is the reality of the “humanitarian interference” by the great powers. Democracy and dictatorship both come from the same capitalist world.
Imperialism has ruined the Balkans and caused an ecological disaster
As Chirac and Carter have shown us, it does sometimes happen that the bourgeoisie tells the truth. Sometimes it even keeps its promises. NATO’s generals promised to destroy Serbia and retard it by 50 years. They have kept their word. “After 79 days of bombing, the [Yugoslav] federation has been taken 50 years back to the past. The power stations and oil refineries have been, if not completely destroyed, rendered incapable of supplying sufficient energy - at least for the winter; the transport and telecommunications infrastructures are unusable, the rivers virtually impracticable. Unemployment, which stood at 35% before the bombing began, will probably double. According to the expert Pavle Petrovic, economic activity has shrunk by 60% since 1968” (Le Monde, op. Cit.). Yugoslavia’s ruin has been an economic disaster for its neighbours - Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, already amongst the poorest countries in Europe - as a result of the influx of refugees, the paralysis of their economies, the end of trade with Serbia, and the disruption of transport by road and the Danube.
The bombardments have been an ecological disaster for Serbia and the surrounding countries: unused bombs dropped in the Adriatic, much to the alarm of Italian fishermen, acid rains in Rumania, “abnormal levels of dioxin” in Greece, “atmospheric concentrations of sulphur dioxide and heavy metals” in Bulgaria, and frequent oil slicks on the Danube. “In Serbia, the ecological damage seems much more worrying (...) According to one UN official, speaking under cover of anonymity, ‘in other circumstances, nobody would hesitate to call this an environmental disaster’” (Le Monde, 26/5/99). As our brave anonymous official says, “in other circumstances”, many would be indignant - the ecologists to start with. But in today’s circumstances, the Greens in power in Germany and France have been amongst the worst warmongers, and they share responsibility for one of the greatest ecological disasters of our time. They took part in the decision to launch graphite bombs, which spread carcinogenic particles which will have incalculable consequences for years to come. They did the same for the cluster bombs - whose effects are the same as anti-personnel mines - which are now spread over Serbia, and above all Kosovo, where they are beginning to kill children (and British soldiers...)! Their “pacifism” and “defence of the eco-system” are at the service of capital and anyway subordinated to the fundamental interests of their national capital, especially when these are at stake. In other words, they are pacifists and ecologists as long as there is no war. In reality, in imperialist war and for the needs of the national capital, they are war-mongers and large-scale polluters just like all the other bourgeois parties.
The lie of NATO’s “just and humanitarian” war
Wasn’t it necessary to intervene to stop Serb state terror against the Kosovars? Didn’t we have to stop Milosevic? This is like the pyromaniac fireman. The arsonists who lit the fuse in 1991 are using their own misdeeds to justify their intervention. Who allowed the worst nationalist Mafia cliques in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, and now Kosovo, to unleash nationalist hysteria and bloody ethnic cleansing, if not the great imperialist powers? Who, if not Germany, pushed for the unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, encouraging and precipitating the unleashing of nationalism in the Balkans which led to the massacres and exile of the Serbian, then the Bosnian populations? Who, if not Britain and France, turned a blind eye to the repression and massacre of the Croat and Bosnian populations, and the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Milosevic and the “Greater Serbia” nationalists? Who, if not the United States, supported and equipped the different rival gangs depending on how their rivals were positioned at any given moment? When they justify the bombing campaign on the grounds of “humanitarian interference”, the “Allied” western democracies demonstrate an unlimited hypocrisy and duplicity. Just as the rivalries between the great powers liberated and precipitated nationalist hysteria by provoking the break-up of Yugoslavia, so NATO’s massive intervention allowed Milosevic to increase his repression against the Kosovars, and to give free rein to his soldiery. Even the bourgeoisie’s own experts recognise this - discreetly of course - when they pretend to wonder: “The intensification of the ethnic cleansing was foreseeable (...). Was the massive ethnic cleansing at the beginning of the bombing campaign foreseen? If the answer is yes, then how can the low level of NATO operations [ie to help the refugees] during the first month, until the Washington summit, be justified?” (François Heisbourg, president of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, quoted in Le Monde supplement of 19/6/99). And yet the answer is clear enough: a million refugees, their terrible stories, the conditions of their expulsion, the threats and mistreatment they suffered at the hands of the Serb militia, were cynically used to justify the military occupation of Kosovo (and an eventual ground war “if necessary”) in the eyes of the great powers’ own populations. Today, the discovery and media use of mass graves is again being used to justify the continuing war situation, and to hide where the real responsibilities lie.
But in the final analysis, has not NATO’s military success restored peace and allowed the refugees to return home? Some of the refugees (“It is already clear that many Kosovar Albanians will never return to their devastated homes”, Flora Lewis, International Herald Tribune, 4/6/99) will return to find the region devastated, and often enough, their home a smouldering ruin. As for the Serbs living in Kosovo, they in their turn have become refugees - whom the Serb bourgeoisie does not want, and whom it is trying to push back into a Kosovo where they are the target of universal hatred - unless they are simply assassinated by the UCK. As in Bosnia, a river of blood and hatred now separates the different populations. As in Bosnia, the entire area must be rebuilt. But also as in Bosnia, reconstruction and economic development will remain mere media promises of the great imperialist powers. A few repairs will be done to roads and bridges, to allow the rapid movement of the KFOR occupying army. The media will use these for a new wash of propaganda on the “humanitarian benefits” of military intervention. We have no doubt that there will be no recovery in a Kosovo already poor before the war began. By contrast, the war situation will not come to an end. NATO’s pyromaniac firemen have poured oil on the fire, and destabilised the region still further: the occupation and division of Kosovo between the different imperialist powers in KFOR uniform has reproduced the situation in Bosnia, where IFOR, then SFOR, have occupied the country since 1995 and the Dayton “peace” agreement. “Along with Bosnia, the whole region will be militarised by NATO for 20 or 30 years” (William Zimmerman, the last US ambassador in Belgrade, quoted in Le Monde of 7/6/99). What about the local population? At best, and at first, they will enjoy an armed peace in the midst of a ruined country, poverty, prey to the militias and under the reign of armed gangs and the local Mafia. This will be followed by new military confrontations both in Kosovo and in the surrounding region (Montenegro, Macedonia...?), expressions, yet again, of the great powers’ imperialist rivalries. Kosovo will then endure the reign of petty warlords and different Mafia clans, often in UCK uniform, behind which each imperialist power - especially in the zone it occupies - will try to hold its rivals in check.
Had we any doubts about this, they would be dissipated by the spectacle of Russian parachutists racing to be the first in Pristina, and to occupy its airport; this action is an open caricature of the implacable logic that drives the great imperialist gangsters. They have no hope of making any economic gains, either to win the “reconstruction market”, or even to gain control of a few wretched mineral resources. Direct economic interest in the war in Kosovo is non-existent, or else so minimal that it is in no way a reason, even one of the reasons, for the war. It would be absurd to think that the war against Serbia was aimed at controlling Serb economic resources, or even at gaining control of the Danube, important thoroughfare though it is. In this war, what matters for each imperialism is to secure the best possible position in the irreversible development of great-power rivalries in order to defend its imperialist interests: in other words, its strategic, diplomatic, and military interests.
One of the main consequences of capitalism’s economic impasse and the resulting frantic competition, is that this economic competition is taken to the imperialist level, to end in generalised war, as the two world imperialist wars this century have shown. Though they are historically the consequence of an economic impasse, imperialist antagonisms have their own dynamic: they are not the direct expression of economic or commercial rivalries, as we can see from the various imperialist line-ups throughout the century, particularly during and immediately after the two world wars. More and more, the search for direct economic advantage is only a secondary imperialist motivation.
An understanding of the strategic stakes in the present war can be found amongst some of the “thinkers” of the bourgeois class (though of course only in publications aimed at an “enlightened few”, not at the working masses): “As for the final goals, the real aims of this war, the European Union and the USA are each pursuing, for very different motives, separate plans which are very precise but never public. The European Union is involved for strategic reasons [while for the US] the Kosovo business provides an ideal pretext for settling an issue that is of prime concern to them: renewing the legitimacy of NATO (...) ‘because of the political influence that it gives the US in Europe, and because it blocks the development of a strategic system to rival that of the USA’” (Ignacio Ramonet in Le Monde Diplomatique of June 1999, quoting William Pfaf’s article “What good is NATO if America intends to go it alone?” in International Herald Tribune 20/5/99).
Imperialist rivalries are the real cause of the war in Kosovo
This implacable logic of imperialism, consisting of increasingly sharp rivalries, antagonisms and conflicts, expressed itself in the way the war broke out and the way it unfolded. The unity of the western allies in NATO was itself merely the result of a momentary and unstable balance of forces between rivals. At the Rambouillet negotiations, under the auspices of Britain and France - and from which Germany was absent - it was at first the Kosovar representatives who rejected the conditions for an agreement under the pressure of the USA. Then, with the impromptu arrival of the American Madeleine Albright in response to the impotence of the Europeans, it was the Serbs who rejected the conditions that the USA wanted to impose on them, and which in fact demanded the complete capitulation of Milosevic without a fight: NATO forces were to have the right to freely circulate, without any authorisation, anywhere in the territory of Yugoslavia[2]. Why such an unacceptable ultimatum? “The showdown at Rambouillet, one of her (Mrs Albright) aides said recently, has ‘only one purpose’: to get the war started with the Europeans locked in” (International Herald Tribune, 11/6/99). Yet another rebuttal of the humanitarian lies of the bourgeoisie about the reasons for the war. And indeed it was the case that the British and French bourgeoisies, traditional allies of Serbia, got “locked in” to the military operation against Serbia. Refusing to join in would have put them out of the game at the end of the conflict. From then on, all the imperialist forces belonging to NATO, from the biggest to the smallest, had to take part in the bombing. Absent from Rambouillet, Germany then had the “humanitarian” opportunity to get back into the game and participate in a military intervention for the first time since 1945. The direct result of these antagonisms was to offer a carte blanche to Milosevic to get on with “ethnic cleansing”, and to plunge millions of people in Serbia and Kosovo into a sheer hell.
The imperialist occupation and carve-up of Kosovo: a success for Britain
And today, the result of these imperialist divisions has been the division of Kosovo into five occupation zones - with a Russian occupation force in the middle of it all - in which each imperialism will play its cards against the others. The murderous imperialist game will take on a new form, with a new alignment of forces. If Britain and France had not participated in the air war against Yugoslavia they would have been relegated to the same level as Russia. Participating in the NATO bombing gave them much better cards, especially the British, who are now at the head of the land occupation. Leading KFOR, occupying the centre of the country and its capital, British imperialism has emerged considerably strengthened both at the military and diplomatic levels. Today in Kosovo, from the end of the bombing and the beginning of the land intervention, Britain holds the best cards, both as the historic ally of Serbia (in spite of the bombings), and thanks to its ability to send the biggest number of soldiers faster than anyone else, and thanks also to the extreme professionalism of its ground troops. Hence the incessant calls from Tony Blair for a land intervention throughout the war. The American bourgeoisie, absolute master of the air war, by trying to sabotage each diplomatic advance, tried to delay the agreement of a ceasefire in which it would totally lose control of events[3]. France, though to a much lesser degree than Britain, is still in the game, as is Italy, though more as a neighbour than as an important great power. Finally, Russia has managed to grab a foothold but one which does not allow it to play any decisive role, except as a troublemaker.
A new step in the imperialist ambitions of Germany
But throughout this last bloody decade in the Balkans, there has been only one imperialist power which has really advanced towards its objectives: Germany. Whereas the USA, Britain and France - to mention only the most important powers - have been against the break-up of Yugoslavia since the beginning of 1991, Germany has made the Yugoslav affair its battle-horse[4], pursuing a strategy always aimed at the Serb “bad guy”. The most recent expression of this has been its arming and financing of the KLA while building up a strong position in Albania. Germany has been advancing its imperialist pawns throughout this decade. The dislocation of Yugoslavia has enabled it to enlarge its imperialist influence from Slovenia and Croatia to Albania. The war against Serbia, its isolation and ruin, has allowed it to participate in air and land military operations for the first time since 1945. Germany was excluded from Rambouillet, but it was in Bonn and Cologne, under its presidency, that the G8 - the group of the richest countries plus Russia - discussed and adopted the peace accords and the UN resolution. With 8500 soldiers, it is the second biggest army in KFOR. At the beginning of the 90s Germany was called an economic giant and a military dwarf; but since then Germany has been the power that has scored most points against its rivals.
Helmut Kohl, the former German chancellor, expressed the hopes and objectives of German imperialism very well: “For a long time the 20th century has been bi-polar. Today there are many, including the USA, who are attached to the idea that the 21st century will be uni-polar and American. This is an error” (Courier International, 12/5/99). He doesn’t say it, but he certainly hopes that the 21st century will be bi-polar with Germany as America’s rival.
The division of Kosovo aggravates the rivalries between the big powers
All the imperialist powers are thus squaring up to each other in Kosovo, directly and militarily. Even if direct armed confrontations between the big powers are not on the agenda in the present period, this face-to-face represents a new aggravation, a new step, in the development and sharpening of imperialist antagonisms. Directly on the ground for “twenty years”, as the former US ambassador to Yugoslavia put it, all of them will be arming the armed gangs and their local proteges, Serb militias and Albanian mafia bands, in order to embarrass and entrap their rivals. All sorts of trip wires and provocations will be used. In sum: for rival geo-strategic, i.e. imperialist interests, millions of people in ex-Yugoslavia have been through hell and will carry on paying for the imperialist “madness” of the capitalist world in misery and despair.
The war in Kosovo will lead to a multiplication of local conflicts
There can be no doubt: the infernal machine of imperialist conflicts is going to be further accentuated and aggravated, going from one from part of the globe to another. In this devastating spiral, all continents and all states, small or big, will be hit. The outbreak of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan at a time when these two countries have embarked upon a frenzied arms race is an expression of this, as are the recent confrontations between the two Koreas. The armed intervention of NATO has already poured oil on the flames globally and heralds the conflagrations to come: “The success of the multinational coalition led by the US in Kosovo will reinforce the dissemination of missiles and arms of mass destruction in Asia...It is now imperative for nations to have the best military technology” (International Herald Tribune, 19/6/99)
Why this imperative? Because “in the period of capitalist decadence, ALL states are imperialist, and take the necessary measures to satisfy their appetites: war economy, arms production, etc. We must state clearly that the deepening convulsions of the world economy can only sharpen the opposition between different states, including and increasingly on the military level. The difference, in the coming period (after the disappearance of the eastern bloc and the USSR) will be that these antagonisms which were previously contained and used by the two great imperialist blocs will come to the fore. The disappearance of the Russian imperialist gendarme, and that to come of the American gendarme as far as its one-time ‘partners’ are concerned, opens the door to the unleashing of a whole series of more local rivalries. For the moment, these rivalries and confrontations cannot degenerate into a world war (even supposing that the proletariat were no longer capable of putting up a resistance). However, with the disappearance of the discipline imposed by the two blocs, these conflicts are liable to become more frequent and more violent, especially of course in those areas where the proletariat is weakest” (International Review 61, February 1990).
This position has been confirmed throughout this decade. At least at the level of local imperialist conflicts. But what does this mean for our position on the role of the international proletariat in the evolution of the situation?
The proletariat and war
The international proletariat has been unable to prevent the outbreak of local imperialist conflicts throughout this decade. Even in Europe, in Yugoslavia, a stone’s throw from the main working class concentrations in the world, the impotence of the proletariat at this level has been shown again by the war in Kosovo. Neither the international proletariat, still less the proletariat in Serbia, has expressed a direct opposition to war.
Of course we are in solidarity with the Serb population which has demonstrated against the return of its soldiers in coffins. Just as we are in solidarity with the collective desertions which took place in connection with these demonstrations. They are a clear refutation of the shameful lies of the NATO powers which present all the Serbs as torturers and murderers united behind Milosevic. Unfortunately these reactions against the war did not develop into a real expression of the working class, which alone is capable of offering even the beginnings of a proletarian response to imperialist war. It was essentially the international isolation of Serbia, the despair amongst significant factions of the Serb bourgeoisie faced with the destruction of the country’s economic apparatus, the prospect of a NATO land intervention, and the exhaustion of a population subjected to daily bombings, which pushed Milosevic to sign the peace agreement. “We are alone. NATO isn’t going to collapse. Russia will not aid Yugoslavia militarily and international opinion is against us” (Vuk Draskovic, Milosevic’s vice-premier who changed his colours on 26/4/99, quoted in Le Monde’s Supplement, 19/6/99).
Does this mean that the proletariat was completely absent faced with the war in Kosovo? Does this mean that the balance of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie at a historic level has no weight in the present situation? No. In the first place, the present historic situation, deriving from the end of the imperialist blocs, is the result of the balance of forces between the two classes. The proletariat’s opposition, throughout the 70s and 80s, to economic and political attacks has also been expressed, particularly in the central countries of capitalism, by its resistance and ‘insubordination’ towards the defence of national interests at the economic level, and thus towards the defence of the nation’s imperialist interests (see the article on the historic course in International Review no.18). And this historic course, this proletarian resistance, has once again been confirmed by the way the war in Kosovo evolved, even if the proletariat was not able to prevent it.
During this war, the working class remained a constant preoccupation of the bourgeoisie. It spent a lot of time and effort, an intensive media barrage, to make sure that the themes of the propaganda campaign were accepted - not without difficulty, and somewhat by default - and obtained a small majority in favour of the war in the public opinion polls in the NATO countries. And this wasn’t the case in all countries. And certainly not at the beginning. It needed the dramatic and unbearable pictures of the exhausted, starving Albanian families for the bourgeoisie to get a minimum of acceptance (you can’t really say that it was a positive support). And despite this the “Vietnam syndrome”, i.e. disquiet about the land war and the risks of popular reactions to the return of dead soldiers, was an obstacle for the bourgeoisie in the commitment of its armed forces. “The option of the air war aims to preserve the lives of the pilots as far as possible, since the loss or capture of a few of them could have negative effects on public support for the operation” (Jamie Shea, Le Monde Supplement 19/6/99). And yet with most of the western armies you are talking about professional soldiers rather than conscripts. It’s not we who say this; it’s the bourgeois politicians themselves who are obliged to recognise that the proletariat of the big imperialist countries is an obstacle to war. Even if “public opinion” is not identical to the proletariat, within the population as a whole the latter is the only class that carries any weight with the bourgeoisie.
This “insubordination” - latent and instinctive - of the international proletariat has also been expressed in various workers’ actions. Despite the war, despite the nationalist and democratic campaigns, significant strikes took place in certain countries. The railway workers’ strike in France, against the advice of the main union federations, the CGT and the CFDT, and against the introduction of added flexibility under the cover of the 35-hour week; a demonstration organised by the unions which attracted more than 25,000 municipal workers in New York; these are two of the most significant expressions of the slow but real rise in workers’ militancy and “resistance”, at the very moment that the war was being unleashed. In contrast to the Gulf war which created a feeling of apathy and powerlessness in the working class, the war in the Balkans has not caused the same disarray.
Of course this working class resistance is limited to the economic terrain, and the link between the economic impasse of capitalism, its economic attacks, and the proliferation of imperialist wars has yet to be made. This link must however be made because it is an important, essential element in the development of revolutionary consciousness among the workers. From this point of view, the interest we encountered while distributing our international leaflet denouncing the imperialist war in Kosovo - for example the discussions it raised at the demonstration in New York, even though this had been called for another reason altogether, are encouraging. It is up to communist groups not only to denounce the war and defend internationalist positions, but also to facilitate the development of consciousness about the dead-end that capitalism has reached[5]. Its economic crisis raises economic rivalries and competition to a higher level and pushes ineluctably towards the sharpening of imperialist antagonisms and the proliferation of wars. Even if economic rivalries don’t always correspond to imperialist ones, which have their own dynamic, the economic contradictions which are expressed in the crisis of capitalism are at the source of imperialist war. Capitalism is economic crisis and war. It is poverty and death.
Faced with the war, and at moments of massive media “bombardment”, in the midst of intense media campaigns, revolutionaries cannot sit and wait for things to blow over, to hold onto their internationalist positions for a brighter day (see in this issue the article on the ICC’s appeal about the war in Serbia). They must do all they can to intervene and defend internationalist positions within the working class, as widely as possible, as effectively as possible, while still seeing their activities in a long term perspective. They must show the working class that there is an alternative to this barbarism, and that this alternative grows out of the workers’ “insubordination” at the economic and political level. That it grows out of the rejection of sacrifices in living and working conditions and the rejection of sacrifices for imperialist wars. If in the last instance imperialist wars are the product of the economic failure of capitalism, they are also a factor which aggravates the economic crisis and so lead to the terrible accentuation of economic attacks on the workers.
The intensity of the war in Kosovo, the fact that it has broken out in Europe, the bloody military participation of all the imperialist powers, the repercussions of this war on every continent, the dramatic aggravation and acceleration of imperialist conflicts on a planetary scale, the extent, the depth and the urgency of the current historical stakes, place the international proletariat and communist groups in front of their historic responsibility. The proletariat is not beaten. It still bears within itself the possibility of overthrowing capitalism and ending its horrors. Socialism or the aggravation of capitalist barbarism is still the historic alternative.
RL 25/6/99
[1] Let us once again remind our readers that marxism and communism have nothing to do with Stalinism, nor with the Stalinists - like Milosevic - who once held power in the Eastern bloc, nor with the Stalinists of the Western CPs, nor with the Maoists and ex-Maoists who today pullulate in the milieu of Western intellectual warmongery. Historically and politically, Stalinism in the service of the Russian state has always been the negation of marxism and the murderer of generations of communist militants.
[2] This condition was only revealed following the outbreak of the war and was confirmed at the ceasefire agreement: “The Russians obtained important concessions for Milosevic, said the officials whose final offer made to Belgrade was an improvement on the previous western plan imposed on Serbia and the Albanians at Rambouillet” (International Herald Tribune, 5/6/99). In particular, “there was no longer any question of authorising NATO forces to circulate freely throughout the territory of Yugoslavia” (J Eyal, Le Monde, 5/6/99).
[3] As a result of history and of geographical proximity, the European powers have more political, diplomatic, and military means, and also more determination, to counter-act and reject American leadership in this area than, for example, in the Gulf war. The military capacity to “project” their forces - especially in the case of Britain - into Europe weakened US leadership once the air war was over and the “peacekeeping” operation began. The concretisation of this reality is expressed by the fact that KFOR is headed by a British general whereas an American one commanded the air war.
[4] We have analysed the role of Germany in the dislocation of Yugoslavia since 1991: see, among others, International Reviews 67 and 68. The bourgeoisie itself also quickly understood this policy: “Germany has a very different attitude. Well before the government itself took position, the press and the political milieus reacted in a unanimous, immediate and almost instinctive manner: they were straight away unreservedly in favour of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia... However, it is difficult not to see here a resurgence of the hostility of German policy to the very existence of Yugoslavia since the treaties of 1919 and throughout the inter-war period. German observers must have been aware that the dislocation would not be a peaceful process and would meet with strong resistance. Nonetheless, German policy remained deeply committed to the dismemberment of the country” (Paul-Marie de la Gorce, Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1992).
[5] In rejecting our proposal to do something together against the war, the groups of the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party have tried to ridicule our analysis of the influence of the proletariat in the present historic situation. In its letter refusing to hold a joint public meeting the CWO declares that “We cannot stand together to fight for a communist alternative if you are suggesting that the working class is still a force to be reckoned with in the present situation...we do not want to be even minimally identified with a view which states that everything is fine for the working class”. We ask the CWO to look at our analyses with a bit more attention and seriousness than this.
In the previous articles of the International Review we saw how the proletariat in Russia remained isolated after the highest point of the revolutionary wave was reached in 1919. While the Comintern tried to react against the reflux of the wave of struggles through an opportunistic turn, thus entering a downward path of degeneration, the Russian state became more and more autonomous from the movement of the class, and tried to bring the Comintern under its wing.
At the same time the bourgeoisie realised that with the end of the civil war in Russia, the workers in Russia no longer represented the same threat, and that the international wave of struggles was beginning to ebb. They became aware that the Comintern was no longer fighting energetically against Social-Democracy but instead was trying to establish alliances within it through the policy of the United Front. The bourgeoisie’s class instinct made it sense that the Russian state was no longer a force in the service of the revolution trying to expand, but had become a force aiming at the establishment of its own position as a State, as the conference of Rapallo had clearly demonstrated. The bourgeoisie felt that it could exploit the opportunistic turn and the degeneration of the Comintern as well as the balance of forces within the Russian state to its own benefit. The international bourgeoisie felt that it could engage an offensive against the working class. Germany was to be the focus of this offensive.
Apart from Russia in 1917, the proletariat’s most radical struggles had developed in Germany and Italy. Even after the defeat of the workers in their fight against the Kapp putsch in spring 1920, and after the defeat in March 1921, the working class in Germany was still very combative, but it was also relatively isolated internationally. With the workers in Austria, Hungary and Italy already defeated and under massive attack, and the proletariat of Germany, Poland and Bulgaria pushed into desperate reactions, the situation in France and in Britain remained comparatively stable. In order to inflict a decisive defeat on the working class in Germany, hoping thus to weaken the international working class altogether, the bourgeoisie could count on the international support of the entire capitalist class, which in the meantime had been able to strengthen its ranks with the integration of Social-Democracy and the Trade Unions into the State apparatus.
In 1923 the bourgeoisie tried to pull the working class in Germany into a nationalist trap, with the hope of derailing its struggles against capitalism.
The disastrous policy of the KPD: Defence of Democracy and United Front
We saw previously how the expulsion of the “Left radicals” (Linksradikalen), who were later to found the KAPD, weakened the KPD and facilitated the blossoming of opportunism in its ranks.
While the KAPD warned of the dangers of opportunism and the degeneration of the Comintern and rising state capitalism in Russia, the KDP reacted opportunistically. In an “Open Letter to the Workers’ Parties” of 1921 it was the first party to call for a United Front.
“The struggle for a United Front leads to the conquest of the old proletarian class organisations (Trade Unions, co-operatives etc.). It transforms these organs of the working class, which because of the tactics of the reformists have become tools of the bourgeoisie, into organs of proletarian class struggle once again”. At the same time the Trade Unions were proudly declaring: “it remains a fact, that the unions are the only solid dyke which has so far protected Germany from the Bolshevik flood” (Korrespondenzblatt der Gewerkschaften, June 1921).
The founding congress of the KPD was not mistaken, when it declared through the voice of Rosa Luxemburg that “the official unions proved during the war and in the war up until today that they are an organisation of the bourgeois State and of the rule of the capitalist class”. Now the same KPD stood for the retransformation of these organs which had gone over to the class enemy.
At the same time the KPD leadership under Brandler stood for a united front from above with the SPD-leadership. Within the KPD this orientation was opposed by a wing around Fischer and Maslow, who put forward the slogan of “workers’ government”. They declared that “support for the Social-Democratic minority government [does not mean] an increased decomposition of the SPD”; not only would such a position foster “illusions among the masses, as if a Social-Democratic cabinet were a weapon of the working class”, but it would tend to “eliminate the KPD, since it supposes that the SPD could lead a revolutionary struggle”.
But it was above all the currents of the Communist Left, which had just emerged in Italy and Germany, that took position against this idea.
“As far as a workers’ government is concerned, we ask: why are we being asked to ally ourselves with the Social-Democrats? To do the only things that they know how, are able, and want to do, or to ask them to do what they do not know how, cannot, and do not want to do? Are we being asked to tell the Social-Democrats that we are ready to collaborate with them, even in Parliament, and even in this government that has been baptised a ‘workers’ government’? In this case, in other words if we are being asked to set out in the name of the Communist Party a proposal for a workers’ government which will include communists and socialists, and to present this government to the masses as ‘the anti-bourgeois government’, then we reply, taking complete responsibility for our response, that such an attitude is opposed to all the fundamental principles of communism” (Il Comunista, no.26, March 1922).
At the 4th congress “the PCI will not therefore accept to take part in joint organisms with other political organisations... [it] will also avoid taking part in joint declarations with political parties when these declarations contradict its own programme and are presented to the proletariat as the result of negotiations aimed at finding a common line of action.
Talk of a workers’ government... comes down to denying in practice the political programme of communism, in other words the necessity of preparing the masses for the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat” (PCI Report to the 4th Congress of the Communist International, November 1922).
Ignoring these critiques by the Left Communists, the KPD had already proposed to form a coalition government with the SPD in Saxony in November 1922, a proposal which was rejected by the Comintern.
The same KPD which in its founding Conference at the beginning of 1919 still said, “Spartakusbund refuses to work together with the lackeys of the bourgeoisie, to share governmental power with Ebert-Scheidemann, because such a co-operation would be a betrayal of the principles of socialism, a strengthening of counter-revolution and a paralysis of the revolution”, now stood for the opposite.
At the same time the KPD was deceived by the number of votes it received, believing that these votes expressed a real balance of forces or even that they reflected the influence of the party.
While the first fascist groups were being set up by members of the middle classes and the petty bourgeoisie, many armed right wing groups started to organise military training. The state was perfectly informed about these groups. Most of them had emerged directly from the Freikorps, which the SPD-led government had set up against the workers during the revolutionary struggles of 1918-1919. Already in August 1921 Rote Fahne declared: “The working class has the right and the duty to protect the republic against reaction” (31.8.1921). One year later, in November 1922, the KPD signed a deal with the Trade Unions and the SPD (the Berlin agreement), with the aim of “democratising the republic” (protection of the republic, elimination of reactionaries from the administration, the judiciary, and the army). The KPD thus increased the illusions amongst the workers about bourgeois democracy and found itself in direct contradiction with the position of the Italian Left around Bordiga, which at the 4th World Congress of the Comintern emphasised in its analysis of fascism that bourgeois democracy was only one facet of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
In an earlier article we have already shown that the Comintern, in particular through its representative Radek, criticised the politics of the KPD outside of the organisational framework and that it started to weaken the leadership by building up a parallel functioning. At the same time petty bourgeois influences began to penetrate the party. Instead of expressing critique whenever necessary in a fraternal manner, an atmosphere of suspicion and incriminations was spreading, all of which led to a weakening of the organisation[1].
The ruling class realised that the KPD was beginning to spread confusion within the class instead of taking on a real vanguard role based on its clarity and determination. The bourgeoisie felt it could turn this opportunistic attitude of the KPD against the working class.
Following the reflux of the revolutionary wave — intensification of imperialist conflicts
The changing balance of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat following the reflux of the revolutionary wave after 1920 also became tangible in the imperialist relations between states. As soon as the immediate threat from the working class receded, and when the revolutionary flame was extinguished in the Russian working class, imperialist tensions were on the rise again.
Germany tried everything to reverse the weakening of its position by its defeat in World War I and the Versailles Treaty. In the West, its strategy was to try to set France and Britain against each other, since no open military confrontation was possible with either. At the same time Germany tried to renew its traditionally close relations with its neighbour to the East. We have already described in previous articles how the German bourgeoisie, in the context of the imperialist tensions in the West, proceeded determinedly to supply arms to the new Russian state, and signed secret agreements for the delivery of weapons and military co-operation. One of Germany’s principle military leaders recognised that: “The relationship between Germany and Russia is the first and hitherto almost the only accession of strength we have achieved since the conclusion of peace. That the beginning of this link lies in the economic field, is in the nature of the situation as a whole; but its strength lies in the fact that this economic rapprochement prepares the possibility of a political and therefore also a military link” (Carr, p. 434, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol.3).
At the same time the Russian state, with the support of the Comintern declared through Bukharin : “I assert that we are already great enough to conclude an alliance with a foreign bourgeoisie in order, by means of this bourgeois state, to be able to overthrow another bourgeoisie... Supposing that a military alliance has been concluded with a bourgeois state, the duty of the comrades in each country consists in contributing to the victory of the two allies” (Carr, p. 442). “We tell the gentlemen of the German bourgeoisie... if you really want to struggle against the occupation, if you want to struggle against the insults of the Entente, nothing is left for you but to seek a rapprochement with the first proletarian country, which cannot help supporting those countries which are now in servile dependence on international imperialism” (Zinoviev, 12th party congress, April 1923).
Nationalist propaganda spoke of Germany’s humiliation and subjection by foreign capital, especially by France. German military leaders as well as prominent representatives of the German bourgeoisie repeatedly made public declarations to the effect that the only possible salvation for the German nation from the subjugation of Versailles was a military alliance with Soviet Russia and a “revolutionary people’s war” against French imperialism
This policy was received with great interest by the new strata of state-capitalist bureaucrats within the Russian state.
The remaining proletarian internationalists within the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party, who remained faithful to the aim of spreading world revolution, were themselves blinded by these seductive speeches. Whereas it was unthinkable for German capital to establish a real alliance with Russia against its imperialist rivals from the West, the Russian state leaders and the Comintern leadership let themselves be fooled and fell into the trap. They thus actively helped to push the working class into the same trap.
With the help of the entire capitalist class, the German bourgeoisie worked out a plot against the working class in Germany. On the one hand Germany wanted to escape from the pressure of the Versailles treaty, by delaying the payments of reparations to France, and threatening to stop them altogether, on the other it pushed the working class in Germany into the nationalist trap. However, the co-operation of the Russian state and the Comintern was vital to this plot.
The German bourgeoisie took the conscious decision to provoke French capitalism by refusing to pay war reparations. The latter reacted by occupying the Ruhr on 11th January, 1923.
At the same time German capital complemented its tactics by the decision to give a free rein to the inflationary tendencies which had sprung from the crisis. It used inflation as a means of lowering the cost of reparation and alleviating the weight of war credits. At the same time it set about modernising its factories.
The bourgeoisie was also very well aware that rising inflation would push the working class into struggle. It hoped to divert the expected workers defensive struggles onto the nationalist terrain. The bait held out to the working class was the occupation of the Ruhr by the French army, a price the Germany bourgeoisie was ready to pay. The key question was going to be the capacity of the working class and revolutionaries to spring the trap of the defence of national capital. Otherwise, the German bourgeoisie would be able to inflict a decisive defeat on the working class. The ruling class was ready to challenge the proletariat once again, because it felt that the international balance of forces was favourable, and that parts of the Russian state apparatus would be attracted by this orientation and that even the Comintern could be pulled into the trap.
The provocation of the Ruhr: what tasks for the working class?
By occupying the Ruhr, the French bourgeoisie hoped to become Europe’s biggest steel and coal producer, since the Ruhr provided 72 % of Germany’s coal supply, 50% of its iron and steel, and 25% of total industrial production. It was obvious that as soon as Germany were deprived of these resources, the abrupt drop in production would lead to a shortage of goods and to profound economic convulsions. The German bourgeoisie was ready to make such a sacrifice because the stakes were so high. German Capital took the risk of pushing the workers to strike, in order to draw them onto a nationalist terrain. The employers and the government decided to lock-out the workers. Any worker who was willing to work under the rule of the French occupying forces was threatened with the sack. SPD President Ebert announced heavy penalties on March 4th for any worker who continued to work in the mines or on the railways. On January 24th the employers’ association and the ADGB (German Trades Union Federation) launched an appeal for funds for the fight against France. The consequence was that more and more companies threw their workers on the street. All this against the background of exploding inflation: whereas the US dollar was still worth 1,000 Marks in April 1922, by November it had already fallen to 6,000 Marks, and it fell again to 20,000 Marks in February 1923 after the occupation of the Ruhr. By June 1923 it had fallen to 100,000 to the dollar, at the end of July it reached 1 million, at the end of August it had dropped again to 10 million, by mid-September 100 million. In November 1923, the Mark reached its nadir of 4.2 billion to the dollar.
This did not hit the Ruhr coal bosses too hard, since they had introduced a system of payment in gold or barter. However, for the working class it meant starvation. Very often the unemployed and those still in work demonstrated together to put forward their demands. Time and time again there were violent confrontations with French occupying forces.
The Comintern pushes the workers into the trap of nationalism
Falling into the trap of the German capitalists, who called for a common struggle by “the oppressed German nation” and Russia, the Comintern started to spread the idea that Germany needed a strong government, which would be able to confront the French occupying forces without the class struggle stabbing the government in its back. The Comintern was willing to sacrifice proletarian internationalism in the interests of the Russian state[2].
This policy was inaugurated under the banner of “national-Bolshevism”. Whereas in autumn 1920 the Comintern had acted with great determination and energy against the “national-Bolshevik tendencies” and insisted in its discussions with the delegates of the KAPD on the expulsion of the “national-Bolsheviks” Laufenberg and Wolffheim from the KAPD, the Comintern itself now began to propagate this line.
This turn-about of the Comintern cannot just be explained by the confusions and the opportunism of the ECCI; we have to look at the “invisible hand” of those forces who were not interested in revolution but in the strengthening of the Russian state. National-Bolshevism could only take hold when the Comintern had already started to degenerate and was already in the grip of the Russian state and being absorbed by it. Radek argued thus: “The Soviet Union is in danger. All tasks must be subordinated to the defence of the Soviet Union, because with this analysis a revolutionary movement in Germany would be dangerous and would undermine the interests of the Soviet Union...
The German communist movement is not capable of overthrowing German capitalism, it must serve as a pillar of Russian foreign policy. The countries of Europe, organised under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, using the military capacities of the German army against the West, this is the perspective, this is the only way out...”.
In January 1923 Rote Fahne wrote: “The German nation will be pushed into the abyss, if it is not saved by the German proletariat. The nation will be sold and destroyed by the German capitalists, unless the working class prevents them. Either the German nation will starve to death and fall apart because of the dictatorship of the French bayonet or it will be saved through the dictatorship of the proletariat”. “However, today national-Bolshevism means that everything is being permeated by the feeling that we can only be saved by the communists. Today, we are the only way out. The strong emphasis on the nation in Germany is a revolutionary act, in the same way as the emphasis on the nation in the colonies” (Rote Fahne, 21.06.23). Rakosi, a delegate of the Comintern, praised this orientation of the KPD: “a communist party has to tackle the national question. The German party has taken up this question in a very skilful, adequate manner. It is in the process of tearing this nationalistic weapon out of the hands of the fascists” (Schüddelkopf, p. 177).
In a manifesto to Soviet Russia, the KPD wrote: “The party conference expresses its gratitude to Soviet Russia for the great lesson, which has been written down in history with streams of blood and incredible sacrifices, that the concern of the nation still remains the concern of the proletariat”.
On April 18th, Thalheimer even declared: “it remains the privileged task of the proletarian revolution not only to liberate Germany, but to complete Bismarck’s work of integrating Austria into the Reich. The proletariat has to accomplish this task in an alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie” (Die Internationale, V 8, 18.4.23, p. 242-247).
What a perversion of the basic communist position on the nation! What a rejection of the internationalist position of revolutionaries during World War I, with at their head Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg who fought for the destruction of all nations!
In the Rhineland and in Bavaria the separatist movement had been on the rise after the war. These forces felt their chances increasing and hoped, with French support, to split off the Rhineland from the Ruhr. With pride the KPD press reported how it helped the Cuno government in its fight against the separatists. “Small armed detachments were mobilised from the Ruhr to move to Düsseldorf. They had the task of preventing the proclamation of a ‘Republic of the Rhineland’. When at 14:00 the separatists gathered on the banks of the river Rhine and were about to start their meeting, some combat groups, armed with hand-grenades, attacked the separatists. It needed only a few hand-grenades and the whole bunch of separatists, gripped by panic, ran away and abandoned the banks of the river Rhine. We had prevented them from gathering and from proclaiming a ‘Republic of the Rhineland’” (W. Ulbricht, Memoirs, p. 132, Volume I).
“We are not revealing any secrets if we say openly that the communist combat detachments, which dispersed the separatists in the Palatinate, in the Eifel and at Düsseldorf with guns and grenades, were under the military command of nationalistic minded Prussian officers” (Vorwärts).
This nationalist orientation, however, was not the work of the KPD alone; it was also the product of the policy of the Russian state and of certain parts of the Comintern.
After co-ordination with the ECCI the KPD leadership pushed for the struggle to be directed in the first instance against France and only afterwards against the German bourgeoisie. This is why the KPD leadership claimed: “The defeat of French imperialism in the world war was not a communist goal, the defeat of French imperialism in the Ruhr, however, is a communist goal”.
The KPD and the hope of a “nationalist alliance”
The KPD leadership stood against strikes. Already at the Leipzig party conference at the end of January, shortly after the occupation of the Ruhr, the leadership - with the support of the Comintern - prevented a discussion on this national-Bolshevik orientation, out of fear it would be rejected by the majority of the party.
When the sections of the KPD in the Ruhr held a regional party conference in March 1923, the party leadership spoke against the orientations of the KPD’s local groups in the Ruhr. The Zentrale claimed: “only a strong government can save Germany, a government, which is carried by the living forces of the nation” (Rote Fahne, 1.4.23).
In the Ruhr area itself the majority of the KPD conference put forward the following orientation:
- downing tools in all zones occupied by the military forces,
- workers taking over factories by making use of the German-French conflict and if possible local seizure of power.
Within the KPD two different orientations clashed: a proletarian, internationalist orientation, which stood for a confrontation with the Cuno government and a radicalisation of the movement in the Ruhr[3].
This was contrary to the position of the KPD Zentrale, which with the help of the Comintern energetically opposed the strikes and tried to push the working class onto a nationalist terrain.
The ruling class could even be so sure of this policy of sabotaging the workers’ struggles, that the Secretary of State, Malzahn, after a discussion with Radek on May 26th reported to Ebert and the most important ministers in a top secret memorandum: “He [Radek] could assure me, that Russian sympathies were already out of their own interests siding with the German government (...) He energetically spoke to and urged the communist party leaders during the past week to show the stupidity and the mistaken approach of their previous attitude vis-à-vis the German government. We can be sure that in a few days the communist coup attempts in the Ruhr will recede” (Foreign Office Archives, Bonn, Deutschland 637.442ff, in Dupeux, p. 181).
After the offer of a united front with the counter-revolutionary SPD and the parties of the 2nd International, now the policy of keeping quiet vis-à-vis the capitalist German government.
The extent to which the KPD leadership were clear about the fact that they could not “stab the government in the back”, can be seen through a statement in Rote Fahne on 27.5.1923: “The government knows that the KPD has remained silent about many questions because of the danger from French capitalism, since otherwise this would have made the government lose face in any international negotiation. As long as the social-democratic workers do not fight together with us for a workers’ government the Communist Party has no interest in the replacement of this headless government by another bourgeois government... Either the government drops the assassination campaign against the CP or we will break our silence” (27.5.1923, Rote Fahne, Dupeux p. 1818).
Appeals to nationalism aim to seduce the patriotic petty bourgeoisie
Since inflation also expropriated the petty bourgeoisie and the middle classes, the KPD believed it could offer these strata an alliance. Instead of insisting on the autonomous struggle of the working class, which alone is able to pull other non-exploiting strata into its orbit inasmuch as its struggles increase in strength and impact, they sent a message of flattery and seduction to these strata, saying that they could enter into an alliance with the working class: “we have to address ourselves to the suffering, confused, outraged masses of the proletarian petty bourgeoisie and tell them, that they can only defend themselves and the future of Germany if they unite with the proletariat in their fight against the bourgeoisie” (Carr, The Interregnum, p. 176).
“It is the task of the KPD, to open the eyes of the broader petty bourgeois and intellectual nationalist masses to the fact that only the working class — once it has achieved a victory — will be able to defend German soil, the treasures of German culture and the future of the German nation” (Rote Fahne, 13.5.1923).
This policy of unity on a nationalist basis was not the work of the KPD alone; it was also supported by the Comintern. Radek’s speech to the ECCI on June 20th 1923 is a testimony of this. In this speech he praised the member of right wing separatist circles, Schlageter, who had been arrested and shot by the French Army on May 26th during the sabotage of railway bridges near Düsseldorf. This was the same Radek, who, within the ranks of the Comintern in 1919 and 1920, had urged the KPD and the KAPD to expel the Hamburg national-Bolsheviks. “But we believe that the great majority of the masses who are swayed by nationalist feeling, are not part of the camp of capital but of the camp of labour. We want to and we shall look for and find a way to reach these masses. We shall do all we can so that men like Schlageter who are ready to sacrifice their life for a general cause, are not people fighting for a void, but that they become fighters for a better future of all humanity” (Radek, 20.6.23, quoted in Broué, p. 693). “It is obvious that the German working class will never conquer power if it is not able to inspire trust in the broad masses of the German people, that its best forces are engaged in the fight to get rid of the yoke of foreign capital” (Dupeux, p. 190).
This idea, that the “proletariat could act as the vanguard, the nationalist petty bourgeoisie as the rearguard”, in short that the whole people could stand up for revolution, that the nationalists might follow the working class, was supported unconditionally by the 5th Congress of the Comintern in 1924.
While the opposition stood up against this policy of “remaining quiet”, which was practised by the KPD leadership until September 1923, this did not protect it from driving the working class into nationalist dead-ends. Thus R. Fischer propagated anti-Semitic slogans “Whoever speaks up against Jewish capital... is already a class fighter, even if he doesn’t know this... Fight against the Jewish capitalists, hang them from lamp posts, crush them... French imperialism now is the biggest danger in the world, France is the country of reaction... Only by establishing an alliance with Russia... can the German people chase French capitalism out of the Ruhr” (Flechtheim, p. 178).
The working class defends itself on its class terrain
While the bourgeoisie was aiming at pulling the working class in Germany onto a nationalist terrain, preventing it from defending its class interests, with the ECCI and the KPD leadership pushing the class in the same direction, the majority of workers in the cities of the Ruhr and elsewhere did not let themselves get pulled onto this terrain. Hardly a factory was unaffected by strikes.
Time and time again there were small waves of strikes and protests. Thus on March 9th 40,000 miners downed tools in Upper Silesia; on March 17th in Dortmund, the miners stopped work. In addition, the unemployed joined workers’ demonstrations, for example on April 2nd at Mühlheim/Ruhr.
Whereas parts of the KPD leadership were seduced and deceived by nationalist flattery, as soon as the strikes erupted in the Ruhr it became clear to the German bourgeoisie that they needed the help of other capitalist states against the working class. At Mühlheim/Ruhr workers occupied several factories. Almost the entire town was hit by a strike wave, the Town Hall was occupied. Since regular German troops of the Reichswehr could not intervene because of the Ruhr’s occupation by the French, the police was called in, but their troops proved insufficient to suppress the workers. The mayor of Düsseldorf appealed for support to the commander-in-chief of the French occupying forces: “I have to remind you that the German supreme command helped the French troops at the time of the Paris Commune at any moment, in order to smash the rising together. I request you to offer us the same support, if you want to avoid a similar situation arising” (Dr. Lutherbeck, letter to General de Goutte, in French in Broué p. 674).
On several occasions the Reichswehr was sent to smash workers’ struggles in different cities - as in Gelsenkirchen and Bochum. While the German bourgeoisie displayed an open animosity towards France, it never hesitated to send its army against the workers who resisted nationalism.
The rapid acceleration of the economic crisis, above all of inflation, gave added impetus to the workers’ combativity. Wages lost their value by the hour. Purchasing power fell to a quarter of its pre-war level. More and more workers lost their jobs. In the summer some 60% of the workforce was jobless. Even civil servants only received ridiculous wages. Companies wanted to print their own currency, local authorities introduced “emergency money” to pay their civil servants. Since the sale of their crops no longer yielded any profit, the farmers hoarded their produce. Food supply was on the point of breaking down completely. Workers and the unemployed demonstrated more and more together. Everywhere there were reports of hunger revolts and shops being looted. The police were often only impotent spectators of these revolts.
At the end of May some 400,000 workers went on strike in the Ruhr ; in June 100,000 miners and steelworkers struck in Silesia, along with 150,000 Berlin metal workers . In July another wave of strikes broke out which led to a series of violent clashes.
A common characteristic of these strikes was typical of all workers’ struggles in the period of capitalist decadence: large numbers of workers left the unions. In the factories workers met in general assemblies, there were more and more meetings in the streets. The workers spent more time on the street, in discussions and demonstrations, than they did at work. The unions opposed this movement as best they could. The workers tried spontaneously to unite in mass meetings and factory committees on the shop floor. The trend was towards unification. The movement gained further momentum. Its driving force was not to regroup around nationalist slogans but to look for a class orientation.
Where were the revolutionary forces? The KAPD, weakened by the fiasco of the split between the Essen and Berlin factions and again reduced in number and organisationally weakened by the foundation of the KAI (Communist Workers’ International) was not able to make an organised intervention in this situation, although it expressed loudly enough its rejection of the national-Bolshevik trap.
The KPD, which was attracting more and more members, nonetheless put a rope around its own neck. The KPD was unable to offer a clear orientation for the class. What did the KPD propose?[4] The KPD refused to work towards the overthrow of the government. In fact, the KPD and the Comintern increased confusion and contributed to the weakening of the working class.
On the one hand the KPD competed on a nationalist level with the fascists. On August 10th for example (on the same day that a wave of strikes broke out in Berlin), KPD leaders like Thalheimer in Stuttgart were still holding nationalist rallies together with the national-socialists. At the same time the KPD called for a struggle against the fascist danger. Whereas the Berlin government forbade any demonstration, and the KPD leadership wanted to submit to this prohibition, the left wing of the party wanted at all costs to hold a demonstration on June 29th, whose slogan was to be a united front mobilisation against the fascists!
But the KPD was unable to take a clear decision, so that on the day of the demonstration some 250,000 workers were in the street in front of the party offices, waiting in vain for instructions.
In August 1923, the KPD against an intensification of the struggle
In August a new wave of strikes began. Almost every day workers demonstrated — both employed and unemployed. In the factories there was turmoil, and factory committees were formed. The influence of the KPD was at its height.
On August 10th the printers at the national mint went on strike. In an economy where every hour the state had to print more money, the strike of the bank-note printers had a particularly paralysing effect. Within a few hours the reserves of paper money were used up. Wages could no longer be paid. The printers’ strike, which started in Berlin, spread like a bush-fire to other parts of the class. From Berlin it spread to Northern Germany, the Rhineland, Wurttemberg, Upper Silesia, Thuringia and as far as Eastern Prussia. More and more parts of the class joined the movement. On August 11th and 12th there were violent confrontations in several cities; more than 35 workers were shot by the police. Like all the movements since 1914 they were characterised by the fact that they took place outside of and against the will of the unions. The Trade Unions understood how serious the situation was. Some of them at first pretended to support the strikes, in order to be able to sabotage them better from within. Other unions opposed the strikes openly. The KPD itself took up position, once the strikes had started to spread: “For an intensification of the economic strikes, no to raising political demands”. And as soon as the union leadership announced that it would not support the strike, the KPD leadership called upon the workers to bring it to an end. The KPD leadership was not willing to support any strike outside of the union framework.
Whereas Brandler insisted that the strike should be stopped, since the ADGB was opposed to it, local party sections wanted to spread the numerous local strikes and to weld them into one big movement against the Cuno government. The rest of the working class “was called upon to unite the powerful movement of the Berlin proletariat and to spread the general strike across Germany”.
The party had arrived at an impasse. The party leadership spoke against a continuation and extension of the strikes, since this would also imply the rejection of the nationalist terrain onto which capital wanted to pull the workers. At the same time the much acclaimed united front with the SPD and unions would be put into danger. Even on August 18th Rote Fahne still wrote: “If they want to, we shall even combine our forces with the people who murdered Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg”. (Rote Fahne, 18.08.23).
The orientation of a United Front, the obligation to work in the unions under the pretext of winning over more workers from within, meant in reality to submit to the union structure, contribute to preventing the workers from taking the struggle into their own hands. All this meant a terrible conflict for the KPD: either it recognised the dynamic of the class struggle, rejected its nationalist orientation and fought against union sabotage, or else it turned against the strikes, to be absorbed by the union apparatus, and in the final analysis to become a protective wall for the state and act as an obstacle to the working class. For the first time in its history the KPD had come into open conflict with the fighting working class because of its union orientation, and because the dynamic of the workers’ struggles was forcing the workers to break down the union framework. Confrontation with the unions is inevitable. Instead of assuming it, the KPD leadership was discussing how it could win over the Trades Union leadership to support for the strike.
Under the pressure of this wave of strikes the Cuno government resigned on August 12th. On August 13th the KPD leadership issued an appeal to end the strike. This appeal by the leadership of the KPD encountered resistance from the radicalised shop stewards in the factories in Berlin. Local party sections were also opposed, since they wanted the movement to continue. The local party sections were waiting for instructions from the Zentrale. They wanted to avoid isolated clashes with the army, until the weapons which the Zentrale claimed to possess could be distributed.
The KPD had become victim of its own national-Bolshevik policy and its United Front tactics; the working class was plunged in confusion and perplexity as to what to do. The bourgeoisie, by contrast, was ready to take the initiative.
As in previous situations of rising combativity the SPD was to play a decisive role of breaking the movement. The Cuno government, close to the Centre Party, was replaced by a “grand coalition”, headed by the Centre’s leader Gustav Stresemann, supported by 4 SPD ministers (Hilferding became Minister of Finance). When the SPD joined the government, this was not an expression of capital’s paralysed helplessness and inability to act, as the KPD believed, it was a conscious tactical step by the bourgeoisie to contain the movement. The SPD was in no way on the point of breaking up, as the KPD leadership later claimed, nor was the bourgeoisie split or unable to nominate a new government.
On August 14th, Stresemann announced the introduction of a new currency and stable wages. The bourgeoisie had managed to keep the situation under control and decided consciously to put an end to the spiral of inflation — in the same way as one year before it had consciously decided to “kick-start” inflation.
At the same time the government called upon the workers in the Ruhr to end their “passive resistance” against France and after flirting with Russia it declared the “war against Bolshevism” to be one of the major goals of German policy.
By promising to curb inflation the bourgeoisie managed to bring about a change in the balance of forces — because even if after the end of the movement in Berlin a series of strikes erupted in the Rhineland and in the Ruhr on August 20th, the movement as a whole had come to an end.
Although it could not be pulled onto the nationalist terrain, the working class was unable to push forward its movement — one of the reasons being that the KPD itself was a victim of its own national-Bolshevik policy. Thus the bourgeoisie had been able to take another step towards its goal of inflicting a decisive defeat on the working class.
The working class for its part came out of these struggles disoriented, with a feeling of helplessness in the face of the crisis.
The left fractions of the Comintern, who felt even more isolated after the cancellation of the proposed alliance between “oppressed Germany” and Russia, and the fiasco of national-Bolshevism, were now led to try to turn the tide again by launching a desperate attempt at insurrection. We will deal with this in the next part of this article.
Dv.
[1] In a private correspondence the Party Chairmain of 1922 E. Meyer insulted the Zentrale and individual party leaders. Meyer for example sent personal notes, giving descriptions of the personality of party leaders to his wife. He asked his wife to report to him about the atmosphere in the party, while he stayed in Moscow. There was a lot of private correspondence by members of the Zentrale with the Comintern. Different tendencies within the Comintern had special links within different tendencies within the KPD. The network of “informal and parallel channels of communication” was widespread. Moreover, the atmosphere in the KPD was poisoned: On the 5th Congress of the Comintern Ruth Fischer, who herself had contributed considerably to this, reported: “At the Leipzig party conference (in January 1923) it sometimes occurred that workers of different districts were sitting at one table. At the end they would ask: Where are you from? And some poor worker would say: I am from Berlin. The others would then get up, leave the table and avoid the delegate from Berlin. So much for the atmosphere in the party” (R.Fischer, 5th Congress of the Comintern, p. 201).
[2] Voices in the Czech CP opposed this orientation. Thus Neurath attacked Thalheimer’s position as an expression of corruption by patriotic sentiments. Sommer, another Czech Communist wrote in Rote Fahne demanding the rejection of this orientation: “there can be no understanding with the enemy within” (Carr, p. 168, Interregnum).
[3] At the same time they wanted to set up autonomous economic units, an orientation which expressed the strong weight of syndicalism. The KPD opposition wanted the workers’ republic, which would have been set up in the Rhine-Ruhr area, to send an army to central Germany in order to help seize power there. This motion, put forward by R. Fischer, was rejected by a majority of 68 to 55 votes.
[4] Many workers, with little theoretical and political training, were attracted to the party. The party opened its doors to a mass membership. Everyone was welcome. In April 1922 the KPD announced: “in the present political situation the KPD has the duty of integrating any worker in our ranks, who wants to join us”. In the summer of 1923 many provincial sections fell into the hands of young, radical elements. Thus more and more impatient, inexperienced elements joined the party. Within 6 months party membership rose from 225,000 to 295,000; between September 1922 and September 1923 the number of local party groups increased from 2,481 to 3,321. At the time, the KPD had its own press service and published 34 daily papers and a number of reviews. The party was also joined by many elements infiltrated into the membership with a view to sabotage from the inside.
On the ICC’s appeal over the war in Serbia: The military offensive of the bourgeoisie demands a united response from revolutionaries
Wars, like revolutions, are historic events of capital importance in demarcating the bourgeois camp from the revolutionary camp; they provide proof of the class nature of political forces. This was the case with the First World War which provoked the betrayal of Social-Democracy at the international level, the death of the Second International and the emergence of a minority which formed the new Communist Parties and the Third International. It was also the case with the Second World War, which confirmed the integration of the various Stalinist parties into the defence of the bourgeois state through their support for the “democratic” imperialist front against fascism. The same applies to the different Trotskyist formations that called on the working class to defend the Russian “workers’ state” against the aggression of the Nazi-fascist dictatorships. The Second World War also saw the courageous resistance of a tiny minority of revolutionaries who were able to stay on course during this terrible historical ordeal. Today we are not yet facing a third world war; the conditions for this have not ripened and we don’t think that they will do so in the near future. Nevertheless, the military operation in Serbia is certainly the most serious event since the end of World War II and it has resulted in a polarisation of political forces around the two main classes in society: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
While the divers leftist formations have confirmed their bourgeois function through their support either for the NATO attack or their defence of Serbia [1] [874], we can by contrast say with great satisfaction that the main revolutionary political groups have all taken up a coherent internationalist position by defending the following fundamental points:
1. The present war is an imperialist war (like all wars today) and the working class has nothing to gain from supporting either front:
“Whichever camp you consider - American or Serb, Italian or French, British or Russian - these are still inter-imperialist conflicts born out of the contradictions of the bourgeois economy... Not a man, not a soldier for the imperialist war; open struggle against our own national bourgeoisie, Serb or Kosovar, Italian or American, German or French” (Il Programma Comunista no. 4, 30th April 1999).
“For genuine communists the choice therefore is not between imperialisms. We don’t distinguish between the small and larger imperialisms. The politics of choosing the supposed lesser of two evils is opportunist and dishonest. Any support for this or that imperialist front is support for capitalism. It is a betrayal of the international working class and the cause of socialism.
The only way to escape from the logic of war is through the revival of class struggle, in Kosovo as well as the rest of Europe, in the USA as well as Russia” (from the IBRP leaflet, “Capitalism means imperialism, imperialism means war”, 25th March 1999).
2. The war in Serbia, far from being motivated by humanitarian concerns about this or that population, is the logical consequence of the inter-imperialist conflict at a global level:
“The warnings and the pressure on Turkey, and even the war against Iraq, have not stopped the repression and massacre of the Kurds, just as the warnings to Israel have not stopped the repression and massacre of the Palestinians. UN missions, so-called peacemaking forces, embargoes, none prevented yesterday’s wars in ex-Yugoslavia between Serbia and Croatia, between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, of each against all. And the military intervention of the western bourgeoisies against Serbia organised by NATO will not prevent “ethnic cleansing” against the Kosovars any more than they have prevented the bombing of Belgrade and Pristina.
“The humanitarian missions of the UN... have in fact prepared the ground for even more horrible repressions and massacres. This is the demonstration that humanitarian, pacifist views and actions are just illusory and impotent” (“The real opposition to military intervention and to war is the class struggle of the proletariat, its classist and internationalist reorganisation against all forms of bourgeois oppression and nationalism” - supplement to Il Comunista no. 64-65, April 1999).
3. This war, behind the facade of unity, is really the outcome of the confrontation between the imperialist powers engaged in NATO, particularly between the US on the one hand and Germany and France on the other:
“The firm will of the US to create a ‘casus belli’ through direct intervention against Serbia was apparent during the Rambouillet negotiations: these conferences, far from seeking a peaceful solution to the inextricable question of Kosovo, had the main aim of placing the responsibility for the war onto the Yugoslav government... The real problem for the US was in fact its own allies and Rambouillet served to put pressure on them and to oblige them to approve NATO intervention” (Il Partito Comunista no. 226, April 1999)
“The United States is trying to prevent the formation of a new imperialist bloc which might be able to compete with them for primacy in the world. This is why they have expanded NATO throughout the entire Balkan region and in Eastern Europe... they aim... perhaps most importantly, to deliver a heavy blow to European hopes of playing an independent imperialist role.
“The Europeans, in their turn, are putting a brave face on things by supporting NATO military action only to avoid the risk of being totally excluded from an area of such vital importance” (IBRP leaflet, 25.3.99).
4. Pacifism, as always, is again showing that it is an instrument not of the working class and of the popular masses against war, but the means to hypnotise them used by the parties of the left; this also confirms the role of the latter as recruiting sergeants for any future carnage:
“Which means that it is necessary to abandon all the pacifist and reformist illusions which can only disarm us, and turn to the objectives and methods of the class struggle which have always belonged to the proletarian tradition” (Il Programma Comunista no. 4, 30th April 1999)
“This motley front addresses the same pacifist appeal to all those which capital has used to make war: the Constitution, The United Nations, the governments... Finally, in the most ridiculous way, they ask the same government which is waging war to be nice and work for peace” (Battaglia Comunista no. 5, May 1999).
As we can see, there is here a complete convergence on all the fundamental questions about the conflict in the Balkans between the different organisations who are part of the proletarian political milieu. However, there naturally exist divergences that relate to different analyses of imperialism in the present period, and of the balance of forces between the classes. But without underestimating these divergences, we consider that the aspects which unite are far more important and significant than what distinguishes them, considering the seriousness of what is at stake today. It was on this basis that on 29th March 1999, we sent an appeal to all these groups [2] [875], to take up a common initiative against the war.
“Comrades,
(...) Today the Left Communist groups are the only ones to defend these traditional positions of the workers’ movement. Only the groups that attach themselves to this current, the only one that didn’t betray in the Second World War, can give a class response to the questions that the working class is asking. Their duty is to intervene throughout the class to denounce the flood of lies spread by all parts of the bourgeoisie and to defend the internationalist principles passed down to us by the Communist International and its Left Fractions. For its part, the ICC has already published a leaflet, a copy of which is enclosed. But we think that the stakes are so grave that all the groups should publish and distribute a joint position, affirming proletarian class positions against the war and the barbarity of capitalism. This is the first time for more than half a century that the main imperialist gangsters have conducted a war in Europe itself, the main theatre of the two world wars as well as greatest concentration of workers in the world. This is the gravity of the present situation. It gives communists the responsibility of uniting their forces to get internationalist principles heard as widely as possible, to give the declaration of these principles the greatest possible impact that our weak forces will allow.
“It is clear to the ICC that taking such a position would mean changes to some of the things contained in the leaflet we have published since we well understand that there are disagreements inside the Communist Left over some of our analyses of the world situation. However, we are firmly convinced that all the groups of the communist left can produce a document reaffirming the basic principles of internationalism without glossing over these principles. Therefore we propose that our organisations get together as soon as possible to develop a joint appeal against the imperialist war, against all the lies of the bourgeoisie, against all the pacifist campaigns and for the proletarian perspective of overthrowing capitalism.
“With this proposal, we consider ourselves faithful to the approach of the internationalists, particularly Lenin, at the time of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences in 1915 and 1916. This approach made it possible to overcome or set to one side the differences that existed between different parts of the European workers’ movement, and to put forward the proletarian perspective against imperialist war. Clearly, we are open to any other initiative that your organisation may take, to all proposals putting forward the proletarian point of view against the bourgeoisie’s butchery and lies...
Communist greetings. The ICC.”
Unfortunately the response to this appeal was not equal to the gravity of the situation and our expectations. Two of the Bordigist formations, Il Comunista-le Proletaire and Il Partito Comunista have not yet replied to our appeal, despite our sending a second letter on 14th April to try to get an answer. The third Bordigist group, Programma Comunista, promised a (negative) written response but we have received nothing. Finally the IBRP did us the honour of replying to our invitation with a fraternal refusal. It is obvious that we can only regret the failure of this appeal, which confirms once again, if confirmation were necessary, the difficulties facing the proletarian political milieu today, which is still strongly impregnated with the sectarianism of the counter-revolutionary climate in which the milieu was reconstituted. But at this moment, with regard to the problem of war, our main concern is not to further fuel the frictions in the proletarian milieu by developing a polemic on the irresponsibility of a negative response, or the absence of any response, to our appeal, but to take forward the arguments in favour of the necessity, the interest for the working class, of a common initiative by all the internationalist groups. To do this we will analyse the arguments put forward by the IBRP (the only ones to have replied to us!), either by letter or in the direct meetings we have had with this group, since many of the IBRP’s arguments are probably the same as those the Bordigist groups would have put forward if they had but deigned to reply. In this way we hope to be able to advance our proposal for a common initiative faced with all the comrades and political formations of the working class, and so obtain a better result in the future.
Is it true that a united response of the political milieu is necessarily based on the “very low political profile”?
The first argument used by the IBRP is that the positions of the various groups are too different, so that any joint position would be based on a “low political profile” and would therefore not be effective in “making heard the proletarian point of view in front of the barbarity and lies of the bourgeoisie”
And it adds to this assertion:
“It’s true that ‘today, the groups of the communist left are the only ones to defend these classic positions of the workers’ movement’, but it’s also true that each current does so in a way that seems radically different today. We won’t indicate here the specific differences that any attentive observer can easily point out, we will just underline that these differences show a strong decantation between the forces that generally make reference to the Communist Left”.
We have just shown exactly the opposite. The quotes at the beginning of this article could easily be interchanged among the different groups without producing any political deformation; and taken as a whole they form the basic political elements of a common statement that is so needed by the working class at this time.
Why then does the IBRP talk about “radical differences” that would make any effort towards a joint initiative ineffectual? Because the IBRP puts at the same level basic positions (the defeatist attitude towards the war) and the political analyses of the present phase (the causes of the war in Serbia, the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat). We certainly don’t seek to underestimate the importance of the current differences in the proletarian political milieu over these analyses. We will come back to these issues in another article and in particular will put forward our criticisms of what we consider to be an economistic position developed in particular by Battaglia Comunista and Il Partito. Today we consider that the most important problem is the underestimation by the IBRP, and with it all the other groups, of the echo that such a joint initiative could have.
It is not for nothing that, to reject this possibility, the IBRP is led to deal with the significance of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences and that it enormously underestimates them.
“For this reason the reference to Zimmerwald and Kienthal made in your letter/appeal has no relevance whatsoever to the present historic situation. Zimmerwald and Kienthal were not initiatives of the Bolsheviks or Lenin, but of Italian and Swiss socialists who regrouped within them a majority of the ‘radical’ tendencies within the parties of the Second International. Lenin and the Bolsheviks participated in them to push for a break within the Second International but (a) the rupture certainly didn’t take place there, in fact Lenin remained in an absolute minority in both conferences; and (b) it certainly wasn’t the Zimmerwald manifesto that ‘clearly affirmed the proletarian perspective in face of imperialist war’, but rather the motion of Lenin that was rejected by the conference. So to present the participation of the Bolsheviks at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences as a model to refer to in the present situation is senseless” (IBRP response to our appeal).
In this passage, the IBRP begins by recalling obvious things such as the fact that the conferences were initiated by Italian and Swiss socialists and not the Bolsheviks, that Lenin participated with the intention of pushing for a break with the Second International and that consequently Lenin remained in an absolute minority in both conferences. It ends up casting an anathema on those who present these conferences “as a model to follow in the present situation”.
The IBRP - obviously through not reading our letter with sufficient attention - does not understand that what we said was that “the approach of the internationalists, particularly Lenin, at the time of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences in 1915 and 1916 [which was able] to put forward the proletarian perspective against imperialist war”. The problem is that the IBRP seems to be unaware of the history of our class. While it is true that the Bolsheviks, who were on the left of the workers’ movement at that time, always tried to push the results of these conferences as far as possible, they never imagined staying outside them because they understood the necessity of gathering forces and coming together at a particularly vital moment of political decantation. Lenin himself carried out a very important role in animating what he called the “Zimmerwald left”, which was the crucible for the political forces that were to construct the Third International. And as for the idea that “Zimmerwald and Kienthal were not Bolshevik initiatives”, here is what the revolutionary left at Zimmerwald thought:
“The Manifesto accepted by the conference does not completely satisfy us. In particular there is nothing in it about open opportunism or about the opportunism which hides behind radical phrases - about the opportunism which not only bears the main responsibility for the collapse of the International but also wants to perpetuate it. The Manifesto does not clearly specify the means to oppose the war...
We accept the
Manifesto because we see it as a call to struggle and because, in this
struggle, we want to march side by side with other groups of the International...”
(Declaration of the Zimmerwald left at the Zimmerwald conference, signed by N
Lenin, G Zinoviev, Radek, Neuman, Hoglund and Winter).
And this is what Zinoviev said after the Kienthal conference: “We Zimmerwaldians have the advantage of already existing at the international level, while the social patriots have not yet been able to do this. We must therefore make the best of this advantage to organise the struggle against social patriotism...
At root the resolution represents a step forward. Those who are comparing this resolution with the draft of the Zimmerwald left in September 1915, and with the writings of the German, Dutch, Polish and Russian left, must admit that our ideas have gone in the same direction as the principles accepted by the conference...
“When we look at it clearly, we can see that the second Zimmerwald conference represents a step forward. Life is working for us... The second Zimmerwald conference will be historically and politically a new step towards the Third International”.
In conclusion, Zimmerwald and Kienthal were two crucial stages in the battle that revolutionaries waged for the rapprochement of proletarian forces, for their separation from the social patriots, and for the formation of the Third International.
The Bolsheviks and Lenin were able to understand that Zimmerwald and Kienthal represented an immense hope for the workers who had felt isolated and desperate at the fronts - it was a doorway out of hell. This is what the IBRP unfortunately does not understand. There are moments in history when an advance by revolutionaries is more important than a thousand of the clearest political programmes, to paraphrase Marx.
The last thing that still needs to be understood as regards the IBRP specifically, is this: up till only a few months ago, and for several years now, this organisation has taken a series of common initiatives with us, the most significant of which were:
* co-ordinated participation, and sometimes interventions in the name of the two organisations, in the second conference on the political heritage of Trotsky organised in Moscow in 1997 by the Trotskyist or semi-Trotskyist milieu there;
* holding a joint public meeting in London on the Russian revolution, with a single introduction for the two groups, a single praesidium and a balance sheet article drawn up by the two groups and published in our respective English-language publications, World Revolution and Revolutionary Perspectives;
* a coordinated intervention by the two organisations in a confrontation with parasitic groups in Britain.
But now, the IBRP rejects any initiative of this kind. When we posed this question to the comrades of Battaglia Comunista, they replied that it was possible to work together on the Russian revolution because “the lessons have been drawn a long time ago”; this was a matter of consolidated analyses, of things of the past, whereas war is a different problem, a contemporary problem which has implications for the perspectives. But leaving aside the fact that as well as the public meeting on the Russian revolution, there was also the intervention at the conferences in Russia which was in no way limited to the past but concerns the present and future of the workers’ movement, it’s curious that the discussion on October 1917 is presented as an element of political archaeology rather than as an instrument for sharpening the weapons of intervention in the working class today. In sum, once again, the IBRP’s arguments are not only invalid, but false.
In reality, looking at it a bit closer, this turnaround by the IBRP is not such a mystery since it corresponds to what the comrades wrote in their conclusions to the “Resolution on international work” from the 6th Congress of Battaglia Comunista, which was adopted by the whole Bureau and is referred to in the IBRP’s response to our appeal.
“‘It is by now an acquired principle of our political line of conduct that, except for very exceptional circumstances, any new international conferences and meetings undertaken by the Bureau and its organisatiions must be completely situated in the direction that leads to the consolidation, strengthening and extension of the revolutionary tendencies of the world proletariat. The International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party and the organisations belonging to it adhere to this principle’...And it’s clear from its context and from the entirety of the other documents of the Bureau that by ‘revolutionary tendencies of the world proletariat’ we mean all of the forces that will go to form an International Party of the Proletariat. And - given the present political method of your organisation and of the others - we don’t think that you can be part of that”.
Behind this passage, leaving aside the first part which we can only agree with (“any new international conferences and meetings...must be completely situated in the direction that leads to the consolidation, strengthening and extension of the revolutionary tendencies of the world proletariat” ...), there hides the idea that the IBRP is today the only credible organisation within the Communist Left (we wonder where such a proclamation, quite new in the workers’ movement, could come from - perhaps the IBRP, like the pope, has an arrangement with heaven). This is because the ICC is “idealist” and the Bordigists are “sclerotic”: “given the present political method of your organisation and of the others - we don’t think that you can be part of that”. So it’s better to follow one’s own path with one’s sister organisations, and not waste any time making conferences or joint initiatives which can only have sterile results.
This is the only clear position of the IBRP on all this; but it’s completely incoherent or at least based on specious arguments.
We will return to these issues. As far as we are concerned we are sure that the party will emerge from the confrontation and political decantation that has to take place among the existing revolutionary organisations.
Ezechiele, 31st May 1999
[1] [876] See our various territorial papers in the months April to June for our denunciation of the false revolutionary formations in each country.
[2] [877] The International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party (the Partito Comunista Internazionalista which publishes Battaglia Comunista in Italy and the Communist Workers organisation which publishes Revolutionary Perspectives in Britain; the Partito Comunista Internazionale which publishes Il Partito Comunista in Italy and Communist Left in Britain; the Partito Comunista Internazionale which publishes Programma Comunista in Italy, Cahiers Internationalistes in French and Internationalist Papers in English).
Once again, war has broken out between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Once again, the bourgeoisie has pushed workers in uniform to die and to kill each other at altitudes and climatic conditions where men may die even without war. While soldiers kill each other, populations living near the borders have been uprooted and turned into refugees. Condemned to poverty and misery even without war, they suffer in open-air camps at temperatures below zero. All this matters little to the ruling gangs for whom war in Kashmir is yet another opportunity to pit their bloated imperialist ambitions against each other.
So far, this latest India-Pakistan war is limited only to Kashmir. But both India and Pakistan have mobilised their military machines all across their borders stretching over thousands of miles. Already, behind the armies, civilian populations from Ran of Kutch in Gujrat to Chamb in Jammu are being ‘relocated’ in preparation for war. Given the jingoism that the bourgeoisie has spread and the desperation of the ruling gangs in both countries, an all-out war may ignite any time all across the borders between the two states.
This is not the first war between India and Pakistan. These two states were born on 15th August 1947, when departing British imperialism ripped apart the Indian sub-continent, unleashing mutual slaughter and genocide that took several million lives and left tens of millions of refugees. This led immediately to war in 1948. Despite poverty, despite hunger and starvation among their populations, they fought again in 1965 and 1971. In addition to these declared and open wars, the two countries have been in a condition of permanent war and carry out not so hidden wars in each others’ territory, fanning terrorism and separatism. In this sense, it may seem ‘business as usual’ between the two warring bourgeois gangs ruling over wretchedly poor populations.
But it is not. This war denotes a raising of the conflict and increases the potentialities of destruction to an unprecedentedly higher level. For one thing, since May 1998, both India and Pakistan possess nuclear arsenals. A conflict between the two could escalate into a nuclear Armageddon, destroying both countries and killing tens of millions. An even bigger factor giving a new dimension to this war in the sub-continent is the condition of free for all in the world after the collapse of the superpower blocs. Even the world’s sole remaining superpower, the USA, has limited leverage to contain it.
In this context tensions between the main states operating in the sub-continent have sharpened. Only in May-June 1998, India and China engaged in a verbal war with India dubbing China its enemy number one, while India and Pakistan indulged in competitive nuclear explosions. Since then the conflicts between them have only intensified.
The present war in Kashmir expresses the growing desperation of Pakistan against its rival India. It is also an expression of China giving a kick in the arse to the Indian state after last year’s verbal duel between the two. On the other hand the Indian bourgeoisie is also getting desperate. A ‘conviction’ about the ‘inevitability’ of a ‘final war’ between India and Pakistan, now or in the future, is being spread by the bourgeoisie.
The present war may not spread. The current interests of the major powers may compel the Indian and Pakistani states, tearing at each other’s throats at the moment, to back off. But it can only be a temporary reprieve. The desperation of both Indian and Pakistani ruling gangs, the bitterness of their conflict, the determination of the Chinese bourgeoisie to keep Indian ambitions in check and the growing free for all and rivalry among the world’s main powers - all this is bound to explode in yet another war in this area. Sooner rather than later. With far higher level of death and destruction.
The bourgeoisie is incapable of stopping war. War springs from the very nature of capitalism, a system of exploitation and merciless conflict and competition between capitalists and nations. ‘Peace talks’ between bourgeois gangs are merely a subterfuge to prepare other, more deadly wars. The present war between India and Pakistan, which followed the ‘outbreak’ of peace between the two only 3 months back, is itself a striking example of the hypocrisy of the peace propaganda of the bourgeoisie.
Only a class that has no stake in these wars, the working class, can finally put an end to war. It is the working class who pays for this war. The soldiers dying at the front are sons of workers, impoverished peasants and landless labourers, many of whom bought their jobs in the army by bribing middlemen. It is workers in the factories, mines and offices who will be made to accept austerity to finance war in the name of nationalism.
As in the war in Iraq, as in the war in Kosovo, as in all imperialist wars between capitalist states today, in the war in Kashmir too workers in India and Pakistan have no sides to choose. No nations to defend.
As internationalists, communists confirm that this war, like all wars today, is an imperialist war. They reject all nationalist hysteria spread by the bourgeoisie. Internationalists call on workers to refuse to be swept along by nationalist frenzy and to start defending their own class interests. To forge an ever-widening class unity, extending across national frontiers, against the bourgeoisie of their own nations and against world capital. Only by developing their class struggle, their class unity, and their class consciousness can workers open the way for the destruction of capitalism and an end to all wars.
4 July, 1999, Communist Internationalist
Nucleus of the ICC in India
After having turned the globe into a gigantic slaughterhouse, inflicting two world wars, nuclear terror and countless local conflicts on an agonised humanity, decadent capitalism has entered into its phase of decomposition, a new historic phase first marked by the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989. In this historic phase, the direct employment of military violence by the great powers, above all by the USA, becomes a permanent phenomenon. In this phase, the strait-jacket discipline of the imperialist blocs gives way to rampant indiscipline and chaos, a generalised state of every man for himself, an uncontrollable spread of military conflicts.
At the close of the century, the historic alternative formulated by marxism during World War 1 - socialism or barbarism - is not only confirmed, but has to be made more precise: it is socialism or the destruction of humanity.
(...) Although a third world war is for the moment not on the agenda, the historic crisis of capitalism has reached such an impasse that the system can move in no other direction than towards war. Not only because the acceleration of the crisis has begun to plunge entire regions such as south-east Asia, which until recently still preserved a semblance of prosperity, into a state of destitution and instability, but above all because the great powers themselves are more and more obliged to employ violence in defence of their interests.
The nature of the conflicts: a key question today
(...)Revolutionaries will in the end only succeed in convincing the proletariat of the complete validity of the marxist position if they are capable of defending a coherent theoretical and historical vision of the evolution of modern imperialism. In particular, the capacity of marxism to explain the real causes and stakes of modern wars is one of our most powerful weapons against bourgeois ideology.
In this sense, a clear understanding of the phenomenon of the decomposition of capitalism, and the whole historic period which is marked by it, constitutes a vital instrument in the defence of revolutionary positions and analyses with regard to imperialism and the nature of wars today.
Decomposition and the collapse of the Eastern bloc
(...)The key event determining the whole character of imperialist conflicts at the turn of the century is the collapse of the Eastern bloc.
(...) The whole world was surprised by the events of 1989. The ICC did not escape from this rule but it has to be said that it very quickly succeeded in grasping the full significance of these events (its ‘Theses on the crisis in the eastern countries’, which foresaw the collapse of the Russian bloc, were written in September 1989, i.e. two months before the fall of the Berlin Wall). The capacity of our organisation to react in this way was not the result of chance. It was the result:
- of the framework of analysis on the characteristics of the Stalinist regimes, which the ICC had developed in the 1980s, following the events in Poland (see ‘Eastern Europe, the weapons of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat’, in International Review 34, third quarter of 1983);
- of an understanding of the historic phenomenon of the decomposition of capitalism which it had begun to elaborate in 1988 (see ‘The decomposition of capitalism” in International Review 57, second quarter of 1989);
It was the first time in history that an imperialist bloc had disappeared outside of a world war. Such a phenomenon created a profound disarray, including in the ranks of communist organisations, where for example there were attempts to understand the economic rationale behind it. For the ICC the unprecedented nature of such an event, which had no rationality but represented a catastrophe for the old Soviet empire (and for the USSR itself, which very soon exploded as well) was a striking confirmation of the analysis of the decomposition of capitalism (see “Decomposition, final phase of the decadence of capitalism”, in International Review 62, third quarter of 1990).
(...) Until 1989, this decomposition, which had brought the world’s second superpower to its knees, had hardly effected the central countries of the Western bloc. Even now, ten years later, the local manifestations of decomposition are almost derisory compared to the capitalist periphery. However, by exploding the existing world imperialist order, the phenomenon of decomposition became the epoch of decomposition, placing the leading countries at the very heart of its contradictions - above all the greatest power of all, the USA.
US imperialism at the heart of the contradictions of decomposition
The evolution of US imperialist policy since 1989 has thus become the most dramatic expression of the present dilemma of the bourgeoisie.
During the Gulf war of 1991, the US could appear as the only counter-pole to the development of each for themselves, in that it was still capable, with whip in hand, of coercing the other powers behind it. And indeed, through its overwhelming demonstration of military superiority in Iraq, the sole remaining superpower was able to strike a decisive blow against the tendency towards the formation of a German bloc which had been opened up by with the unification of that country.
But only six months after the Gulf War, the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia already confirmed that the “New World Order” announced by Bush would be dominated not by the Americans. but by a rampant “each for himself”.
(...) By February 1998 Washington, which in the Gulf War had used the United Nations and the Security Council in order to have its leadership sanctioned by the ‘international community’, had lost control of that instrument to such an extent that it could be humiliated by Iraq and its French and Russian allies.
Of course the US was able to overcome this obstacle by tossing the UN into the dustbin of history....The logical conclusion was the “Lone Ranger” operation “Desert Fox”, which openly flouted the advice of all the other big and small powers concerned.
Washington does not need the permission of anybody in order to strike at any time anywhere. But in pursuing such a policy, the USA, instead of limiting “each for himself” as it did momentarily during the Gulf War, has merely put itself at the head of this same tendency. Worse still: the political signals given by Washington during the course of the Desert Fox operation have inflicted great damage to its own cause. For the first time since the end of the Vietnam war, the US bourgeoisie, in marked contrast to its British partner of the day, has proven incapable of preserving a united front towards the outside during a war situation. Not only did the impeachment process against Clinton intensify during the action; leading American politicians, immersed in a real internal conflict over foreign policy, instead of repudiating the propaganda of America’s enemies that Clinton was taking action out of personal motives (“Monicagate”) politically repeated it.
(...) The underlying conflict over foreign policy between certain fractions among the Republican and Democratic Parties has proven so destructive precisely because this “debate” represents different sides of its insoluble contradiction, which the resolution of the 12th congress of the ICC formulated as follows:
“On the one hand, if it gives up using or extending the use of its military superiority, this will only encourage the countries contesting its authority to contest even more;
On the other hand, when it does use brute force, even, and especially when this momentarily obliges its opponents to rein in their ambitions towards independence, this only pushes the latter to seize on the latest occasion to get their revenge and squirm away from Washington’s grasp”.
Paradoxically, as long as the USSR-led imperialist bloc still existed, the USA remained protected from the worst effects of decomposition on its foreign policy... Since there is no challenger in sight strong enough to form an imperialist bloc of its own against Washington, there is no common enemy and thus no reason for the other powers to accept the “protection” and discipline of America ...
The offensive character of US military strategy illustrates the increased irrationality of imperialist relations
Faced with this irresistible rise of every man for himself, the USA has had no choice but to wage a constantly offensive military policy. Not the weaker challengers of Washington, but the USA itself is obliged to regularly and increasingly intervene with armed force in defence of its position - normally the characteristic of the weaker power in a more desperate situation.
The ICC also pointed out this tendency already at its 9th Congress:
“In some ways, the present situation of the USA is similar to that of Germany before the two world wars. The latter tried to compensate for its economic disadvantages (...) by overturning the imperialist division of spoils through force of arms. This is why, in both world wars, it took on the role of ‘aggressor’ because the better placed powers had no interest in upsetting the apple-cart. (...) As long as the Eastern bloc existed (...) the USA had no a priori need to make great use of its weapons because the essential part of the protection accorded to its allies was of a defensive nature (even though at the beginning of the 80s the USA began a general offensive against the Russian bloc). With the disappearance of the Russian threat, the ‘obedience’ of the other great powers was no longer guaranteed (this is why the Western bloc fell apart). To obtain obedience, the US has had to adopt a systematically offensive stance on the military level (..) which looks a bit like the behaviour of Germany in the past. The difference is that today the initiative isn’t being taken by a power that wants to overthrow the imperialist balance but on the contrary the world’s leading power, the one that for the moment has the best slice of the cake” (‘Report on the International Situation’, International Review no.67).
Each for himself: the dominant tendency today
Drawing a balance sheet of the past two years, the detailed analysis of concrete events confirms the framework laid down by the 12th Congress report and resolution:
1. The openly defiant nuclear armament of India and Pakistan, for instance, an example almost certain to be followed by others, greatly increasing the likelihood of the use of atomic bombs in war.
2. The increasing military aggressiveness of Germany, freed from the iron corset of the imperialist blocs, an example which will be followed by Japan, the other great power contained by the US bloc after 1945.
3. The terrifying acceleration of chaos and instability in Russia, today the most caricatural expression of decomposition and the most dangerous centre of all the tendencies towards the dissolution of the bourgeois world order.
4. The continuing resistance of Israel’s Netanyahu to the Pax Americana imposed on its allies in the Middle East, and the conversion of Africa into a slaughterhouse are other examples confirming:
- that the dominant tendency in imperialist tensions after 1989 is chaos and each for himself,
- that at the heart of this dominant tendency lies the challenge to the dominance of the American super-power, and increasingly violent military actions by that power,
- that this dynamic can only be understood in the context of decomposition,
- that this dominance in no way removes the tendency towards the formation of new blocks, which today as a secondary but real trend is itself one of the principle factors fanning the flames of war and the unfolding of chaos,
- that the sharpening of the economic crisis of decadent capitalism is itself a powerful factor in the sharpening of tensions, without however establishing a mechanical link between the two, or lending these conflicts any economic or historical rationality (on the contrary) (...).
Decomposition of the bourgeoisie accentuates tensions and each for himself
With the loss of any concretely realisable project except that of “saving the furniture” in face of the economic crisis, the lack of perspective facing the bourgeoisie tends to lead it to lose sight of the interests of the state or of the national capital as a whole.
The political life of the bourgeoisie, in the weaker countries, tends to be reduced to the struggle of different fractions or even cliques for power or merely survival. This in turn becomes an enormous obstacle to the establishment of stable alliances or even of a coherent foreign policy, giving way to chaos, unpredictability and even madness in relations between states.
The dead end of the capitalist system leads to the break-up of some of those states which were established late, in the decadence of capitalism, and on an unsound basis, (such as the USSR or Yugoslavia) or with artificial frontiers such as in Africa, leading to an explosion of wars aimed at drawing frontiers anew.
To this must be added the aggravation of racial, ethnic, religious, tribal and other tensions, a very important aspect of the present world situation.
One of the most progressive tasks of ascendant capitalism was the replacement of the religious, ethnic etc. fragmentation of humanity by large, centralised national units (the American melting pot, the forging of a national unity out of Catholics and Protestants in Germany, or German, French and Italian speakers in Switzerland). But even in ascendancy the bourgeoisie was unable to overcome these divisions dating from before capitalism. While genocide and ethnic divide and rule were on the agenda wherever the system expanded into the non-capitalist areas, such conflicts survived even at the heart of capitalism (e.g. Ulster). Although the bourgeoisie pretends that the holocaust against the Jews was unique in modern history, and lyingly accuses the communist left of “excusing” this crime, decadent capitalism in general, and decomposition in particular, constitute the epoch of genocide and “ethnic cleansing” properly speaking. It is only with decomposition that all these age-old and recent conflicts, which apparently have nothing to do with the “rationality” of the capitalist economy, reach a generalised explosion - as a result of the complete lack of a bourgeois perspective. Irrationality is a characteristic feature of decomposition. Today, we not only have concretely diverging strategic interests, but also the sheer insolubility of all these countless conflicts. The culmination of the 20th century vindicates the marxist movement which at the beginning of the century, against the Bund in Russia, showed that the only progressive solution to the Jewish question in Europe was the world revolution, or those who later showed that there could be no progressive formation of nation states in the Balkans (...).
The absence of an established and realistic division of the world after 1989 fans the flames of “each for himself”
In addition to American superiority over its rivals, there is another strategic factor, directly linked to decomposition, explaining the present pre-dominance of each for himself: the collapse of the Russian bloc without its military defeat. Until then, historically, the re-division of the world through imperialist war has been the most favourable precondition for the formation of new blocs, as shown after 1945. The legacy of this collapse without war is that:
- one third of the earth, that of the ex-Eastern bloc, has become a zone without a master, a gigantic bone of contention between the remaining powers,
- the main strategic positions of the ex-Western bloc powers in the rest of the world after 1989 in no way represented the real imperialist balance of forces between them, but rather their former division of labour against the Russian bloc.
This situation, by leaving completely open, or generally dissatisfying, the zones of influence of the greater and lesser powers, is an enormous encouragement for a free for all, an unorganised scramble for positions and zones of influence.
The main imperialist line up between the “satiated” and the “have not” European powers, which dominated world politics between 1900 and 1939, was the product of decades, or even of centuries of capitalist development. The line up of the Cold War was in turn the result of over a decade of the sharpest and most profound belligerent confrontations between the great powers, from the early 1930s to 1945.
By contrast, the collapse of the Yalta world order took place overnight, and without resolving any of the great questions of imperialist rivalry posed by capitalism - except one: the irreversible decline of Russia.
Decadent imperialist confrontation outside the corset of blocs:
an exception, but not a complete novelty
The only imperialist world order possible in decadence is that of imperialist blocs, of world war.
In decadent capitalism there is a natural tendency towards the imperialist bi-polarisation of the world, which can only be relegated to second place under exceptional circumstances, usually linked to the balance of class forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat. This was the case after World War I.- until the coming to power of Hitler in Germany - as a result of the world revolutionary wave, which first obliged the bourgeoisie to end the war before it had been brought to a conclusion (i.e. the total defeat of Germany, which would have cleared the way for new blocs formed from within the victorious camp -presumably headed by Britain and the US), and then obliged it to collaborate to save its system after the war. Thus, once the proletariat had been defeated and Germany recovered from its exhaustion, World War II was fought out basically between the same camps as the first.
Obviously today, the factors counter-acting the tendency towards bi-polarity are much weightier than in the 1920s, when they were overwhelmed by bloc formation within hardly more than a decade. Today, not only overwhelming American supremacy, but also decomposition may well prevent new blocs ever being formed.
The tendency towards blocs and the rise of Germany
Decomposition is thus an enormous factor favouring “each for himself”. But it does not eliminate the tendency towards the formation of blocs. Nor can we make the theoretical claim that decomposition as such makes the formation of blocs impossible on principle.
But we should not forget that these two bourgeois interests, the pursuit of its imperialist ambitions and the limiting of decomposition, are not always and necessarily opposed. In particular, the efforts of the German bourgeoisie to establish a first foundation for an eventual imperialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and to stabilise several of the countries in that zone against chaos, are more often complimentary than contradictory.
We also know that “each for himself” and the formation of blocs are not in absolute contradiction, that blocs are but the organised form of “each for himself” steered towards a single explosion of all the pent-up imperialist rivalries.
We know that the long term goal of the USA, to remain the world’s strongest power, is an eminently realistic project, but nevertheless in pursuit of this goal, it tangles itself in insoluble contradictions. With Germany it is the other way round: whereas its long term project of a German-led bloc may never be realised, its concrete policy in this direction proves to be extremely realistic.
The alliance with Poland, the advances on the Balkan peninsula, the reorientation of its armed forces towards military interventions abroad, are steps in the direction of a future German bloc. Small steps, it is true, but enough to worry the world’s super-power (...).
The credibility of marxism
All Communist organisations have had the common experience of how difficult it has become since 1989 to convince most workers of the validity of the marxist analysis of imperialist conflicts. There are two main reasons for this difficulty. One is the objective situation of “each for himself” and the fact that the conflict of interest of the great powers is today, as opposed to the Cold War period, still largely hidden. The other reason however is that the bourgeoisie, as part of its systematic equation of Stalinism with communism, has been able to present as “Marxist” a completely caricatural vision of war waged solely to fill the pockets of a few greedy capitalists. Since 1989, the bourgeoisie has benefited enormously from this falsification in order to sow the most incredible confusion. During the Gulf War the bourgeoisie itself propagated the monstrous, pseudo-materialist mystification of a “war over oil prices” in order to conceal the underlying conflict between the great powers.
As opposed to this, the organisations of the communist left have determinedly exposed the imperialist interests of the imperialist powers, in the tradition of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. But they have sometimes waged this struggle with insufficient weapons, in particular with a reductionist, exaggerated vision of the immediate, economic motives of modern imperialist war. This weakens the authority of the marxist argumentation. This “economistic” approach leads to falling for the propaganda of the bourgeoisie, as in the case of the CWO believing in a certain reality behind the “peace process” in Ireland.
Global character of imperialist war
The whole proletarian milieu shares the understanding that imperialist war is the product of the contradictions of capitalism, having in the last analysis an economic cause. But every war which ever took place in class society also has a strategic dimension, an important aspect with an internal dynamic of its own. Hannibal marched into the North of Italy with his elephants, not in order to open a trade route across the Alps, but as a strategic ploy in the Punic “world wars” between Carthage and Rome for the domination of the Mediterranean.
With the rise of capitalist competition it is true that the economic cause of war becomes more pronounced: hence the colonial wars of conquest and the national wars of unification of the last century. But the creation of the world market and the division of the earth among the capitalist nations also gives war, in the epoch of imperialism, a global, and thus more political and strategic character than ever before in history. This is already clearly the case for World War I. The cause of that war was strictly economic: the limits reached to the expansion of the world market relative to the needs of existing accumulated capital; the entry of the system into its phase of decadence. But it was not the economic “cyclical crisis of accumulation” as such which led to imperialist war in 1914, but the fact that all the zones of influence were already divided up, so that the “late arrivers” could only expand at the expense of the already established powers. The economic crisis as such was much milder than it had been for example in the 1870s. In reality it was more the imperialist war which announced the coming world economic crisis of decadent capitalism in 1929, than the other way round.
Similarly, the immediate economic situation of Germany, the main power pushing for a re-division of the world, was far from critical in 1914 - not least because it still had access to the markets of the British Empire and other colonial powers. But this situation placed Germany, politically, at the mercy of its main rivals. The main war goal of Germany was thus not the conquest of this or that market, but breaking British domination of the oceans: on the one hand through a German war fleet and a string of colonies and naval bases throughout the world, on the other hand through a land route towards Asia and the Middle East via Russia and the Balkans. Already at that time, German troops were sent to the Balkans in pursuit of this global strategic goal much more than because of the mere Yugoslav market. Already at that time, the fight to control certain key raw materials was only one moment in the general fight to dominate the world.
Many of the opportunists in the Second and Third Internationals - and the partisans of “socialism in one country” - benefited from their partial, in the last analysis national viewpoint, in order to deny the “economic and thus imperialist ambitions” of... their own country. The marxist left, on the contrary, was able to defend this global comprehension because it understood that modern capitalist industry cannot survive without the markets, raw materials, agricultural products, transport facilities and labour power of the whole globe at its disposal. In the imperialist epoch, where the entire world economy forms a complex whole, local wars not only have global causes, but are always part of an international system of struggle for domination of the world. This is why Rosa Luxemburg was right when she wrote in the Junius Pamphlet that all states, whether big or small, have become imperialist (...).
The irrational character of
imperialist war
“The decadence of capitalism is strikingly expressed by the fact that whereas wars were once a factor for economic development (ascendant period), today, in the decadent period, economic activity is geared essentially towards war. This does not mean that war has become the goal of capitalist production, which remains the production of surplus; it means that war, taking on a permanent character, has become decadent capitalism’s way of life” (Report on the international situation of the Communist Left of France, July 1945).
This analysis developed within the communist left represents a further, fundamental deepening of our understanding of imperialist conflicts: not only are the economic goals of imperialist war global and political, but they themselves become dominated by questions of military strategy and “security”. Whereas at the beginning of decadence war is still more or less at the service of the economy, with the passage of time the situation is reversed, the economy is increasingly placed at the service of war.
A current like the IBRP, steeped in the Marxist tradition, is well aware of this.
“....We must clearly reiterate a basic element of Marxist dialectical thinking: when material forces are creating a dynamic towards war it is this which will become the central reference point for politicians and governments. War is waged in order to win: friends and enemies are chosen on that basis.”
And elsewhere in the same article:
“It then remains for the political leadership and the army to establish the political direction of each state according to a single imperative: an estimation of how to achieve military victory because this now overrides economic victory” (“End of the cold war: new step towards a new imperialist line-up”: Internationalist Communist Review No.10).
Here, we are far away from the oil in the Gulf and Yugoslav markets. But unfortunately, this understanding is not anchored in a coherent theory of the economic irrationality of militarism today.
Furthermore, the identification between economic tensions and military antagonisms leads to a myopia about the significance of the European Union and the single currency, which the IBRP sees as a future imperialist bloc (...)
“Euroland” is not an imperialist bloc
Until the 1990s, the bourgeoisie found no other means of co-ordinating economic policies between nation states - in an attempt to maintain the cohesion of the world market in the face of permanent economic crisis - than the framework of imperialist blocs. In this context, the character of the Western bloc during the Cold War, composed as it was of all the leading economic powers, was particularly favourable to the international, state capitalist crisis management of the bourgeoisie - going a long way towards preventing the kind of dislocation of world trade which took place in the 1930s. The circumstances of the post-1945 imperialist world order, lasting over half a century, could thus give the impression that the co-ordination of economic policy and the containment of commercial rivalries between given states within certain rules and limits is the specific function of imperialist blocs.
After 1989 however, when the imperialist blocs disappeared, the bourgeoisie of the leading countries was able to find new means of international economic co-operation towards “crisis management”, whereas at the imperialist level the struggle of each against all quickly gained the upper hand.
This situation is perfectly illustrated by the attitude of the United States, which, at the imperialist level massively resists any moves towards a military alliance of European states, but at the economic level - after initial hesitations - supports and itself profits from the European Union and the Euro currency project.
During the Cold War, the “European integration process” was first and foremost a means of strengthening the cohesion of the US bloc in Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. If the European Union has survived the break-up of the Western bloc this is above all because it has assumed a new role as an economic anchor at the heart of the world economy.
In this sense, the bourgeoisie has learnt in the past years to operate a certain separation between the questions of economic co-operation (crisis management) and that of imperialist alliances. And reality today shows that the fight of each for himself dominates at the imperialist, but not at the economic level. But if the bourgeoisie is able to make such a distinction, this is only because the two phenomena are distinct - although not completely separate - in reality. “Euroland” illustrates perfectly that strategic-imperialist and commercial trade interests of nation states are not identical. The economy of the Netherlands, for instance, is heavily dependent on the world market in general, and the German economy in particular. This is why this county has been one of the most fervent supporters within Europe of the German policy in favour of a common currency. At the imperialist level, on the contrary, the Dutch bourgeoisie, precisely because of its geographical proximity to Germany, opposes the interests of its powerful neighbour wherever it can, and constitutes one of the most loyal allies of the USA on the old continent. If the Euro were first and foremost a cornerstone of a future German bloc, The Hague would be the first to oppose it. But in reality Holland, France and other countries who are afraid of the imperialist resurgence of Germany support the common currency precisely because it does not menace their national security, i.e. their military sovereignty.
As opposed to an economic co-ordination, based on a contract between sovereign bourgeois states (under the pressure of given economic constraints and balance of forces of course) an imperialist bloc is an iron corset imposed on a group of states by the military supremacy of a bloc leader, and held together by a common will to destroy an opposing military alliance. The blocs of the Cold War did not arise through negotiated agreements: they were the result of World War II. The Western bloc came into being because Western Europe and Japan were occupied by the USA, the Warsaw Pact through the invasion of Eastern Europe by the USSR.
The Eastern bloc did not fall apart because of shifts in economic interests and trade alliances, but because the leader, who held the bloc together with blood and iron, was no longer able to assume the task. And the Western bloc - which was stronger and did not fall apart - simply became defunct because the common enemy had disappeared. As Winston Churchill once wrote, military alliances are not the product of love, but of fear: fear of the common enemy.
Europe at the heart, not of a new bloc, but of “each for himself”
Europe and North America are the two centres of world capitalism. The USA, as the dominant power in North America, was destined by its continental dimension, its situation at a safe distance from potential enemies in Europe and Asia, and its economic strength to become the leading power in the world.
The economic and strategic position of Europe on the contrary, has condemned it to become and remain the main focus of imperialist tensions in decadent capitalism. The principle battlefield in both world wars, and the continent divided by the “iron curtain” during the Cold War, Europe has never constituted a unity, and under capitalism it never will.
Because of its historical role as the birthplace of modern capitalism, and its geographical situation as a semi-peninsula of Asia lying to the north of Africa, Europe in the 20th century has become the key to the imperialist struggle for world rule. At the same time, not least because of its geographical situation, Europe is militarily particularly difficult to dominate. Great Britain, even in the days when it “ruled the waves”, had to make do with keeping Europe in check through a complicated system of “balance of forces”. As for Germany under Hitler, even in 1941 its domination of the continent was more apparent than real, as long as Britain, Russia and North Africa were in enemy hands. Even the United States, at the height of the Cold War, never succeeded in dominating more than half the continent.
Ironically, since its “victory” over the USSR, the position of the United States in Europe has been considerably weakened, with the disappearance of the “evil empire”. Although the world’s super-power maintains a considerable military presence on the old continent, Europe is not an underdeveloped area which can be kept in check by a handful of GI barracks: four of the leading G8 industrial countries are European.
Indeed, whereas the USA can militarily manoeuvre in the Persian Gulf almost at will, the time and effort which Washington requires to impose its policy in former Yugoslavia reveals the present difficulty even for the sole remaining super-power to maintain a decisive presence 5000 km from home.
Not only are the conflicts in the Balkans or the Caucasus directly related to the struggle for control of Europe, but also those in Africa and the Middle East. North Africa is the southern shore of the Mediterranean basin; its north-eastern coast (particularly the “Horn”) dominates the approaches to the Suez Canal; southern Africa, the southern shipping routes between Europe and Asia. If Hitler, despite the over-stretching of his military resources in Europe, despatched Rommel to Africa, this was above all because he knew that otherwise Europe could not be held.
What goes for Africa goes all the more for the Middle East, the point where Europe, Asia and Africa meet. The domination of the Middle East is one of the principle means through which the USA can remain a decisive “European” and global power (thus the vital importance of the Pax Americana between Israel and the Palestinians for Washington).
Europe is also the main reason why Washington, over the past eight years, has persistently made Iraq the focal point of international crises: as a means of dividing the European powers. Whereas France and Russia are allies of Iraq, Britain is the natural enemy of the present regime in Baghdad, while Germany is closer to the regional rivals of Iraq such as Turkey and Iran.
But if Europe is the centre of imperialist tensions today, this is above all because the principle European powers themselves have divergent military interests. We should not forget that both world wars began above all as wars between the European powers - as did the Balkan wars of the 1990s (...).
1. Out of the 15 countries which make up the European Union, 13 today have Social-Democratic governments or governments in which the Social-Democrats are participating (Spain and Ireland are the only exceptions). This reality has obviously been subject to analyses both by bourgeois journalists and by revolutionary groups. Thus, for a ‘specialist’ in international politics like Alexander Adler. “the European lefts have at least one joint objective: the preservation of the welfare state, the defence of a common European security” (Courier International, no. 417). Similarly, Le Prolétaire for last October devoted an article to this question, rightly arguing that the current predominance of Social-Democracy in the majority of countries corresponds to a deliberate and co-ordinated international policy of the bourgeoisie against the working class. However, both in the bourgeois commentaries and in the article of Le Prolétaire, it is not possible to see the specificity of this policy in relation to the policies carried out in previous periods since the end of the 60s. It is thus a question of understanding the causes of the political phenomenon we are seeing on a European scale, and even on a world scale (with the Democrats at the head of the executive in the US). This said, even before going into these causes, we have to respond to one question in particular: can we say that the undeniable fact that the Social-Democratic parties have a hegemonic position in nearly all the countries of western Europe is the result of a general phenomenon with common causes for all the countries, or is it rather a circumstantial convergence of a series of specific and particular situations in each country?
2. Marxism can be demarcated from the empirical approach in the sense that it does not draw its conclusions only from the facts observed at a given moment, but interprets and integrates these facts into a historical and global vision of social reality. This said, as a living method, marxism is concerned to permanently examine this reality, and is never afraid to put into question the analyses that it has elaborated previously:
- either because they have been shown to be erroneous (the marxist method has never claimed to be immune from error);
- or because new historical elements have arisen, rendering the old analyses obsolete.
In no way should the marxist method be seen as an immutable dogma to which reality has no choice but to bow down. Such a conception of marxism is that of the Bordigists (or of the FOR which denied the reality of the crisis because it didn’t correspond to its schemas). It is not the method that the ICC has inherited from Bilan and the whole of the communist left. While the marxist method certainly refuses to be limited only to immediate facts and refuses to submit to the ‘evidence’ celebrated by the ideologues of the ruling class, it is still always obliged to take account of these facts. Faced with the phenomenon of the massive presence of the left at the head of the countries of Europe, we can obviously find within each country specific reasons militating in favour of such a disposition of political forces. For example, we have attributed the return of the left to government in France in 1997 to the extreme political weakness and the divisions within the right. Similarly, we saw that considerations of foreign policy played an important part in the formation of the left government in Italy (against the Berlusconi wing favourable to an alliance with the USA) or in Britain (where the Conservatives were profoundly divided with regard to the European Union and the USA). However, to try to derive the current political situation in Europe from the simple sum of particular situations in different countries would be a futile exercise contrary to the marxist spirit. In fact, in the marxist method, in certain circumstances quantity becomes a new quality. When we consider that never since they joined the bourgeois camp have so many socialist parties been simultaneously in government (even if all of them have been at one time or another), when we also see that in countries as important as Britain and Germany (where the bourgeoisie usually has a remarkable mastery over its political apparatus) the left was put into government in a deliberate manner by the bourgeoisie, then we have to consider that this is a new “quality” which can’t be reduced to a mere superimposition of “particular cases”[1].
Furthermore, we argued no differently when we highlighted the phenomenon of the “left in opposition” at the end of the 70s. Thus the text adopted by the 3rd Congress of the ICC, and which gives the framework for our analysis of the left in opposition, began by taking into account the fact that in most countries of Europe, the left had been pushed out of power:
“We only have to glance at the situation briefly to see that... the arrival of the left in power has not only not been verified, but that the left has over the last year been systematically moved out of power in most of the countries of Europe. It is enough to cite Portugal, Italy, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, France, Belgium, Britain as well as Israel to see this. There are practically only two countries in Europe where the left is still in power: Germany and Austria” (“In opposition as in government, the ‘left’ against the workers” International Review 18).
3. In the analysis of the causes for the coming of the left into government in this or that European country, we had to take into account some specific factors (for example, in the case of France, the extreme weakness of “the world’s most stupid right”). However, it is vital that revolutionaries are able to give an overall response to an overall phenomenon, to answer it as completely as possible. This is what the ICC did in 1979, at its 3rd Congress, with regard to the left in opposition and the best way to take up this work is to recall the method we used to analyse this phenomenon at the time:
“With the appearance of the crisis and the first signs of the workers’ struggle, the ‘left in power’ was capitalism’s most adequate response in these initial years. The left in government, and the left posing its candidature to govern, effectively fulfilled the task of containing, demobilising and paralysing the proletariat with all its mystifications about ‘change’ and about electoralism.
The left had to remain, and did remain, in this position, as long as it enabled it to fulfil its function. Thus, we weren’t committing any error in the past. Something different and more substantial has taken place: a change in the alignment of the political forces of the bourgeoisie. We would be committing a serious error if we didn’t recognise this change in time and continued to repeat ourselves emptily about the danger of the ‘left in power’.
Before continuing the examination of why this change has taken place and what it means, we must particularly insist on the fact that we’re not talking about a circumstantial phenomenon, limited to this or that country, but a general phenomenon, valid in the short term and possibly the middle term for all the countries of the western world.
Having effectively carried out its task of immobilising the working class during these initial years, the left, whether in power or moving towards power, can no longer perform this task except by putting itself in opposition. There are many reasons for this change, to do with the specific conditions of various countries, but these are secondary reasons. The main reasons are the wearing-out of the mystifications of the left, of the left in power, and the slow disillusionment of the working masses which follows from this. The recent revival and radicalisation of workers’ struggle bears witness to this.
Let’s remind ourselves of the three criteria for the left coming to power which are outlined in our previous analyses and discussions:
1. Necessity to strengthen state capitalist measures,
2. Closer integration into the western imperialist bloc under the domination of US capital,
3. Effective containment of the working class and immobilisation of its struggles.
The left fulfils these three conditions most effectively, and the USA, leader of the bloc, clearly supported its coming to power, although it has reservations about the CPs (...) But while the USA remained suspicious about the CPs, it gave total support for the maintenance or arrival of the Socialists in power, wherever that was possible....
Let’s return to our criteria for the left being in power. When we examine them more closely, we can see that while the left fulfils them best, they aren’t all the exclusive patrimony of the left. The first two, state capitalist measures and integration into the bloc, can easily be accomplished, if the situation demands it, by other political forces of the bourgeoisie: parties of the centre or even outright right-wing ones[2]... On the other hand, the third criterion, the containment of the working class, is the specific property of the left. It is its specific function, its raison d’être.
The left doesn’t accomplish this function only, or even generally, when it’s in power (...) As a general rule, the left’s participation in power is only absolutely necessary in two precise situations: in a Union Sacrée to dragoon the workers into national defence in direct preparation for war, and in a revolutionary situation to counter-act the movement towards revolution.
Outside of these two extreme situations, when the left can’t avoid openly exposing itself as an unconditional defender of the bourgeois regime by directly, violently confronting the working class, it must always try to avoid betraying its real identity, its capitalist function, and to maintain the mystification that its policies are aimed at the defence of working class interests (...) Thus, even if the left, like any other bourgeois party aspires ‘legitimately’ to government office, we must note an important difference between these parties and other bourgeois parties concerning their participation in power. That is that these parties claim to be ‘workers’ parties and as such are forced to present themselves with ‘anti-capitalist’ masks and phrases, as wolves in sheep’s clothing. Being in power puts them in an ambivalent situation, more difficult than for more frankly bourgeois parties. An openly bourgeois party carries out in power what it says it’s going to do: the defence of capital, and it in no way gets discredited by carrying out anti-working class policies. It’s exactly the same in opposition as it is in government. It’s quite the opposite with the ‘workers’’ parties. They must have a working class phraseology and a capitalist practise, one language in opposition and an absolutely opposed practise when in government...
After an explosion of social discontent and convulsions which caught the bourgeoisie by surprise, and which was only neutralised by bringing the left to power, the crisis deepened, illusions in the left began to weaken, the class struggle began to revive. It became necessary for the left to be in opposition and to radicalise its phraseology, so as to be able to control the re-emerging struggle. Obviously this couldn’t be an absolute, but it is today and for the near future a general rule[3]” (ibid).
4. The text of 1979, as we can see, reminds us of the need to examine the phenomenon of the deployment of the political forces at the head of the bourgeois state under three different angles:
- the necessities of the bourgeoisie in the face of the economic crisis,
- the imperialist needs of each national bourgeoisie,
- the policy towards the proletariat.
It also affirms that this last aspect is, in the last instance, the most important one in the historic period opened up by the proletarian resurgence at the end of the 60s.
In our efforts to understand the present situation, the ICC took this factor into account in January 1990, at the time of the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the retreat in consciousness that it provoked in the working class: “This is why, in particular, we have to update the ICC’s analysis of the ‘left in opposition’. This was a necessary card for the bourgeoisie at the end of the 70s and throughout the 80s due to the class’ general dynamic towards increasingly determined and conscious combats, and its growing rejection of democratic, electoral, and trade union mystifications (...) By contrast, the class’ present reflux means that for a while this strategy will no longer be a priority for the bourgeoisie” (International Review 61).
However, what at the time was seen as a possibility is today being imposed as a quasi-general rule (even more general than the left in opposition during the 80s). Having seen the possibility of the phenomenon it is thus important to understand its causes, taking into account the three factors mentioned above.
5. The search for the causes of the hegemony of the left in Europe must be based on a consideration of the specific characteristics of the present period. This work has been done in the three reports on the international situation presented to the congress, and this isn’t the place to go over it in detail here. However it is important to compare the present situation with that of the 1970s when the bourgeoisie played the card of the left in government or moving towards government.
On the economic level, the1970s were the first years of the open crisis of capitalism. In fact, it was mainly after the recession of 1974 that the bourgeoisie became aware of the gravity of the situation. However, despite the violence of the convulsions of this period, the ruling class still clung to the illusion that they could be surmounted. Attributing its difficulties to the oil price rises that followed the Yom Kippur war in 1973, it hoped to overcome this problem through stabilising oil prices and installing new sources of energy. It also counted on a revival based on the very considerable credits (drawn from the ‘petrodollars’) doled out to the countries of the Third World. Finally, it imagined that new state capitalist measures of a neo-Keynsian type would make it possible to stabilise the mechanisms of the economy in each country.
At the level of imperialist conflicts, there was an aggravation of the latter, largely due to the development of the economic crisis - even if this aggravation was well below what took place at the beginning of the 80s. The necessity for greater discipline within each of the blocs was an important element in bourgeois policy (thus in a country like France, the arrival of Giscard d’Estaing in 1974 put an end to the strivings for ‘independence’ which characterised the Gaullist period).
At the level of the class struggle, this period was characterised by the very strong combativity which developed in all countries in the wake of May 68 in France and the Italian ‘rampant May’ of 1969; a combativity which initially had taken the bourgeoisie by surprise.
On these three aspects, the situation today is very different from what it was in the 1970s.
On the economic level, the bourgeoisie has long since lost its illusions about ‘coming out’ of the crisis. Despite the campaigns of the recent period about the benefits of ‘globalisation’, it doesn’t really bank on a return to the glories of the reconstruction period even if it still hopes to limit the damage of the crisis. And even this last hope has been severely undermined since the summer of 1997 with the collapse of the ‘dragons’ and ‘tigers’, followed by the fall of Russia and Brazil in 1998.
At the level of imperialist conflicts, the situation has been radically altered: today there are no imperialist blocs. However, military confrontations have in no way come to a halt. They have even sharpened, multiplied, and got closer to the central countries, notably the metropoles of western Europe. They have also been marked by a tendency for the big powers to participate more and more directly, particularly the world’s greatest power. The 70s, by contrast, saw a certain disengagement by the great powers from such a direct role, particularly the US which was in the process of leaving Vietnam.
At the level of workers’ struggles, the present period is still marked by the retreat in combativity and consciousness provoked by the events at the end of the 80s (collapse of the Eastern bloc and of the ‘socialist’ regimes) and the beginning of the 90s (Gulf War, war in Yugoslavia, etc), even if we are seeing tendencies towards a revival of combativity and there is a profound political ferment amongst a very small minority.
Finally, it is important to underline the new factor acting on the life of society today, and which didn’t exist in the 70s: capitalism’s entry into the phase of decomposition.
6. This last factor has to be taken into account if we are to understand the present phenomenon of the left coming to power. Decomposition affects the whole of society and in the first place the ruling class itself. This phenomenon is particularly spectacular in the countries of the periphery and constitutes a factor of growing instability which often fuels imperialist confrontations. We have shown that in the most developed countries, the ruling class is much better placed to control the effects of decomposition, but at the same time it can’t completely protect itself from them. One of the most spectacular examples of this is without doubt the Monicagate pantomime in the world’s leading bourgeoisie; although it is aimed at reorienting the USA’s imperialist policy, it has at the same time resulted in a definite loss of American authority.
Among the various bourgeois parties, not all sectors are affected by decomposition in the same way. All bourgeois parties obviously have the mission of preserving the short and long term interests of the national capital. However, within this spectrum, the parties which generally have a clearer consciousness of their responsibilities are the parties of the left, since they are less tied to the short term interests of this or that capitalist sector, and also because the bourgeoisie has already given them a leading role at decisive moments in the life of bourgeois society (world wars and above all revolutionary periods). Obviously the parties of the left are subject to the effects of decomposition - corruption, scandals, a tendency towards falling apart, etc. However, the example of countries like Italy or France shows that because of their characteristics they are less affected than the right. In this sense, one of the elements that enable us to explain the arrival of left parties in government in many countries is the fact that these parties are better able to resist the effects of decomposition and have a greater cohesion (this is also valid for a country like Britain where the Tories were much more divided than Labour)[4].
Another factor helping to explain the current ‘success’ of the left, and connected to the problem of decomposition, is the necessity to give a boost to the democratic and electoral mystification. The collapse of the Stalinist regimes was a very important factor in the revival of these mystifications, particularly among the workers who, as long as there existed a system that was presented as being different from capitalism, could still harbour the hope that there was an alternative to capitalism (even if they already had few illusions in the in the so-called ‘socialist’ countries). However, the Gulf war of 1991 struck a blow against democratic illusions. Even more, the general disenchantment towards the traditional values of society, a distinguishing feature of decomposition, and which is expressed especially in atomisation and the trend of ‘look after number one’, could not fail to have an effect on the classic institutions of the capitalist states, and in particular, the democratic and electoral mechanisms. And it was precisely the electoral victory of the left - in countries where, in conformity with the needs of the bourgeoisie, the right had governed for a very long period (notably in important countries like Germany and Britain) - that constituted a very important factor in the reanimation of electoral mystifications.
7. The aspect of imperialist conflicts (which also has to be linked with the question of decomposition: the collapse of the Eastern bloc and ‘each for himself’ at the international level) is another important factor in the left’s accession to government in a number of countries. We have already seen that the necessary reorientation of Italian diplomacy to the detriment of the alliance with the USA was a central element in the break up and disappearance of Christian Democracy in this country, as well as in the failure of the Berlusconi ‘pole’ (more favourable to the US). We have also seen that the greater homogeneity of Labour in Britain towards the European Union was one of the keys to the choice of Blair by the British bourgeoisie. Finally the arrival in the German government of political sectors most distant from Hitlerism, and even dressed in a ‘pacifist’ garb (the Social-Democrats and above all the Greens) is the best cover for the imperialist ambitions of a country which in the long term is the USA’s main rival. However, there is another element to take into consideration and which also applies to countries (like France) where there is no difference between the right and the left in international policy. This is the necessity for each bourgeoisie in the central countries to participate more and more in the military conflicts which ravage the world, and this is connected to the very nature of these conflicts, which are often presented as horrible massacres of the civilian populations in response to which the ‘international community’ has to apply the ‘law’ and send in its ‘humanitarian missions’. Since 1990, nearly all the military interventions by the great powers (and particularly in Yugoslavia) have been dressed in this costume and not in the banner of ‘national interests’. And for waging ‘humanitarian’ wars it is clear that the left is better placed than the right (even if the latter can also do the job), since its speciality is the ‘defence of the rights of man’[5].
8. At the level of the management of the economic crisis, there are also elements which work in favour of the left coming to government in most countries. In particular, we have the now patent failure of the ultra-liberal policies of which Thatcher and Reagan were the most noted representatives. Obviously, the bourgeoisie has no choice but to continue its economic attacks on the working class. It will also not go back on its privatisations which have allowed it:
- to lighten the budget deficits of the state,
- to make a certain number of economic activities more profitable,
- to avoid the immediate politicisation of social conflicts due to situations where the state itself is the boss.
This said, the failure of the ultra-liberal policies (which was expressed very clearly by the Asian crisis) does provide fuel for the advocates of greater state intervention. This applies at the level of ideological discourse: the bourgeoisie has to give the appearance of correcting what it presents as the result of the errors of liberalism - the aggravation of the crisis - in order to prevent the crisis from facilitating the development of consciousness in the proletariat. But it is equally valid at the level of real policy: the bourgeoisie is becoming aware of the ‘excesses’ of the ‘ultra-liberal’ policy. To the extent that the right was strongly marked by this policy of ‘less state’, the left is for the moment the best placed to bring about such changes (even if we know that the right can also take these kinds of measures as we saw with Giscard d’Estaing in France in the 70s; and it’s a man of the right, Aznar, in Spain who identifies with the policies of Blair’s Labour party). The left cannot re-establish the welfare state, but it has to appear not to entirely betray its programme, by re-establishing greater state intervention in the economy.
Furthermore, the failure of ‘unlimited globalisation’, which was particularly concretised by the Asian crisis, is another factor adding grist to the left’s mill. When the open crisis developed at the beginning of the 70s, the bourgeoisie understood that it could not repeat the errors which had helped to aggravate the crisis in the 30s. In particular, despite all the tendencies pushing in this direction, it was necessary to combat the temptation to shut off each country in autarky and protectionism, which would deal a fatal blow to world trade. This is why the European Economic Community had to carry on its development till it became the European Union and set up the Euro. This is also why the World Trade Organisation was set up, with the aim of limiting customs duties and facilitating international trade. However, this policy of opening the markets has been an important factor in the explosion of financial speculation (which constitutes the favourite ‘sport’ of capitalists in periods of crisis when there is little chance of profitable investment in productive activities), the dangers of which were clearly revealed by the Asian crisis. Even if the left will not basically call into question the policy of the right, it is more in favour of greater regulation of the flow of international finance (one of the formulae for this being the ‘Tobin Tax’), thus claiming to limit the excesses of ‘globalisation’. Its policy is to create a kind of cordon sanitaire around the most developed countries, so limiting the effects of the convulsions hitting the periphery.
9. The necessity to face up to the development of the class struggle is an essential factor in the coming of the left to government in the current period. But before determining the reasons for this we must look at the differences between the present situation and the situation in the 70s in this domain. In the 70s, the argument for the left coming to power presented to the workers was:
- there has to be a radically different economic policy from that of the right, a ‘socialist’ one that will revive the economy and ‘make the rich pay’[6];
- in order not to compromise this policy or to allow the left to win the elections, social struggles had to be put under wraps;
To put it crudely, we can say that the ‘left alternative’ had the function of channelling workers’ discontent and militancy towards the election booths.
Today, the different left parties which have got into government by winning the elections are far from speaking the ‘workers’’ language they spoke in the 70s. The most striking examples of this are Blair, the apostle of the third way, and Schroeder, the man of the ‘new centre’. In fact, it’s not a question of channelling a still weak combativity towards the election booths but of ensuring that the left government doesn’t have a language that is too different from the one it had during the election campaign, so as to avoid a rapid loss of credit as in the 70s (for example, the British Labour party came to power in the wake of the miners’ strike of 1974 then had to leave it in 1979 faced with an exceptional level of militancy in that year). The fact that the left has a much more ‘bourgeois’ face than in the 70s is a reflection of the low level of working class militancy today. This has allowed the left to replace the right without too many upsets. However, the generalisation of left governments in the most advanced countries is not just a phenomenon ‘by default’ linked to the weakness of the working class. It also plays a ‘positive’ role for the bourgeoisie faced with its mortal enemy. And this in the middle as well as the short term.
In the short term the alternation has not only made it possible to restore the credibility of the electoral process, it has allowed the parties of the right to regain some strength in opposition[7] so that they will be better able to play their role when it becomes necessary to put the left in opposition with a ‘hard’ right in power[8].
In the immediate, the ‘moderate’ language of the left in pushing through its attacks makes it possible to avoid the explosions of militancy that would be made more likely by a Thatcher style language of provocation. And this is indeed one of the most important objectives of the bourgeoisie. To the extent that, as we have shown, one of the essential conditions that will enable the working class to regain the ground it lost with the fall of the Eastern bloc and to become more conscious is the development of the struggle, the bourgeoisie today is trying to gain as much time as possible, even if it knows it cannot always play this card.
10. The massive presence of the left parties in the European governments is a very significant aspect of the current situation. This card is not being played by the different national bourgeoisies each in their own corner. Already during the 70s, when the card of the left in or moving towards government was played by the European bourgeoisie, it had the support of the Democratic president of the USA, Jimmy Carter. In the 80s, the card of the left in opposition and the ‘hard’ right found in Ronald Reagan (as well as Margaret Thatcher) its most eminent representative. At this time, the bourgeoisie elaborated its policies at the level of the entire Western bloc. Today the blocs have disappeared and imperialist tensions have grown sharper and sharper between the USA and a number of European states. However, faced with the crisis and the class struggle the main bourgeoisies of the world are still concerned to co-ordinate their policies. Thus on 21st September in New York there was a summit meeting of the ‘international centre left’, where Tony Blair celebrated the ‘radical centre’ and Romano Prodi the ‘world wide olive tree’. As for Bill Clinton, he expressed his joy at seeing the ‘third way’ spreading across the world[9]. However these enthusiastic expressions by the main leaders of the bourgeoisie cannot hide the gravity of the world situation which is what really lies behind the current strategy of the bourgeoisie.
It is probable that the bourgeoisie will carry on with this strategy for a while to come. In particular, it is vital that the parties of the right recover the strength and cohesion that will eventually allow them to take their place at the head of the state. What’s more, the fact that the coming to power of the left in a large number of countries (and particularly in Britain and Germany) took place in a climate of weak combativity in the working class (contrary to what happened in Britain in 74 for example), with an electoral programme very close to what they have actually carried out, means that the bourgeoisie has the intention of playing this card for a good while to come. In fact, one of the decisive elements which will determine when the right comes back will be the return to centre stage of massive proletarian struggles. In the meantime, while workers’ discontent only expresses itself in limited and above all isolated ways, it is the job of the ‘left wing of the left’ to channel the discontent. As we have already seen, the bourgeoisie cannot leave the social terrain totally unguarded. This is why we are seeing a certain rise in strength of the leftists (notably in France) and why, in certain countries, the left parties in government have tried to take their distance from the unions, who can thus speak a more ‘challenging’ language. However, the fact that in Italy a whole sector of Rifondazione Comunista has decided to carry on supporting the government, and that in France the CGT decided at its last congress to adopt a more ‘moderate’ policy, shows that the ruling class does not yet feel itself to be faced with any emergencies at this level.
[1] We should note that in Sweden, where, at the last elections, the Social-Democrats got their lowest score since 1928, the bourgeoisie still called on this party (with the aid of the Stalinist party) to run the affairs of state.
[2] This is an idea that the ICC had already developed on several occasions “It can be seen that the parties of the left are not the only representatives of the general tendency towards state capitalism, that in periods of crisis, this tendency expresses itself so forcefully that, whatever political tendency is in power, it cannot avoid taking measures of statification, the only difference between right and left being the way they try to silence the proletariat - the carrot or the stick” (Révolution Internationale no. 9, May-June 74). As we can see, the analysis that we developed at the 3rd Ccongress did not fall from the sky but developed from the framework we had already elaborated five years earlier.
[3] The possibility for a left party to play its role better by staying in opposition rather than entering the government was also not a new idea in the ICC. Thus, five years before this, we had written with regard to Spain: “The PCE is more and more being outflanked by the present struggles and, if it takes up a place in the government, it risks not being able to carry out its job of controlling the working class; in this case, its anti-working class effectiveness would remain much greater by staying in opposition” (Révolution Internationale 11, September 1974).
[4] It is important to underline what is mentioned above: decomposition affects the bourgeoisie very differently depending on whether it is from a rich or a poor country. In the countries of the old bourgeoisie, the political apparatus, even the right wing sectors which are the most vulnerable, is generally capable of remaining master of the situation and of avoiding the convulsions which affect the countries of the periphery or of the old Soviet empire.
[5] After this text was written, the war in Yugoslavia has provided a striking illustration of this idea. The NATO strikes were presented as being purely ‘humanitaarian’, aimed at protecting the Kosovo Albanians against the exactions of Milosevic. Every day, the televised spectacle of the tragedy of the Albanian refugees reinforced the revolting thesis of the ‘humanitarian’ war. In this bellicose ideological campaign, the left of the left as represented by the Greens played a particularly illustrious role, since it was the leader of the German Greens, Joshka Fischer, who led Germany’s war diplomacy in the name of ‘pacifist’ and ‘humanitarian’ ideals. Similarly, in France, while the Socialist party was hesitant on the question of the land war, it was the Greens who, in the name of a ‘humanitarian emergency’, called for such an intervention. The left is thus rediscovering the accents of its ancestors in the 1930s who called for ‘arms for Spain’ and who wanted to be in the front ranks of pro-war propaganda in the name of anti-fascism.
[6] This was the time when Mitterand (yes, President Mitterand of France and not some leftist) talked so fervantly in his electoral speeches about “breaking with capitalism”.
[7] As a general rule, “rest cures in opposition” are a better therapy for bourgeois forces than a long and wearing stay in power. However, this isn’t the case in all countries. Thus, the return of the French right into opposition following its electoral failure in the spring of 1997 was a new catastrophe for it. This sector of the bourgeois political apparatus only dived deeper into incoherence and division, something it would not have been able to do if it had stayed in power. But it is true that we are talking about the stupidest right wing in the world. In this sense, it is difficult to accept, as Le Prolétaire suggests in its article, that president Chirac deliberately provoked the anticipated elections in order to allow the Socialist party to take the reins of government. We know that the bourgeoisie is machiavellian but there are limits. And Chirac, who is himself ‘limited’, certainly didn’t want the defeat of his party which has now given him a very secondary role.
[8] Note after the ICC Congress: the European elections of June 1999, which in most countries (and particularly Germany and Britain) saw a very clear revival of the right, provide evidence that a rest cure in opposition has been benficial for this sector of the bourgeois political apparatus. The notable counter-example is obviously in France where the elections were a new catastrophe for the right, not so much at the level of the number of electors but at the level of its divisions, which reached grotesque proportions.
[9] We should note that the card of the left in government being played today in the most advanced countries (over and above local particularities) is having a certain echo in some of the peripheral countries. Thus, the recent election in Venezuela - with the support of the “Revolutionary Left” (MIR) and the Stalinists - of the former putchist colonel Chavez, to the detriment of the right (Copei) and of a particularly discredited Social-Democratic party (Accion Democratica), corresponds to the formula of the left in government. Similarly, in Mexico, we are seeing the rise of a left party, the PRD, led by Cardenas (the son of a former president), which has already taken over the leadership of the capital city from the PRI (which has been in power for eight decades) and which has recently benefited from the discrete support of Bill Clinton himself.
Introduction
The aim of this report[1] was above all to combat the prevailing bourgeois ideological campaigns about the ‘end of the class struggle’ and the disappearance of the working class’, and defend the view that, in spite of all its current difficulties, the proletariat has not lost its revolutionary potential. As we insisted in the opening sections, omitted here for lack of space, the bourgeoisie’s dismissal of this potential is founded on a purely immediatist conception which identifies the state of the class struggle at any given moment as the essential truth of the proletariat for all time. Against this shallow and empiricist approach, we counterpose the marxist method, which holds that “the proletariat can only exist world historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a world-historical existence” (German Ideology). The report on the class struggle was thus framed in the context of the historic movement of the class since its first epic attempts to overthrow capitalism in 1917-23, and then through the decades of counter-revolution that followed. We begin here as the report focuses more particularly on the evolution of the movement since the resurgence of class combats at the end of the 1960s. Some passages dealing with more recent and short-term developments have also been left out or compressed.
1968-89: the reawakening of the proletariat
…And here resides the whole significance of the May-June events in France in 1968: the emergence of a new generation of workers who had not been crushed and demoralised by the miseries and defeats of the previous decades, who had become accustomed to a relatively higher standard of living in the “boom” years after the war, and who were not prepared to bow down in front of the exigencies of a national economy once more sliding into crisis. The ten-million strong general strike in France, which was accompanied by a huge political ferment in which the notion of revolution, of changing the world, once again became a serious matter to discuss, marked the re-entry of the working class onto the scene of history, the end of the counter-revolutionary nightmare which had lain on its chest for so long. The importance of Italy’s “rampant May” and “hot autumn” the following year is that it provided firm proof of this interpretation, especially against all those who tried to prevent May 68 as little more than a student revolt. The explosion of struggle among the Italian proletariat, politically the most developed in the world, with its powerful anti-union dynamic, showed quite clearly that May 68 was no flash in the pan but the overture to a whole period of rising class struggles on an international scale. Subsequent massive movements (Argentina 69, Poland 70, Spain and Britain 72, etc) provided further confirmation.
Not all the existing revolutionary organisations were able to see this: the older ones, particularly in the Bordigist current, had grown myopic over the years and were unable to see the profound change in the global balance of forces between the classes; but those who were able both to encapsulate the dynamic of this new movement, and to reassimilate the “old” method of the Italian left which had made it such a pole of clarity in the depths of the counter-revolution, were able to declare the opening of a new historic course, markedly different from the one that had prevailed during the height of the counter-revolution, dominated by the course towards war The reopening of the world economic crisis would certainly lead to a sharpening of imperialist antagonisms which, if left to their own dynamic, would drag humanity towards a third, and almost certainly final, world war. But because the proletariat had begun to respond to the crisis on its own class terrain, it acted as a fundamental obstacle to this dynamic; not only that, by developing its struggles of resistance, it could open up its own dynamic towards the second world revolutionary onslaught on the capitalist system.
The massive and open nature of this first wave of struggles, coupled with the fact that that they had once again made it possible to talk about revolution, led many of the more impatient offspring of the movement to “take their desires for reality” and think that the world was already on the brink of a revolutionary crisis in the early 70s. This kind of immediatism was based on a failure to grasp:
- that the economic crisis which provided the impetus for the struggle was still very much in its initial phases; and, in contrast to the 1930s, this crisis was being met by a bourgeoisie armed with the lessons of experience and the instruments that enabled it to “manage” the descent into the abyss: state capitalism, the use of bloc-wide organs, the capacity to put off the worst effects of the crisis through the resort to credit and through spreading its impact out onto the peripheries of the system;
- that the political effects of the counter-revolution still had a considerable weight on the working class: the almost complete break in organic continuity with the political organisations of the past; the low level of political culture in the proletariat as a whole, with its ingrained distrust for “politics” resulting from its traumatic experience with Stalinism and social democracy.
These factors ensured that the period of proletarian struggle opened up in 68 could only be a long drawn out one. In contrast to the first revolutionary wave, which had arisen in response to a war and thus very rapidly hurtled onto the political level - too rapidly in many ways, as Luxemburg noted with regard to the November revolution in Germany - the revolutionary battles of the future could only be prepared by a whole series of defensive economic combats which - and this was in any case a fundamental feature of the class struggle in general - would be forced to go through a difficult and uneven pattern of advances and retreats.
The response of the French bourgeoisie to May 68 set the tone for the world bourgeoisie’s counter-attack: the electoral trick was used to disperse the class struggle (once the unions had successfully corralled it); the promise of a left government was dangled in front of the workers, conveying the dazzling illusion that it would sort out all the problems that had motivated the upsurge and institute a new reign of prosperity and justice, even a little bit of “workers’ control”. The 1970s could thus be characterised as “years of illusion” in the sense that the bourgeoisie, faced as it was with a relatively limited development of the economic crisis, was far better placed to sell these illusions to the working class. This counter-offensive of the bourgeoisie broke the impetus of the first international wave of struggles.
The inability of the bourgeoisie to actually realise any of its false promises meant that it was only a matter of time before the struggle resurfaced. The years 1978-80 witnessed a very concentrated burst of important class movements: Longwy-Denain in France, with its efforts to extend beyond the steel sector and its challenge to union authority; the Rotterdam dock strike, which saw the emergence of an autonomous strike committee; the massive movement in Iran which led to the fall of the regime of the Shah; in Britain, the “winter of discontent” which saw a simultaneous outbreak of struggle in numerous sectors, and the steel strike of 1980; and finally, Poland 1980, the culmination of this wave, and in many ways of the entire period of the resurgence so far.
At the end of this turbulent decade, the ICC had already announced that the 80s would be “years of truth”: by which we meant not, as is often misconstrued, that this would be the decade of the revolution, but a decade in which the illusions of the 70s would be worn away by the brutal acceleration of the crisis and of the resulting assault on working class living standards. A decade in which the bourgeoisie itself would speak the language of truth, of “blood sweat and tears”, of Thatcher’s “there is no alternative”; a change in language that also corresponded to a change in the ruling class’s political line up, with a hard-nosed right in power openly implementing the necessary attacks, and a falsely radicalised left in opposition, charged with derailing the workers’ response from the inside. And finally, the 80s would be years of truth because the historic alternative facing mankind - world war or world revolution - would not only become clearer, but would in some sense be decided by the events of the ensuing decade. And indeed the opening events of the decade showed this to the case: on the one hand, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan sharply highlighted the bourgeoisie’s “answer” to the crisis, and opened up a period of greatly sharpened tensions between the blocs, typified by Reagan’s warnings about the Evil Empire and the gigantic military budgets invested in such schemes as the “Star Wars” project. On the other hand, the proletarian response could be glimpsed very clearly through the mass strike in Poland.
The ICC always recognised the crucial importance of this movement, which provided the “answers” to all the questions posed by the preceding combats: “The struggle in Poland has provided answers to a whole series of questions which were posed to previous struggles without being answered in a clear way:
- the necessity for the extension of the struggle (Rotterdam);
- the necessity for self-organisation (steel strike in Britain);
- the attitude towards repression (Longwy/Denain).
On all these points the struggles in Poland represent a great step forward in the world-wide struggle of the proletariat, which is why these struggles are the most important for half a century” (Resolution on the Class struggle, 4th ICC Congress, 1980, published in International Review no.26)
In sum, the Polish movement showed how the proletariat could pose itself as a unified social force capable not only of resisting capital’s onslaught, but also of raising the perspective of workers’ power (a danger well appreciated by the bourgeoisie who temporarily shelved their imperialist rivalries to smother the movement, particularly through the construction of the Solidarnosc union).
Having answered the question: how to extend and organise the struggle - to unify it - the Polish mass strike posed another question: that of the generalisation of the mass strike across national frontiers, which would be a precondition for the development of a revolutionary situation. But as our resolution expressed it at the time, this could not be an immediate prospect: the question of generalisation had been posed in Poland, but it was up to the world proletariat, and particularly the proletariat of Western Europe, to answer it. In trying to keep a clear head about the significance of the event in Poland, we had to fight two different deviations: on the one hand, a serious underestimation of the importance of the struggle (for example, in our section in Britain, among the partisans of the union strike committees in the British steel strike, who considered the movement to be of lesser importance than what had taken place in Britain); and on the other hand, a dangerous immediatism which exaggerated the short-term revolutionary potential of this movement. In order to criticise these symmetrical errors, we were obliged to develop the critique of the theory of the weak link.
The central element of this critique is a recognition that the revolutionary breakthrough requires a concentrated and above all a politically experienced or “cultured” proletariat. The proletariat of the Eastern countries has a glorious revolutionary past but this has been all but erased by the horrors of Stalinism, which explains the huge gap between the level of self-organisation and extension of the movement in Poland, and its political consciousness (the domination of religion but above all of democratic and trade unionist ideology). The political level of the proletariat in Western Europe, which has had decades of experience of the delights of democracy, is considerably higher (a fact expressed among other things, by the fact that the majority of the world’s revolutionary organisations are concentrated in Western Europe). It is to Western Europe, first and foremost, that we must look for the maturation of the conditions for the next revolutionary movement of the working class.
All the same, the profound counter-revolution that descended on the working class in the 1920s has taken its toll of the entire proletariat. It could be said that the proletariat of today has one advantage over the revolutionary generation of 1917: today there are no large workers’ organisations who have only just gone over to the ruling class, and who are thus capable of commanding tremendous loyalty in a class that has not had time to assimilate the historic consequences of their betrayal. This was a major reason for the defeat of the German revolution at the hands of social democracy in 1918-19. But there is a down side to this. The systematic destruction of the proletariat’s revolutionary traditions, the proletariat’s acquired distrust for all political organisations, its growing amnesia about its own history (a factor that has accelerated considerably in the last decade or so) constitute a grave weakness for the working class of the entire globe.
At all events, the Western European proletariat was not ready to take up the challenge posed by the Polish mass strike. The second wave of struggles was blunted by the bourgeoisie’s new strategy of placing the left in opposition, and the Polish workers found themselves isolated at precisely the time they most needed the struggle to break out elsewhere. This isolation (consciously imposed by the world bourgeoisie) opened the gates to Jaruzelski’s tanks. The repression of 1981 in Poland marked the end of the second wave of struggles.
Historic events on this scale have long term consequences. The mass strike in Poland provided definitive proof that the class struggle is the only force that can compel the bourgeoisie to set aside its imperialist rivalries. In particular, it showed that the Russian bloc - historically condemned, by its weakened position, to be the “aggressor” in any war - was incapable of responding to its growing economic crisis with a policy of military expansion. Clearly the workers of the Eastern bloc countries (and of Russia itself) were totally unreliable as cannon fodder in any future war for the glory of “socialism”. Thus the mass strike in Poland was a potent factor in the eventual implosion of the Russian imperialist bloc.
Though unable to pose the question of generalisation, the working class of the West did not go into retreat for long. With the first series of public sector strikes in Belgium in 1983, it launched a very long “third wave” which, though not starting at the level of the mass strike, did contain an overall dynamic towards it.
In our resolution of 1980 cited above, we compared the situation of the class today to that of 1917. The conditions of world war had ensured that any class resistance would immediately have to confront the full force of the state and thus pose the question of revolution. At the same time, the conditions of war brought numerous disadvantages - the capacity of the bourgeoisie to sow divisions between the workers of “victor” and “vanquished” nations; to take the wind out of the revolution’s sails by ending the war, etc). A long drawn out and world wide economic crisis, on the other hand, not only tends to create uniform conditions for the whole class, but also gives the proletariat more to time to develop its forces, to develop its class consciousness through a whole series of partial struggles against capitalism’s attacks. The international wave of the 1980s definitely did have this characteristic; if none of the struggles had the spectacular features of a France 1968 or a Poland 1980, they nevertheless combined to bring important clarifications about the goals and aims of the struggle. For example: the very widespread appeals for solidarity across sectoral boundaries in Belgium in 1983 and 1986, or Denmark in 1985, showed concretely how the problem of extension could be solved; the efforts at taking control of the struggle (railway workers’ assemblies in France 1986, school-workers’ assemblies in Italy 1987) showed how to organise outside the unions. There were also fledgling attempts to draw lessons from defeats: in Britain for example, following the defeat of the militant but long drawn out and isolated miners’ and printers’ struggles of the mid 80s, struggles in Britain towards the end of the decade showed that workers were unwilling to be drawn into the same traps (the British Telecom workers who struck quickly and then returned to work before they could be ground down; the simultaneous struggles in various sectors in the summer of 1988). At the same time the appearance of workers’ struggle groups in various countries provided answers to the question how should the most militant workers act towards the struggle as a whole; and so on. All these apparently separate streams were running towards a point of convergence, which would have represented a qualitative deepening of the world-wide class struggle.
Nevertheless, at a certain point, the time factor began to play less and less in favour of the proletariat. Faced with the deepening crisis of a whole mode of production, a historic form of civilisation, the workers’ struggle, though slowly advancing, was not keeping pace with the overall acceleration of events, was not raising itself to the level required to affirm the proletariat as a positive revolutionary force, even if its combats continued to block the road to world war. Thus, for the vast majority of mankind, and of the proletariat itself, the reality of the third wave remained more or less concealed - by the blackouts of the bourgeoisie, certainly, but also by the slow, unspectacular nature of its progress. The third wave was even “hidden” from the majority of the proletarian political orgaisations, who tended to see only its most overt expressions, and only then as separate and unconnected phenomena.
This situation, in which, despite an ever-deepening crisis, neither major class was able to impose its solution, gave rise to the phenomenon of decomposition, which became more and more identifiable in the 1980, at various inter-related levels: social (growing atomisation, gangsterism, drug addiction, etc), ideological (development of irrational and fundamentalist ideologies), ecological, etc etc. Arising out of the impasse in the class struggle, decomposition then acted in its turn to sap the capacity of the proletariat to forge itself into a unified force; as the decade moved to a close, decomposition had moved more and more to centre stage, culminating in the gigantic events of 1989, which mark the definitive opening of a new phase in the long descent of obsolete capitalism, a phase in which the whole social edifice begins to crack, shudder, and fall apart.
1989-99: The class struggle faced with the decomposition of bourgeois society
The collapse of the Eastern bloc thus confronted a proletariat which, while still combative and slowly developing its class consciousness, had not yet reached a point where it was able to respond to such an enormous historic event on its own class terrain. The collapse of “communism” stopped the third wave dead in its tracks and (except for a very restricted politicised minority) had a profoundly negative impact on the key element of class consciousness - the ability to develop a perspective, an overall goal for the struggle, more vital than ever in an epoch in which there can be no Chinese wall between the defensive combat and the offensive, revolutionary struggles of the class. The collapse of the Eastern bloc assaulted the class in two ways:
- it enabled the bourgeoisie to develop a whole series of campaigns around the theme of “the end of communism”, the “end of the class struggle”, which deeply affected the capacity of the class to invest its struggles with the perspective of building a new society, to pose itself as an independent force hostile to capital, with its own interests to defend. The self-confidence of the class, which played absolutely no autonomous role in the actual events of 1989-91, was shaken to the core. Both its fighting spirit and its consciousness went into a very considerable retreat, certainly the deepest since the resurgence of 1968; the trade unions profited greatly from this loss of confidence by enjoying a major comeback as the “only thing the workers have” to defend themselves;
- at the same time the collapse of the Eastern bloc further unleashed all the forces of decomposition which already lay behind it, more and more subjecting the class to the putrid atmosphere of every man for himself, to the nefarious influences of gangsterism, fundamentalism, etc. The bourgeoisie, moreover, while equally, if not more affected by the decomposition of its system, was able to turn its manifestations against the class: a classic example being the Dutroux affair in Belgium, where the sordid practices of bourgeois cliques were used as an excuse to drown the working class in a vast democratic campaign for “clean government”. In fact, the use of the democratic mystification became more and more systematic, since it was both the logical “conclusion” to be drawn from the “failure of communism”, and is the ideal instrument for atomising the class still further and tying it hand and foot to the capitalist state. The wars provoked by decomposition - Gulf massacre of 1991, ex-Yugoslavia, etc - though allowing a minority to see the militarist nature of capitalism more clearly, also had the more general affect of increasing the proletariat’s feelings of powerlessness, of living in a cruel and irrational world where there is no solution but to bury your head in the sand.
The situation of the unemployed sharply highlights the problems facing the class here. In the late 70s and early 80s, the ICC identified the unemployed workers as potential source of radicalisation for the class movement as a whole, comparable to the role played by the soldiers in the first revolutionary wave. But under the weight of decomposition it has proved harder and harder for the unemployed to develop their own collective forms of struggle and organisation, being particularly vulnerable to its most destructive social effects (atomisation, deliquency, etc). This is true above all of the generation of young unemployed proletarians who have never experienced the collective discipline and solidarity of labour. But at the same time, this negative weight has not been lightened by capital’s tendency to “de-industrialise” those “traditional” sectors where workers have a long experience of class solidarity - mines, shipbuilding, steel, etc. Rather than being able to bring their collective traditions to the other unemployed workers, these proletarians have tended to become drowned in a more amorphous mass. The decimation of these sectors had also of course had its effects on the struggles of the employed as well, since it has helped to disperse important sources of class identity and experience.
The dangers of the new period for the working class and the future of its struggle cannot be underestimated. While the class struggle was definitely a barrier to war in the 70s and 80s, the day to day struggle does not halt or slow down the process of decomposition. To launch a world war, the bourgeoisie would have had to have inflicted a series of major defeats on the central battalions of the working class; today the proletariat faces the more long term, but in the end no less dangerous threat of a “death by a thousand cuts”, in which the working class is increasingly ground down by the whole process to the point where it has lost the ability to affirm itself as a class, while capitalism plunges from catastrophe to catastrophe (local wars, ecological breakdown, famine, disease, etc) until it reaches the point where the very premises of a communist society have been destroyed for generations - if we are not talking about the very destruction of humanity itself…
For us, however… despite the problems posed by decomposition, despite the reflux in the class struggle than we have been through over the past few years, the proletariat’s capacity to struggle, to respond to the decline of the capitalist system, has not vanished, and the course towards massive class confrontations remains open. To show this, it is necessary to re-examine the broad dynamic of the class struggle since the onset of the phase of decomposition.
The evolution of the struggle since 1989
As the ICC had predicted at the time, in the first two or three years after the fall of the Eastern bloc, the reflux was very marked, both at the level of consciousness and of combativeness. The working class was under the full force of the campaign about the death of communism.
By 1992, the effects of these campaigns were beginning, if not to wear off, then at least to diminish, and the first signs of a revival of class militancy could be discerned, in particular with the mobilisations by the Italian workers against the Amato government’s austerity measures in September of 1992. This was followed by miners’ demonstrations against pit closures in Britain in October. The end of 1993 saw further movements in Italy, Belgium, Spain, and in particular Germany, with strikes and demonstrations in a number of sectors, notably construction and automobiles. The ICC, in an editorial aptly entitled “The difficult resurgence of the class struggle” (International Review no.76), declared that “the calm that has reigned for nearly four years has been definitively broken”. While saluting this revival of fighting spirit in the class, the ICC also emphasised the difficulties it faced: the renewed strength of the trade unions; the capacity of the bourgeoisie to manoeuvre against the class, particularly by choosing the time and issues around which the bigger movements would break out; similarly, the capacity of the ruling class to make full use of the phenomena of decomposition to reinforce the atomisation of the class (at that moment, the use of scandals was highlighted in particular - for example the “Clean Hands” campaign in Italy).
In December 1995, the ICC, and the revolutionary milieu in general, faced an important test. In the wake of disputes on the railways and a highly provocative attack on the social wage of all workers, it appeared as if France was on the verge of a major class movement, with strikes and general assemblies in many sectors and workers raising slogans which stressed that the only way to win demands was to struggle all together. A number of revolutionary groups, sceptical of the class struggle in general, became wildly enthusiastic about this movement. The ICC, however, warned the workers that this “movement” was above all the product of a gigantic manoeuvre by the ruling class, aware of the mounting discontent within the class and seeking to strike a pre-emptive blow before this simmering anger could express itself in a real militancy, a real will to action. In particular, by presenting the trade unions as champions of the workers’ struggle, as the best defenders of working class methods of struggle (assemblies, massive delegations to other sectors, etc), the bourgeoisie was trying to boost the credibility of its trade union apparatus, in preparation for more important confrontations ahead. Though the ICC was widely criticised for its “conspiratorial” view of the struggle, this analysis was confirmed in the period that followed. The German and Belgian bourgeoisies launched virtual carbon copies of the French strikes, while in Britain (the Liverpool docks campaign) and the USA (the UPS strike), there were further attempts to strengthen the image of the trade unions.
The scale of these manoeuvres did not call into question the underlying reality of a revival of class struggle. In fact, it could be said that these manoeuvres, for all that the bourgeoisie was usually one step ahead of the workers, provoking movements in unfavourable conditions and often around false issues, were a measure of the danger posed by the working class.…
The most important confirmation of our analyses was provided by the huge strike in Denmark in the early summer of 1998. At first sight, this movement bore many similarities to the events of December 1995 in France, but as we said in the editorial of our International Review no.94, this was not the case: “despite the failure of the strike and the manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie, the significance of this movement is not the same as that of December 95 in France. In particular, whereas in France the return to work went along with a certain euphoria, a feeling of victory which left no room for putting unionism in doubt, the end of the Danish strike brought with it a feeling of defeat, and few illusions in the unions. This time, the bourgeoisie’s objective was not to launch a huge operation to restore credibility to the unions internationally, as in 1995, but to ‘wet the powder’, to anticipate the discontent and growing combativeness which is asserting itself little by little in Denmark, as it is in other European countries and elsewhere”.
The editorial also points out other important aspects of the strike: its sheer scale (a quarter of the workforce out for two weeks), which was a real testimony to the level of anger and militancy building up in the class, and the intensive use of rank and file unionism to mop up this militancy and the workers’ dissatisfaction with the official union machinery.
Above all, it was the international context which had changed: a growing atmosphere of combativeness which was expressing itself in numerous countries, and has continued to do so:
- in the USA over the summer of 1998, with the strike of nearly 10,000 workers at General Motors, of 70,000 Bell Atlantic telephone workers, of health care workers in New York, and the violent confrontations with the police during a massive demonstration of 40,000 construction workers in New York;
- in Britain, with the unofficial strikes by care workers in Scotland, of postal workers in London, and the two electricians’ strikes in London which showed a clear willingness to struggle despite the opposition of the union leadership;
- in Greece, in the summer, where struggles around the education sector led to running battles with the police;
- in Norway where a strike comparable in scale to the one in Denmark took place in the autumn
- in France, where there has been a whole series of struggles in different sectors, including education, health, post, and transport, most notably the strikes by bus drivers in Paris in the autumn, where workers reacted on a class terrain to one of the consequences of decomposition - the growing number of attacks on transport workers - by calling for more jobs rather than more policing;
- in Belgium where a slow but definite growth in combativeness, expressed in strikes in the car industry, in transport, in communications, has been countered with a huge campaign of the bourgeoisie around the theme of “fighting trade unionism”. This has taken an absolutely explicit form with the promotion of a “Movement for Union Renewal” which uses very radical, “unitary” language and whose leader, D’Orazio, has been given a halo of radicalism by being put on trial for “violence”;
- in the third world, with strikes in Korea, rumours of massive social discontent in China, and most recently, in Zimbabwe, where a general strike was called to channel workers’ anger not only with government austerity measures but also with the sacrifices demanded for the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo; this strike coincided with desertions and protests amongst the troops.
Other examples could be given, although it has been difficult to obtain information because - in contrast to the big, well-publicised manoeuvres of 95-96 - the bourgeoisie has responded to most of these movements with the black-out tactic, which is additional evidence that these movements express a real and mounting militancy which the bourgeoisie certainly does not want to encourage.
The responses of the bourgeoisie and the perspectives for the class struggle
Faced with this growth of combativeness, the bourgeoisie will not remain inactive, but has already launched or intensified a whole series of campaigns, both on the direct terrain of the struggle, and in the more general political sense, to undermine the militancy of the class and impede the development of its consciousness: a revival of “fighting” trade unionism (eg in Belgium, in Greece, in the British electricians’ strikes); the propaganda barrage about “democracy” (victory of left governments, Pinochet affair, etc); mystifications about the crisis (“critiques” of globalisation, calls for a “third way” which uses the state to rein in a rampant “market economy”); continuation of the slanders against October 1917, Bolshevism, and the communist left, and so on.
In addition to these campaigns, we will certainly see the ruling class making maximum use of all the manifestations of social decomposition to aggravate all the difficulties faced by the working class. There is thus a very long road to travel between the kind of movement we saw in Denmark and the development of massive class confrontations in the heart-lands of capital, confrontations that will once again offer the perspective of revolution to all the exploited and oppressed of the earth.
Nevertheless, the development of the struggle over the recent period has shown that, for all the difficulties it has faced in the last decade, the working class remains undefeated, and still retains a huge potential for fighting against this moribund system. Indeed, there are several important factors which can serve to radicalise the present movements of the class and take them towards higher level;
- the increasingly open development of the world economic crisis. Despite all the bourgeoisie’s attempts to minimise its significance and distort its causes, the crisis remains the “ally of the proletariat” in that it tends to lay bare the real limitations of the capitalist mode of production. Over the last year we have already seen a major deepening of the economic crisis, and yet we know that the worst of it still lies ahead; above all, the great capitalist centres are only just beginning to feel the effects of this latest plunge;
- the acceleration of the crisis also means the acceleration of the bourgeoisie’s attacks on the working class. But it also means that the bourgeoisie is less and less in a position to stagger these attacks, to dilute them, to aim them at particular sectors. More and more the entire working class will be under the cosh, and all aspects of its living standards will be under threat. Thus the necessity for massive attacks by the bourgeoisie will increasingly highlight the necessity for a massive response from the working class.
- at the same time, the bourgeoisie of the main capitalist centers will also be compelled to engage in more and more military adventures; society will be increasingly permeated with an atmosphere of war. We have noted that in certain circumstances (ie immediately after the collapse of the Eastern bloc), the development of militarism can increase the proletariat’s sense of powerlessness. At the same time we noted even at the time of the Gulf War that such events can also have a positive effect on class consciousness, particularly amongst a more politicised or more militant minority. And it remains the case that the bourgeoisie is unable to mobilise the proletariat en masse for its military adventures. One of the factors explaining the wide “opposition” among the ruling class to the latest raids on Iraq was the difficulty of selling this war policy to the population in general and the working class in particular. These difficulties are going to increase for the ruling class, as it will be forced to show its military teeth more and more overtly
***
The Communist Manifesto describes the class struggle as a “more or less veiled civil war”. The bourgeoisie, in trying to create the illusion of a social order in which class conflict is a thing of the past, is nevertheless forced to accelerate the very conditions that polarise society into two camps, divided by irreconcilable antagonisms. The more bourgeois society sinks into its death agony, the more the veils hiding this “civil war” will be cast aside. Faced with ever-increasing economic, social and military contradictions, the bourgeoisie is obliged to increase its totalitarian political grip over society, to outlaw any challenge to its order, to demand more and more sacrifices for less and less reward. As at the beginning of capitalism’s life, when the Manifesto was written, the workers’ struggle tends once again to become the struggle of an “outlaw” class, a class which has no stake in the existing system, and where all its rebellions and protests are effectively forbidden by law. Herein lies the importance of three fundamental aspects of the class struggle today:
- the struggle to build a balance of forces in the workers’ favour: this is the key to the working class being able to reassert its class identity against all the corporatist divisions imposed by bourgeois ideology in general and the trade unions in particular, and against the atomisation aggravated by capitalist decomposition. It is above all a practical key, because it arises as an immediate necessity in every struggle: the workers can only defend themselves by enlarging the front of their struggle as widely as possible;
- the struggle to break out of the union jail: it is the unions which everywhere enforce capitalist “legality” and corporatist divisions on the struggle, which seek to prevent the workers from constituting a balance of forces in their favour. The ability of the workers to confront the unions and develop their own forms of organisation will thus be a crucial yardstick for the real maturation of the struggle in the period ahead, no matter how uneven and difficult this process may be;
- the confrontation with the unions is at the same time the confrontation with the capitalist state; and the confrontation with the capitalist state - and its anticipation by the more advanced minority - is the nub of the politicisation of the class struggle. In many ways it is the bourgeoisie which takes the initiative for making “every class struggle a political struggle” (Manifesto), because it cannot, in the end, integrate the class struggle into its system. The “confrontational” approach has been, and will more and more be, inaugurated by the ruling class. But the working class will have to respond, not simply on the terrain of immediate self-defence, but above all by developing an overall perspective for its struggles, by locating each partial struggle in the wider context of the fight against the whole system. This consciousness will necessarily be limited to a minority for a long time to come, but it will be a growing minority, and this growth will be expressed by the increasing impact of the revolutionary political organisations on a wider stratum of radicalised workers. Hence the vital necessity for these organisations to follow very closely the real development of the class movement, and to be able to intervene within it as effectively as their means permit.
The bourgeoisie may try to sell us the lie that the class struggle is dead. But it is already preparing for the “unveiled civil war” that is inevitably contained in the future of a social order which has its back to the wall. The working class, and its revolutionary minorities, must also be prepared.
28/12/1998
[1] This report was written in December 1998, well before the outbreak of the war in ex-Yugoslavia.
In a previous article, we showed how the international isolation of the revolution in Russia - due to the revolution’s failure to spread to Western Europe - caused the degeneration of the Communist International and the rise of Russian state capitalism, which in turn hastened the workers’ defeats in Germany
After the signing of the secret treaty of Rapallo the international capitalist class realised that the Russian State was more and more making the Comintern its tool. Within Russia itself there was strong opposition to this trend, which led to a series of strikes in the Moscow area during the summer of 1923, and which found expression above all through an increasingly vociferous opposition within the Bolshevik party. In autumn 1923 Trotsky, after many hesitations, finally decided to join a more determined struggle against the state capitalist orientation. Even if the Comintern became more and more opportunistic after the policies of the United Front and the backing of national-bolshevism, and degenerated all the more quickly as a result of its strangulation by the Russian state, there remained within it a minority of internationalist comrades, who still defended the orientation of world revolution. After German capital dropped its promise of a common struggle between the “oppressed nation” and Russia, this internationalist minority felt disoriented because it was convinced that as a result the chances of “saving” the October revolution from outside and relaunching the world revolutionary wave were receding further and further. Out of fear of rising state capitalism in Russia, and in the hope of a revolutionary resurgence they were looking desperately looked for a last spark, the last possibility of a revolutionary onslaught.
Convinced that a revolutionary potential still remained, and that the moment of insurrection had not yet passed, Trotsky urged the Comintern to do everything they could to support a revolutionary development: “You can see comrades, this is finally the big onslaught, that we waited for so many years, and which will change the face of the world. These unfolding events will have a tremendous importance. German revolution means the collapse of the capitalist world”.
At the same time the situation in Poland and Bulgaria was accelerating. On 23rd September, communists in Bulgaria launched an attempted rising, supported by the Comintern, which failed. In October and November, a new wave of strikes erupted in Poland, involving some two thirds of the country’s industrial labour force. The Polish CP was itself surprised by the class’ combativity. These insurrectional risings were also smashed on 23rd November.
Within the framework of the political struggle going on within the Russian party, Stalin stood against supporting the movement in Germany, inasmuch as its success could have been a direct threat to the existing Russian state apparatus, within which he held some of the most important positions: “My point of view is that the German comrades have to be held back and we should not encourage them” (Letter from Stalin to Zinoviev, 5.8.23).
The Comintern launches an adventurist insurrection
Clinging to the last hope of a revival of the revolutionary wave, the Comintern’s Executive Committee (the ECCI) decided on its own, without any prior consultation with the KPD, to force the movement in Germany and to prepare for insurrection.
When the news of the end of Germany’s policy of “passive resistance” against France, and of the opening of Franco-German negotiations reached Moscow on 11th September, the ECCI pushed for an insurrection at the end of September in Bulgaria, to be followed shortly afterwards by one in Germany. The representatives of the KPD were summoned to Moscow, in order to prepare the insurrection together with the ECCI. These discussions, in which representatives of countries bordering Germany also took part, lasted for more than one month from the beginning of September to early October.
The Comintern was to take another disastrous turn. The catastrophic policy of the United Front with the counter-revolutionary Social-Democratic forces, whose destructive consequences could still be felt, and the flirt with national-bolshevism, were now to be followed by the desperate adventure of an attempted rising, without the conditions being ready for any possibility of success.
Unfavourable conditions
Although the working class in Germany remained the strongest and most concentrated sector of the international proletariat, the sector which – alongside the Russian proletariat – had been at the forefront of the revolutionary combat, in 1923 the international wave of struggles was already on the retreat, leaving it relatively isolated.
In this situation, the ECCI wrongly assessed the balance of forces and it failed to see how the tactical reorientation of the SPD-led government in August 1923 had managed to swing the tide in favour of the bourgeoisie. To assess a situation correctly, to understand the strategy of the enemy, an internationally organised and centralised party must be able to rely on the correct evaluation of the situation on the spot by its local section. But the KPD itself was blinded by its national-Bolshevik policy and did not understand the real dynamic of the movement.
The movement in Germany itself had laid bare a number of weaknesses:
- Up until August it had mostly been limited to economic demands. The working class had not yet come forward with its own political demands. Although the movement developed more strength coming out of the factories, moving towards the streets, although more and more workers were united in general assemblies, and some workers councils had been founded, it was still not possible to speak of a period of dual power. Several members of the ECCI thought that the formation of workers councils could only be a distraction from what they considered the primary task - military preparation of insurrection - and that the councils would even serve as a pretext for repression by the government. The new government had indeed forbidden the factory councils. A majority of the ECCI therefore proposed that the Soviets only be set up after the seizure of power.
- Instead of drawing the lessons of the disastrous policy essentially based on a “national alliance”, a policy in which the United Front was only the first step, the preparation of the insurrection was entirely based on the formation of a workers’ government composed of the SPD and the KPD.
- Last not least: the vital condition for a successful insurrection was missing: the KPD, undermined and weakened by its opportunist evolution, did not play a really decisive political role within the class.
Preparing the insurrection
Various questions were debated in the ECCI. Trotsky insisted forcefully on the necessity of fixing a date for the insurrection. He proposed 7th November, the day of the successful October rising in Russia 6 years earlier. By fixing a date, he wanted to pre-empt any attitude of “let’s wait and see”. Brandler, president of the KPD, refused to fix a precise date. The decision was taken at the end of September, for an insurrection sometime during the next 4-6 weeks, i.e. during the first days of November.
Since the German party leadership considered itself too inexperienced, Brandler suggested that Trotsky himself, who had played such an outstanding role during the organisation of the October insurrection in 1917, should come to Germany in order to help organise the rising.
This proposal came up against the resistance of the other ECCI members. As chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev demanded this leading role. This quarrel can only be understood against the background of the growing power struggle within Russia itself. In the end, it was decided that a collective body should be sent, composed of Radek, Guralski, Skoblevski and Tosmki. The ECCI also decided that help should be provided on three levels:
- military support was the most important. Officers of the Red Army, who had gained experience during the civil war in Russia, were sent secretly to Germany to help the Red Centuries and to build up a Red Army. They also offered their help in setting up an intelligence service in Germany whose task was to maintain ties with opposition officers in the Reichswehr. In addition, it was planned that very experienced party members should be waiting at the border in order to reach Germany as quickly as possible.
- material (food) help, in particular one million tons of wheat which were to be transported to Russia’s western border in order to send immediate food supplies to Germany, if the revolution was successful.
- on the level of propaganda, public meetings were organised on the theme “The German October is ahead of us”, and “How can we help the German revolution?”, where reports were given about the development in Germany. Funds were raised and money and other items collected. Women were called to donate their jewellery for the “German cause”.
While discussions were still going on in Moscow, Comintern emissaries in Germany had already pushed ahead with preparations for the insurrection. At the beginning of October many of the KPD’s leaders had already gone underground. But while in Moscow the leadership of the KPD and the ECCI were still debating the plans for insurrection, in Germany itself there does not seem to have been any deeper debate on this question or the immediate perspectives.
Since the beginning of 1923, and especially since the Leipzig party conference, the KPD had started to set up combat units of Red Centuries. Initially these armed troops were to protect demonstrations and workers’ assemblies. Any worker with combat experience could join, irrespective of his political convictions. Now, Red Centuries were busily training in military skills, practising alerts and undergoing special training in the handling of weapons.
In comparison to March 1921 much more attention was paid to preparations in this field and considerable means were invested in military preparation. By now, the KPD had built up a military intelligence service. There was the M-Apparat, the Z-Gruppe for infiltrating the Reichswehr and the T-Terrorgruppe in the police force. Secret arsenals were set up, military maps of all sorts collected.
The Russian military advisers had half a million rifles at their disposal. They hoped to be able to mobilise very quickly 50-60,000 troops. However, the Reichswehr and the right wing’s armed groups which supported it, along with the police, were some 50 times stronger than the military formations headed by the KPD.
Against the background of these preparations the Comintern worked out a plan based on a strategic military strike.
If, in certain regions, the KPD were to apply the tactic of the United Front by the joining the SPD to form a “workers government”, this could not help but light a powder keg. Saxony and Thuringia were chosen because the SPD already held government posts in these Länder, and because the Reichswehr disposed of fewer units there than in Berlin and the rest of the country.
The basic idea was that the formation of a SPD-KPD workers’ government would be seen as a provocation by the “fascist forces” and the Reichswehr. It was supposed the fascists would set off from Bavaria and Southern Germany for Saxony and Central Germany. At the same time a reaction of the Reichswehr was expected with a mobilisation of its troops in Prussia. This offensive of the bourgeoisie could be countered by the mobilisation of gigantic armed workers’ units. It was even planned that the Reichswehr and the fascists would be defeated by drawing them into a trap near Kassel. The Red Centuries were to be the starting point for the formation of a Red Army, whose Saxon units were to march on Berlin, while the Thuringians marched on Munich. Finally, it was planned that the government, set up on a national level, should comprise communists, left Social-Democrats, Trade unionists, and national-Bolshevik officers.
A decisive situation therefore would arise, as soon as the KPD joined the government in Saxony.
Could the insurrection be based on a governmental alliance with the SPD?
In August the SPD joined the national government in order to head off an insurrectional movement by making a lot of promises to calm the situation.
On 26th September the government announced the official end of “passive resistance” against the French forces of occupation, and promised the payment of wage arrears; on 27th September a strike erupted in the Ruhr area. On 28th September the KPD called for a general strike throughout the country and the arming of workers in order to establish a “workers’ and peasants’ government”. On 29th September, a state of emergency was declared, whereupon the KPD called upon the workers to stop their strikes on 1st October. As in the past, its aim was not so much to try progressively to strengthen the working class through the struggle in the factories, but to focus everything on the decisive moment, which was to occur later. Thus instead of increasing the pressure from the factories, as the Comintern pointed out critically later, in order to unmask the real face of the new SPD-led government, it tended on the contrary to block the initiative of the workers in the factories. Thus workers’ combativity, their determination to fight back against the attacks of the new government, were undermined not only by the promises of compromises by the new government, but also by the KPD itself. At its 5th Congress, the Comintern was to conclude: “After the Cuno strike the mistake was made of wanting to delay elementary movements until the decisive struggle. One of the biggest mistakes was that the instinctive rebellion of the masses was not transformed into a conscious revolutionary will to fight by focussing systematically on political goals... The party failed to pursue an energetic, living agitation for the task of setting up political councils. Transitional demands and partial struggles had to be linked as best as possible to the final goal of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The neglect of the factory council movement made it impossible for the factory councils to take over temporarily the role of the workers’ councils, so that during the decisive days there was no authoritative centre, around which the wavering masses of workers might have gathered, and which might have been opposed the influence of the SPD.
Since other unitary organs (action committees, control committees, struggle committees) were not used in a systematic manner, in order to prepare the struggle politically, the struggle was mainly seen as a party question and not as a unitary struggle of the proletariat”.
By preventing the working class from developing its defensive struggle, on the grounds that it should “wait for the day of insurrection”, the KPD in fact prevented it from gaining strength in the confrontation with capital, and from winning over those workers who remained hesitant thanks to the propaganda of the SPD. Thus the Comintern later made the following critique:
“Overestimating the technical preparations during the decisive weeks, focussing on the actions as a party struggle and waiting for the ‘decisive blow’ without a movement of partial struggles and mass movements preparing them, prevented assessment of the real balance of forces and made it impossible to set a real date... In reality it was only possible to notice that the party was in the process of winning the majority, without, however, really holding the leadership in the class.” (The lessons of the German events and the tactics of the United Front).
On 1st October members of a “black Reichswehr division” (a unit sympathising with the fascists) staged a revolt in Küstrin. But their revolt was smashed by Prussian police troops. Clearly, the democratic State did not yet need the fascists.
Thus on 9th October Brandler arrived from Moscow with the new orientation for an insurrection initiated by the KPD joining the government.
On 10th October the formation of a government with the SPD was decided for Saxony and Thuringia. 3 Communists (Brandler, Heckert, Böttcher) joined the Saxon government, while two (K.Korsch and A. Tenner) joined the government of Thuringia.
Whereas in January 1923 the party conference still emphasised: “participation of the KPD in a government of a Land, without posing conditions to the SPD, without a strong mass movement and without sufficient extra-parliamentary support – could only have a negative effect on the idea of a workers’ government and have a destructive effect within the party itself” (p. 255, Dokumente), only a few months later the KPD leadership was ready to follow the instructions of the Comintern and enter an SPD government practically without posing any conditions. The KPD was hoping to find a lever for insurrection, since it hoped to arm the working class once it was in government.
But whereas the KPD had expected a violent reaction from the fascists and the Reichswehr, in fact it was the SPD-Reichspresident, Ebert, who, on 14th October declared the Saxon and Thuringian governments be deposed. On the same day Ebert ordered the Reichswehr to occupy Saxony and Thuringia.
It was the “democratic” Social-Democrat president who sent the armed forces against the SPD governments of Saxony and Thuringia, despite their being “democratically elected‘. Once again it was the SPD, which through a clever political manoeuvre decided and took over the repression of workers on behalf of capital.
At the same time fascist troops left Bavaria for Thuringia.
The KPD counter-attacked by calling the workers to take up arms. In the night of 19/20th October the KPD distributed 150,000 leaflets demanding that party members get hold of all possible weapons. At the same time it called a general strike, which was to trigger the insurrection.
Chronicle of a predictable defeat
To avoid the party taking the decision to launch an insurrection, and to make sure that it was decided by a workers’ general assembly, Brandler tried to convince the workers’ conference in Chemnitz to vote for a strike. Some 450 delegates were present, of whom about 60 were official delegates of the KPD, 7 were from the SPD while 102 were representatives of the Trades Unions.
In order to “test the atmosphere”, Brandler suggested that the meeting vote for a general strike. Hearing this proposal, the Union representatives and the SPD delegates protested vigorously and threatened to leave the meeting. Nobody even mentioned insurrection. The SPD minister present in the meeting spoke up energetically against a general strike. The meeting thus submitted to the SPD and the union representatives. Even the other KPD delegates failed to utter a word. Thus the conference, which the KPD had counted on providing the spark for an insurrectional movement by deciding a general strike, decided to reject the latter.
Brandler and the KPD leadership nonetheless remained convinced that the delegates in the meeting would recover their ardour once they heard of the troops moving on Saxony and that they would surely call for a struggle because of the “predictable” overthrow of the Berlin government. After wrongly assessing the balance of forces in August, the KPD once again misjudged both the balance of forces and the mood of the workers.
In the Chemnitz meeting, which had been chosen by the KPD leadership as the key moment for insurrection, the majority of the delegates were influenced by the bourgeois SPD. Even in the factory committees and in the general assemblies the KPD had not yet won the majority. Unlike the Bolsheviks in 1917, the KPD had neither correctly assessed the situation, nor been able to exercise a decisive influence on the course of events. For the Bolsheviks the question of insurrection could only be put on the agenda once they had won the majority of the delegates in the councils and when the party could therefore play a leading and determining role.
The Chemnitz meeting thus broke up without having decided for a strike, still less an insurrection. Following this disastrous outcome, the KPD leadership voted unanimously - including the “left wing” members of the Zentrale and all the foreign comrades who were present in Germany at the time - to retreat.
When the party’s local sections, whose members were standing ready, “rifle in hand”, throughout the country were informed, their disappointment was enormous.
Although there exist different versions of what exactly happened in Hamburg, it seems that the message to cancel the insurrection failed to arrive in time. Convinced that the insurrection would be implemented as planned, the party members had already set out without waiting for confirmation from the KPD leadership. In the night of 22nd-23rd October the Communists and Red Centuries started to implement the insurrection plan in Hamburg. Several hundred Communists fought the police according to their previously established instructions. The fighting lasted for several days. But most of the workers remained passive, whereas a large number of SPD members reported as volunteers at the police stations in order to fight the insurgents.
When on 24th October instructions arrived to stop the fighting, arrived in Hamburg, an orderly retreat was no longer possible. A defeat was inevitable.
On 23rd October troops of the Reichswehr marched into Saxony. Once again, repression was directed against the KPD. Shortly afterwards, on 13th November, Thuringia was also occupied by the army. In the other parts of the country, there was no significant reaction from the workers. Even in Berlin, where the “left wing” dominated the KPD, only a few hundred workers could be mobilised for solidarity demonstrations. Many of its members left the party in disappointment.
The lessons of the defeat
The Comintern’s attempt to stage an adventurist insurrection, hoping to revive the world-wide revolutionary wave and turn around the situation in Russia, was a failure.
In 1923 the working class in Germany found itself more isolated than at the beginning of the revolutionary wave in 1918 and 1919. Moreover, the bourgeoisie was already more aware of the danger posed by the working class, and had closed ranks against it. It is obvious that the conditions were not ripe for a successful rising in Germany itself. The combativity which did exist within the working class had been countered by the bourgeoisie in August 1923. The pressure from the factories, the efforts to unite in general assemblies, had all ebbed significantly. “From our point of view, the criteria of our revolutionary influence were the Soviets... The Soviets offered the political framework for our conspiratorial activities; they were also organs of government after the actual seizure of power” (L. Trotsky, Can a counter-revolution or a revolution be determined for a fixed date?, 1924). In Germany in 1923 the working class had not succeeded in setting up workers’ councils, which are one of the principal conditions for the seizure of power.
The political conditions within the class as a whole were not yet ripe, but above all the KPD showed itself incapable of playing its political leading role. Its political orientation – the orientation of national-Bolshevism until August, its policy of a United Front and the defence of bourgeois democracy – contributed to the confusion in the class and was a factor in its political disarmament. A successful insurrection is only possible if the working class has a clear vision of its political goals and if it has a party within it, capable of clearly showing the direction to take, and of determining the right moment for action. Without a strong and solid party, no insurrection can be successful, since it is only the party which can have a real overview, correctly assess the balance of forces and draw the appropriate conclusions. Understanding the strategy of the enemy class, measuring the temperature within the class especially in its main battalions, throwing all its weight into the battle in decisive moments: it is these abilities, when they are put into effect, that make the party indispensable.
The Comintern had focussed all its attention on military preparations. The comrade in charge of the military preparations in the KPD, K. Retzlaw, relates in his biography that the Russian military advisers mostly discussed purely military strategy, without ever taking account of the broad masses of the working class.
Although the insurrection needs a precise military plan, it is not a mere military operation. The military preparations can only be tackled once the process of political maturation and mobilisation of the class has already substantially advanced. This process cannot be left to one side.
This means that the working class cannot neglect and reduce its pressure from the factories, as the KPD proposed in 1923.
Whereas the Bolsheviks knew how to apply the “art of insurrection” in October 1917, the insurrection plan of October 1923 was a pure farce, which led to tragedy.
The internationalists within the Comintern, not only made a wrong evaluation of the situation, they clutched at vain hopes. In September, Trotsky himself, clearly ill-informed as to the real situation, was the more convinced that the movement was still on the rise, and was amongst those who urged most strongly for insurrection.
Trotsky’s critique after the events is largely invalid. He reproached the KPD for having in 1921 attempted an adventurist and impatient putsch, and in 1923 of having fallen into the other extreme, of waiting and neglecting its own role: “The maturation of the revolutionary situation in Germany was understood too late... so that the most important measures of combat were tackled too late.
The Communist Party cannot – in relation to a growing revolutionary movement - take up a position of ‘wait and see’. This is the attitude of the Mensheviks: act as a hindrance to the revolution as long as it develops, use its successes, when there is a little victory do everything you can, to oppose it” (Trotsky, op.cit.).
On the one hand he correctly insisted on the subjective factor and that insurrection needs the clear, determined and energetic intervention of the party whatever the hesitations and wavering of the class. Moreover, Trotsky also understood perfectly the destructive role of the Stalinists: “the Stalinist leadership... hampered and put a brake on the workers when the situation demanded a bold revolutionary onslaught, proclaimed revolutionary situations, when their moment had already passed, formed alliances with the phrase mongers and the big talkers of the petty-bourgeoisie, and trod relentlessly behind the Social-Democracy under the facade of the United Front policy” (The tragedy of the German proletariat, May 1933).
But on the other hand Trotsky himself was dominated by vain hopes in the recovery of the revolutionary wave than guided by a correct analysis of the balance of forces.
The defeat of October 1923 was not only a physical defeat of the German workers. Above all, it led to a profound political disorientation throughout the working class.
The wave of revolutionary struggles, which peaked during 1918-1919, in effect came to an end in 1923. In Germany, the bourgeoisie succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the working class.
The defeats of the struggles in Germany, Bulgaria and Poland left the class in Russia even more isolated. Although there were still some important struggles to come, amongst them those of 1927 in China, the working class had begun a retreat, which was to lead to a long and terrible period of counter-revolution, which only ended with the revival of the class struggle in 1968.
The Comintern proved unable to draw the real lessons of events in Germany.
The inability of the Comintern and KPD to draw the real lessons
At its 5th World Congress in 1924, the Comintern (and the KPD within it) concentrated its criticisms mainly on the accusation that the KPD had wrongly applied tactics of the United Front and the workers’ government.
But this policy itself was absolutely not called into question.
The KPD even absolved the SPD for its responsibility in the workers’ defeat, asserting that: “One can say without any exaggeration: the present German Social-Democracy is in reality only a loose knit network of poorly linked organisations with very different political attitudes”. It persisted in its opportunist and damaging policy towards the traitor Social-Democracy: “the permanent communist pressure on the Zeigner-government [in Saxony] and the left-wing fraction which formed within the SPD will lead the SPD to fall apart. The point is that under the KPD’s leadership the pressure of the masses on the Social-Democratic government must be increased, sharpened and that the emerging left Social-Democratic leading group under the pressure of a big movement must be confronted with the alternative, either of entering into the struggle against the bourgeoisie with the communists or of unmasking themselves and thus destroying the last illusions of the Social-Democratic masses of workers” (9th Party Congress, April 1924).
Since the First World War, the SPD had been totally integrated into the bourgeois state. This party, whose hands were stained with the blood of workers slaughtered during the Great War, and from smashing the workers’ struggles in the revolutionary wave, was in no way in a process of falling apart. On the contrary, while still a part of the state apparatus it continued to hold great influence over the workers. Even Zinoviev had to concede on behalf of the Comintern that “a large number of workers still trust the ‘left’ Social-Democrats, ... who in reality only serve as a cover for the dirty, counter-revolutionary politics of the right wing of Social-Democracy”.
History has shown repeatedly that it is not possible for the working class to reconquer a party which had betrayed, and changed its class nature. The attempt to try and radicalise a part of the working class with the help of the SPD, was at the time already an expression of the opportunist degeneration of the Comintern. While Lenin in his famous April Theses of 1917 rejected the support of the Kerensky-government and demanded the biggest possible demarcation from it, the KPD in October 1923 rejected any idea of demarcation from the SPD government and in the end joined it without any conditions whatsoever. Instead of radicalising the combat, the KPD’s participation in the government tended to demobilise the workers. The class frontier between KPD and SPD was glossed over. The working class was increasingly disarmed politically and repression by the army became easier.
An insurrection can only develop if the working class succeeds in getting rid of its illusions in bourgeois democracy. And the revolution can only vanquish by crushing those political forces which defend that democracy, which is the main barrier to the revolution.
In 1923, not only did the KPD fail to combat bourgeois democracy, it even went as far as to call on the workers to mobilise in its defence.
Particularly as regards the SPD, this was in flagrant contradiction with the position defended by the Comintern at its founding Congress, when it denounced this party with the greatest possible clarity as the butcher of the 1919 German revolution.
Thereafter, the KPD was not content to remain in error, it asserted itself as a champion of opportunism. Amongst the parties of the Comintern, the KPD became the most faithful lackey of Stalinism. Not only did it become the driving force for the United Front and “workers’ government” tactic, it was also the first party to apply the policy of factory cells and “Bolshevisation” proposed by Stalin.
The defeat of the working class in Germany also strengthened the position of Stalinism. Both in Russia and internationally the bourgeoisie could henceforth intensify its offensive and so impose on the working class the worst counter-revolution it has ever been subjected to. After 1923, the Russian state was recognised by the other capitalist countries and by the League of Nations.
In 1917, the successful seizure of power in Russia had been the beginning of the first world-wide revolutionary wave. But capital had managed to prevent successful revolutions above all in key countries like Germany.
The lessons of the proletariat’s successful conquest of power in Russia in 1917 as well as those of the failure of the revolution in Germany, notably understanding how the bourgeoisie managed to prevent a victory of the revolution in Germany, and the consequences this had on the international dynamic of the struggles and the degeneration of the revolution in Russia flowing from this, all these elements are part of one and the same international revolutionary wave, one and the same historic experience of the class.
For the next revolutionary wave to be possible, and the next revolution a success, it is vital for the working class to recover this priceless experience. Dv
The working class is still living with the heavy consequences of the defeat of the Russian revolution. Primarily because its defeat was really the defeat of the world revolution, of the first attempt by the international proletariat to overthrow capitalism, and the result of this failure was that humanity has since been subjected to the most tragic century in its entire history. But also because of the manner of its defeat: the Stalinist counter-revolution that stifled it assumed its mantle, the mantle of Lenin and Bolshevism. This has permitted the world bourgeoisie to get away with the immeasurable lie that Stalinism is communism. This has been a factor of profound confusion and demoralisation within the working class for decades, but never more so than after the final collapse of the Stalinist regimes at the end of the 1980s.
For communist organisations today, the combat against this lie therefore remains a primordial task. It is one in which we can be very sure of our ground: “the statified regimes which arose in the USSR, Eastern Europe, China, Cuba etc and were called ‘socialist’ or ‘communist’ were just a particularly brutal form of the universal tendency towards state capitalism, itself a major characteristic of the period of decadence” (political positions of the ICC, reprinted in every publication). But this gift of clarity was by no means easily obtained. On the contrary, it took at least two decades of reflection, analysis and debate before the “Russian enigma” can be said to have been definitively solved. And prior to that, when the revolution in Russia was still alive, but showing signs of going off the tracks, revolutionaries were faced with the challenge of criticising its errors and warning of the dangers it faced, while at the same time defending it from its enemies - a task that in some ways was even more difficult.
In the next group of articles in this series, we will look at some of the key moments in this long and arduous struggle for clarity. While it is beyond our ambitions to write a complete history of this struggle, it is equally impossible to omit it from a series whose declared goal is to show how the proletarian movement has progressively developed its understanding of the goals and methods of the communist revolution; and it is perfectly evident that understanding why and how the Russian revolution went down to defeat is an indispensable guide to the path that the revolution of the future must follow.
Marxism is first and foremost a critical method, since it is the product of a class which can only emancipate itself through the ruthless criticism of all existing conditions. A revolutionary organisation that fails to criticise its errors, to learn from its mistakes, inevitably exposes itself to the conservative and reactionary influences of the dominant ideology. And this is all the more true at a time of revolution, which by its very nature has to break new ground, enter an unknown landscape with little more than a compass of general principles to find its way. The revolutionary party is all the more necessary after the victorious insurrection, because it has the strongest grasp of this compass, which is based on the historical experience of the class and the scientific approach of marxism. But if it renounces the critical nature of this approach, it will both lose sight of these historical lessons and be unable to draw the new ones that derive from the groundbreaking events of the revolutionary process. As we shall see, one of the consequences of the Bolshevik party identifying itself with the Soviet state was that it increasingly lost this capacity to criticise itself and the general course of the revolution. But as long as it remained a proletarian party it continuously generated minorities who did continue to carry out this task. The heroic combat of these Bolshevik minorities will be the main focus of the next few articles. But we will begin by examining the contribution of a revolutionary who was not in the Bolshevik party: Rosa Luxemburg, who, in 1918, in the most trying of conditions, wrote her essay The Russian Revolution, which provides us with the best possible method for approaching the errors of the revolution: the sharpest criticism based on unflinching solidarity in the face of the assaults of the ruling class.
The Russian Revolution was written in prison, just prior to the outbreak of the revolution in Germany. At this stage, with the imperialist war still raging, it was extraordinarily difficult to obtain any accurate information about what was happening in Russia - not only because of the material obstacles to communication resulting from the war (not to mention Luxemburg’s imprisonment), but above all because from the very start the bourgeoisie did everything it could to hide the truth of the Russian revolution behind a smokescreen of slander and bloodthirsty fabulation. The essay was not published in Luxemburg’s lifetime; Paul Levi, on behalf of the Spartacus League, had already visited Rosa in prison to persuade her that, given all the vicious campaigns against the Russian revolution, publishing articles criticising the Bolsheviks would add grist to these campaigns. Luxemburg agreed with him, and so sent the essay to Levi with a note saying “I am writing this only for you and if I can convince you, then the effort isn’t wasted” (Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Pathfinder Press, p 366). The text was not published until 1922 - and by then Levi’s motives for doing so were far from revolutionary (for Levi’s growing break with communism, see the article on the March Action in Germany in International Review no.93).
Nevertheless, the method of criticism contained in The Russian Revolution is entirely in the right spirit. From the very start, Luxemburg staunchly defends the October revolution against the Kautskyite/ Menshevik theory that because Russia was such a backward country, it should have stopped short at the “democratic” stage, showing that only the Bolsheviks were able to uncover the real alternative: bourgeois counter-revolution or proletarian dictatorship. And she simultaneously refutes the social democratic argument that formal majorities have to be obtained before revolutionary policies can be applied. Against this deadening parliamentary logic she praises the revolutionary audacity of the Bolshevik vanguard: “As bred-in-the bone disciples of parliamentary cretinism, these German Social-Democrats have sought to apply to revolutions the homemade wisdom of the parliamentary nursery: in order to carry out anything you must first have a majority. The same, they say, applies to revolution: first let’s become a ‘majority’. The true dialectic of revolution, however, stands this wisdom of parliamentary moles on its head: not through a majority to revolutionary tactics, but through revolutionary tactics to a majority - that is the way the road runs.
Only a party which knows how to lead, that is, to advance things, wins support in stormy times. The determination with which, at the decisive moment, Lenin and his comrades offered the only solution which could advance things (‘all power in the hands of the proletariat and peasantry’) transformed them overnight from a persecuted, slandered, oulawed minority whose leaders had to hide like Marat in cellars, into the absolute master of the situation” (ibid, p 374-5).
And, like the Bolsheviks, Luxemburg was perfectly well aware that this bold policy of insurrection in Russia could only have any meaning as a first step towards the world proletarian revolution. This is the whole significance of the famous concluding words of her text: “theirs is the immortal historical service of having marched at the head of the international proletariat with the conquest of political power and the practical placing of the problems of the realisation of socialism, and of having advanced mightily the settlement of the score between capital and labour in the entire world. In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia. And in this sense, the future everywhere belongs to ‘Bolshevism’” (ibid, p395).
And this solution was, in Luxemburg’s mind, entirely concrete: it demanded that the German proletariat above all must fulfil its responsibility and come to the aid of the proletarian bastion in Russia by making the revolution itself. This process was under way even as she wrote, although her assessment, in this very essay, of the relative political immaturity of the German working class was also an insight into the tragic fate of this attempt.
Luxemburg was therefore well placed to develop the necessary criticisms of what she saw as the principal errors of the Bolsheviks: she judged them not from the detached heights of an “observer”, but as a revolutionary comrade who recognised that these errors were first and foremost the product of the immense difficulties that isolation imposed on the Soviet power in Russia. Indeed, it is precisely these difficulties that required the real friends of the Russian revolution to approach it not with “uncritical apologetics” or a “revolutionary hurrah spirit”, but with “penetrating and thoughtful criticism”: “Dealing as we are with the very first experiment in proletarian dictatorship in world history (and one taking place at that under the harshest conceivable conditions, in the midst of the worldwide conflagration and chaos of the imperialist mass slaughter, caught in the coils of the most reactionary military power in Europe, and accompanied by the completest failure on the part of the international working class), it would be a crazy idea to think that every last thing done or left undone in an experiment with the dictatorship of the proletariat under such abnormal conditions represented the very pinnacle of perfection” (ibid p 368-9).
Luxemburg’s criticisms of the Bolsheviks were focussed on three main areas:
1. The Bolsheviks had won peasant support for the October revolution by inviting them to seize the land from the big landowners. Luxemburg recognised that this was “an excellent tactical move” But she went on: “Unfortunately it had two sides to it; and the reverse side consisted in the fact that the direct seizure of the land by the peasants has in general nothing at all in common with socialist economy…Not only is it not a socialist measure, it even cuts off the way to such measures; it piles up insurmountable obstacles to the socialist transformation of agrarian relations” (ibid, pp375-376). Luxemburg points out that a socialist economic policy can only start from the collectivisation of large landed property. Fully cognisant of the difficulties facing the Bolsheviks, she does not criticise them for failing to implement this straight away. But she does say that by actively encouraging the peasants to divide the land up into innumerable small plots, the Bolsheviks were piling up problems for later on, creating a new stratum of small property owners who would be naturally hostile to any attempt to socialise the economy. This was certainly confirmed by experience: though prepared to support the Bolsehviks against the old Czarist regime, the “independent” peasants later became an increasingly conservative weight on the proletarian power. Luxemburg was also very accurate in her warning that the division of the land would favour the richer peasants at the expense of the poorer. But it has also to be said that in itself the collectivisation of the land would be no guarantee of the march towards socialism, any more than the collectivisation of industry; only the success of the revolution on a world scale could have secured that - just as it could have overcome the difficulties posed by the parcellisation of the land in Russia.
2. Luxemburg’s most trenchant criticisms concern the question of “national self-determination”. While recognising that the Bolsheviks’ defence of the slogan of “the right of peoples to self-determination” was based on a legitimate concern to oppose all forms of national oppression and to win to the revolutionary cause the masses of those parts of the Czarist empire which had been under the yoke of Great Russian chauvinism, Luxemburg showed what this “right” meant in practise: the “new” national units which had opted for separation from the Russian Soviet republic systematically allied themselves with imperialism against the proletarian power: “While Lenin and his comrades clearly expected that, as champions of national freedom, even to the extent of ‘separation’, they would turn Finland, the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic countries, the Caucasus etc into so many faithful allies of the Russian revolution, we have witnessed the opposite spectacle. One after another, these ‘nations’ used the newly granted freedom to ally themselves with German imperialism against the Russian revolution as its mortal enemy, and, under German protection, to carry the banner of counter-revolution into Russia itself” (p 380). And she goes on to explain why it could not be otherwise, since in a capitalist class society, there is no such thing as the “nation” separate from the interests of the bourgeoisie, which would far rather subject itself to the domination of imperialism than make common cause with the revolutionary working class: “To be sure, in all these cases, it was really not the ‘people’ who engaged in these reactionary policies, but only the bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes, who - in sharpest opposition to their own proletarian masses - perverted the ‘national right of self-determination’ into an instrument of their counter-revolutionary class policies. But - and here we come to the very heart of the question - it is in this that the utopian, petty bourgeois character of this nationalistic slogan resides: that in the midst of the crude realities of class society and when class antagonisms are sharpened to the uttermost, it is simply converted into a means of bourgeois class rule. The Bolsheviks were to be taught to their own great hurt, and that of the revolution, that under the rule of capitalism there is no self-determination of peoples, that in a class society each class of the nation strives to ‘determine itself’ in a different fashion, and that, for the bourgeois classes, the standpoint of national freedom is fully subordinated to that of class rule. The Finnish bourgeoisie like the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, were unanimous in preferring the violent rule of Germany to national freedom, if the latter should be bound up with Bolshevism” (ibid).
Furthermore, the Bolsheviks’ confusion on this point (although it must be remembered that there was a minority in the Bolshevik party - in particular Piatakov - who fully agreed with Luxemburg’s point of view on this question) was having a negative effect internationally since ‘national self-determination’ was also the rallying cry of Woodrow Wilson and of all the big imperialist sharks who were seeking to use it to dislodge their imperialist rivals from the regions that they themselves coveted. And the whole history of the twentieth century has confirmed how easily the “rights of nations” has become no more than a cloak for the imperialist desires of the great powers and of their lesser emulators.
Luxemburg did not dismiss the problem of national sensitivities; she insisted that there could be no question of a proletarian regime ‘integrating’ outlying countries through military force alone. But it was equally true that any concession made to the nationalist illusions of the masses in those regions could only tie them more closely to their exploiters. The proletariat, once it has assumed power in any region, can only win those masses to its cause through “the most compact union of revolutionary forces”, through a “genuine international class policy” aimed at splitting the workers from their own bourgeoisie.
3. On “democracy and dictatorship” there are profoundly contradictory elements in Luxemburg’s position. On the one hand there is no doubt that she falls into a real confusion between democracy in general and workers’ democracy in particular - the democratic forms used in the framework and in the interest of the proletarian dictatorship. This is shown by her resolute defence of the Constituent Assembly, which the Soviet power dissolved in 1918, in perfect consistency with the fact that the very appearance of the latter had made the old bourgeois democratic forms entirely obsolete. And yet somehow Luxemburg sees this act as a threat to the life of the revolution. In a similar vein she is reluctant to accept that, in order to exclude the ruling class from political life, “suffrage” in a Sovietregime should be based primarily on the workplace collective rather than on the individual citizen’s domicile (albeit her concern was also to ensure that the unemployed would not be excluded by this criterion, which was certainly not its intention). These inter-classist, democratic prejudices are in striking contrast to her argument that “national self-determination” can never express anything else than the “self-determination” of the bourgeoisie. The argument is identical as regards parliamentary institutions, which do not, whatever the appearance, express the interests of the “people” but of the capitalist ruling class. Luxemburg’s views in this text are also totally at odds with the programme of the Spartacus League formulated soon after, since this document demands the dissolution of all municipal and national parliamentary type bodies and their replacement by councils of workers’ and soldiers’ delegates: we can only presume that Luxemburg’s position on the Constituent Assembly - which also became the rallying cry of the counter-revolution in Germany - had evolved very rapidly in the heat of the revolutionary process.
But this does not mean that there is no validity to any of Luxemburg’s criticisms of the Bolsheviks’ approach to the question of workers’ democracy. She was fully aware that in the extremely difficult situation facing the beleaguered Soviet power, there was a real danger that the political life of the working class would be subordinated to the necessity to bar the road to the counter-revolution. Given this situation, Luxemburg was right to be sensitive to any signs that the norms of workers’ democracy were being violated. Her defence of the necessity for the widest possible debate within the proletarian camp, and against the forcible suppression of any proletarian political tendencies, was justified in light of the fact that the Bolsheviks, having assumed state power, were drifting towards a party monopoly that was to damage themselves as much as the life of the proletariat in general, particularly with the introduction of the Red Terror. Luxemburg did not at all oppose the notion of the proletarian dictatorship. But as she insisted “this dictatorship consists in the manner of applying democracy, not in its elimination, in energetic, resolute attacks upon the well-entrenched rights and economic relationships of bourgeois society, without which a socialist transformation cannot be accomplished. But this dictatorship must be the work of the class and not of a little leading minority in the name of the class - that is, must proceed step by step out of the active participation of the masses; it must be under their direct influence, subjected to the control of complete public activity; it must arise out of the growing political training of the mass of the people (ibid, p 394).
Luxemburg was particularly prescient in warning of the danger of the political life of the Soviets being emptied out more and more as power became concentrated in the hands of the party: over the next three years, under the pressures of the civil war, this was to become one of the central dramas of the revolution. But whether Luxemburg was right or wrong in her specific criticisms, what inspires us above all is her approach to the problem, an approach that should have served as a guide to all subsequent analyses of the revolution and its demise: intransigent defence of its proletarian character, and thus criticism of its weaknesses and its eventual failure as a problem of the proletariat and for the proletariat. Unfortunately, all too often the name of Luxemburg has been used to pour scorn on the very memory of October - not only by those councilist currents who have claimed descent from the German left but who have lost sight of the real traditions of the working class; but also, and perhaps more importantly, by those bourgeois forces who in the name of “democratic socialism” use Luxemburg as a hammer against Lenin and Bolshevism. This has been the speciality of those who descend politically from the very forces who murdered Luxemburg in 1919 to save the skin of the bourgeoisie - the social democrats, particularly their left wing factions. For our part, we have every intention, in analysing the mistakes of the Bolsheviks and the degeneration of the Russian revolution, of remaining faithful to the real content of her method.
Almost simultaneously with Luxemburg’s criticisms, the first important disagreements arose within the Bolshevik party about the direction of the revolution. This debate - provoked in the first instance by the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but subsequently moving on to the forms and methods of proletarian power - was carried out in a completely open manner within the party. It certainly gave rise to sharp polemics between its protagonists, but there was no question of minority positions being silenced. Indeed, for a while, the “minority” position on the signing of the treaty looked as if it might become a majority. At this stage, the groupings who defended different positions took the form of tendencies rather than clearly defined fractions resisting a course of degeneration. In other words, they had come together on a temporary basis to express particular orientations within a party that, despite the implications of its entanglement with the state, was still very much the living, breathing vanguard organism of the class.
Nevertheless, there are those who have argued that the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty was already the beginning of the end, if not the end, for the Bolsheviks as a proletarian party, already marking their effective abandonment of the world revolution (see the book by Guy Sabatier, Brest-Litovsk, coup d’arrêt à la révolution, Spartacus editions, Paris) And to some extent the tendency within the party that most vociferously opposed the treaty - the Left Communist group around Bukharin, Piatakov, Ossinski and others - feared that a fundamental principle was being breached when the representatives of the Soviet power signed a highly disadvantageous “peace” agreement with a rapacious German imperialism rather than committing itself to a “revolutionary war” against it. Their views were not dissimilar to those of Rosa Luxemburg, although her main concern was that the signing of the treaty would retard the outbreak of the revolution in Germany and the West.
In any case, a simple comparison between the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918 and the Rapallo treaty four years later shows the essential difference between a principled retreat in the face of overwhelming odds, and a real marketing of principles which paved the way towards Soviet Russia being integrated into the world concert of capitalist nations. In the first case, the treaty was debated openly in the party and the Soviets; there was no attempt to hide the draconian terms imposed by Germany; and the whole framework of the debate was determined by the interests of the world revolution, rather than the “national” interests of Russia. Rapallo, by contrast, was signed in secret, and its terms even involved the Soviet state supplying the German army with the very weapons that would be used to defend capitalist order against the German workers in 1923.
The essential debate around Brest-Litovsk was a strategic one: did the Soviet power, master of a country that had already been exhausted by four years of imperialist slaughter, have the economic and military means at its disposal to launch an immediate “revolutionary war” against Germany, even the kind of partisan warfare that Bukharin and other Left Communists seemed to favour? And secondly, would the signing of the treaty seriously delay the outbreak of the revolution in Germany, whether through the “capitulationist” message it sent out to the world proletariat, or more concretely through providing German imperialism with a life line in the East? On both counts, it seems to us, as it did to Bilan in the 1930s, that Lenin was correct to argue that what the Soviet power needed above all was a breathing space in which to regroup its forces - not to develop as a “national” power but so that it could make a better contribution to the world revolution than by going down in heroic defeat (as it did, for example, by helping to found the Third International in 1919). And it could even be said that this retreat, far from delaying the outbreak of the revolution in Germany, helped to hasten it: freed from the war on the Eastern front, German imperialism then attempted to launch a new offensive in the west, and this in turn provoked the mutinies in the navy and army that sparked off the German revolution in November 1918.
If there is a principle to be drawn from the signing of the treaty, it is the one drawn by Bilan: “The positions of the fraction led by Bukharin, according to which the function of the proletarian state was to liberate the workers of other countries through a ‘revolutionary war’, are in contradiction with the very nature of the proletarian revolution and the historic role of the proletariat”. In contrast to the bourgeois revolution, which could indeed be exported by military means, the proletarian revolution depends on the conscious struggle of the proletariat of each country against its own bourgeoisie: “The victory of a proletarian state against a capitalist state (in the territorial sense of the word) in no way means a victory of the world revolution” (‘Parti-Etat-Internationale: L’Etat prolétarien’, Bilan no.18, April-May 1935). This position had already been confirmed in 1920, with the debacle around the attempt to export revolution to Poland on the bayonets of the Red Army.
The position of the Left Communists on Brest-Litovsk - especially in the “death rather than dishonour” way that Bukharin defended it - was not therefore their strong point, even if it is the position that they are best remembered for. With the conclusion of “peace” with Germany, and the suppression of the first wave of bourgeois resistance and sabotage that arose in the immediate aftermath of the October insurrection, the focus of the debate shifted. The breathing space having been won, the priority was to determine how the Soviet power should set about consolidating itself until the world revolution had moved on to its next stage.
In April 918, Lenin made a speech to the Bolshevik central committee that was subsequently published as The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power. In this text he argues that the primary task facing the revolution - assuming, as he and many others did, that the worst moments of the civil war were behind rather than in front of the new power - was the task of “administration”, of rebuilding a shattered economy, of imposing labour discipline and raising productivity, of ensuring strict accounting and control in the process of production and distribution, of eliminating corruption and waste, and, perhaps above all, of struggling against the ubiquitous petty bourgeois mentality that he saw as the ransom paid to the huge weight of the peasantry and of semi-mediaeval survivals.
The most controversial parts of this text concern the methods that Lenin advocated to achieve these aims. He did not hesitate to make use of what he himself termed bourgeois methods, including: the use of bourgeois technical specialists (which he described as a “step backwards” from the principles of the Commune, since in order to “win them over” to the Soviet power they had to be bribed with wages much higher than that of the average worker); the recourse to piecework; the adoption of the “Taylor system” which Lenin saw as “a combination of the refined brutality of bourgeois exploitation and a number of the greatest scientific achievements in the field of analysing mechanical motions during work, the elimination of superfluous and awkward motions, the elaboration of correct methods of work, the introduction of the best system of accounting and control, etc” (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 27, p 259). Most controversial of all, Lenin, reacted against a certain degree of “anarchy” at the level of the workplace especially where the factory committee movement was strong and was disputing control of the plants with the old or the new management. He therefore called for “One man management”, insisting that “unquestioning subordination to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of processes organised on the pattern of large-scale machine industry” (p269). This latter passage is often quoted by anarchists and councilists who are keen to show that Lenin was the precursor of Stalin. But it must be read in the proper context: Lenin’s advocacy of “individual dictatorship” in management did not at all preclude the extensive development of democratic discussions and decision-making about overall policy at mass meetings; and the stronger the class consciousness of the workers, the more this subordination to the “manager” during the actual work process would be “something like the mild leadership of a conductor of an orchestra”. (ibid)
Nevertheless, the whole orientation of this speech alarmed the Left Communists, particularly as it was accompanied by a push to curb the power of the factory committees at shop-floor level and to incorporate them into the more pliant trade union apparatus.
The Left Communist group, which was extremely influential both in the Petrograd and Moscow regions, had established its own journal, Kommunist. Here it published two principal polemics with the approach contained in Lenin’s speech: the group’s “Theses on the Current Situation” (published by Critique, Glasgow, as a pamphlet in 1977), and Ossinski’s article “On the construction of socialism”.
The first document shows that this group was by no means animated by a spirit of “petty bourgeois childishness” as Lenin was to claim. The approach is profoundly serious, beginning by trying to analyse the balance of forces between the classes in the aftermath of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Certainly, this reveals the weak side of the group’s analyses: it both clings to the view that the treaty has dealt a serious blow to the prospects of revolution, while at the same time predicting that “during spring and summer the collapse of the imperialist system must begin” - a piece of fortune-telling that Lenin rightly lambasts in his reply to this document. This contradictory stance is a direct product of the false assumptions the Lefts had made during the debate over the treaty.
The strong side of the document is its critique of the use of bourgeois methods by the new Soviet power. Here it must be said that the text is not rigidly doctrinaire: it accepts that bourgeois technical specialists will have to be used by the proletarian dictatorship, and does not rule out the possibility of establishing trade relations with capitalist powers, although it does warn against the danger of “diplomatic manoeuvring on the part of the Russian state among the imperialist powers”, including political and military alliances. And it also warned that such policies on the international level would inevitably be accompanied by concessions to both international and “native” capital within Russia itself. These dangers were to become particularly concrete with the retreat of the revolutionary wave after 1921. But the most immediately relevant aspect of the Lefts’ criticisms concerned the danger of abandoning the principles of the commune state in the Soviets, in the army, and in the factories:
“A policy of directing enterprises on the principle of wide participation of capitalists and semi-bureaucratic centralisation naturally goes with a labour policy directed at the establishment among the workers of discipline disguised as ‘self-discipline’, the introduction of labour responsibility for the workers (a project of this nature has been put forward by the right Bolsheviks (piecework, lengthening of the working day, etc).
The form of state control of enterprises must develop in the direction of bureaucratic centralisation, of rule by various commissars, of deprivation of independence from local Soviets and of rejection in practise of the type of ‘Commune state’ ruled from below…
In the field of military policy there must appear, and can in fact be noted already, a deviation towards the re-establishment of nationwide (including the bourgeoisie) military service…With the setting up of army cadres for whose training and leadership officers are necessary, the task of creating a proletarian officer corps through broad and planned organisation of appropriate schools and courses is being lost from sight. In this way in practise the old officer corps and command structures of the Czarist generals is being reconstituted” (‘Theses…’).
Here the Left Communists were discerning worrying trends that were beginning to appear within the new Soviet regime, and which were to be rapidly accelerated in the ensuing period of War Communism. They were particularly concerned that if the party identified itself with these trends, it would eventually be forced to confront the workers as a hostile force: “The introduction of labour discipline in connection with the restoration of capitalist leadership in production cannot essentially increase the productivity of labour, but it will lower the class autonomy, activity and degree of organisation of the proletariat. It threatens the enslavement of the working class, and arouses the dissatisfaction both of the backward sections and of the vanguard of the proletariat. To carry this system through with the sharp class hatred prevailing in the working class against the ‘capitalists and saboteurs’, the communist party would have to draw its support from the petty bourgeoisie against the workers and therefore put an end to itself as the party of the proletariat” (ibid).
The final outcome of such an involution, for the Lefts, was the degeneration of the proletarian power into a system of state capitalism:
“In place of a transition from partial nationalisation to general socialisation of big industry, agreements with ‘captains of industry’ must lead to the formation of large trusts led by them and embracing the basic branches of industry, which may with external help take the form of state enterprises. Such a system of organisation of production gives a base for evolution in the direction of state capitalism and is a transitional stage towards it” (ibid).
At the end of the Theses, the Left Communists put forward their own proposals for keeping the revolution on the right path: continuation of the offensive against the bourgeois political counter-revolution and capitalist property; strict control over bourgeois industrial and military specialists; support for the struggle of the poor peasants in the countryside; and, most importantly, for the workers, “Not the introduction of piece-work and the lengthening of the working day, which in circumstances of rising unemployment are senseless, but the introduction by local economic councils and trade unions of standards of manufacture and shortening of the working day with an increase in the number of shifts and broad organisation of productive social labour.
The granting of broad independence to local Soviets and not the checking of their activities by commissars sent by the central power. Soviet power and the party of the proletariat must seek support in the class autonomy of the broad masses, to the development of which all efforts must be directed”. Finally, the Lefts defined their own role: “They define their attitude to the Soviet power as a position of universal support for that power in the event of necessity - by means of participation in it…This participation is possible only on the basis of a definite political programme, which would prevent the deviation of the Soviet power and the party majority onto the fateful path of petty bourgeois politics. In the event of such a deviation, the left wing of the party will have to take the position of an active and responsible proletarian opposition”.
A number of important theoretical weaknesses can be discerned in these passages. One is a tendency to confuse the total nationalisation of the economy by the Soviet state as being identical with a real process of socialisation - ie as already part of the construction of a socialist society. In his reply to the Theses, ‘Left wing childishness and the petty bourgeois mentality’ (May 1918, CW, vol 27), Lenin pounces on this confusion. To the statement in the Theses that “the systematic use of the remaining means of production is conceivable only if a most determined policy of socialisation is pursued”, Lenin replies: “One may or may not be determined on the question of nationalisation or confiscation, but the whole point is that even the greatest possible ‘determination’ in the world is not enough to pass from nationalisation and confiscation to socialisation. The misfortune of our ‘Lefts’ is that by their naïve, childish combination of words they reveal their utter failure to understand the crux of the question, the crux of the ‘present situation’…Yesterday, the main task of the moment was, as determinedly as possible, to nationalise, confiscate, beat down and crush the bourgeoisie, and put down sabotage. Today, only a blind man could fail to see that we have nationalised, confiscated, beaten down and put down more than we have had time to count. The difference between socialisation and simple confiscation is that confiscation can be carried out by ‘determination’ alone, without the ability to calculate and distribute properly, whereas socialisation cannot be brought about without this ability” (p333-4). Here Lenin is able to show that there is a difference in quality between mere expropriation of the bourgeoisie (especially when this takes the form of statification) and the real construction of new social relations. The Lefts’ weakness on this point was to lead many of them into confusing the almost complete statification of property and even distribution that took place during the War Communism period with authentic communism: as we have shown, Bukharin in particular developed this confusion into an elaborate theory in his Economics of the Transformation Period (see International Review no.96). Lenin, by contrast, is much more realistic about the possibility of the besieged, depleted Russian Soviet power taking real steps towards socialism in the absence of the world revolution.
This weakness also prevents the Lefts from seeing with full clarity where the main danger of counter-revolution comes from. For them, “state capitalism” is identified as a central danger, it is true, but this is seen rather as an expression of an even greater danger: that the party will end up deviating towards “petty bourgeois politics”, that it will line up with the interests of the petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat. This was a partial reflection of reality: the post-insurrectionary status quo was indeed one in which the victorious proletariat found itself confronting not only the fury of the old ruling classes, but also the dead weight of the vast peasant masses who had their own reasons for resisting the further advance of the revolutionary process. But the weight of these social strata made itself felt on the proletariat above all through the organism of the state, which in the interests of preserving the social status quo was tending to become an autonomous power in its own right. Like most of the revolutionaries of their day, the Lefts identified “state capitalism” with a system of state control that ran the economy in the interests either of the big bourgeoisie, or the petty bourgeoisie; they couldn’t yet envisage the rise of a state capitalism which had effectively crushed these classes and still operated on an entirely capitalist basis.
As we have seen, Lenin’s reply to the Lefts, ‘Left wing Childishness’, hits the group on its weak points: their confusions about the implications of Brest-Litovsk, their tendency to confound nationalisation with socialisation. But Lenin in turn fell into a profound error when he began to laud state capitalism as a necessary step forward for backward Russia, indeed as the foundation stone of socialism. Lenin had already outlined this view in a speech delivered to the executive committee of the Soviets at the end of April. Here he took issue with the best intuition of the Left Communists - the danger of an evolution towards state capitalism - and went off in entirely the wrong direction:
“When I read these references to such enemies in the newspaper of the Left Communists, I ask: what has happened to these people that fragments of book-learning can make them forget reality? Reality tells us that state capitalism would be a step forward. If in a small space of time we could achieve state capitalism in Russia, that would be a victory, How is it that they cannot see that it is the petty proprietor, small capital, that is our enemy? How can they regard state capitalism as the chief enemy? They ought not to forget that in the transition from capitalism to socialism our chief enemy is the petty bourgeoisie, its habits and customs, its economic position…
What is state capitalism under Soviet power? To achieve state capitalism at the present time means putting into effect the accounting and control that the capitalist classes carried out. We see a sample of state capitalism in Germany. We know that Germany has proved superior to us. But if you reflect even slightly on what it would mean if the foundations of such state capitalism was established in Russia, Soviet Russia, everyone who is not out of his senses and has not stuffed his head with fragments of book-learning, would have to say that state capitalism would be our salvation.
I said that state capitalism would be our salvation; if we had it in Russia, the transition to full socialism would be easy, would be within our grasp, because state capitalism is something centralised, calculated, controlled and socialised, and that is exactly what we lack; we are threatened by the element of petty bourgeois slovenliness, which more than anything else has been developed by the whole history of Russia and her economy… ” (Works, 27, p293-4).
There is in this discourse a strong element of revolutionary honesty, of warning against any utopian schemes for rapidly building socialism in a Russia which has hardly dragged itself out of the Middle Ages, and which does not yet enjoy the direct assistance of the world proletariat. But there is also a serious mistake, which has been verified by the whole history of the 20th century. State capitalism is not an organic step towards socialism. In fact it represents capitalism’s last form of defence against the collapse of its system and the emergence of communism. The communist revolution is the dialectical negation of state capitalism. Lenin’s arguments, on the other hand, betray the vestiges of the old social democratic idea that capitalism was evolving peacefully towards socialism. Certainly Lenin rejected the idea that the transition to socialism could begin without the political destruction of the capitalist state, but what he forgets is that the new society can only emerge through a constant and conscious struggle by the proletariat to supplant the blind laws of capital and create new social relations founded on production for use. The “centralisation” of the capitalist economic structure by the state - even a Soviet state - does not do away with the laws of capital, with the domination of dead labour over living labour. This is why the Lefts were correct to say, as in Ossinski’s oft-quoted remarks, that “If the proletariat itself does not know how to create the necessary prerequisites for the socialist organisation of labour, no one can do this for it and no one can compel it to do this. The stick, if raised against the workers, will find itself in the hands of a social force which is either under the influence of another social class or is in the hands of the Soviet power; but the Soviet power will then be forced to seek support against the proletariat from another class (eg the peasantry) and by this it will destroy itself as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialism and socialist organisation will be set up by the proletariat itself, or they will not be set up at all; something else will be set up - state capitalism” (“On the construction of socialism”, Kommunist 2, April 1918). In short, living labour can only impose its interests over those of dead labour through its own efforts, through its very struggle to take direct control over both the state and the means of production and distribution. Lenin was wrong to see this as a proof of the petty bourgeois, anarchist approach of the Lefts. The Lefts unlike the anarchists, were not opposed to centralisation. Although they were in favour of the initiative of local factory committees and Soviets, they were for the centralisation of these bodies in higher economic and political councils. What they saw, however, was that there was no choice between two ways of building the new society - the way of proletarian centralisation and the way of bureaucratic centralisation. The latter could only lead in a different direction altogether, and would inevitably culminate in a confrontation between the working class and a power which, even though born out of the revolution, had increasingly estranged itself from it.
This was a general truth, applicable to all phases of the revolutionary process. But the criticisms of the Left Communists also had a more immediate relevance. As we wrote in our study of the Russian communist left in International Review no.8.
“Kommunist’s defence of factory committees, Soviets and working class self-activity was important not because it provided a solution to the economic problems facing Russia, still less a formula for the ‘immediate construction of communism’ in Russia; the Lefts explicitly stated that ‘socialism cannot be put into operation in one country and a backward one at that’(cited by L Schapiro, The Origins of the Communist Autocracy, 1955, p137). The imposition of labour discipline by the state, the incorporation of the proletariat’s autonomous organs into the sate apparatus, were above all blows against the political domination of the Russian working class. As the ICC has often pointed out, the political power of the class is the only real guarantee of the successful outcome of the revolution. And this political power can only be exercised by the mass organs of the class - by its factory committees and assemblies, its Soviets, its militias. In undermining the authority of these organs, the policies of the Bolshevik leadership were posing a grave threat to the revolution itself. The danger signals so perceptively observed by the Left Communists in the early months of the revolution were to become even more serious during the ensuing Civil War period”.
***
In the immediate aftermath of the October insurrection, when the Soviet government was being formed, Lenin had a momentary hesitation before accepting his post as chairman of the Soviet of People’s Commissars. His political intuition told him that this would put a brake on is capacity to act in the vanguard of the vanguard - to be on the left of the revolutionary party, as he had been so clearly between April and October 1917. The position that Lenin adopted against the Lefts in 1918, though still firmly within the parameters of a living proletarian party, already reflected the pressures of state power on the Bolsheviks; interests of state, of the national economy, of the defence of the status quo, had already begun to conflict with the interests of the workers. In this sense there is a certain continuity between Lenin’s false arguments against the Lefts in 1918, and his polemic against the international communist left after 1920, which he also accused of infantilism and anarchism. But in 1918 the world revolution was still in the ascendant, and had it extended beyond Russia, it would have been far easier to correct its early mistakes. In subsequent articles, we will examine how the communist left responded to the real process of degeneration that took hold of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet power when the international revolution entered into reflux.
CDW
After Kosovo, East Timor; after East Timor, Chechnya. Barely has the blood from one massacre dried than it is flowing again somewhere else on the planet. At the same time, the African continent is in agony: the endemic wars in Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and other countries, have been joined by new massacres in Burundi and a confrontation between Rwanda and its Ugandan "allies", just as the war gets under way again in Angola. We are far indeed from the prophecies of President Bush, exactly ten years ago after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, predicting "a new world order of peace and prosperity". The only peace that has made any progress is the peace of the grave.
In reality, every day that passes brings further confirmation of capitalism’s plunge into chaos and decomposition.
The slaughter (thousands dead) and destruction (between 80% and 90% of houses burned down in some towns) that have ravaged East Timor are not new to that country. One week after Portugal granted it independence in May 1975, Indonesian troops invaded it, and a year later it became Indonesia’s 27th province. The killings and famine that followed left between 200-300,000 dead, out of a population of less than 1 million. However, this does not mean that today’s events in East Timor are simply a pale "remake" of the events of 1975.
There were already many bloody conflicts under way at the time (the Vietnam war only came to an end in 1975), but the systematic extermination of civilian populations solely on the basis of their ethnic origins was still an exception, rather than the rule it has become today. The 1994 massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda is not an "African" peculiarity caused by the backwardness of the continent. The same tragedy took place in the heart of Europe only a few months ago, in Kosovo. And the repetition of these acts of barbarity in East Timor must be seen, not as a specific problem linked to a failed decolonisation 25 years ago, but as an expression of the barbarity of capitalism, of the chaos into which the system is plunging.
The clear distinction between the present period and the one that preceded the collapse of the Eastern bloc is perfectly illustrated by the new war which today is ravaging Chechnya. Ten years ago, the USSR lost the imperialist bloc which it had ruled with a hand of steel for four decades, in the space of a few weeks. This collapf a few weeks. This collapse was primarily the result of a catastrophic economic and political crisis which had led to the complete paralysis of the bloc’s dominant power. As such, it bore within it the disintegration of the USSR itself: the republics of the Baltic, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Byelorussia) all wanted to follow the example of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, etc. In 1992, the Russian Federation thus found itself alone. But Russia itself is constituted by multiple nationalities, and began to fall victim to the same process of disintegration, concretised by the war in Chechnya (1994-96). After 100,000 deaths on both sides, and the destruction of the country’s major towns, the war ended in a defeat for Russia and de facto independence for Chechnya.
In August, the entry of Islamic troops led by the Chechen Chamil Bessaiev and the Jordanian Khattab kicked off a new war in Chechnya. This war is a concentrate of the expressions of decomposition which affect the whole of capitalism.
On the one hand, it is part of the fallout from the collapse of the USSR which to date has been the most important expression of the decomposition of bourgeois society. On the other hand, it brings into play the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which reveals the decomposition of society in a whole series of countries (Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria, etc), and whose counterpart in the advanced countries is the rise in urban violence, drug addiction and religious sects.
Moreover, if it is true as many sources say (and as is perfectly possible) that Bessaiev and his clique are in fact financed by the Mafia millionaire Berezovsky, the power behind Yeltsin’s throne, or that the explosions in Moscow were the work of the Russian secret services, then we would be confronted here with another expression of capitalist decomposition, which is far from being limited to Russia: the ever more frequent use of terrorism by the bourgeois states themselves (and not just by little uncontrolled groups), and the rise of corruption within them. At all events, even if the Russian "services" are not behind the bomb attacks, they have been used by the authorities to create a powerful sentiment of xenophobia in Russia and so to justify the new war against Chechnya.
The war is wanted by every player on the Russian political scene (except Lebed, who signed the August 1996 agreement with the Chechens), from Zhuganov’s Stalinists to the "democrats" behind Lujkov, the mayor of Moscow. That Russia’s entire political apparatus, despite the fact that most of them denounce the Yeltsin clique’s corruption and incompetence, should support the latter’s plunge into an adventure which can only aggravate country’s economic and political disaster is eloquent testimony to the chaos which is gripping it more and more.
A few months ago, the NATO offensive in ex-Yugoslavia was dressed in the fig-leaf of "humanitarian intervention". It took an intensive barrage of images of the distress of Kosovar refugees, and the mass graves discovered after the retreat of Serb troops from Kosovo to make the populations of the NATO countries forget that the first result of the military operation was to unleash the "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo’s Albanians by Milosevic’s militia.
Today, hypocrisy is beating new records over East Timor. When the region was annexed by Suharto’s Indonesia in 1975-76, leading to the death of nearly two thirds of the population, the Western media, and still less the governments, barely noticed this tragedy. Although the UN General Assembly refused to recognise the annexation, the great Western powers offered unstinting support to the Suharto regime, which they saw as a bulwark of Western order in that part of the world. Clearly, the USA has particularly distinguished itself in its support for the butcher of Timor, in particularly with arms deliveries and training for the Indonesian special forces, who organised the anti-independence militias recruited from the Timorese underworld.
But it was not alone, since France and Britain have also continued to deliver weapons to Indonesia (the latter’s SAS also helped to train Indonesia’s crack troops). As for Australia, which today is presented as the "saviour" of the East-Timorese population, it was the only country to recognise the annexation of East Timor (for which it was rewarded in 1981 by a stake in East Timor’s offshore oil fields). Still more recently, in 1995, Australia signed a military co-operation treaty with Indonesia, aimed in particular at combating "terrorism" - which of course included the independentist guerrilla of East Timor.
Today, all the media have mobilised to reveal the barbarity which the East Timorese population has suffered ever since the massive vote for independence. And this media mobilisation has of course supported the intervention of the UN mandated forces under Australian command. As in Kosovo, military intervention is preceded by campaigns about "human rights". Once again, the humanitarian organisations (the swarms of NGOs) have arrived with the army’s baggage, making it possible to put over the lie that an armed intervention has no other aim than to defend human life (and of course not to defend imperialist interests).
However, while the massacre of the Albanians in Kosovo was perfectly foreseeable (and was in fact desired by the NATO leaders as a justification a posteriori of their intervention), that of the East Timorese was not only foreseeable but openly announced by its perpetrators, the anti-independence militias. Despite all the warnings, the UN sponsored the preparation of 30th May, and delivered the East Timorese to the slaughter.
When UN leaders asked why they had behaved with so little foresight, one of its diplomats calmly replied that "the UN is only the sum of its members". And indeed, for its main member, the USA, the discredit which overshadowed the UN was no bad thing. It was a means of restoring the balance after the end of the war in Kosovo, which had begun under the aegis of the USA with the NATO bombing campaign, only to end under the influence of the UN, which the US is less and less able to control because of the weight within it of other powers, like France, that contest US leadership.
The US made its position perfectly clear on a number of occasions: "There can be no question of sending UN troops in the short term. The Indonesians must themselves recover control of the various factions that exist within the population" (Peter Burleigh, aide to the US ambassador to the United Nations). This was well said, when it was blindingly obvious that the anti-independence "faction" was at the beck and call of the Indonesian army. "Just because we bombed Belgrade doesn’t mean that we are going to bomb Dili" (Samuel Berger, chief of the National Security Council at the White House). "East Timor is not Kosovo" (James Rubin, spokesman for the State Department).
These words at least have the merit of highlighting the hypocrisy of Clinton a few months previously, just after the end of the war in Kosovo, when he proclaimed:
"Whether you live in Africa, in Central Europe, or anywhere else, if anyone wants to commit crimes against an innocent civilian population, then he should be aware that as far as we are able, we will prevent him".
In fact, the USA’s refusal to intervene springs not just from a desire to cut the UN down to size. More fundamentally - and apart from the fact that the world’s greatest power did not want to "offend" its faithful ally in Djakarta (with which, on 25th August, it had just conducted joint manoeuvres around the theme of "aid and humanitarian assistance in disaster situations"!) - the USA’s aim was to support the "police operation" of the Indonesian state, which consisted of the massacres perpetrated by the militias.
Although the Indonesian army (the main power in the country) knew that it could not keep control of East Timor indefinitely (which is why it agreed to the intervention of the UN-mandated troops), the massacres it orchestrated after the referendum were intended to deliver a warning to whoever else throughout the vast Indonesian archipelago, such as the people of Northern Sumatra or the Moluccas, who might be tempted by the siren songs of the various nationalist movements. This objective of the Indonesian bourgeoisie is entirely shared by the bourgeoisie of the other states in the region (Thailand, Burma, Malaysia) which all have their own problems with ethnic minorities. It is also entirely shared by the American bourgeoisie, which is worried by the destabilisation of this region, coming on top of so many others.
The operation to "restore order" to East Timor had to happen, since anything else would have discredited the floods of "humanitarian" ideology of recent years. The United States delegated the job to Australia, its most solid ally in the region, which had the advantage of avoiding a direct conflict with Djakarta. For Australia, this represented a good opportunity to advance its own imperialist projects in the region (even at the cost of a temporary cooling of relations with Indonesia). For the US, it is vital to maintain a strong presence, through its allies, in this region, since it knows that the general development of the imperialist tensions contained in the present historic situation brings with it the threat of a growing influence of the other two powers which can claim to have a role to play in the region: Japan and China. region: Japan and China.
The same kind of geo-strategic concerns explain the attitude of the USA and other powers towards the present war in Chechnya, where the civilian population is being crushed under Russian bombs. There are already hundreds of thousands of refugees, and tens of thousands of families are homeless in the face of approaching winter. The Western leaders have spoken out at this "humanitarian disaster". Clinton has declared himself "concerned" at the situation in Chechnya, while Laurent Fabius, president of the French National Assembly, has said outright that all attempts to secede from the Russian Federation should be opposed:
"France supports the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, and condemns terrorism, operations of destabilisation, fundamentalism, which are all threats to democracy".
Although the media continue to play on the humanitarian string, there is a consensus, including amongst countries which are often in confrontation elsewhere (such as France and the USA) to avoid creating the slightest difficulty for Russia, and to let the massacre continue. In fact, every sector of the Western ruling class has an interest in avoiding a new aggravation of the chaos into which the largest country in the world is plunging, and moreover one that possesses thousands of nuclear warheads.
At two extremes of the vast Asian continent, that holds the biggest population on the planet, the world bourgeoisie is confronted with the growing threat of chaos. During the summer of 1997, this continent was subjected to the brutal attacks of the crisis, which had a particularly destabilising effect on certain countries, as we have seen in Indonesia (which although it is not part of Asia properly speaking is nonetheless in close proximity to the continent). At the same time, factors of chaos have been accumulating, especially with the deterioration of traditional conflicts such as that between Pakistan and India at the beginning of the summer 1999. In the end, the same danger threatens the whole Asian continent: the explosion of confrontations such as those engulfing the Caucasus today, the development of a situation similar to that of the African continent, but obviously with far more disastrous consequences for the rest of the planet.
oOo
The chaos affecting ever-wider areas of the world is obviously a matter of real concern for every sector of the world bourgeoisie, especially for the leaders of the great powers. But their concern is impotent. The desire to guarantee a minimum of stability is constantly coming up against the contradictory interests of the different national sectors of the ruling class. As a result, the advanced countries, the "great democracies", more often than not play the pyromaniac firemen, intervening to "stabilise" a situation that they have largely helped to create (as we have seen notably in ex-Yugoslavia, and today in East Timor).
But this spreading chaos in the inter-imperialist arena is itself only an expression of the general decomposition of bourgeois society: a decomposition which is the result of the ruling class’ inability to offer the slightest response - including that of World War as in 1914 and 1939 - to the insoluble crisis of its economy. A decomposition which is expressed in the whole of society rotting on its feet. A decomposition which is not reserved for backward countries, but which also affects the great bourgeois metropolises, as we have seen most recently in the awful rail accident of 5th October in London, capital of the world’s oldest capitalist power, and the nuclear accident of 30th September at Tokaimura in Japaember at Tokaimura in Japan, the country of "Total Quality" and "Zero Defect" manufacturing. A decomposition which will only come to an end with capitalism itself, when the proletariat overthrows this system which has become synonymous with chaos and barbarity.
Fabienne (10/10/1999)
At the end of 1999, a sort of euphoria reigns over "economic growth". In 1998, the collapse of the "tigers" and "dragons" ose of the "tigers" and "dragons" of South East Asia, and of Brazil, Venezuela, and Russia had provoked the fear of a recession, and even a "depression", a fear which today seems "unjustified" if we are to believe the great bourgeois media. The millennium seems to be ending on an optimistic note, which feeds the propaganda aimed at the working masses: the eulogy of capitalism, that "only viable economic system", ever ready to confront its crises. In short, the message boils down to: "capitalism is doing fine and that’s how things will continue".
Whereas in early 1999, some forecasts envisaged a "recession" in the developed countries, today’s figures reveal non-negligible growth rates, accompanied by a fall in unemployment - according to the official figures of course. We ourselves wrote:
"The plunge into a new open recession which will be still deeper than its predecessors - some or even talking of ‘depression’ - is silencing all the talk about lasting economic growth promised by the ‘experts’" (International Review no.96),
or again:
"Although the central countries of capitalism have escaped this fate [ie the bankruptcy of South East Asia] until now, they are certainly facing their worst recession since the war - in Japan it has already begun" ("Resolution on the International Situation", International Review no.97).
Did we adventure too boldly into an unjustified forecast? What is the real economic situation today?
We are being treated to a new sleight of hand, a new and enormous lie about the state of the world economy. At the level of some official figures, we are indeed seeing a slowdown in the world economy which is less rapid than expected, especially in the United States - a phenomenon which the hired hacks falsely describe as a "boom". But the continued seven or eight years of growth, even weak growth, without recession, has not been seen since World War II, and is the sign of a certain "prosperity". However, the figures are deceptive.
Firstly, the bourgeoisie possesses all kinds of tricks whereby it uses financial and monetary manipulation to hide the slowdown in the growth of real production. And while it is fashionable to proclaim the "continuation of uninterrupted growth" and to boast of the economy’s good health when addressing the population, and eessing the population, and especially the working class, in the more select circles of the ruling class, which needs a concrete not a mystified understanding of the state of the economy, the talk is already less optimistic. Some examples are worth citing:
"In the most optimistic scenarios, world growth is forecast to be 50% below last year’s projection, but it will remain at 2% in 1999, as it was in 1998. For the pessimists, growth practically disappears. The threat of a global recession in 2000 thus seems to us to be a real one (…).America booms while the old dragons are in depression: what an incredible turnaround! But let’s be clear: it is the swelling bubble on Wall Street which has saved expansion in the US, and therefore elsewhere in the world also. Historians will call it the ‘Greenspan bubble’. For some, the president of the Federal Reserve remains a magician. For others, he is a sorcerer’s apprentice, for the correction will be on the same scale as the error. It is already present in the experts’ ‘pessimistic’ scenarios: a 13% fall on Wall Street for the IMF, 30% for the OECD… Why? Because the rise on the stock market is absolutely unjustified by the tendency of the real economy, which is in decline" (L’Expansion, October 1999)., October 1999).
Or again:
"The Fed’s stimulus measures last autumn seemed to have averted an immediate catastrophe. Some economists and policymakers fear the easing of monetary policy has significantly increased the gaping imbalances that now dominate the US economy. By pumping up stock prices, it helped inflate an asset price bubble that now poses the greatest threat to global stability, say the critics. By allowing global spending to surge, it widened the already vast US current account deficit to more than $300 billion this year - 3% of gross domestic product. The Fed, of course, has already taken back two of the three quarter-point rate cuts of last year. But the gloomy view is that it is already too late to stop the imbalances ending in a smash. The current account deficit is undermining the dollar; once investors leave the US currency in droves, inflation will pick up speed and the stock market will collapse. That would provoke a new round of global financial instability, significantly damage domestic US demand, and perhaps even precipitate the world recession the G7 worked so hard to avoid a year ago" (Financial Times, October 1999).
Perhaps, one year ago, we were wrong to follow the forecasts of economic "recession". Nonetheless, we persist in our conviction that the crisis has got considerably worse. The bourgeoisie’s experts themselves are forced to recognise it, in their own way: there is no perspective of any lasting improvement of the economic situation. On the contrary, everything points to new tremors on the way, whose cost will as always fall on the proletariat.
Moreover, the recession is far from being the only expression of the capitalist crisis. We have already pointed out the mistake of only taking into account the figures for "growth" provided by the bourgeoisie, which are based on
"the growth of the crude figures of production, without any concern for what was being produced (in reality, mainly weapons), or without asking who was going to pay for it" (International Review no.59, 4th Quarter 1989, "Resolution on the International Situation").
At the time, we pointed to all the other elements which allow us to measure the true gravity of the crisis:
"the dizzying growth in the debt of the under-developed countries (…) the acceleration of the process of creating industrial deserts (…) the enormous aggravation of unemployment (…) the increasing number of calamities hitting the under-developed countries" (ibid.).
Today, not only are all these elements still present, they have got worse. And factors such as debt (not to mention "disasters" in terms of health or safety) are now affecting the heart of industrialised capitalism as well as the peripheral countries.
The US trade deficit, officially estimated at $240 billion, is beating every record, and will widen to more than 3% of GDP this year (see above). Developing domestic consumption, which has been the most "spectacular" factor in this "growth" is not based on rising wages, since despite all the fine talk the tendency during recent years has been for wages to fall. It is based above all on income from shares, whose distribution has been "democratised" (even if this has been above all in the direction of company management, in the form of stock options).
This income has been substantial, because it has been linked to the constant "record-breaking" rise on Wall Street. This growth in consumption is thus extremely volatile, since the slightest downturn on the stock market will be a disaster for those workers a large part of whose income or pensions comes from shares. The "growth rates" hide this fragility, just as they mask a new historical aberration - from the economic standpoint: the fact that today, the rate of savings in the USA is negative, in other words American households overall have more debts than savings! This has not escaped the "specialists":
"American industry is on the verge of bankruptcy. This is incompatible with the rise in share values on Wall Street, whose valuation is at its highest since 1926: expected profit is higher than at any time since the war. All this is untenable, but vital in maintaining the confidence of households and the distribution of the impression of wealth which encourages them to consume more and more on credit. The savings rate has become negative, a phenomenon unseen since the Great Depression. How can the (inevitable) touchdown be made a soft one?" (L’Expansion, op.cit.).
The official indicator of recession - negative growth of production - negative growth in production - has once again been hidden, the recession has been pushed back with the same palliatives: debt, a headlong flight into credit, and speculation (in shares, in this case). And another symbol of this headlong flight which no longer has any tie to the real production of wealth, is that the share prices which have risen the most in recent months have been those of companies offering access to the Internet, which are basically selling hot air! The situation of the world economy is thus more fragile and pregnant with the next "purges" which will once again leave masses of workers on the street.
Finally, inasmuch as the "recession", in other words a negative growth rate, is for the bourgeoisie a symbol of the crisis of its system, it is also a factor of destabilisation and sometimes even panic within capitalist circles which serves to amplify the phenomenon still further. This is one reason that the bourgeoisie has done everything it can to avoid such a situation.
Another reason, perhaps still more important, is the need to hide the system’s bankruptcy from the working class; as the specialists put it, it is
"vital in maintaining the confidence of households and the distribution of the impression of wealth which encourages them to consume more and more on credit".
When the "growth rate" collapses, it jeopardises all the propaganda about the validity of the capitalist system; it encourages the class to struggle, and above all to think, and consequently calls into question the whole system. This is what the bourgeoisie fears more than anything else.
For the millions of proletarians thrown onto the street in the so-called "emerging" countries (like those in South East Asia, which will never recover from the acceleration of the crisis in 1997-98), or for the pauperised masses of the so-called "developing" countries on the capitalist periphery (in Africa, Asia, Latin America), but also for the increasing numbers left out of the "growth" in the industrialised countries, there is no need for great theoretical demonstrations. They already suffer, in their day-to-day living conditions, the bankruptcy of a system which is increasingly incapable of providing them with the most basic means of subsistence.
Some see in this a sort of "natural" fatality, a law according to which the strong are called on to survive, while poverty and death for the "weak" is no more than the "normal" result of this "law". This is obviously nonsense. Today, as it has done since World War I, capitalism is suffocating from a crisis of over-production. Potentially, society today disposes of all industrial and technical means to provide in abundance for the whole of humanity, and has done ever since the beginning of the 20th Century. The millions of workers in the industrialised countries are suffering unemployment and falling living conditions, the tens of millions of human beings in the peripheral countries of capitalism are hurled into direst poverty by the proliferation of local wars, because of the survival of this capitalist system based on the law of profit and the accumulation of capital.
Up to the end of the 19th Century, the developed of capitalism, albeit already in "blood and filth", still corresponded to an increase in the satisfaction of human needs. With the First World War, it entered its period of historical decadence and decline, and ever since has dragged the world down in a spiral of crisis-war-reconstruction, followed by a new and deeper crisis, a new and bloodier war, a new economic crisis; the latest expression of the crisis has lasted for thirty years, and the threat of planetary destruction is still real indeed, even if no longer in the form of a world-wide nuclear war since the two great imperialist blocs disappeared a decade ago.
This irreversThis irreversible decline of the capitalist system does not mean that the ruling class will declare itself bankrupt, give up and go home, as might happen in the case of an individual capitalist company. The whole history of the 20th Century is there to prove it - and especially world capitalism’s "solution" to the Great Crash of 1929: World War II. The capitalists are ready to drag the whole of humanity down to destruction in their merciless struggle for the pie of the world market. And although in thirty years of crisis they have been unable to draw the great masses of workers into war, they have endlessly cheated with the laws of capitalist development themselves in order to keep the system alive, and made the workers and unemployed pay the price for the death-agony of their moribund economy.
Against the ever stronger attacks on their living conditions, understanding the economic crisis - its irreversibility, its constantly worsening dynamic - is an essential factor in the development of an awareness of the vital necessity of the class struggle, not only in self-defence against capitalism, but also to open up the only real perspective left to humanity: the communist revolution, the real one, not the hideous face of Stalinist state capitalism which the bourgeoisie has offered as a travesty of communism.
MG
After some promising indications of a mutual recognition and debate among the groups of the communist left over the past few years, and even a common public meeting on the Russian Revolution between the International Bureau for the Revolutionary Party and the ICC in Britain, the recent Nato war in the Balkans came as a sort of test of the capacity of these groups to strengthen their influence through some kind of common defence of internationalism. Unfortunately the groups refused an appeal by the ICC for a common declaration against the imperialist carnage in Kosovo. An article in International Review 97 gave a preliminary balance sheet of the reactions to this appeal.
Here, in this article, we will reply briefly to the idea put forward by the IBRP that the ICC's supposed ‘idealist' political method justified such a refusal.
In their reply to our appeal they say:
"...When you write in your leaflet "Because the world working class, ever since the massive strikes of May '68 in France has developed its struggle and refused to submit to the logic of capitalism, it has been able to prevent a third World War from being unleashed", you show that you've remained tied to your schemas that we've already characterised as idealist and which are today particularly inapt to the need for clarity and theoretic-political solidarity required fro intervention towards the class".
Now, idealism would be a profound defect for a revolutionary organisation. Idealism is one important, if not the only, philosophical rampart of bourgeois ideology. Finding the ultimate driving force of history in the ideas, morals, and truths that are produced by human consciousness, idealism is one of the fundamental bases for the various ideologies of the ruling class that obscure their exploitation of the working classes and deny it any real capacity for its liberation. The division of the world into classes and the possibility and necessity of the communist revolution to overturn this world can only be understood by the materialist conception of history. The history of thinking is explained by the history of being and not the other way around.
But why is the conception of the "historic course" that takes a view on the balance of class forces over a given historical period and draws the conclusion that the perspective is not open to a generalised imperialist war today, but is still open to immense class confrontations.... idealist'?
The Communist Workers' Organisation's (the IBRP in Britain) letter to the ICC refusing a joint public meeting in Britain on the war tries to explain:
"For you it seems a small point but for us it only underlines how far you are not relating to reality. We are absolutely aghast at the turn events are taking with so little proletarian response. ‘Socialism or barbarism' is a slogan which has absolute meaning in this crisis. But how can you maintain that the working class is holding back war when the evidence of all that has happened in Yugoslavia shows how free a hand the imperialists (big and little) have got?...The war is now only 800 miles from London (as the crow flies). Does it have to get to Brighton before you readjust your perspectives? The war is a serious step towards general barbarism. We cannot stand together to fight for a communist alternative if you are suggesting that the working class is a force to be reckoned with in the present situation".
This is hardly a sufficient justification for the serious charge of ‘idealism' since it reduces an entire historical question to a problem of ‘sound common sense'. All we can do is reply by questioning the consistency of the IBRP's own interpretation of events in their short and allegedly sober exposition of reality. At the beginning of the paragraph two fundamental historical tendencies are at work: socialism and barbarism apply ‘absolutely' to the situation. But by the end of it only one tendency - capitalist barbarism is taken into account. Socialism, and its historical vehicle, the proletariat, has disappeared from the reckoning. Only the IBRP are left in the world holding the torch for the communist alternative.
While the ICC has attempted at least to understand the historic weight of the proletariat in the Balkans War without in the least minimising the seriousness of the situation, the IBRP (appropriately speaking from the empiricist homeland of Bacon and Locke[1]), would rather judge events by their geographic proximity to London or Brighton. The proletariat is supposedly not a "force to be reckoned with in the present situation" because there are no immediate tangible facts to prove it, it cannot be empirically verified. The IBRP can't see it, smell it, taste it, or hear it - therefore it doesn't exist. And anybody who says it does is an idealist. This is the limit of the IBRP's critique.
The counter-tendencies to the apparent absence of the proletariat - particularly the lack of adhesion by Western European and North American working classes to the war - are consequently ignored as factors. The latent tendencies in events that may only give a negative imprint on the situation, like footprints in the sand must, however, be taken into account in order to be consistent with the wider historical reality.
The method which sees events as simple facts without all their historical interconnections is only materialist in the metaphysical sense:
"And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.
To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. ‘His communication is ‘yea, yea, nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil'. For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.
At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. The metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the object, invariably bumps into a limit sooner or later, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions because in the presence of individual things it forgets their connections, because in the presence of their existence it forgets their coming into being and passing away; because in their state of rest it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees" (Engels, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific).
Empiricism - sound common sense - despite all these bumps, always equates historical materialism and its dialectical method with idealism because Marxism doesn't, or shouldn't, take facts at their face value.
The IBRP is bumping into the history of the revolutionary movement when it terms the ‘schema' of the historical course idealist. Was the left fraction of the Italian CP, which published Bilan during the 1930s, guilty of idealism when it developed this concept to determine whether history was marching toward war or revolution?[2] It's a question the IBRP should answer since Bilan was intrinsic part of the history of the Italian Left within which the IBRP situates itself.
But if the IBRP thinks itself able to use historical materialism to put forward a supposedly obvious factual truth, it is also capable of using mechanical schemas to invent facts which don't exist. According to its internationalist leaflet against the war, NATO's main aim was to "ensure the control of the oil of the Caucasus". How has the IBRP arrived at such a fantasy? By applying the schema which says that the motive power behind imperialism today is the search of economic profit "to ensure the control and management of oil, of oil revenue, and ot the financial and commercial markets".
This may be a materialist schema, but it is mechanical materialism. Although the main factor behind modern imperialism remains the basic economic contradictions of capitalism, this schema ignores the political and strategic factors which have become predominant in the conflicts between nation-states.
If the IBRP adopts an empiricist approach when confronted with the weight of the working class on the scales of history at any conjuncture, on the broader and more decisive questions it shows that it is perfectly capable to see in a Marxist way what sound common sense cannot. Their leaflet on the war - like the leaflets of other groups of the communist left - revealed that behind the apparently united humanitarian aims of the great powers in Kosovo a wider and unavoidable imperialist confrontation was taking place. They showed that the pacificists and leftists, despite their loud declamations against violence were in reality stoking the fires of war. Finally, although they couldn't see the proletariat as a force in the present situation, they nevertheless asserted that the working class struggle leading to the communist revolution was the only means of escaping the worsening barbarism.
The common internationalist proletarian positions of the different left communist groups on the imperialist war, shared by both the ICC and the IBRP, were eminently Marxist and thus faithful to the method of historical materialism.
So here at least the accusation of idealism against the ICC completely collapses.
In his letter to Wilhelm Bracke in 1875 that introduced his Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx says that "Every step of a real movement is more important than a dozen programmes". And this famous sentence constitutes a reference point for the united action of revolutionaries. It is a restatement of the equally famous Theses On Feuerbach of 1845 demonstrating that historical materialism is not another contemplative philosophy but a weapon of proletarian action.
"The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood as revolutionary practice" and "The philosophers have only interpreted the world the point is to change it".
In his introductory letter and critique Marx sharply criticises the unity programme of the Social Democratic Party to be and the concessions made to the Lassalleans.[3] He deems an "agreement for action against the common enemy" to be of the highest importance and suggests it would have been better to postpone the writing of the programme "until such time as it has been prepared for by a considerable period of common activity" (The First International and After, p340, Penguin 1974). Extreme differences were thus no barrier to united action, but on the contrary were to be confronted within this context.
As we have already put forward in our appeal, Lenin and other representatives of the Marxist left applied this same method to the Zimmerwald Conference of 1915 where they signed its ringing manifesto against the first imperialist war. And yet they had expressed criticisms and sharp disagreements with its insufficiencies and submitted their own statement to a vote, where it was rejected by the majority.[4]
The IBRP has already been to work to learnedly demonstrate that such a historical example of the unity of revolutionaries in the past took place in different circumstances and therefore doesn't apply to the present situation. In other words the IBRP don't want to see the threads of the past in the present but as a finished episode that is only relevant for its own time for historians to ponder over. The different circumstances in which revolutionary unity took place in the past instead of proving their inapplicability to the present revolutionary movement, actually emphasise their contemporary relevance all the more.
The most striking thing about Marx and Lenin's advocation of common work between revolutionaries in the two examples given is that differences between the Eisenachers and the Lassalleans on the one hand, and between the Bolsheviks and the socialists at Zimmerwald on the other were far more severe than the differences between the groups of today's communist left.
Marx advocated common work with a tendency that advocated a "free state", "equal rights", "the just distribution of the proceeds of labour" and talked about the "iron law of wages", and other bourgeois prejudices. Zimmerwald was a common stand against the imperialist war between the real internationalists who advocated a civil war against the imperialist war and called for a new International, and pacifists, centrists and other waverers who advocated a reconciliation with the social patriots and questioned the revolutionary slogans of the left. In today's communist milieu on the other hand there are no concessions to democracy or humanitarian illusions, there is a common denunciation of the war as imperialist, a common denunciation of the pacifism and chauvinism of the left, and a common commitment to the "civil war", in other words to opposing to imperialist war the perspective and necessity of the proletarian revolution.
Lenin signed the Zimmerwald Manifesto, with all its inadequacies and inconsistencies, in order to advance the real movement. In an article written immediately after the first Zimmerwald conference, he said: "It is a fact that the [Zimmerwald Manifesto] is a step forward towards an effective struggle against opportunism, towards a break and a split with it. It would be sectarianism to refuse to take this step forward with the minority of Germans, Swedes, French, Norwegians and Swiss, when we keep our full liberty and possiblity to criticise its inconsistency and to try to go further. It would be poor military tactics to refuse to march with the growing international movement of protest against social-chauvinism, on the pretext that the movement is too slow, that it has taken ‘only' one step forward, that it is ready and inclined to take a step backward and look for a conciliation with the old International Socialist Bureau" (Lenin, A first step, October 1915)
Karl Radek arrived at the same conclusion in another article on the conference: "... the left decided to vote the Manifesto for the following reasons. It would be doctrinaire and sectarian to separate ourselves from those forces which have begun, to a certain extent, to struggle against social-patriotism in their own countries when they have to confront the furious attacks of the social-patriots" (from The Zimmerwald Left).
There is no doubt that revolutionaries today should act against the development of imperialist war with the same method as Lenin and the Zimmerwald left against World War I. The central priority is the advance of the revolutionary movement as a whole. The main difference between conditions then and today, is that today there is a far greater convergence of positions between the internationalist groups than there was between the left and the centre at Zimmerwald,[5] and so a much greater justification and necessity for common action.
A common internationalist declaration and other expressions of united activity against the Nato war would of course have increased enormously the political presence of left communism by comparison with the impact of the different groups taken separately. It would have been a material antidote to the nationalist divisions imposed by the bourgeoisie. The common intention to advance the real movement would have created a stronger pole of attraction to elements in search of communist positions who are at present disappointed by the confusing dispersion of the different groups. And the pooling of resources would have had a wider impact on the working class as a whole. Above all, it would have marked a historical reference point of revolutionaries in the future, as of course did the Zimmerwald Manifesto that sent a beacon of hope to future revolutionaries in the trenches. How are we to describe the political method which refuses such common action? The answer is given by Lenin and Radek: doctrinaire sectarianism.[6]
If we have restricted ourselves to two examples, it is for reasons of space not any shortage of examples of common action by revolutionaries in the past. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Internationals were all formed with the participation of elements who did not even accept the main premises of Marxism, such as the anarchists of the 1st, or the French and Spanish anarcho-syndicalists who defended internationalism and the Russian revolution and so were welcomed into the 3rd.
Nor should we forget that the Spartacist Karl Liebnecht, recognised by the whole Marxist left as the most heroic defender of the proletariat in the first world war, was an idealist in the real sense of the term, since he rejected the dialectical materialist method in favour of Kantianism.
Most of today's groups imagine that by uniting even for a minimum of activity they will be obscuring or diluting the important differences they have with the other groups. Nothing could be further from the truth.
After the formation of the German Social Democratic Party and after Zimmerwald, there was not an opportunist diluting of the differences of its separate constituents but conversely a sharpening of them and a confirmation in practice of the positions of the clearest tendencies. The Marxists came to predominate completely in the German party and then in the second International over the Lassalleans after 1875.
After Zimmerwald, the intransigent positions of the left, which was in a minority, prevailed completely in the subsequent years as the revolutionary wave beginning in Russia 1917 confirmed their policy in the heat of events, while the centrists eventually fell back into the arms of the social patriots.
Yet without testing their positions in the framework, however limited, of a common action, their future success would not have been possible. The Communist International was indebted to the Zimmerwald left.[7]
These examples from the history of the revolutionary movement only confirm another well known second thesis on Feuerbach:
"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth , i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of think ing that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question".
The groups of the communist left that deny a practical framework of their common movement within which its differences can be confronted are tending to reduce their disputes on Marxist theory to a scholastic level. Although these groups have the idea of proving their positions through practice in the wider class struggle this objective will remain a vain hope if they cannot put their own house in order - and verify their positions in practical association with other internationalist tendencies.
A recognition of a minimum of common activity is the basis on which the differences can develop be confronted, tested and clarified to those militants who are emerging from the ranks of the proletariat particularly in countries where the Communist left has no organised presence yet. One of the most frustrating proofs of this view, a contrario, is in Internationalist Communist n°17, the review of the IBRP, which is more or less dedicated to expressing its differences with the ICC for the benefit of searching elements in Russia and elsewhere who are unclear on this question. But in its rush on the one hand to minimise or deny the common positions of our two tendencies, and on the other tits refusal to take our mutual differences seriously enough, the reader probably ends up more confused than ever. When we read: "We criticise the ICC (...) for expecting what they call the ‘proletarian political milieu' to take up and debate their increasingly outlandish political concerns" (IC 17) then we can wonder whether the internationalist milieu has even reached the scholastic level of debate due to a fear of confronting opposing views. Today's movement needs to reappropriate the confidence of the Marxists of the past in their ideas.
The accusation that the ICC is idealist doesn't hold water. We await at least more developed critiques on this score. But it should be clear that the materialist method of the Marxist revolutionary movement demands a common response to the worsening international situation and the increasing demands it places on the working class. The communist left may not have been up to all of its responsibilities over Kosovo - but the coming events will force it to bring them into sharper focus.
Como 11/9/1999
[1] Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and John Locke (1632-1704) were two English materialist philosophers.
[2] In an article with the explicit title, "The course towards war", this is how Bilan n°29 of March 1936 posed the problem of the historic course: "Those in government today (...) have a right to the eternal gratitude of the capitalist regime for having taken to its ultimate conclusion the work of crushing the world proletariat. By disembowelling the only force capable of creating a new society, they have opened the door to inevitable war, the final expression of the internal contradictions of the capitalist regime (...) When will war break out? Nobody can say. What is certain is that everything is ready for it". Another article in the same issue returns to the question by clarifying the preconditions of the imperialist war: "We are perfectly convinced that the socialo-centrist policy of betrayal which has reduced the proletariat to class impotence in the ‘democratic' countries, and fascism which has achieved the same result by terror, have laid the vital foundations for the unleashing of a new world-wide carnage. The degeneration of the USSR and the CI is one of the most alarming symptoms of the course towards the abyss of war". In passing, it is worth reminding - or informing - the IBRP and the Bordigist groups what was the perspective for action that Bilan proposed to the different communist forces that had survived: "The only response that these communists can oppose to the events we have lived through, the only political expression which could serve as a milestone on the road to the victory of tomorrow, would be an International Conference which would tie together the few poor membranes that are left of the brain of the world working class". Our concern to determin what is the historic course today, and our appeal for a common defence of internationalism, are completely within the tradition of the Italian Left, whether the ignorant like it or not.
[3] The German Social Democratic Party was formed from the unification of two great currents: one petty-bourgeois, known as the Lassalleans from the name of their leader Lassalle, the other marxist and known as the Eisenachers from the name of the town where their tendency created the German Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1869.
[4] We insisted on the validity, for today's internationalist camp, of the Zimmerwald left's unity policy in International Review n°44 (1986).
[5] In fact, we could even say that the differences within the Zimmerwald left itself were greater than those within today's internationalist camp. In particular, there were at the time important differences on whether national liberation was still possible, and therefore whether the slogan of "nations' right to self-determination" was still part of marxist policy. The clear-cut and opposing positions of Lenin on the one hand, Trotsky and Radek on the other, over the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, sharply revealed the divisions within the Zimmerwald left. Within the Bolshevik Party itself, there were significant differences on national self-determination, with Bukharin and Piatakov defending its obsolescence, as well as on the slogans of "revolutionary defeatism" and the "United States of Europe".
[6] Lenin's policy of internationalist unity was not limited to the Zimmerwald movement. He also applied it within Russian social-democracy, encouraging common work with a non-Bolshevik group like Trotsky's Nache Slovo. And if these efforts were unsuccessful - until the Russian revolution - it was because of Trotsky's own hesitations and sectarianism at the time.
[7] "The Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences had their importance at a time when it was necessary to unite all the proletarian elements ready in one form or another to protest against the imperialist slaughter (...) The Zimmerwald grouping has had its day. Everything that was really revolutionary in the Zimmerwald grouping passes over to and joins the Communist International" (Declaration by the participants at the Zimmerwald conference to the Congress of the CI). The declaration was signed by Rakovsky, Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Platten.
Presentation
Ten years ago exactly, there took place one of the most important events of the second half of the 20th century: the collapse of the Eastern imperialist bloc and of Europe’s Stalinist regimes, including the largest of them, the USSR itself.
The event was used by the ruling class to unleash one of the most massive and pernicious campaigns ever directed against the working class. By dishonestly identifying disintegrating Stalinism with communism, by pretending that the bankruptcy and barbarity of the Stalinist regimes was an inevitable consequence of the proletarian revolution, the bourgeoisie aimed to turn the working class away from any revolutionary perspective, and to deal a decisive blow to the working class struggle. The document reprinted below was published as a supplement to our territorial press in January 1990, fundamentally with a view to fighting the bourgeoisie’s campaign of lies, whose effects can still be felt today.
When this text was written, the chaos overtaking the USSR and the Stalinist regimes was still far from being what it is today. In particular, the USSR was still formally in existence, led by the Communist Party of Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been trying since 1985 to recover the situation through his policy of "perestroika" (restructuring). However, from the summer of 1989 the situation accelerated, notably with the formation of the Solidarnosc-led government in Poland at the end of August, the increasing defiance of Soviet authority by the various governments of Central Europe (eg Hungary), as well as the rise of nationalism in the republics of the USSR itself. Our organisation analysed the significance and the implications of these events in International Review no.59:
"The convulsions shaking Poland today, though they may take on an extreme form in this country, are by no means specific to it. All the countries under Stalinist regimes are in the same dead-end. Their economies have been particularly brutally hit by the world capitalist crisis, not only because of their backwardness, but because they are totally incapable of adapting to an exacerbation of inter-capitalist competition. The attempts to improve their competitiveness by introducing some of the ‘classical’ norms of capitalist management have only succeeded in provoking a still greater shambles, as can be seen from the utter failure of ‘perestroika’ in the USSR (…)What is in store for the Stalinist regimes is thus not a ‘peaceful democratisation’, still less an economic ‘recovery’. With the deepening of the world-wide capitalist crisis, these countries have entered a period of convulsions to an extent unheard-of in a past which is nonetheless rich in violent upheavals" ("Capitalist convulsions and workers’ struggles").
One week later (5th October), a text adopted by the ICC’s central organ was put up for discussion throughout the organisation, trying to analyse the situation in greater depth and to determine its perspectives:
"Already, the Eastern bloc is in a state of growing dislocation (…) In this zone, the centrifugal tendencies are so strong that they go out of control as soon as they have the opportunity (…) We find a similar phenomenon in the peripheral republics of the USSR (…) The [dynamic of the ] nationalist movements which today are profiting from a loosening of central control by the Russian party (…) is towards separation from Russia.
In the end, if the central power in Moscow does not react, then we will see the explosion, not just of the Russian bloc, but of its dominant power. The Russian bourgeoisie, which today rules the world’s second power, would find itself at the head of a second-rate power, a good deal weaker than Germany for example (…)
But however the situation in the Eastern bloc evolves, the events that are shaking it today mean the historic crisis, the definitive collapse of Stalinism, this monstrous symbol of the most terrible counter-revolution the proletariat has ever known. The greatest lie in history is being stripped bare today.
In these countries, an unprecedented period of instability, convulsions, and chaos has begun, whose implications go far beyond their frontiers. In particular the weakening, which will continue, of the Russian bloc, opens the gates to a destabilisation of the whole system of international relations and imperialist constellations which emerged from World War II with the Yalta Agreements" ("Theses on the economic and political crisis in the USSR and the Eastern countries", in International Review no.60).
One month later, 9th November 1989 saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had symbolised the world’s division between Western and Eastern blocs. It signed the latter’s death sentence, and completely overturned the world order that had emerged from Yalta, thereby implying the eventual disappearance of the Western bloc itself:
"The disintegration of the Eastern bloc, its disappearance as a major consideration in inter-imperialist conflict, implies a radical calling into question of the Yalta Agreements, and the spread of instability to all the imperialist constellations formed on that basis, including the Western bloc which the USA has dominated for the last 40 years. The latter will in turn see its foundations being called into question. During the 1980s, the cohesion of the Western countries against the Russian bloc was an important factor in the latter’s collapse; today, the cement for that cohesion no longer exists. Although it is impossible to foresee exactly the rhythm and forms that this will take, the perspective today is one of growing tension between the great powers of the Western bloc…" ("Collapse of the Eastern bloc, the definitive bankruptcy of Stalinism", in International Review no.60, 19/11/1989).
At the same time, an impressive chain reaction swept away regimes which had governed the countries of the Soviet glacis for four decades:
on 10th November, Todor Jivkov was sacked after governing Bulgaria since 1954;
3rd December saw the scuppering of the East German Communist Party;
on 22nd December, the Ceaucescu regime in Romania was overthrown;in Romania was overthrown;
on 29th December, the long-standing dissident Vaclav Havel was elected president of Czechoslovakia.
This situation was the basis for the text we are publishing below. But Stalinism’s disintegration did not end there. The USSR’s disappearance was to follow that of its bloc. By early 1990, the Baltic countries declared for independence. Worse still, on 16th July Ukraine, the USSR’s second republic, tied to Russia by centuries of history, declared its sovereignty. It was followed by Belarus, then by all the Caucasian and Central Asian republics.
Gorbachev tried to save what he could by proposing the adoption of a treaty of the Union (planned to be signed on 20th August, 1991), which would maintain a minimum of political unity among the various components of the USSR. On 18th August the Party’s old guard, with the support of a part of the police and military apparatus, tried to oppose this surrender of the USSR. The attempted coup d’Etat was a lamentable failure, and immediately prompted almost all the federated republics to declare their independence. On 21st December, the Community of Independent States was formed, an extremely vague structure which brought together some of the component parts of the USSR. On 25th December, Gorbachev, its last outgoing president, declared its dissolution. The Russian flag replaced the red flag floating over the Kremlin.
As the USSR fell apart, the disappearance of its bloc brought with it, not the "new era of peace and prosperity" predicted by US President Bush, but a series of bloody convulsions, the most important being the Gulf War against Iraq in January 1991, and the wars in Yugoslavia whose latest episode in Kosovo during the spring of 1999 marked a new step in military barbarism at the heart of Europe and only an hour from its main industrial centres.
The upheavals the world has been through since 1989 and the collapse of the Stalinist regimes, the enormous ideological campaigns which have accompanied them (both on the failure of "communism", but also the "humanitarian" campaigns which have accompanied every episode of an ever-increasing barbarism), have all provoked a disorientation within the working class, a retreat both in its consciousness and its self-confidence. This does not call into question the general perspective for the present historic period of increasing class confrontations between bourgeoisie and proletariat, as we show in the report on the class struggle adopted by the ICC’s 13th Congress and published in this issue of the Review. However, if the proletariat is to resume its forward march, it will have to attack the formidable mystifications developed by the ruling class since 1989. It is to contribute to this necessary effort of the class that we are republishing here our document from January 1990.
FM, 15/9/1999
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The proletariat faced with the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the bankruptcy of Stalinism
In a few months, the entire bloc of the capitalist world dominated by Russian imperialism has fallen apart, revealing the irreparable bankruptcy of a system maintained for almost half a century by the bloodiest terror mankind has ever known.
Not only have these events, at the very gates of Western Europe, overturned the entire world order as it emerged from World War II; today, they are the object of a deafening media campaign on the supposed "bankruptcy of communism". Like famished vultures, every fraction of the "liberal" and "democratic" ruling class is tearing at the carrion of Stalinism in order to perpetuate the dirty lie that Stalinism is the same as communism, that the Stalinist dictatorship was contained in the programme of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and that when it comes down to it Stalinism was nothing but the logical continuation of the proletarian revolution of October 1917. In short, they aim to drive home the idea that such barbarity was the inevitable price that the working class must pay for having dared to defy the capitalist order and to call it into question 70 years ago.
In its last gasps, Stalinism is thus rendering one last service to capitalism. The most powerful, the most machiavellian, the most hypocritical bourgeoisie is profiting from its death-throes. Not a day passes without the hired hacks of the ruling class exploiting to the hilt every convulsion that shakes the Soviet glacis, the better to vaunt the merits of "democracy" and "liberal" capitalism, presented as "the best of all possible worlds". A world of freedom and plenty, the only one worth fighting for, the only one which can appease all the suffering imposed on the population by the "communist" system.
Stalinism’s death is an ideological victory for the Western bourgeoisie. For the moment, the proletariat must roll with the blow. But it must understand that Stalinism has never been anything other than the most caricatured form of capitalist rule. The workers must understand that "democracy" is only the most hypocritical mask for the bourgeoisie’s class dictatorship, and that it would be a tragedy if they let themselves be taken in by its siren song. They must understand that - West or East - capitalism has nothing to offer the exploited masses but growing poverty and barbarism, ending in the destruction of the planet. They must understand that there is no hope for humanity outside the class struggle of the international proletariat, which by overthrowing capitalism will make it possible to build a real world-wide communist society, a society rid of crises, wars, barbarity and oppression in every form.
***
All the deafening propaganda that we are being served today around the theme of democracy’s "victory" over "communist" totalitarianism is no accident. In reality, the bourgeoisie has a very precise aim when it hammers home the lie that Stalinism was the inevitable result of the revolution of October 1917: by disgusting the workers with any idea of communism, a capitalism at bay hopes to turn the proletariat away from the final goal of the last 20 years’ class struggle against capitalism’s incessant attacks against its living standards.
The total opposition between Stalinism and the October Revolution
The ruling class’ claim that Stalinist barbarism is the legitimate heir to the October revolution, that Stalin only took a system worked out by Lenin to its logical conclusion, is a LIE. All the hired hacks, historians, and ideologues know very well that there is no continuity between proletarian October and Stalinism. They all know that this reign of terror was the work of the counter-revolution which established itself on the ruins of the Russian revolution with the defeat of the first revolutionary wave of 1917-23. It was the isolation of the Russian proletariat after the bloody suppression of the revolution in Germany which dealt the final blow to the power of the workers’ Soviets in Russia.
History has tragically confirmed what marxism declared at the very dawn of the workers’ movement: the communist revolution can only be international.
"The communist revolution (…) will not be a purely national revolution; it will take place at the same time in the civilised countries (…) it will have a considerable effect on all other countries of the planet, and will completely transform and accelerate their development. It is a universal revolution; consequently, it will have a universal terrain"(Engels, Principles of communism, 1847).
Lenin, waiting for the aid of the revolution in Europe, was only keeping faith with the principles of communism and proletarian internationalism when he expressed himself in these terms:
"The Russian revolution is only a detachment of the world socialist army, and the success and triumph of the revolution that we have carried out will depend on the action of that army. This is a fact that nobody amongst us forgets (…) The Russian proletariat is aware of its own revolutionary isolation, and it sees clearly that that the indispensable and fundamental condition for its own victory is the united intervention of the workers of the entire world"(Lenin, Report to the conference of factory committees of Moscow province, 23rd July 1918).
Internationalism has always been the cornerstone of the working class’ struggles, and of its revolutionary organisations’ programmes. This is the programme that Lenin and the Bolsheviks always defended. Armed with this programme, the proletariat was able to take power in Russia and so force the bourgeoisie to put an end to World War I. In doing so, it declared its own alternative: against the generalised barbarity of capitalism, transformation of the imperialist war into class war.
Calling this essential principle of proletarian internationalism into question has always been synonymous with quitting the proletarian camp, and going over to capital.
As the Russian revolution collapsed from the inside, Stalinism made this break in 1925. When Stalin put forward his thesis of "building socialism in one country" this was to be the basis for the most appalling counter-revolution in human history. Henceforth, the USSR was "Soviet" only in name. The dictatorship through the power of the workers’ councils (Soviets) was to be transformed into the merciless dictatorship of the Party-State over the proletariat.
By abandoning internationalism, Stalin, that worthy representative of the state bureaucracy, signed the revolution’s death-sentence. Under Stalin’s orders, the policy of the degenerating IIIrd International was to become a counter-revolutionary policy of the defence of capitalist interests. So, in China in 1927 the Communist Party followed Stalin’s instructions and dissolved itself into the Kuomintang (the Chinese nationalist party). In doing so, it disarmed the proletarian uprising in Shanghai and its own revolutionary militants, to deliver them bound hand and foot to the bloody repression of Chang kai Shek, declared an "honorary member" of the Stalinised International for the occasion.
The Stalinist counter-revolution then directed its bloody hatred against the developing Left Opposition to this nationalist policy: all those Bolsheviks who still tried, come what may, to defend the principles of October, were excluded from the party in the USSR, deported in their thousands, tracked down by the GPU, and finally executed during the great Moscow trials (with the wholehearted support and benediction of all the "democratic" countries!).
This is how the regime of Stalinist terror was set up, on the ruins of the 1917 October revolution. Thanks to this negation of communism - "socialism in one country" - the USSR became once again a wholly capitalist state where the proletariat was subjected at gunpoint to the interests of the national capital, in the name of the defence of the "socialist fatherland".
Thanks to the power of the workers’ councils, proletarian October brought World War I to a halt. The Stalinist counter-revolution, by destroying all revolutionary thought, by muzzling every attempt at class struggle, by subjecting the whole of social life to terror and militarisation, heralded the second world slaughter.
Each step in Stalinism’s development on the international scene during the 1930s was in fact marked by imperialist bargaining with the major capitalist powers, which were preparing to subject Europe once again to blood and destruction. Having used his alliance with German imperialism to thwart the latter’s expansion towards the East, Stalin turned his coat in the nid-30s to ally with the "democratic" bloc (in 1934, Russia joined the "den of thieves" as Lenin had described the League of Nations. 1935 saw the Stalin-Laval pact between the USSR and France.
The CPs took part in the "Popular Fronts" and in the Spanish Civil War, in the course of which the Stalinists did not hesitate to massacre any workers or revolutionaries who questioned their policies. On the eve of war, Stalin turned his coat yet again and sold the USSR’s neutrality to Hitler, in exchange for several territories, before finally joining the "Allied" camp in the imperialist massacre of World War II, where the Stalinist state was to sacrifice the lives of more than 20 million of its own citizens. This was the result of all Stalinism’s sordid dealings with the different imperialist sharks of Western Europe. Over heaps of corpses, Stalinism built its empire, and imposed its will on all the states which the treaty of Yalta brought under its exclusive domination.
But although Stalin was a "gift from heaven" for world capitalism in suppressing Bolshevism, one individual alone, however paranoiac, was not the architect of this terrible counter-revolution. The Stalinist state was controlled by the same ruling class as everywhere else: the national bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie was reconstituted as the revolution degenerated from within, not from the old Tsarist ruling class which the revolution had eliminated in 1917, but on the basis of the parasitic bureaucracy of the state apparatus which under Stalin’s leadership was increasingly identified with the Bolshevik Party.
At the end of the 1920s, this Party-state bureaucracy wiped out all those sectors capable of forming a private bourgeoisie, and with which it had been allied (speculators and NEP landowners). In doing so, it took control of the economy. These conditions explain why, contrary to what happened in other countries, state capitalism in Russia took on this totalitarian and caricatural form. State capitalism is capitalism’s universal mode of domination in its period of decadence, when capitalism has to keep its grip on the whole of social life.
It gives rise to parasitic sectors everywhere. But in other capitalist countries, state control over the whole of society is not hostile to the existence of private, competitive sectors, preventing the complete domination of the economy by its parasitic sectors. The particular form of state capitalism in the USSR was characterised by an extreme development of the parasitic sector, which sprang from the state bureaucracy. Their only concern was not to make capital productive by taking account of market laws, but to fill their own pockets, even to the detriment of the national economy. From the viewpoint of the functioning of capitalism, this form of state capitalism was an aberration which could not but collapse as the world economic crisis accelerated. The collapse of the state capitalism which emerged from the Russian counter-revolution has signalled the irredeemable bankruptcy of the whole brutal ideology which, for more than half a century, had held the Stalinist regime together and held sway over millions of human beings.
This is how Stalinism was born; this is why it died. It appeared on the historical stage covered in the filth and blood of the counter-revolution. And covered in filth and blood, it is now leaving it, as we can see yet again in the horrible events in Romania which do no more than announce the imminence of still worse massacres at the heart of Stalinism: in the USSR itself.
Whatever the bourgeoisie and its venal media may say, this monstrous hydra has nothing whatever in common with the October revolution, either in form or content. The proletariat must become fully aware of this radical break, this total antagonism between Stalinism and the October revolution, if it is not to fall victim to another form of bourgeois dictatorship: that of the "democratic" state.
Democracy is only the most pernicious form of capital’s dictatorship
The spectacular collapse of Stalinism does not in the least mean that the proletariat has at last been liberated from the yoke of capital’s dictatorship. The decadent bourgeoisie is today burying in great pomp its most monstrous offspring the better to hide from the exploited masses the real nature of its class domination. To do so, it is constantly pushing the idea that there is a fundamental opposition between the "democratic" and the "totalitarian" forms of the bourgeois state.
This is nothing but lies. So-called "democracy" is nothing but a disguise for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. It is the fig-leaf that the ruling class uses to cover its obscene system of terror and exploitation. This disgusting hypocrisy has always been denounced by revolutionaries, and in particular by Lenin addressing the first congress of the Communist International, when he said that the bourgeoisie always tries to find philosophical or political arguments to justify its own rule:
"Among these arguments, the condemnation of dictatorship and the apology for democracy are particularly emphasised (…) Firstly, this demonstration works with the help of the notions of ‘democracy in general’ and ‘dictatorship in general’, without ever asking which class we are talking about. To put the question like this, outside and above classes, supposedly from the viewpoint of the people as a whole, is an insult to the doctrine of socialism, in other words the theory of the class struggle (…) For in no civilised capitalist country does there exist ‘democracy in general’, but only bourgeois democracy, and it is not a question of ‘dictatorship in general’, but of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, ie the proletariat, over its oppressors and exploiters, ie the bourgeoisie, with the aim of breaking their resistance in their struggle for domination (…). This is why today’s defence of bourgeois democracy under cover of defending ‘democracy in general’, and today’s outcry against the dictatorship of the proletariat under the pretext of denouncing ‘dictatorship in general’ are nothing but a deliberate betrayal of socialism (…), a refusal of the proletariat’s right to its own proletarian revolution, a defence of bourgeois reformism just at the historic moment when bourgeois reformism is collapsing throughout the world, when the war has created a revolutionary situation (…). The history of the 19th and 20th centuries even before the war has already shown us what this much-vaunted ‘pure democracy’ really means under capitalism. Marxists have always affirmed that the more democracy is developed, the ‘purer’ it is, the more acute, bitter, and merciless becomes the class struggle, the more the yoke of capital and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie appear in all their ‘purity’" (Lenin, "Theses on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat", 1st Congress of the Communist International, 4th March 1919).
From its very birth, bourgeois democracy has proved itself the most pernicious form of capital’s merciless dictatorship. Already in the mid-17th century, before the proletariat could stand as the only class able to free humanity from capitalist exploitation, the first bourgeois revolution in England showed what democracy would be capable of. In 1648, faced with the first embryonic expressions of the communist movement, Cromwell’s democratic republic unleashed its bloody repression against the Levellers, who demanded that wealth be equally shared amongst all members of society.
In France, the young bourgeois democracy established in 1789 behaved with the same savagery when in 1797 it laid low Babeuf and the "Equals" for defending the same ideas. And the more the working class stood on its own terrain, the more firmly it resisted capital’s encroachments, the more capital’s democratic dictatorship was laid bare. The whole history of the workers’ movement throughout the 19th century is marked by bloody repression carried out by the most "progressive" ruling class of all time. We need only remember the crushing of the Lyon knife-workers’ insurrection in 1841 by an army of 20,000 men despatched by the "democratic" government of Casimir Perier. Remember the bloody days of June 1848 when the Parisian workers in revolt fell by thousands under the guns of the republic general Cavaignac, while the survivors were deported, imprisoned, or condemned to forced labour.
All freedom of association or of the press was forbidden to the working class in the name of the "defence of the Constitution". Remember how Gallifet’s republican troops defended the interests of the bourgeois class with the ferocious repression unleashed against the Communards of 1871, "that vile scum" as Thiers called them: more than 20,000 proletarians were assassinated during the "week of blood", more than 40,000 arrested, hundreds condemned to forced labour, thousands transported to New Caledonia, not to mention the repression of children torn from their parents to be placed in "houses of correction".
Such have been the despicable deeds of parliamentary democracy, with its "Declarations of Human Rights" and its fine principles of "liberty, equality, fraternity". Since its birth, it has fed on workers’ blood. And it has wallowed in blood and filth throughout the decadence of capitalism. In the name of "freedom", the most "free" and "civilised" of Europe’s great democratic powers entered into World War I, and massacred tens of millions of human beings to satisfy their imperialist appetites. And when the proletariat, with the first revolutionary wave of 1917-23, rose up against capitalist barbarity and tried, in Lenin’s words, to "strip away the artificial flowers with which the bourgeoisie tries to cover itself", the latter unveiled its true face once again. Faced with the spreading threat of the workers’ Soviets’ power, all the most "democratic" states (Britain, France, Germany, the USA) united their strength against the Russian revolution.
They supported the White armies throughout the civil war in Russia: the most "advanced" democratic states despatched arms, warships, and troops to arm to the teeth the counter-revolutionary forces engaged in the USSR, Poland, and Romania, in a merciless struggle against the first bastion of the proletarian revolution. In the name of threatened "democracy", the bourgeoisie the world over denounced the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and screamed "death to Bolshevism".
The same tender-hearted "democrats" who today are calling on us to give for the hungry Romanian population, organised an economic blockade of Soviet Russia in 1920, then struck by a terrible famine. They prevented all working class solidarity, the despatch of the most elementary aid, and coldly left hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, to die of starvation. There are no bounds to the cynicism and infamy of this "democratic" bourgeoisie!
Then in January 1919, the new-born republican democracy in Germany, one of the most "democratic" in Europe, headed by the Social-Democratic government of Noske, Scheidemann, and Ebert massacred the Berlin workers and ordered the summary execution of the revolutionary leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. In the name of the defence of "democratic" liberties, these republicans pit-bulls used the worst terrorist methods to set up the dictatorship of the very "democratic" Weimar Republic, which was to serve as a stepping stone for Nazism.
Today, the whole of bourgeois propaganda is trying to make us swallow the idea that the proletarian revolution is synonymous with bloody barbarism. The truth is that ever since World War I, the worst barbarity has always been committed by parliamentary institutions in the name of democracy. Under the auspices of democratic institutions, Mussolini came to power as head of a parliamentary government in 1922. In Germany, it was the "democratic" Weimar Republic under Hindenburg which declared Hitler Chancellor in 1933 and opened the way to the Nazi terror.
In the name of democracy threatened by Franco’s hordes, the Spanish "Popular Front" sent thousands of workers to their deaths; the anti-fascist mystification used in Spain prepared the way for the second imperialist holocaust, and more than 50 million deaths. And in this bloody orgy of a desperate capitalism, still in the holy name of democracy, the bourgeoisie of the Allied imperialist bloc "liberated" the world from dictatorship by dropping atomic bombs on the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and systematically bombarding the great working-class concentrations of Dresden, Hamburg, and Berlin at the cost of almost 3 million casualties.
And ever since the end of World War II, the "Free World" has not ceased sowing death and destruction over the four corners of the planet. All the colonial expeditions, in Algeria, Africa, or Vietnam, were conducted under the flags of Western democracies, under the emblem of the "rights of man", in other words the right to torture, starve and massacre civilian populations under cover of "freedom" and "peoples’ right to self-determination". Under the aegis of these same "human rights", the "democratic" imperialist bloc is today conducting its crusades in the Middle East, perpetrating massacres in Iran and Iraq, in the Lebanon, the Philippines, and Panama in the name of the struggle against terrorism, religious fanaticism and military dictatorship. Still in the name of the defence of "freedom" and "order", the highly democratic states of Argentina and Venezuela put down the hunger riots at the beginning of 1989.
"Human rights" have always been capitalism’s justification for its worst massacres. "Human rights" are the rights of the ruling class to subject the oppressed masses to its rct the oppressed masses to its rule, to impose its class dictatorship by state terror.
This is why today, as Stalinism declares itself bankrupt, there is nothing for the proletariat to support in the democratic camp, which has nothing to offer but, as Churchill said on another occasion, "blood, sweat, and tears". If the Western bourgeoisie is today settling its accounts with Stalinism, and ringing in the triumph of "democracy" over "totalitarianism", it is only the better to make us forget their own crimes. The Western democracies’ shocked rejection of Stalinist terror today should not make us forget that our "democrats" were Stalin’s worst accomplices in the systematic extermination of the last combatants of October 1917.
It was with the support and benediction of the "democratic" world that the Stalinist counter-revolution imposed itself for decades on millions of human beings. Stalinism and democracy are just two sides of the same coin, as were fascism and anti-fascism before them. Two complementary ideologies which cover one and the same reality: the implacable dictatorship of capital, which the proletariat must necessarily answer with its own class dictatorship. This alone will be able to wash humanity clean of all the blood sphumanity clean of all the blood spilled during capital’s domination.
The world proletarian revolution is indeed the only alternative to the barbarity of capitalism. This is the alternative that the bourgeoisie is doing everything it can to distort and disfigure, using the stinking corpse of Stalinism to drive home the message that these regimes’ bankruptcy means the failure of communism.
Faced with the increasing barbarity of capitalism, there is only one perspective: the renewed class struggle of the world proletariat
The irreversible collapse of the Eastern bloc is not due to the failure of communism. It is the most brutal sign so far of the bankruptcy of the capitalist economy: an economy condemned to collapse piece by piece under the blows of a chronic and insoluble crisis. In this sense, the utter bankruptcy of the Eastern bloc countries only heralds that of the most industrialised Western countries, as the crisis inexorably accelerates. Already, the first signs of recession in Great Britain and the USA announce the generalised recession which will hit the world economy in the months and years to come.
Capitalism will be forced to impose on the Western working class still greater poverty and austerity, with lay-offs by the truck-load, falling wages and ever more infernal work rates. In the Eastern countries, the "liberalisation" of the economy will create, as is already the case in Poland, an explosion of unemployment and hunger, which will simply be a preparation for real famine. The proletariat in these countries will endure suffering worse than anything since World War II. The "democratic" governments with all their "humanitarian" aid and "solidarity" are just trying to pull the wool over our eyes. They are only trying to feed the present democratic campaigns, to give some credit to the idea that only Western capitalism is capable of filling hungry bellies, of bringing freedom and plenty to the exploited masses. They aim to turn the workers away from the only real solidarity which can offer humanity a future: class solidarity, the development world-wide of the combat against capitalist exploitation, against this system of poverty, massacres, and endless barbarism.
Today, as Stalinism collapses and capitalism trumpets its "victory" over "communism", the bourgeoisie has scored a point. It has succeeded in provoking a profound confusion in the ranks of the working class. Momentarily, it has succeeded in halting the proletariat’s march towards the affirmation of its own revolutionary perspective. But the ruling class cannot indefinitely escape History’s verdict.
The crisis will continue to accelerate; in doing so, it will prove itself the proletariat’s best ally. This is what will force the working class to take up the combat, once again, on its own terrain: resistance step by step against all the attacks on its own conditions of existence. The worsening world economic situation will lay bare capitalism’s historic impasse. In doing so, it will force the proletariat to look the truth in the face, and through its economic struggles become aware of the need to put an end to this moribund system and build a true world-wide communist society.
In the struggles that must lead it to final victory, the working class will have no choice but to confront openly all the agents of the "democratic" state, and especially the trades unions and their leftist appendages. The latter’s only function is to disarm the proletariat, to hinder the development of its class consciousness, and to try today to inject it with the reformist illusion in the possibility of improving the system, in order to turn it away from its own revolutionary perspective.
The proletariat cannot escape from this difficult struggle against capitalism and all its defenders. If it is to save itself, and the rest of humanity along with it, it will have to confront and overcome the obstacles that the bourgeoisie sows in its path, to denounce the lies spewed out daily, to become aware of what is really at stake in its combat, and of the immense responsibility it carries on its shoulders.
ICC, 8th January 1990
Links
[1] https://en.internationalism.org/intreview.htm
[2] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/historic-events/collapse-eastern-bloc
[3] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/17/stalinism-eastern-bloc
[4] https://en.internationalism.org/files/en/images/tank_and_crowd.gif
[5] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/304/understanding-capitalisms-decadence
[6] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/15/decadence-capitalism
[7] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/30/economics
[8] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/political-currents-and-reference/international-bureau-revolutionary-party
[9] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/polemic
[10] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/062/the-russian-experience#_ftn1
[11] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/062/the-russian-experience#_ftn2
[12] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/062/the-russian-experience#_ftn3
[13] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/062/the-russian-experience#_ftnref1
[14] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/062/the-russian-experience#_ftnref2
[15] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/062/the-russian-experience#_ftnref3
[16] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/1996/state-capitalism-after-world-war-ii
[17] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/27/dictatorship-proletariat
[18] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/development-proletarian-consciousness-and-organisation/french-communist-left
[19] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/16/state-capitalism
[20] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/2042/party-and-fraction-marxist-tradition
[21] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/28/revolutionary-organisation
[22] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/political-currents-and-reference/battaglia-comunista
[23] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/110/party-and-fraction
[24] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/25/2043/ottorino-perrone-vercesi
[25] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/economic-crisis
[26] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/eastern-countries
[27] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/people/polemic
[28] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/people/collapse-eastern-bloc
[29] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/geographical/germany
[30] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/nationalism
[31] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/eastern-europe
[32] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/russia
[33] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/262/environment
[34] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/general-and-theoretical-questions/war
[35] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/persian-gulf
[36] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/hunger-riots
[37] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/international-situation
[38] https://62.0.5.133/scripts/imgreload.js';document.getElementsByTagName
[39] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/class-struggle
[40] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/political-currents-and-reference/external-fraction-icc-eficc
[41] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/life-icc/orientation-texts
[42] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/32/decomposition
[43] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/militarism
[44] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/gulf-war
[45] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/emancipacion-obrera
[46] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/people/lenin
[47] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/people/karl-marx
[48] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/25/2046/ferdinand-freiligrath
[49] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/1998/history-gcf
[50] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/political-currents-and-reference/communist-left
[51] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/development-proletarian-consciousness-and-organisation/german-and-dutch-left
[52] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/development-proletarian-consciousness-and-organisation/italian-left
[53] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/development-proletarian-consciousness-and-organisation/international-communist-current
[54] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/people/marc-chirik
[55] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/065_prole_and_war.html#_ftn1
[56] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/065_prole_and_war.html#_ftn2
[57] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/065_prole_and_war.html#_ftnref1
[58] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/065_prole_and_war.html#_ftnref2
[59] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/328/war
[60] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/development-proletarian-consciousness-and-organisation/zimmerwald-movement
[61] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/development-proletarian-consciousness-and-organisation/third-international
[62] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/066_natlib_01.html#_ftn1
[63] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/066_natlib_01.html#_ftn2
[64] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/066_natlib_01.html#_ftnref1
[65] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/066_natlib_01.html#_ftnref2
[66] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/331/balance-sheet-70-years-national-liberation-struggles
[67] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/22/national-question
[68] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/5/50/united-states
[69] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/186/imperialism
[70] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/historic-events/world-war-ii
[71] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/359/democracy
[72] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/065/marc-01
[73] https://www.alalettre.com/daudet-oeuvres-chevre-monsieur-seguin
[74] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/life-icc/congress-reports
[75] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/067_appeal_ppm.html#_ftn1
[76] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/067_appeal_ppm.html#_ftnref1
[77] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/135/internationalism
[78] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/life-icc/congress-resolutions
[79] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1461/international-review-no68
[80] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1462/quarter
[81] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/066_natlib_01.html
[82] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/068_natlib_02.html#_ftn1
[83] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/068_natlib_02.html#_ftn2
[84] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/068_natlib_02.html#_ftn3
[85] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/068_natlib_02.html#_ftnref1
[86] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/068_natlib_02.html#_ftnref2
[87] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/068_natlib_02.html#_ftnref3
[88] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/massacres
[89] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/ussr
[90] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/yugoslavia
[91] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/1929/communism-and-19th-century-workers-movement
[92] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1406/socialism
[93] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1407/marxism
[94] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1421/karl-marx
[95] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1427/communism
[96] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1446/social-class
[97] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1447/bourgeoisie
[98] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1448/society
[99] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/34/communism
[100] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn1
[101] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn2
[102] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn3
[103] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn4
[104] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn5
[105] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn6
[106] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn7
[107] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn8
[108] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn9
[109] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn10
[110] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn11
[111] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn12
[112] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn13
[113] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn14
[114] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn15
[115] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn16
[116] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn17
[117] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn18
[118] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn19
[119] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn20
[120] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn21
[121] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn22
[122] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn23
[123] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn24
[124] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn25
[125] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn26
[126] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn27
[127] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftn28
[128] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref1
[129] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref2
[130] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref3
[131] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref4
[132] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref5
[133] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref6
[134] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref7
[135] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref8
[136] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref9
[137] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref10
[138] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref11
[139] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref12
[140] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref13
[141] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref14
[142] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref15
[143] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref16
[144] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref17
[145] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref18
[146] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref19
[147] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref20
[148] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref21
[149] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref22
[150] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref23
[151] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref24
[152] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref25
[153] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref26
[154] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref27
[155] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/069_natlib_03.html#_ftnref28
[156] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1429/marx
[157] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1433/class
[158] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1449/friedrich-engels
[159] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1450/proletariat
[160] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/3/13/marxism-theory-revolution
[161] https://en.internationalism.org/pamphlets/decadence
[162] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/historic-events/america
[163] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/historic-events/capitalism
[164] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/5/1848/mexico
[165] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/chaos
[166] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1451/man
[167] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1452/labour
[168] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1453/alienation
[169] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/33/alienation
[170] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/history-workers-movement/1919-german-revolution
[171] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/4/360/fascism
[172] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1420/capitalism
[173] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1455/means-production
[174] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1464/human
[175] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1465/religion
[176] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1466/communist-society
[177] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1467/epm
[178] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1468/labor
[179] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1469/private-property
[180] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/408/russia-1917
[181] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/history-workers-movement/1917-russian-revolution
[182] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1463/revolution
[183] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1470/engels
[184] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1471/manifesto
[185] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/history-workers-movement/1848-civil-wars-europe
[186] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftn1
[187] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftn2
[188] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftn3
[189] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftn4
[190] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftn5
[191] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftn6
[192] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftnref1
[193] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftnref2
[194] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftnref3
[195] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftnref4
[196] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftnref5
[197] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/072_conflicts.html#_ftnref6
[198] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/historic-events/collapse-balkans
[199] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/people/agis-stinas
[200] https://en.internationalism.org/international-review/199210/2257/russian-revolution-part-1-first-massive-and-conscious-revolution-hi
[201] https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/may/03.htm
[202] https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm
[203] https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/09.htm
[204] https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/tasks/index.htm
[205] https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/russian-revolution/index.htm
[206] https://www.marxists.org/archive/reed/1919/10days/10days/
[207] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1472/working-class
[208] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1473/communist-league
[209] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1474/bourgeois
[210] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/proletariat
[211] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/revolutionary-class
[212] https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1909/national-question/ch02.htm
[213] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/geographical/europe
[214] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/life-icc/life-icc
[215] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/history-workers-movement/1968-may-france
[216] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftn1
[217] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftn2
[218] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftn3
[219] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftn4
[220] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftnref1
[221] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftnref2
[222] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftnref3
[223] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/075_1943.html#_ftnref4
[224] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/geographical/italy
[225] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1424/capital
[226] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1454/sociology
[227] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1456/relations-production
[228] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1457/capitalist-mode-production
[229] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1458/production
[230] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1459/nature
[231] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1460/development
[232] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/72/russ-revn-02
[233] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/012/october1917
[234] https://en.internationalism.org/content/2640/october-1917-beginning-proletarian-revolution-part-2
[235] https://en.internationalism.org/content/1585/pamphlet-period-transition
[236] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/state
[237] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/gatt
[238] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1475/das-kapital
[239] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1476/surplus-value
[240] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1477/exploitation
[241] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn1
[242] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn2
[243] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn3
[244] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn4
[245] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn5
[246] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn6
[247] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn7
[248] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn8
[249] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftn9
[250] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref1
[251] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref2
[252] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref3
[253] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref4
[254] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref5
[255] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref6
[256] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref7
[257] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref8
[258] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/076_ibrp.html#_ftnref9
[259] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/317/1990s-and-perspectives-regroupment
[260] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1434/vladimir-lenin
[261] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1478/paris
[262] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1479/france
[263] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1480/commune
[264] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1481/state
[265] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/31/1482/war
[266] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/history-workers-movement/1871-paris-commune
[267] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/bourgeois-maneuvers
[268] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn1
[269] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn2
[270] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn3
[271] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn4
[272] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn5
[273] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn6
[274] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftn7
[275] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref1
[276] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref2
[277] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref3
[278] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref4
[279] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref5
[280] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref6
[281] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/077_rejection01.html#_ftnref7
[282] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/28/337/rejecting-notion-decadence
[283] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/bourgeois-class
[284] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/unemployment
[285] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn1
[286] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn2
[287] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn3
[288] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn4
[289] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn5
[290] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn6
[291] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn7
[292] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftn8
[293] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftnref1
[294] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftnref2
[295] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftnref3
[296] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftnref4
[297] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftnref5
[298] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/078_1944_01.html#_ftnref6
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[868] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/97/leninists2#_ftnref47
[869] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/97/leninists2#_ftnref48
[870] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/97/leninists2#_ftnref49
[871] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/97/leninists2#_ftnref50
[872] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/97/leninists2#_ftnref51
[873] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/97/leninists2#_ftnref52
[874] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/98_appeal.htm#_ftn1
[875] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/98_appeal.htm#_ftn2
[876] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/98_appeal.htm#_ftnref1
[877] https://en.internationalism.org/ir/98_appeal.htm#_ftnref2
[878] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/5/61/india
[879] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/5/144/pakistan
[880] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/recent-and-ongoing/left-parties
[881] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/historic-events/brest-litovsk
[882] https://en.internationalism.org/tag/geographical/australasia